NG-09-0119, Request for Exemption from Certain Requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J and Associated Changes to Technical Specifications for Main Steamline Isolation Valve Local Leakage Rate Testing (TSCR-096) Affected Technical Specification...

Request for Exemption from Certain Requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J and Associated Changes to Technical Specifications for Main Steamline Isolation Valve Local Leakage Rate Testing (TSCR-096) Affected Technical Specification...

ML090680040
Person / Time
Site:	Duane Arnold
Issue date:	03/04/2009
From:	Richard Anderson Duane Arnold
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NG-09-0119
Download: ML090680040 (30)

Text

FPL Energy Duane Arnold, LLC 3277 DAEC Road Palo, Iowa 52324 FPL Energy.

Duane Arnold Energy Center March 4, 2009 NG-09-0119 10 CFR 50.12 10 CFR 50.90 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Duane Arnold Energy Center Docket No. 50-331 License No. DPR-49 Request for Exemption from Certain Requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J and Associated Changes to Technical Specifications for Main Steamline Isolation Valve Local Leakage Rate Testing (TSCR-096)

Affected Technical Specification Sections: 3.6.1.3 and 5.5.12 Pursuant to the provisions of Section 50.12 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), FPL Energy Duane Arnold, LLC (hereafter FPL Energy Duane Arnold) hereby requests exemption from certain portions of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, Option B. Specifically, to exempt the measured leakage rate for the Main Steamline Isolation Valves (MSIVs), and associated inboard drain line, from inclusion in both the overall measured leakage rate for Type A integrated tests and from the sum of the local leakage rates for Type B and Type C tests as required by Appendix J, Option B, Paragraphs III.A and Ill.B, respectively. Enclosure 1 of this letter contains the supporting information for this exemption request.

FPL Energy Duane Arnold also requests approval, pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.90, of associated changes to the Duane Arnold Energy Center (DAEC)

Technical Specifications (TS) Section 5.5.12 (Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program) that reflect the exemptions to Appendix J requested above.

An additional TS change is included in this request that is also associated with MSIV leakage testing requirements, but does not require a corresponding exemption from 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J. A proposed change to TS Section 3.6.1.3 (Primary Containment Isolation Valves) is included to remove the repair criterion for MSIVs Ao 1l

NG-09-0119 March 4, 2009 Page 2 of 3 that fail their as-found leakage rate acceptance criterion found in current Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.6.1.3.9.

Enclosure 2 to this letter contains the supporting information for the requested TS changes. Enclosures 3 and 4 to this letter contain the associated "pen & ink" mark-ups of the affected TS pages and a set of clean, typed revised TS pages, respectively. Enclosure 5 contains a mark-up of the affected TS Bases page for information only. The final changes to the TS Bases will be made under TS Section 5.5.10 (Technical Specifications (TS) Bases Control Program) requirements upon implementation of the approved license amendment.

FPL Energy Duane Arnold has evaluated the proposed changes against the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c) as part of Enclosure 2 and concluded that the requested changes do not involve a significant hazards consideration. A copy of this application, including this evaluation is being forwarded to the appointed official for the State of Iowa, pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.91 (b)(1).

FPL Energy Duane Arnold has determined that this application meets the standards set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9) for a categorical exclusion from the requirements for an Environmental Impact Statement.

The proposed TS changes have been reviewed and approved by the DAEC Onsite Review Group (ORG), as required by the Quality Assurance Topical Report (QATR) for the DAEC.

FPL Energy Duane Arnold requests approval of the enclosed exemption request and associated license amendment request within one year of this application. Upon approval, these changes will be implemented within 30 days.

This letter contains no new commitments nor does it revise any existing commitments.

Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Mr. Tony Browning at (319) 851-7750.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on March 4, 2009.

Richard L. Anderson Vice President, Duane Arnold Energy Center FPL Energy Duane Arnold, LLC

NG-09-0119 March 4, 2009 Page 3 of 3 Enclosures (5) cc: Regional Administrator, USNRC, Region III Resident Inspector, USNRC, Duane Arnold Energy Center Project Manager, USNRC, Duane Arnold Energy Center State of Iowa (D. McGee)

Enclosure 1 to NG-09-0119 REQUEST FOR EXEMPTION FROM CERTAIN REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR PART 50, APPENDIX J

1.0 INTRODUCTION

2.0 APPLICABLE RULE 3.0 REQUESTED EXEMPTION 4.0 JUSTIFICATION

5.0 REGULATORY ANALYSIS

5.1 Authorized by Law 5.2 No Undue Risk to Public Health and Safety 5.3 Consistent with Common Defense and Security 5.4 Special Circumstances 6.0 ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT

7.0 REFERENCES

Page 1 of 6

Enclosure 1 to NG-09-0119

1.0 INTRODUCTION

10 CFR 50.54(o) requires that primary containments be subject to the requirements of Appendix J to 10 CFR Part 50. Appendix J specifies the leakage rate test requirements, schedules and acceptance criteria for test of the leak-tight integrity of primary reactor containment and systems and components that penetrate the containment. In Option B of Appendix J, Paragraph III.A requires that the overall integrated leakage rate (Type A test) must not exceed the allowable leakage (La) with margin, as specified in the Technical Specifications (TS), and Paragraph 1II.B requires the sum of the leakage of Type B and Type C leakage rate tests to be less than the performance criterion (La) with margin as specified in the TS. These tests include the contribution from the five main steam line penetrations in the primary containment, referred to as Main Steam pathway leakage. Main Steam pathway leakage consists of the combined leakage of the four main steam lines where each line contains two Main Steamline Isolation Valves (MSIVs) in series, and associated inboard MSIV drain line, which has two isolation valves in series. The MSIVs and drain line isolation valves are tested in accordance with Duane Arnold Energy Center (DAEC) TS Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.6.1.3.9 and Section 5.5.12 (Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program). It should be noted that FPL Energy Duane Arnold conservatively includes the leakage contribution from the two drain line valves as part of the "combined maximum pathway leakage rate for all four main steam lines" specified in SR 3.6.1.3.9.

