ML20235C997
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SUMMARY
EVALUATION[
/IN THE MATTER OF /
ACIFICCASANDELECTRICCOMPANY/
CODECA_ BAY ATOMIC PARKl 1
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' FINAL DRAFT RLDOAN SLS 10/14/64 llis tory The Pacific Cas and Electric Company of San Francisco on December 28, 1962, submitted an application to the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) for a permit to construct and operate a nuclear power plant at Bodega Bay, California, pursuant to the provisions of Title 10, Chapter 1. Code of ;
Federal Regulations, Part 50 (10 CFR 50). The application, which includes a " Preliminary llazards Summary Report", dated December 28, 1962, and Amend-ments 1 through 9, received during the period March 4,1963 through September 16, 1964, has been reviewed by the staff of the AEC's Division of Reactor Licensing. Technical consultants assisted the staff in special-ized areas. The application was also considered by the AEC's Advisory ;
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Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). The recommendations of the ACRS were expressed in letters to the Chairman of the AEC dated April 18, 1963 and October , 1964 Site l
l The nuclear power plant is proposed for construction on Bodega Head, a small peninsula of land in Sonoma County on the Coast of California about 50 miles northwest of San Francisco. The property owned by Pacific Gas and Electric Company at the site consists of approximately 225 acres and includes the entire southern end of the peninsula. To the north of the site the University of California is acquiring approximately 320 acres for use as a field station for marine biology and other scientific studies.
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-The nearest residenca to the site is approximately 1-1/2 miles l eway. Bodega Bay (population 350) is the nearest village and is f located approximately 2 miles north-northeast of the reactor site. I The total population within 5 miles is about 500 and within 25 miles j i
is about 114,000. j Plant Description The nuclear power reactor proposed for construction on Bodega Head is a direct cycle, forced circulation, boiling water type. Reaccors of this type have been operated successfully at Dresden, Illinois, Big Rock, d
Michigan, and Humboldt Bay, California. Design power at Bodega is 1008 3 thermal megawatts (Mwt), compared with 700 Mwt for Dresden, 240 Mwt for Big Rock Point and 165 :!wt for Humboldt Bay.
The reactor core will have an active fuel length of 125 inches and an equivalent diameter of 137 inches. It will contain 592 fuel assen-blies and 145 movable control rods (cruciform blades) . The control rod drives will be similar to the rod drives which have been used at Dresden, ,
i Big Rock Point, and Humboldt Bay. !
For containment the Bodega Bay plant proposes to utilize the pressure suppression concept similar to that aircady in use at the applicant's Humboldt Bay plant. The reactor vessel and the coolant recirculation system are to be enclosed in a dry well vessel, whose volune is about 155,000 cu. ft.The dry well is connected through eight vont pipes each U_ _ _ __._ -
eight feet in diameter to a suppression chamber with a volume of i
approximately 142,000 cu. f t. , of which about 62,000 cu. f t. is filled with water. In the unlikely event of a complete severance of a reactor coolant recirculation line, the prescure build-up in the dry well would ,
i be reduced both in magnitude and duration as a result of steam flow to the suppression pool where the steam would be condensed. (Any fission products released either concurrently or subsequently would be trapped i either in the dry well or suppression chamber.) Tests have been con-ducted that demonstrate the effectiveness of this concept. Further tests are in progress to determine where and to what extent baffles are needed between the underwater exhausts, i The fuel-handling facilities at this plant provide for underwater transfer of spent fuel from the reactor vessel to the fuel storage pool through an interconnecting pool of water. These operations are to be conducted inside a refueling building which will be maintained at a slight negative pressure by fans which discharge air through particulate and halogen removal filters to a stack, thereby minimizing the possibility of direct out-leakage from the building.
Radioactive liquid vastes from the Bodega plant are to be mixed with condenser ef fluent (about 250.000 gpm) prior to discharge to the Pacific Ocean. All solid wastes with radioactive contamination are to be transferred to licensed waste disposal agents for off-site dis-posal. Radioactive gases are to be vented to a special stack whose i
! height is to be specified on the basis of results of a meteorological survey now in progress . The disposal of both liquid and gaseous
a radioactive wastes will be monitored and controlled so that at any off-site location the concentration of radioactive contaminants will not exceed the limits set forth in Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 20.
Important Safety Considerations in our evaluation of this application, we have given special consid-erstion to a number of site and design features which have important safety implications. The more important of these safety considerations are dis-cusacd in the following paragraphs.
- 1. Suitability of the Proposed Site, Based on considerations of potential hazards to public health and safety, this reactor site is in most respects an excellent one. By virtue of property ownership by PG6E, as enhanced by the water areas on three sidea of the peninsula, the applicant can exert positive control over an area having a minimum radius of about 450 feet from the reactor, and can exert substantial control over an area extending out to a radius of about 1300 feet, the nearest point on Doran Beach across the harbor entrance channel.
The population in the vicinity of the site is low and the isolation distances are well within acceptable ranges. The local meteorology, although not excellent for certain portions of the tiu, is as good as or better than that in California generally. The site is not upstream from any drinking water intakes. Since the amount of gasecus and liquid radioactive waste to be discharged to the air and water will be nonitored and controlled to assure l
compliance with 10 CFR Part 20 requirements, radioactive waste disposal at l j
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( I this site will not cause any undue hazard to the public as a result of
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either direct exposure or ingestion. l
- 2. Suitability of the Nuclear Reactor Design 1
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The boiling water nuclear reactor proposed for the Bodega plant is of 3
a type that has .been operated safely at a number of other locations includ-i I
ing Dresden, Big Rock Point and Humboldt Bay. It is expected to exhibit negative temperature and void coef ficients of reactivity at operating con-ditions. Further, the reactor will be brought to full power through a step-wise approach so that any unforeseen instability vould be detected before a damaRing transient could result.
The Bodega Bay reactor is to be designed so that at any time during core life with all control rods inserted the k-offective of the core will not exceed 0.97. Vith the most reactiva rod fully withdrawn and the other rods fully inserted, the k-effective of the core vill be 0.99 or less. Thus , the reactor will remain suberitical if one rod is inadvertently withdrawn, or it can be shut down even if one rod should becoco stuck in the fully withdrawn i position. In addition, a soluble poison control material can be injected into the reactor vessel if needed to hold the reactor suberitical.
Further research and development work is being conducted on the proposed fuel elenent cladding. It is expected that this work will lead to a satis-factory desir,n. Even if some clad f ailures abould occur. however, the associated fission product release should not cause a hazard to the health and i
aafety of the pubite.
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The control rod drives proposed for this reactor are similar to, but include certain improvements over,che locking-piston type rod drives that have been used at other plants. The applicant has stated that prototype and k
production drives will be subjected to functional and endurance tests before reactor startup.
- 3. Suitability of Fuel Handling Facilities The fuel _ handling concept for this f acility has f avorable safety characteristics. During refueling operations the fuel storage pool is con-nected by a water channel to the reactor vessel, thua providing for visual observation and underwater cooling of all operations, and eliminating the potential hazards associated with fuel handling casks. Fuel storage rack design to assure suberiticality is not complete pending further fuel element design.
- 4. Adequacy of the Radioactive Waste Disposal Plans __and Designs Radioactive liquid wastes from this plant are to be mixed with l condenser ef fluent prior to discharge to the Pacific Ocean. No problem is anticipated in maintaining the concentration of radionuclides in thw mixture below the maximum permissible enneentrations specified in 10 CFR 20. In I
addition, the applicant has stated that a radiological monitoring survey of I
this site and its envircus will be initiated two years before operation of the reactor and will continue af ter operation commences. Details of the i sampling program have not been completed, but it is expected that quarterly l
samples would be taken of marine waters, plankton, bottom sediments, I
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invertebrates, shellfish, resident fishes and of the intertidal algae and i sel grass. Thus, the applicant would be able to determine any reconcen-i tration of radionuclides that might occur before it became a potential safety problem. .:
All solid wastes from this plant are to be transferred to licensed waste" disposal agents for off-site disposal.
The applicant has stated that gaseous vastes disposal vill be monitored and controlled.so that a maximum annual exposure of 0.5 rem at any off-site location, as provided by 10 CFR 20, will not be exceeded. There appears to be no reason to believe that this objective cannot be met. The diffusion climatology is expected to be satisf actory and a meteorological f acility is ,
being installed at the site to develop a better understanding of the local meterology, so that an appropriate radioactive gaseous waste stack height may be selected. A radiological survey program at the site is planned for initiation two years in advance of reactor operation. Quarterly sampling i
of soil, vegetation, local agricultural products, well water, stream water '
and stream mud, and weekly sampling of air particulate and air background are also planned.
- 5. Adequac,y of _Emegency Sys tems The applicant proposes to equip the plant with a substantial nunber of f acilities for the safe handling. of emery.cncies. An energency feedwater pucp is provided to assure that the reactor core is always kept submerged in voter so long as the reactor vessel and piping beneath it remain intact. Core spray systeras are provided to cool the core if, for j sone reason, such as pipe failure, the core cannot be kept s ubme rge d . An
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amargency condenser with a large water storage capacity and provisions for !
make-up from the fire system is provided to serve as a heat sink in case the main condenser is darnaged. A bleed-and-feed sys tem is available as a i backup to the emergency condenser. This system provides for bleeding steam from the main steam line to the suppression pool, and making up water thus lost through action of the auxiliary feed water pump or its backup. A liquid poison injection system is available to keep the reactor suberitical if such action becorees necessary for any reason.
Several sources of emergency electric power are available. A startup-standby transformer is provided to supply station service power during plant startup, or in emergencico, fro:n the 220 KV transmission system. An auxiliary J
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- 4 standby transforiner can supply suf ficient power for orderly shutdown f rom a ,{
h 12 KV distribution line from a nearby substation. If both these sources fail, '
an engina driven generator can supply puer for safe shutdown and decay heat r removal. In addition to these sources a substantial station battery will ,
supply power for control instruments and, through an inverter, essential AC -
loads.
- 6. Adequacy of the Containment Concept This plant is to utilize the pressure suppression concept in its containment design. Mockup testa have been conducted by the applicant to determine the maximum pressure the containtnent would experience as a result of the complete severance of one of the 28-inch recirculation loop linen under a variety of reactor coolant pressures and temperatures, and dry well temperatures. These tests have provided a suitable basis for designing
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the system and have also shown that the steam exhausted to the suppression pool is completely condensed beneath the pool surface.
The applicant has proposed adequate provisions to assure reliable containment performance in the event of an accident. Fedundant isolation valves are to be placed in the main steam lines. Containment leek rate tests are to be conducted after installation of all penetrations by applying dry well desir.n pressure to the comnleted dry well and suppression chamber design pressure to the completed suppression chamber. 'he contain- hI 3
f ment leshtightness vill he tested at periodic intervals throughout the life / '
of the plant and indications of inadequate containment desim pressure and f(d li i $. '
leak rate vill limit potential accident consequences to acceptable levels.
- 7. Acceptability of Potential Exnocure to the Maxir.um Credible Accident The applicant han evaluated the consequences of a number of credible accidents , based on the assumption that the containment and other saferuards function as designed. In nost cases they would creste no significant hazard to the health and safety of the public. Of those credible accidents which vers considered to have a potential for significant releases of radioactivity to the environment , the accident categorized as the refueling accident resulted in the highest potential off-nite doses. It van assumed in the refueling sceident analysis that n fuel bundle was dropped into a near-critical reactor, causing a nuclear excursion which releasee fission products into the refueling building. Uning a decontamination factor of 100 for all radionuclides except noble gnses , the applicant calculated that the noxir.un off-site potential whole bo# dose for the duration of this accident would be less than 1.0 rer.
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Since noble gases are the major contributor to the potential whole body doses from such an accident, the decontamination factor assumed does not ,
carkedly af fect the resultant whole body doses. For potential thyroid '
doses from this assumed accident, however, the decontamination factor assumed will af fect resultant exposures. Although we do not believe there is sufficient evidence to support the use of the decontamination f actor ,
I assumed by the applicant, use of a smaller factor which can be readily !
substantiated would not result in potential whole body or thyroid exposures in excess of Part 100 guidelines. From these results it can be concluded that the containment system proposed for this reactor appears to be capabic of reducing the potential hazards of credible accidents to levels which do not present an undue risk to the health and safety of the public. ~l Research and development Programa Pacific Cas and Electric Company and its contractors are planning a number of research and development programs, the results of which will be utilized in final design of the plant. They include the following:
- 1. Radiological Survey A preoperational monitoring survey of the site and its environs I
to be initiated two years before commencement of operation of the reactor.
1 Although the details of this program have not been completed, it is anticipated that it will be similar to that conducted for the company's I
!!tanboldt Bay nuclear unit.
2- @ltegyp, logy A meteorological facility is being installed at the site to provide necessary data for atmospheric diffusion studies. Ins t ruments i
4 will be mounted at three levels on a 250 f t. tower and will measure temperature and wind speed and direction. All readings will be digitized and recorded on paper tape. The results of this program will be used in calculating the potential dilution of radioactive gases, and in selecting -
a suitable stack height. .
- 3. Oce anography The capacity of the ocean to diffuse the condenser cooling water and minimize the effects of temperature and radioactivity on the marine biota is being investigated in a series of experiments to be conducted at the site. These tests include use of drift poles and uranine dye as well as, '
measurements of temperature and salinity. They will continue through at least one annual cycle of oceanographic and meteorological conditions.
- 4. Marino Biology survey An ecological survey is being conducted to prepare lists of the marine fauna and flora of Bodega Head and Harbor.
- 5. Pressure Suppression Tests As described in the applicant's llazards Summary Report, Appendix I, extensive tests of the pressure suppression concept have been conducted.
Additional tests will be conducted at the company's Moss Landing Power Plant to determine whether or not baffles between vent pipes are required in the suppression pool.
- 6. Fuel Development Results from fuel element development tests and experience with fuel designs now employed in existing reactors will form the basis for the selection of the Bodega fuel cladding and its thickness.
- 7. Instrumentation Development In-core startup range neutron detectors are being developed as a
I possible substitute for the presently planned out-of-core detectors. > 1 Control' System Development l
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l A prototype Bodega control rod drive is curantly being !
manufactured. It will be subjected to extensive developmental testing l beforw the final drive design is released for manufacture. Several I devices which would reduce the likelihood or magnitude of a control rod .r ;
dropout accident are being developed for possible use in the Bodega l i
control system.
Seismic Considerations The proposed location of the Bodega Nuclear Power Paactor is approximately 1000 feet west of the western edge of the San Andreas i
fault zone, a prominent band of seismic activity running generally i north and south along two-thirds of the State of California. The choice of this location by the applicant has necessitated prolonged and intensive study of factors affecting the safety of the installation in the event of the occurrence of a severe earthquake at or near the location of the plant.
