NUREG/CR-2239, Forwards Slides/Handout Used at 821110 Presentation of NUREG/CR-2239 Re Sandia Siting or Consequences Study. Transcript of Meeting in PDR Did Not Include Slides

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Forwards Slides/Handout Used at 821110 Presentation of NUREG/CR-2239 Re Sandia Siting or Consequences Study. Transcript of Meeting in PDR Did Not Include Slides
ML20136H189
Person / Time
Issue date: 11/18/1985
From: Bernero R
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To: Shelburne E
NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY)
References
REF-10CFR9.7, RTR-NUREG-CR-2239 NUDOCS 8511250058
Download: ML20136H189 (26)
v • d • e


Text

_ _ _ _ _ _ __

NOV181985 MEMORANDUM FOR: Elizabeth Shelburne, Chief

.NRC Public Document Room FROM: Robert M. Bernero, Director Division of Systems Integration, NRR

SUBJECT:

COMISSION MEETING TRANSCRIPT FOR NOVEMBER 10, 1982 On November 10, 1982, I made a presentation to the Commission related to the then soon-to-be published Sandia Siting (or Consequences) Study, NUREG/CR-2239. A member of the public recently checked that file in the PDR and informed me that the transcript did not include a copy of the slides used in that meeting. That person asked me for a copy of those slides. I have checked my files and extracted the attached copy of what I believe was the slides handout used at that meeting. Please insert these into the PDR record for the meeting on November 10, 1982.

I am enclosing two copies as requested.

O'riginal Signed By:

Robert L Bornero Robert M. Bernero, Director Division of Systems Integration

Enclosures:

As stated Distribution

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! 0511250058 B51118 PDR NUREG CR-2239 C PDR t___________________-__________________________________________________________----______----------__-.___________________________________

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On Monday, November 1,1982 the Washington Post carried a news story about an NRC-sponsored siting study which was performed by Sandia National Laboratories.

That story has led to widespread interest and further reporting here in the U.S.,

and in other parts of the world as well, on the purported contents and significance of the Sandia study. The concerns expressed arise in great part, but not entirely, from the original report in the Washington Post. In brief, these concerns are:

(1) that the' Sandia study constitutes a new set of estimates of severe accident risks at nuclear power plants which greatly surpasses the estimates of the Reactor .

Safety Study; (2) that theselnew estimates are a cause for great public concern,

  • especially because of the great doubts about the predictions of low probabilities; and (3) that the NRC is misleading the public when it is not honest'about what the worst-case possibility is.

Our purpose today is to brief the Commission on this work and to address the concerns expressed. Before turning to my staff and our contractor for the detailed briefing, I wish to present a brief sumary of the substance and the conclusions of this briefing.

The Sandia study, NUREG/CR-2239 (or SAND 81-1549), is entitled " Technical Guidance I

for Siting Criteria Development." Its purpose was to develop the technical guidance to support the formulation and comparison of possible siting criteria e

for nuclear power plants. It includes information on (1) consequences of hypo-thetical severe accidents; (2) characteristics of population distributions around current reactor sites; (3) site availability within the continental United States; and (4) socioeconomic impacts of reactor siting.

j  !

The Sandia study is not a new generic analysis of the risk of reactor accidents, it merely assumes the occurrence of severe accidents of different severity and calculates the range of possible consequences at U.S. reactor sites. Although the

[ Sandia study provides us with useful analyses of the importance of various siting factors, it does not change our overall perception of reactor risk. On the contrary, the results presented in this report are consistent with those presented in the

. Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400) and later publications. The results in the Sandia

! study also give us assurance that our present reactor siting criteria are not i

seriously flawed, and that it is reasonable to postpone further consideration of changes in siting criteria until new infonnation on radioactive source tenns is available next year.

ihe news stories have concentrated on the peak, or maximum calculated values of consequences. The likelihood of occurrence of these most severe consequences is very low. The exact value of this low probability is, of course, quite uncertain.

But the fact that it is very low is beyond reasonable dispute, since the necessary sequence of events is a combination of low probability events. This report assumes that the annual probability of full scale core melt at a typical plan,t is 1 chance A%

in 10,000 and that the probability of large scale release; M thre @,a a full sca core melt, is 1 chance in 100,000. These assumptions are supported reasonably well by existing risk studies including both predictive studies and analysis of operating experience. The siting study merely assumes these probabilities of core melt and large release, but it calculates further probabilities based on meteorology and population data. The analyses indicate an annual probability of 1 chance in 10 that anyone at all will be killed if a large release occurs and 1

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chance in 10,000 that weather sequences and wind direction could combine to produce the very unlikely scenarios which led to the maximum calculated consequences. The staff estimates that these are 1 chance in 1 billion events even without recognizing the further reduction in either probability or severity which should be made to account for known conservatism in radioactive release source terms and other factors. Significant reductions in source terms are expected based on current work and they alone are expected to lead to a very large decrease in the estimates for early fatality or injury. In addition, the present calculations incorporate a conservative bias in the emergency response assumptions for the extreme cases which leads to a conservative overestimation of the number of deaths or injuries.

