ML20212P646

Forwards Response to Chatham Coalition for Alternatives to Shearon Harris (Cash) 860723 Rept, Chatham County Emergency Response Plan - Unanswered Questions. Cash Criticisms W/O Foundation.Svc List Encl.Related Correspondence

ML20212P646
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	08/29/1986
From:	Utley E CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	Zech L NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
References
CON-#386-554 OL, NUDOCS 8609030219
Download: ML20212P646 (33)

Text

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'FL 44Q DOCKETED Carolina Power & Light Company N P. o. Bo/1551 e Ralenjh, N. C. 27602 -

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GFFICE OCCFt.IR"U Or {4"'~ 'tf E.E.UTLEY r -

Senior Executive Vice President Power Supply and Engineering & Construction August 29, 1986 Mr. Lando W. Zech, Jr., Chairman U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 In the Matter of Carolina Power & Light Company and North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant)

Docket No. 50-400 OL

Dear Chairman Zech:

By letter dated July 23, 1986, the Chatham Coalition for Alternatives to Shearon Harris (" CASH") transmitted to you a report entitled "Chatham County Emergency Response Plan -- the Unanswered Questions." The CASH Report purports to show that inadequacies exist in the Chatham County portion of the North Carolina Emergency Response Plan in Support of the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant. As applicant for a license to operate the Harris Plant, Carolina Power & Light Company ("CP&L") has prepared a Response to the CASH Report. A copy of our Response is attached.

Our Response demonstrates that CASH's criticisms of the Emergency Response Plan are without foundation or merit. The development of the Plan has been a successful joint effort among the State of North Carolina, the four affected counties, and CP&L.

CP&L has worked cooperatively with Chatham County officials for several years and looks forward to a continuation of that relationship.

Very truly yours, "f *

,i EEU:ew ' E'.'E. Utley .cf Enclosure h9030219860829 A, DOCK 05000400 G

PDR Oso 3

o Mr. Lands W. Zich, Jr.

Paga 2 August 29,1986 cc: Service list attached Mr. Harold R. Denton Governor James C. Martin Attorney General Lacy Thornburg Robert O. Wells, Chairman-NCUC Senator James T. Broyhill Representative William W. Cobey, Jr.

Mr. Terry Sanford Mr. David Price

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0 CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY RESPONSE TO CASH REPORT ON EMERGENCY PLANNING August 1986

e The Coalition for Alternatives to Shearon Harris (" CASH")

recently released a report entitled "Chatham County Emergency Re-sponse Plan -- The Unanswered Questions" (" CASH deport"). This document, prepared by the CASH Research Committee, purports to prove that "real changes in the official NRC guidelines [on emer-gency planning), as well as in the state plan and its imple-mentation, are needed." These assertions lack foundation in fact.

Offsite emergency response planning for the area within ten miles of the Shearon Harris Nuclear Poaer Plant -- the Harris

. Emergency Planning Zone ("EPZ") -- has been a successful cooper-ative effort among the principal response organizations: the State of North Carolina, Chatham, Harnett, Lee and Wake Counties, and Carolina Power & Light Company. The plans developed through this process have been scrutinized by the staffs of both the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC") and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (" FEMA"), tested in a " full participation" ex-ercise involving public and private response organizations at all levels, and litigated in detail in public adjudicatory proceed-ings before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board. As discussed in greater detail below, each of these independent review mecha-nisms has confirmed the adequacy of emergency planning in the Harris EPZ.

In consultation with Chatham County and other local organi-zations, the North Carolina Division of Emergency Management

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. initiated preparation of the " North Carolina Emergency Response Plan in Support of the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant"

(" Emergency Plan"). The plan was developed based upon the de-tailed FEMA /NRC guidance in NUREG-0654,1/ as well as the emergen-cy response plans which had already been approved and success-fully tested at three other nuclear plants in and near North Carolina. Because of these other plants already in operation, the State of North Carolina and its agencies are among the most experienced in the United States in nuclear emergency response.

The first draft of the Emergency Plan was issued in February 1984. Part 1 of the plan establishes State procedures and de-scribes how the State integrates its emergency response activity with other organizations and jurisdictions. Part 2 contains sim-ilar information for Chatham County, with Parts 3 through 5 de-voted to the other three counties in the Harris EPZ. The plan has been revised several times since its initial issuance, in re-sponse to the comments and suggestions of involved State and local personnel, the exhaustive review conducted by FEMA and its multi-disciplinary Regional Assistance Committee, the NRC, out-side emergency planning experts, and members of the public who have participated in the reviews both through informal comment and the formal NRC hearings.

1 1/ " Criteria For Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1 (Rev. 1, Nov.

1980).

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Litigation of emergency planning at the Licensing Board level spanned more than two years. The Licensing Board admitted approximately 30 of the well over 200 emergency planning conten-tions proposed by intervenors. Most of these were resolved through settlement or summary disposition, following discovery.