Since the field of earthquake structural design is highly specialized, i it has been necessary to call upon the services of expert consultants for help in analyzing the various problems involved in arriving at a de-cision on the technical feasibility of building the Bodega plant at the proposed location with reasonable assurance that it will cafely withstand the maximum earthquake that alght credibly occur during the life of the plant. The design consultants employed by the applicant, P4E, include Dr. George W. Housner, Professor of Civil Engineering and Applied Mechanics at the California Institute of Technology, Dr. ilugo Benioff, Engineer-l
ing Seismologist also of Caltech, and Mr. E. C. Marliave, Consulting Geologist. The AEC Regulatory 's'taff has retained the servicas of Dr. N. M. Newmark, Professor of Civil Engineering at the University of Illinois and Mr. Robert A. Williamson of Holmes & Narver. t There is a substantial difference between the viewpoint of the applicant and that of the U. 5. Coast and Geodetic Survey (USC&GS) and l
U. S. Geological Survey (USGS) with respect to the maximum credible earth-quake that should be taken as the design basis for the Bodega Head plant.
The PG&E earthquake consultants feel strongly that the maximum ground acceleration to be expected during any credible earthquake at or near the plant site is 0.33g, and they consider it incredible that there should ever be more than a few inches of differential ground motion under the site. The USC&GS, on the other hand, has recommended that the reactor and its containment structure be designed to withstand a ground response spectrum of 2/3g, with peak accelerations up to 1.0g,together with possible dif ferential shear ground motion of up to 2-1/2 feet. The USGS, f pointing out that the geologic setting of Bodega flead is similar to that i
l of Point Reyes Peninsula where bedrock ruptures did occur in the 1906 California earthquake, feels that there is a possibility of a comparable rupture g Jaf 3 feet d kSyy at the proposed reactor site in the event of a severe carthquake in that area.
There is also a wido difference of opinion respecting the size of the tsunamin that may be expected to result f rom of fshore earthquakes, L__ -_ - -
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Consultants to the applicant are firm in their opinion, based on all available records along the West Coast, that no tsunami will ever push water more than 15 feet above mean water level at the plant site. How- l f
l 1 ever, the USC&CS has recommended that protection against 50-foot tsunamis be provided in the design of the plant.
The applicant was made svare of the recommendations of the USC&CS !
and USGS , and has been asked a number of questions l designed to determine whether the applicant considered it feasible to design the Bodega plant so as to provide reasonable assurance that the integrity of the reactor containment would be preserved and that the reactor i
would be shut down and maintained in a safe condition in the event of the occurrence of an earthquake of the severity postulated by the USC&GS and USGS. The technical basis for their conclusion was also requested.
While continuing to disagree strongly with the credibility of such an extreme earthquake, the applicant has nevertheless proposed a design which the company and its consultants feel confident will safely ride through a 2/3g earthquake, with peak ground acceleration up to 1.0g, which is accompanied by dif ferential shear ground displacement under the reactor containment of up to 3 feet either horizontal or vertical.
If such an earthquake should occur, the containment might be tipped or rotated slightly, but there would be no breach in its leak-tightness and no release of fission products, in the opinion of the applicant.
The general description of the postulated earthquake involves a pattern of ground motions similar to that recorded by the Coast and Geodetic Survey in the El Centro Earthquake of May 18, 1940, but with
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approximately twice the intensity, corresponding to a maximum acceleration of two-thirds gravity, a maximum velocity of 2.5 f t/sec, and a maximum ,
ground displacement of 3 feet, and with occasional intermittent pulses of ,
acceleration up to 1.0g. The structures are considered to be subjected to simultaneous shear displacements ranging up to 3 feet, along lines ex-tending under the containment structure or other parts of the plant, with j motions in either horizontal or vertical directions along the f ault. It is also assumed that aftershocks of intensity equal to the El Centro quake might be suffered before remedial action could be taken.
There are two nojor problems posed by the postulated earthquake.
The most unusual one is that of providing for shear ground displacement of as emch as three feet underneath the reactor building. The other is that of vibrational strenses.
Although there is a substantial design effort involved in computing the vibrational stresses, and judgment has to be exercised as to the proper 1
vibrational spectrum and structural damping factors to use in assuring that the reactor containment structure and all the equipment inside it will safely withstand the vibrational aspects of the earthquake, the technology is well unders tood. The critical area here is the ability of vital structural com-ponents to withstand the stresses put on them by the simultaneous occurrence of the maximum postulated accident (rupture of reactor coolant system) and maximum postulated earthquake. Under these extreme conditions the question focuses on the maximum allowable stresses that should be used in the design computation relative to the vield stress of the various materials under con-sideration. While many of these details have not yet been resolved, there appears to be no reason to believe that anything of a fundamental nature will ]
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arise that cannot be successfully handled.
Building the reactor structure and its foundation in such a way that it will safely survive a shear ground movemnt underneath it of as tauch as 3 feet poses a more taublesome problem. The applicant proposes to accomplish this by a deeign which provides for a 3 foot unobstmeted radial clearance between the outside of the reinforced concrete containment structure and the inside of a containment pit , completely around the circum-fore from elevation -73 feet to yard elevation at +25 feet. The valls of the reactor containment pit vill be lined with reinforced concrete to prevent possible spalling of material into the pit. The annular space vill be permitted to fill with vater. The reactor containment structum vill be founded on a layer of carefully selected sand of known characteristics which vill permit horizontal movements up to 3 feet without impairing the function of the containment structure, although the structure might be shifted or rotated. Differential vertical motions up to 3 feet may cause the contain-ment structure to tilt or shift, but, in the opinion of the applicant, in no case vill the containment function be impaired.
The plant will be designed with no rigid structural intereennection between any major components. The reactor containment structure vill be structurally independent of the turbine generator foundation, the plant control building, the radvaste facility, the stack, nnd the plant service buildings . Piping and viring interconnections ircoortant to safety between the reactor containment structure, the control building and the turbine t
generator vill have sufficient flexibility to accommodate 3 feet of relative I movement. In order to prevent overstress at points of penetration for piping
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connecting the dry well with the turbine, the company proposes to provide adaquate anchors and bracing adjacent to the containment shell and beyond the double isolation valves. These anchors will be adequate to withstand all piping loads due to ' differential motion in any direction up to 3 feet between the reactor containment structure and the turbine generator founda-tion.
The foregoing proposal for safeguarding the Bodega Reactor and its containment structure against the postulated shear differential ground motion embodies concepts which are in mny respects novel and for which little or no precedent exists. The Regulatory Staff Consultant , Dr. N. M.
Newmark, has come to the conclusion after carefully studying the basis of the proposal that the structural integrity and leak-tightne's of the containment building can be maintained under the conditions postulated.
lie points out, however, several items that will have to be given special attention during the design phase in order to achieve the desired objective.
I Perhaps the most important of these items is the main piping system leading from the reactor pmssure vessel to the turbine and other equipment outside the containment building. The piping would have to be made sufficiently flexible to accommodate a relative movement of 3 feet without failure, and at the same time be damped to reduce its dynamic responae to earthquake oscillations. Adequate provisions would also have to be made to have enough emergency power available locally to operate the energency cooling system e and other engineered safeguards in the ovent of earthquake damage to over-
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head power lines f rors outside power sources. Protection of the plant against the possible occurrence of large tsunamis has not yet been r 1 satisfactorily resolved but does not- hpear to offer any unsurmountable design barriers. !
The Atomic Energy Commission is in the difficult position of having ;
4* k to arrive at evaluation of the public safety risks involved in a new type of construction for which there is little or no experience background. l 1
Other reactor installations have presented seismic design problems, but not l in the extreme form presented by Bodega Head under the earthquake postulated by the Coast and Geodetic Survey and the Geological Survey. One problem which the Bodega plant has in comcaon with all other nuclear power plants subject to J special seismic design considerations is the inability to conduct any sort of performance test on the finished structure that will demonstrate that the design objectives have been achieved. The uncertainty presented by this situ-ation has been accepted as a reasonable risk at all of the other nuclear reactor installations meeting specified seismic design criteria. There would be no difficulty in applying the same philosophy at Bodega Head were it not for the extreme earthquake postulated by the Coast and Geodetic Survey and Geological Survey, involving the possibility of bedrock fracture and shear ground movement underneath the reactor.
With proper attention to several specific items still in the discussion stage, the eart.hquake design proposed by the applicant, Pacific Cas and Electric Company, appears technically feasible for earthquakes up to the mag-nitude postulated by the applicant and its consultants, and may be feasible I
even for the larger earthquake postulated by the USC&GS and USCS, although we have some reservations on the latter. The seismic design of the plant seems counsensurate with the probable dimensions j
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f of severe earthquakes, so that the ' likelihood of damage to the plant of sufficient magnitude to ,ename fission product release appears to be quite lov. Even if the plant vere to be severely damaged there are many safeguard systems of different ypes that also would have to fail before any damage to the public would result. t There are policy considerations as well as technical censidera ens ,,
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which must be weighed in arriving at a decision as to whether or not to grant a construction permit for the proposed reactor. The fact that the 1
proposed site is adjacent to the San Andreas fault zone makes it almost certain that it vill be subjected to one or more severe seismic disturbances during the lifetime of the plant. While thers is a high probability that the plant under the proposed deslgn could survive even a very large earth-quake without damage, it must le admitted that if such an earthquake should involve several feet of shear ground movenent as well as ground accelerations as high as 2/3g to 1.0g there is presently no sound experimental or experience basis for predicting the extent of damage that might be incurred by the Itactor containment structure and emergency equipment designed to assure the safety of the reactor.
Whether the public benefits to be 6ained from operation of the Bodega Nuclear Power Plant are high enough to justify public acceptance of the added uncertainties involved in the seismic design of the plant to vithstand several feet of shear ground movement io , of course, a me,tter [
of judgraent. The s uO G;hyl requirement that there be " reasonable assurance" dtht&t that any licensed nuclear reactor can be built and operated without undue risk to the health and safety of the public recognizes that thers. is no way of i ,
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gnarmateeing that acaidents will not occur in which some of the safeguards ]
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in the case of nuclear power reactors is normally based on the assuurption I
that the uncertainties are limited to those thinas that might happen due {
to unpredictable failums of plant' componerts rather than outside forces whiah .aight credibly initiate an accident. e grey arna surrounding i
"teasonable assurance". becauses enlarged vten it becouveri necessary to take
-into consideration d.bernal factors having the potential of invalidating i some of the safeguards built into the mactor installation. The der:ree of enlargement depends on the uncertainties involved in the design measures taken to counteract the external forces if they should occur. If these uncertainties are as great or greater than the uncertainties involved in
! the desi6n of the reactor system, the possibility exists for vital safe-7 guard components to be placed in " double jeopardy", by a combination of the normal probability of failure and r.he abnormal probability of failure due to externally applied forces. ' There is usually nh.5,h redundancy of engineered safeguards that one or two f ailures vould not necessarily create any sign.ificant public hasards. Somewhere alone, the line , however.
1 i enough uncertainties vill create a situation in which the " assurance" can no longer be said to be " reasonable".
3 The containment and all of the emerrency equipnent for shuttine down the Bodega reactor and maintaining it indefinitely in n.date condition are designed on the basis of well-established engineering principles.
They can also be tested to ascertain that the design objectives have been
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achieved. Consequently, there is a high degree of assurance that the reactor
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can be built and operated without undue rf sk to the health and safety of j the public in the absence of' seismic disturbances.
he seismic design of the reactor structure to withstand purely vibrational effects is also based on well-established engineering principles j
vhich in scene cases at least have been verified in the presence of earth quakes. Thus, while it is not possible to car 27 out any measurements on the finished structure to assure that the sof.smic design objectives have been accomplished, there is sufficient experience background to justify 1 a conclusion of " reasonable pne ance" that the specified meismic vibrational y criteria have been achieved and that the plant will therefore be safeguarded e
j against any endible carthquake that does not rupture the foundation rock.
I We believe there is room for reascmable doubt that, a comparable situation exists with mspect to that particular aspect of the proposed seismic design of the Bodega reactor stru cture intended to .araure th'at the containment i t and reactor shutdown functions will remain int.act. in the event of a shear displacement of its foundation bedrock as grect as three feet in any direction.
While the proposed engineering principles anpear reasonable, experimental verification and experience bar'.r.round on the proposed r.orel construction i 1
method are lacking. If approved, thic would, to the best of our knowledre , l be the first attempt on record to design a building structum nno its ansociated vital equipmnt to withstand the effects of substantial movenent in its foundation simultaneously with the vibration accononnying s severe earthquake.
Because of the magnitude of the possible. consequences of a ardor rupture l
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we do not believe that a large nuclev power zwactor should be the subject of a pioneering ecostruction effort based en unverified engineering principles, however sound they may appear to be. i
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We believe k~$' Teen made adequately clear)in the forer,oing ~.
analysis \.,
that in all respects except one the proposed design of the Bodega Nuclear i
Power Plant provides reasonable assurance that the plant can be built l l
and operated without undue risk to the health and safety of the public. I Unfortunately the single exceptics is quite important if one accepts the 1
credibility of an earthquake of sufficient magnitude to cause a ma.ior displacement of foundation rock underneath the plant. Althour.h there is i
n wide variety of expert opinion on the credibility of such an earthquake ,
l prudent judgment favo. e accepting the conservative reconenendations of the USC&GS and the USGS. On this basis and for reasons given above, it in our conclusion that Bodega Head is not a suitable location for the proposed nuclear power plant.
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OFFICE OF THE t,nNiidiaN -
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1 For information DL For appropriate handiing For preparation of reply for Chairman's signature; with copies for the <
information of the Commissioners; ;
and Secretariat. Distribution to be handled by Chairman's Office.
For discussion at Commissioners' Information Meeting For Daily Log l
Other H . .- .. ;r , tv-For the Chairman
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? 26 September 19fA:
. Honorable Lyndon B. Johnson The White House Washington, D.C.
My dear President Johnson:
AL calamity of an atomic plant a t Bodega Bay needs to be prevented. A fishing harbor should be no. place for such a factory--especially with poisonous. wastes involved and located on an earthquake fault.
And how can radioactive-fission products he i contgined during an earth tremor when watar pipes always break' while most needed to prevent. a tra.dedy. p. '
Living in Marin County even as close as 40 miles.by-air' scares me,'and release.of poisons would also "
reach San Francisco.
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7ery truly yours,
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MEMO B00TE SLIP p
l rorm ar na (nev. May is.190)
Note and retura. For Ornature. For inf ormation.