The Reactor Safety Study attempted' to display the nature and range of severe accident consequences and the probabilities which should be associated with '

them. Probabilistic risk analysis has been further refined since then and 1

both NRC-sponsored and industry publications have displayed a range of conse-quences with extreme values ,similar to those associated with the siting study.

Example publications include the 1978 report SAN 078-0556, "An Investigation of the Adequacyo ' f the Composite Population Distributions Used in the Reactor Safety Study;" the 1980 reporc NUREG-0715, " Task Force Report on Interim Operation of Indian Point;" and the many Environmental Impact Statements which have been i

published since the Connission adopted the policy of describing severe or Class 9 accident risk in such statements. A similar range of consequences can be found in recent industry-sponsored risk analyses such as the Zion Probabilistic Safety Study and the Indian Point Probabilistic Safety Study. The NRC has even invited l .

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4-the Congress' attention to this range of estimates as a possible basis for change

- in the liability limits of the Price-Anderson Act in a 1980 letter to the Chaiman

, of the Senate Conmiittee on Governmental Affairs.

The maximum consequences cited in the current news reports are pessimistically overstated estimates for very low probability sequences of events; they are not a cause for great public concern. The results of the Sandia study have not increased our estimates of reactor risk. On the contrary, they give us further assurance of the acceptability of past and current reactor siting policy.

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DESCRIPTION 0F RISK AND RISK EXTREMES IN SANDIA SITING STUDY NOVEMBER 10, 1982 3

4 FIVE POINTS

1. SANDIA REPORT IS NOT A NEW RISK ASSESSMENT WHICH SHOULD BE A CAUSE FOR PUBLIC CONCERN.
2. CURRENT SITING POLICY IS NOT SERIOUSLY FLAWED.
3. THE PUBLICIZED MAXIMUM CONSEQUENCES ARE PROBABLY OVERSTATED DUE TO CONSERVATIVE MODELING ASSUMPTION.

11 . THE SCENARIOS FOR WORST CASES ARE EXTREMELY IMPROBABLE.

5. THE RANGE OF CONSEQUENCES AND THE EXTREMELY LOW PROBABILITY VALUES HAVE BEEN PUBLISHED AND DISCUSSED FOR YEARS.

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SITING o NUREG-0625 (1979) CALL FOR MORE REMOTE SITING

o KEMENY AND ROGOVIN REPORTS o 1980 CONGRESSIONAL CALL FOR REVISED SITING POLICY o WORK IN 1980 AND 1981 ON TECHN,1 CAL BASIS u

o EXPECTED SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS IN l SOURCE TERMS DELAYED ACTION ON SITING l

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10,003' 100,000 1,000,000 10 100 1,000 Early Fatalities, X

AN INVESTIGATION OF THE ADEQUACY OF THE COMPOSITE

..* POPULATION DISTRIBUTIONS USED IN THE REACTOR SAFETY STUDY RANDE OF SPECIFIC SITE PROBABILITIES . . ....., . . ......

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+0 10 10 10 10 EARLY FATALITIES Figure 16: Log-Log plot of probability (per reactor-year versus early f atalities showing the dispersion of site specific CCDF's about the Reactor Safety Study CCDF.

1 = Indian Point (2985 MWt) 2 = Zion (3150 MWt) 3 = Palo Verde (3713 MWt) 4 = Millstone BWR (1956 MWt)

  • = Reactor Safety Study 5 = San onof re (1290 MWt) s W

~~

NUREG/CR-2239 S AN D81-1549 .

TECHNICAL GUIDANCE FOR SITING CRITERIA DEVELOPMDtT D. C. Aldrich J. 1. Sprung (Project Coordinators)

D. J. Alpert K. Diegert , ,

R. M. Ostmeyer L. T. Ritchie D. R. Strip Sandia National laboratories Albuquerque, New Mexico 87185 J. D. Johnson .

Dikewood Corporation Albuquerqu e, New Mexico K. Hansen, J. Robinson Dames and Moore los Angeles, California

  • Manuscript Submitted: July 1982 Date Published: November 1982 Sandia National Laboratories Albuque"rque, New Mexico 87185 -

operated by '

Sandia Corporation "

  • for the
  • U.S. Department of Energy Prepared for

. "U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Wa shing ton, D.C. 20555 -

Under Memorandum of Understanding DDE 40-550-75 NRC' FIN No. A-1123

TECHNICAL APPROACH SCOPE OF STUDY o DESIGN INDEPENDENT ACCIDENT CONSEQUENCES o CHARACTERISTICS OF POPULATION DISTRIBUTION o SITE AVAILABILITY o SOCIDECONOMIC IMPACTS .

