ML20214V688
| ML20214V688 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Maine Yankee |
| Issue date: | 06/02/1987 |
| From: | Nimitz R, Shanbaky M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20214V683 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-309-87-08, 50-309-87-8, NUDOCS 8706120247 | |
| Download: ML20214V688 (21) | |
See also: IR 05000309/1987008
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report;No.
50-309/87-08
Docket No.
50-309
License'No.
Category
C
Licensee: . Maine-Yankee Atomic Power Company
83 Edison Drive
Augusta, Maine 04336
Facility Name: Maine Yankee Nuclear Generating Station
Inspection At: Wiscasset, Maine
Inspection Conducted: April 27-30, % nd May 8-13, 1987
~ed de
S/L/87
Inspecto s:
R. L. Nimi't
iorpdiationSpecialist
'date
Approved by:
T
N/2.[M
M. M. ShanbaTy, Chief Facilit'ies Radiation
' date
,
Protection Section.
Areas Inspected:
Routine (April 27-30,1987) and special (May 8-13,1987),
unannounced Radiological Controls Inspection during an outage. Areas reviewed
external exposure controls; internal exposure controls; radiation,.
were:
contamination and airborne radioactivity surveys; personnel contamination
controls; exposure evaluations; and radioactive and contaminated material
control. The circumstances, and licensee evaluations.following identification
of a 1000 R/hr object and worker concerns were also reviewed. The inspection
was performed by one region based inspector.
Results:
Five apparent violations were identified:
(Failure to post a high
radiation area, paragraph 3; Failure to adhere to' procedures, paragraph 3;
Failure to control access to a high radiation area, paragraph 3; Failure to
instruct workers, paragraph 3; Failure to survey and identify the presence. of a
1000 R/hr object, paragraph 6).
Programmatic weaknesses were identified in the
area of airborne radioactivity surveys, : personnel contamination control;
exposure evaluations; and effluent monitoring.
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B706120247 870602
ADOCK 05000309
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DETAILS
1.0 Individuals Contacted
1.1 Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company
1) 2) J. Garrity, Plant Manager
1) 2) E. Boulette, Assistant Plant Manager / Technical Support Manager
1) 2) G. Pillsbury, Radiological Control Section Head
2) W. Riethle, Manager-Radiation Protection
Yankee Nuclear Service Division
2) D. Whittier, Manager, Nuclear Engineering and Licensing
2) P. Radsky, Chemistry Section Head
1.2 NRC
1) 2) C. Holden, Senior Resident Inspector, Maine Yankee
2) M. Shanbaky, Chief, Facilities Radiation Protection
Section, NRC Region I
1) Denotes those individuals attending the exit meeting on April 30,
1987.
2) Denotes those individuals attending the exit meeting on May 13,
1987.
The inspector contacted other licensee personnel.
2.0 Purpose of Inspection
The inspection was a combined routine and special unannounced.Radiologi-
cal Controls Inspection during the outage.
The following matters were
reviewed:
external exposure controls
internal exposure controls
radiological surveys including:
- radiation
contamination
- airborne radioactivity
personnel contamination controls
radioactive and contaminated material control
personnel exposure evaluations
circumstances, licensee evaluations and corrective
actions associated with the identification of a
small object indicating 1000 R/hr on contact
worker concerns
3.0 Radiological Controls
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3.1 General
The inspector reviewed the adequacy, implementation and effectiveness
of radiological controls for the outage.
The review was with respect
to criteria contained in applicable Technical Specifications and
licensee procedures.
The purpose of this review was to determine the following:
the adequacy of radiation, contamination and airborne radio-
activity surveys to support on going work
the adequacy of radiation work permit system
implementation of ALARA controls
the adequacy of high radiation area access controls
posting and labeling of radiological control areas and
radioactive material
use of personnel monitoring devices
radiation survey instrumentation and airborne radioactivity
sampling instrumentation checking and calibrations
use of engineering controls or respiratory protective equipment,
as appropriate, to minimize intake of radioactive material by
personnel,
instructions to workers on the radiological conditions at their
work location.