>1 TO (Name and unit) INITIALS RLMARK5 The attached report was_ passed out by Mr. Zetler REG oars . of the__Qf fice of Ocaanograp_by4_C_Qasund_ Geodetic Survev. at the meetine held on Mnndav. .Tulv 77 with TO (Name and unit) INITI AL.1 REMARKS an ACRS subcommittsg_fo discuss the basis for the l
DATE .__ Coast Survey's recognendations on estmnmf runun on the Californin coast.
TO (Name and unit) INITIALS REMARKS 1
l oars FROM (Name and unit) ARKS
'T E. G. C s ,3RL Rec'd Off. Dir. of Reg. <
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PHONE NCL DATE V ,/
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341 7/31 USE QTHEH SIDE FOR ADQlitO=AL REMARKS GPo e43 14 - 77M = 1
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Notes on Tsunami Runup on California Coast
" Potential Tsunami Inundation Areas in Hawaii," by Doak C. Cox, Hawaii Institute of Geophysics, Report No.14, (about 1962), page 5, lists nine significant parameters influencing runup. It goes on to say that the effects of only a few of these have been studied quantitatively and "the results of such quantitative studies as have been made do not permit the estimation of the expectable height of runup or width of inundation with any useful degree of accuracy."
This statement essentially sums up the inadequacies in the state of the art at present. The relatively short duration of historical records for the coast of California precludes a statistical approach to the problem.
An evaluation for potential runup on the coast of California chould include at least three areas of consideration. These are:
(1 ) runup from locally generated tsunamis, (2) the possibility of differentiating the risk for various zones for tsunamis generated at significant distances away, and (3) the appreciable variations in runup at nearby places within the same zone.
In the case of locally generated tsunamis, many of Cox's parameters are unimportant as they deal with topographic .
i and distance effects on wave propagation. What remains are primarily generation aspects (seismological) and local phenomena such as land roughness and the height of storm waves. It may be possible to differentiate seismologically the risk of a particular type of earth motion occurring nearby to these places.
It does not appear possible to differentiate the runup height for different locations on the coast based on these criteria.
l Thus the same numerical height (50 feet) must be assigned to each place although the risk of such a runup occurring may be appreciably different for these places.
With respect to runup associated with distant earthquakes, there appears to be sufficient evidence to. state that California as a whole is less vulnerable to tsunami damage than other areas such as Hawaii. It also appears that there are zones, such as the Crescent City area and possibly San Diego, that are more vulnerable than others. Refraction studies depicting the advancing tsunami wave front from various hypothetical source areas would furnish information on relative convergence and divergence of rays of energy and thereby permit some degree
. of differentiation of potential runup. The Coast and Geodetic Survey proposes to program this study for computers, starting later this year. Even without this study, however, existing records from destructive tsunamis generated in various remote portions of the Pacific indicate that a maximum potential runup can be estimated for the California coast as a whole that is
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' appreciably.below that estimated for one from a nearby. epicenter.
Extrapolating from available. tide gage records,, and accepting
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'that the vertical l'evel of. extreme runup is considerably higher-
.than that observed = simultaneously at a tide gage, 30 foot
- would appear to-be 'a reasonable maximum.
1 Finally,-with respect to local variations in runup, detailed studies have been made in Hawaii for many places for L
the tsunamis of 1946,1952,1957 and 1960. Despite somewhat t
similar azimuths of ' approach for three of these tsunamis, the y relative runups at nearby places are appreciably random in character. .It1 appears reasonable to conclude.that local differences are related to chance phase relationships of various
' incident and' reflected waves. If this is true, there never will be an acceptable way of predicting these local variations.
As a precautionary note not necessarily related to these particular hearings, another danger to nuclear power plants is the sudden (possibly unpredicted) withdrawal of water from coastal areas (the trough of the seismic sea wave). Unless the l intake pipes supplying cooling water are sufficiently low in E j the water, this supply could be terminated for a period as long i
as 30 or 40 minutes. Again, as a gross approximation, the intakes should be 25 feet below mean lower low water.
Prepared for AEC preliminary discussions on July 27, 1964.
B. D. Zetler, Chief, Research Group Office of Oceanography Coast and Geodetic Survey l _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ ____
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_ 'ar actiam Furrn A rc.n1 (Rev. May 14, )M7) Note and return. For signature.
't. For information.
TC ( 42me sna unit} INifl ALS MMARKS I
l H. L. Price - Attached i_s_a revised page 3 t.o_Navaszt's report MG o^'t
_an the_Dodega_ Bay reactor _Which I sent_ym by t nek silt) dated Sentemhor 29.
TO (Name and unst) INITI AL$ REMARKS
'.C.K.Di$k
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/ DArE TO (Name and unit) ANITIALS REMARKS R. Lowenstein l REG DATE M. E. Mann REG FROM (Name and unit) REMARKS E. G. Case RL PHONE NO, DATE 41 9/30 LLE OTHER SiOE FOR ADDITIQhAL HLMARKS U $ 60VCH4MEMY PRihilhG OFFICE e 1957-O-432007
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4 The supply of. power to the ' facility, from power lines crossing the major fault, might' be interrupted, although the probability of such inter-ruption 'is fairly low. In the event of such interruption, auxiliary power supplies are required. The sources of auxiliary power described appear to have adequate capability to resist the postulated earthquake e ffe cts .
In general, the provisions for meeting the various requirements are based on methods which in the light of analysis and study appear to be reasonably adequate.
The earthquake motions, in terms of acceleration and velocity, appear ,
I to be 2 to 3 times more intense than any that have been recorded in the United States , and probably about twice as intense as those experienced anywhere else in the world in the recent years for which we have fairly good records. Nevertheless , it appears that the design objectives can be l accomplished.
A more detailed discussion of the various points described in Amendment No. 6 is contained in the following material. In addition, consideration is given to several points not specifically discussed in the amendment.
EFFECTIVENESS OF SAND _ LAYER IN SHOCK ISOLATION The sand layer under the containment building is intended to act in two ways: (1) to isolate in part the containment structure from the high peaks of acceleration that might be transmitted to it from the ground beneath it; and (2) to permit either horirontal or vertical faulting to take place f a the rock beneath the containment structure without damaging the structure. It will be shown in the following discussion that the effectiveness of the sand layer in reducing the peak accelerations may be questionable, but its effectiveness in reducing the effects of faulting is substantial.
33,-,- - -- -- -
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! GEOLOGIC AND SEISM 0 LOGIC SAFETY QUESTIONS CONNECTED WITH THE BODEGA FACILITY )
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- 1. What are the possible causes of the cracking and jointing found in the bedrock?
< How does the cracking and jointing of the bedrock connare with other I locations this close to a major fault and with other locations farther removed from a major fault? ,
. Can the amount of cracking and jointing in the bedrock be used to predict the degree of previous seismic activity and hence future seisade activity?
- h. Does the degree of cracking mad jointinr, indicate that Bodega Head ,
might be considered as part of the San Andreas fault zone?
- 5. List all possible causes of the offsets in the sediments above the g bedrockt
- 6. For each possible cause of the offsets in the sediments , what are the conditions under which the offsets would be expected to extend to the surface?
7 For each possible cause of the offsets in the sediments, what are the conditions under which the offsets would not be expected to extend to the surf ace?
- 8. Considering the observations made at the site, what is the most likely cause of the offsets in the sediments?
9 What are the conditions of sim arity related to seism.icity between
{ Bodega and Pt. Reyes?
- 10. What are the di f fe r ces in conditions related to seismicity between Bodega and Pt. Reyes?
- 11. What are the similarities and differences between Bodega and other locations where faulting was observed adj acent to a major fault?
- 12. Should the design of the Bodegn facility take into account the potential effects of a recurrence of an earthquake whose intensity is comnarable l to the 1906 earthquake at a point on the San Andreas fault closest to l the proposed location? j
- 13. Does the design proposed by PG&E take into account the expected displacements resulting from a recurrence of an earthquake of an intensity comparable to the 1906 earthquake?
j 1
l
\
lb. Is it possible to design the Bodega facility such that a safe and orderly shutdown can be ' assured if horizontal and vertical displacements of several feet should occur at the site?
-4 l,
1 l
E_- _ __ _ _
101 ,
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, PRIMARY GEOLOGIC AND SEISM 0 LOGIC SAFETY QUESTIONS CONNECTED WITH THE. BODEGA HEAD SITE
- 1. What is the location of the western extremity (boundary)'of the San Andreas f ault zone with respect to the proposed plant location, and what is the -
geologic and.seismologic significance of this so-called boundary in i
relation to stability of the plant site f ormations-if a large earthquake I occurred along the San Andreas Fault in the vicinity of Bodega Head?
- 2. !What are the relations of the faults traversing the plant site to the .
l l- San Andreas Fault, -e.e.. can they be considered as part of the San Andreas fault zone?
- 3. What is the probable. history of movement on these faults? Did movement occur in-19067 What is the extent of vertical and horizontal motion that has occurred?
- 4. Would a large earthquake on the San Andreas.in the vicinity of Dodega be likely to cause movement on these f aults? What would be the probable j i
extent of movement for a 1906 San Francisco size earthquake?
- 5. Uhat are the significant characteristics of the geologic formations that f sould serve as a foundation to bear the loads that would be imposed by the structures? Vill these characteristics be affected during en earthquake to an extent that would affect the load carrving capacity.
- 6. What ground accelerations vould be associated with a 1906 San Francisco size earthquake?
- 7. Can a structure be designed to withstand without f ailure the forces associated with the differential motion that has occurred along the f aults traversing the plant site?
1 I
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BASE MAP FROM U.S G S.
$ GEOLOGY AFTER JOHNSON,1943 AND KOENIG,1963 Geologic map of Bodega Head, Sonoma County, showing Son Ande.as Fowle mone.
(Reproduced from "The Geologic Setting of Bodega Head," Koenig, J.B. , Calif. Div. of Mines and Geology, Mineral Information Service, July 1963.) k_ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _m. .
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fJ\ , h e Ch j FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE E < . . f' yvyr s m1 GVmn rI 9 M f9- -Friday, October 29, 1964
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RULES COMMITTEE TO HEAR ATOMIC POWER PROBLEMS Tom Bane,-Chairman of the Assembly Committee on Rules, announced today that his Committee will still hold its planned hearing on the Bodega Bay atomic power plant. Following the announcement by the Pacific Gas and Electric Company that it was withdrawing its application to the AEC for the Bodega Bay-atomic i- plant, Chairman Bane said that the hearing will have a slightly i different emphasis because the Bodega Bay controversy appears to have been resolved. Bane stated that the Rules Committee will receive testimony dealing with the problems of the development and location of atomic energy fa'cilities and the various conflicting interests involved. The committee will review the present process j for selecting and approving sites and the State's participation in the development of atomic energy facilities to determine if the , State of California should assume a more active role in the zoning ,t and regulation of nuclear development. { triMMMMMMte### RECEIVED ! UOV 2 - 1964 R. L; ,,y g g D N __M__* I Y_I_*'. 'III'_ __ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ .3
Oct. 23, 1964_ a NOTES OF FOLLOW-UP ACTION - BODDGA All of the following material vill be in final form by 12 noon on Friday, October 23: i Memo to the Commission: Copies for each Commissioners of the following material: Letter to the Joint Committee Press Announcement ACRS Analysis
>- AE_C Summary Analysis (The Regulatory Staff)
/
'*
- U. S. Coast and Geodetic Survey Report Newmark's Report Press Announcement:
ACRS Letter dated October 20 Suamary Analysis - AEC Regulatory Staff Letter to the Joint Committee: ! Press Announcement ACRS Letter dated October 20 AEC's Regulatory Staff Summary Analysis USGS Report USC6CS Report Neumark's Report Transmittal to the White House - To be prepared and handled by Congressional but including the following: i Press Announcement ACRS Letter dated Oct. 20 > AEC's Reg. Staff - Summary Analysis USGS Report USC&GS Report Newmark's Report Lotter to Whelchel, PG&E USGS Report Press Announcement USC&GS Report ACRS Letter dated Oct. 20 Newmark's Report AEC Reg. Sta f f - Summary Analysis Questions and Answers i i
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SUMMARY
EVALUATION' IN THE MATTER OF PACIFIC CAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY BODEGA B AY ATOMIC PARK UNIT NUMBER 1 i l
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, J residence to the site is approximately 1-1/2 miles away, The nearest d approxi- J Bodega Bay (population 350) is the nearest village and is locate The total population mately 2 miles north-northeast of the reactor site. l 114,000. j 500 and within 25 miles is about within 5 miles is about !
Plant Descriptiori is The nuclear power reactor proposed for construction on Bodega Head I Reactors of this a direct cycle, forced circulation, boiling water type. Illinois, Big Rock, Michigan, , type have been operated successfully at Dresden, Design power at Bodega is 1008 thermal and Humboldt Bay, California, for Dresden, 240 Mwt for Big Rock megawatts (Mwt), compared with 700 Mwt Point and 165 Mwt for Humboldt Bay. da ; The reactor core will have an active fuel length of 125 inches an ! diameter of 137 inches. It will contain 592 fuel assemblies and 145 movable. l The control rod drives will be similar to control rods (cruciform blades) . Dresden, Big Rock Point, and Humboldt the rod drives which have been used at Bay. the Bodega Bay plant the company proposes to utilize For containment at similar to that already in use at its the pressure suppression concept The reactor vessel and the coolant recirculation system Humboldt Bay plant. 115,000 cu. ft. ) are to be enclosed in a dry well vessel, whose volume is about pipes, each eight feet in diameter, The dry well is connected through eight vent ft., of 142,000 cu. to a suppression chamber with a volume of approximately In the unlikely event of which about 62.000 cu. ft. is filled with water. recirculation line, the pressure a complete severance of a reactor coolant DRAFT RLDO AN :SLS 10/16/64
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\ ,~ a result of steam flow to the suppression pool where the steam would be condensed. ( Any fission products released either concurrently or subsequently would be trapped either in the dry well or suppression chamber.) Tests have been conducted that demonstrate the effectiveness of this concept. Further tests are in progress to determine where and to what extent baffles are needed between the underwater exhausts. The fuel-handling facilities at this plant provide for underwater transfer of spent fuel from the reactor vessel to the fuel storage pool through an interconnecting pool of water. These operations are to be conducted inside a refueling building which will be maintained at a olight
. negative pressure by fans which discharge air through particulate and halogen removal filters to a stack, thereby minimizing the possibility of direct out-leakage from the building.