RISK PORTION o SET OF SEVERE ACCIDENT RELEASES I

o ANALYZE 91 U.S. SITES o CONDUCT SENSITIVITY ANALYSES 1

TECHNICAL APPROACH

-RISK PORTION-o SET OF SEVERE ACCIDENT RELEASES o ANALYZE 91 U.S. REACTOR SITES FOR CONDITIONAL RISKS WITH THESE RELEASES o CONDUCT SENSITIVITY ANALYSES SOURCE TERMS METEOROLOGY ,

POPULATION Ef1ERGENCY RESPONSE 0THER.

o A SITING STUDY NOT A RISK ASSESSMENT FOR l

ALL EXISTING REACTORS l

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SEVERE ACCIDENT SITING SOURCE TERMS SST Category Description Essentially involves loss 1 Gross core melting.

of all inttalled safety features (core and containmuit). Severe direct breach of contain-ment (analogous to Reactor Safety Study PWR

Category 2).

2 Gross core melting. Containment fails to isolate. Fission product release mitigating systems (e.g., sprays, suppression pool, fan coolers) operate to reduce release (analogous to Reactor Safety Study PWR Categories 4 and 5).

3 Gross core melting. Containment fails by basemat melt-through. All other release miti-gation systems have functioned as designed (analogous to Reactor Safety Study PWR Categories 6 and 7).

-4 Limited to moderate core damage (no gross core melting). Containment systems operate but in somewhat degraded mode (THI-2 equivalent).

5 Limited core damage. No failures of engineered safety features beyond those postulated by the various design basis accidents are assumed.

REPRESENTATIVE PROBABILITIES .

SST-1 1x10-5/RYR SST-2 2x10-5/RYR SST-3 lx10-4/RYR 9"

TYPICALSITE PRdBABILITY'0F OCCURRENCE PROBABILITY PER YEAR EVENT CdNDITIdNAE CUMULATIVE

1. LARGE SCALE CORE MELT 1x10-4 1x10-4
2. LARGE (SST-1) RELEASE 1x10-1 1x10-5 IF 1. OCCURS
3. AN EARLY FATALITY IF 1x10-1 1x10-6
2. OCCURS
4. THE " MAXIMUM CALCULATED" 1x10-3 1x10-9 WEATHER SEQUENCE AND POPULATION COMBINATION OCCURS IF 3. OCCURS 9

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NUMBER OF SITES 30 -

214 - NUMBER OF SITES 20 -

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5-10 1-5 5-10 1-5 5-10 1-5 CHANCES PER CHANCES PER CHANCES PER. CHANCES PER CHANCES PER CHANCES PER hILLION 1 MILLION 10 MILLION 10 MILLION 100 MILLION 100 MILLION PROBABILITY OF ONE FATALITY PER REACTOR YEAR e

MODEL UNCERTAINTIES o RADI0 ACTIVE SOURCE TERM PESSIMISTIC o EMERGENCY RESPONSE i

PESSIMISTIC BEYOND 10 MILES o RELEASE ENERGY  !

o PLUME DEPLETION o RADIATION EFFECTS MEDICAL TREATMENT CANCER INCIDENCE o WIND TRAJECTORY

\/ "

SENSITIVITY ANALYSES -

PURPOSE - INVESTIGATE DEPENDENCE OF PREDICTED CONSEQUENCES ON i SITE AND ACCIDENT CHARACTERISTICS SUCH AS:

o POPULATION DISTRIBUTION o METEOROLOGY L

o EMERGENCY RESPONSE o SOURCE TERMS

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l o INTERDICTION / DECONTAMINATION MAXIMUM PREDICTED CONSEQUENCES INCREASE WITH EXTREME ASSUMPTIONS s

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S1IING FACTORS L'lilCH INFLliENCE R1SK Lull.Tl M .UiPAC.l