Three emergency planning contentions were the subject of eviden-tiary hearings, and were resolved in favor of the adequacy of emergency planning. See LBP-85-49, 22 N.R.C. 899, 902-08, 915 (1985) (resolving contentions on emergency worker response and sheltering effectiveness of institutional, commercial and indus-

-trial structures); LBP-86-ll, 23 N.R.C. 294, 299-301, 364-97 (1986)-(resolving contention on night-time notification).

In addition, a full-participation exercise of the emergency plan was conducted on May 17-18, 1985. The exercise was cri-tiqued by NRC, FEMA and State evaluators, followed by a public meeting convened by FEMA on May 19, 1985. In that meeting,.the NRC observed that "the exercise was fully successful; the licensee played very well; and the training and commitment to emergency preparedness was obvious." The NRC found no violations or deviations. See Inspection Report No. 50-400/85-20 (June 5, 1985). Similarly, on the basis of the exercise and its review of the plan, FEMA concluded that "the State and local emergency plans are adequate and capable of being implemented and the exer-cise demonstrated that appropriate measures can be taken to pro-tect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity e

e of the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant in the event of a ra-diological emergency." See Memorandum, to E. Jordan (NRC) from R. Krimm (FEMA), dated August 7, 1985, re: Interim Findings on Offsite Radiological Emergency Response (RER) Plans and Prepared-ness for the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Station. The May 1985 full-participation exercise was also subject to litigation before the Licensing Board. Again, all issues were resolved in favor of licensing the Harris plant. See LBP-85-49, 22 N.R.C. 899, 908-14 (1985); LBP-86-ll, 23 N.R.C. 294, 397-407 (1986). See~also

" Safety Evaluation Report Related to Operation of Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No. 1," NUREG-1038, Supp. 3 (May 1986) at 13-2 to 13-3.

To confirm emergency preparedness, the EPZ counties (includ-ing Chatham County) will participate in CP&L's annual exercise

! for the Harris plant, to be conducted in October 1986. That ex-ercise will include the following activities:

a. Mobilize appropriate local county staffs;

b. Activate local county emergency facilities;

c. Confirm adequacy of local county facilities;

d. Exercise command and control functions during emergency response;

e. Confirm adequacy of communications between facilities and organizations;

f. Exercise the alert notification procedures;

g. Exercise the capability for ambulance support for contaminated injured person; and

h. Exercise the capability for hospital support for contaminated injured person.

Further, CP&L, the State of North Carolina, and the four EPZ counties have jointly scheduled a February 1987 full-scale local exercise, with support from State agencies for direction, control 1

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and communication. See Letter, A.B. Cutter (CP&L) to H.R. Denton (NRC), dated May 2, 1986, re: Emergency Preparedness Exer-cise/ Supplemental Information; Letter, S.R. Zimmerman (CP&L) to H.R. Denton (NRC), dated July 10, 1986, re: Emergency Prepared-ness Exercise.

An informed review of the CASH Report provides no basis to question the adequacy of NRC emergency planning regulations. In any event, any proposal for revisions to those regulations must be advanced in a properly supported petition for rulemaking filed pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 5 2.802. This CASH has failed to do. Nor does the CASH Report document even a single respect in which the Emergency Plan for the Harris EPZ fails to meet the Commission's regulations.

In sum, the efficacy of the Emergency Plan has been estab-lished through rigorous review by the cognizable federal author-ities, confirmed via the NRC's public hearing process, and demon-strated in a comprehensive full-participation exercise involving more than 2,000 people. The continuing programs of training, drills and exercises provide assurance that the current state of emergency preparedness will be maintained over the life of the plant. Nothing in the CASH report calls this state of readiness into question.

L Basis for Plannino As the premise of its report, CASH criticizes the NRC, as-serting that federal authorities require "only plans for the I

' design basis accident' (a low level of accident by definition)."

CASH Report at 1. To the contrary, it is beyond cavil that NRC emergency planning regulations and guidance are based upon a full spectrum of accident scenarios, " including the core melt accident release categories of the Reactor Safety Study." NUREG-0654 at

7. Further, actions speak louder than words, and CP&L's demon-strated commitment to excellence in onsite and offsite emergency.

preparedness belies CASH's allegations of an "it can't happen here" mentality. Indeed, while the emergency public information brochure distributed throughout the EPZ notes that "[a]n emergen-cy is not likely," it emphasizes:

But you need to be prepared if a serious accident happens. A re-lease of a large dose of radiation might threaten your life.

See Cover, " Safety Information for the Shearon Harris Nuclear i

Power Plant." CASH's assertions thus are baseless.

EPZ Size CASH purportedly " points out inadequacies in the NRC's and CP&L's ten mile maximum Emergency Planning Zone." CASH Report at 2, Appendices A & B. The NRC and FEMA regulations provide for a plume EPZ of approximately 10 miles in radius. The precise boundaries of the EPZ are to be determined "in relation to local emergency response needs and capabilities as they are reflected by such conditions as demography, topography, land characteris-tics, access routes, and jurisdictional boundaries." See 4

10 C.F.R. S 50.47(c)(2). In this case, the Emergency Plan re-flects the consideration of the appropriate factors in the deter -

mination of the Harris EPZ. See Emergency Plan, Annex I (map de-picting irregular EPZ boundary, drawn to reflect required factors). There is no assertion here that the Harris EPZ fails to comply with existing federal regulations; nor can there be.