Radioactive liquid wastes from the Bodega plant are to be mixed with condenser effluent (about 250,000 gpm) prior to discharge to the Pacific Ocean. All solid wastes with radioactive contamination are to be transferred to licensed waste disposal agents for off-site disposal. Radioactive gases are to be vented to a special stack the height of which is to be specified on the basis of results of a meteorological survey now in progress. The disposal of both liquid and gaseous radioactive wastes will be monitored and controlled so that at any off-site location the concentration of radioactive contaminants will not exceed the limits set forth in Title 10, Cade of Federal Regulations, Part 20. Important Safety Considerations In our evaluation of this application, we have given special consideration i to a number of site and design features which have important safety implications . I l i' 2_________ _ i
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,lacitirc-bus rotcaer eht dloh ot dedeen fi lessev rotcaer eht otni detcejni eb nac lairetam lortnoc nosiop elbulos a ,noitidda nI .noitisop nwardhtiw ylluf eht ni kcuts emoceb dluohs dor eno fi neve nwod tuhs eb nac ti ro ,nwardhtiw yltnetrevdani si dor eno fi lacitirc= bus niamer lliw rotcaer eht ,suhT .ssel ro 99 0 eb lliw eroc eht f o evitceff e-k eht ,detresni ylluf sdor rehto eht dna nwardhtiw ylluf dor evitcaer tsom eht htiW 79 0 deecxe ton lliw eroc eht fo evitceffe-k eht detresni sdor lortnoc lla htiw efil eroc gnirud emit yna ta taht os dengised eb ot si rotcaer yaB agedoB ehT !
.tluser dluoc tneisnart gnigamad a erofeb detceted eb dluow ytilibatsni neeserofnu yna taht os (
hcaorppa esiw-pets a hguorht rewop lluf ot thguorb eb lliw rotcaer I eht ,rehtruF .snoitjidnoc gnitarepo ta ytivitcaer f o stneicif f eoc diov dna erutarepmet evitagen tibihxe ot detcepxe si tI
.yaB tdlobmuH dna tnioP kcoR giB ,nedserD gnidulcni snoitacol rehto fo rebmun a ta ylefas detarepo neeb sah taht epyt a fo si tnalp ;
agedoB eht rof desoporp rotcaer raelcun retaw gniliob ehT ngiseD rotcaeR raelcuN eht fo vtilibatiuS 2 g ,
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ti erofeb rucco thgim taht sedilcunoidar fo noitartnecnocer yna f 1 enimreted ot elba eb dluow tnacilppa eht ,suhT .ssarg lee dna eagla laditretni eht fo dna sehsif tnediser.,hsifllehs ,setarbetrevni
,stnemides mottob ,notknalp ,sretaw eniram fo nekat eb dluow selpmas ylretrauq taht detcepxe si ti tub ,detelpmoc neeb ton evah margorp gnilpmas eht fo sliateD .secnemmoc noitarepo retfa eunitnoc l lliw dna rotcaer eht fo noitarepo erofeb sraey owt detaitini eb lliw snorivne.sti dna etis siht fo yevrus gnirotinom lacigoloidar a taht detats sah tnacilppa eht ,noitidda nI 02 RFC 01 ni deificeps snoitartnecnoc elbissimrep mumixam eht woleb erutxim eht ni sedilcun
-oidar fo noitartnecnoc eht gniniatniam ni detapicitna si melborp oN .naecO cificaP eht ot egrahcsid ot roirp tneulffe resnednoc htiw dexim eb ot era tnalp siht morf setsaw diuqil evitcaoidaR sngiseD dna snalP lasopsiD etsaW evitcaoidaR eht fo ycauqedA 4
.ngised tnemele leuf rehtruf gnidnep etelpmoc ton si ytilacitircbus erussa ot ngised kcar egarots leuF .sksac gnildnah leuf htiw detaicossa sdrazah laitnetop eht gnitanimile dna ,snoitarepo lla fo gnilooc retawrednu dna noitavresbo lausiv rof gnidivorp suht
,lessev rotcaer eht ot lennahc retaw a yb detcennoc si loop egarots leuf eht snoitarepo gnileufer gniruD .scitsiretcarahc ytefas elbarovaf sah ytilicaf siht rof tpecnoc gnildnah-leuf ehT seitilicaF enildna11 leuF f o ytilibatiuS 3
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1 .__ _ _ __ f nA .degrembus tpek eb tonnac eroc eht ,eruliaf epip sa hcus ,nosaer emos rof ,fi eroc eht looc ot dedivorp era smetsys yarps eroC .tcatni niamer ti htaeneb gnipip dna lessev rotcaer eht sa gnol os retaw ni degrembus tpek syawla si eroc rotcaer eht taht erussa ot dedivorp si pmup retavdeef i ycnegreme nA .seicnegreme fo gnildnah ef as eht rof seitilicaf fo rebmun ' laitnatsbus a htiw tnalp eht piuqe ot sesoporp tnacilppa ehT smetsys ycnegremE fo ycauqedA 5
.dennalp osla era dnuorgkcab ria dna setalucitrap-ria fo gnilpmas ylkeew dna ,dum maerts dna retaw maerts ,retaw llew ,stcudorp larutlucirga lacol ,noitategev ,lios fo gnilpmas ylretrauQ
.noitarepo rotcaer f o ecnavda ni sraey owt noitaitini rof dennalp si etis eht ta margorp yevrus lacigoloidar A .detceles eb yam thgieh kcats etsav suoesag evitcaoidar etairporppa na taht os ,ygoloroetem lacol l eht fo gnidnatsrednu retteb a poleved ot etis eht ta dellatsni gnieb si ytilicaf lacigoloroetem a dna yrotcaf sitas eb ot detcepxe si ygolotamilc noisuffid ehT . tem eb tonnA9c evitcejbo siht taht eveileb ot nosaer on eb ot sraeppa erehT .stimil elbissimrep deecxe ton lliv noitacol etis-ffo yna ta erusopxe launna mumixam a taht os dellortnoc dna derotinom eb lliv lasopsid setsaw suoesag taht detats sah tnacilppa ehT
.lasopsid etis-ffo rof stnega lasopsid etsav desnecil ot derrefsnart eb ot era tnalp siht morf setsav dilos llA 7 <
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.i gningised rof sisab elbatius a dedivorp evah stset esehT .serutarepmet J llew yrd dna ,serutarepmet dna serusserp tnalooc rotcaer fo yteirav a rednu senil pool'noitalucricer hcni-82 eht fo eno fo ecnareves etelpmoc eht fo l
l tluser a sa ecneirepxe dluow tnemniatnoc eht erusserp mumixam eht enimreted ot tnacilppa eht yb detcudnoc neeb evah stset pukcoM .ngised tnemniatnoc sti ni tpecnoc noisserppus erusserp eht ezilitu ot si tnalp sihT tpecnoC tnemniatnoC eht fo ycauqedA 6
! .sdaol CA laitnesse ,retrevni na hguorht ,dna stnemurtsni lortnoc rof rewop ylppus lliw yrettab noitats laitnatheds a secruos eseht ot noitidda nI .lavomer taeh yaced dna nwcdtuhs efas'rof rewop ylppus nac rotareneg nevird enigne na
,liaf secruos eseht htob fI .noitatshtier ybraen a morf enil noitubirtsid VK 21 ybdnats a morf nwodtuhs ylr.edro rof rewop tneicif fus ylppus nac remrof snart
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yrailixua nA .metsys noissimsnart VK 022 eht morf ,seicnegreme ni ro ,putrats ybdnats tnalp gnirud rewop itivres noitats ylppus ot dedivorp si remrof snart putrats A .elbaliava era rewop cirtcele ycnegreme f o secruos lareveS
.nosaer yna rof yrassecen semoceb noitca hcus fi lacitircbus rotcaer eht peek ot elbaliava ni metsys noitcejni nosiop diuqil A .pukcab sti ro pmup retaw deef yrailixaa eht fo noitca hguorht tsol suht retaw pu gnikam dna , loop noisserppus eht ot enil maets niam eht morf maets gnideelb rof sedivorp metsys sihT .resnednoc ycnegreme eht ot pukc a b (
a sa elbaliava si metsys deef-dna-deelb A .degamad si resnednoc niam eht isac ni knis taeh a sa evres ot dedivorp si metsys erif eht morf pu-ekam i rol snoisivorp dna yticapac egarots retaw egral a htiw resnednoc ycnegremc
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m n The more important of these safety considerations are discussed in LSe {
> I following paragraphs.
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- 1. Suitability of_the Propn ed' Site .
Bes'ed on considerations of potential hacards to public herith ' andI nafety, this reactor site is an excellent one in all respects
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l except one - its proximity to the San Andreas fault zone whose a sodthwest boundary runs approximately 1000 feet to the northeast ' y , of the proposed reactor location. f Problems, posed by this location are considered in a later section of this report. By virtue of property ownership by PGif., as enhanced by the water areas on three sides of the. peninsula, the applicant can
,f-exert positive control over'an area having a minimum radius of about 450 feet from the reactor,.and can exert substantial control over an area extending out to a radius of a%out 1300 feet, the nearest point on Doran Beach across the harbor entrance channel.
I The population in the vicinity of the site is low and the isolation distances are well within acceptable ranges. The local raeteorology is as good as or better than that in Californic > gener i.)) y . The site is not upstream from any drinking water' intakes. Since the amount of gaseous and liquid radioactive waste to be..; discharp,sd to the air and water.will be monitored and controlled to aasure compliance with 10 CFR Part 20' requirements, radioactive waste disposal at this site will not cause any undue ha.'.ard to the public as a result of either direct exposure or ingestion. f 9
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- 2. Suitability of the Nuclear Reactor Design The boiling water nuclear reactor proposed for the Bodega plant is of a type that has been operated safely at a number of other locations including Dresden, Big Rock Point and Humboldt Bay. ,
It is expected to exhibit negative temperature and void coefficientsofreactivityatoperatingcondijtions. Further, the i reactor will be brought to full power through a step-wise approach
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so that any unforeseen instability would be detected before a damaging transient could result. The Bodega Bay reactor is to be designed so that at any time during core life with all control rods inserted the k-effective of the core will not exceed 0.97. With the most reactive rod fully withdrawn and the other rods fully inserted, the k-effective of the core will be 0.99 or less. Thus, the reactor will remain sub-critical if one rod is inadvertently withdrawn, or it can be shut down even if one rod should become stuck in the fully withdrawn position. In addition, a soluble poison control material can be injected into the reactor vessel if needed to hold the reactor sub-critical. The control rod drives proposed for this reactor are similar to, but include certain improvements over, the locking-piston type rod drives that have been used at other plants. The applicant has stated that prototype and production drives will be subjected to functional and endurance tests before reactor startup. 1 L - _ - - _ . _ _ _ - _ - - _ _ _ _ - - - - - - - - - - - . - - - - - - - -
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- 3. Suitability of Fuel Handling Facilities The fuel-handling concept for this facility has favorable safety characteristics. During refueling operations the fuel storage pool is connected by a water channel to the reactor vessel,
.thus providing for visual observation and underwater cooling of all operations, and eliminating the potential hazards associated with fuel handling casks. Fuel storage rack design to assure subcriticality is not complete pending further fuel element design.
- 4. Adequacy of the Radioactive Waste Disposal Plans and Designs Radioactive liquid wastes from this plant are to be mixed with condenser effluent prior to discharge to the Pacific Ocean. No problem is anticipated in maintaining the concentration of radio-nuclides in the mixture below the maximum permissible concentrations specified in 10 CFR 20. In addition, the applicant has stated that a radiological monitocing survey of this site and its environs will be initiated two years before operation of the reactor and will continue after operation commences. Details of the sampling program have not been completed, but it is expected that quarterly samples would be taken of marine waters, plankton, bottom sediments, invertebrates, shellfish, resident fishes and of the intertidal algae and eel grass. Thus, the applicant would be able to determine any reconcentration of radionuclides that might occur before it became a potential safety problem.
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l 7 All solid vastes from this plant are to be transferred to licensed l vaste disposal agents for off-site disposal. The applicant has stated that gaseous vastes disposal vill be monitored and coutrolled so that a maximum annual exposure at any off-site location vill not exceed permissible limits. 'Ibere appears to be no reason to believe that this objective cannot be met. The diffusion climatology is expected to be satisfactory and a meteorological facility is being installed at the site to develop a better understanding of the local meteorology, so that an appropriate radioactive gaseous vaste stack height may be selected. A radiological survey program at the site is planned for initiation two years in advance of reactor operation. Quarterly sampling of soil, vegetation, local agricultural products, well water, stream water and stream mud, and weekly sampling of air particulate and air background are also planned. 5 Adequacy of Emergency systems
'Ihe applicant proposes to equip the plant with a substantial number of facilities for the safe handling of emergencies. An emergency feedvater pump is provided to assure that the reactor core is always kept submerged in water so long as the reactor vessel and piping beneath it remain intact. Core spray systems are prt>vided to cool the core if, for some reason, such as pipe failure, the core cannot be kept submerged. An
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-emergency. condenser with a large water storage capacity and prov ii for s ons make-up from the fire system is provided.to serve as a heat sink in case the main-condenser.is damaged. A bleed-and-feed system is 'available as a j
backup to the emergency condenser. This system provides for bleeding steam
- f rom the main steam line to the suppression pool, and making up water thus lost through action of the auxiliary feed water pump or its backup. A liquid poison injection system is available to keep the- reactor subcritical if'such action becomes necessary. for any reason.
Several sources ' of echrgency electric power are available. A startup-
. standby transformer is provided to supply station service power during plant
-startup, or in emergencies, from the 220 KV transmission system. An auxiliary ,
standby transformer can supply sufficient power for orderly shutdown,from' a 12 KV distribution line from a nearby substation. If both these sources fail, an engine driven generator can supply power for safe shutdown and decay heat removal. In addition to these sources a substantial station battery will supply power for control instruments and, through an inverter, essential AC loads.
- 6. Adequacy of the Containment Concept This plant is to utilize the pressure suppression concept in its containment design. Mockup tests have been conducted by the applicant to determine the maximum pressure the containment would experience as a result of the complete severance of one of the 28-inch recirculation loop lines under a variety of reactor coolant pressures and temperatures, and dry well temperatures. These tests have provided a suitabic basis for designing 4
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the system and have also shown that the steam exhausted to the suppression pool is completely condensed beneath the pool surface. The applicant has proposed adequate provisions to assure reliable containment performance in the event of an accident. Redundant isolation valves are to be placed in the main steam lines. Containment leak rate tests are to be conducted after installation of all penetrations by applying dry well design pressure to the completed dry well and suppression chamber design pressure to the completed suppression chamber. The containment leaktightness will be tested at periodic intervals throughout the life of the plant. Specifications for contain-i ment design pressure and leak rate will ibnit potential accident consequences to acceptable levels.