The evaluation of licensee performance in this area was based on:
discussions with personnel
review of documents
inspector performance of independent radiation surveys
inspector observations of work in the following areas:
- refueling activities
- Reactor Coolant Pump work
- Steam Generator secondary side work
3.2 Findings
Within the scope of this review, the following apparent violations
were identified:
Apparent Violation 1 (50-309/87-08-01)
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Technical Specification 5.11 requires that procedures for
personnel radiation protection be prepared and adhered to for
all operation involving personnel radiation exposure.
Radiation
Protection Procedure 9.1.10, Radiation Work Permits, requires,
in part, in Section 7.4, that the method of high radiation area
control utilized and the surveillance frequency of checking work
be indicated on the radiation work permit.
Contrary to the above, on April 30, 1987, several radiation work
permits including 87-4-30, 87-4-47, 87-4-231, 87-4-232 and
87-4-281, used, in part, for entry into high radiation areas,
did not indicate the method of.high radiation area control or
the surveillance frequency of checking work.
The licensee immediately initiated action to review and revise
(as appropriate) the subject permits.
Apparent Violation 2 (50-309/87-08-02)
Technical Specification 5.12.1 requires in part that each
high radiation area in which the intensity of radiation is
at such levels that a major portion of the body could
receive in any one hour a dose in excess of 100 mrem be
,
barricaded and conspicuously posted as a High Radiation
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Area.
Contrary to the above, at about noon on April 27, 1987, a
high radiation area, located on the -2' elevation of the
Containment near the Reactor Head Stand, was neither
barricaded nor nosted as a High Radiation' Area.
The area
exhibited dose rates which would result in an individual
receiving a dose to a major portion of the body in excess
of 120 mrem in an hour.
The area was immediately posted and properly barricaded.
Apparent Violation 3 (50-309/87-08-03)
Technical Specification 5.12.2 requires, in part, that
unauthorized access to high radiation areas, in which the
radiation intensity is such that a major portion of the
body could receive 1,000 mrem in any one hour, be prevented
by use of locked doors.
Contrary to the above, on May 10, 1987 neither locked doors
nor other compensatory measures were in place to prevent
unauthorized access to the waste storage area adjacent to
the RCA Storage Building. A scaffolding and ladder
arrangement provided for unauthorized access to locations
within the area that exhibited whole body dose rates up to
2,000 mrem /hr.
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When brought to the licensee's attention, the scaffolding
was immediately removed.
Apparent Violation 4 (50-309/87-08-04)
10 CFR 19.12 requires in part that all individuals working
in or frequenting any portion of a restricted area be kept
informed of the storage of radioactive material and
precautions to minimize exposure.
Contrary to the above, at about 11:00 p.m. on May 8, 1987,
workers, tensioning Reactor Head studs, were not informed
of radioactive material stored in a 55 gallon drum located
near the Reactor Head or precautions to minimize their
exposure to the radiation emanating from this material.
The workers were standing next to the drum which indicated
contact dose rates of up to 1200 mrem /hr.
The inspector noted that:
The drum was not marked or labelled in any manner.
The drum was not depicted on radiation survey records.
Inspector questioning of Radiological Controls (RC)
Technicians covering the tensioning work indicated they
were unaware of the drum's presence.
The Radiation work permit issued for the work specified
radiation protection " coverage" every 15 minutes.
The drum had been at the location for at least several
hours.
The following programmatic weaknesses in this area were
identified:
High Radiation Area Control
Licensee radiological controls supervisory personnel were
not providing effective instruction and/or guidance to
personnel controlling access to High Radiation Areas.
A Radiological Controls Supervisor informed the inspector
that security guards were responsible, in part, for High
Radiation Area Access Control. The superv+ sor informed the
inspector that security guards would prohibit inspector
access to a High Radiation Area unless certain criteria
were met.
Inspector questioning of a guard controlling
access to Containment and the Spray Pump Areas indicated
that no High Radiation Area Access Control guidance had
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been provided to the guard.
This indicates a lack of
understanding of responsibilities of personnel in the area
of high radiation area access control.
The licensee initiated action to clarify personnel
responsibilities in this area.
