IR 05000295/1988013

Insp Repts 50-295/88-13 & 50-304/88-14 on 880526-0719.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Licensee Action on Previous Findings,Summary of Operations & Main Steam Safety Valves Set Nonconservatively

ML20207D332
Person / Time
Site:	Zion  File:ZionSolutions icon.png
Issue date:	08/08/1988
From:	Hinds J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20207D311	List: IR 05000295/1988013 ML20207D307
References
50-295-88-13, 50-304-88-14, NUDOCS 8808150324
Download: ML20207D332 (14)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report Nos. 50-295/88013(DRP);50-304/88014(DRP)

1 Docket Nos. 50-295; 50-304 License Nos. DPR-39; DPR-48 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company P. O. Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name: Zion Nuclear Power Station, Units I and 2 Inspection At: Zion, IL Inspection Conducted: May 26 through July 19, 1988 Inspectors: H. M. Holzmer P. L. Eng R. M. Lerch P. R. Rescheske

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Approved B : J. .. Hinds, C f 8> B 88 ctor Projects Section 1A Date Inspection Summary Inspection from May 26 through July 19, 1988 (Report Nos. 50-295/88013(DRP)1 50-304/88014(DRP))

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced resident inspection of licensee action on previous inspection findings; summary of operations; main steam safety valves set nonconservatively; diesel generator control wiring isolation switches wired incorrectly; Unit 2 auxiliary feedwater check valve backleakage; Unit I reactor trip; Unit 1 engineered safety features actuation; operational safety verification and engineered safety feature (ESF) system walkdown; surveillance observation; maintenance observation; licensee event reports (LERs);andtraining.

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Results: Of the 11 areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifTed. A Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) was issued by NRC Region III regarding the licensee's actions to correct excessive auxiliary feedwater check valve backleakag ? ^

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DETAILS Persons Contacted

• K. Graesser, General Manager, PWR Operations

• R. Stobert, Director of Quality Assrance, Operations

• G. Plim1, Station Manager

• E. Fuerst, Superintendent, Production T. Rieck, Superintendent, Services

• Kurth, Assistant Station Superintendent, Operations R. Johnson, Assistant Station Superintendent, Maintenance R. Budowle, Assistant Station Superintendent, Technical Services N. Valos, Unit 2 Operating Engineer M. Carnahan, Unit 1 Operating Engineer R. Cascarano, Technical Staff Supervisor

• T. Vandevoort, Quality Assurance Supervisor

• T. Printz, Assistant Technical Staff Supervisor V. Williams, Station Health Physicist

• C. Schultz, Quality Control Supervisor

• W. Stone, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor A. Bless, Regulatory Assurance Engineer P. LeBlond, Radiation Chemistry Supervisor

• L. Bird, Project and Construction Services

• Indicates persons present at 'he exit intervie . LicenseeAclionsonPreviousIns,ectionFindings(92701,92N21 (Closed) Open Item (295/85013-01) iMview licensee resolution to inspsetor concerns regarding material exclusion :.ontrols in containment. During refueling activities, the fuel handlers have the responsibility for j establishing and maintaining material exclusion controls. Discussions 4 with the licensee indicated th6t for periods of time during which refueling activities are not being performed, but the reactor internals are exposed, material controls are maintained. The outage coordinatcr has the responsibility for establishing the controls. Two meast os ere used to maintain controls: (1) a core cover (screen) which can be installed over the reactor core to prevent objects from enter Ng tiie vessel, and/or (2) a person (cavity watch) who is posted to moniter activities in containment. Based on discussions with the licensee, this item is close (Closed)OpenItem(295/85013-02) Review licensee resolution to inspector concerns regarding exposed electrical panels above the. :oent fuel pit (SFP) bridge. Work request number 52232 was laitiated in Juh 1986, which resulted in vented covers being installed over the front of the SFP bridge crane electrical panels. The ventilation openings shouid eliminate the problems with overheating, which resulted in expocing the breakers during SFP activities. Based on discussions with the licensee and review of the completed work request, this item is considered close No violations or deviations were identifie . . . . . . .