Concurrent with the request for license amendment (Enclosure 2 of this letter), FPL Energy Duane Arnold, LLC (hereafter FPL Energy Duane Arnold) is seeking an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, Option B, Paragraphs III.A and III.B to permit exclusion of the Main Steam pathway leakage contribution from the overall integrated leakage rate Type A test measurement and from the sum of the leakage rates from Type B and Type C tests.

This request for exemption is similar to exemptions granted for the Cooper Nuclear Station on October 30, 2006 (ADAM Accession No.: ML062540172) and the Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 and 2, on March 9, 2005 (ADAM Accession No.: ML050420381) 2.0 APPLICABLE RULE The pertinent applicable rule is 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, Option B, Paragraphs III.A and Ill.B, which state in part:

A. Type A Test Type A tests to measure the containment system overall integrated leakage rate must be conducted under conditions representing design basis loss-of-coolant accident Page 2 of 6

Enclosure 1 to NG-09-0119 containment peak pressure. The leakage rate must not exceed the allowable leakage rate (La) with margin, as specified in the Technical Specifications.

Paragraph II of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B defines the overall integrated leakage rate as: "... the total leakage rate through all tested leakage paths, including containment welds, valves, fittings, and components that penetrate the containment system."

And similarly, B. Type B and C Tests Type B pneumatic tests to detect and measure local leakage rates across pressure retaining, leakage-limiting boundaries, and Type C pneumatic tests to measure containment isolation valve leakage rates, ... The tests must demonstrate that the sum of the leakage rates at accident pressure of Type B tests, and pathway leakage rates from Type C tests, is less than the performance criterion (La) with margin, as specified in the Technical Specification.

The underlying purpose of the above testing requirements is to assess the condition of the overall containment system " ... as a barrier to fission product releases to reduce the risk from reactor accidents." And from the description of the Type A test above, the reactoraccident of particular concern is the "design basis loss-of-coolant accident."

3.0 REQUESTED EXEMPTION FPL Energy Duane Arnold requests permanent exemption from:

1) the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B, Paragraph Ill.A, to allow exclusion of the Main Steam pathway leakage from the overall integrated leakage rate measured when performing Type A tests, and

2) the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B, Paragraph Ill.B, to allow exclusion of the Main Steam pathway leakage from the combined leakage rate of all penetrations and valves subject to Type B and C tests.

4.0 JUSTIFICATION FPL Energy Duane Arnold has been authorized to use Option B of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J in License Amendment No. 219 to the DAEC Operating License (Reference 1).

While DAEC TS SR 3.6.1.3.9 specifies the leakage testing requirements and acceptance criteria unique to MSIVs and Main Steam pathway, TS Section 5.5.12 governs the overall conduct of containment leakage testing required by 10 CFR Part Page 3 of 6

Enclosure 1 to NG-09-0119 50, Appendix J, Option B. As required by TS 5.5.12, Main Steam pathway leakage is currently included in the leakage totals for both Type A tests, and Type B and C tests.

In References 2 and 3, the NRC approved the use of the Alternative Source Term (AST) (10 CFR 50.67) in the calculations of the radiological dose consequences of design basis accidents (DBAs) for the DAEC. As noted above, the reactor accident of concern is the design basis loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA). The Staff Safety Evaluation accompanying Reference 2 acknowledged that Main Steam pathway leakage is treated separately from the remainder of the assumed leakage from primary containment in the LOCA analysis.

Once dispersed in the primary containment, the release to the environment is assumed to occur through three pathways:

• Leakage of primary containment atmosphere (i.e., design leakage).

"Leakage of primary containment atmosphere via design leakage through main steam isolation valves (MSIVs).

"Leakage from emergency core cooling systems (ECCS) that recirculate suppression pool water outside of the primary containment (i.e., design leakage).

Note: Reference 3 was specifically for the Fuel Handling Accident (FHA), which occurs during refueling when primary containment is not required. Thus, Main Steam pathway leakage is not part of the release pathway for this reactor accident.

Approval of this exemption request will not change the assumptions used in the previously approved dose calculations, nor will it change the TS acceptance criteria for either individual MSIV leakage (< 100 scfh per valve), total maximum Main Steam pathway (5 200 scfh), Type A total leakage (< 0.75 La) or Type B and C leakage totals (5 0.60 La). The definition of La is also not being changed (2 weight percent/day). However, by currently including the Main Steam pathway leakage in with the rest of the primary containment leakage actual test results, it is essentially being accounted for twice in the dose analysis. This is unnecessarily conservative.

Based on the above information, the NRC has already reviewed and accepted that Main Steam pathway leakage for DBA dose analyses has been accounted for separately from the leakage associated with the rest of the primary containment boundary. As such, the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B, Paragraphs III.A and Ill.B, that Main Steam pathway leakage be included as part of the Type A, and the Type B and C test results, is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule; that is, ensuring the actual radiological consequences of reactor accidents remain below those analyzed as demonstrated through the measured containment leakage tests.

Page 4 of 6

Enclosure 1 to NG-09-0119

5.0 REGULATORY ANALYSIS

5.1 Authorized by Law The Commission has previously ruled on several occasions, as noted earlier for both Cooper and Brunswick, that the requested exemption is authorized by law.