- 7. Acceptability of Potential Exposure to the Maximum Credible Accident The applicant has evaluated the consequences of a -'
i number of credible accidents, based on the assumption that the containment and other safeguards function as designed. In most cases they would create no significant hazard to the health and safety of the public. Of those credible accidents which were considered to have a potential for significant releases of Gi%r96 iw Tiu.}ul sal;3 Lu %ii radioactivity to the environment, tbc accident resulted in the highest potential off-site doses. It was assumed in the refueling accident analysis that a fuel bundle was dropped into a near-critical reactor, causing a nuclear excursion which releases . 4
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fission products into the refueling building. .Using standard calculation procedures and realistic numbers, the applicant calculated that the maximum off-site potential whole body
' dose for the duration of this accident would be less than 1.0 rem. Noble gases are the major contributor to the potential whole body doses from such an accident. Potential thyroid doses from this assumed accident would not result in potential whole body or thyroid exposures in excess of Part 100 guide-lines for reactor site criteria. Fr these results it can be concluded that the containment syst p posed for this reactor is capable of reducing the poten 1 hazards of credible accidents to levels which do not pre 3ent an undue risk to the health and safety of the public.
Research and Development Programs Pacific Gas and Electric Company and its contractors are planning a number of research and development programs, the results of which will be utilized in final design of the plant. They include the following:
- 1. Radiological Survey A preoperational monitoring survey of the site and its environs to be initiated two years before commencement of operation of the reactor. Although the details of this program have not been completed, it is anticipa ted that it will be similar to that conducted for the company's Humboldt Bay nuclear unit. '
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- 2. Meteorology A meteorological facility is being installed at the site to provide necessary data for atmospheric diffusion studies.
Instruments will be mounted at three levels on a 250 ft. tower and will measure temperature and wind speed and direction. All readings will be digitized and recorded on paper tape. The results of this program will be used in calculating the potential dilution of radioactive gases, and in selecting a suitable stack height. 3. Oceanography The capacity of the ocean to diffuse the condenser cooling water and minimize the effects of temperature and radioactivity on the marine biota is being investigated in a series of experi-ments to be conducted at the site. These tests include use of drift poles and uranine dye as well as measurements of temperature and salinity. They will continue through at least one annual cycle of oceanographic and meteorological conditions.
- 4. Marine Biology Survey An ecological survey is being conducted to prepare lists of the marine fauna and flora of Bodega Head and Harbor.
- 5. Pressure Suppression Tests As described in the applicant's Hazards Summary Report, Appendix I, extensive tests of the pressure suppression concept have been conducted. Additional tests will be conducted at the m____.____
) 13 3 the safety of the installation in the event of the occurrence of a severe earthquake at or near the location of the plant.
Since the field of earthquake structural design is highly specialized, it has been necessary to call upon the services of expert consultants for help in analyzing the various problems involved in arriving at a decision on the technical feasibility of building the Bodega plant at the proposed location with reasonable assurance that it will safely withstand the maximum earthquake that might credibly occur during the life of the plant. The design consultants employed by the applicant, PG&E, include Dr. George W. Housner, Professor of Civil Engineering and Applied Mechanics at the California Institute of Technology, Dr. Hugo Benioff, prominent West Coast Engineering Seismologist, and Mr. E. C. Marliave, Consulting Geologist. The AEC Regulatory Staff has retained the services of Dr. N. M. Newmark, Professor l of Civil Engineering at the University of Illinois and Mr. Robert A. Williamson of Holmes & Narver. There is a substantial difference between the viewpoint of the applicant and that of the U. S. Coast and Geodetic Survey (USC&GS) and U. S. Geological Survey (USGS) with respect to the maximum credible earthquake that should be taken as the design basis for the Bodega Head plant. The PG&E earthquake consultants feel strongly that the maximum ground acceleration to be expected j
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.. ) 15 determine whether t'he company considered it feasible to design the Bodega plant so_as to provide reasonable assurance that the integrity of the ' reactor containment would be preserved and that the reactor would lue shut down and maintained in a safe condition in the event of the occurrence of an earthquake of the severity postulated'by the USC&GS and USGS. The technical basis for their conclusion was also requested. While continuing to disagree strongly with the credibility of.such an extreme earthquake, the applicant has nevertheless proposed a design which the company and its consultants feel confident will safely ride through a 2/3g earthquake, with peak ground acceleration up to 1.0g, which is accompanied by differen-tial shear ground displacement under the reactor containment of up to 3 feet either horizontal or vertical. If such an earth-quake should occur, the containment might be tipped or rotated i slightly, but there would be no breach in its lehk-tightness and no release of fission products, in the the. applicant. The general description of the postulated earthquake involves a patter of ground motions similar to that recorded by the Coast and Geodetic Survey in the El Centro Earthquake of May 18, 1940, but with ! i l I
crise that cannot be successfully handled. Building the reactor structure and its foundation in such a way I I that it will safely survive a shear ground movement underneath it of as much cs 3 feet poses a more troublesome problem. n e applicant proposes to i cecomplish this by a design which provides for a 3 foot unobstructed radial-i clearance between the outside of the reinforced concrete containment structure and the inside of a containment pit, completely around the circum- ] ference, from elevation -73 feet to yard elevation at +25 feet. ne walls of the reactor containment pit will be lined with reinforced concrete to j prevent possible spalling of material into the pit. n e annular space will ; be pennitted to fill with water. D e reactor containment structure will be founded on a layer of carefully selected sand of characteristics which the cpplicant believes will permit horizontal movements up to 3 feet without impairing the function of the containment structure, although the structure might be shif ted or rotated. Differential vertical notions up to 3 feet may cause the contain-i sent structure to tilt or shift, but, in the opinion of the applicant, in np case vill the
. inmen: !! unction be impaired.
It is proposed that the plant be designed with no rigid structural interconnection between any major components. n e reactor containment structure will be structurally independent of the turbine generator foundation, the plant l control building, the radwaste facility, the stack, and the plant service buildings. Piping and wiring interconnections important to safety between the reactor containment structure, the control building and the turbine generator will have suf ficient flexibility to accommodate 3 feet of relative movement. In order to prevern overstress at points of penetration for piping l l i
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. ,' 18 connecting the dry well with the turbine, the company proposes to provide adequate anchora and bracing adjacent to the containment shell and beyond l the double isolation valves. These anchors will be adequate to withstand all piping loads due to differential motion in any direction up to 3 feet between the reactor containment structure and the turbine generator founda-tion.
The foregoing proposal for safeguarding the Bodega Reactor and its containment structure against the postulated shear differential ground motion embodies concepts which are in many respects novel and for which little or no precedent exists. The Regulatory Staff Consultant, Dr. N. M. Newmark, has come to the conclusion af ter carefully studying the basis of the proposal that the structural integrity and leak-tightness of the containment building can be maintained under the conditions postulated. 1 He points out, however, several items that will have to be given special attention during the design phase in order to achieve the desired objective. Perhaps the most important of these items is the main piping system leading from the reactor pressure vessel to the turbine and other equipment outside the containment building. The piping would have to be made sufficiently l flexible to acconanodate a relative movement of 3 feet without failure, and at the same time be damped to reduce its dynamic response to earthquake oscillations. Adequate provisions would also have to be made to have enough emergency power available locally to operate the emergency cooling system and other engineered safeguards in the event of earthquake damage to over-head power lines from outside power cources. Protection of the plant against the possible occurrence of large tsunamis has not yet been satisfactorily resolved but does not appear to offer any unsurmountable design barriers.
19 It is difficult to evaluate the public safety risks involved in a new type of construction for which there is little or no experience background.
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Other reactor installations have presented seismic design problems, but not in the extreme form presented by Bodega Head under the earthquake postulated by the Coast and Geodetic Survey and the Geological Survey. One problem wb'-h the Bodega plant has in common with all other nuclear power plants sub'*;t to special seismic design considerations is the inability to conduct any sort of performance test on the finished structure that will demonstrate that the design objectives have been achieved. The uncertainty precented by this situation has been accepted as a reasonable risk in t)e seismic design at other locations where the only problem involved is the ability to withstand vibrational stresses, since this aspect of earthquake design is well understood and has a considerable amount of experience background. There is difficulty in applying the same philosophy at Bodega Head, however, because of the necessity of considering the additional problem of designing the reactor structure to safely withstand differential ground motion as well as high vibrational stresses, and because there is no realistic way of evaluating the proposed solution to the problem. The fact that the proposed site is adjacent to the San Andreas fault zone makes it almost certain that it will be subjected to one or more severe seismic disturbances during the lifetime of the plant. While there is a high probability that the plant under the proposed design could survive even a very large vibrational earthquake without damage, it must be recognized that if such an earthquake should also involve several feet of shear ground movement as well as ground accelerations as high as 2/3g to 1.0g there is presently no sound experimental or experience basis for predicting the extent of damage that might be incurred by the reactor containment structure and emergency equipment designed to assure the safety of the reactor.
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; 20 The fact that a novel method is proposed for safeguarding the Bodega Head reactor against differential ground movement of its foundation rock is not in itself a cause for concern. The nuclear power industry is replete with new methods of coping with a large variety of problems never previously encountered until the arrival of the atomic age. What is of concern is the lack of any experimental or experience proof-test of the proposed novel method that could form an acceptable basis for the required safety evaluation.
The pressure-suppression concept of reactor containment was co rpletely novel when it was first proposed for use at the Humboldt Bay Nuclear Power Plant. In many mspects it was much simpler than the pedestal concept for safeguarding against shear movement of foundation rock proposed for the Bodega Head reactor. But it was not approved for use as reactor containment until after the successful conclusion of a long series of engineering tests at the PG&E's Moss Landing power generation plant which proved beyond reasonable doubt that the concept could be utilized safely for boiling water reactors. Similar proof-test standards have consistently been applied to other new and previously untried features incorporated from time to tim in nuclear power plants. The fact that meaningful proof tests are difficult to achieve in the case of seismic safeguards does not , in our opinion, constitute a valid reason for accepting them in critical areas on the basis of theoretical reasons alone. Nor does it justify accepting the conclusions and recommendations of outside expert consultants unless these am backed up by somewhere near the same kind of experimental evidence required of all other safeguards. We do not see such evidence in support of the pedestal concept for safeguarding the Bodega reactor against differential ground motion.
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Whether the public benefits to be gained from operation of the Bodega Nuclear Power Plant are high enough to justify pub acceptance of the added uncertainties involved in the seismic design of the plant to withstand several feet of shear ground movement is , of course , a matter of judgment. The regulatory requirement that there be " reasonable assurance" that any licensed nuclear reactor een be built and operated without undue risk to the health and safety of the public recognizes that there is no way of eliminating all of the uncertainties,. app experienced judgment is therefore required. The standard of " reasonable assurance" is more difficult to meet when it becomes necessary to take into consideration un M @ n external ving the potential of invalidating some of the safeguards built into the reactor installation. The difficulty is enlarged when there are uncertainties in the design measures intended to counteract the external forces. Somekhere alongthelineenoughuncertaintieswillcreateasituationinhwhichthe
" assurance" can no longer be said to be " reasonable".
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22 . ]> ( ( . ! " would exist if the proposed pedestal concept of seismic design were to j be approved without more convincing evidence of its validity than is afforded by presently available infomation. The containment and all of the emergency equipment for shutting down the Bodega reactor and maintaining it indefinitely in a safe condition in the absence of seismic disturbances are designed on the basis of well-established engineering principles. They can also be tested to ascertain that the design objectives have been achieved. Consequently, there is a high degree of assurance that the reactor can be built and operated without undue risk to the health and safety of the public in the absence of seismic dis'turbances. The seismic design of the reactor structure to withstand purely vibrational effects is also based on well-established engineering principles which in some cases at least have been verified in the presence of earth-quakes. Thus, while it is not possible to carry out any measurements on the finished structure to assure that the seismic deoign objectives have been accomplished, there is sufficient experience background to justify a conclusion of " reasonable assurance" that the specified seismic vibrational criteria have been achieved and' that the plant will therefore be safeguarded against any credible earthquake that does not rupture the foundation rock. There is room for reasonable doubt that a comparable situation exists I with respect to that particular aspect of the proposed seismic design of ] i' the Bodega reactor structure intended to assure that the containment and reactor shutdown functions vill remain intact in the event of a shear displacement of its foundation bedrock as great as three feet in any direction. While the proposed engineering principles appear reasonable, experimental verification and experience background on the proposed novel construction method are lacking. If approved, this would, to the best of our knowledge,
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nd its i be the first attempt on record to design a building structure a ffects of substantial movement associated vital equipment to withstand the e i g a severe , in its foundation simultaneously with the vibration accompany n earthquake, Because of the magnitude of the possible consequences of a i d by a failure of major rupture in the reactor containment accompan e large nuclear power reactor emergency equipment, we do not believe that a ffort based on un-should be the subject of a pioneering construction e h y appear to be. I verified engineering principles, however sound t ey ma Nuclear In all respects except one the proposed design of the Bodega be built Power Plant provides reasonable assurance that the plant can f of the public. and operated without undue risk to the health and sa ety ts the However, the single exception is quite important if one accep se a major credibility of an earthquake of suf ficient magnitude to cau Although there is 1 displacement of foundation rock underneath the plant. f such an earthquake, b a wide difference of expert opinion on the credibility o dations of the prudent judgment favors accepting the conservative recommen f On this basis and for reasons given above, it is USC6CS and the USGS. for the proposed our conclusion that Bodega Head is not a suitable location the present stage of our knowledge. nuclear power plant at
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- 1. ' Assume an earthquake having a vibration spectrum similar 't:o that of El Centro but .with . maximum acceleration of-2/3.g* velocities up to.2 ft./sec.; ground displacements up to.3 ft.; shear, displacement (faulting) of 2 f t. in the founda- ,.
tions of the ~ plant, Land with the occurrence of ldanbeaftershock taken. What equal.to El Centro before remedial action cou plarit"a'rrairgeme'nt;e, design criterie- and procedures .cou.1d,_be_ _ developed to prevent impairment of functions t This of structures, should include equipment and systems impcrtant to safety? an analysis indicating ~the margins to allowable stress or-deformation limits, ' i
- 2. ' Assume an earthquake having a vibration spectrum similar to that of El Centro but with accelerations generally. .. .
up - to 2/3. g. plus intennittent pulses of acceleration up to 1 g*; velocities up to 2 ft./sec.; ground displacements up to 3 ft.; I shear displacement (faulting) in the plant foundations of 3 ft.; and with the occurrenEe 'of an 'af tershbck' What equal- planttoarrangements, El Centro- - - before remedial action could be taken. design criteria and procedures could be developed in which safe would shutdown assure shutdown and maintenance of the plant , condition? !
*The maximum of acceleration, velocity and displacement would ,
not occur for the same periods of vibrations. l l um__.____ __
i **- A.