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. Sunmary Of Operations Unit 1 The unit began the inspection period in Mode 1 and operated until the reactor tripped on July 13, 1988, due to failure of a feedwater flow instrument (paragraph 7). The unit was tied to the grid on July 16, 1988, and operated for the remainder of the period at power levels up to 100%.

Unit 2 The unit operated at power levels up to 100% for the entire perio No violations or deviations were identifie . Operation of Unit 1 in an Unanalyzed Condition Due to Main Steam Safety Valve (MSSV) Setpoint?s Being Set Nonconservatively (93702)

On June 17, 1988, at approximately(4:08 the Emergency Notification p.m.,

System ENS) that the licensee reported on durin refueling outage (February 24 through May 9,1988)g theofrecent

, 20 out Unit 1 20 Crosby MSSVs had as-found relief setpoints which were out of tolerance hig The licensee reported that in this condition, the MSSVs would not pass enough steam flow at 1150 psig to maintain the peak steam temperature less that 560*F as required by the Zion Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).

Following receipt of the test results during the outage, the licensee installed the MSSVs which had been reset and satisfactorily tested by Crosb However, no deviation report (DVR) was initiated to determine and correct the cause of the nonconservative setpoints until May 20, 1988, 11 days after the Unit 1 startup. The licensee's safety analysis performed pursuant to the DVR was completed en June 17, 1988, and was reported as described abov ,

An inspection was performed by NRC Region III specialists to assess the adequacy of the licensee's root cause analysis and of the licensee's corrective actions. Results of that inspection will be documented in inspection report 295/88015. A review of the reason for the late issuance of the DVR and why there was no documented review of root cause and corrective action prior to the Unit I startup will be performed as part of the review of the Licensee Event Report (LER) by the resident inspectors, and will be considered an Unresolved Item (295/88013-01).

One Unresolved Item was identifie > Wiring Discrepancy Identified in the 18 Diesel Generator (DG) Appendix R TsBationlircuit (93702)

On June 22, 1988, at approximately 8:15 a.m. , the licensee informed the resident inspector that during a field walkdown for as-built verification of DG control circuits on June 21, 1988, it was discovered that a switch

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designed to isolate the control room from the IB DG local control panel would not perform its intended function. This isolation switch, installed pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, is designed to isolate the local DG control circuits from the control room

.in the event of a control room or cable spreading room fire which might damage control circuitr The licensee issued Standing Order 88-15, which instructed the equipment operator to cut the appropriate wire (which was identified by a tag)

which bypasses the isolation switch contar.t in the event that the IB DG is needed during a control room or cable spreading room fire. The Fire t Operating Procedures (F0Ps) were temporarily revised until repair of the wiring proble Two inspection specialists from NRC Region III were sent to the site to assess the licensee's response to the identified problem. Their inspection will be documented in a future inspection report (295/88016).

No violations or deviations were identifie . Unit 2 Auxiliary Feedwater Check Valve Backleakage (93702, 92703)

Over the course of Unit 2's current operating cycle, leakage from the steam generators into the auxiliary feedwater system increased to the point that on June 17, 1988, the licensee issued Standing Order (S.O.)