Licensee procedures require that the coverage frequency for
High Radiation Areas be specified on the radiation work
permit.
Radiological Controls technicians were not provided clear
guidance as to what constitutes " coverage".
Airborne Radioactivity Surveys
The licensee's program for airborte radioactivity sampling
and analysis would not ensure the quantification of
unidentified alpha airborne radioactivity (unidentified
nuclides) at the concentration value specified in 10 CFR 20
Appendix B.
The program did not include a priori selected
air sample volumes and sample count times to ensure that
lower limits of detection were capable of identifying
concentrations at this Appendix B value.
The program
appeared capable of detecting gross concentrations of
airborne alpha radioactivity at high concentration values.
The licensee immediately revised several procedures to
include methods to ensure identification and quantification
of unidentified alpha emitters.
The licensee is reviewing the need to revise other program
procedures in this area.
The licensee was using long duration air samples to
determine airborne radioactivity concentrations in water
boxes during Steam Generator Jumps.
The samples, approxi-
mately 30 minutes in duration, do not appear to adequately
reflect peak concentrations which could be present during
the short duration of the jumps (about 2 minutes).
In
addition, personnel are not exposed the entire 30 minutes
resulting in clean air being sampled and thus causing a
possible reduction of the peak concentration value.
Peak
concentrations should be known to effectively control
personnel exposures.
The licensee initiated a review of this matter.
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The licensee did not appear to have an effective program
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for real time airborne radioactivity monitoring of on going
work. With the exception of the Spent Fuel Pool area, no
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continuous air monitors (CAMS) were set up and operable in
the station. About 4 other CAMS were out of service.
In
addition, the licensee had not established quick sort
techniques for estimating airborne radioactivity by
counting of the samples in the field. A excessive back log
of~ air samples for counting was. identified in the count
room.
The licensee's action on the above airborne radioactivity
sampling concerns in the area of alpha monitoring, measur-
ing airborne radioactivity in a steam generator, and per-
forming real time air monitoring will be reviewed during a
subsequent inspection.
The above matters are considered an unresolved item.
(50-309/87-08-05)
ALARA Controls
Personnel were observed on the -2' elevation of Containment
standing in radiation fields up to 25 mrem /hr.
The
individuals (3) were inspecting small hand tools to be used
on a job. A low dose rate area was located a short
distance away.
A Radiation Protection Technician in the area did not
recommend to the individuals that they work in the lower
dose rate area.
Radioactive and Contaminated Material Control
The licensee has posted and roped off the backyard area as
a Radiological Control Area. However,'the following were
noted:
signs and ropes indicating Contaminated Areas were
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down or poorly posted.
bags of material labeled Radioactive Material extended
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beyond the posted contaminated areas into the clean
area.
Sections of soil were posted " Contaminated - Shoe covers
required".
The soil was in close proximity to storm
drains.
Two of the three storm drain outlets from the plant were
monitored for radioactivity. One of the drains not
monitored (Backbay) had at least one storm drain collection
point within the area posted as the Radiological Controls
Area.
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Note:
Subsequent licensee sampling indicated that the storm
drain collection point (located near the Primary Water
Storage Tank) contained low levels of radioactive
material.
It was also apparently not shown on plant
drawings.
The licensee initiated action to place the BackBay
storm drain outlet on their routine surveillance
schedule for periodic monitoring.
4.0 Exposure Evaluation
The licensee has inplace a procedure to be used to provide guidance to
personnel performing exposure evaluations.
The procedure is used to
provide guidance for review of such matters as lost TLD badges, off-scale
dosimeters and lost dosimeters.
The review of this area indicated the following:
The procedure did not provide guidance as to the minimum evaluations
that should be performed for various dosimetry problem situations
(e.g. off-scale dosimetry).
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Inspector questioning of dosimetry personnel did not indicate a
uniform understanding of minimum evaluations which are to be per-
formed for various dosimetry problem situations (e.g. off-scale
dosimetry).
The inspector identified several individuals who had experienced
multiple off-scale pocket dosimeters within a period of a week.
However, the individuals' TLD dosimeters had not been read.
It was
not apparent, based on review of documentation, that a thorough
review of the events had occurred.