5.2 No Undue Risk to Public Health and Safety The proposed exemption presents no undue risk to public health and safety. Main Steam pathway leakage has been accounted in the DAEC radiological dose analysis for DBAs separately from the overall leakage associated with the primary containment boundary (Type A) and local leakage rate total (Type B and C). As such, the inclusion of Main Steam pathway leakage as part of Type A and as part of Type B and C test results is not necessary to ensure the actual radiological consequences of DBAs remain below those previously evaluated and accepted. Nor does it result in any change to the previously evaluated consequences of DBAs. As such, the proposed exemption presents no undue risk to public health and safety.

5.3 Consistent with Common Defense and Security This proposed exemption is consistent with the common defense and security of the United States. The Commission's Statement of Considerations in support of the exemption rule noted with approval in Long Island Lighting Company (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-84-45, 20 NRC 1343, 1400 (October 29, 1984) that the term "common defense and security" refers principally to the safeguarding of special nuclear material, the absence of foreign control over the applicant, the protection of Restricted Data, and the availability of special nuclear material for defense needs. Granting this exemption does not affect any of these matters and, thus, is consistent with common defense and security.

5.4 Special Circumstances Special circumstances are present which warrant this exemption. The applicable criterion from 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2) is identified as:

(ii) Application of the regulation in the particular circumstances would not serve the underlying purpose of the rule or is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule.

The underlying purpose of the rule is to ensure the actual radiological consequences of DBAs remain below those previously evaluated and accepted as demonstrated by the actual, periodic measurement of containment leakage (Type A) and local leakage rate measurement (Type B and C). Although Type A, and Type B and C, leakage tests are defined as a measurement of those leakages, inclusion of the Main Steam pathway leakage results in double counting, once as a part of the actual Page 5 of 6

Enclosure 1 to NG-09-0119 containment leakage and again as part of Main Steam pathway leakage used in dose calculations. This exemption resolves the special circumstance in which requiring inclusion of Main Steam pathway leakage in the Type A, and Type B and C, leakage is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule.

6.0 ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT The proposed exemption will not cause additional construction or operational activities which may significantly affect the environment. The proposed exemption does not result in an increase in any adverse environmental impact previously evaluated, does not result in a change in effluents or power levels, and does not affect any matter not previously reviewed by the NRC which may have a significant adverse environmental impact.

The proposed exemption does not alter the land use for the plant; any water uses or impacts on water quality; or, air or ambient air quality. The proposed exemption does not affect the ecology of the site or vicinity and does not affect the noise emitted by the station. Therefore, the proposed exemption does not affect the analysis of environmental impacts described in the environmental report.

7.0 REFERENCES

1) Amendment No. 219 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-49, Duane Arnold Energy Center (TAC No. M94455), dated October 4, 1996. (ML021920104)

2) Duane Arnold Energy Center - Issuance of Amendment regarding Alternative Source Term (TAC No. MB0347), dated July 31, 2001. (ML011660142)

3) Duane Arnold Energy Center - Issuance of Amendment regarding Secondary Containment OPERABILITY During Movement of Irradiated Fuel and Core Alterations (TAC No. MB1569), dated April 16, 2001. (ML011070147)

Page 6 of 6

Enclosure 2 to NG-09-0119 EVALUATION OF PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE

Subject:

TSCR-096 - Changes to Main Steamline Isolation Valve Local Leakage Rate Testing Requirements

3.0 BACKGROUND

3.1 System Description 3.2 Licensing Basis

5.0 REGULATORY ANALYSIS

5.1 No Significant Hazards Consideration 5.2 Applicable Regulatory Requirements/Criteria 5.3 Precedents

7.0 REFERENCES

Page 1 of 11

Enclosure 2 to NG-09-0119

1.0 DESCRIPTION

This letter is a request to amend Operating License DPR-49 for the Duane Arnold Energy Center (DAEC). The proposed Amendment will add the two exemptions being requested in Enclosure 1 to this letter to the description of the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program in Technical Specification (TS) Section 5.5.12. In addition, a proposed change to Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.6.1.3.9 will remove the current as-left repair criterion that is invoked whenever a Main Steamline Isolation Valve (MSIV) fails its individual local leakage rate test as-found acceptance criterion. Specifically, SR 3.6.1.3.9 states any MSIV that fails the as-found leakage rate criterion of _<100 scfh (standard cubic feet per hour) must be repaired to an as-left leakage rate criterion of _<11.5 scfh.

As detailed in Enclosure 1, including the Main Steam pathway leakage rates as part of the overall total for Type A integrated leak rate tests and in the local leakage rate total from Type B and C tests, constitutes "double counting" of this leakage contribution in the analyses of radiological release consequences of design basis accidents (DBAs). Such "double counting" is not required by the Staff's guidelines for such analyses (i.e., Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.183) and is excessively conservative.

Neither the pertinent regulations, 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, Option B, nor the associated guidance documents (RG 1.163) specify an as-left repair criterion for MSIVs that fail their individual as-found leakage limit and thus, no exemption pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12 is required for this proposed change. Seeing as the associated analyses of radiological release consequences from DBAs do not use this as-left criterion as an input to those calculations, specifying a repair criterion within the TS is overly conservative, is not required by 10 CFR 50.36(d)(3), and is not consistent with the applicable Improved Standard Technical Specifications (ISTS), NUREG-1433.