88-1 l'he S.0. stated that backleakage from the main feedwater system through the discharge check valves for both the 2B and 2C motor-driven auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pumps was causing elevated AFW pump casing temperatures. The S.0. also stated that pump casing temperatures were to be monitored at least four times per shift and that pump casings were to be cooled by venting the casings or by running the pumps in order to cool the discharge piping before pump casing temperatures were significantly above ambient. The standing order also stated that the pumps were to be run as often as twice a shift in order to maintain acceptable pump casing temperature The inspectors noted that elevated AFW pump casing temperatures had been l experienced during the previous operating cycle. The licensee stated that during the last Unit 2 refueling outage, three valves had been removed from the AFW system and sent back to the valve manufacturer for

refurbishment in an effort to minimize backleakage into the AFW system from the main feedwater piping. These valvec included 2 FW0033, the discharge check valve for the 2C motor-driven AFW pump, and 2 FW0069 and

2 FW0066, the check valves located insediately upstream of the feedwater injection points and downstream from the flow orifices for the 2D and 2A steaiu generators, respectively. A spare check valve from the warehouse was installed as 2 FWOO33. Valves 2 FW0069 and 2 FWOO66 were returned from the vendor and reinstalled prior to the Unit 2 startup in August 198 _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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The inspectors also noted that backleakage into the AFW system had been discussed in I and E Bulletin 85-01, "Steam Binding of Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps," and in Generic Letter 88-03, "Resolution of Generic Safety Issue 93, ' Steam Binding of Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps.'" These two documents address the disabling of AFW pumps by steam binding caused by backleakage of main feedwater past the isolation check valves between the AFW and main feedwater systems. The licensee stated that its response to the I and E Pulletin had described shiftly monitoring of the AFW pump casing temperatures by "touch," and noted that the response had been deemed acceptabl When asked if the source of the backleakage into the AFW system had been identified, the licensee stated that informal temperature surveys of the feedwater piping revealed that the backleakage came from the 2D steam generator. Members of the technical staff stated that temperatures obtained from AFW piping upstream of the 2D steam generator were approximately 100 degrees higher than those from the piping upstream of the other three steam generators and that the pump casing temperatures *

for both the 2B and 2C AFW pumps were elevated. This data indicated that valves 2 FWOO69; 2 FW0032, the discharge check valve for the 2B motor-driven AFW pump; and 2 FW0033 were leaking throug Since the frequency of AFW pump runs necessary to maintain AFW pump casing temperatures at approximately ambient had increased from twice weekly to twice per shift over the cou >e of the current operating cycle, on June 28, 1988, the inspectors asked if the backleakage had increased significantly and when the valves would be repaired. The licensee could not provide any documented technical data regarding the status or trend of backleakage into the AFW system; however, it stated that the AFW pumps

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were run more frequently to ensure that the pump casings would not have a chance to heat up. The licensee also stated that since the casing temperature for the 2C pump became elevated at a faster rate than the 2B pump, it believed that elevated temperatures on the 2B pump were due to conductive heating from the common AFW pump discharge header. As a result, the licensee stated that it had tentatively scheduled repair of 2 FW0033 only for July 11, 198 The inspectors noted that actual pump casing temperatures had not been obtained and inquired as to how the licensee knew that the 2C casing was heating up faster than the 2B casing and how changes in the backleakage rate would be detected and evaluated. As a result of the inspectors'

inquiries, the licensee installed thermocouples and a strip chart recorder on both the 28 and 2C AFW pump casings in order to quantify the pump casing heat-up rat On June 30, 1988, the NRC issued Confirmatory Action Letter CAL-Rill-88-017 documenting the agreement between the licensee and members of the NRC staff with regard to actions associated with the repair of the AFW check valves. The CAL stated that the licensee agreed to:

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..-- Using Standing Order 88-14 dated June 17, 1988, check the casing temperatures of the 2B and 2C AFW pumps on an hourly basis using a contact pyrometer or contact thermocouples with

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a strip chart recorder, and report any tren In the event that the casing temperature of either the 2B or 2C AFW pump reaches or exceeds 150*F, cool the pump casing

