ML20198K600
| ML20198K600 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 11/14/1984 |
| From: | NRC - COMANCHE PEAK PROJECT (TECHNICAL REVIEW TEAM) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20197J316 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-85-59 NUDOCS 8606040063 | |
| Download: ML20198K600 (120) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:.- .- _ _ _ - _ _ _ - - _
. . ~ .
1 b s. , d
.'s A. . M
/ gs T8:
Sol /#A.Ete<ssn fk{ ~" / b f5 S C
&iu er y sur myeen A y L4
- 2., $$ ,
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COIO!ISSICri i i Technical Review Team Staff ( 1 i I i t ( i Taken by: Cartren Gooden, CSn, PSR' Neverier 14, 1984
,i i . . . _ _ . . .
&_ i f01A-85-59 8 ' ' ' "# '"
- 8606040063 860527 mix taxAs reais DE 9 PDR 5]
- 3. <~.s.s.s,.. .,ss,sm,.sm...,_,,,.,,,,,,_,,,,,,,,__,,,,,,
i .
*I
, .I p 1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCIIAR REGULATORY COMMISSION TECFNICAL REVIDJ TEAM 1 l l TECHNICAL INTERVID'
~ ', Wednesday, November 14, 1984 Granbury, Texas This interview was com.cnced at 9:00 a.m.
PRESENT: l- biR. JOIDi ZUDANS Technical Review Team Staff Nuclear Regulator / Ccemission Washington, D. C. 20555 MR. BOB MASTERSON Technical Review Team Staff Nuc1 car Regulatorf Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 DR. SHOU HOU Technical Review Team Staff l Nuclear Regulatory Cortrission
;i Washington, D. C. 20555 -
i
,l t
i i b 4 e
l ( Ig 2 PROCEEDINGS
. MR. ZUDANS: For the record, this is an interview with to provide him with feedback regarding certain
- technical concerns which we have been made aware of in the recent past for which the Technical Review Team has done an
, assessment and is. prepared today to provide with an ,
i
,- indication of how these items havc been resolved by the NRC.
s The location of the interview is the Granbury Inn. Present in the interview are Ecb Masterson, Shou Hou, John Zudans and This meeting has been agreed to be transcribed by at this time, i There were five iter.s--correct me?--six items that we ad have reviewed, technical items, which we have reviewed, M
- M that came out of these conversations that you had previously with Ms. Tang at the NRC., We'll go through them again and explain them to you.
M I'm not aware of the conversation you're i} talking about. '{ l MR. ZUDANS: My understanding is that in August--I li believe it was August--there were sece--I know where these l: l: itens came from. Just a minute. The itees that were of concern came out'of an ASLB hearing on 9-15-82 at which you 9 l testified. They came out of an inspection report, 83-12, t l; - i and we have Sob Masterson here to describe the six-itier..s 1 '
) that came out of that bearing that were concerns that; you 1
e
W : 3 test fied to, and we'd like~ to explain to you what we did to resolve those first and- then we could go on to the iter.s that are of real concern to close out your area that we're trying to address. The item that you're talking about: Is it
. the testimony that I gave to NRC that went in the record?
This piece of paper right here? (Indicating)
, MR. MASTERSON: Maybe I can explain, five of the concerns were from the ASLB hearings. One of the concerns is this telephonic interview between yourself and Mr. Brooks j Griffin on August 28. !
A lot of that is phony. MR. MASTERSON: We can talk about that in a minute, but the other five concerns are ASLB hearing records, limited
, appearances.
(4 Okay. That would be this right here, right? (Indicating) 1 i I; MR. MASTERSON: That looks like it's a transcription of il something else. This is actual hearings that you went to in September of 1982. This is what I presented right here. 6tR. MASTERSON: This is a transcript-- This is in the record. l MR. MASTERSON: This is a transcript of what you said. Okay. So it would be the same thing. ,. . . . . . . . . . ~ . . .
'. b l
4 MR. MASTERSON: Five of the concerns are based upon this
;. particular document, and the first concern is on the tele-phone interview between yourself and Mr. Brooks Griffin.
Are you going to take that first? r MR. MASTERSON: Let's do that first. Let me tell you 5 how I viewed that, what I did as a technical reviewer, and 7 then you can interject if you feel that something is not 5 f correct in this document. When we received this, I looked 4 it over and it talks about an incorrect--or a suggestion to redesign a particular pipe hanger in the tunnel, and there b+ was a meeting h' eld between Gigsen Hill and TUSI engineers at which you were present. Supposedly, according to this document, you made a suggestion on'how to redesign the support, they asked you to leave, and the next day you were fired. That's not right. That's completely phony; y , that's not what I told him. l
-j MR. MASTERSON: Why don't you relate exactly what t ', happened? . This tunnel-- "b
( MR. MASTERSON: Can you describe the tunnel? i )- The tunnel is about, I'd say, 42 inches by 38 or- 40, socething like that. i 1
'tR. MASTERSCN: Can you give ce the location of the I -
tunnel? 4 -
n n-. ~ _.-~_-n._ ~~
--y
^
- I 5 i lYou'reaskingforalotthere.
MR. MASTERSON: I have to,ask. Would this be the 7c service water tunnel? ' I can tell you where it's at. It's the next level above ground level, and it's about the center of the t
. :. Auxiliary Building and at the fuel line. In other words, TO it's at the Fuel Building, right there where they interface. f g
i. MR. MASTERSON: Where the Auxiliary Building and the .- Fuel Building interface. It's right there. I forget the number, elevation number.
- MR. ZUDANS: The reason that we try to get more details !
is that we can go maybe to the location. !
~
I could take you right to it, or I could I take a drawing. If you had the drawings, I could show you : t' on the drawings, but-- ' DR. HOU: What is your concern here? - MR. MASTERSON: Why don' t you go on and explain? In this tunnel they had--there was four-inch 7 d t lines in there, and two of the four-inch lines were seistic ' and, as I remember, that was the only seismic---I guess they ' were Class 3--so the rest of the lines, I t.elieve, were Class - -
- 5. '. l
. ,e MR. ZUDANS: 'The lines were one inch in diameter or four , g$ '
. ..? .-
inches in diameter? ihk , i L?-Q:n.'L q
.s.. . _ _ . . _ . ..-
)
....~......-. . . . . .... -
,7 . . . .
- l. s i 1c, 1 6 DR.. HOU: How many lin'as?
' There was two that were seismic,. but this l whole thing was full of--it had--I don't knew how rany four )C l
inch it had in there. There was four four-inch lines right j up in the topf and two of these four were seismic. It was
- a variety--there was three inch, various sizes, but it was
. essentially full. At one end of it there was another tunnel I - running--it comes in here like this and there's tunnels going i
this direction and like so (Indicating), and I'd say there's i
+
a little opening on this side but it's actually shielded to
-l J
l the people that's walking down below here. As ycu come in I -' and walk in the plant, you're walking right.by it.
$ MR. MASTERSON: Could somebody walk through this tunnel
.1 or would you have to stoop 'down?
~
M This one here? MR. MASTERSON: Yeah. MR. ZUDANS: The one that has tho' lines in it. MR. MASTERSON: Is it one you can't stand upright? 7Cl l l The position was that it was so filled with l ' lines that they couldn't put the h' angers in and they couldn't got in there. That was the. problem.right there. ( (, MR.. ZUDANS: It's like a tunnel that allows piping to i j go from one. building to another.< It was an access tunnel;
.is that what it was?'
( M ~ It goes right--once you get over here in the _y ,
e s
/ .
7 Fuel Building--this is the Auxiliary Building here, and over j , here in the Fuel Building (Indicating) --okay. _ It comes down here, it turns and it comes back this way. But all the top l - of it is open here, but in here the top is closed in. MR. ZUDANS: There's no way to get out of it.
- ' There's a little opening along the side here as you're looking in, and also some of these lines go verti-cal here at this point. I believe it's about in the center b
j of the Auxiliary Building there. This here is about in the center of the Auxiliary Building on the Fuel--this Fuel Building here (Indicating).
! MR. ZUDANS: Is that about the lower level or about the
- level of the fuel pool?
M This would be, this tunnel--I mean, you're 7
. going through here (Indicating) ; you can walk through here i and then this is way up above it, about 18 feet or 'so, tiR . ZUDANS: It's about 18 feet above ground, above--
Under the ceiling up there. , DR. HOU: By ground level you mean the ground level-- 2 i MR. MASTERSON: As you walk in.
; . As you walk in. So.the problem was they gy i
,' wanted--the large bore piping people wanted to cut out all i
these lines. f MR. ZUDANS: To remove them. Yeah, and put the hangers in; and over here--
.s . . . . ~ ._ ___ ..
7 0 . 8
- {- I mean, some of the problems they'd have had, it would have
! been terrible problems trying to get those lines out of there
- ! l
'I because all of the: were in there. ! !! MR. MASTERSON: Was there both large bore and small bore
! . piping in this tunnel then?
Right.
~ ; MR. MASTERSON: So there was four inch and then there was six and eight'and whatever.
g Wait a minute. Four inch was large bore.
- ! MR. MASTERSON: I thought large bore was six and above.
No. It was two and-a-half or something like p 8 . that; I forget what it was. Two and-a-half and above was j large bore, I believe is the way it was. , MR. ZUDANS: So they w' anted to remove the piping so
, they could put the hangers in there and then reinsert the 1
4 piping. M Right. But it was almost impossible. You'd have to cut the pipe up in pieces first of all to get it out of there, and then to put it back in there and weld it--to 4 tell you how rediculous it was, they said they couldn't get in there, but these welders had got in there and welded the pipe in.
' You said that MR. MASTERSON: I'm'getting confused.
I they wanted to go in and cut out the small bore piping? ] -
- Cut all.the piping out. Cut all the pipe
i,
, Ql 9
7
- that was necessary to get the hangers in. In other words, l
. take everything out to where they could get hangers in.
I MR. MASTERSON: Were there any hangers at all in the tunnel yet, or were there some hangers in the tunnel? ( )Thereweresome. MR. MASTERSON: How did they get those hangers in? I think they put them in as they were install-ing the pipe before it completely got full. I j MR. MASTERSON: Were the hangers that hadn't been i. installed additional to the original' analysis or were they just ones that had gotten missed? Or would you know that? { M Well, that's kind of side to--I know it stight
- be useful information to you, but right off the top of h
~
my head, I'd say it was the same as the other areas. They would install hangers and many times the hanger would be
' Sometimes if it was a good hanger, it would torn out later.
i i be left, so what each individual hanger was, I couldn't tell I you for sure. MR. MASTERSON: So regardless of how it happened, they ] had to install this particular hanger and they couldn't get
; at it and that's basically-- . Wait a minute. Not just a hanger. There was hangers--there was at least two hangers on these--this in i
approximately 13 feet, I think, so there was at least two hangers on most of them. If you got a tunnel there that's
_ j. . . 1 i . ,, 1 l 10 I got 20 to 30 lines in there--it had a bunch of them in there. j d l - MR. MASTERSON : I thought you just said that some of j. l these already had hangers on them.
. g M. i If they only had one hanger on them, that i
wouldn't help you much. One hanger doesn't help you much if you got 25 more that's got to have a hanger at that location. j MR. ZUDANS: Let me just try to recap what we have i 1 gotten up to now. There are a lot of pipes in this tunnel that don't have hangers and need to have hangers put in for support. The applicant suggested taking all the piping out j 1
! or such piping as necessary to put hangers in and then re-i l place the piping, right? h Yeah.
~
21R . ZUDANS: Ncw, where is your concern now? The people in Piping didn't want to take i
]
them out, but I think basically their situation was the ., problems with taking them out and getting them back in cnd
-k j getting high-quality welding--in other words, a good system i
. in there, and I don't blame them for that--and also I believe they thought it was a task that shouldn't b'e done, it shouldn' t be taken out. I was asked to go by with one of the piping engineers-- ,
!!R . ZUDANS: isho is MR. MASTERSON: Actually, it's id; . .
2 l 1
' 11 i
tie's the lead piping s.upport engineer.
- MR. ZUDANS: Okay. You were asked by _
- The other guy and I were asked to go out
. there and see what lines had to be taken out.
MR. ZUDANS: Okay. l
' ' So we went out there and the guy that was 1 -
with me went back and reported the results to his boss and, . of course, it got from his boss back to and the result of the report was that I said that we didn't have to take any pipes out and so-- i
! MR. ZUDANS: In other words, the other gentler-an that I
was with you told his boss that you said that no pipes had to be taken out to put the supports in. Yeah. So at this time I was called--shortly thereafter I was called to office who'was in charge--I was called to his office and he had all his lead engineers in there, and there was no one from my group as I recceber. MR. MASTERSON: What is your group?
- It was small bore; and in this meeting they asked that I get out of' it; in other words, I back out of it, that I couldn't do what I said I would do.
MR. ZUDANS: They clair.ed that you could not do what you said; that is, to put the supports in the tunnel without removing the piping.
- . = . = = , = * . . - - . . _
.~. _ . . . ._. . .. . . . . . _ . .
i 1 l /f
= -
p , Righ't .
- t i MR. ZUDANS: And they asked you to back out of that .
l i job. Y0ah* f l MR. ZUDANS: Not to do that jcb anyr' ore, that particular 3 one.
~
It has small bore and large bore pipes in it, (
~ , and I had been given the assignment for that tunnel because , it was a mixture of the two.
1 l j MR. MASTERSON: Were the hangers for both the large bore and the small bore? Right. ,, MR. ZUDANS: So then you were asked to-- Maybe I ought to back up a little bit here. In discussion of this, the first thing that was proposed was
. fill the tunnel with concrete so they wouldn't have to tear the pipes out to put the hingers in. ~
MR. ZUDANS: Great idea. Gibson Hill did not agree to this. The next h r thing was to put the material that's used around pipes when l\ they go through a wall-- l MR. ZUDANS: Sleeves? Well, it'was a soft, rubbery material to j , pump in and fill it with that, the tunnel with thi s material, but the cost was extremely high. Then they got down to the l 1 v p_% _ , , , _ , - . %.~...w......,.ga. . ~ . . _s _ _ _
. o
/) I C
j ._. ... 13
- j. point where he sent us out to see if we'could take out a j
certain nu=ber of pipes and then install hangers. I DR. HOU: Can you recall any locations-inside the. tunnel? j Where in location? Is there one piece pipe installed through [ the tunnel or at some place it needs a welding joint, con-1 1 nection? Goodness. '[ If you take along the top here, like.I say, and there's four four-inch pipes running along here-- DR. HOU: This tunnel is how many feet? l MR. MASTERSON: He said it was 13 feet. Thirteen feet here to an opening and, see, '7 the top of it is open in here, in this area (Indicating) .
~ ! . DR. HOU: Where in location inside the tunnel to give the inspection in the future?
Okay. The welding--inspecting the welding, you mean?
- DR. EOU
- Is any welding locations inside the tunnel?