FPL Energy Duane Arnold, LLC (hereafter, FPL Energy Duane Arnold) believes that these current TS requirements have the potential to cause unnecessary maintenance on the MSIVs (or drain line valves) to remain within the licensing basis criteria for Type A tests (___0.75 La), and for Type B and C tests (_<0.6 La), or for individual MSIVs (_<11.5 scfh). Such maintenance would cause a diversion of resources (cost of parts and man-power), a negative schedule impact on refueling outages, and result in additional man-REM of personnel exposure, and is not required to assure public health and safety.

2.0 PROPOSED CHANGE

The holders of license DPR-49 for the Duane Arnold Energy Center propose to amend the TS by deleting the referenced pages and replacing them with the enclosed new pages.

Page 2 of 11

Enclosure 2 to NG-09-0119

SUMMARY

OF CHANGES:

TS Pages BASES Pages 3.6-15 B 3.6 - 29 5.0- 17 5.0- 18 The proposed Amendment revises SR 3.6.1.3.9 to remove the as-left repair criterion for MSIVs that fail their individual as-found leakage limit of _<100 scfh (see for the "pen & ink" mark-up of the existing page and Enclosure 4 for the corresponding clean, typed page).

Technical Specification Bases are also modified to reflect the above change (see ). The Bases change is included for information only. Bases changes will be completed per the TS Bases Control Program (TS 5.5.10).

The proposed Amendment also revises TS Section 5.5.12 for the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program description to include the two 10 CFR 50.12 exemptions to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J being requested in Enclosure 1 of this submittal to exclude the Main Steam pathway leakage contribution to both the overall containment leakage for Type A tests and the total leakage of individual components tested as part of Type B and C tests. These changes are included with the other previously-approved exception to the guidelines contained in NEI 94-01, Rev. 0, "Industry Guideline for Implementing Performance-Based Option of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J."

To better accommodate the addition of these new exceptions, TS Section 5.5.12 is being re-formatted into sub-sections and sub-parts thereto. This new format is consistent with the current version of the ISTS (NUREG-1433, Rev. 3.1). These formatting changes to Section 5.5.12 are considered to be editorial in nature and no further justification is being provided.

3.0 BACKGROUND

3.1 System Description

The four Main Steam Lines (MSL) penetrate the Primary Containment boundary and connect the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) directly to the Main Turbine-Generator located in the Turbine Building. Each MSL has two 20-inch diameter MSIVs installed in series for a total of eight valves. Each MSL has one MSIV located within the Primary Containment (inboard) and the second valve is located outside Primary Containment within the Steam Tunnel (outboard), which is part of Secondary Containment. Each of the four inboard MSIVs has a drain line that is connected to a common pipe that penetrates Primary Containment and drains to the Main Page 3 of 11

Enclosure 2 to NG-09-0119 Condenser. This drain line also has its own set of inboard and outboard containment isolation valves.

The MSIVs have two primary safety functions. One is to serve as a Nuclear Steam Supply System Shutoff (NSSSS) valve whose safety function is to isolate the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary (RCPB) in response to a MSL Break (MSLB) accident outside Secondary Containment and thus, prevent fuel damage by limiting the loss of reactor coolant prior to the reactor core from being uncovered. The second is to function as a Primary Containment Isolation Valve (PCIV), whose safety function is to limit the release of radioactive materials in case of a major RCPB leak inside the primary containment by closing the Primary Containment barrier.

The MSIVs (and drain line isolation valves) automatically close to accomplish both safety functions by instrument logics receiving signals from a variety of individual process variables, such as MSL high flow or low RPV water level. To preclude inadvertent MSIV isolations, these logics are typically arranged into a "one-out-of-two-twice" logic arrangement. The isolation logic for the drain line isolation valves is a "two-out-of-two once" logic to each valve.

Also to accomplish the two safety functions, the MSIVs have a TS specified closure time requirement and acceptable leakage criteria, both individually and collectively.

The drain line isolation valves are controlled by the In-Service Testing Program for closure time.

All of these key features are controlled within the TS in Sections 3.3.6.1 (Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation) and Section 3.6.1.3 (Primary Containment Isolation Valves) and have corresponding SRs (e.g., SR 3.6.1.3.3 (drain line isolation time), SR 3.6.1.3.5 (MSIV isolation time), SR 3.6.1.3.6 (auto actuation), and SR 3.6.1.3.9 (MSIV and Main Steam pathway leakage measurement)).

3.2 Licensing Basis The current DAEC TS surveillance acceptance criteria for MSIV and Main Steam pathway leakage, including the repair criterion for as-left leakage, were introduced by License Amendment #207 (Reference 1). (Note: These requirements were maintained during the conversion of the DAEC old "custom" TS to the Improved Standard TS in License Amendment #223 (Reference 2)).

Amendment #207 implemented the Boiling Water Reactor Owners' Group (BWROG) topical report NEDC-31858P, Revision 2, "BWROG Report for Increasing MSIV Leakage Rate Limits and Elimination of Leakage Control Systems," which was approved by NRC in Reference 3. This topical report included various options for licensee submittals, one of which included the technical justification for a §50.12 exemption request to exclude the Main Steam pathway leakage contribution to the Type A test and Type B and C overall test results. Although the DAEC performed the radiological dose calculations for this license amendment request using the Page 4 of 11

Enclosure 2 to NG-09-0119 guidelines of the BWROG topical, specifically, to model the Main Steam pathway leakage pathway independently from the remainder of the Primary Containment leakage term (La), the DAEC chose not to pursue the Appendix J exemption option, but only the change to the TS for MSIV and Main Steam pathway leakage test acceptance criteria.