NOTE:
Licensee personnel indicated this area would be reviewed
and that the exposure evaluations for the individuals identified
with off-scale dosimeters would be re-examined.
The licensee's exposure evaluation program will be reviewed
during a subsequent inspection.
(Inspector Followup Item
50-309/87-08-06).
5.0 Personnel Contamination Control
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5.1 General
The inspector reviewed the personnel contamination control program.
Because a number of instances of personnel contamination with hot
particles were identified by the licensee, emphasis was placed on
control of personnel exposure from hot particles.
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The review was with respect to applicable licensee procedures and
recommendations contained in IE Information Notice 86-23, " Control of
Exposure From Hot Particles" dated April 9, 1986.
The Information Notice provided information on problems identified at
other reactor sites in the areas of:
personnel contamination with
hot particles; processing of laundry; and contamination control.
5.2 Findings
The following matters were identified and discussed with licensee
representatives.
Licensee representatives indicated that the matters
will be reviewed.
The licensee's action on these matters will be
reviewed during a subsequent inspection:
(Inspector Follow-up Item
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50-309/87-08-07).
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5.2.1
Frisking
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The licensee allows personnel to leave a contaminated
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area (e.g. Containment) with protective clothing (e.g.
coveralls) and enter a clean area after removing
shoecovers and gloves.
Personnel then frisk their
person, including the protective clothing, prior to
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performing activities in the clean area.
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Some personnel were observed not to perform a frisk
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for the length of time guidelires established by the
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licensee.
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Note:
Frisking practices at several frisking locations
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did not evidence aggressive oversight (e.g.
Containment) by technicians monitoring access
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control to ensure adequate frisking by workers.
Workers were observed performing poor frisking
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(e.g. rapidly),
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The licensee maintains a donut and coffee trailer
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within the Radiological Control Area.
Personnel
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leaving the Containment with protective clothing,
excluding shoe covers and gloves, frisk themselves
then obtain coffee and donuts.
In consideration of
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the poor frisking practice cbserved, this is
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considered a questionable practice.
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The licensee has established guidelines for personnel
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frisking. These are:
25 seconds (total) for hand and
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feet to be performed by personnel who have not been in
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a contaminated area; and 90 seconds for a whole body
frisk to be performed by personnel who have been in a
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contaminated area.
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The licensee is experiencing some hot particles
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problems, consequently it was not apparent that the
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time limitsLspecified were adequate for detection of
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hot particles.
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The licensee does not possess high sensitivity portal
monitors. - Inspector challenging of the portal monitor
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using small check sources at the Health Physics check point
indicated its detection and alarm capability was between
approximately 0.1 uCi (220,000 disintegrations per minute
(dpm)) and 0.2 uCi (440,000 dpm) of Cobalt 60.' Particle
activity less than-this detection capability would not be
detected.
The detection' capability of the portal monitor
at the Main Guard Station was about I uCi (2.2*10' dpm) of
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Cobalt 60.
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.The licensee was performing tracking and trending of
personnel contamination events.
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Note:
The licensee's Plant Manager met with all persons
on May 9,1987 to reinforce the requirements for
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proper frisking.
In addition, person el were
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stationed at the frisking points to r...,nitor personnel
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frisking performance.
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The licensee also initiated action to obtain and
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install high sensitivity portal monitors at the Main
Health Physics Control Point.
These monitors were
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installed and being calibrated by the end of the
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inspection.
The licensee's action on the matter was
timely.
5.2.2
Laundry Monitoring / Processing
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The licensee had established informal guidelines (greater
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than 500 counts per minute (cpm) above background) for
surveying laundry in the issue shelves.
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The licensee's closure package for the Information Notice,
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which was issued in April 1986, indicated no additional
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action need be taken.
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However, inspector review indicated the following:
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The guidelines (500 cpm > background) were not being
adhered to.
Personnel were using a criterialof imR/hr
greater than background.
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The criteria used - ImR/hr> background was considered
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less than adequate for detection of hot particles.
No procedures or instructions were in place for
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quality assurance of processed laundry.