To the extent CASH seeks to charige the generic "about 10 miles" rule, CASH must file a properly supported petition for rulemaking pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 5 2.802. The CASH Report is an inappropri-ate vehicle for rulemaking.

Moreover, CASH distorts the reports it cites in support of its case. For example, while CASH intimates that NUREG/CR-2239 supports the expansion of the EPZ beyond ten miles, the authors of that report concluded that evacuation of a 10-mile radius would be "a particularly effective response strategy" in the event of a nuclear accident. See " Technical Guidance for Siting Criteria Development," NUREG/CR-2239 (Nov. 1982). CASH also sug-gests that the generic 10-mile EPZ may be inappropriate for Harris because it is not based on site-specific meteorology.

However, the prevailing wind direction and its influence on emer-gency response were litigated in the public hearings at the con-struction permit stage of the Harris licensing proceedings. The presiding Licensing Board found that adequate consideration had been given to wind direction and speed in the area of the Harris site, and that any accidental radiological releases would be below applicable federal limits. See LBP-78-4, 7 N.R.C. 92, 129 (1978). Thus, there is no merit in CASH's criticisms of the Harris EPZ.

Shelterina and KI CASH asserts that the Emergency Plan "does not document-6ny established shielding factors (shielding effectiveness) for the dwellings in the 10 mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) in Chatham County." CASH Report at 3. To the contrary, the Emergency Plan includes data on the " protection factors" ("PFs") of residential structures in the EPZ, based on a survey of local housing and federal guidance on sheltering effectiveness. See Emergency Plan, Part 1 at 51. Indeed, the subject of sheltering effective-ness was litigated extensively before the Licensing Board, which has approved the information included in the Emergency Plan. See

" Memorandum and Order (Ruling on Remaining Summary Disposition Motions)," at 3-6 (April 24, 1985); " Applicants' Motion For Sum-mary Disposition of Eddleman Contention 57-C-10" (January 14, 1985). Thus, there is no basis for CASH's concern that public officials will lack sufficient information to make appropriate protective action decisions.

CASH also asserts that there may be insufficient shelter available at Jordan Lake Recreation Area, depending upon the num-ber of persons using the recreational facilities at the time.

4 CASH Report at 3-4. This concern is not unique to Harris; rath-er, the same situation exists at all nuclear plants across the

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country which have such recreational facilities within their EPZ boundaries.. The resolution is a straightforward, practical one:

lake users would be instructed to seek shelter in the closest available structures -- outside the recreational area, if neces-sary. Thus, CASH's concern raises no deficiency in emergency planning for the Harris EPZ.

Finally, noting that the Emergency Plan provides for the distribution of radioprotective drugs only to emergency workers and institutionalized persons, CASH argues that federal guidance requires "the distribution of KI to the general public in the 10 mile EPZ." CASH Report at 4. However, current federal policy is unequivocally to the contrary. According to the Federal Ra-diological Preparedness Coordinating Committee, "[t]he Federal position with regard to the predistribution or stockpiling of po-tassium iodide for use by the general public is.that it should not be required." See " Federal Policy on Distribution of Potas-sium Iodide Around Nuclear Power Sites For Use as a Thyroidal Blocking Agent," 50 Fed. Req. 30258 (July 24, 1985). Accord, Union Electric Co. (Callaway Plant, Unit 1), ALAB-754, 18 N.R.C.

1333 (1983). CASH's allegations therefore have no foundation in i

fact.

Notification and Response l CASH asserts baldly that, during the May 1985 full-participation exercise, it "took half a day just to notify all the boaters on [ Jordan] Lake." According to CASH, this i

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• cdnflicts with the-EPZ evacuation time estimate of a maximum of approximately four hours. CASH Report at 4. However, CASH's re-liance on the May 1985 exercise as a demonstration of lake noti-fication capability is misplaced. Applicable federal guidance l recognizes that the non-emergency use of certain types of public notification -- sirens and public address systems on vehicles and aircraft, for example -- can be needlessly alarming and dangerous j to the public. Accordingly, the activation of such systems need only be simulated for exercise purposes. See FEMA-43, " Standard Guide For The Evaluation of Alert and Notification Systems For Nuclear Power Plants" (September 1983), at N-3. Consistent with this guidance, the public alert / notification system for Jordan 1

Lake was not fully implemented in the May 1985 exercise.

The detailed provisions of the procedures for Jordan Lake notification and evacuation, and the many resources allocated to i

those functions, are persuasive evidence of the capability to protect Jordan Lake visitors. See Emergency Plan, Annex G.

CASH's broadbrush allegations in no way undermine the profession-i al. judgment of State and Federal authorities on the adequacy of plans for the notification of users of the-Jordan Lake recre-

ational area. Nor is the evacuation time estimate study for the Harris EPZ premised on unrealistic assumptions about Jordan Lake notification. The evacuation time estimates assume that boaters i

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and-others on.the lake will " evacuate over a fairly extended period of time," taking between 30 minutes and 150 minutes to reach shore to commence evacuation. See " Evacuation Time Esti-mates For The Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zone /Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant" (October 1983), at 6-3 to 6-4.