Although the restoration (repair) criterion for as-left leakage rate was not part of the BWROG topical report, it was deemed prudent at that time (circa 1994) to include it as part of this TS change to increase allowable individual MSIV leakage, given the previous history of high as-found MSIV leakage rates within the BWR Fleet (Reference NUREG-1 169). The 11.5 scfh leakage repair criterion was the original as-found leakage limit for MSIVs prior to Amendment #207. As MSIV leakage performance improved in the subsequent years, plants were able to adopt this topical report without including this repair criterion in their TS, as the Staff did not mandate this as a condition for using the BWROG topical in their Safety Evaluation (Reference 3), and it is not included in the ISTS (NUREG-1433).

DAEC adopted performance-based (Option B) Appendix J leakage rate testing in License Amendment #219 (Reference 4). The MSIV and Main Steam pathway leakage as-found testing and MSIV repair (as-left) criteria approved in Amendment

1. 207 above were not changed by Amendment #219.

With License Amendments 237 and 240 (References 5 and 6, respectively), the DAEC converted its licensing basis for radiological dose consequences to utilize the Alternative Source Term (AST) under 10 CFR 50.67. In the AST analyses, the previously-approved dose model for MSIV leakage in the BWROG topical above was used, only the source term (magnitude and duration) was revised, in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.183, Appendix A, Section 6. The previously approved allowances granted by Amendment #207 to use the alternate leakage treatment system and take credit for condenser hold-up of fission products were not changed and are still part of the DAEC current licensing basis.

4.0 TECHNICAL ANALYSIS

As explained in Enclosure 1 of this submittal, including the contribution from Main Steam pathway leakage in the overall tabulation of La is not required to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule (i.e., §50.54(o) and App. J), given that the offsite dose contribution from Main Steam pathway leakage is accounted for separately in the accident dose analysis from the rest of the leakage from primary containment (i.e.,

Type A, and Type B and C leakage). This was previously approved by the Staff in Amendments 237 and 240, FPL Energy Duane Arnold's adoption of the Alternative Source Term (§50.67) for the DAEC. No other technical change in the TS for Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program (TS 5.5.12) is being requested.

Page 5 of 11

Enclosure 2 to NG-09-0119 The current as-left leakage limit (repair criterion) for MSIVs was added to the DAEC TS as a prudent measure as the DAEC was one of the first plants to adopt the BWROG report (NEDC-31858P, Revision 2) for increasing MSIV leakage limits and eliminating the MSIV Leakage Control system back in 1994-95, when industry operating experience with MSIV leakage was not particularly good (ref. NUREG-1169). Since that time, performance has improved significantly and later plants have been approved to increase their allowable MSIV (or Main Steam pathway) leakage using the BWROG report, but without specifying a repair criterion within the TS. This operating experience is also true for the DAEC. DAEC Appendix J Program records indicate that no MSIV has failed an as-found leakage test in the last 10 years, including the most-recent testing in 2009.

In addition, when this provision was added to the DAEC TS in Amendment # 207, the Maintenance Rule (§50.65) had not yet been implemented. Today, failure of a MSIV to pass an as-found leakage test would constitute a "Maintenance Rule Functional Failure (MRFF)" in the DAEC Maintenance Rule Program and would be entered into the Corrective Action Program for resolution. Thus, it is no longer necessary to have such a prescriptive repair criterion in the TS to achieve the underlying purpose of proper maintenance and overall reliable performance of the MSIVs. Therefore, removing the repair criterion from TS Surveillance Requirement 3.6.1.3.9 and relying upon the Maintenance Rule Program is justified.

Specifying such maintenance criteria within TS is not consistent with the Improved Standard TS (ISTS), NUREG-1433, and the ISTS does not contain this requirement for MSIVs in Section 3.6.1.3. Thus, the proposed change is consistent with the ISTS.

5.0 REGULATORY ANALYSIS

5.1 No Significant Hazards Consideration FPL Energy Duane Arnold, LLC has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, "Issuance of amendment," as discussed below:

1. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

This proposed change to TS 5.5.12 does not modify existing structures, systems or components (SSCs) of the plant, and it does not introduce new SSCs. It does not change assumptions, methodology, likelihood, or results of previously evaluated accidents in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. It does not change operating procedures or administrative controls that affect the functions of SSCs. By excluding Main Steam pathway leakage from Type A, and Type B and C test results, this Page 6 of 11

Enclosure 2 to NG-09-0119 change will make the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program more closely aligned with the assumptions used in associated accident dose consequence analyses.

The proposed change to eliminate the repair criterion (i.e., as-left leakage limit) for MSIVs that fail their as-found leak test, does not change how the MSIVs function in response to any event, nor the likelihood of occurrence of any accident previously identified in the UFSAR. Repairing the MSIVs to an as-left leakage value, which can be higher than the currently specified value in TS, that reliably assures the next as-found leakage test will be within limits is sufficient to ensure that the calculated dose consequences of any event involving MSIV leakage as an effluent pathway remain within analyzed limits.

Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

No new or different accidents result from utilizing the proposed changes. The changes do not involve a physical alteration of the plant (i.e., no new or different type of equipment will be installed) or a change in the methods governing normal plant operation. The changes do not alter assumptions made in the safety analysis for MSIV performance.

Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

3. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No.

Since Main Steam pathway leakage bypasses the containment and its filtration system (Standby Gas Treatment System) during a Loss-of-Coolant Accident (LOCA), the effects on release to the environment is analyzed and specifically accounted for in the DAEC dose analysis methodology approved by Amendments 237 and 241. This proposed change to exclude Main Steam pathway leakage from Type A, and Type B and C test results does not change dose analysis values, and thus, does not affect actual margin in the dose analysis.