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The licensee is identifying particles with different
radionuclide composition. However, it was not clear
that the calculational methodology for estimating skin
dose establisned by the licensee was adequate for the
different nuclides.
The licensee has not evaluated the acceptability of
the calibration of the instruments used for measuring
the dose or counts per minute from a particle for the
various nuclides identified.
Consequently, it was not
apparent that all dose estimates made were acceptable.
Note:
Licensee personnel indicated that the adequacy of
previous dose estimates for personnel who had
received skin exposure due to contamination would
be reviewed and corrected, if necessary,
following evaluation of the skin dose estimation
methodology and instrument calibration factors.
The licensee's laundry vendor uses a wide area probe
to check laundry.
The licensee has not verified the
acceptability of this probe.
6.0 Radioactive Object
Found on -2 Elevation of Containment
6.1 General
The inspector reviewed the circumstances, licensee evaluations, and
corrective actions associated with the identification of a small
object measuring about 1000 R/hr on contact.
The object was found in
the Upender Drain Down Area located on the -2' elevation of the
Containment.
The following matters were reviewed:
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General Description
Licensee Actions
Origin of Object
Radiation Surveys
Personnel Exposures
6.2 General Description
At about 4:45 a.m. on May 7, 1987 an Auxiliary Operator contacted.the
Health Physics Technician located at the -2' elevation for guidance
regarding entry into the normally locked Upender Drain Down Area.
The purpose of the entry was to hook up a hose to the Upender Cavity
Drain line.
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Prior to allowing entry into the area, the technician performed a
general area survey and identified a small loose object (about 4
inches long and 1/4 inch in diameter) on the floor near the end of a
section of concrete blocks located on the floor (See Figure 1). An
initial survey of the object with an ion chamber (about 5:00 a.m.)
resulted in an off-scale reading (> 50 R/hr).
Subsequent surveys
with a high range instrument also resulted in an off scale reading (>
1000 R/hr) on contact and 25 R/hr at approximately 1 foot.
Four
layers of lead were placed over the object resulting in a contact
dose rate approximately 12 R/hr and a general area dose rate
approximately 1 R/hr at I foot from the lead.
Subsequent to the shielding, the auxiliary operator was permitted to
hook up the drain line.
The hook up was performed about 5 feet away
from the shielded object.
The NRC Senior Resident Inspector was notified about 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> later.
(7:15 a.m. morning meeting)
An NRC Region I Senior Radiation Specialist was dispatched to the
site on May 8, 1987.
6.3 Corrective Actions
Short Term
The Upender Drain Down Area was secured. Access was prohibited
without specific Radiological Controls Oversight.
The object was transferred to a shielded container using long
handled tools to minimize personnel exposure.
An investigation into the origin of the object was initiated.
An investigation to determine the potential for significant
exposures of personnel who may have come in contact with the
object was initiated. Assistance with the dose evaluations was
requested from the Yankee Nuclear Service Division.
The licensee established an action plan matrix to track actions
to be performed.
The licensee surveyed the Containment for the purpose of
identifying any additional loose / uncontrolled radioactive
objects.
Note:
The surveys identified several point (" speck") sources of
radioactive material.
These specks read up to
approximately 1 R/hr on contact with an ion chamber. One
speck had been identified previously (approximately early
May, 1987), which indicated about 200 R/hr on contact with
an ion chamber.
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The licensee was requested to review the hazards and
personnel dose consequences of these specks.
The licensee's action on this matter will be reviewed in a
subsequent inspection.
(50-309/87-08-10)
Long Term
The licensee initiated a review of the Upender Cavity Drain Down
operation to identify improvements.
6.4 Origin of Object
The licensee examined the object and believes it, based on
preliminary review, to be a part of an incore instrument.
This is based on the object's size and the appearance of " cut" ends.
Note:
These instruments are periodically replaced.
Prior to
disposal they are cut up under water in the Reactor Cavity.
The licensee believes the cut piece was introduced into the
Upender Drain Down piping in September 1985 or possibly
earlier.
The licensee further believes that the piece fell to the floor area
(See Figure 1) when the drain down tubing was disconnected on
September 15, 1985.