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W t Ap * ' Sa "" bou""'*- _ Far coacu( F F"t'a-MEMO ROUTE SLIP _ For signature. For information. Note and return.
.nirm AEC+93 mev. May14, 1947)
INITIALS REMARKS Attached are clips re N : TO (Name end unit) Joe Fouchard, News Service Br. J. E. F. chrenfelarIO/M/M DF1, aq 2._s. F. L = (t.ar, L0/30/64 OAT 3 sara n h .u. 1>r eu n a rat, in/.29/M Marold Price, REG, E 4. Oakland Tribune, 10/29/64 (2 items) anALs REMARKS To (Name ang. - in, asc, an _ (seert -
.So-ROS Richard L. Doan, REC, BQ WilALS REMARKS TO (Name and unit)
R. W. Sanit.h, Cocyl. V., SAN DATE RE M ARKS F ROM (Name and unst) Rodacy L. Southwicl: } Asst. to the Mgr. for -- hablic Ir.furstion - SAN HONC 16 DATE 10/30/64 u s coviewfNt PRINfthG orriCE mf -O-422007 USE OTHER SIDE FOR ADDITIONAL REMARKS
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,ee N Brbwn Urges PG,&E to un Abandon Bodega Prcjec^
< ;,, v e c n o r Eamt4r.d G. It would be unsafe.
3rown ur,:ed the Pacific Northern Calhurnsa .
- Gas and Electric Co. yev ! In San l'rancisev. Pubae Dennett said he was u r.1-s terday to. seek a site for its;' ham M Bennett .
ongtime a lUtilities Comrnissioner Wil 'ing ta Gerde
- p r opo se d nuclear poweriopponent of the Dode.;;a proj : decision in the last analysisi
- plant that would be less 'e c t, l e a r t h q u a k e-prone than sent rest.< with you or at the wryi
; Bodega Head. PG&E president Robert H. ' nated by your views "a let Gerdes to make a personal .
Tne Governor said he was i A spokesman from PG&E; dis:urbed by Tuesday's, decision to abanden the s.tc. said neither the comptny nor s' f ep rt a isi g f safe .As I read the Atomic En. Gerdes would makeim- :.1 em CoMssion stan 2:mediak re%y to hn o.- ty reasons. against building, port. it makes it abundantlyj the p'. ant. He added he recog clear that the conccrn I have Dent.ett \ -
'nizec taat an advisory com 8I*AYs had for the pubhc Th e company has spent mittee of distinguished scien. safet>, ls well placed. Ben ,labout Si million on tce site of tlsts approved the idea. nett wrote. t proposed nucier.r plant. $
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l arest - nuc' ear danger is so t he PG"It also makes it clear th ; shghtly mare inan a year. I cr.ar.d:at 9 you c n't take any,gerous &E is playing a car. pendmg a rt. ing by tne AEC wdat. soever." Brown : game um the u eh gn PG&E's application to ti.. M.c at a news conference in'and safety of the people ot , tsh the job. u.c mento Ari my imn'ediate Tac ,I m ,a , :) say to PG&E, iet's go sGmcWnere el59 ' ' T,rc u . n;d he woa:d *arcr arac.c .nt. tne plant es an if g .i.;n J L: e ".catisti ap-proWG s ar.G h J.lority said 6 ne
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Brow _n A Site View: ' Safety' l Governor Edmund G. Public Utilities Commissioner . Brown yesterday offered a William Bennett fired off a
" safety first" opinion of Pa 1 e t t e r to PG&E President cific Gas pany's & Electr'c proposed Bodega Com. Robert H. Gerdes in which he Head said:
site for an atomic reactor. "As I read the Atomic En-Brown, who qualified his ergy Commission report it offhand remarks by saying he makes it abundantly clear
. hadn't been able to " crystal- that the concern I've always ize" his position, said:
"My immediate reaction is well had for the public safety is placed, that if there is any question of safety at all, the PG&E "It also makes it clear that g the PG&E is playing a dan-better abandon that site and gerous game with the welfare go to another one, and safety of the people of "If there is any danger in northern California." -l it. or if a majority says it Bennett said that he may would be safe but a minority l ask the utilities commission.
says it would be unsafe, let's which get out of it." last year authorized PG&E to construct the plant The Governor added that on the Bodgea site, to take "this nuclear danger is so another look at the plan. ! great that you can't take any{ P G & E President Gerdes! chance whatsoever." i made no immediate comment! Tr.c Governor's remarks!on either B2nnett's letter or~ followed two conflicting red Gov Brown's remarks. ports by the Atomic Energyj Commission on the safety of l building a nuclear powerj Cllinese Detector-plant on a site over the San OSAKA (Japan)-(AP)- Andreas earthquake fault. Nationalist Chinese Olympic The Advisory Committee on marksman Ma Ching Shan, Reactor Safeguards found the wha defected last Friday be-site safe but the Division of cause he wanted to see his Reactor Licensing found it, parents in Communist China, unsuitable. jsailed for the Chinese main-As a result of the reports,iland yesterday. j l l l
tont oh g 2 t u "t,lIj! x"I s , ii s s - e o wi"d t
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ins e s ..i e jn a ee n elyts nc o ri a e r 9 r e n
. m qu . h rl ;k l et i i.t lp eat c uai" o drp cafi p lo aliyno t
o idhi a t pjleicm t t a y C ht ekr ty r aob o en p p .bsbt ra b. L eh a sf d a a oi icr u e ap ah" "s o y e vono .iwi at t h niCt el edia ri ll wil t t u r es neod t t n o h eh eisds t s u ne ie ad oit s er sibdv e c iu l na o ar mm P ss e m f
- it o e oEnkb i yn Al pmnt a ai s siGinl ie ut m.l e te mr y o
t o s qt Codl ic emn e i n i l h s ni wy t e n o n nee s n s t d e n r
.ii c d ouh smgtayt het aenc o n oMa r e
p uiimsht eMe d ye b re b,s%Ftlic f e B b sd m o r vf n Be gmi hh t s o e a e i d io t n tcr .t e ccnt. tn u etis odt t t oh a If biM l 'ns r. Tk h sicn na uC t ipt
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t Et oh e Avt k a gepr e r ohio r f s a notcoa l f sal ped y ec "m d a nu n se t dpr u qdinh i p eyc e aa a o t rex oh eo ixos a pdtnt t ab p b "c ta tp hr nre smnfai i r n m . er "t or e e p eh r o eies t t icdCve pd e ooit t p r l p id d e e n ad r c e ew a c i unUo u tod fa e onh h s i gn c PNo r mt oh leb s :c f v ta e c o o e lyd c "t eea t eh n s s et t a c rt f b n n t v d mf nn" a ey sh p ei ga a Ce c E rnr i o".ne pnt oi iu tyi s! o vh v t n r v s o h t u e v no ur spogr t eattnh ad h e o its e cl u id" ef tnn ei e. x A e i c vts x tel.Bmep g Tcenett s .hinp dd el unm dd h o y e n e - m r.oc s n f i t
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",i m nmo yro t to nth r de gc oo cta r wa o f s r r n e n aA R e o gv e a n c o cs e nt oent its uo a
h m "o h i f ege a lr n v e e og s imh ee mSI itya ov eidt o u t a at d lp r ot tngac t n d qEh e s ot . li o t aayea ei &t I t B tanGt ui c he s ert btt s t yG o",h a e s i t e no n P "e, n t h t n w e, dnh e t,his e ot r pr imta a t id u nn t e t a t. sl
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dt.h mtadirpo eomh t lu'e r a h l a s ne pB e eCs i i t"I t m-f t nemr e o w dh abl net a e .yl a dgtnf pntgih a i r t e ir z deo Ee ia"imt tsd ef mf a s r gro ub db yr aeh et t t an o
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r inh t t n t O C'mn si c cf irt ge uj ClPaA
*i f oc lemk .md " ig ed n pi r ty".
t jd rh e omnt. r t os s rd o yh ab a ca e et e oejwpf jz a ioi s o gt t s hed b ne ai et uh hat tn ie e rmo rmi g ast s a iml a s a E pu n on r sT orl a vf aih f e h et Ai d do "e mo u a
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ybI t - , s - s.f ephdt a sB b cp l or US o n r ooo nf'- d 'o - di sf - ot.i o oif iss y B is et nmisi e oa eh o s lairl a .dv nw Br f s r, pkt y IL cCeuCmtnie iq emes - r as a o s e md tnEa fas nI dA I r B at e la t r Dc et Cr v ot a . li h o e ees il n p& o Gle mf e Gt e A o o es a tr a n wG s ePsth W ON U NEs i onlpyd . Wsht odre no P i E rt t o n er d
& sinbid gel i crl i ut t
f o t e O Oal mUa t n v e i.rmies snal e nGs I h DGu ycmmiy y l e c leimt d eioh a p eEh t is or s vt oiri t r ev t e w B S Bfiici s a umbB b ad yh l oat v .nmh o do wp pwMl a s a a Pym a oaa P a gA t t anGn d m,Cha nt o I n o s dfrihh nt t ed yb b a aCttcU oPhd ee p e r i k
- - --w -
(s ( -k l t A-Plant i Under i New Fire (Continued from Page 1)
' There is now " legit i m a t e doubt" over the plant's safety from an " impartial source,":
.Mr. Bennett said; "why takel
. the risk?"
l There is "no shortage of con tb jventional fuels for energy re-[ qtdrements," he said, and the
! project is "not needed for elec l:
itrical energy." Among evidence considered by the PUC before it made at finding of ' public convenience-and necessity" in connecuon: with the plant was the cuestion! of whether the nuclear plant; would produce cheaper pc w a r! than a conventional one. In IM2 PG&E testified that it; would be chaper at the Bodega,I location. A Nace then the company has ' done some site developm e n t ' work at the 225-acre site-includ 3 mg excavation of the reactor pit-and has spent in t o t a I f about $4 million, according to t cornpany testimony before the C State Supreme Court. lf PG&E spokesman a e k n o 1 i edged that the Bennett le t t e ti has been received, but had nol comment on that, cr on Gov. : Brown's statement. t
- _ _ _ _ _ _ ~
y - e
.(
rusarn Bodega Plant
/o &
! Site Opp /4o ed I
iBy Governor SACRAMENTO (UPI)--Gov. lEdmund
- G. Brown today said j that the Pacific Gas and Electric t Company should abandon its plans to construct an atomic
, power plant at Bodega Bay.
The governor made clear that his statement was an "immedi-ate reaction" to reports submit-ted to the Atomic Energy Com- ,
. mission on the safety of the t
l proposed installation. One report,
' from AEC engineers, said the
, plant might be unsafe; another,trom an advisory committee.
'said that construction could pro-ceed "If there'.s any question of safety at all. PG&E ought to abandon that site," Brown said.
PG&E had already started construction of the plant. on the lSonoma County coast. hut has
'lately delayed additionc work because of opposition from per-
! sans charging that it would he unsafe and would desecrate the natural beauty of the area.
Brown had so far rt enined out of the controversy. But on the basis of the AEC reports, he said, he would be inclined to tell the company: "Let's g) someplace else." _. ______mm.__m__ __m._____m
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GdEe.~t flew w/4/H AL MARTINEZ When It's Temblor
) $
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i Time at Bodega Bay ve ry> ,o,,y
! am certainly glad that the Atomic and, after an interminable wait, was in-l Etiergy Commission has cleared up the formed tha'. yes, the lights are out all question of whether a PG&E nuclear re- right, goodbye, call again. This naturally actor near Bodega Bay would pose a haz, makes me irritable. What's going to hap-ard in an earthquake. Two reports issued pen if there's an earthquake? My xite by commission agencies say (1) sure, will say there's an earthquar:e, do scme-P'G&E, it's perfectly safe to build there thing, and the PG&E people will say yes, and (2) don't you dare. In other words, there's an earthquake, goodbye, call perhaps there is a danger and perhaps aga:n. AndI'lllose sleep.
there isn't. There is. There isn't. Is. Isn't. On the other hand, however, I am not Yes. No. Well, maybe. going to sit around for the rest of my The AEC's Division of Nuclear Licens- life worrying about earthquakes. I've got ing is the agency responsible for the nega- too many things to worry about as it is, tive report. The AEC's Advisory Commit- such as increased taxes and the possteility tee on Reactor Safeguards minimized the that the sky will fall. I am getting old hezard of a nuclear plant near an earth, too soon. quake fault. Which set of experts do you All thm;,s considered, I say let PG&E b6teve? bui!d its nuclear power plant at Bodega Bay. But du't let them use it. If the p; ant wins final anproval and if there b a major ecrthquake at the fault am going sn ts t to toss py emonc, M c,
- mne, sou may either flee for your life in the lap of the sae problem rt;;ht bac,.
Atomic r.nergy Com-oc seek safety' atop the PG&E facility, de-3 " 6 pt.nding upon wher. your faith lies. 'hg **ffr - But I cannot allo"/ such a complex prob- agency to handle. fem, complicated by two opposing reports, to go unirterpreted. TherMore, I offer t* The real issue is that PG&E ought to day an exclusive analysis of the situa- get a bigger r.ight crew to answer tele-t.on. phone calls when there is a power Diiurt Don't push, madam, there are plenty of in my area. Then I would not have to wait newspapers for evegone- . so long to learn positively what I had al-ready suspected and would be treated First. I would like to say that you have with more respect by the PG&E man who to think twice about granting a nuclear answers the phone. _ permit to any outfit that keeps having I would callif there were an carthquake power failures. Just the other mght, for and I lived n(ar Bodega Bay and a friendly instance, the power failed for 40 minutes voice would come on instantly and say ch and my wife woke me up at 1:30 a.m. yes, there has been an earthquake, the to say the lights are out, do something. nuclear reactor has ruptured ar.d you will Of course the lights are out, I said, it's die a slow and terribk death. Many night. thanks for your call. This is a recording. But she insisted, so I telephoned PG&M Now then, that's better. - almtz l 1
o i
~6C-Qgf Sa m' abat tal*- For action.
MEMO ROUTE St.lP ( _. _ For concurrence, f _ w,rm Arc.ca m n.wari4.im) [ Note and return. For slEnature. For information. TO (Nam. and unit) INITIALS REMARKS Joe Soushard, 991, M Atteshed is Moustetter No. 14 - No. Calif. Asen. Se Preserve Bodega Esed ene eerser. Barold Fries 238, 4 D*" nebert_* _ _ :nNass. M _ ame and unit) NITIA REM ARKS 6' TO a .