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to within 10 degrees of condensate water temperature by using l

the casing vent valves and/or starting the pump using an approved Zion Unit 2 procedure to equalize the casing-temperatur Complete a walkdown of the affected AFW piping system, e inspecting for evidence of damage to pipe hangers, penetra-tions, and equipmen'. anchors and other physical or thermal damage, and imediately perfonn a safety analysis of any damage identified for system operability. Additionally during this walkdown, determine the temperature gradient, as achievable, of the piping down to 200 F from valve 2 FW0069. Upon completion, report the results to the Zion NRC Resident Inspector. In the event of gas formation, pump binding or water hamer indications, subsequent to the initial walkdown perform an additional system walkdown and appropriate analysis, and report the results to the Zion NRC Resident Inspector, Complete a safety analysis of possible thermal stress effects on the affected AFW system and components for system operability, including the thermal cycles and number of pump starts since the last startup. Upon completion, report the results to the Zion NRC Resident Inspecto Determine and report to Region III its criteria related to temperaturcs, pressures, pump starts, etc., which if exceeded will be used to establish unit shutdown requirements, Coninence repair or replacement of valve 2 FWOO33 no later than July 15, 198 If Unit 2 should be shutdown for any reason and repairs are not con!pleted to valves 2 FWOO32, 2 FWOO33, and 2 FW0069, notify RIII prior to restart of the uni The CAL also stated that restart of Unit 2 would require the concurrence of the Regional Administrator or his designe On June 30, 1988, the licensee inforned the Resident Inspector of its intent to run the 2C AFW pump continuously in order to minimize thennal cycling of the affected AFW system piping. The licensee also issued Standing Order 88-16, which directed operators to run the 2C AFW pump at all times with AFW flow control valves throttled to approximately 105 gallons per minute (gpm) per steam generator. This flow rate is that l

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required for adequate heat removal frcm the reactor coolant system in the event of an accident. The S.0. also stated that hourly pump casing temperatures were to be obtained and that the Unit 2 calorinetric calculation was to be adjusted to compensate for the constant injection of cool condensate water from the AFW system. The S.0. also specified that with the 2C AFW pump idle, pump casing temperatures for both the 28 and 2C AFW pumps were to be monitored every half hour and the pumps started when the casing temperature reached 115 F. It was estimated that the 2C AFW pump would have to be run hcurly in order to maintain casing temperatures below 115 F. In addition, if the temperature of either AFW pump casing could not be maintained below 150 degrees by running the pump or venting the pump casing, the affected AFW pump was to be declared inoperable and the appropriate Limiting Condition for Operation (LC0) followe On July 7, 1988, the licensee began repair of valve 2 FWOO33 and issued Standing Order 88-18, which stated that with the 2C AFW pump isolated and out of service, only 28 AFW pump casing temperatures were required to be taken hourl The licensee responded to the CAL by letter dated July 7, 1988. As a result of the licensee's written request, items 1 and 2 of the CAL were revised on July 12, 1988, so that the licensee would: Check the casing temperatures of the 2B and 2C AFW pumps, when their associated discharge valves are open, on an hourly basis using a contact pyrometer or contact thermocouples with a strip chart recorder. Report any trend to the Zion NRC Resident Inspecto In the event that the casing temperature of either the 2B or 2C AFW pump reaches or exceeds 150 F, the pump casing will be cooled to within 25 degrees of condensate water temperature by using the casing vent valves and/or starting the pump using an approved Zion Unit 2 precedure to equalize the casing temperatur The two changes effectively permitted the licensee to monitor AFW pump casing temperatures using procedures other than Standing Order 88-14, and compensated for the heating effects of running an AFW pump on a continuous basis by allowing the licensee to cool the affected pump casing to within 25 degrees of condensate water temperature vice 10 degree Inspection of the internal parts of valve 2 FW0033 revealed an offset of approximately 60 mils between the centers of holes into which the valve disk hinge pins are inserted. This offset resulted in the inability of the disk to obtain a positive fit in the valve seat, thereby allowing backleakage from the 2D steam generator to contact the 2C pump internals, as exhibited by elevated pump casing temperatures. The licensee corrected the offset by replacing the valve bushings with eccentrically bored bushings made of the sarre material to restore the pin alignment and