Licensee review of personal exposure records and available survey
records prior to this time does not indicate the presence of a
significant localized source of radiation prior to this date.
Consequently the object was most likely in this area from
September 15, 1985 until it was discovered on May 7, 1987.
The individual who disconnected the Upender Cavity Drain Down
Equipment on September 15, 1985, was interviewed by the
inspector. The individual was unable to positively indicate
whether he did or did not perform a radiation survey of the
drain line prior to disconnecting the drain down line at that
time or after disconnection.
Two radiation work permits (RWPs) were used by at least three
individuals performing the September 1985 Upender Cavity Drain
Down/ Disconnection (RWP Nos. 85-8-111,85-9-228).
Neither RWP
provided precautions or guidance relative to the need to perform
radiation surveys of the drain lines or piping prior to handling
or touching them.
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6.5 Radiation Surveys
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The inspector reviewed the radiation surveys made to support the
draining of the Opender Cavity.
The review was with respect to 10
,
CFR 20.201, Surveys.
Within the scope of this review, the following was identified:
Prior to allowing hook-up of the drain line and drain down of
the Opender Cavity on May 7, 1987, a radiation protection
technician surveyed the area. The source was located at that
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time.
The licensee was unable to provide specific survey records of
the area where the object was found.
General area surveys
indicated 100-600 mR/hr.
Note:
Dirt and debris from the Upender Cavity may be highly
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radioactive.
This material is filtered prior to the liquid
being discharged to the Annulus sump.
Within the scope of this review, the inspector concluded that the
licensee's radiation surveys of the previous drain down operation
(September 1985) were inadequate to identify this highly radioactive
source.
The following apparent violation was identified.
(50-309/87-08-08)
10 CFR 20.201b requires, in part, that each licensee make or cause to
be made such surveys as may be necessary to comply with the regula-
tions in Part 20 and are reasonable under the circumstances to
evaluate the extent of radiation hazards that may be present.
10 CFR
,
20.201a defines a survey as an evaluation of the radiation hazards
incident to the presence of radioactive material and requires that
when appropriate, such an evaluation is to include measurements of
levels of radiation present.
Contrary to the above, on or before September 15, 1985, necessary and
1
reasonable surveys, sufficient to identify the presence of a small
object measuring approximately 1000 R/hr on contact were not
performed at the -2'
elevation Upender Cavity Drain Down Area.
These
surveys were necessary to ensure compliance with the occupational
personnel external exposure limits of 10 CFR 20.101.
6.6 Personnel Exposures
,
The inspector reviewed the potential exposures to personnel who may
have entered the Upender Cavity Drain Down Area on -2' elevation of
the Containment.
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Within the scope of this review the following was identified:
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The licensee initiated a review of the exposure of all
individuals who may have entered the Drain Down Area.
The
individuals names were obtained from radiation work permits
which may have allowed access to the area. A total of 222
individuals were identified who may have entered the area since
the start of the 1985 outage (August 1985).
The licensee did not identify any significant whole body exposures.
The licensee indicated that, since there were no high whole body
exposures, it was reasonable to conclude that no high extremity
i
exposures occurred.
The licensee pulled and read the active TLDs of those indi-
viduals who may have entered the area during this outage.
No
unusual exposures were identified.
<
A dose evaluation was initiated for the individual who performed
the disconnect operation on September 15, 1985.
Preliminary
!
estimates by the licensee indicate a maximum extremity dose of
about 4 rem.
i
(Note:
The quarterly exposure limit for the extremities is
lt
18.25 rem.)
The licensee's exposure evaluations were ongoing at the conclusion of
'
the inspection.
The inspector indicated that the lack of radiological surveys to
identify and control such a highly radioactive source, may have
created a substantial potential for personnel exposures in excess of
the applicable regulatory limits.
The area of personnel exposure to the radiation from the object and
resulting maximum personnel exposure is an unresolved item.
(50-309/87-08-09)
7.0 Worker Concerns
On May 6, 1987, an individual working at the Maine Yankee Nuclear Station
,
contacted NRC Region I to discuss some concerns.