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g VV & J rner md 3 fIu s % n/2 An i
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- s. me i o.. era, a TO (Name and untt) INITIALS REMARKS c-
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R. W. Smith, Camp 1. i., SAN DATE
.., t4 O
FROM (Name and unit) REM ARKS . Bodney L. M W ak ' Asst. to the Mgr. far .. o Publis Emiermation s&N PHONE NCL DATE g USE OTHER 54DE FOR ADDITION AL REMARKS OPO 64) 16 e 77649 e 1
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, -a4.b ichcrapn r, venue, der 'e .q:y -
,, .:n tirornir . . 19 ;'i', [ih msE> Sonona, Ca ifornia'"t PG&E OPTS TH E LOO PH O L E i l(
p 3 All proter.no tMt the W.dec; rAac*,or vnl be founded on "nni id rocl " nas nw bemt abandonedi Amendr.ent,5c . 4 to MW'n hazard.; naalyaic, sut..itted te the fS on July 20th, rev als that the Q prener t ache:re 12 literally ( floatinq veaael . Tne. t6 madmen , was -filed in respons,. to th9 AE0; R iet.ter of Rty 19th (cnclosed with our luct neve.letto d. j 1 "caway sm:fru sea" - -
- j. "rhe reactor conta5 ment atr e ur.," m e a'
L 'he 80-page amoaUmont, " vill be Gimiad an a " EMPTY HOLE IN THE HE A0 0AY" f layer of carefully aelec ted . sad M known ch.-i- ! mtb re v ul
- a plc.;.ic, acceches and ,b.zz;t me h w v.,
-l th2 Ascociatjon's first an
*j racteriatico unich vill pwtit Sc21n ntal em c l "e.g y y L W Ecw %" picnic at BMega <(
meats- un to 3 feet whhcut i 1.dp t the ru sc . Sq y W.;, 4 ,,.. , ru m ,7 q r. m tion of the contain. tent strueWre, slop <yh ;m o,.c. osion vill honor t he date wh~n con-
. the utructure right be id "te( nr ret M " i. " , .
'..'A'!G J /,CKET l gr :icle o g.:.d st r. 2 rNetor pit Ic.: v .
In addition, "tr.e des !'lm r,re rides Po* u 3 i br: PAa b Nm no fur
- Wr vorx at the rit[ ear l x m e, co n t r g..,$ .m g gyg.g gg y. 3 gp gg.
foot unobstructed radia] el . :ra.oo" betvwn ia- ,j nno~ ig ., hu heated in taa aard vest the inside usj.ls of .he r m tor % t wJ tne . exterior vana of thu rea.cy or *r.uildw. y.n an...g.n.a.gu..oDr. Joe;dedkyt[, a, cmr or 20 f d !b' h h.- Gtation C a.,; ace between the rentor Ni) .h4 and No . .iill valls of the pit will be j' erntv.W1 R,pfCt l a.m.en N eh, a verid Poet ;hmeva with water, states the n.mendment. teur, cGmrcser, andmrina 'biclvgist Irich harpiat, , Chus the plant ud n have no structdral re-
>1 ~Ila topk vin be "N Premn %
Flower of the Fopr.y " latior to the chaft which caa beca dW on ;& sic will be l' rom the new Lu. Wtters dbum Bod y Head, >
"3;oer oyc7 pog,:ga," including the tune c.f
.he1might as well put it oc air mat,tressea tba.: title, and "Ssn An1rean Shake," elent; out at sea, noted one observer; 'it would make more engineerin; sense, with the Goodtime ',lashboard 3's (or "Oskinnd" '
Jo building of any kind anywhere in the fa'.e) new recordin (It r.:ust be San Ar$g or " Don't Blame PGM, Pai" ' world, 30 far as we can determ.ine, hsc ever rea:: Fani.t) . .11,0% copi a employed thic conec;,t to withstand fault action. of this record were sold in the paat few conthe
,The rGh design ruct be rvarded e a desperate 1,o htters and David Fesonen vill also speak effort to gain approval for a aite whieri 10 th.. . . able: but sc0t Mer, drinks and coffee vill be avail-t rinc your ovo lunch bas 2et. Ihe vorat conceivable 2ccation rcr a nuclear rec.etorhita vill be nt tne cid houne on the rcV. to on the California coset and perharc in the v ;rldJth, punt o m., bath'1 of Hi+'mM.S *;'%
(neludinr: the flank.: of a few ru?. cay.+ 3. ) Since there :.3 cc experienn with t.nj e de Qnjl" h Birdo." y, ring tr,,. f mily and help celebnte ce cor. cept.1t is bed to .m hw the A1C erald f;nd',intnrk accom .
- hat t offers a "reamnnle n: .urap " of p.t'.;; J?
3"fCtYa h sehr 'a e it-a fincat thia timi of
, ye.r ed the cowrys'.de is heased in ita 1ver 3.,y umn fCtit w. _
Peactor Buildi T MSCOVEFI DA'!-00TOEG 3, 4 h , ~e ! 'fpe annur.1 E:cevery hy c:leiration r/.
,f ' ,' . . -
p' .; jW 1 h "pI ( g, l Bode 6a; ;;.rnv ' d
- s anotner opportunity to j vini'. the fj aca; Mrber of refuge on the j ,c - \r.a /
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, i NorWrn '.cliord s cctw t. ?:tober 3 and 5 um g
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L %h sno iversar" of tne da;r
'f
,$ i g
D s j /
.u vei tha* J'an Francisco de la Bo'ies% commanding tr.e .ynon , ami.;cd into Bodern Bay on hio n
b[tW [ /[ [ nor'-harn U .(pl.oTat iona . j/, g, , t 3re g ,, , Nare vill % a parade of boata and bleanind
,/ -
,,4 Of UC fi603 C Mday, and ,iadgin;; of :.he
/ .w(" Concrete fuc- inc,'S[ ,9 ' ' fl oM.n , ".sne of .r,1 ch il cponrred by thr-
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.i % i The famous Fc'ato P ech outside the Go. den 7"0'"' > C F. m f t Pault k.p,e p nur.ed u l@'? af ter a cchco:Mr
- rom anmate remneaur s =.; cts
- w le t a a rm or -, M sac a or stata detailG. 604iega iby rCLCEOr, N EoD *
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4 ai , 4 . 4 m ( " T.; 100.15 R E P TS H A [
- R D S 1 A .@ cc C'l *fInej uded with thi j
fo'rmation. We are sencing nevaletterit for two in the April report by the St. Louis Committee for Nuclear In rencons: i (1) it is one of the best brief analyses avail-D able ekplaininc vhy the-issue of earthquake hazarda a.t Bodega Head has assumed great significanes; and (2). it is ita' ovn beat answer to the bitter denuchtien it met from PG&E at the t,ime of its relesse.' Hal Stroube, " atomic information specialist" in the publicity and news bureau of the
' co$an,s ,. asid thst the report, v .s Mac5 on "a gren:, den! of publbnedy misinformation."
Hven a cursory; readina of the report vill chov that the trineinal acurce on which. its authors relied
-vso PG&/,'s ova hatards anslyn ic, cubmitted t.o the Al'.C in Deestber .1962. ,
The' Committee for Nuclear Incot ::ation pro- ). E vided the copies f or this mailing e n very g
)
'reasonabic bulk rate. However, tfu total cor, BLACKMAIL SONDS
.of acquirin6 and distributive the .un. W. h.c Lame duck Donom County Supervisor E.J. .("Nin" been s burden on the already vaniobtng tr usury G u.idotti is determined to leave all the dsnage of the Assoc'ation. l be eaa in hiu var.e, when he leaves office next HELP K dP THE HCL.1 IE M
.bnn ry. His late::t troposal $s for a $1.h
> Jr everyone receiving thic Levnnite vero eill 100 bond Isaae on the November ballot, the to- return a dollar (k .CO) to the Osoclajien
~
mene. to be used for develo;uent of Bodega Harboe ve vould be able to pay routine ex wnsea . rent, ; ,,3,,.fe esteh is t&4t the bonda cannot be sold uno phone, postage, printing, de. ) um.Il tne MC (3 MPd. ree ,1ven AIC approval for tha hearingo--aa yet unscheduled. M e n vower p1snt, and (2) it can be shown that ' Plence contribute,-the trensury la tst itr m 7.-venue fror tu plant vill be sufficient to ! 1cuest ebb during,thn lons limbo, pending AC retire the bonda. action., / This u the latest r.ove in a longstanding quarrel between the supervisor and his consti-HR 512 ' HOLD.S PROMISE tuents in Bodega 3av, who have initiated two re I' Pro. .poaed statejlegisla*.lon may now grant a esll attempts against him the past 4 years. Mr.( lon~-evaited opportunity to chanae the chnotic Guidotti is often descri'oed by the Santa Posa lava which allovcd construction of the infamous of Presa Democrat as an "enthouinstic supporter" , ICAE access road in 3cd+p Harbor. the utilitv's proposal, The .inogic of the eurrent lag ,nas men Knowing thht the peopN in Bodega Bay are both'j recognized in s bill j rA, 'jl2, vnsen enJia for anxious to ater the supervisors' ancient neglect an investi.ption of %he arcte's tiaalandc of their harbor and strongly opposed to the PG&E ' policy. The bill it: now up for hearings .re- ' power plant, he has apparently chosen the band 1: fore Acae:nblymn :!dwin ? %rd'1 omittee on saue to blackr.sil the town into approving the R.tural P.csources, Planui:::l ra :d }cuo.i c .sorka. renetor. r
. Let.terv to the ec:nminee cauld help prevent a "he inutigator. of this strstagem, who have repetP,f en elsevbere of the awful concequecen Phcvn IJttle regari for local opinion in the past {q at sosep 6!.s. ara nn up for election nov; Senator Joseph The histcry of the rorl ,;oe: bad to a ; rant p3ggg.;n is the most lor.ical person to write to to Sonoma Unuity froc. tre : ta'e M 17. i, a imed about i Mis develope ept.
aa enc 3urc3 1 ,c recreatiod, mera a m u.se and cecnercird finhi..n' 2f the hartmr were. CDC APPE ALS TO LBJ a
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substant2all*i . Aprov e. .',or tnew uaes , the On w.ut;ust IL W. iifornia Democrstic ,,ouncil v < t ecunty would acqaire u f ll titly to ,Je tiae- . Pre.tident Tom E. L,arvev uraed Presic,ent Johnson's ( lands, includin.; centrol of haca to nrore-diqct ute g ntien into the ,dodega m tter. '1,ne propert"y ovaera. q after outi ming the issues of conservation and i 1 or ta triy 10 vesra th9 ~4"rvicoM sts ll ed, ,; e Art.cynxe hazerda ut the n.te, v,arvey noted: c hen , .,,e a i ng i.nn; C tle v W d rev~r,, to tos
. ne iM.ic f.nerg"" w, eciacion .av of cource lon6
-state, th y ,.atched onto the schern t.,nt e,m.,,c lbeen an advoeste of the y.,ver nlant. b.e there-road would satist.'y the conditionc h,. the othe fore do not be m..w they csn fuirly *'udge the trust.
, merits m. continu1 M construction.,,
,r ., va te 2 y . E .,n contenda th w, in v;a .,orced Carve" also ne*ea. that tn,e plant ,,is an extre-linto buildinv" the rosd n the . ic.c hnda ar.d f,
rely unppu,lar matter to. a vast nu::,ber of people pr.'rerred an g..aul hcatlon. g d, e com s:c,, l.in Nort hern California. More letters to the howser, nec.ected ceveral o.partunitics to (r resident on tnh point would be instructive, r state auch .5 posit icn publica, --nowbly 9t i R:!CY v,,LADL1, AC. CEPI.Em..n,:
.he Amy w,,orps o,.
cnnneers nsrin3 .n ly. .. ./ . / The Association hn3 so far refrained in the S Prc', eats tc the AU ornes k nersi and the Viat tv7 years true pleading for fir.ancial help. tW Uv.do con:niacion rechved the re;<ponw We've aqueeked by, hand to mouth. Eut now... tht Sne state was pcVerless to psJa on the-acceptabliity of the county's Trcposal. l' RI' 33C - 3
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hlTED TATES l h ATOMIC ENIRd4 COM WASHINGTON, D.C. 1554 N 2954 y _,1 , J t r\* 76 s No. . G-247 VOR IMMEDIATE - REIE AS E iA Tel. 973 3'335'or (Tuesday, October 27, 19,64) 973 3446 3 , AEC RELEASES TWO REPORTS ON PROPOSED REACTOW.AT l EODEGA HEAD, CALIlORNIA L
.I The Atomic Energy Ch.ttmission today is making public two reports concerning the safety aspects of a nuclear power plant proposed by Pacific Gas and Electric Company ae. Bodega Head, approximately 50 miles north of Sa ) Francisco. J l r /
One report is $ rom the Commission's Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, a group established by law to advise the1AEC on safety matters involved in r.eactor construction and operation. The ACRS has concluded that there is reasonable assurance thrd the proposed reactor can be constructed and operated at the Bodega Head site without undue hazard to the health and safety of the public. The other report, by the Division of. Reactor Licensing, has been issued by the AEC Director of Regulation, whose staff makes safety reviews of reactor licensing applications. The Regulatory Staff has concluded that " Bodega Head is not a cuitable location for the proposed nuc3 ear power plant at the present state of our knowledge. " Under AEC regulatory procedures, a decision by the ! Commission on PG&E's application will not be made until after I the holding of a public hearing avd issuance of an initial decision by a three-member atomic sa fety and licensing board. Pacific Gas and Electric Company has applied to the Commission for a permit to construct a 325,000 electrical kilowatt boiling water reactor at tha south end of Bodega ) IIe a d , a peninsula separating Bodega harbor from the Pacific Ocean. The proposed reactor site is approximately 1000 feet west of the western edge of the San Andreas fault zone. The application for a provisional construction permit was made on December 26, 1963. Nine amendments to the appli-cation have been received. In ; addition to information provided (more) I
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1 ( ATTACHMENT #2 I
SUMMARY
ANALYSIS BY THE DIVISION OF REACTOR LICENSING IN THE MATTER OF PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY BODEGA HEAD NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DOCKET No. 50-205 October 26, 1964 l
p. o' . I (' . Att J2 - G-247 l scismic disturbances during the lifetime of the plant. While there is a high probability that the plant under the proposed design could survive the vibrational stresses of even a very large carthquake without damage, it must be recognized that if such an earthquake should also involve several feet of shear ground movement as well as ground accelerations as high as 2/3g to 1.0g.there is presently no sound expe,rimental or experience basis for predicting the extent of damage that might be incurred by the reactor containment structure and emergency equipment designed to assure the safety of the reactor. A novel method is proposed for safeguarding the Bodega Head reactor against differential ground movement of its found'ation rock. This is not in itself a cause for concern. What is of concern is the lack of any experi-mental or experience proof-test of the proposed novel method that could form an acceptable basis for the required safety evaluation. Because of the magnitude of possible consequences of a major rupture in the reactor containment accompanied by a failure of emergency equipment, we do not believe that a large nuclear power reactor should be the subject of a pioneering construction effort based on unverified engineering principles, however sound they may appear to be. For these reasons, it is our conclusion that Bodega Head is not a suitable location for the proposed nuclear power plant at the present state of our knowledge.