Oh, yes, there's welding in various places. In fact, scma of these pipes go straight up right here, and so they got: welds in there; some of ther have . bends in therr
; down through here. They actually offset them .a little to meet a location up~here, to go this direction or go that direction (Indicating).
MR. MASTERSON: So somebody had to get in there to weld 1'
- ---._____m_. _ _ _ _ . _ - - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _
. o !
/I I 14 l _. ._
that at some time.
- Yes.
MR. ZUDANS: Anyway, we were getting to the point-- Okay. he're down to the point where I had told the guy with me and he had told his boss that-- MR. ZUDANS: This guy: Do you know his name? _-I can' t think of his last name. I'm
- 1
- j a little bit skeptical about giving his name.
1 MR. ZUDANS: All of this would go in strict confi-dentiality-- 1 [ But after what happened here, I'm not too 2 enthused about him talking to the NRC. MR. ZUDANS: I understand that, but believe r.e, what
-i
' we're trying to do is to ge't to the bottom of your concern and the way we would handle this, as we have handled with 2
! anything we've done with you, is in strict confidentiality.
Whether the story was given--the story that was portrayed
> in that writeup is incorrect or not is really a--we don' t i
know that much--what we ' re trying to do is address what your 1 , i problem is and if we can get the name, we'd be able to do l . it much easier. Okay. Anyhow--I can prove my story. MR. ZUDANS: We're not questioning at all what ycu're i saying. Oe're just trying to get the details. There's not} ting that I have to gain. All I
. . e. . , . - - . . . . .
- ~ . _ . . . . . - . . , . . - - . . . .
. ll gg i
f 15 { have to'do.is lose--the only thing I can do is lose by coming
. down here and talking to you, and I have already-felt the effects of that, but--okay. Let's go ahead on that.. Anyhew,
,j during the lunch period a few days later then--I hadn't even
~
and he came by and asked me during
.i talkedto(
j - the lunch period to go to a meeting to represent pipe support engineering. So I went to the meeting and the subject was
' this tunnel, and it came around for them to review the point of whether we could put hangers in there or not, and I told them that I could get in there and locate the hangers. The i Craft people said if I could get in there they could'put the hangers in. So essentially that was the story on that.
t
,1 MR. MASTERSON: What they said was that they could definitely get in there-- ~
i - [ No, I said I could get in there and they said if I could get in there-MR. MASTERSON: --they could get in there. Yes, because of my size relative to their size.
; MR. MASTERSON: Okay.
MR. ZUDANS: So'what happened after that? h* ell, I never did get cut--in other words, I didn ',t go tio anyone, or anyone else, and ask to 3, gJt outi of that; but by this time I was called in to a reeeting in my own group and was criticized severely. So I
; ~*~~- - *
*. s 16 gave a note to and this is the original right there.. He received a copy, and this was 12-22-81. which was the time that--all the dates are on here--and so after this l
l I was in a position that I needed hangers to design because i j your job was dependent on how many hangers you designed each
! week. So if your boss didn't assign you any, then you was
~
in trouble. So all these things started adding up and he l quit assigning me hangers because he was from Brown and Root, same as __ MR. ZUDANS: Anyway, what was the criticism over? Well, the criticism was that I didn't get out of this tunnel problem and I continued to design the hangers for it, fro . point of view. I MR. ZUDANS: In'other ords, w they did not want you to work on the hanger designs in the tunnel because it was such 4 a controversial job, or someone else wanted to do it, or--? Well, I had actually told ss l who was that I could design the hangers with-1 j - out taking any lines out, and they wanted to take them all I cut to put the hangers in. That was the whole--that's how I got in trouble there. MR. MASTERSON: Maybe I can a'sk a question here. You were representing small bore piping. _w as supervisor j of large bore piping.
~
Yeah. l eS s. , a w e me.m eA s * .=am** * = = . .
. _ . . , . .- -- - . . . . ..- - . . ~ . . ~. -
l
. ,.:. . .. ... - . . . . . . . ~ . . . . . - . ..
~
. .. . . ..._._ 17
. MR. MASTERSON: When you said that you could design the hangers, you were talking just about the small bore hangers j or both the small and the large bore hangers?
Both, because I had been given that responsi-bility for that tunnel, for both large bore and small bore. f.. S MR. MASTERSON: I was under the impression that you were only looking at it from the standpoint of the small bore. ))
~
No. Usually when we went into a tunnel like i this or someplace where they had a mixture, that particular area was assigned to either a large bore or small bore engineer, one or the other, and in that way he would make a *
; z l . gang hanger a lot of times and he'd pick up all the lines t .
with this gang hanger. MR. MASTERSON: Who wa's your supervisor in the small bore hangers? i It changed there. )-justaminute 9 here. It seems like we're kind of jumping around here. MR. ZUDANS: We are jumping around a little bit, but I think we're trying to get the gist of what the real issue l was. 4
)Basicallytheissuewasthat I was gaine
( against their decided engineering position. MR. ZUDANS: That was to take out the piping and then put in the support. And also I was saving a lot of money by doing 3%- . %v.e. ge. .
. s g o. . % *.e.e.e.=====-*=== 4
18 it, and I was also saving time on their people's part, man-hours. The piping people would have had a lot of work in 3 there to do, and so it would have been a lot of manhours there, too. Then the Craft people would have had a lot of l manhours. DR. HOU:
- What did they finally do?
- Well, when I left, the hangers that I designed were--they were in the process of putting them in.
i MR. MASTERSON: How many of the hangers had you already designed when you left? Can you give ce some idea? l MR. ZUDANS: We were talking about you being criticized 1, for continuing the job and the number of supports that you i had already designed in the tunnel and the fact that they were putting those in. i That's about the situation when I left. 4 MR. ZUDANS: Do you know whether they actually took out any of the piping? As far as I know, they didn't. ,1 MR. ZUDANS: So they did w' hat you had suggested. Yes. 1 MR. MASTERSON: Or they at least started to do that when you left. Yes. 1 .i
- j DR. HOU
- So actually you saved the company a lot.of l -
j money, a lot of trouble; they should appreciate you, right? N 9 O 8% 4 9 999* +g 4 um we s%+G g l k q_44
- - . . _ - . - e .- .
--r - ----. .. _.. . . .
. . ,I
*1 19 I.think it was completely opposite. I'd j ,
have been working out there a lot longer if I had kept my mouth shut and not even helped them. MR. MASTERSON: How long after this incident did you j leave the site?
- After--well,--
MR. MASTERSON: In other words, after the meeting where
] ! - you had--
It was several renths because--see, the i process of them getting--let me just read this here. This is a note to It starts off, "In answer to
~
I your question on 12-18-81. I was in a meeting with
- " on 10-29-81.
Subject:
I was not weceptable for their criteria as an Example: I was not completing enough hangers. So I engineer. I only three h' angers were assigned to me until 12-18-81. I went to Piping and got them to give me a remo on some lines that were finished. I have been locating hangers on these
! lines for analysis. No credit is given for locating hangers.
not to tell you about this reeting." Iwastoldbk f MR. MASTERSON: That was 12-18-81? Mait.a minute. The date of this was I 12-22-81. l . MR. MASTERSON: Now, when did ycu leave the site? It was conths; it was six months later.
= --
.,..a .. . . - - . . . . _ . . . . . , . s s,
p. 20 i i
- MR. MASTERSCN:
. Sometico in June or July?
. . Somewhere along there, right.
, MR. ZUDANS: To what do you attribute the leaving, that A l I
lC they didn't give you enough work? _ Well, this occurred soon after, as I remember,
! s I had proposed a solution to that tunnel.
MR. MASTERSON: By this, you mean the fact that you 3 weren't being given hangers to design? Yes. f , !i MR. MASTERSON: What did you do then between 12-18-- f 12-21 and the time you left? Did you work strictly on this tunnel or did you do other functions? [ This affidavit here covers most everything.
~
, I provided this affidavit to my boss and asked him to sign i it, but he wouldn't sign it, even though he was leaving; he l ,
had got a job in Arizona at the time. This affidavit goes like this: has worked for me during the j last part of his employment at , Comanche Peak. This period was when he was laid off. During this period he worked on Task Force in Auxiliary i Building in locating hangers (which 'is a non-credit task) . On many lines over 20 , my boss, agreed.that he, would design the hangers for these same lines. was allowed to design some of those hangers after rigorous analysis for banger loads had been conducted. Most il 2 .. LE -. . -
.. - - . - . . -. . - . ~ . . .
.,. %. ;. ..s.., . . . . ~ . . . . _ . -
21
! of these hangers were assigned.to other people for design.
4 1 . During this same period other lines were in analysis on which had located the hangers and designed the gang l hangers, including STRUDL analysis. These partially-finished t designs were also given to other people.
]
l . t, "During the time worked for me, he also had a -l .] job to design gang hangers for a trench previously assigned to large bore hanger design"--now this is the one that I was i { giving the discussion on- "Their design consisted of cutting s out all pipes and installing hangers. The pipes would then i be slid through the hangers. The method would have been very
; difficult and costly. design did not require any lines to be removed and would not restrict entry into the trench for heat trace, painting and insulation."--I guess I
}
.should have included in there inspection also- " Productivity is :upposed to be a measure of how much a person is producing and can be a very rough estimate. Productivity is based on the number of hangers designed per week. Thus, if you are lucating hangers most of the time, then your productivity could be near zero, even though you're working all the time.
was the person who regulated the assign-ment of lines for hanger design and controlled the productivity , of - l "During the period worked for me, he was always l 'l busy and designed over 249 hangers, which is very high, since i
. . . . . - n . . ~ --. -
. . . . ...._ _ . ~ . . . _
,s. .
i .
, some groups had only five hangers per week.
was always trying to apply pressure on. , by wanting a
- compressed schedule for work to be finished. In the last evaluation on employee productivity,' deempha-sized production in spite of the fact that it was
; the highest in the group. comment to this wb wA burned out. I do not agree that he was
, burned out. _
work required he climb to high t
- locations and crawl through dirty trenches to locate and i
) design hangers. My evaluation is that he did his best, l
l produced goo'd hanger designs that would work by completely I
! checking and measuring at each location."
Now, he would not sign this affidavit. He agreed 'with it, but he wouldn't sign it. 1 '! 'MR . ZUDANS: Did he say why?
}Decauseitwouldhaveadirecteffecton wherever he went and his future, and I agree with him. It p l would have because everyone that I know that says anything--
t i { actually comes out and tells what happened or things like l j this--like during the period I was there, during the holiday i I, period or just before a holiday period, when the Craft people
}
l would get so boozed up they'd let them go horce--and this I j happened; oore than once, too. Are you aware of this? i MR. ZUDANS: No, I wasn't aware of it.
]C NRC surely should have known that because
4 -_. . . . . . _ . _ _ . 3 4d ! 23 I.think it was in the paper. l . MR. ZUDANS: I say I didn't know that. I was not investigating or even doing anything with this project. i . MR. MASTERSON: When you left in July, do you know whether the hangers in that tunnel had been completed or not? 3 No. I said earlier I didn't think that all of them were finished.
- t. Ma. MASTERSON: But again, to recapture that, they were
~
going through and installing hangers without taking the pipe out. In other words, they were following your suggestion. Right. { MR. MASTERSON: The way I read this particular telephone
.4 interview and the way you relate your story, there are definitely some differences. It looks to me like this was a paraphrase and maybe some timing was off on how this was ,
t' , written up. My basic question and the reason I was given this particular concern was: Was there any technical con-cern that you had about this whole af f air or was it strictly l the fact that there was some intimidation involved in this area? In other words, were they designing hangers correctly or were they going through the. correct procedures as far as redesigning or reanalyzing supports? j Let me toll you. The area that the whole I set'of hangers that I was working on in the Auxiliary Cuild-ing there had had hangers o'n before and all those hangers
a: . 24 I were being replaced. i. MR. MASTERSON. Okay. Sut-- I That was our--in other .words , we were in there to put hangers, approved hangers, in and remove the
~
hangers that were inadequate. I i' MR. MASTERSON: But the reason for your telephone inter-7 view with Mr. Griffin: Was that to relate to him this concern 5 about intimidation or a concern about some technical issue? 9
, He called me up and wanted me to just tell a him something about the situation down there, what happened 4 and--first of all, after I was terminated, I went to the 4
i
. people at the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. They l investigated it and his conclusion was here completely oppo-l 2 site to what happened, and I know I didn't tell him that.
3 His conclusion was that I was advised I had insufficient grounds to sue, and they sent me a letter that I did have. t' DR. HOU: Let me summarize my understanding-- But I didn't because I had already--what good
- p. would it do me?
4
, DR. HOU: Let me repeat your suggestions. You have made i
suggestion .about the hanger design which don't need to take out the pipe as they originally planned. It appears to be a very good suggestion. It was a good engineering practice and they didn't like.it. But they still accept it, so the problem, your complaint, is because they accepted that
, , , . e a e+e
r -, - - g 25 I rel~uctantly, it come up intimidation issues. They not assign you core hangers so maybe your productivity down, and finally you quit job six months later, but for your suggestion concern is they did accept it. In other words, i there's nothing deviated from the procedures, no deviation t c from the good engineering design, good engineering practice. I j 7 Is that my understanding? 3 First of all, I didn't quit; I was laid off.
'I DR. HOU: But as a result of your--
l
.' MR. MASTERSON: Eventually you feel that it was the I
' result of what happened with this tunnel issue? l
. Right. I was told it was.
t
' MR. MASTERSON: The first step was to put you on this
. Task Force where you got no' credit. It was mainly to go through and to locate hangers and maybe do a few designs,
- but your productivity went way down and you got laid off 1
4 j six months later; but it was mainly due to this particular incident. Is that your basic concern with this whole issue? My point is,_ that we're trying to separate out the technical aspect from the intimidation aspect. From what I can read from my file here and from what you've told me, j there does not seem to be a particular technical aspect to-
! this, but there definitely is something,'according to your statement, about intimidation, that eventually you lost your
,. job because of certain happenings.
49
, 1 . ll 26 r s - - - . . . - .
'l I believe I lost my job because I got involved in the tunnel, because I provided a solution to an area which, had they gone the other way, 'the potential for
, flaws in there because of the difficulty of reinstalling j -
them, could have been high. i 4 l s MR. MASTERSON: Was there any procedure that you know I - of that would have prevented them from doing .it the other I g way? c No, I don't think so, y MR. MASTERSON: It was just a more costly way of doing it, in other words .
~
Anytime you got a weld down here for a ' welder and it's down in a corner and all he can see the t back side with is a mirror,-the quality of that weld is not i f going to be like one that he can get to; and that's the i type of situations you had in there.
, MR. ZUDANS: Okay. I think we can summarize this issue, j this An8 now, by saying basically that there seems to have ,
~{
- ., been a problem with Mr. Griffin's telephone--a difference jC between what and Mr. Griffin have. h'e will take
-] this back and consider it more from the intimidation aspect. From the technical standpoint, 'I think that therc { appears--I den't know whether,you agree or not--that.there is no real technical issue with this tunnel because they've done what you had suggested *as far as you know. And basically
.+ee e * *=%, e e ..