The workers concerns and
1
the inspector's findings relative to these concerns are as follows:
Worker Concern 1
The housekeeping in the Containment Building is poor, particularly in the
Loop Areas.
.
Findings
During the inspection, the licensee was in the process of storing material
in preparation for its removal from Containment.
Therefore some of the
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.
16
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housekeeping concerns appear to be related to accumulation of material
in the process of being removed, particularly from the Containment Annulus
Areas.
i
The inspector tours in the Loop Areas, however, did indicate an apparent
lack of aggressive housekeeping. Material observed included rubber boots,
paper and trash.
J
The licensee was informed of this concern.
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Worker Concern 2
Very high radiation areas in the loop area are not marked such that
workers can avoid " hot spots".
-
Findings
The inspector toured the Loop Areas and made independent radiation
surveys. Generally, Hot Spots indicated on licensee surveys were found to
be marked.
One Hot Spot originally indicating 300 R/hr on contact was
found not to be marked. However, this spot had been shielded, but the
j
sign indicating the hot spot was not reattached after shielding.
The hot
spot sign was reposted.
The inspector did identify some examples of poor
posting.
(See Section 3.0)
i
Worker Concern 3
l
4
Station rules change frequently and are contrary to training provided.
Workers were required to stand in 35 F weather in bare feet and underwear
due to a change in frisking policy.
Findings
The physical arrangement of buildings at the facility requires workers to
>
suit up in Protective Clothing inside the locker room near the Main Health
Physics Access Control Point and pass outside in the weather to enter the
Containment Building.
Those workers who remove all outer Protective
Clothing upon exiting the Containment must pass outside in the weather in
i
order to return to the locker room.
Some workers were observed passing
i
between the two locations in under clothing.
In addition, during
Containment evacuations, personnel were required to " frisk out" in the
weather.
Regarding frisking practices, due to concerns identified in the area of
frisking (discussed in Section 5 of the report), the licensee initiated
action to strictly enforce his current frisking policy.
Instructions to
personnel in training regarding frisking, were consistent with in-field
1
practice. No rule changes that were contrary to training were identified.
!
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_
_ - -.
.
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Worker Concern 4
The licensee did not provide protection against radiofodine while cutting
into a coolant pipe even though it is known that high radiotodine levels
are present due to failed fuel.
Finding
The inspector reviewed numerous airborne radioiodine samples collected
since the start of the outage including those collected during initial
pulling of the Reactor Vessel 1:ead, a task which could introduce radio-
iodine into the air.
No signiiicant airborne radiofodine was identified
(normally less than 10% MPC).
The licensee took a number of steps prior to opening of its primary system
to clean up residual radiciodine.
These included:
running of the Primary Containment Atmosphere Cleanup System
Maintenance of primary water cleanup and
Venting of the primary system to the Containment Ventilation System
prior to opening.
Exposure to radiotodine was maintained well below the regulatory limits.
Worker Concern 5
Twelve workers became til after exposure to hydrazine and morpholine
inside the steam generator secondary side.
Findings
The inspector discussed the matter with the two station nurses and the
station Industrial Safety Director.
The incident in question occurred April 8, 1987.
Circumstances, causes
and corrective actions were discussed in an April 13, 1987 meeting with
all appropriate personnel.
The meeting minutes were documented in an
April 15, 1987 licensee memorandum.
Exposure to hydrazine and morpholine was not identified as a casual factor
based on sampling inside the generator.
No exposure to chemicals was identified.
i
Worker Concern 6
i
Chemical drums are improperly disposed.
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.
18
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Finding
This matter was discussed with the Waste Coordinator.
The Coordinator was
unaware of individuals improperly disposing of drums. The Waste
Coordinator indicated that the principal chemicals in use were morpholine
and hydrazine. Morpholine drums are sent back to the manufacturer.
Hydrazine drums (plastic) are rinsed out to clean out residual hydrazine,
cut in half and disposed of as normal trash.
Worker Concern 7
Training is poor.
Instructors are inexperienced and not knowledgeable.
!
Findings
.
This concern relates to General Employee Training.
The inspector reviewed the training, certification and qualification of
General Employee Training Instructors.