CASH.further alleges that Jordan Lake area notification pro-cedures concentrate only on the lake, and ignore the lands sur-rounding the lake. CASH Report at 5. To the contrary, the noti-P fication procedures are expressly addressed ~to not only Jordan Lake boaters, but also " associated recreation sites, surrounding 1

areas and other facilities where persons may congregate." See-Emergency Plan, Annex G. CASH also notes that notification may be impeded "if the weather is inclement and aircraft cannot be used." CASH Report at 5. But, again, these difficulties are not unique to Harris. Moreover, such situations are explicitly addressed in the applicable federal guidance:

Hiking trails and hunting areas are illustrative of areas where'it may not be feasible to provide a prompt notification by any other means ex-cept by aircraft *** . Such would not work in bad weather, of course, 1 but such areas are less likely to be used in bad weather. These areas should be reached on a best effort basis.

NUREG-0654, Appendix 3 at 3-16. Thus, there is no deficiency in the Emergency Plan for the Harris EPZ.

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) CASH also expresses concern that the State Division of Parks and Recreation might be unable to adequately warn Jordan Lake users in the event of a fast-breaking emergency. CASH Report at

4. But the Division of Parks and Recreation is not the only --

or even the primary -- agency which would provide emergency pub-lic notification to the Jordan Lake area. The North Carolina Wildlife Resources Commission has direction and control of emer-gency operations at Jordan Lake, with assistance provided by agencies such as the State Division of Forest Resources, the Army Corps of Engineers, and the Chatham County Sheriff's Department, as well as the Division of Parks and Recreation. See Emergency Plan, Annex G. CASH offers nothing to suggest that this comple-ment of resources would be unable to provide the requisite noti-fication.

CASH asserts that "

two (Parks and Recreation]

employees * *

• said that they would leave the area as soon as they could" if there were a problem at the Harris plant. CASH Report at 4. Although CASH seems to imply that these State employees would fail to perform their emergency functions in the event of a Harris accident, that is not what they were actually quoted as saying. It is equally plausible that the two were indicating their intent to evacuate as soon as possible after they completed their official duties. In any event, as discussed more fully in the next section of this response, historical expe-rience indicates that emergency workers do respond in t

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O emergencies, even where they have earlier indicated that they would not do so.

CASH also attempts to make much of the fact that a seasonal employee at Jordan Lake was not aware of Harris emergency notifi-cation procedures. CASH Report at 4. But there was no need for that employee to be instructed in those procedures. As CASH con-cedes, the employee at issue was only " hired for the summer."

Thus, the employee will be gone before fuel load, which is sched-uled for the fall.

With respect to the EPZ generally, CASH complains that

"[n]ight notification has not been checked out," and questions what will happen if an emergency occurs before the night-time ex-ercise required every six years. CASH Report at 5. But the sys-tem for public notification at night.is the same as the system for public notification during the day -- fixed sirens, mobile alerting, informal notification, and tone alert radios (within the first five miles of the EPZ); and there is no requirement that the publi.c notification system ever be tested at night. In any event, the efficacy of night-time notification was litigated extensively before the Licensing Board, which expressly approved the adequacy of the public alert / notification system for the Harris EPZ. Specifically, the Licensing Board concluded that --

under " worst case" conditions (e.g., summer night, when people are sleeping, with air conditioners on) -- approximately 98.5% of persons within five miles of the plant would be warned within the

first 15 minutes of an emergency (by sirens, tone alerts, and in-formal notification). The Licensing Board further found that more than 90% of those between five and ten miles.from the plant would be warned within the same period (by sirens and informal notification). See LBP-86-ll, 23 N.R.C. 294, 395-96 (1986).

Nothing in the CASH Report casts doubt on the Licensing Board's determinations.

CASH also challenges the procedures for notification of the hearing-impaired, asserting a lack of assurance that emergency workers "can communicate effectively with a hearing impaired per -

son." CASH Report at 5. But CASH fails to recognize the rela-tively limited amount of information the emergency workers need to communicate to the hearing-impaired. Indeed, where the person has a television, the worker need only turn it on; EBS television broadcasts will include " crawl messages" (lines of text at the bottom of the TV screen) to provide emergency warnings and in-formation to hearing-impaired members of the general public. See

" Applicants' Motion For Summary Disposition of CHANGE 17" (December 21, 1984). Similarly, CASH overlooks the ability of emergency workers to provide basic warnings to the hearing-impaired through written notes or even gestures.