L. - . ;---... ...-.: . . . . . . .
'[(
27 the supports. are probab1y okay in there. But I think it was well. worth hearing your story again., and I think it may '- be clearer, based on this transcript, what happened. We'll l take this back to the Office of Investigation and give them 1
. a transcript to read and to follow up on. Is that satis-i
* - 6 factory?
? Well, I would like to look at the transcript i and make sure that it speaks exactly as to what happened.
9 I don't have no ax to grind on the thing. All I'm telling 0 you is what happened. In other areas--in other words, if i this happened in this area like the stick in the concrete l - t . in the tunnel, going to put the rubber material in there, i and this gives you an idea of the competency of the super-
;; vision and the people that 'are involved. They were not i
I - only working this one problem, they were working the whole plant, so this gives you a handle, this is kind of a bird's-cye look at one little portion of it. MR. ZUDANS: I want you to know that the Technical Review Team, of which there are six different disciplines, 1 I . is concerned about general ways that the Utility approaches 1 1 the building of their plant, and 'this would be considered one of 'those things, actually how they put the supports in I the tunnel and what they would consider. Based on your I You will
- testimony, that will be looked into a little bit.
1 . be sent a copy of this transcript, if you wish, to review M e & m 6 e,%. g %h*A "
- --a.
-~;--- , -
28 and correct whatever you don't see as accurate. We will actually do that and .show you the corrections so that the record is exactly the way you believe it should be; but I think what we would like to do is to proceed to the other
' ~
areas that Bob has to explain to you how he followed them
- i up and what he did..
~
Let's go off the record for a minute.
! 5 (A discussion was held off the record.) I i
p MR. ZUDANS: if we may, we would like to cover
- five items that came out of the Atomic Safety Licensing Board hearing of September 15, 1982, in which you testified about-f .
l . certain concerns you had about some computer programs and some technical concerns regarding seismic response, spectra
- used, and Class 5 and Class- 3 lines. So, Bob, why don't you l pick up on those?
i MR. MASTERSON : Two of these particular items are l l' related so I'm going to cover them together. That's the f ITT Grinnell FUB II Computer Program and the Corner and LADA l'
, ' Base Plate Computer Program used for sizing anchor bolts in base plates. Based upon what I got out of reading the transcript of your ASLS hearing record was that you had concerns over the validation of both of these particular computer programs and'then some specific items with each one.
i What I did was I reviewed the ITT Grinnell FUL II 1
a ~.s---. . _. .. 22_. Computer Program, the back-up documentation, and by back-up documentation I mean when they wrote this program they had to compare this against some existing, more sophisticated t I - computer codes such as a finite element analysis. I reviewed
$ the documentation for FUB II, their Revision 0 through 1
6 Revision 3, and it was very extensive. They had numerous
~
comparisons between a FUB II printout, which was a less l '- i sophisticated approach to the problem than the finite element l
. analysis was. In every case the FUB II ar.alyses were 25 to 30 percent more conservative than the finite element analysis.
, As far as I'm concerned, the validity of the program is
. there. There was different back-up documentation for the 5
' program. 1N
~
- ou probably noted in there that they had
; revised it a number of times. We were using the program for I ; sometime and through checking with hand calculations, we l
ll' found that it was obviously way off base, and so they'd l revise it. So, in other words, this wasn't just a week or something. This was long periods in between .these revisions.
- Now, if they would have had a valid program in the beginning, we would never have had any revisions.
l l MP. . MASTERSON: If you've ever had'any experience with i l computer codes, you'll realize that these codes tend to have I a history of getting the bugs out, as they say in the industry, so the fact that there were some earlier versions in that 9
. . . - - . ~ . . . . . . . . _ . . . . . - - - . . .
30 there were revisions after that does not mean that there's anything wrong'with the computer code. And the documentation l that Grinnell had and that I' looked at tracked from Rev 0 t j . what they did between each particular revision and how they 4
. verified that the change they made did or did not affect I
l , s previous calculations made with that program.
}
There was one concern that you had that the program s was always picking the same bolt as the highest loaded bolt. j u No matter what parameters you put in--this is what I got out t
; ,, of the transcript now--it would always pick the same par-t ticular bolt. Grinnell did a OA review of their program--
h - a documented review based upon that concern because I re-j viewed it--and they had numerous examples of base plates and i j ,, anchor bolts with varying loads and varying locations of the attachment on the plate, and I couldn't find any evidence of it always picking the same particulsr bolt. It would arbitrarily pick the correct bolt based upon the loading and the loading directions. If it did that, there was a revision after ,i the last one I used then. h
; MR. MASTERSON: This is the. revision--
Because I was given new results. These
-l were results that I had done myself.
I DR. liOU: What your cortplaint is was correct. Indeed, thair computer program go through, as you say, growing pains.
.. . . . . . . ~ . -. ... . .
, .. .p... . ... - , . . - . . ..
i 31 It originally is not perfect, but they have the corrective
. actions. They rerun actually 1200 hangers--
MR. ZUDANS: There was a factory program--
.; l . Who's paying for this? I'm paying for it. ; I'm paying the electric bill for all their mistakes. Why a _ ) e- didn't just give them a valid program in the gy beginning instead of having us go through all these gyrations?
MR. MASTERSON: That's not the issue here. The issue
- t
'! is: has there a technical problem with that particular program? l _ I'll tell you it's an issue with me. It's 7
~
an issue with the taxpayers out here, and TU3I's having trouble getting money down here through the State of Texas.
, MR. MASTERSON: I can understand your concern. I'm not 'l trying to say that you shouldn't have that concern, but you .! have to understand our position. We're trying to separate everything out except the technical aspect of your concern.
If I tell them that they got a bad hanger , 1 out there, they will go fix it, but if I just say they got i bad hangers out there, they'll just say, "Well, we don't l- !{ know of any." l ,; HR.~ZUDA:IS: They'll say, "Which one?" I think it jI should be made very clear.that any concern that you have l .' we're concerned about, too. I think the problem here, though, I is that historically computer programs are used for simplifying
.- . -_~- .
i .. _ . . _ . - - - - . . . _ ~____ . . _ . . . 1 10 32
- the job of the engineer or the designer in order that he can l do more jobs, he can design more supports by putting it in j the computer program.
. Let me tell you how simple this'is. All
- they had to do is take a design, put strain gauges on it l
8 and validate their program. Maybe they had to .use several 7 different designs to where they had a good program. 5 MR. MASTERSOti: A strain gauge isn't going to give you e a load on a bolt. They could set it up where it did give you i a load on the bolt.
. DR. 110U: Some is operating load, some is the natural i
load. For instance, like an earthquake. You cannot siculate
- . the earthquake in the plan to verify the hanger design is i
adequate to the earthquake. You have to, rely on the analysis. MR. MASTERSON: The method that used to verify their computer code was a typical approach to that problem or to that area of engiiteering. What they basically did
.. was take a hand calculation and computerize it. It was no sophisticated type analysis as you would find with a finite , element analysis. It was what they call close form engineering I
f solution, and it was put in the comput'er program so that they i .
. could run many of these base plates very quickly. :fow , the j -
theory behind this had been verified against other computer codes in--as the computer code develops, as people start using
% 't % 99 9
- i. _
33 I it and start finding a little bit of a probletn here--and
. this is very normal with computer codes. The QA--and this
. is where QA has to come in; this shows that QA is working in
- j. . this particular case--the QA requires that Grinnell in this ji -
case go back and verify that anything run previously, if 3 they made a revision to upgrade the program, to correct ~it,
~
I - that any previous analyses run can be documented, signed off
. as okay based upon the new revision.
Now, you can do this one of two ways. You can go back and rerun all these hangers with the new revision to show i i f that they are acceptable or the change might be very slight, that it can be done in an engineering judgment, statement, or by doing some sampling of the previously run base plates. In the case of Grinnell, they had gone back between FUB II, Rev 1 and Rev 2, and raran 1200 base plates. I reviewed approximately ten percent of those, over a hundred of them,
,I . and I just randomly pulled the hanger packages to make sure ,1 l
that there was no evidence of a FUB II Rev 1 which was the one that you were concerned about, and in every single case r l the base plates had been reanalyzed with the later revision
! and the loads were acceptable based upon what they used on the hanger sketch.
j So they did have a back-fit program, and that's a l'
- normal approach to a problem like that. I can understand l
l your concern that maybe that costs some dollars, but it's l
- 1 k
Gm *:;;;;' :~- - g xp
- T 2:- la:. ;w ._ r.i ' * .- ~ . m . . . - -
- .-.. ~ .
!.._,-......1.
/[(,
3
)
34 i : very hard to compare how many hours it would have taken the engineers to fo ali this by hand versus the way they
; did it by the computer analysis. But technically, everything
, was there to document that the changes they made from Rev i
0 right up to Rev 3 had been properly documented and bench j :. marked agair.st an industry-accepted ccrrputer code. _ When I made all these statements before NRC,
~
TUSI made no rebuttal, NRC staff made no rebuttal whatsoever of these statements; and anyone else--other people, they jumped on them. 4 I. MR. ZUDANS: What we're doing right now is giving you in essence a reply to your concern. Okty.
, . MR. MASTERSON: The NRC Region 4 also addressed this
. point a couple of years ago. Whether you're aware of that, I don't know.- _
,- No. t;
. MR. MASTERSON: The"NRC did not' ignore your concern.
l 1 L ;,, They passed it-I'm sure it was. Region 4 peopl'e, who were I at this meeting et the ASI3 hearings e.nd they picked up on 1 l it, and they did follow up on it . They came to the same conclusions as I did as far as the validity of the computer i t j progr'am. I think the Utility also--there's evidence that the Utility also picked up'on it because they cust have go'etien back to becduse before Region 4 went into S
. g ==*e-e===g6. ..%,. ***
- 3 7.. .
1c - 35
. I- to order their back-up document ion had run this test and found that the. concern about picking the t
one bolt was not correct, but they did find a related problem about the moment arm from the edge of the attachment to the bolt. They corrected that and showed that that was a minor l 6 revision and by running 25 or 50 particular base plate sample ( 4 7 problems, they could document that and the ones run previously 4 would not have to be rerun all over again. So people have been listening to you, and the concerns are being picked up both by the NRC and by the Utility in f this case. 1
- MR. ZUDANS: I think that's a very important point that you should know.
- .. MR. MASTERSON
- Maybe you weren't getting the feedback, l1 l but our job now is to give you our feedback because we did 1
j it all over again. i MR. ZUDANS: You asked before what's the purpose of this I meeting today. I think that's very important that you should
, realize that the NRC has recognized that communications is
., very important, has recognized over the years that cocmuni-l! cation--but not everyone can be contacted always. So in f this case, though, we're contacting everyone that has concerns, and we're giving them and you this kind of a report on any'- thing that you eight~have had. In that regard, if you have anyotherconcernthatyouklaveaboutanythingthatis
. .. . . ~ . . . . - . -
.. . . _ . . _ - - . . . . . . _ . _ _ . . . . . . . . . . . ~ . . . .
36 i technical in nature with this plant, we want to know about
~
it. But let's finish tip the items that Bob has. MR. MASTERSON: That was the ITT Base Plate l . Ccmputer Program. The othcr one that we looked at was Corner l and LADA Base Plate Computer Program. Now, the concern that i
. 6 we saw was in three particular parts: one, that the program 1 -
assumes rotation about the center of the attachment; two,
. 3 the program has not been validated; and three, that there 1 o was additional rigidity that has not been taken into con- ! sideration.
From what we could gather in our review, approximately i
,: 2000 base plates at Comanche Peak had been analyzed using
! this particular computer code, Corner and LADA. We looked
. at the documentation and we- found very similar documentation as we did when we looked at It was very well
.l documented. The theory was defined. It was written out.
; . Each step of the process of the program was written out and 4
defined, and the' final solution that was used by the Ccrner and LADA Program was compared against two particular finite
- element analyses.
Now, I've worked.against finite elcrent analyses. That's what NASTRAN is, and just like you're / i i saying.on FUB II, so what, it .was conservative, [20 to 30 t Well, if the input is 900 percent too high in the
~
I percent. spectra, then you're plumb out of the ball park with 25 or
4 37 1 30 percent.
,, .: MR. MASTERSON: I don't follow your point.
We'll get into it on over here. Now, con-tinuing on this, though, I never saw any validation of either ,s \ i one of these programs.
. 6 MR. MASTERSON: Well, the validation is not kept on j -
site. The validation is kept at the manufacturer's location i or it was sent down to the site for management to view. The ' a validation of the program is not open for the world to look
; at because it's a proprietary program. ! The fact that it was verified by finite l element, I've done a lot of finite element analyses and then checked it with actual data and found it to be quite a ways y off. All finite analysis it is theoretical program.
MR. MASTERSON: It's a much more sophisticated theoretical program than a hand calculation, and what it does is it' i, verifies that the hand calculation is a more conservative l; approach than the finite element approach. It's less exact. Okay. MR. MASTERSON: So if you designed a base plate using ji NASTRAN.with a particular set of' input data loads--I forget iI
, where they'come from for this particular example--you might
{f i
'get bolt diameters of one inch. If you design the same
' base plates and anchor bolts using either Grinnell or Corner and LADA or anybody else's close form hand-type calculation,
_.._e . _ _ ...-. .e . . _ ._. . . _ , . . . ...... . _ . . . . .
... . . . . . . . . . _ . . . a
- - - j \
1 . I 38 i you might end up with a bolt diameter of an inch and-a-half bolt diameter. So it's a little more feasible an inch and-a quarter, and the Utility says, "I don't want to go out and spend eight hundred million dollars or a large amount of money
~
I to analyze every base plate in the plant by finite element .
, i + . 5 analysis. It's just too long and too costly." They're willing i
- 1. 7 to say, "We know we're going to get a little bit higher--
I
- j $ bigger diameter bolt by using this particular program, but I-we can do them much faster and the documentation is there."
i a They will also have to review this back-up documentation and accept it before they can use these computer codes.
. fItcomesdowntothis, though: NRC looks i
bad, the Utility Company looks bad, and we look bad anytime
- .: we keep doing these things 6ver and over again like this.
l I j , Why didn't we just do it o'ce n and do it right? That's the
. whole thing here. ) -
MR. MASTERSON: I guess we' re still learning. g . l . MR. ZUDANS: We can't do it right the first time ever. If we designed
~
It's just impossible. Let's put it this way: everything by hand, if we used the bending moment equation l , for stress and the tensile stress equation to do everything by hand, then we would do it right everytime because it-
; would almost always be very conservative and you would have
~
bolts that are two inches in diameter in every case. They'd l . use a lot of steel, but it might save them money anyway. e e m4. ey.9%gog , m/te e" yM eh 'e4W4 % . -ee e eew e
, - . . . . . . . . . _ . - ~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . -. - . - . -.-. . . - . .