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allow the valve disk to seat properly. The licensee monitored pump casing temperatures for 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> after repairs to 2 FW0033 were completed and noted that casing temperatures were not significantly higher than ambient even after the 2C pump was run several times, thereby lifting the check valve disk off its sea Determination of whether the 2B AFW purp discharge check valve, 2 FW0032, is leaking and whether the licensee should take corrective action is considered to be an Unresolved Item (304/88014-01).

i No violations or deviations were identified. One unresolved item was identifie . Unit 1 Reactor Trip on July 13, 1988 (93702)  ;

On July 13, 1988, at approximately 3:46 p.m. (CDT), with Unit 2 at approximately 99% power, Unit 1 tripped from 99% power on steam flow /

feed flow mismatch coincident with low steam generator level in the ID steam generator. The initiating event was the failure of the square root extractor module for feedwater flow channel 530. The subject channel was the designated controlling channel; its failure resulted in the 10 feedwater regulating valve going fully closed. Closure of the ID feedwater regulating valve resulted in a mismatch between steam flow and feed flow in the ID steam generator as well as a decreasing steam generator level. Approximately 27 seconds after the feed flow channel failure, the steam generator low level setpoint of 25% was reached, and the reactor trip logic was completed. All systems responded as expected, with the exception of the control rod positicn indicators for rods B-8 and C-11. The rod bottom light for rod 8-11 did not light, and the C-11 indicator response appeared to be slo The licensee's investigation of the failure of the rod bottom light for control rod B-8 revealed that the rod position indicator module had recently been changed out during power operations. Although the module had been replaced, the zero setpoint adjustment could not be made with the reactor at pcwer and with the rod fully withdrawn. The rod position zero setpoint was adjusted, and satisfactory actuation of the rod bottom light was verifie The licensee reviewed previous rod drop times and determined that control rod C-11 was responding acceptably. Slave relay currents for control rod C-11 obtained during the subsequent unit startup verified that the control red drive was functioning properly; however, the licensee believes that the rod position indication signal conditioning module may need replacemen Replacement of the signal conditioning module is planned for the near futur The licensee remained in Mode 3 until 12:12 a.m. on July 16, 1988, at which time the unit was made critical. The unit was synchronized to the grid at 5:31 a.m. the same da [ , - -

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Completion of evaluation of this event remains open pending receipt and review of the licensee's LER on this subjec No violations or deviations were identifie . Unit 1 Engineered _ Safety Features Act_u_ation Due to Offsi_te Grid Disturbance __on July l h 1988 (9370lf)

On July 15, 1988, at approximately 2:15 p.m.'(CDT), with Unit 1 in Mode 3 and Unit 2 at approximately 99% power, a 300 megavolt-ampere (MVA)

transformer located in Lombard, Illinois faile Loss of the transformer induced a volt-anp-reactive (VAR) perturbation in the Contr.onwealth Edison Company (CECO) system,affectingbothUnits1and2. Nonvital 4160-volt bus 142, which is the normal power supply for ESF bus 147, experienced a voltage drop from 4160 to 3850 volts, actuating the second level undervoltage protection circuitry. Bus 147 was then stripped from bus 142, and the "0" diesel generator auto started. Once the diesel generator had come up to speed, the loads for bus 147 were sequenced o All components responded as expecte The VAR perturbation resulted in a brief overexcitation of the Unit 2 main generator. The overexcitation did not last long enough for the generator protection timer to cause a main generator tri The licensee immediately reduced Unit 2 power from 99% to 92% in order to increase VARs emanating from Unit 2 and reduced house loads. The "0" diesel generator was left running and continued to carry bus 147 loads until after the system evening peak at 7:00 p.m. Bus 147 loads were realigned to normal and the "0" diesel generator secured at approximately 7:45 p.m. Unit 2 power was increased from 92% to 99% at approximately 11:05 p.m. the same evenin During the licensee's event evaluation, it noted that PRIME computer data indicated that ESF bus 148 may have experienced voltages lower than those for bus 147. The licensee verified the calibration status for the second level undervoltage relays for the affected ESF buses and noted that the as-found and as-left calibration data supported the conclusion that the voltage setpoint for the relays had not experienced any previous drif The licensee then conducted a test which verified that the second level undervoltage relays for bus 148 were within their calibration. The licensee then concluded that the data obtained from the PRIME computer were indicative of trends only and that the absolute values were not Correc Completion of evaluation of this event remains open pending receipt and review of the licensee's LER on this subjec No violations or deviations were identifie . .