The instructors were found to be
certified and/or qualified (as appropriate) by the approved program.
However, the following was noted:
Certification documentation for one of the three instructors was not
available.
The documentation was subsequently completed.
The three instructors did not possess any significant health physics
.
experience.
However, this was acceptable under the licensee's
current program.
The instructors were " certified" as able to effectively instruct a
class.
Individuals with little or no health physics experience were
l
certifying the instructors as acceptable to instruct General Employee
Training.
'
The training, certification and qualification program for General
l
Employee Training Instructors did not clearly describe the
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certification and qualification methodology.
The above matters were brought to the licensee's attention.
,
Worker Concern 8
The station is issuing " hot" protective clothing.
"
Finding
The area of monitoring of protective clothing for issuance is discussed in
i
Section 5.2.2 of this report.
The inspector surveyed 10 pairs of coveralls, 5 hoods and 5 pairs of
rubber gloves ready for issuance. One pair of coveralls was found to have
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.
. _ _ _ - _ _ _ . - - -
-
_ _ _
et.
19
.
a " speck" of contamination indicating about 15 mR/hr (open window GM
Tube). All other protective clothing indicated less than about 200 counts
per minute (cpa) above background (100 cpm).
The contaminated coveralls
were identified to the licensee.
The licensee is aware of this concern and has initiated a review of it.
(See Section 5.2.2)
Worker Concern 9
Respirators are not properly cleaned and maintained. Workers are not
allowed to inspect respirators after issuance.
Findings
Cleaning of respirators was reviewed during inspection 50-309/87-07.
Some
weaknesses were identified in the area of respirator washing. The
licensee is aware of this matter.
Regarding maintenance, the inspector selected 12 full face respirators
(Scott and MSA) from the issue shelf.
The inspector inspected the masks
and checked them for contamination.
No deficiencies were identified.
Regarding worker checking of respirators, the inspector questioned several
workers thcut their ability to "self-check" their respirators and how it
would be performed.
The workers had been trained to perform self-checks
in the iespirator Training Program and were permitted to do so.
The
t
inspector observed workers performing "self-checks".
Worker Concern 10
Work was performed on a pump reading 50 R/hr on contact without health
physics technician coverage.
Finding
The work referred to appears to be Reactor Coolant Pump impeller work.
The coverage of the pump work was reviewed during inspection 50-309/87-07.
No violations were identified.
The work coverage was consistent with
radiation work permit requirements.
The inspector reviewed work associated with impeller work in the Primary
Auxiliary Building Decontamination Room (RWP No. 87-4-414). The RWP
specified continuous radiation protection coverage. When the inspector
checked the work area, a technician was providing continuous coverage.
No violations were identified.
.
20
.
Worker Concern 11
The crane operator receives high exposure when he passes over the
"Wiscasset Wall".
Findings
The Wiscasset Wall encloses a radioactive waste storage area. Dose. rates
in the area range are up to 2R/hr whole body.
Inspector surveys at the top of the wall indicated dose rates about 120
mR/hr.
Inspector discussion with several radiation protection technicians
indicated that dose rates in the crane cab were on the order of 10 to 15
mrem /hr.
No high exposure situation was identified.
Worker Concern 12
The roof of the Primary Auxiliary Building and the yard areas are
contaminated.
Findings
The roof of the Spent Fuel Building indicated contamination levels of
about 10,000 dpm/100cm2 based on discussions with health physics
supervisory personnel.
The roof is posted as a Contaminated Area.
Several areas in the back yard areas are posted as contaminated areas (See
Section 3.2).
Worker Concern 13
Health physics technicians are inexperienced and do not perform well in
protecting workers.
Findings
The inspector selected five technicians providing responsible oversight of
radiological activities inside the Containment on different shifts.
The
training. qualification and experience of each individual was reviewed.
No violations or deficiencies were identified.
Regarding technician performance, weaknesses in this area were identified
and are discussed in Section 3.0
8.0 Exit Meeting
The inspector met with those individuals denoted in Section 1 on April 30,
1987 and May 13, 1987.
The-inspector summarized the purpose, scope and
findings of the inspection.
No written material was provided to the licensee.
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