Similarly, removing the as-left repair criterion for MSIVs from the TS has no impact on the assumptions for MSIV leakage used in the accident analysis, which are based upon the as-found MSIV leakage limit, not the as-left leakage. As long as the Page 7 of 11

Enclosure 2 to NG-09-0119 as-left leakage value gives high confidence that the as-found leakage will remain within limits over the next operating cycle until the next as-found leak test is conducted, the assumptions of the dose consequence analyses are not adversely impacted and the previously calculated results remain bounding.

Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

CONCLUSION Based on the preceding 10 CFR 50.92 evaluation, FPL Energy Duane Arnold concludes that the proposed amendment presents no significant hazards consideration under the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), and, accordingly, a finding of "no significant hazards consideration" is justified.

5.2 Applicable Regulatory Requirements/Criteria The DAEC Construction Permit was issued in 1970, prior to the issuance of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria (GDC) in 1971, and thus, the DAEC was not specifically licensed to the GDC (Ref. SECY-92-223). The following describes the DAEC UFSAR commitment to the GDCs pertinent to this application and the impact of the requested change on those commitments.

UFSAR 3.1.2.5.3: Criterion 52 - Capability for Containment Leakage Rate Testing The reactorcontainment and other equipment which may be subjected to containment test conditions shall be designed so that periodic integratedleakage rate testing can be conducted at containment design pressure.

The proposed amendment does not alter the design of the containment. As a result, the ability to conduct leakage rate testing at design pressure would not be adversely impacted. Thus, the FPL Energy Duane Arnold commitment to this criterion will continue to be met with the proposed changes to exclude Main Steam pathway leakage from La and elimination of the as-left leakage limit (repair criterion) for MSIVs.

UFSAR Section 3.1.2.5.5: Criterion 54 - Piping Systems Penetrating Containment Piping systems penetratingprimary reactorcontainment shall be provided with leak detection, isolation, and containment capabilitieshaving redundancy, reliability,and performance capabilitieswhich reflect the importance to safety of isolating these piping systems. Such piping systems shall be designed with a capability to test periodicallythe operabilityof the isolation valves and associatedapparatusand to determine if valve leakage is within acceptable limits.

Page 8 of 11

Enclosure 2 to NG-09-0119 The proposed amendment does not alter the design of the containment nor any piping penetrations. As a result, the ability to perform periodic testing of the containment and isolation valves (MSIVs and drain line isolation valves in this case) would not be adversely impacted. Thus, the FPL Energy Duane Arnold commitment to this criterion will continue to be met with the proposed changes to exclude Main Steam pathway leakage from La and elimination of the as-left leakage limit (repair criterion) for MSIVs.

10 CFR 50.54(o) requires that primary containments be subject to the requirements of Appendix J to 10 CFR Part 50. Appendix J specifies the leakage rate test requirements, schedules and acceptance criteria for test of the leak-tight integrity of primary reactor containment and systems and components that penetrate the containment. Option B, Paragraph III.A requires that the overall integrated leakage rate must not exceed the allowable leakage (La) with margin, as specified in the Technical Specifications (TS). 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B, Paragraph 111.B requires the sum of the leakage of Type B and C leakage rate tests be less than the performance criterion (La) with margin as specified in the TS.

License Amendment 219 authorized FPL Energy Duane Arnold to adopt 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B provisions for Type A, Type B and C tests and provides the current basis for DAEC TS 5.5.12. FPL Energy Duane Arnold has implemented this amendment and thus complies with the rule. The accompanying 10 CFR 50.12 exemption request (Enclosure 1) to this proposed TS change will ensure that the Appendix J testing program at the DAEC complies with the underlying intent of the regulation, while specifically allowing the leakage contribution from the Main Steam pathway to be excluded from the tabulation of La. No exemption to Appendix J is needed to remove the as-left leakage limit (repair criterion) from the TS, as Appendix J, Option B does not contain such detailed repair requirements, i.e., does not specify a numerical as-left value.

10 CFR 50.65 (Maintenance Rule) establishes requirements governing the performance of systems, structures, and components (SSCs) that meet certain functional criteria within the licensing basis. MSIVs meet-these functional criteria under the design and licensing basis of the DAEC. Accordingly, performance goals have been established for the MSIVs within the DAEC Maintenance Rule program, which include as-found leakage limits commensurate with the TS values. Thus, a failure to meet such as-found leakage limits during testing would constitute a Maintenance Rule Functional Failure (MRFF), which would require appropriate corrective actions to be taken to once again meet those performance goals. Thus, it is not necessary to specify a prescriptive repair criterion within the TS to ensure that proper maintenance is performed if an MSIV fails its as-found leakage performance criteria.

In addition, it is not necessary to include Main Steam pathway leakage in the tabulation of total as-found leakage for either Type A, or Type B and C tests to meet the performance goals for primary containment (0.75 La and 0.6 La, respectively), as Page 9 of 11

Enclosure 2 to NG-09-0119 the offsite dose consequences evaluated under §50.67 account for Main Steam pathway leakage separately from the remaining effluent pathways, whose leakage contribution is included in the tabulation of La.

5.3 Precedents Main Steam Pathway Leakage exclusion from La The following are considered precedents of plants that were recently granted TS changes similar to FPL Energy Duane Arnold's request to exclude MSIV leakage contribution from the Appendix J as-found test acceptance criterion.

o Cooper Nuclear Station (ML062540089)

The enclosed application is similar to one approved for the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station (ML041280599) with the exception that FPL Energy Duane Arnold is not seeking to increase the current leakage limit on individual MSIVs or combined leakage from all the MSIVs for the DAEC.