Noting that the hearing-impaired are identified through the "special needs card" which is distributed annually, CASH asserts that "[nlo provision is made for those who might move to the area or lose their hearing between mailings." CASH Report at 5. The 1

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shortfanswer to this allegation is that the identification and notification of the hearing-impaired were litigated before the Licensing Board, and were found to be in full compliance with ap-plicable federal regulations and guidance. See " Memorandum and Order.(Ruling on Eleven Summary Disposition Motions)" (February 27, 1985); " Applicants' Motion For Summary Disposition of CHANGE 17" (December 21, 1984); " FEMA Staff Response To Applicants' Mo-4 tion For Summary Disposition of CHANGE Contention 17" (January 22, 1985). In any event, CASH is overlooking CP&L's commitment to provide all new customers within the EPZ with a copy of the brochure (with the special needs card) through its area offices and electric membership cooperative offices. See " Applicants' Motion For Summary Disposition of CHANGE-17" (December 21, 1984).

Thus contrary to CASH's assertions, people moving into the EPZ

will have an opportunity to promptly identify any special needs they might have in an emergency at Harris. Moreover, CASH is en-tirely discounting the personal notification of such a hearing-impaired person by friends, neighbors and relatives, who are likely to be particularly sensitive to the special needs of 4

that person. Further, CASH is assuming that any temporarily non-registered hearing-impaired persons would be oblivious to the evacuation of everyone around them. Such a scenario simply j strains credulity. Even assuming (for the sake of argument) that someone were to evade initial notification, he would not go en-tirely without warning. Rather, he would be notified by law t

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enforcement personnel who would be patrolling the EPZ, to provide security and confirm evacuation. See " Applicants' Motion For Summary Disposition of Eddleman 57-C-3" (November 2, 1984).

Thus, CASH's criticisms have no basis in fact or law.

CASH expresses similar, concerns about provisions for "those who are temporarily without transportation or temporarily handi-capped or ' shut-in'." CASH Report at 5. These issues, too, were litigated before the Harris Licensing Board. Contrary to CASH's assertions, the County Emergency Coordinators are responsible for maintaining the list of persons with special needs in their re-spective counties. Moreover, emergency planning provides for persons who may be temporarily without transportation or tempo-rarily handicapped, and thus perhaps not included on the special needs list. Of course, past experience in hundreds of disasters of all types indicates that many such people would accept rides with friends, neighbors or' relatives. But, nevertheless, the EBS announcements would advise any able-bodied persons needing offi-c'ial transportation assistance to walk to the closest  !

predesignated pick-up point or route, where transportation would be provided to the designated shelter. The EBS announcements would also include a telephone number for disabled persons to call to receive special evacuation assistance (such as ambulance or wheelchair van transportation). CASH's unsupported allega-tions do not undermine the Licensing Board's determination of the adequacy of these arrangements for the evacuation of special l

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populations within the Harris EPZ. See " Memorandum and Order (Ruling on Remaining Summary Disposition Motions)" (April 24, 1985); " Applicants' Motion For Summary Disposition of Wilson 12(b)(3) and EPJ-2" '(January 14, 1985); " Supplemental Affidavit of Joseph F. Myers on EPJ-2" (April 25, 1985); " Applicants' Mo-tion For Summary Disposition of EPJ-5" (January 14, 1985).

CASH further asserts (1) that public response to a nuclear emergency would differ dramatically from public response to a natural or non-nuclear technological disaster; (2) that the pub-lic will disregard official instructions; and (3) that the

so-called " evacuation shadow phenomenon" will complicate emergen-CASH Report at 5, Appendix C.

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cy response efforts. CASH's argu-ments are baseless.

j The subject of human. response to an emergency is one of the

! most litigated issues in NRC licensing hearings, here and else-j .where across the country. Based on the overwhelming evidence, the NRC adjudicatory boards have consistently rejected the notion that human response in a nuclear emergency would differ signifi-  !

cantly from human response to other types of natural and techno-logical disasters. See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. of New i

York (Indian Point, Unit No. 2), LBP-83-68, 18 N.R.C. 811, 957-58 '

(1983) (rejecting arguments that emergency worker behavior in nuclear emergency would differ from other types of emergencies).

i l According to the leading disaster sociologists in the na-tion, the historical record of emergencies demonstrates i

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conclusively that the key to appropriate response in any emergen-cy -- nuclear or non-nuclear -- is timely, accurate public in-formation about the emergency. If the public is provided with timely, accurate information about the emergency so that they can understand the general basis for the protective action recommen-dations issued by officials, they will follow those recommenda-tions.

Because there was no plan for emergency public information at the time of the Three Mile Island ("TMI") accident, the in-formation provided to the public was insufficient, inaccurate and

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often contradictory. As a result, public response was confused.

Since the TMI accident, NRC regulations have been amended to re-quire that all nuclear emergency plans include comprehensive pub-lic education /information programs. 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(b)(7); 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, S IV.D.

To assure appropriate public response in the event of an emergency at Harris, an aggressive public information program has been developed which provides for dissemination of information both (a) in advance of an emergency and (b) at the time of an emergency. The public information disseminated prior to an emer-gency includes an emergency public information brochure, distri-buted annually within the Harris EPZ, which includes educational information on radiation, an explanation of public notification methods, information about protective actions (e.o., sheltering, evacuation routes and reception centers) and a number to contact for additional information. See Emergency Plan, Part 1 at 41-43; " Safety Information for the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant."