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9. Operational Safety V_erification and Engineered Safety Features System Walkdown (71707~& 71710)

The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators from May 26 through July 19, 1988. During these discussions and observations, the inspectors ascertained-that the operators were alert, cognizant of plant conditions, attentive to changes in those conditions, and took prompt action when appropriate. The inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout recordt and verified proper return to service of affected components.- Tours of the auxiliary and turbine buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenanc The inspectors by observation and direct interview verified that selected physical security activities were being implemented in accordance with the station security pla The inspectors observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection control From May 26, 1988, to July 18, 1988, the inspectors walked down accessible portions of the auxiliary feedwater, safety injection, containment spray and 4160-volt ESF AC electrical distribution systems to verify operability. The inspectors also witnessed portions of the radioactive waste system controls associated with radwaste shipments and barrelin These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under Technical Specifications, 10 CFR, and administrative procedure As mentioned in inspection report 295/88014; 304/88015, on June 14, 1988, a CECO security guard escort entered the Unit 1 Radwaste Annex from the main steam isolation valve house. A few steps into the room, he was accosted by an individual who ordered the guard to leave the area because it was a high radiation area. Review later determined that the Radwaste Annex had been temporarily established as a high radiation area during the transfer of contaminated resin to a shielded shipping cask. The door through which the guard passed was posted with a radiation area sign, which is what the Radwaste Annex usually require The guard was not authorized to enter a high radiation area in that he had not met the administrative requirement The licensee reviewed the details of the event, including cask survey data and exposure records for both the guard and the worker. The worker was reported as having an exposure of 5 millirem (mr) for the entire time he was in the annex. It was estimated that the cask, at about 30 feet from the dear, had an effective dose rate contribution of less than 1 mr/hr and that the general area dose rate at the door was about 1 mr/hr. The guard's dosimetry indicated that his exposure was less than measurable for the quarter year. Based on these facts, the inspector concluded that this event had little safety significanc __ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _

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The inspector stated that although an inadvertent exposure did not occur, the potential for such an occurrence existed. A review of the requirements of 10 CFR 20.203 for high radiation areas and Zion administrative procedure (ZAP) 5-51-15, "High Radiation Area Access Control," revealed that the ZAP meets the regulatory requirement These include the identification and posting of high radiation areas and direct surveillance to prevent unauthorized entry. The ZAP includes a precaution that access doors not be left open unless a worker is posted outside the door. The inspector noted that more stringent application of these requirements to temporary high radiation areas would minimize the potential-for unauthorized entry to these areas. As a result of these concerns the licensee has temporarily changed the applicable radwaste procedure to require posting of the door and will make this change permanent. The licensee will also reevaluate access controls to the Radwaste Annex during activities which create high radiation areas. The licensee is also reviewing all other activities which potentially require temporary high radiation area control These actions adequately address the inspector's concerns regarding this event; this matter is considered close No violations or deviations were identifie . Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)

The inspector observed Technical Specifications required surveillance testing on the reactor protection, containment spray and auxiliary feedwater systems and verified whether testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, whether test instrumentation was calibrated, whether limiting conditions for operation were met, whether removal and restoraticn of the affected components were accorrplished, whether test results conformed with Technical Specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and whether any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate managerrent personnel.

l The inspector also witnessed portions of the following test activities:

PT-10 Safeguards Actuation PT-6 Containment Spray System Tests and Checks PT-7 Auxiliary Feedwater System Tests and Checks PT-11 Diesel Generator Loading Test

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No violations or deviations were identifie . Monthly Maintena_nc_e Observation (62703)

Station maintenance activities on the safety-related systems and components listed below were observed or reviewed to ascertain whether they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes or standards and in conformance with Technical Specification .