I 39 I What the programs are there for is to make life easier for
- the designer, for the company that's building it, and they are not necessarily designed wrong. The guys who wrote the program--if you've ever seen a program, there are hundreds ; of lines that have to be put in this thing to get the final i .. 6 calculation to come out; and when they find what's wrong, i -
( they are required by law to go back and: check everything b . 3 that they've done before to make sure that one of those 4 wasn't wrong. While this is an iterative process where
~
', there is continual redoing to get the program to the perfect
, condition that it should be in, it appears to be something
_ that psople are willing to do. The companies are willing to go that way. While I agree with you 100 percent "Why can't
.: we do things right the first time", I don't think I've ever i
done anything right the first time. I don't mean in engi-
'neering. I mean at home. I've never done anything right
, the first time. I think it's a philosophy--I think your philosophy is very good and very important for people to remember that things should be done the right way, but it j .,
doesn't work that way. Not everyone has the ambition and the motivation that you might have to do. ever1 thing exactly i right. 7 f.~' . ( M That's not true.- You're putting me in the j wrong position there that I don't want to take. I was in i - the aircraft industry for 20 years, and I've been in the _. _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ . _ _ .n__ _n n
. _ . . . _ . . . ...s. __ . . . . . . . . .. _. -. __
j ,
- . - ---- . . _ . _ . . _ . . -_ 4 40 i oil field industry; and in testing landing gear I found that t .
when we had a. rigid drop test that the dynamic magnification
-, . factors were real high.- Out heire we have a model that says i
we have a certain dynamic response to an earthquake. Every-thing that I was interested in in a drop test happened in j e .09 seconds, and when I put the strain gauges on an airplane i . I had a different dynamic magnification factor because I was 4 setting all the characteristics of the airplane. I'd get t o pitch and a wing would deflect and things like this. Well, l ,, the program out here that goes through from Little--is it Little? 1d . MR. MASTERSON: Is it ADL pipe? The big program--
- MR.MASTERSON: ' ADL pipe from A. D. Little.
- That program is supposed to take the spectra and correct damping, whatever he puts in. One guy puts it
- in and if he rakes a ristake, they run all these analyses out here--FUB II, Corner and LADA--based on his loads, he's
;. got the input from temperature, he's got everything in there; j -
t - he's got the seismic, the temperature, the vibration, if it i
' needs snubbers or whatever it needs; he's got everything in this section of this pipe' that he's analyzing. If he makes 1 a mistake on input, nobody ever knows it because nobody ever i .
checks it, right? MR. MASTERSON: No, I disagree.
*9 %N94 %s%e
j , , j . .
; - il_
[ Well, sometimes they'll check it. Sometimes 2 they will say, "This load looks wrong." ,
) - -
MR. MASTERSON: Their design procedures require them to be checked, requires all the input to be checked before I anything is passed on to somebody else.
. 6 MR..ZUDANS: Especially the input.
I 7 MR. MASTERSON: Especially the input. Now, when that 5 input gets checked is some people do it different ways.
.i 4 Some people, if they're doing it by physically coding it up i
- - and doing punch cards, some people will verify the input at that stage, other people will run jus,t a geometry check on
. .- the computer program and with that they'll do an input check.
! But the requirements of the design procedures are that all
-l I . .; design information be done 'and checked and that includes
.- piping and pipe supports.
MR. ZUDANS: And that, by the way, NRC goes and randomly checks at the location where they actually do the calcula-
) - tions..
}
. But I take issue with that because we found
,;. at times we'd get the results and we'd find something that
,i I just looked oddball, and as far as: I' know, the guy'that put !J it in was the only one that had ever been involved with it. I Where.it wa's checked--I don't think it was. 1 MR. MASTERSON: Did.you look at his stress report to see whether it had been checked? The piping. report to see
. ._ ..~.. . . . . . . . . - . -
p -_. -.
' k .'
42 I whether somebody had signed this as having been checked by
- somebody else? I viewed a lot of documents--
'That area is kind of fuzzy, but I just remember that we found errors and we would go back, and as
, far as--
N n MR. MASTERSON: Like John said, nobody is perfect,. and 7 I'm sure you've been through enough audits and-- I, j S MR. ZUDANS: I can tell you from experience that I I
! 4 used to do those base plate calculations at Stone and
- 6 Webster and I had someone that had to check my work after I was finished, after I did the hand calculation. It was
.. all done by hand when I was doing it. Somebody had to actually check what I did and actually check the loads and 1
13 everything else, all the input. And also I've done computer
; analysis where I had to put input and somebody had to check l
that. I think the point is that " Hey, absolutely right again." q It.may very well be that some of these things slip by; how-
+
I
. ever, is the whole program in question or is it just one or
. two cases where you might have seen this, that it has I
j happened? We don't know. MR. MASTERSON: That's where Quality Assurance comes in. The Quality Assurance--the people, when they l , came to me, these people didn't even have an engineering
~
1 j degree and they were analyzing what I had done. MR. MASTERSON: Were they analyzing or were they _ m o e * *M* h
~ , , . . - , . . - . ~ - - - - - - - - - - .
_& . _ . _ . . _ _ _- __- . . _ _ e- 9 i
i '... . . . . .. i l 4)_. l reviewing the . technical content or were they reviewing to
. see whether the proper procedure had been followed? There , is a big difference there.
Most of the procedure is technical procedure
~
for the engineering manual. D DR. HOU: I can see your part. You've been working in l 1 7 aerospace for quite some time. I worked for aerospace some
- time .in Apollo Program.in aerospace, which is much more 1
l critical in their analyses because there is a very severe ( I weight penalty in that kind of structure. Is different kind i of concern here. The weight penalty is not that severe, yet we are looking for 40 years operations and al,so safety, so in here it turns out it's more emphasis on the margin of I - the design and because of tilis philosophy they evolved
? -
another method here which can be simpler. It look like it's
; crude analysis; however, it leaves a lot of margin in there, ^
so also when you.look at the piping and see miles and miles of piping there are so many, cannot affor.d to have a rigorous
. analysis in aerospace. That's why there's some method which look crude but hard to check with detailed method and is on
] conservative side and can save the money, save the time and
; people will continue .to use and just let it go ahead.
If I was you--like he was saying where.you got'20 or 30 percent on the positive side, you got an
~
, . excess there. In the aircraft industry that would be poor t _ _ . . _ _ _ . _ , . - - - . . _ _ _ -
/
p ois==mm.newesee . =.=.e...... . ......m . s m. eewmess . . ..
}
.___._____m _. _. _ . . . . _ . . . ... ., _ . _ _ _ . . . . _ _ __ . . . . . . . _.
44, design. MR. ZUDANS: Everyone else that's a good engineer would I be looking for the same thing.
~
-
- When you got people out there like there was I
l.
~
~ at times, before holidays, that were out there, craftsmen 3C
' out there working that were drunk and they.run them home 7 because all of them brought in a bottle or a good number of j i them, you don't know what you got in some areas, do you?
i
" MR. ZUDANS: But we really believe that if they did a
- bad job, then the QA-QC group in that plant had to go back i
j I there when they checked those safety welds, the enes that I
; involve safety syste=s, they would have found a problem with i
i the weld if the guy was intoxicated to the point where he I a couldn't.do the job; and th'at's a completely other area aside from what we're talking, but that's a very broad area that we're looking at at this time at the NRC. The Quality Assurance-Quality Control aspect--there is a group here at this time that's working on tijat alone to see how they have implemented the law regarding quality assurance and quality l control. Uow, the guy that was intoxicated at the plant, obviously he shouldn't have been there. He shouldn't have f j been on that site. QC
^
They rede the right choice by sending them all home.
~
MR. ZUDAMS: But we have hope and we have evidence from
.= . ,.. ,. .
S
- - - . . . ~ . . . : . . . . . . . . . . . . . ._ .-- . .- . . . . . - . . ~ . :m
.it 45 l
}- I what I've heard in the previous meetings that I've been here i
on, which are very few, that the quality assurance system I i does work at Comanche Peak in some of the things that I've found. In other words, they will correct things that are
; wrong, and what we're looking for is the overall have they 9
5 checked ~enough to make this plant safe enough to operate? Are all the safety systems good at this plant? The issue 5 that we're discussing with you right now, these two computer
" programs, it appears to me that there has been a significant
, amount of documentation to come to the conclusion that the t
programs are adequate in doing a design for these base plates. ll
. , The reason we went back, which we probably would not have done, was because you brought up the fact that you felt that
. there wasn't enough documentation that you had seen and you
. probably couldn't have seen it because if you had asked for it, they wouldn't have given that to you. So, we have done
,j that for you and we are telling you that our estimate is that everything looks pretty good on these two programs. Basically, that's what we're saying, that the programs do have the qualification. The other things that we've talked about up to now are i philosophical, I think.- I think they're important, but basically they go around this issue of should people be using computer programs. Should people be doing things by hand; should they be doing strain gauge tests instead, and all
-N * -g. e ee we em spi.. ..e i
m *** _** ' g-_.- p 7 7 -' &.
. ~ . . . . -- -.. . - - . . -. . .. . . ~ . .- .
i .. . -- - i 46 f t 2 this. That's no,t somethi.,q that we can decide. We couldn't
. even tell people to'do what--wa can tell them how they're
> to develop'their loads. We can tell.them how they're to j .. check their calculations. We can tell them that they must have this much amount cf margin in their calculations. We 6 can tell them all those things, ..l they have to meet those
{ things, but we can't tell them how to do the calculations. { 5 They have to use good engineering and come to a conclusion 4 that what they're done is right. We can go back and check l { g:) them on that. That's in essence what we've done here. The growing pains in the revisions--I guess the part I would be concerned about is did they cover the i
;; ones that were where the program was obsolete. In other y words- - -
I
;; MR. MASTERSON: I can tell you without any problems at
, all that I was very impressed to be honest with you with the
~
i documentation of both the ITT Grinnell and the Corner and
, LADA Programs. I've reviewed many others not even associated
,. with this particular plant, and some of them were good and some of them aren't so good. These were very well documented, and step by step they would define what the revision was supposed to cover and they would address each point, and they would show what they did.to make the change, why they made the change, how it'a:'fected the previous revision, whether they had to go back and rerun a$y analysis or whether they could
~
~
. _ . . . . . . . . . . _ _. . _ . . ~ . . .
1'. . l i
']b -
47--
; do it-by a sampling plan. It was extremely well documented.
- I came out of there feeling very good that they had :a good
. handle and good control of these particular base plate pro-
- grams.
In other words, their sampling procedure h would allow them to say by engineering judgment that certain 9 of these hangers were, good; they didn't have to go back and i S look at them-- MR. MASTERSON: Not even engineering judgment. Engi-
;, neering judgment would be "that looks okay so I'm not going i to bother going back", or they might have made a revision to make something more conservative because there were more internal meetings. In that case a one-line statement saying i
- .: the change will make the program more conservative; therefore, ,
- this is no reason to go back and rerun the analysis. But if it's a change that could go either way and they're not sure about it, they would either--in this case what they did was
.t . they went back and they reran 1200 hangers. In another
,: revision change they did a sampling of about 25 to 50 hangers
. that they had done- before, and in every single case there i were 30 percent more conservative or greater than finite element. And don't forget-when.I say that, there is also a factor safety on top of this, besides this. So the design' was designed to maybe effect a safety of three to four, what-
! ~
j ever the allowable stresses would show in that particular
- i. m.w.s. m i.e.w.-- - 4-w. .
{ ,.
e ., , e % l 0 48 design, but beyond that, by using their program, they were. I { that euch more conservative than if they had done that by 1 { finite element analysis. They had all the back-up there, i they had all the finite element problems there, and you could sit down and spend three days checking these things back and A Everything was there. I was satisfied, totally
. forth.
satisfied, that what they had done was adequate in that they i had good control. That's your most important point. t
I can see your concern where they went from--with these l
4 growing pains, how do you know that anybody is keeping track
. of these things? My review showed that they definitely had I
j _ this in place, and I was satisfied. 7c/ Well, I don't know if there's anything slipped I : through or not. All I can take is your review of it. I know , that the engineering--during the same period that the FUB II was changing, the engineering manual was changing, so the procedures used to design were also changing, so-- i 1
., MR. MASTERSON: That's a normal process.
, You keep saying that, but my point of view is the engineering manual could have been written when they started this, and the reason it wasn't written was none of the people here knew enough about it to write an adequa'te engineering manual.
I MR. ZUDANS: I think that that could be'the case, but i ' really we don't have any evidence of that here. The evidence mee .- e
j
-..- . . . . .c I 49 we do have is that these programs are adequate, that;we have j gone through a significant--
- I think we're going to spend too much time on I
this. MR. ZUDANS: Why don't we go on to the next items? I
$ think that you understand what we have done, how we've 7 reviewed it. I don't want to put words in your mouth, but I think there's been a tremendous amount of effort-- , _I understand his sampling procedure and all ! this, and I don't know to what extent that something might k
, have fell through.
- What was the next item?
MR. MASTERS'N: O The next item: three concerns basically
.- in the piping analysis area'. The first one was that the s ADLPIPE piping analysis program had not been validated.
The second one was the simplified piping analysis technique in its seismic response spectra criteria h,ad never been validated or substantiated. And three, that there'.were no provisions to account for damage to Class 3 seismic piping and supports
. caused by the failure of Class 5 non-seismic piping supports.
The ADLPIPE. program was written and maintained by the
' Arthur D. Little Company and is currently owned by another company called DIS /ADLPIPE.
I've reviewed the similar back-
~
up documentation for ADLPIPE where it's compared to other
,- computer codes doing the same function, piping analysis e e- - me - e M
. . . - . _ - . _ _ _ - _ . , -...m. , . .. _ _ . - . _ _ _ . - .
)
l l
.. . -- . .. 5 0-- l
' computer codes, and I also reviewed-the quality assurance t
. effort that is performed by ADLPIPE. By this, I mean for the ,
same reasoning that ITT Grinnell had growing pains in their l 3 FUB II program, ADLPIPE, which has been around for many years, they issue updates, computer updates, and code revisiens on
^- a regular basis. Whenever they have a case where somebody--
d *
. a customer or their own internal QA or some other company--
5 has come in to audit their records, if they come up with a potential problem with their program, regardless of what it is, they send out to all their customers, all the people that own the program and all of the companies that lease the t - program and then sell those rightis to engineering firms, they will send them letters explaining what these problems
. are, how they've been revised, and asking for the company to
- l respond back to them that they've received this letter and they have taken the approp~riate action. I reviewed five particular letters that ADLPIPE had sent to a company called
, University Computing company, which is what's called a 2 service bureau. That's a company that X-Y-X engineering firms might be hooked up to to run ADLPIPE as opposed to owning the program. UCC owns the program so they get this information sent to them by ADLPIPE, and then they, in turn, disseminate this inforcation~down to their users. This is the quality assurance end of this particular computer
{ program concept, so they are following the quality assurance Q , , h .. h ' __ , T,. ?