MSIV Leakage Increases without Repair Criterion Although FPL Energy Duane Arnold is not requesting an increase in MSIV Leakage limits from those currently approved, the following are considered precedents of plants that were recently granted increases similar to that previously approved for the DAEC in Amendment #207, using the same basic technical justifications (e.g.,

BWROG LTR NEDC-31858P and Alternative Source Term conversions), but without a specific repair criterion for as-left leakage within their TS:

o Browns Ferry Unit 1 (ML062210458) o Brunswick Units 1 & 2 (ML060540205)

6.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

10 CFR Section 51.22(c)(9) identifies certain licensing and regulatory actions which are eligible for categorical exclusion from the requirement to perform an environmental assessment. A proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility requires no environmental assessment if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not: (1) involve a significant hazards consideration; (2) result in a significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite; and (3) result in a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.

FPL Energy Duane Arnold has reviewed this request and determined that the proposed amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR Section 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR Section 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment needs to be prepared Page 10 of 11

Enclosure 2 to NG-09-0119 in connection with the issuance of the amendment. The basis for this determination follows.

Basis The change meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR Section 51.22(c)(9) for the following reasons:

1. As demonstrated in the 10 CFR 50.92 evaluation included in Section 5.1, the proposed amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

2. The proposed changes do not result in an increase in power level, do not increase the production, nor alter the flow path or method of disposal of radioactive waste or byproducts. There is no significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite.

3. The proposed changes do not result in changes in the level of control or methodology used for processing of radioactive effluents or handling of solid radioactive waste nor will the proposal result in any change in the normal radiation levels within the plant. There is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.

7.0 REFERENCES

1. Amendment No. 207 to Facility Operating License No. DPR Duane Arnold Energy Center (TAC No. M90155), dated February 22, 1995.

(ML021920059)

2. Amendment No. 223 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-49 Duane Arnold Energy Center (TAC NO. M97197), dated May 22, 1998. (ML021920121)

3. USNRC to T. A. Green (BWR Owners' Group), "Safety Evaluation of GE Topical Report, NEDC-31858P, Rev. 2, 'BWROG Report for Increasing MSIV Leakage Limits and Elimination of Leakage Control Systems, September 1993," dated March 3, 1999. (ML010640286)

4. Amendment No. 219 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-49, Duane Arnold Energy Center (TAC No. M94455), dated October 4, 1996. (ML021920104)

5. Duane Arnold Energy Center - Issuance of Amendment Regarding Secondary Containment OPERABILITY During Movement of Irradiated Fuel and Core Alterations (TAC No. MB1569), dated April 16, 2001. (ML011070147)

6. Duane Arnold Energy Center - Issuance of Amendment Regarding Alternative Source Term (TAC No. MB0347), dated July 31, 2001. (ML011660142)

Page 11 of 11

Enclosure 3 to NG-09-0119 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES (MARK-UP) 3 pages to follow

PCIVs 3.6.1.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.3.9 Verify leakage rate through each MSIV is In accordance

< 100 scfh and that the combined maximum with the Primary pathway leakage rate for all four main steam Containment lines is < 200 scfh when tested at > 24 psig. Leakage Rate Testing Program if the lcakage rate through an ini.'. ..l MSIV exceeds 100 Scffi, the leakage rate will be reztored to !511 .5 scfh.

DAEC 3.6-15 Amendment 2M22 TSCR-096

Programs and Manuals 5.5 5.5 Programs and Manuals 5.5.11 Safety Function Determination Program (SFDP) (continued)

2. Provisions for ensuring the plant is maintained in a safe condition if a loss of function condition exists;

3. Provisions to ensure that an inoperable supported system's Completion Time is not inappropriately extended as a result of multiple support system inoperabilities; and

4. Other appropriate limitations and remedial or compensatory actions.

b. A loss of safety function exists when, assuming no concurrent single failure, no concurrent loss of offsite power or no concurrent loss of "4 onsite diesel generator(s), a safety function assumed in the accident '1 analysis cannot be performed. For the purpose of this program, a loss of safety function may exist when a support system is inoperable, and:

1. A required system redundant to system(s) supported by the inoperable support system is also inoperable; or

2. A required system redundant to system(s) in turn supported by the inoperable supported system is also inoperable; or

3. A required system redundant to support system(s) for the supported systems (1) and (2) above is also inoperable.

c. The SFDP identifies where a loss of safety function exists. If a loss of safety function is determined to exist by this program, the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions of the LCO in which the loss of safety function exists are required to be entered. When a loss of safety function is caused by the inoperability of a single Technical Specification support system, the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions to enter are those of the support system.

5.5.12 Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program

a. A program shall be established to implement the leakage rate testing of the primary containment as required by 10 CFR 50.54(o) and 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B, as modified by approved exemptions.

b. This program shall be in accordance with the guidelines contained in Regulatory Guide 1.163, "Performance-Based Containment Leak-Test Program," dated September 1995, as modified by the following exceptions to NEI 94-01, Rev. 0, "Industry Guideline for Implementing Performance-Based Option of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J":

1. The first Type A test after the September 1993 Type A test shall be performed no later than September 2008.

(continued)

DAEC 5.0-17 Amendment No. 258 TSCR-096

Programs and Manuals 5.5 5.5 Programs and Manuals 5.5.12 Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program (continued)

2. Exemption from Section 111.A of 10 CFR Part50, Appendix J, Option B, to allow the contribution from Main Steam pathway leakage to be excluded from the overall integratedleakage rate from Type A tests.