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The following items were considered during this review: the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional kring and/or calibrations were perfonred prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemente Work requests were reviewed to determine the status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety-relater' equipment maintenance which may affect system performanc The following maintenance activities were observed or reviewed:

Z-53467 Repair of 2 FW0033, Auxiliary Feedwater Check Valve Following completicn of maintenance on valve 2 FWOO33, the inspector verified that the auxiliary feedwater system had been returned to service properl No violations or deviations were identifie . Licensee Event Reports (LERs) Follow-up (92700)

Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, that immediate corrective action was accomplished, and that corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specifications. The LERs listed below are considered closed:

UNIT 1 LER N DESCRIPTION

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88001 Missed Battery Temperature Surveillance 88002 Missed Tritium Sample Due to Deficient Tracking System 88003 Quarterly Composite Sample Unable to Meet Lower Limit of Detection Requirements

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With regard to LER 295/88001, the plant surveillance coordinator noted during his review of the December 27, 1987 data taken in accordance with PT-0, Appendix K, "Station Daily Record," that some but not all 3 temperature data had been cbtained. Investigation into the cause of this event revealed that the surveillance procedure did not clearly define which test data were required for acceptable performance. Also, temperatures for battery cells adjacent to the pilot cells were not

obtaine This deficiency was due to the fact that several of the

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thermometers normally installed in the adjacent cells had been removed for certification as official measuring and test equipment. The licensee has revised PT-0, Appendix K to clearly note which test data is required, and has installed properly certified thermometers in all pilot and adjacent battery cells. This LER is close With' regard to LER 295/88002, a liquid sample could not be obtained from the service building ventilation radiation monitoring system dehumidifier for analysis. The sample could not be obtained during the period January 20, 1988 through February 27, 1988, due to the lack of humidity i in the service building. Also, the surveillance tracking system failed to track successful completion of this surveillance. The licensee has established procedures to ensure that tritium samples will be collected when the service building air is arid and revised the surveillance tracking system to monitor successful completion of the surveillanc This LER is close With regard to LER 295/88003, the licensee obtained and shipped the appropriate quarterly composite samples for the lake discharge and the fire sump to an offsite laboratory for analysis. Due to delays at the offsite laboratory, sufficient time elapsed that the strontium 89 in the samples decayed to levels below the lower limit of detection required by the technical specifications. The licensee has revised the pertinent themistry procedure to provide for obtaining a larger sample for analysis. This LER is close tio violations or deviations were identifie . Training (41400)

During the inspection period, the inspectors reviewed abnormal events and unusual occurrences which may have resulted, in part, from training deficiencies. Selected events were evaluated to determine whether the classroom, simulator, or on-the-job training received before the event was sufficient to have either prevented the occurrence or mitigated its effects by recognition and proper operator action. Personnel qualifica-tions were also evaluated. In addition, the inspectors determined whether lessons learned from the events were incorporated into the training progra Events reviewed included the events discussed in this report. In addition, LERs were routinely evaluated for training impact, fio events reviewed this period were found to have significant training deficiencies as contributors, fio violations or deviations were identifie . Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of nonccmpliance or deviations. Two Unresolved Items disclosed during this inspection are discussed in paragraphs 4 and .

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15. Exit Interview (30703)

The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1)

throughout the inspection period and at the conclusion of the inspection on July 19, 1988, to summarize the scope and findings of the inspection activitie The licensee acknowledged the inspectors' comments. The inspectors also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any such documents or processes as proprietar