-1. POPilLAT10i1 DENSITY CONSE0llEI!CES 10 LlHlTS 101AL Hil".RER 0F P;:0PLE

2. SECTOR LlHlT CONSE0llENCES 4 LlHITS POPULATION CLilsTER1NG
3. DISTAllCE/ GRID SIZE CONSE0llENCES 3 LlHITS POPULATION CLllSTERING 4, P014ER LEVEL CONSEQUENCES 2 LINEAR
5. EHERGENCY RESPONSE CONSEQUENCES 10 INDEPENDENT
6. CORRELATION OF HIND PROBABILITIES 3 DATAhNDfiETHOD AND POPULATION PROBLEMS 7t PRECIPITATION OCCUR- PROBABILITIES 3 DATA PROBLENS RENCE R. HU!iPER AND PR0XIMITY PROBABILITIES 2 LIREAR OF U. NITS
9. SITE I;ETEOR0 LOGY PROBABILITIES ' 1. 2 DATA PROBLEMS
10. DES 10','/ SOURCE TERM PROBABILITIES 100 I NDPE..'P.':':T 9

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EXTREME VALUE SCEN4RIOISSilES o EMERGENCY RESPONSE ASSUMPTIONS FOR

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10:1 5ITE:RLLENSCREE_K HET:FTWTH-5HELTER:3 STATE:37 INvFNTORv:i AcclDENT SEQUENCE '55T i , EUACUATION SCHEhd 5u.1:1A;:

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ce DESCRIPTION ** *** HERH ***

  • UARIANCE *
  • P(NOT 0) * *** PEAK *** ** PiPEA

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186 ACU THY . i .'l.%82E+02>/ti,N ', I .94E+05;,

1r i 2.'03E+02@Tf;3.50E+04.'J' , -l .00E+00, * .l.59E+03- 8.28E-04 187 ACU THY D5- 30HI '.9.82E+01' .

. 8.41E+03- l.00E+00." '

6.98E+02 .' : U.28E-09 188 ACU THY DS- 50HI li. . 2 . 9 6 E + 0 1 ; .'!;:.. 7.77E+02' .

l.00E+00 l.46E+02 7.19E-03 189 ACU THY.D5-100H1 6.04E+0 0 i .~ . .: 4.62E+01,

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4 PREVI'dOSREPORTTOCdN5RESS o COMMENTS ON GA0 PRICE-ANDERSON RECOMMENDATIONS o CHAIRMAN AHEARNE TO SENATOR RIBIC0FF (12/31/80) o RANGE OF ESTIMATES BASED ON NUREG-0715 EARLV FATA[lTIES 10-6/RYR 0-5'l000 10-9/RYR 700-50j000 PROPERTYhMAGEV1974"Dd[LhRS) 10-6/RYR $2M - $2B 10-9/RYR $8B-$100B t

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PUBLISHED DOCUMENTS WHICH HAVE PRESENTED EXTREME RESULTS O SAND 78-0556, AN INVESTIGATION OF THE ADEQUACY OF THE COMPOSITE POPULATION DISTRIBUTION USED IN THE REACTOR SAFETY STUDY', OCTOBER 1978.

O NUREG-0715, TASK FORCE REPORT ON INTERIM OPERATION OF INDIAN POINT, AUGUST 1980.

O ZION PROBABILISTIC SAFETY STUDY, SEPTEMBER 1981.

O TWENTY ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENTS NUREG-0848 BYRON NUREG-0490 SAN ONOFRE NUREG-0813 CALLAWAY NUREG-0895 SEABROOK NUREG-0921 CATAWBA NUREG-0842 ST. LUCIE CLINTON NUREG-0719 l NUREG-0854 SUMMER NUREG-0775 COMANCHE PEAK NUREG-0564 SUSQUEHANNA NUREG-0769 FERMI ~ NUREG 0779 WATERFORD NUREG-0777 GRAND GULF NUREG-0878 WOLF CREEK NUREG-0537 MIDLAND NUREG-0812 WNP-2 NUREG-0841 PALO VERDE IN PUBLICATION NARRIS NUREG-0884 PERRY IN PUBLICATION BELLEFONTE

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CONClilSIONS o SITING POLICY IS NOT SERIOUSLY FLAWED, DELAY FOR REVISED SOURCE TERM IS LOGICAL o THERE IS NO CAUSE FOR INCREASED PUBLIC CONCERN BECAUSE OF MAXIV.UM CALCULATED VALUES i

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PERCENT CHANCES 0F OCCURRENCE ASSUMPTIONS o 100 REACTORS OPERATING o NEXT 20 YEARS EQUATION PROB.

100 REACTORS x 20 YEARS x x 100 =

REACTOR YEAR PERCENT CHANCE LARGE SCALE RELEASE (SST-1) 1 100 x 20 x x 100 = 2 PERCENT 100,000 AN EARLY' FATALITY l 1 100 x 20 x x 100 = 0.2 PERCENT 1,000,000 MAXIMUM CALCULATED'EhRLY' FATALITIES 1

r 100 x 20 x x 100 = 0.0002 PERCENT

! 1,000','000,000 l3

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ . . _ _ _ _ .

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