J - - - -~ ~ 3; _,-- ~ ;.-- ,2- _ ;.-f _;-- ---, ---~__ . - - t * ..
~
- J
! 51 requirements set upon them by their customers.. And the
- technical requirements of the program--how it analyzes the l )
'j piping, how it uses the response spectra input, how it uses j the thermal analysis input--I found it to be well documented. -j - Again, when it's compared against similar computer codes,
. 6 the answers are either identical or extremely similar. So 7 I could not find any technical problems with the use of 5 ADLPIPE.
9 When they actually went through--how f ar j . have they gone out here? I know that some of the pipes they've had a lot of problems with. MR. MASTERSON: Explain that. ,! Hangers, snubbers, and things like that. That's what I've been told.- MR. MASTERSON: What do you mean by problems? Is it a problem with the computer program or was it a problem with using the computer program?
~
It would be especially validation in some ! respects of the results from a computer program because all [1 ( hangers and snubbers were designed due to ADLPIPE, and if M . l! the system doesn't work and I've been told it doesn't work-- MR. MASTERSON: Who told y'ou that? l.
' People that work down there said they have h had a lot of failures'since they've been trying to get this system--what have'they donc so far? All they have done m
.. -. . - - - - ~ ...--..... -.. -
7.............. g .. s
. . - ~
52 is run the pumps up and build up pipe pressures, right? l MR. MASTERSON: They've gone'through hot functional-- y That's what I'm saying-- l
. MR. MASTERSON: They've gone through secondary hot
{ functionals. S _ And they've had a lot of piping problems, yd right? ,
, ? MR. MASTERSON: They've had problems with--again, I
'.' didn't look at it from that standpoint. I'm looking at it j from the standpoint of the concern you brought up.
This is the same thing. MR. MASTERSON: That's not the way_it was presented. I was looking at it from the standpoint that the program was not validated. -
- _The validation--
, MR. MASTERSON: The fact that the piping is not correct might have nothing to do with the computer program. It could be something else that was involved. It could be the fact i
.., that snubbers were installed incorrectly. Maybe that's why--
l.
. as a matter of fact, that's mainly why piping will not go the 1
U way it is supposed to go. j Wait a minute. ADLPIPE is. supposed to tell you where the snhbber is good at the locatien-- ( . l MR. MASTERSON: You tell ADLPIPE where you're going to put the snubber. i
~
\
. . . . ..u.-~ . , ~ ~ . ~ ~ ~ + , ~ = - . . ,. - - . - . . , , - ~ .
l
} . 'i 53 i _ That's right. And it tells you whether that 4
snubber is okay or not. , 3 MR. MASTERSON: And it tells you the load at that point 1 and the stress in the pipe, and that's all that it does. The 'l
;! engineer decides where that goes, not the program. ] C-6 ~Nevertheless, the ADLPIPE takes care of all
~
;I the loads that go into the snubber. He puts the snubber 3 on there.
l l 9 MR. MASTERSON: And he gets a load back from ADLPIPE. 4 That's correct. And if that system fails-- MR. MASTERSON: I don't know what you mean by fail.
- 3 '
3 - The snubber busts or sornething, if the pipe l1 l r\
! busts or -something like that, then the,re was something wrong d .
. with ADLPIPE. You're actually getting feedback--you're aware 1
l of it, that they've had problems-- MR. MASTERSON: I'm aware that when they go hot func-t' tional, the reason for going hot functional is to find out i. l' i if the piping is going to be going where it's supposed to go, i.
~
l? and if it doesn't, why doesn't it go there? They have'a l whole preoperational testing department that does that, l-DR. UOU: It's not only the program-- MR. MASTERSON: Sometimes-- Most of the tire-- DR. HOU: Sometimes the problem is not created by' the program itself. When you s ay ' input geometry is not right--
**h* .-m e
%%%%"E*'s% % de 9 4 64 4*D MMMG'0% -
. . _ . _ . . _ _ . . . . _ . . . . . _ _ _ . . . . _ _ . . . . . . ... ~ . _.. . . . __
_ . . . . . - .. . . - . - - ~ -
, . , 9 C,
54
, it's three dimensional,.the piping. It s a very complicated i
layout ,' and you have to input it to run the program-- 't f I know that. I'm well aware of this--
.t j . DR. HOU: --they certify and af ter that you run the I
hot functional and see where it has the interference-- j l 1G 3 MR. MASTERSON: There were many reasons why the hot 1 functional might show that the pipe is not in the right
- position. It could be because it was installed or from where-
.. the design drawing shows it was supposed to have been. They "i have a walk-down function to verify whether it is, and this is what they do during the hot functional.
MR. ZUDANS: I can maybe help a little bit here. When they did their hot " functional test, we heard last week there
- j. were some concerns about the fact that the piping didn't move
. in the direction that it was predicted to move. I don't know
, if ADLPIPE does that--
This is the proof of the pudding. This is
- l. ,
where you need the information. [. , MR. ZUDANS: However, let me point out that the program was there to initially place supports here and there so the thing is properly supported. The proof of the pudding, which t you have alluded to several times, was this test; and the i test was not to prove that the snubbers were good or the
. supports are good, but to prove that the piping was actually moving in the direction it w~as supposed to move as predicted
. . -...'.a.,. : -.~.n,a.. . - ~ ~ . .a. ~: 5 +:~~ - ~""A~M~~~ -- - -~ ~~"~' -
____________m ___e-
.-----u.
-~. . . . . ' ..; : . _ _____ .. . .
1c,
?
t 55_ l by the computer program. And what is routinely found is -
~
. that,it doesn't predict exactly right where the piping is
~
I going to'go. In many cases it moves exactly the. opposite 1 direction that it's supposed to. We're not denying that. The reason why you do this hot functional test is so that [ 6 you can come back and correct the problem with the piping I j where you know it's going in the wrong ; direction, .and here's l - the QA-QC part that comes back in here. They, design some i j . piping on a piece of paper, like you did, like everybody
, else does, which you know is not necessarily going to be exactly what's in the field because the guy who's out in the field installing that support or whatever, he may say, "I just can't get it in here, so I've got to move it two
~
feet"-- But that drawing is supposed to be revised. liR. ZUDANS: I know. So he revised everything and, , ll let's say, it's just one or two and it's a small distance, l' so it's decided by engineering judgment maybe that it's not, , l' 'necessary to redo the whole analysis. Comes the time for
- q. ,
the hot functienal test, which is the reason why they'do it, they do the hot functional test to make.sure that their piping
-is going to be okay when.the plant is run and it's hot and-it's operating. So this is wh'at the hot functional test found out. The hot functional test did find out that there
. 'r were some problems with the direction in which the piping ci-
~
~
,,. e' ,
56 1 moved due to thermal expansion. Nevertheless, that had been corrected based on what.they did on the hot functional test.
- l!
,1 - You see what the NRC and what the Utility and everybody
.i concerned should be doing. They should be making sure that
- j. the things that are really important in the plant, like l4
. 6 piping, are behaving the way--they know which way they're 1!
- j ;, 7 going to go when they're actually going to be operating.
)
. }. Cl
! 5 That's why they did the hot functional test.
9 All you've done is prove my point that the
; 6 program cannot predict it and even--
MR. ZUDANS: I think not. What I tried to relate to a
- you is that the program is a starting point that you must I;I ,
l have. You can't go out there and just hang pipe without
- having some kind of guidanci on where to go.
i MR. MASTERSON: It!s the first phase.
~ }
1 Irealizethattheprogramisagoodprogram.]c,
] It's a very useful program-- -
DR. EOU: But program alone--
,. T s a big help, but now I wonder when they done functional tests, what is the relation between the 4
stresses in the pipe and what their record says from ADLPIPE. MR. MASTERSON: When they run a hot functional test, if they find they have acceptance criteria that's been established, if they find that a snubber setting is off by . a half an inch or a string hanger was bottomed out or the m.m e. 51-
,. :, - -55
I. i 57 l . i
. pipe .is moving left when it should be moving. right, the preoperational testing group walks these lines down during .
the hot functional and at various temperature increases--250, J ( - 350, 450, 550--they record all this information. When they get all the information back and they review it, if the o piping system falls within the acceptance criteria that's I been established for being off from the ADLPIPE prediction, I 5 they're fine, because they've already validated the criteria l f
," 9 as being acceptable under certain requirements. If it falls a'- outside this criteria, it's sent to engineering on a Test q
Deficiency Report, it's called. Engineering now takes this
, . record and decides whether they can, by engineering judgment or by maybe rerunning parts of the analysis, correct this or
- whether they have to go back and totally rerun the piping analysis with the new locatio's n or the changes that were made because during installation, like John was saying, the hanger--they've got a tolerance on installing hangers, plus or minus six inches it could be. If these tolerances all i;
- stacked up such that that was causing the pipe to move in
. the wrong direction and Engineering felt that they had to reanalyze the pipe to make sure they had a valid record of the stresses in the pipe and whether the loads changed in the support, they'll make a reanalysis of the piping. But there'was definitely a system that closes the loop between hot functional testing and the final analysis of the piping
,g_ ,
w:. - ~~- -- -m -
.; _ m.u.
(.~........._ .. _. _- .
'f C- .
t
. 58 system. I~ reviewed that as part of another concern unrelated
- q. 2 to yours.
. The next concern was that the seismic response spectra
's *
; generated for the Comanche Peak station was nonrepresentative l I
i ' and did not agree with the Uniform Building Code. The
. h response spectra that was used for Comanche Peak is estab -
[. .j. I t lished in the FSAR. I reviewed the FSAR in detail, compared S it to Reg Guide 1.92 and the annual Reg Guide that is required 4 for seismic analysis by NRC, and I find that the FSAR requirh-ments were perfectly okay. They met the requirements of the J ' 1 NRC and the use of the . response spectra together with its i}
. . damping values in the piping analysis was established by system in. the FSAR: as far as compared to the Uniform Building
;2 Code, you really can't do that because we're looking at a much more complicated seismic response spectra for a nuclear plant than you would be for a normal office building. As far as the spectra that'I saw in Comanche Peak, it's repre-sentative of any other nuclear plant, based on the seismic zones that it's located'in, which is one of the lowest zones a
in the country as a matter of. fact. i Between one and a zero. 9 C'
. MR. MASTERSON: It's pretty light; very low.
DR. EiOU: Uniform Building Code is very pricitive-- What? DR. !!OU: . Uniform Building Code is very primitive code' g%%t.A# g e. a0.**""
' 59 t.
l'p . 1 . used only to static G level and just--i.t's kind of static j t 2 type-- !
~
. It's got built into it a f actor for con-
! 1 . sideration of going from zero to four. And it must be i adequate for California because that's where it's actually N 6 documented and revised, and--
t 7 DR. HOU : Because you mention about vibration and you l, ') mention about dynamics, and you know all those dynamic loads
- i j 4 you consider--what?--the magnitude of the load and also the to frequence content, the radiance or these effects, the dynamic.
effect. For the spectrum that is much better defined
.. dynamic loads than the Uniform Building Code only used at G t levels.
ifave you l'ocked at the lump masses for the ! 14 4 model for Comanche Peak? It's a very simplified thing.
, MR. MASTERSON: It's supposed to be simplified.
DR. HOU: It's different level.
, MR. ZUDANS: Do you mean the lump mass model for the 'l p Reactor Building or--
For the whole thing. MR. ZUDANS: That's the standard way of designing 1 building structures when you do response spectra analysis. I l MR. MASTERSON: It meets all requirements of the NRC for response spectra development. I coufdn't find anything l l that was out of the ordinar in the response spectra. g. e
. 'E W F. 3
_ . _ . . . . . _ . _ _ _ . _ . . . . _ _ _ _ . . . ~ . . . _ . _ . _ __ -. t < .. . i - - Ao ; l . $.9 - I l MR. ZUDANS: Again, this is our feedback to you regard-l - ing what we have found, and you don't really have to agree with us. It's just that we wanted to let you know precisely'
, ' what we found when we go back and look at your concerns.
i That's really all there is. 6 There wouldn't be any use in my talking to j
}
i. 7 you if there wasn't some way I could be beneficial to 'you. 3 MR. ZUDANS: I agree with you, and we hope that you 9 agree with what we're finding so that when we leave here
'i
- 1 today we can say, " Yeah, I think we understand each other."
i
! The problem is that you can't appreciate necessarily maybe
-- what he's done, and he can't appreciate necessarily al'1 of
, .- what you're saying, but we're trying to make this communica-
- .- tion gap a little bit better so there is this understanding between us and you regarding 'your concern. Basically what I
q we found is that they've used what they're required to use i j which is a regulatory guide that the NRC endorses and requires them to use for developing a response spectra, Reg Guide 1.92. l - Based on that and our check that that response record was accurate or good, we find that they're going to meet their l ' safety criteria frequirement on that ~ issue. 3#' I appreciate all the work and the digging and--some of these things h~e's done for the public out here. 1 ' This is-- MR. ZUDANS: For everybody. This is for everybody. l-1 1 .- - -- - ._
. :* _ . . a . . . _.- . . ... . . . - ~
i i . 1 fQ <
- s _. 6.1_
! I appreciate.that. I ' m not trying to--I ' ve
- been--since 1962, for example, we had a B52 when I was at s Boeing-Wichita, and we had all these lump masses, 16 degrees L t.
'i ; . of freedom for an airplane, and here we got a nuclear plant I - down here and the comparison is--there's no comparison. This 6 thing down here is so-- i 7 , MR. MASTERSON: You have to be familiar with the develop-
% ment of response spectra for nuclear plants.
9 I'm saying that it's so simplified that it
;) seemed so inadequate to me because they're assuming certain t'
l characteristics of the ground level due to the rock base l I - that it sets on, and then they got this simplified model of the structure. What.I'm saying is--you may say, 'Okay, it-y complies with NRC." I'm saping that it should have been a more detailed model to more accurately represent the structure. That's what I'm saying, and also I'm saying that just the simple check that I done should have had better agreement than what it did. t
;., MR. MASTERSON: You really can't tell--
i
) - (A brief recess was taken.)
MR. ZUDANS: What we were talking about was that- c concern really was that the model should be more accurately represented in the development of the response spectra. I guess--I don ' t know what else I can say on 'that. What do you think, Bob?
,.. . .. - .. . ~ . - - . ..
___m._ . . _-- a_ TL_ ..~ .- .
.c _.-._
~
~- . -- m-
. j .;.x.
. _ . _ . ._.- -- m . ...