3. Exemption from Section III.B of 10 CFR Part50, Appendix J, Option B, to allow the contribution from Main Steam pathway leakage to be excluded from the sum of the leakage rates from Type B and Type C tests.

c. The peak calculated containment internal pressure for the design basis loss of coolant accident, Pa, is 45.7 psig.

d. The maximum allowable primary containment leakage rate, La, at Pa, shall be 2.0% of primary containment air weight per day.

e.* Leakage Rate acceptance criteria are:

1. Primary Containment leakage rate acceptance criterion is < 1.0 La. During the first startup following testing in accordance with this program, the leakage rate acceptance criteria are: < 0.60 La for the Type B and Type C tests; and, < 0.75 La for the Type A tests; and

2. The air lock testing acceptance criterion is overall air lock leakage rate < 0.05 La when tested at >_Pa.

f. The provisions of SR 3.0.3 are applicable to the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

DAEC 5.0-18 ,Am*ndment No. 258 TSCR-096

Enclosure 4 to NG-09-0119 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES (RE-TYPED) 3 pages to follow

PCIVs 3.6.1.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.3.9 Verify leakage rate through each MSIV is In accordance

_<100 scfh and that the combined maximum with the Primary pathway leakage rate for all four main steam Containment lines is < 200 scfh when tested at _>24 psig. Leakage Rate Testing Program DAEC 3.6-15 Amendment No.

Programs and Manuals 5.5 5.5 Programs and Manuals 5.5.11 Safety Function Determination Program (SFDP) (continued)

2. Provisions for ensuring the plant is maintained in a safe condition if a loss of function condition exists;

3. Provisions to ensure that an inoperable supported system's Completion Time is not inappropriately extended as a result of multiple support system inoperabilities; and

4. Other appropriate limitations and remedial or compensatory actions.

b. A loss of safety function exists when, assuming no concurrent single failure, no concurrent loss of offsite power or no concurrent loss of onsite diesel generator(s), a safety function assumed in the accident analysis cannot be performed. For the purpose of this program, a loss of safety function may exist when a support system is inoperable, and:

1. A required system redundant to system(s) supported by the inoperable support system is also inoperable; or

2. A required system redundant to system(s) in turn supported by the inoperable supported system is also inoperable; or

3. A required system redundant to support system(s) for the supported systems (1) and (2) above is also inoperable.

c. The SFDP identifies where a loss of safety function exists. If a loss of safety function is determined to exist by this program, the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions of the LCO in which the loss of safety function exists are required to be entered. When a loss of safety function is caused by the inoperability of a single Technical Specification support system, the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions to enter are those of the support system.

5.5.12 Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program

a. A program shall be established to implement the leakage rate testing of the primary containment as required by 10 CFR 50.54(o) and 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B, as modified by approved exemptions.

b. This program shall be in accordance with the guidelines contained in Regulatory Guide 1.163, "Performance-Based Containment Leak-Test Program," dated September 1995, as modified by the following exceptions to NEI 94-01, Rev. 0, "Industry Guideline for Implementing Performance-Based Option of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J":

1. The first Type A test after the September 1993 Type A test shall be performed no later than September 2008.

(continued)

DAEC 5.0-17 Amendment No.

Programs and Manuals 5.5 5.5 Programs and Manuals 5.5.12 Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program (continued)

2. Exemption from Section III.A of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, Option B, to allow the contribution from Main Steam pathway leakage to be excluded from the overall integrated leakage rate from Type A tests.

3. Exemption from Section 111.8 of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, Option B, to allow the contribution from Main Steam pathway leakage to be excluded from the sum of the leakage rates from Type B and Type C tests.

c. The peak calculated containment internal pressure for the design basis loss of coolant accident, Pa, is 45.7 psig.

d. The maximum allowable primary containment leakage rate, La, at Pa, shall be 2.0% of primary containment air weight per day.

e. Leakage Rate acceptance criteria are:

1. Primary Containment leakage rate acceptance criterion is _<1.0 La. During the first startup following testing in accordance with this program, the leakage rate acceptance criteria are: _<0.60 La for the Type B and Type C tests; and, < 0.75 La for the Type A tests; and

2. The air lock testing acceptance criterion is overall air lock leakage rate < 0.05 La when tested at _>Pa.

f. The provisions of SR 3.0.3 are applicable to the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

DAEC 5.0-18 Amendment No.

Enclosure 5 to NG-09-0119 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES PAGE (MARK-UP) 1 page to follow

PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.3.9 REQUIREMENTS The analysis in Reference 8 is based on leakage that is less than the specified leakage rate. Leakage through each MSIV must beI (including the inboard MSIV

< 100 scfh when tested at _Ž24 psig. The combited maximum drain line) pathway leakage rate for all four main steam line_ must be < 200 scfh when tested at > 24 psig. If-the-leakage-rat through an aiidvduu' M,SH exceeds 100 ^efh, the leakage rate shall be-reSt...d to 11.5 scfh. This ensures that MSIV leakage is properly accounted for in determining the overall primary containment leakage rate. The frequnecy is required by the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Chapter 15.2.

2. UFSAR, Table 7.3-1.

3. 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B.

4. UFSAR, Section 7.3.1.1.1.7.

5. UFSAR, Section 1.8.11.

6. J. Franz (IELP) to T. Murley (NRC), "Revised Response to NRC Position on Operability of Safety-Related Dual Function Valves," NG-93-5124, December 7, 1993.

7. G. Kelly (NRC) to L. Liu (IES), "NRC Position on Operability of Safety-Related Dual Function Valves at the Duane Arnold Energy Center (TAC No. 88398)," January 3, 1995.

8. UFSAR Section 6.7.4.3

9. UFSAR Section 3.1.2.5

10. GE BWROG B21-00658-01, "Excess Flow Check Valve Testing Relaxation," dated November 1998.

096-]

DAEC B 3.6-29 TSC R-044A-