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' Plant Description The nuclear power reactor proposed for construction on Bodega Head is a direct. cycle, forced circulation, boiling water type. Reactors of the boiling water type have been operated successfully at Dresden, Illinois , Big Rock, Michigan, and Humboldt Bay, California. Design power at Bodega is 1008 thermal megawatts (Mwt), compared with 700 Mwt for Dresden, 240 Mwt for Big Rock Point l
nnd'165 Mwt for Humboldt Bay. The reactor core will have an active fuel length of 125 inches and a diameter of 137 inches. It will contain 592 fuel assemblies and 145 movable control rods (cruciform blades). The control rod drives will be similar to the rod drives which have been used at Dresden, Big Rock Point, and Humboldt Bay. For containment.at the Bodega Bay plant the company proposes to utilize the pressure suppression concept similar to that already in use at its Humboldt Bay plant. The reactor vessel and the coolant recirculation system are to be enclosed in a dry well vessel, whose volume is about 115,000 cu. ft. j l The dry well is connected through eight vent pipes, each eight feet in diameter, to a suppression chamber with a volume of approximately 142,000 In the unlikely cu. ft., of which about 62.000 cu. ft. is filled with water. I event of a complete severance of a reactor coolant recirculation line, the f i J pressure build-up in the dry well would be reduced both in magnitude and ) I duration as a result of steam flow to the suppression pool where the steam would be condensed. (Any fission products released either concurrently or subsequently would be trapped either in the dry well or suppression chamber.)
' Tests have been conducted that demonstrate the effectiveness of this concept.
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4 , Att #2 - G-247 ( 1 i 1 l l safety, this reactor site is an excellent one in all respects except one - the possibility of a severe earthquake involving substantial shear earth movement at the site. Earthquake problems posed by this location are considered in a later section of this report. By virtue of property ownership by PG&E, as enhanced by the water areas on three sides of the peninsula, the applicant can exert positive 1 control over an area having a minimum radius of about 450 feet from the reactor, and can exer.t substantial control over an area extending out to a radius of about 1300 feet, the nearest point on Doran Beach 1 across the harbor entrance channel. The population in the vicinity of the site is low and the iso-lation distances are well within acceptable ranges. The meteorology 1 is as good-as or better than that in California generally. The site is not upstream from any drinking water intakes, i
- 2. Suitability of the Nuclear Reactor Design The boiling water nuclear reactor proposed for the Bodega plant is of a type that has been operated safely at a number of other locations including Dresden, Big Rock Point and Humboldt Bay. It is expected to exhibit negative temperature and void coefficients of reactivity at operating conditions. Further, the reactor will be i
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- 4. Adequacy of the Radioactive Waste Disposal Plans and Designs Radioactive liquid wastes from this plant are to be mixed with condenser effluent prior to discharge to the Pacific Ocean. No problem is anticipated in maintaining the concentration of radionuclides in the mixture below the maximum permissible concentrations specified in 10 CFR 20. In addition, the applicant has stated that a radiological monitoring survey of this site and its environs will be initiated two years before operation of the reactor and will continue after operation commences. Details of the sampling program have not been completed, but it is expected'that quarterly samples would be taken of marine waters, plankton, bottom sediments, invertebrates, shellfish, resident fishes and of the intertidal algae and eel, grass. Thus, the applicant would be able to determine any reconcentration of radionuclides that might occur before it became a potential safety problem.
All solid wastes from this plant are to be transferred to licensed waste disposal agents for off-site disposal. The applicant has stated that gaseous wastes disposal will be monitored and controlled so that a maximum annual exposure at any off-site location will not exceed permissible limits. There appears to be no reason to believe that this objective cannot be met. The diffusion climatology is expected to be satisfactory and a meteorological facility is being installed at the site to develop.e better understanding of the local meteorology,' so that an appropriate radioactive gaseous waste stack height may be selected. A radiological
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Att #2 - G-247 ( ! .~ power for orderly shutdown from a 12 KV distribution line from a nearby substation. If both these sources fail, an engine driven l, generator can supply power for' safe shutdown and decay heat removal. ' In addition to these sources a substantial station battery will supply power for control instruments and, through an inverter, essential AC loads.
- 6. Adequacy of the Containment Concept This plant is to utilize the pressure suppression concept in its containment design. Mockup tests have been conducted by the appli-cant to determine the maximum pressure the containment would l- experience as a result of the complete severance of one of the 28-inch recirculation loop lines under a variety of reactor coolant pressures and temperatures, and dry well temperatures. These tests have provided a suitable basis for designing the system and have also shown that the steam exhausted to the suppression pool is completely condensed beneath the pool surface. 1 The applicant has proposed a number of special provisions to assure reliable containment performance in the event of an accident.
Redundant isolation valves are to be placed in the main steam lines. , Containment leak rate tests are to be conducted after installation of all penetrations by applying dry well design pressure to the completed dry well and suppression chamber design pressure to the completed suppression chamber. The containment leaktightness will be 1 tested at periodic intervals throughout the life of the plant. Specifications for containment design pressure and leak rate vill limit potential accident consequences to acceptable levels. (! i
Att. s2 - G-247 l l it is anticipated that it will be similar to that conducted for the company's Humboldt Bay nuclear unit.
- 2. Meteorolog; A meteorological facility is being installed at the site to pro-vide necessary data for atmospheric diffusion studies. Instruments will be mounted at three levels on a 250 ft. tower and will measure temperature and wind speed and direction. All readings will be digitized and recorded on paper tape. The results of this program will be used in calculating the potential dilution of radioactive gases, and in selecting a suitable stack height.
- 3. Oceanography The capacity of the ocean to diffuse the condenser cooling i
water and minimize the effects of temperature and radioactivity on the marine biota is being investigated in a series of experiments at the site. These tests include use of drift poles and uranine dye as well as measurements of temperature and salinity. They will continue through at least one annual cycle of oceanographic and meteorological conditions, l l
- 4. Marine Biology Survey j i
An ecological survey is being conducted to prepare lists of l I the marine fauna and flora of Bodega Head and Harbor. I I l
- 5. Pressure Suppression Tests j I
Extensive tests of the pressure suppression concept have been conducted at the Company's test facility at its Moss Landing Power
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' I I, Att.'#2 - G-247 h .'Since the fields of. geology, seismology and earthquake structural design are highly specialized, it has been necessary to call upon the services of expert consultants for help in analyzing'the various. problems involved in arriving at a decision on the technical feasibility of building the Bodega plant'at the proposed location with reasonable assurance that'it will safely l withstand the maximum earthquake that might credibly occur during the life of the plant.
The consultants employed by the applicant (PG&E) include Dr. George W. Housner, Professor of Civil Engineering and Applied Mechanics at the j California Institute of Technology, Dr. Hugo Benioff, prominent West Coast Engineering Seismologist,.and Mr. E. C. Mar 11 ave, Consulting Geologist. 1 I The AEC Regulatory Staff has retained the services of Dr. N. M. Newmark, . j 1 Professor of Civil; Engineering at the University of Illinois and Mr. Robert I A. Williamson of Holmes & Narver. The staff has been assisted by the U. S. ! Coast and Geodetic Survey (USC&GS) and the U. S. Geological Survey (USGS) l 1 on seismicity and geology. There is a substantial difference between the viewpoint of the applicant l and that of the USC&GS and USGS with respect to the maximum credible earth-quake that should be taken as the design basis for the Bodega Head plant. The PG&E earthquake consultants feel strongly that the maximum ground acceleration to be expected during any credible earthquake at or near the plant site is 0.33g, and they consider it incredible that there should ever be more than a few inches of differential ground motion under the site. The USC&GS, on the other hand, has recommended that the reactor and its
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;the company and its consultants feel confident will safely ride through a 2/3g. earthquake, with peak ground acceleration up to 1.0g, which'is accompanied by differential shear ground displacement under the. reactor containment of up to 3 feet either horizontal or vertical . If such an earth-qu'ake should occur, the containment might be tipped or, rotated.slightly, but there would be no breach in its. leak-tightness and no release of fission
- l. products, in the opinion of'the. applicant. -
The postulate'd earthquake involves a pattern of ground motion generally l similar to.that recorded by the Coast and Geodetic Survey in'the El C'entro Earthquake of May . 18, 1940, but'with approximately twice the intensity, corresponding to a maximum acceleration of two-thirds gravity, a maximum velocity of 2.5 f t/sec, and a maximum ground displacement of' 3 feet, and with occasional intermittent pulses of acceleration up to 1.0g. The structures are considered to be subjected to simultaneous shear displace-ments ranging up to 3 feet, along lines extending under the containment structure or other parts of the plant, with motions in either horizontal or vertical directions along the fault. It is also assumed that aftershocks of intensity equal to the El Centro quake might be suffered before remedial action could be taken. There are two major problems posed by the postulated earthquake. The most unusual one is that of providing for shear ground displacement of as
-much as three feet underneath the reactor building. The other is that of vibrational stresses.
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I Att. #2 - C-247 applicant believes will permit horizontal movements up to 3 feet without impairing the function of the containment structure, although the structure might be shifted or rotated. Dif ferential vertical motions up to 3 feet niay cause the containment structure to tilt or shift, but, in the opinion of the applicant, in no case will the containment . function be impaired. It is proposed that the plant be designed with no rigid structural interconnection between any major components. The reactor containment structure will b'e structurally independent of the turbine generator founda-tion, the plant control building, the radwaste facility, the stack, and the plant service buildings. Piping and wiring interconnections important to safety between the reactor containment strdcture, the control building and the turbine generator will have sufficient flexibility to accommodate 3 feet i of relative movemen.t. In order to prevent overstress at point of penetration for piping connecting the dry well with the turbine, the company proposes to provide adequate anchors and bracing adjacent to the containment shell and beyond the double isolation valves. These anchors will be adequate to withstand all piping loads due to differential motion in any direction up to 3 feet between the reactor containment structure and the turbine generator foundation. The foregoing proposal for safeguarding the Bodega Reactor and its containment structure against the postulated shear differential ground motion embodies concepts which are in many respects novel and for which little or no precedent exists. The Regulatory Staf f Consultants , Dr. N. M. l Newmark and Mr. Robert Williamson have come to the conclusion after carefully 1 l
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Other reactor installations have presented seismic design problems, but not in the extreme form presented by Bodega Head under the earthquake postulated by'the Coast and Geodetic Survey and the Geological Survey. One problem j which the Bodega. plant has in common.with all other nuclear power plants l subject to,special seismic design considerations is the inability to conduct { any sort of performance test on the finished' structure that will demonstrate-that the design. objectives have been achieved. The uncertainty presented by
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this situation has been accepted as a reasonable risk i.n the seismic design ! at.other locations where the only problem involved is the ability to withstand vibrational stresses, since this aspect of earthqualle design is well under- ] 1 stood and has a considerable amount.of experience' background. There is
-difficulty in applying the same philosophy at Bodega Head, however, because of the necessity of considering the additional problem of designing the
-reactor structure'to safely withstand differential ground motion as well as high vibrational stresses, and because there is no realistic way of evaluating the proposed solution to the problem.
The fact that the proposed site is adjacent to the San Andreas fault zone makes it almost certain that it will be subjectad to one or more severe seismic disturbances during the lifetime of the plant. While there is a high probability that the plant under the proposed design could survive the vibrations from even a very large earthquake without damage, it must be recognized that if such an earthquake should also involve several feet of shear ground movement as well as ground accelerations as high as 2/3g to 1.0g there is presently no sound experimental or experience basis for predicting the extent of damage that might be incurred by the reactor con-tainment structure and emergency equipment designed to assure the safety of C.
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- Att. #2 - G-247 by somewhere near the same kind of experimental evidence required of all other safeguards. We do not see such evidence in support of the pedestal concept for safeguarding the Bodega Reactor against differential ground motion.
Whether the public benefits to be gained from operation of the Bodega Nuclear Power Plant are high enough to justify acceptance of the added uncertainties involved in the seismic design of the plant to withstand several feet of shear ground movement is, of course, a matter of judgment. The regulatory requirement that there be " reasonable assurance" that any licensed nucicar reactor can be built and operated without undue risk to the health and safety of the public recognizes that there is no way of eliminating all of the uncertainties; experience'd judgment is therefore required. The standard bf "reas'onable acnurinch" 'istmorb difficult to. meet I when it becomes necessary to take into consideration external forces having ; 1 the potential of invalidating some of the safeguards built into the reactor installation. The difficulty is enJarged when there are uncertainties in l l the design measures intended to counteract the external forces. Somewhere along.the line enough uncertainties will create a situation in which the l
" assurance" can no longer be said to be " reasonable." We believe that this situation would exist if the proposed pedestal concept of seismic design were to be approved without more convincing evidence of its validity than is afforded by presently available information.
Conclusions The containment and all of the emergency equipment for shutting down the Bodega reactor and maintaining it indefinitely in a safe condition in
i . ( -4 Att #2 - G-247 associated vital equipment to withstand the effects of substantial movement in its foundation simultaneously with the vibration accompanying a severe earthquake. Because of the magnitude of the possible consequences of a major rupture in the reactor containment accompanied by a failure of emergency equipment, we do not believe that a large nuclear power reactor should be the subject of a pioneering construction effort based on unverified engineering principles,.however sound they may appear to be. The Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards has reached the conclusion that the reactor can be constructed and operated at the proposed location I l without undue risk to the. health and safety of the,public. We have carefully conside red the views of the ACRS. We have the highest respect for those views and we do not lightly reach an opposite conclusion. This is a kind , of case, however, on which reasonable men may differ. In our' view, the proposal to rely.on unproven and perhaps unprovable design measures to cope with forces as great as would be produced by several feet of shear ground movement under a large reactor building in a severe earthquake raises a substantial safety questions. In all respects except one the proposed design of the Bodega Nuclear Power Plant provides reasonable assurance that the plant can be built and operated without undue risk to the health and safety of the public. However, the single exception is quite important if one accepts the credibility of an earthquake of sufficient magnitude to cause a major displacement of foundation rock underneath the plant. Although there is a wide difference of expert opinion on the credibility of such an earthquake, prudent judgment favors accepting the conservative recommendations of the USC6CS and the USGS. On this basis and for reasons given above, it is our conclusion that Bodega Head is not a suitable location for the proposed nuclear power plant at the present stage of our knowledge. 1
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