.l 62 I MR. MASTERSON: Again, as far as my review is concerned,. i
- I -
the method that was used is a common method and it agrees g with all the requirements of the.'FSAR and the NRC require- I ry . , r l monts. Bear in mind that the response spectra is used on l all the equipment and piping and; supports throughout the 6 plant. It might sound like,it's a simple formulation, but j , when you apply that plant-wide,-believe me,.you're definitely getting the most sophisticated criteria next tc time history 5 analysis..that we can come up with. 4 i 4 MR. ZUDANS: Just to close this:out, in my. opinion any-1
'l . way, wheie it's necessary--okay; for axampi.e, in spent fuel
.. pool rack design, which I've dona a lot of that in finite
-s element analysis, where it's necessary they get very com-
- .: plex. They go to nonlinear analysis when they do that where
- - they actually put the air gaps in between spaces, and they I
go into three-dimen.sional modal analysis which you'want to a call lump mass modes and all that. Where necessary in that plant and especially, for example, in the reactor vessel
, internals, reactor vessel design, where you have the '.'langes for the reactor vessel, that's done in tremendous detail.
- I (d mean,JE would say it's not far from the kind of analysis .
that's done for airplanes. When you get to massive structures like buildings where you just pour six, seven feet of con-
~
crete, then they go to these other simplified techniques because they just are acceptable or reasonable to do it e.esem b %
- 9 dM '
ng. ' m...'rC"'Z'D_.1- .i "21 "' ' 2Wr,M F 'I#NMM En
.s s
{ .
}
f j C/ .
. . . _ ._. 5.3._.
that way. It's not that they don't do what you say. They
. I do it where they actually need to do it.
Let me make one point. The analysis that they i - do with this simple model, if it's high or low; for example, j if it's way high, then that is carried through into the O {. piping analysis, all the hangers. In other words, everything l l- 7 in there reflects what that is.
! 5 1 MR. ZUDANS: That's correct.
So if they have a good handle on that model, i
.- then they're close to the real world. That's all I'm saying..
DR. HOU: For your information, you know NRC originally 1
' ~
. formed a committee, a Piping Review Ceremittee; you know, l because of so many conservative assumptions, they'r,e incurring
~
i: a lot of effects. For example, in that wall I got a
;- six-inch wall: 1 can make it twelve inch. So what? But piping, where you get too many conservatisms, piping can get very stiff and create a lot of thermal stress and prob-i . lems. Now the NRC actually. looking to review some models, t- to give a more detail analysis. .
2 That's what I'm speaking of-- DR. IIOU: That's the original goal, but it's not changed overnight. We have to gradually. I have seen very detailed analysis-- MR. ZUDANS: Wherever we are involved with--in terms of a consensus of' opinion on ahything--it's like if you belong
, s *. . a. . ".a -
a ,o
. . _ _ _ . . . ._ . _ _ _ _ . _ . . . ~ _ . . . _ . . . . . _ .. -
J .. . i 64 1
; i to-a committee that reviews something, it's going to take s
f .
. time'. What we have in hand right now we believe is conserva-tive and safe. That's why we're going to continue using it.
l It saves time. MR. MASTERSON: That's our number one concern now, i
! o safety.
7 MR. ZUDhNS: How about the next item? J 5 MR. MASTERSON: The next item is the last item and that's
} }
2 the one on the concern that the failure of a Class 5 or non-j seismic piping system could cause a reaction that would I
; trigger the failure of a Class 3 piping system and support.
, The way I viewed this, Mr. Yost, was that what you're talking
, about is a Class 5 piping system running in the vicinity of
- a Class 3 piping' system and'if for some reason the supports
- - failed or the pipe broke on the Class 5 and there were no j- provisions to account for' the damage to the Class 3 system from the breaking of the Class 5 pipe. Is that basically what your concern was?
1 , _ I had a case in mind like that, yes. MR. MASTERSON: I spent some time looking at what's called the Field Damage Study Group. Are you familiar with this group on site? [ I think I've had sorte acquaintance with them probably. 1 MR. MASTERSON: -Their "whole function is to address
% "%" 5 4 kg g% N 4 \S% % b NbNN %.% % 4 % . g 4 $h a.%O en
- 9 *8 gga, g W'
^^' * ' - ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ '
' ~" =C~: '
{., , 65 I situations like the one that you had the concern about. I ,
- reviewed what they had done in two particular buildings, the
.j Auxiliary' Building and the Electrical Building, where they go
- in and they look at it area by area. They walked the lines i
down and they identify what they call targets and sources, f' t 6 targets being a Class 3 piping system or Class 2 piping sys- ; I l tem, and source being a Class 5 or a Class 6 piping system l that's close by. In their evaluation they account for the Class 5 system damaging the Class 3 system and the additional 4
' loads that it would impart to the Class 3 system. They then ) ; sent this to Engineering for evaluation. If the Class 3 +
system and its supports can accept the loads without any . additional analysis, then this is the way thdt the result
; is sent back to the Damage Study Group. If that's not the case, they will either add more supports to the class 3 line or they will prevent the pipe from whipping the Class 5 pipe, assuming that it might break.' So there was a group on site who did this. Again, I viewed a sampling of what
- they had done, and in ev'ery case they had identified all these sources and all these targets, so your concern was being addressed. That's as far as I could take that. I i
couldn't find any instance where they didn't follow up on 7C i something like this. 4 The case in point was a heavy tank, and the tank was Class 5 support which is-Class 5 supports-- t .
~
s
*% ** * *-'%* I . % % m% gge. % . -e n. % [%nfg
- eIM'past.M *.* M + '*m atstepanpapgwanga.,%,- . -P e,% w -%%wp t % .*%%%.
~ - - -_ ,_.
- ~ . . . . ..
, - \
h'
}0
- 66 MR. MASTERSON: It's safety related, but it's not nuclear.
But adjacent to this and connecting to it
- j
~l _
i i 1 - was Class 3. liR. MASTERSON: Class 3 pipe was connected to it or a Class 5 tank? l I DR. HOU:. Supported by Class 5 and then-- i Wait a minute. Assume that Class 3 changed to Class 5 at certain points in the system. This was one of those cases, and this was in a--maybe this was more severe o than I think because there's a lot of controls in there also - 4 . besides that. i MR. MASTERSON: Do you know what the class of the con , IJ trols was?
~
I didn't get involved with the controls, but there were sensitive control systems in there, I'm sure. , 4 [
'1R . MASTERSON: Do you know what room this was in, what
.- the tank was? .
~ ~
~That tank'was about'that big around, I believe,.and about so long (Indicating). It was in the 1
It.was not the ground level floor. I Auxiliary Building. believe it was the floor above ground level.. It's about the l center of the building and that's--right outside the-door going'into it--there's a passageway ' going from the stairs
~
from one end of the building--in other words, all the way e** eq
- kNb WW gg.ggg$"4 444-M4 4g.s4 *.%
% %S, M
' - " " "\===- " e, Q , g( t %
__.u.,. _ _ , . . . _ . . _ 2..... _ _ . , . ~ . .. . . _ _ . - . .c -
. I-(D 67 I through the, building there, as I: remember. So it's right
- in the center of the building, and I did have--well, I disagreed with them on that point also, on that hanging of that heavy tank there adjacent to Class 3 lines without l
putting additional support for that tank or .either con-
]
. 6 sidering moving their Class 3 down below the tank and then 7 including the tank as part of a Class 3, you know, for their S analysis. -
MR. MASTERSON: That's established by their own criteria i ;,- as to-- hey can stop them wherever they want to--
. MR. MASTERSCN: Not wherever they want to'. They have criteria.
.: [ ~There was.a valve there above it, if that's what you're saying, yeah.
MR. ::UDANS : Do you know if they did anything with that? Did you suggest to them in writing that they do that? I took some verbal abuse over 3.t. l- MR. MASTERSON: How were you involved? Were you designing supports for the Class 3 linc and just happened to be in this area, or-- I was designing supports in that whole area there. In other words, at one time I had all those lines, and I located the supports. Taa~t was part of this non-credit thing that you located all the supports and then they gave t-(' ,.
-~~ -
j O
. _ . _ . . - . _ _ . _ . _ _ . _ . . _ . _ . _ _ . _ . _ _ . ._. - . l_ ~ .
68 I them to somebody else and they got' the credit. It depended
~l ~
cn your supervisor, second-level supervisor. MR. MASTERSON: So you weren't- involved in designing or locating the supports on the tank or the system, but you i were in that area. , l 6 j [Iwaslocatingthesupports. ' I MR. MASTERSON: On that piping? ' b I believe so, if I remember right. , i 9 MR. MASTERSON: das the tank a floor-mounted tank or-- X-
} It was just above the floor. ' 1 MR. ZUDANS: It wasn ' t supported--
t was supported, as I remember, by a pipe that came out of the bottom with an "L" and I don't remember i
- whether the support was on 'the wall or on the floor, but there was a support going to either the wall or the floor.
MR. ZUDANS: Is it on the passageway, right off the , q passageway, that you can see it?
- o. It's in' the room where all these con-i trols are.
l [.
. MR. ZUDANS: I think that what we will do is go over there and try to find this in this room to try to see what's L
' there. That's about as much as we can do to try to address
~
this. (
~
I don't think that's the point. I think the 7'd 4 . point is that these things like this, that one did exist I 1 i
~
l ..i
. . _ . _ _ . _ _ . ~ . _ . _ . . . . . . _ _ _ _ . . . _ _ . _ _ . _ . . . . _ _. .
2 . . . -. f, ,
/
t , l _ . . _ _ . _ 6 9._ l I don't know whether it still exists or not. There may,be j cases .at other locations like that. l' Again, what is your specific concern MR. MASTERSON:
] about that?
In an earthquake condition, which is highly 1 i i 6 unlikely for this area, but if you look to seismic--I mean, I I that's why we're designing it. What I'm saying is it's not
-' compatible safety.-wise with adjacent safety for the Class 3 Y lines because it could damage them. .
i j DR. HOU: There is a team to look into all this. We may think that team overlook something, but unless you have something very specific that we look at, then we say, " Hey, you didn't come forward with that." !
- This might ise a matter of judgment. They ~/
might say, "Okay, you got poor judgment. Just leave it alone j . and 'get yourself out of it and say no more." MR. MASTERSON: Who did you talk to?' Were you talking to--
._ ._Italkedtf -_
1h MR. MASTERSON: He's the piping guy for large bore.. MR. ZUDANS: I think to summarize just this little portion that we were just talking 'about, it appears that there is an ongoing program at the plant where they do
^
review this interaction that you are concerned about, the
.- interaction--
~ . . _ . . - . . . . .. _._:,
*- p .
) .
h.'
! 70 j ,
I I think it existed at that time, though. 2 MR. MASTERSON: They may not have gotten to that par-ticular area. This is done over a period of time. I 3 - MR. ZUDANS: There is no reason to believe also that they i didn't look at your concern and say that maybe they weren't
! ^ concerned. It could be that they evaluated subjectively i
7 that maybe it was not a concern to them. i S MR. MASTERSON: Do you remember what particular piping
" system this was? Was it stainless or carbon steel? gy bi I'm sure it wasn't stainless. Stainless is N
l used mostly in the Reactor Building. I I . MR. MASTERSON: If I could pinpoint this location a
}
little bit tighter--if you can give me more information, I t la can go locate this tank and then go to the Damage Study Group 4 .I
'and say, "Have you looked at this particular one?"
2d. ZUDANS: Not only just to look at that one but to look at the approach. What you're really saying is, " Hey, i 1
- I'm telling you one place. How about the rest of the plant?"
I - How many other place's did they not look at? 1' MR. MASTERSON: What I looked at was,their overall pro-gram and how they approached this. interaction question, and they 'do it in a very systematic-type way. They identify the targets, they identify the sources, they identify the loads- C i that can b~e transmitted to the target, and then they have y v. acceptance criteria that they use that's in a procedure- ' _.f3 K l l 5 ~ g .K p 'h
.fA % ?-
^
. _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ - _ _ . . - _. _.. - - _ - . ~ . -
- ~, ,,
n .
/
4 _ . . . . .71._. I it's in an approved procedure--and as a final review, if they can't come to an agreement as to whether they have to add more supports or restrain the other piping, it goes to
- l 8
Engineering for final evaluation. Again, they closed that l t ~
$ loop. From: the standpoint of the whole effort, I've looked 6 at that. A specific one, I didn't go out and look at any j 7 particular one. '
i . I 5 MR. ZUDANS: I think it might be worthwhile, Shou, to - actually sit down and try to find that one and talk to
'and say, "Look, how did you handle just this one? We have been evaluating your overall program. Would you be
- I --
willing to tell us- " MR. MASTERSON asn't the one that was involved. 3 J
- He was involved with piping, but he isn't the guy involved l
l in this Damage Study Group. My memory escapes me on this. I'm not sure whether he contacted the Darage Study Group or not. I would say of f the top of my head tblat I think he did, but I'm not sure. 2 MR. MASTER $0N: Do you want me to pursue'this any further? I'll be glad to-- It's not up to me. I'm just giving you a
~ I case here.
i MR. ZUDANS: I think we' re trying to sound out what
- i. your concern is.
MN* wee e .
- 464gg%g9 4 e k N' , a4% 9 '% MdM E 9 AFtWWW Om=9O 4 .W 4 , . , , , .
___ - _ _ - _ _ . _ . _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - . _ _ _ _ _ .- - - .41 __
}
;. L _ . _ - .
, .- o
. . . _ . . . _ . . . ..... 7 2__
t
)
Do you have drawings:of the plant out there?
}
i MR. ZUDANS: We have drawings back home, and we have e i' access to all the drawings at the plant. There is a possi-
. bility that we could bring you on site and let you show us where it is.
' *> MR. MASTERSON: That's strictly up to you, i ,
j MR. ZUDANS: There's no problem with that if you want i 5 to come en site and look at the place where this was and show-
. o us precisely where it was, but that's up to you. That's the g; kind of thing that we would be willing to do, come and escort you. As a matter of fact,,it was done last week.
Anyway, that basically covers the concerns that we know that you have or had. Now, I guess.we would like to find out if there is anything else that you have that you might
- want to bring forth that we might need to look at regarding any area that you felt you had some concerns about.
What about this Brooks Griffin thing? Is that going to be corrected? MR. MASTERSON: I know that we have passed on our review l to the office of Investigations telling them that the way l' that we viewed this particular one it was an intimidation i concern. I don' t knew what they do-- DR. HOU: These are Technical Review Teams, separate That's only one part of NRC's whole ef fort. he groups. have another Of fice of Inves'tigation that look at the things t i*g . '
. - - _ ._ , _.,m
3. a I i 73 1~ like intimidation of this kind. What we do usually is take this information and pass to them because our part is .to i look on the technical aspect, whether there are any safety I
- concerns. Certainly they can go into that. Now, I'm going I
to go back and check whether they know about those or not. t 6 If not, let them be aware of this. [ 7 'MR. MASTERSON: Somebody, I would assume, will get back
$ t G MR. ZUDANS: We will give Mr. Griffin a copy of this
-J. transcript when we have it completed and that will be given to him with the express intent to show what we discussed
. today versus what is on his writeup.