The public information disseminated at the time of an emer-gency would include official EBS announcements and detailed media releases. To assure that apprcpriate EBS announcements can be issued immediately upon notification of an emergency, various

" fill-in-the-blank"-type EBS announcements have been prepared and are included in the Emergency Plan. In addition, Public In-formation Officers have been designated by the State, the four EPZ counties, and CP&L, and detailed arrangements have been made for the coordination of media releases by all emergency organiza-tions. These measures provide assurance of appropriate public response and will minimize any inappropriate response (including over-reaction, ruch as the so-called " evacuation shadow phenome-non").

In any event, emergency planning for the Harris EPZ has con-sidered the possibility that persons beyond the 10-mile EPZ may evacuate. Traffic control points (shown on the " Operations Map,"

Emergency Plan, Annex I) have been strategically placed throughout the area, both to assure a smooth flow of traffic out of the EPZ, and to assure that any traffic outside the EPZ would not impede the evacuation to safety of those inside the EPZ. The effectiveness of these traffic control points was confirmed by a detailed, computerized time / motion study of the road network in the area. See " Evacuation Time Estimates For The Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zone /Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant" (October 1983). This study, conducted by a prestigious nationally-known traffic engineering firm, was reviewed and ap-proved by experts at the renowned Texas Transportation Institute, as well as the NRC and FEMA. CASH's bald assertions provide no basis to dispute the studied conclusions of these experts.

Emeroency Workers and Facilities CASH asserts that several people it has interviewed have in-dicated that they will not perform their emergency functions in the event of a Harris accident. CASH Report at 4 (two Parks and Recreation employees), 6 (a landfill employee and unspecified "others"). However, NRC case law recognizes the unreliability of pre-emergency surveys of worker response. In actual emergencies, people conform to pro-social behavior patterns and assume their

! roles under the emergency plan, even where they have earlier as-serted that they would not do so. See, e.o., Pacific Gas & Elec-tric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2),

LBP-82-70, 16 N.R.C. 756, 825 (1982) (characterizing as

" unreliable" people's statements about their likely behavior under stress while being interviewed under unstressed condi-tions); Consolidated Edison Co. of New York (Indian Point, Unit No. 2), LBP-83-68, 18 N.R.C. 811, 958 (1983) (in actual emergen-cy, people behave in pro-social manner and in accord with roles under plan, despite earlier assertions to the contrary). Indeed,

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a the responsiveness of emergency workers in the event of a Harris emergency was litigated before the Licensing Board here. The Li- 4 l

censing Board granted summary disposition.in favor of CP&L, based I upon the historical record of emergency response in hundreds of natural and technological disasters across the country, as well as the testimony of State officials that North Carolina emergency workers (both paid and volunteer) are on record as performing their. assigned functions in the face of imminent life-threatening situations, such as tornados, hurricanes, forest fires and floods. See " Memorandum and Order (Ruling on Remaining Summary Disposition Motions)" (April 24, 1985); " Applicants' Motion For Summary Disposition of EPJ-3" (January 11, 1985). CASH's anecdotal observations cast no doubt on this established record of emergency response. See also Indian Point, supra, 18 N.R.C.

at 957-59 (relying on FEMA testimony that past experience demon-strates that emergency workers fult'ill their duties);

Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1), LBP-81-59, 14 N.R.C. 1211, 1487 (1981) (noting FEMA testimony that, based on previous disaster experience, emergency workers can be expected to " perform their emergency functions re-gardless of conflicting demands.")

CASH broadly impugns ths equipment and training provided to Chatham County emergerCv eor' 3rs. CASH Report at 6. While FEMA did identify areas for improvement in equipment and training, FEMA emphasized that they were not deficiencies in planning and 4

did.not detract from Chatham County's overall capability to pro-tect the health and safety of the public. See Report, "Shearon I

j Harris Nuclear Station Exercise, Conducted on May 17-18, 1985" (FEMA Region IV), esp. at 20-22. Moreover, in response to FEMA's comments, Chatham County facilities, equipment and training have

'been enhanced.

CASH focuses particularly upon facilities.and procedures for use in evacuee reception and sheltering and in monitoring and decontamination activities, alleging that FEMA found these to be

" marginal." CASH Report at 6, Appendix D. However, it was the physical. facilities of the Chatham County EOC which were so char-

! acterized. See FEMA Exercise Report at 20. And these facilities have been upgraded. Another room has been added to the EOC. The use of this room will provide more space and will reduce the

. noise level in the EOC. Additional maps and overlays are being provided, and more telephones have been installed.

Contrary to CASH's representations, FEMA found.the Chatham County shelter facilities to be " excellent." See FEMA Exercise Report at 21. And, despite CASH's disparaging comments about shelter operations, FEMA -- the federal agency which is the re-pository of the nation's emergency mar.agement expertise -- noted that, "[t]he shelter manager and chief of monitoring and decon-tamination teams were khowledgeable in their area's of responsi-bility," and "[t]he registration and handling of evacuees were adequately demonstrated." FEMA Exercise Report at 21. Further, l

shelter facilities and operations are being enhanced. Hand-held multi-band radios are being provided to shelters to facilitate communications, and the procedures for monitoring and decontami-nation teams are being revised and streamlined.