' I'm a little bit disturbed about this thing
. : because he called me up on.the phone, and I talked to him
) - and told him what I knew and my personal experience, and he i doesn't report them correctly. That kind of bugs me. MR. ZUDANS: I think that you recognize that even sitting across the table, between you and I, that cormunications is pretty tough, to get to all the details. Now, en tl}e phone that's probably reduced by 50 percent, the ability to communicate. So if that's the case, then I would expect that, based on what's in the transcript, Mr. Griffin would 1 j at least call you and let you know what he has decided. I L don't know what his basis was -for writing what he wrote. I haven't even read it to be quite truthful with you; however, 4
& g e4%ogR g 44gg4g a g a@q gggqg gg ,,, g g 4 g4 , g ei. ,
e
s 1l i. l _ _ . . 7.4. _ 3
. ! .we will give him a copy of today's transcript so he can !
! . try to see how that iells with what he said to you before or whatever you discussed with him before. I think that should be at least a starting point. You'll get a copy of the trans-i i cript so you can make sure that what's in'the transcript is O what you said.
. Are there any other items that you'd like to cover with -
1 i S u?
\ -
C
'h DR. HOU: Let me clarify one thing. That particular P
' item about intimidation: We did inform the Office of Investigation.-
~
MR. ZUDANS: That's why Mr. Griffin called f; MR. MASTERSON: No. Mr. Griffin called up in 1983. What I had to do my feview was a copy of that tele-phone interview. Now, based upon what that said there and, again, what we discussed today, I think I still feel that t it's not a technical problem; it's an intimidation problem .
. But when I gave my report to our team leader, they at that time--which was maybe a month or so ago--contacted OI and j ; said this is an intimidation concern. What they've done b
with it since that time, I guessa you will have to follow up on. DR. HOU: I did follow up and that did transfer to OI. l l MR. ZUDANS: They will read this transcript and assess what they see in it versus "what was discussed before, okay?
. e se 4 = '9 %*%4.4 es%'ee g g ., , ...,,.s% % N9.e... . .Waq% ,% * * * *
- 5- * * * - -
._ ..- ..-. -.. . ~ . . . . - . . . . . .
- i. -_.. >.
- y. - . - . . . . _ _ . _ . _ .- .
k j
. . . _ . _ _ _ 75
! About what we can do. Is there anything -else that you'd like i
to. bring up? guess in summary it seems to me the biggest
~
problem, not only with this plant but I knew plant people 7
~
that had come from all.the other plants, and the Utility b Company has all of this learning curve everytime. It seems - 7 to me that if one engineering manual was written by NRC based i " j on all of the knowledge that is available right now, it would 4
! 9 save billions of dollars in redesign and all of this stuff.
In other words, if they would just put it together to where they used the current experience--and there's a lot of i
experience available because there's a lot of plants running, i In fact, I understand there's one in California that is
.a instrumented for recording earthquakes and'the response of the plant. The reason I say this: The public has been l;
. paying for NACA NASA for years to provide solid criteria for
!i
- building in the aircraft industry, but this has not come along in the nuclear industry. We need an engineering manual that is complete. I heard them say down here--an ASME quy
~! .- came down and lectured, and he said, "How many of you people I
understand the ASME code?" i DR. HOU: Not too many. 7 He said, "If you say you understand it, you're telling a lie. So I don't believe that it has to be that complicated. I believe that you can have an engineering b
- %'kk: *.$
. - - ... . . - - - - . . -.~ - . . - . . - - . - . . . - . . . .. - - . . . . .
, g7 _
- 4
= - . . . .. 76_
manual that has the information in it to design by, and I also feel that they could have computer programs now that are
}
- i an improvement over what they currently have, and they could 2
- - easily validate them with hot functional tests. In'the area j where they have deficiencies--ADLPIPE?--I don't know what the 1
^ deficiencies are. You mentioned that they've been changing l
7 it all the time. I don't know what the schedule, as far as 5
) related to how the 've revised hangers,is related to these 9 changes in ADLPIPE, so all this--I mean, it's kind of a record-l 10 keeping and a' mixture.
1 j MR. ZUDANS: 'I think we could spend two or three days
. on this issue of should we have standardized plants or not.
1 The NRC has approved already-standardized plants. That's 14 the closest thing that comes to what you're saying, in my 1
- -; mind. What that means is that you build a plant the same .
6 way every time, and it has tha'same structure, same location, same piping system, same everything; and every company that
, builds these plants has provided an FSAR to the NRC saying Ia how they would build this standard plant, and each one has
, . their own standard plan. The American way is to build the Chryslers, the Fords, the Chevys, and so that's the way they do it. I think that we are not here capable of really solving the problem you have which I think is unique--it's not unique at all; I.think everybody has that same concern.
Why can't we have a more clear direction in doing everything? Mk0-( , Je%6
,%w, -- #8*1M - -. , - m 14 ue :_4 ..
e, --
'_~ ,
__Mqg w
. f.
7 , ,. .
~ ~
1
]
i. 77 j Because there are a thousand people with a thousand opinions l
- and a thousand good brains out there trying to build a plant.
Wait a minute. There's one thing here. There's people getting payoffs, there's people that don't i l want the job to be done in just one cycle because the longer i ( 6 it goes on, the more money they maker and this here is--this
,i .
!- 7 is evident up in Washington--I'm talking about the State of f ,
' Washington--at those plants up there, and all the people I've
! 9 talked to that worked up there. So it seems to me that it's
- o. time that somebody said, "Okay, here's a manual." I don't i
care where it's--even in your case, like they standardize the i ; plant. You come down here and you take it to a company like
? TUSI that has no previous experience; they'd still have to go I
through these expensive groQing pains, and it would be l
'- billions and billions of dollars to their consumer which would f, - be unnecessary if there was just one manual and they went and built the thing and built it right.
. MR. ZUDANS: I don't agree. I think what we'll do is
- i. we will certainly point out thi's because it's in the' trans-cript as a potential for change,' but my own personal opinion l{
! is that that's--because this 3.ndustry is a growing industry, that's difficult to accomplish at this time. There are just i too many things that are involved that. will not allow that
~
to happen. Even though it's a great idea, it's not easy to I do. Anyway-- mi
%% s% 4 Y s 1g 944%%A@ a eip 4 EE 3 R%%.5 %
2
,..,7.
8 O
) _
78
~
l ! You mean NRC is not willing to take the
. bull by the horns?
MR. MASTERSON: No. NRC cannot'tell Utility how to
- . build the plant. That's the biggest problem.
That's a copout, isn't it?
~
[ 6 MR. MASTERSON: That's not a copout. That's not in the charter of the NRC. They can't do that., 5 DR. HOU: We only regulate to be sure it's not unsafe. . MR. ZUDANS: That's part of it, but the other thing is
. . that it may not be in the interest of the public that NRC
.l actually design plants for anyone because, truthfully, I
~
; think we're good engineers--the NRC people are good engi-neers--but we do'n' t really design plants every day. We
. may not be the best people to do that.
] _ I'm not saying that URC needs to design j
, any. plants. If there was one set' manual instead of a manual for every plant around the country and everybody going different directions, if there was one manual yith good f4 criteria to adhere to--
MR. ZUDANS: There is one manual. If you want to look
! at ic that way, you can say that our Standard Review Manual, which is our manual for how to build plants--there is a t
manual.
- ' MR. MASTERSON: It's how people apply that is where 1
1 your concern comes in. l
j .. .. - - - - - . . . . . . l
'l .
i j 79 t
- l 1 MR. ZUDANS: The Standard Review Manual is what the
. -t NRC looks at as their cookbook as to how to build a plant.
You should try to get a copy of that so you could understand l more what we go into to try to review a new plant and how it's built. Then you'll see that there is an inmense amount
'i .
n of material that we go through to come to the conclusion that. 7 plants are safe and that they're built adequately. The NRC l!
! . i Standard Review Manual might be the closest. thing to what
" you're saying we need to do.
Okay. I'm sure we can't resolve that today, but let me ask yous Do you believe that of the technical concerns l l; . that we have had, do you believe that we have done what you would expect us to in trying to resolve your concerns? 1d
; Personally, I think you've done more than I
;- expected: though in some areas I'm not completely confident
, and I don't believe either one of you are that there's not flaws down there that we don't know about--
. MR. MASTERSON: That's right. We could never say that
. there aren't.
~
I .
--or is there points in the system that won' t h c be highly stressed and fail.
-MR. ZUDAMS: I think that we can say with sace certainty
~
l that when the applicant gets his license, what the Cormission will probably say is that there is a reasonable assurance that the safety of the public will be maintained by the o g
- p. .,-.
l
. . . . . . _ . . .. 80 l
j, i plant' operating that plant. That reasonable assurance has a weighted conservatism to it. That's a lot of words, but what i I'm saying to you is after going through the Standard Review Plan and reviewing everything that's in that plant to assure
' that it's safe, you come to this conclusion that yes, they
" should be able to operate that plant safely. Again, you have i
~
!, to see what's in there. I think really this might be a key j
5 to your concerns, to see what it is that we do to go through 4 this whole kind of effort ^to make the plants safe. 4 I know that a lot of the things that you do AC would be kind of depressing for me doing and drudgery-type I i -
! - things, and I can feel for that. But even the things that t
'I you had to go through in checking some of their werk for i* this--and some of those things they were doing when I was 15 there already; I mean, they.were g.oing through those, even l though I never said nothing, I mean, they were doing those i things--
s DR. HOU: We spent three months in the plant in the hot summer. h f _ MR. ZUDAllS: The last thing I wanted to ask you was have you given this statement freely and voluntarily? This is just for the record. Well,.I feel like I've given the statement M l! for the benefit of 'the'iRC; all the information that seems significant to me as far as'--both in discussion and new
. . _ . . _ . . _ . .__.m._. .
a Y & _._ 81
,' information . -
j ~ MR. ZUDANS: We want you to know that we believe that this has been a contributor to making this assessment that the team is making a significant contributor, and we believe
', that this will be good for the plant and for the public in 6
general. - I got one more point. I still believe that l there can be high stress points in the pipe with potential failure down there, and I don't know--it seems to me that the only thing that would show up these points is a review of ADLPIPE for those areas where they had problems in the hot functional; if hot functional will adequately cover the .i 1
' system in the operating condition. I know that they're I'
looking at those; you've al' ready said that they were looking at those. If they cover those, that would give more confi-dence in my case. , ii DR. HOU: Let me answer you with this: Your comments ll ., age well taken. Now, even if it is a good program and good li + criteria, we're not certain that there's no problem, so after 1 - that we still have the' hot function ~al testing, testing to look at expansion, see whether it checks, any interference,
.. and also we look on whether it has' vibrations problem or j
hammer problems which analysis hardly covered. In' addition to that, we also.look.on the potential high stress locations. High stress doesn't mean it's really O s+.o ,
_ ~ ._.. _ _ _ _..____ _ , 1 s, . $ ~ . , . - - - - . - . . - - . . .
. . . ....-. . 2 l . . f s
bY 'I 82 i very high.
, It's still within the code limits. In:80. percent I , of the code allowable we postulate a break location and look- l t
on whether if the pipe break there, what cause the problems, and that's why I have the piping restraint and all these. l - So it's all over, these exercises. We feel very confident I 5 that the plant will be very safe. I think that concludes our interview today,. l MR. ZUDANS: .i d' and we thank you very much for coming here, and I hope that it's been somewhat useful. i . MR. MASTERSON: Thank you for your com=ents. I hope it will be useful. Maybe I should
! , have reviewed a little bit more, but I-didn't. I just looked at those things that I had previously been involved
?
;; in. -
- MR. ZUDANS: One other thing; I'm sorry. There's going
. .. to be, around January of next year, an SER published, Safety 1
Evaluation Report, which will include all of your concerns
, and many other concerns that have been brought up about this 3 plant. We would like to know if you would like to receive a i
copy of the Safety Evaluation Report.
~
Yes, I would. MR. ZUDANS: You can look at what we've written, and we don't have it for you today because they're not totally completed but we would like to send you that. If you could 1 i give the court reporter you$ address, we would be able to
- n. m-u ? yy _- .y _ . . . --
. - . . . . . . . . . . - . . - ~ - . ...- . .
o. q s,,9 . . ... .. . . _ ~ . . . . . . . . _ _ . ... .
. t, -
_ _ _ . . ___ _ .. . .. . . . .- - 83 4 send you both the transcript and the SER when they become available. 1 (This interview was completed at 11:30 a.m.) e e i, i 7 9 e o O 5 e 9 h 4 i j 1 l 1 4 e 6 ,,o no me. S Y-~,. . . - _1,__. , , , n av + .- - AM, 3*' ' ~ ' ,p- [ p p m _ _
, p,, #.fShha ' * '
_2mW F ' '
- - - . = . . . . . - ~ - . -.. . . . . . . . . -.
,, . - . _ . -y g .. .-
i 84 . CERTIFICATE OF PROCEEDINGS l This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the
; Nuclear Regulatory Commission i -
4 In the Matter of: COMANCHE PEAK TECHNICAL INTERVIEW Date of Proceedings: November 14, 1984 Place of Proceedings: Granbury, Texas
.., 'were held as herein appears, and that this is the original j ., transcript for the file of the Commission.
I i f Carmen Gooden Certified Shorthand Reporter g
. . ,r ,
'w -j M -
Certified Shorthand Reporter l 1
.e e
I l i I l' - t
,;2^^~^^^Ta W W :C*;"c'2,"=:' 'Q 4 r&*
. L'n ~_ : LMM 1w , ,. .. ~we -- - - mm ~-
7 mAY . ...
* - + SA '- . --- - - ' D
~
^
i f.' .. NRC TECH!!ICAL REVIEW TEAM FEEDBACK Y. i (. .
. . . ~..:.: ~. . ..
* ' ~ '
, . . . . .% - : *"Wl ' - t..',
/
GODFREY ae AMES COURT REPORTING . camTerzo suoaTHAND REPORTER 44 sussrx ARLINCTON. TX fen 4 M. March 5, 19.85
?,
- s. " F01A-85-5<
e 9 9 Y #
- - - - __ w m w w w =- w n : m.-+ w e : :7.- yrp:u=~muumcazmmyx::gr $ ,e r .' ., '7 1 ,.
3 - 57 l" . 1 allegation. r 1
) 2 MR. HUBBARD: Are you on? The first one that I L
i 3 had was a result of some comments that you had made i j 4 about whether welders vers properly qualified, and j 5 qualified at the site. - 0 6 1 NR. POSLUSNT: AQ number and the category, please. 7 MR. HUBBARD: AQW-2, category 26 8 So in order to determine whether or not there j 9 were, I looked and went through the method of 10 qualifying welders, and then followed it through and I 11 1 ran a spot check on the controls that were in place on
)
a j 12 the determination at the-time or welding. Whether a i
.i 13 qualified welders were being used for specific welds l
i i 14 and so on and so forth. l, 15 And some of this may seen oversimplification to 16 you, but I'll run through it anyway, just to make sure
! 17 I covered it all. ! 18 As you know, when a welders attempts to become
- 19 part of the work force out there, he has to pass a i,
() 20 performance qualitioation test.