Loting that State agencies in Raleigh would support Chatham County in a Harris emergency, CASH hypothesizes that these re-sources could be unavailable in a serious accident which spread radiation more than ten miles from the plant. CASH Report at 7.

This scenario is a thinly-veiled challenge to the Commission's generic "10-mile EPZ" rule. Moreover, downtown Raleigh (where the State facilities are located) is approximately 22 miles from the Harris plant, so that resources could first be concentrated on areas closer to the plant, with additional time to expand re-sponse efforts outside the 10-mile area (if necessary). Simi-larly, CASH postulates the need to evacuate Northwood High School, one of the Chatham County shelters. CASH Report at 7.

However, to minimize the potential need for such actions, the ap-plicable NRC/ FEMA guidance provides that shelters should be lo-cated at least 5 miles outside the plume EPZ. See NUREG-0654, Criterion J.10.h. The Chatham County shelters were selected in accordance with this guidance, with Northwood High School approx-imately 15 miles f rom Harris, and the other two Chatham County shelters more than 20 miles from the plant.

CASH's concerns about shelter capacity, discussed below in the section on " Shelters," are similarly unfounded. See CASH l 1

l a

4

9 o

Report at 6-7. Thus, CASH's comments on. emergency workers and facilities identify no flaws in emergency planning for the Harris EPZ.

Incestion EPZ CASH contends that emergency planning for the Harris EPZ "makes no plans for the protection of livestock during a nuclear accident." CASH Report at 7. The short answer to this argument is that the NRC is charged with_ responsibility for public health and safety. Thus, the agency's regulatory authority and guidance is properly directed to the protection of human health and life, although required protective measures may incidentally provide some measure of protection to property. See generally Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1), LBP-81-59, 14 N.R.C. 1211, 1674 (1981). This is similar to emergency planning and response for other types of disasters, where efforts focus primarily on human life, and only secondarily on personal and real property.

CASH's proposals (e z g., for special notification of farmers, special reserves of feed and water, lists of all growers regard-less of size, etc.) generally extend far beyond the NRC's regula-tory requirements. Compare CASH Report at 7-8 with 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(b)(10); NUREG-0654, Criterion J.ll. Nevertheless, emergen-cy planning fcr the Harris EPZ has recognized the special needs of farmers. For example, the State Radiation Protection Section may order that cattle be placed on stored feed. See Emergency

1

! Plan, Part.1 at 53. And the North Carolina Department of Agri-culture is responsible for locating and reporting sources of-uncontaminated feed for livestock, and for providing expert con-sultation on livestock, dairy and agricultural practices. See t

Emergency Plan, Part 1 at 18-19, 53. " Fill-in-the-blank" EBS messages have been prepared in advance to assure that farmers are advised to shelter and provide food and water for livestock. See Emergency Plan, Annex D, Message A. The emergency public in-formation brochure (distributed annually) contains similar in-formation for farmers. See " Safety Information for the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant,".at 1, 4, 5. Moreover, the State is developing a special brochure for farmers, which will be avail-able to farmers throughout the 50-mile Ingestion EPZ. This new brochure, which is in excess of regulatory requirements, will provide more detailed information on topics such as radioactive contamination of crops, animal feed and water sources during emergencies, sheltering of livestock, use of stored feed, and sources of additional assistance and information.

Noting that the Emergency Plan provides that arrangements may be made for evacuees to return home for short periods to replenish supplies of feed and water for. livestock, CASH ques-tions the measures which would be used to control the exposure of any such farmers. While the measures employed would necessarily

depend upon the situation at the time, the State could provide

,, farmers with a broad range of protective gear, from protective l'

i

_ ~ . , -, - - - ._ ..-_.,. - . . . m.., . - _ , , , , . . . _ , . . - - - - - , ,

clothing and respiratory protection devices to permanent record and self-reading dosimetry and potassium iodide. Thus, none of CASH's allegations undermine FEMA's finding that "[p]rotective measures to be used for the ingestion pathway are adequately pro-3

vided for" in the Emergency Plan. See " Interim Findings Report on the Adequacy of Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness for Plant Harris, North Carolina" (FEMA Region IV June 12, 1985),

at 14.

Shelters CASH challenges the c_apacity of the designated shelters to accommodate Chatham County evacuees. See CASH Report at 6-7, 8:

Three facilities have been designated as shelters for evacuees from the Chatham County portion of the EPZ -- Jordan Matthews High School, Chatham Central High School, and Northwood High School. In the event of an emergency necessitating use of shel-ters, school children (except those living in the evacuated area) would be sent home, so that classroom areas could be used for j evacuees. According to Red Cross standards for public shelters, the three identified facilities have the combined capacity to house a minimum of 5400 evacuees simultaneously. Moreover, as the Emergency Plan points out, the Red Cross standards are gener-ous; therefore, more than 5400 evacuees could actually be accom ,

modated. See State Plan, Part 2 at 33.

To make its point, CASH postulates the need to simulta-neously accommodate the approximately 2700 residents of the u

Chatham County. portion of the EPZ, as well as the peak transient population from the Jordan Lake area (which CASH inconsistently fixes at 10,000, 15,000, and 27,000). See CASH Report at 3, 6.

Such a scenario is wildly unrealistic. The arrival of evacuees at shelters would be staggered over a period of time, and --

i based on past experience in hundreds of natural and technological disasters in this country -- it can be expected that, after reg-istering at a public sh.elter, many evacuees would choose to stay with friends or relatives or at a motel rather than staying at the shelters. CASH argues that, even after people have been per-sonally decontaminated, they would be unable to leave the shelter "for an extended period of time" because their cars would be con-

! taminated. However, provisions have been made for the monitoring and decontamination of vehicles as well. See, e.g., State Plan, Part 2 at 3-10 (assigning responsibility for vehicle decontamina-tion).

CASH also asserts a need for detailed provisions for "commu-1 nication" between shelters, alleging that school children will be evacuated to one shelter, while their parents go to another.

CASH is simply wrong. Parents are free to go directly to their children's shelter to pick up their children. Parents are in-formed of this option both in the emergency public information i

brochure for the general public and in a special " school bro-chure" developed specifically to provide emergency information to students and their parents. See " Safety Information for the

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Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant"; "Shearon Harris Nuclear

. Power Plant Student Safety Information". Thus, CASH's concerns are baseless.

Conclusion As discussed in detail above, CASH's criticisms of the Emer-gency Plan for the Harris EPZ are lacking in merit. Over the past two and one-half years, Chatham County has worked together with Harnett, Lee, and Wake Counties, as well as the State.and Federal-governments and CP&L, to develop integrated emergency re-sponse plans for the Harris'EPZ. Opportunity for public partici-pation -- through informal comment.as well as formal hearings --

has been provided throughout the process. Emergency response fa-cilities and equipment are in place. Emergency workers have been trained, drilled, and exercised in implementing the plans, and have proven their proficiency. The lengthy and complex Federal review process -- which addressed and resolved the issues CASH raises -- has been completed. The NRC and FEMA have concluded that the plans can be implemented and that they provide reason-able assurance that public health and safety would be protected in the' event of a radiological emergency at the Harris Plant.

CP&L-looks forward to continued cooperation with State and local officials to maintain that state of emergency preparedness over the life of the plant.

6-SERVICE LIST L ndo W. Zech, Jr. Dr. James H. Carpenter Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D. C. 20555 Ccmmissioner Thomas M. Roberts Charles A. Barth, Esquire U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Myron Karman, Esquire W:shington, D.C. 20555 Office of the General Counsel U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Ccmmissioner James K. Asselstine Washington, D. C. 20555 t U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Docketing and Service Section Office of the Secretary Commissioner Frederick M. Bernthal U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 W:.shington, D.C. 20555 Mr. Daniel F. Read, President Commissioner Kenneth M. Carr Chapel Hill Anti-Nuclear U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Group Effort Washington, D.C. 20555 Post Office Box 2151 Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 Thomas S. Moore, Esquire Ch frman Dr. Linda Little Atomic Safety and Licensing Governor's Waste Management Board Appeal Board 513 Albemarle Building U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 325 Salisbury Street Washington, D.C. 20555 Raleigh. North Carolina 27611 Dr. Reginald L. Gotchy John D. Runkle, Esquire Atomic Safety and Licensing Conservation Council of North Carolina Appeal Board 307 Granville Road U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27515 Wcshington, D.C. 20555 Jo Anne Sanford, Esquire Mr. Howard A. Wilber H. A. Cole, Jr., Esquire Atomic Safety and Licensing Special Deputy Attorneys General Appeal Board Post Office Box 629 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 Wcshington, D.C. 20555 M. Travis Payne, Esquire Jtmes L. Kelley, Esquire Edelstein and Payne At:mic Safety and Licensing Board Post Office Box 12643 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Raleigh, North Carolina 27605 Wzshington, D. C. 20555 Dr. Richard D. Wilson Mr. Glenn O. Belght 729 Hunter Street Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Apex, North Carolina 27502 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission W shington, D. C. 20555 Mr. Wells Eddleman 812 Yancey Street Durham, North Carolina 27701

b Thomas A. Baxter, Esquire Delissa A. Ridgway, Esquire Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge 1800 M Street, NW

- Wrshington, D.C. 20036 Bradley W. Jones, Esquire - -

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region 11 101 Marietta Street Atlinta, Georgia 30303 Rcbert P. Gruber Ex:cutive Director Public Staff N:rth Carolina Utilities Commission Post Office Box 29520 R leigh, North Carolina 27626-0520 Jcs ph Flynn, Esquire Associate General Counsel Fcderal Emergency Management Agency 500 C Street, S.W.

Room 480 Wr.shington, D. C. 20740 Stsven Rochlis, Esquire >

Federal Emergency Management Agency  :'

1371 Peachtree Street, N.E.

Atlanta, Georgia 30309 )

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