- p And this is the 21 primary qualification he is expected to show. The test 4
l. 22 has to be done to a specific weld procedure, which l 23 duplicates the actual, or as close as possible, the
~~
i< i 24 actual velding conditions that will be on the job site 1 . 25 for that particular weld. i GODFREY & AMES COURT REPORTING Metro 469-6100, (817) 460-2048 g
- &YRTTRW74Q%;X4WC'y[PD _+ % =
- m " M M W " W E
- 'h, IC- 58 1 And his qualification comes~in passing that i- ~
1 4 2 test. And that's the. primary way to determine whether 3- he's qualified or not to do the work. After he
~
i 4 performs a test, and successfully, and is about to 5 start to work on a. weld, then.at the time the veld is 6 ready to go, the wel data eard ooses out with the weld i 7 filler material sheet, and on it is listed his 8 particular welding procedure that it will be welded 9 to. 10 And. at. the same time- he should weakly, or as the 11 welder qualification matrix .which relates the specific 12 tests ne took, to a specifie welding. procedure. b '13 Also at the samettime,. issued weekly, is a welder 14 performance qualification record, which shows which 15 test he has successfully completed. And so the welding 16 supervisor matches up the welding procedure to be used 17 with the test to make sure that he has qualified to do
- 18 that test at that time. -
19 [ Let me say this. I had something 20 like 40 something welders, so I know the whole 21 procedure of welders and stuff like that. And 22 everything's great as long as you go by this schooling
. 23 and paperwork and stuff.
24' -
-{ The incident I was speaking about of welders at l 25 one' time, I had this:welde'r getting ready to transfer GODFRET & AMES COURT REPORTING Metro 469-6100 (817) 460 2048 !
. . . . . . , . . =
LIdlIS .hh1 E MhdMh h4
u a .mi 4 .p i s
.: '., , t YC
, 60 1 they're hard. 80 percent of the-welders you have on t
2 that job are great welders. Some of the best welders I 3 have ever seen. 4 But you have got certain ones that's not too 5 good. And stuff like that. ,And another problem is you
- 6 have got people that's not certified to weld that gets 7 other people's rods and use them, and stuff like that.
I l 8 That was some of the questions I brought. 9 MR. POSLUSNT: Was this the specifics he had given 10 you before? 11 MR. HUBBARD: No. 12 , I have seen -- but anyway, you're : J 13 trying to tell.me. you have got good welders out here. 14 I agree. 80 percent of your welders -- as a matter of 15 fact, all crafts should,be tested like your welders, 16 then you would have a better plant, the welders is tne 17 only people that has to take a test in the.oraft. Some 18 of the best welders I ever laid eyes on, is the nuclear
, 19 welders.
20 MR. HUBBARD: And like we both agree, the 21 qualification is set up the by the particular code, and
, 22 whatever it is. If you pass it,.you're qualified. And 23 whether you are a good, a medium, or a poor welder, is I
t . 24 a subjective thing a'fter that, once you're qualified.
~
. 25 ,
But some people passes the test
, GODFRET & AMES COURT RgPORTING g Metro 469-6100 (817) 460-2048 e awoman as.mapeuwamesepam
-...-_._,_n__. a_.-.~ _ , . .
\ . y ,,. . 1: MR. HUBBARD: Yeah. ' 2 ' MS . 'G A RD E :. Was.5.t referred to OI? j 3 Okay. Exactly what I was -- p 4 , MR. HUBBARD: No, I -- I i 5 MS. GARDE: Wait. Hold on a minute. Was it I ' 6 referred to QA7 7 MR. HUBBARD: Let's back up.and make sure I 8 understand the exact nature of what he's talking 9 about. He's saying that, because of undue influence i 10 from some sort, people were allowed to weld who, in his + 11 mind, were not qualified to weld, even though they may 12 have-passed the test. *
, O
_J 11 MS. GARDE: ,Right. ,No, I. don't think even though
~14 may have passed the test. I think what he's saying is, 15 undue influence used by construction supervision to s
16 give people higher qualification, in the case that he 17 knew about. { ~ 18 '.Let me take this off the record a 19 minute. 20 (Whereupon there was a discussion held 21 off the record.) 22 T'all have got some of the 23 better welders I have ever laid eyes on out here.
-{ 24 They're good.
25 MS. GARDE: Give the details, if you would, GODFREY & AMES COURT REPORTING . Metro 469-6100 ' (817) 460-2048 hh hhmegM rms.m %4rg/ t _hhwRld M.O1/lMJ # b W} & m" .../.L. . L. AL .J. Jres a. P. lf arb.2 2 LIEN.las h$ sr"h
n.. , ,. IC' 63 I i ofthespecificincidentwithhueM"JrichwJand
, 1 please,
- 2 and'the velder's name.
3 Okaye .The welder's name is 4
- Si MR. HU5MARD: _
!6 I can't spell.
7 MR. POSLUSNY: . 8 MR. HUBBARD: Do you know his 9 first name? 10 ( Not really. But you can pull the 11 millwrights. h 12 MR. HUBBARD: He's a millwright?
'13 Well, he works with millwrights.
14 Millwrights had we1ders, too. 15 HR. HUBBARD: He's.a millwright welder? 16
~
' He was. He went to the pipe 17 department. He started out with us.
18 HR. HUBBARD: When was this~i 19 Ch,'must have been somewhe're 20 around '81. We have got a file of all of our personnel 21 people. , 22 Okay. I had other welders coming and complaining / 23 to me about this and he was working in the [ { 24 full pool liner, and he was -- worked in the stainless 25 steel liner. And they told me the guy didn't know b /
/
f GODFREY & AMES COURT REPORTING 1 Metro 469-6100, (817) 460-2048 \, -! A--------------------- . . - r =u j
~ '
^
wgg
., M 64 '" Ni 4-
.to weld, and had all kind of complaints.
1 So I went down and looked at some of his work, and s 2 - he worked and.he fused the plates together-like he was , t-3 He'd be I 4 running -- he would be-a running a bead. Looked real orappy. 5 hitting one side and the other. S What were you doing at that time? 6 MR. HUBBARD: I was the general foreman over at 7 And I was over him. And he worked for 8 boilermakers. 9 me. I was over all the welders for the boilermakers - 10 and the mi11 wrights. . 11 So in the meanwhile, he was getting ready to -
--when.I I
12 transfer to the pipe department. So I went -
- when j l l;
13 seen.his work, I went. to the. welding engineer 3 l
.v '
he had to be 14- you. normally get irr the pipe department, 15 higher qualified for a pipe. welder, because he was just 16 a plate welder. So I went over and seen the welding people. 17 was one of them. And I 18 welding engineer, _ 19 told M about what kind of work he's been doing'. And they was f. 20 Also of the stick work looked terrible. ' Aold me he And 21 going to re-evaluate him. .
- re-evaluated the man, and he was . going to pullh- his >
22 ,
~
23 certification, because he wasn't up to par. ,_v,.__ i 24 Then thie next thing I know,'Mtold me called him and tol'd them he better have it'
~
25' I GODFREY & AMES COURT REPORTING
~
Metro 469-6100 (817) 460-2048
- ~ . - - - - - -
ex,,mmunay.c.mna----K , _ a w ,. -
.,g ,. u '
r - 5*. . 7C 65 l j .' 1 certify by Monday morning, or else. j 2 MR. HUBBARD: When they re-evaluated him, did they' i - 1 3 Just.look at the -- 4 .
.They took you in there in the
( r 5- booth, and they have you do some welding. l r 6 performance test on the pipe weld? 7 ._They do each -- everything you're 8 qualified for, you're supposed to run it, if you 9 qualify.. But.he couldn't -- l 10 MR. HUBBARD: Yeah. In other words, this -- they 1 11 gave a performance qualification test for the pipe { 12 welding, and he was going to do it. l
; 13' . No, o n t h e p l a t e- t e s t that he's 14 - been doing That consists of -- you.have to pass a
( 15 certain pipe- test in order to do a plate test. And 16 even though he had never passed a pipe test to get into 17 the pipe department, yo's have to pass a pipe test to f 18 get in the plate department, but anyway. 19 So they -- every procedure that he's qualified 20 for, that he's tested for, they get him do welding, 21 that type of welding, bu't they'said he wasa't up to 22 par. Anyway..that's about the end of it.
,23 .MS. GARDE: Is till out there?
] 24 a still there, yes.
25 -
'MR. HUBBARD: Did he take the qualification test GODFREY & AMES COURT REPORTING Metro 469-6100, (817) 460-2048 ,
4 am M.-----s _,a-
- 9. m " --u -h g-_____# '-'etb,3="f .*m ,,,a_, . , _ . =
z- - -~ -__.m.._ .ampm_ g C 66 !
- r N
1 for pipe welding, then? 2 ,
. No. 'In order to pass like a 3 10,046 plate heavy wall, you have to pass a pipe test.
~
4 But you don't.x-ray it. Tou just band it. 5 In order to get in the pipe department and weld 6 pipe, you have to do a pi,pe test, and then x-ray. Then 7 you're qualified up higher. Then you're certified for 8 pipe welding. He was certified, well, for plate 9 welding only. 10 HR. HUBBARD: Did he ever pass the pipe weld test 11 that was x-rayed? , 12 f I don't know. n ' L 'J 13' HR. HUBBARD t Sa you don't know whether he ever 3<._
^
14 did any pipe welding or not?
~
15 Tes, sir, I'm pretty sure he did. 16 HR. HUBBARD: Then he must have passed the test. 17 Right. He's in the pipe
- 18. department.
19 HS. GARDE: No, he must not -- that's the wrong 20 characterization. He may have been qualified. That 21 doesn't mean he had to pass the test. If there was. 22 undue influence by and that's proved, he 23 may not have. They may just have approved it. Oh, all right. You're entering -- I L . 24 HR.'HUBBARD: 25 I'm assuming the log'ical' steps, without the influence GODFREY & AHES COURT REPORTING , l
'He,tro 469 ,6100,.(817) 460-2048 oo -
l
- -n ummense mru ex.h A.:1 *. m z. w.T M 1- A .N N A-**2
- c j . .
67 1 l - 1 factor.
$C
. 2 HR. PHILLIPS: .That was the requirement. 8 j . 3 MR. HUBBARD: That was the requirement.
4 MS. GARDE: He should have passed the test.
~
5 MR. HUBBARD: It be became a pipe welder, he j 6 should have passed it. l l 1 l j 7 MS. GARDE: And that procedure isn't dependable if ; 1 8 somebody's circumventing it. I 9 MR. HUBBARD: Well, what I'm trying to do is to 10 make sure I'm looking in all the spots. If I'm looking i 11 up checking this fellow, I'll see if he passed the pipe 12 test on paper. 13 Well, I don't know. Aft'er he
- :r.:: .
14 left me,. I was there through with him. 15 MR. HUBB RD: Pardon? 16
~} When he once left me and went 17 back to school, I didn't have anything --
18 MR. HUBBARD: He didn't come back to you as a 19 plate welder? 20 No. 21 MS., GARDE: Have we located this weekend in time?
'22 , how close can we get it?
~
'23 Okay. You can -- all you' have to 7>J 24 do is pull his~name,' find out when he was transferred, 25 and that would be_the week, GODFRET & AMES COURT REPORTING'
~
Metro 469-6100 (817) 460-2048 ! mma.mm m .w .. . . +,..c . . . .
r- . . .
~-
- l,
'ff,
, 68 I MS. GARDE: Okay.
1 s 2 MR. HUBBARD: I have nothing el'se on that. i 3 MR. POSLUSNY: Did we summarize what our position 4 , was that on that allegation, the way you addressed it 5 then? 6 MR. HUBBARD: Well, I found that there was a 7 system in place, which was available for qualifying new 8 welders, or welders being requalified. And that the 9 system did effectively control the proper use of
~
1E qualified welders on the job site. 11 / Well, if everybody on the job 12 site went by the papers and. procedures, we would have a ; p' t.
. _ 13' good job today. ;.;
. v, , 39.yy j;39.,
. sy - .n ,.e .n .
.c ..
. , 14-MS. GARDE: You didn't s.ttempt to determine i
e . 15 whether or not the procedures were actually followed? - 16 MR.. HUBBARD: I took a very limited sample to see 17 if the system was there. And I took one veld, had four I 18 welders on it, and I just tracked that back through to 19 see that they had all qualified, to see if they were 20 all on the daily -- the weekly lists and so on. 21 .But I didn't make any attempt to make a QA type 22 analysis of a hundred. welders or 1 hundred welds, no, I 23 did not.
~
~
24- MS. GARDE: Okay. {~ ~ 25 MR. POSLUSNY: So you. understand how he came to GODFREY & AMES COURT REPORTING
- l Metro 469-6100, (817) 460-2048 w:: : -
m m m m r mu,aw meme-
~
- C 69
. 1. his position?
~
- 2 HR. HUBBARD: There was a very narrow --
3 MS. GARDE: Right. I think we agree with you on 4 the establishment of the procedures. Where we disagree h 1 . i 5 and where -- I have in my notes that you're going to go 6 back and check the incident, and
.' 7 refer the undue influence to OI in terms of the !
I 8 specific incident raised? And we don't 1 l ,
! 9 disagree with t'he procedural conclusions.
l
! 10 HR. HUBBARD: Okay. The second~one, and this --
l 11 there's -- I have two, and they relate to the same 12 thing.. They were.different. First is AQW-15, category 71 ' 30,. and AQW-47, category 14. _; 13 14 Now this one has to do _with the condenser,. which 15 I.must preface the conversation here by the fact that 16 it is not a safety related item. And so therefore 17 there is -- there will be no safety significance to the 18 findings. . l 19 And we normally would not have investigated this 20 condition because it is not safety related. But I 21 looked at part of iti because I felt that_it might give 22 us some indication of perhaps how receiving material is 23 handled. You may recall, {ithadtodowithsome
- ~~l
,J 24 condenser supports sheets that came in.
! 25 And you had gone down to the receiving yard and
-GODFREY & AMES COURT. REPORTING Metro 469-6100 (817) 460-2048
_ _1 -
# #M %C. $26#X2Rr/M 3 Metat.7 . '4.- ir c.wwm % ,am. .. ,c ,,,gs v , , , ,s m % , n
- veeav vannt:amazz.:rmh-r~ e.emy,%anwg -
-l..:'K>~
70 1 looked at them, and had put some dowel bins in the 1 2 holes, and found that in your estimation, the holes 3 were not in alignment, and so you were concerned about 4 ,t heir installation and how they had been received.and 5 so on. 6 One of the s problems dealing with non-safety 7 related equipment is that it doesn't fall under 10 CFR 8 50, and the records are not available, receiving 9 records are not available, as other records. 10 And so I had.to do some searcing around. And I 11 tracked back through vendor shop inspections to see 12 what type of work I could. find, what had been done on M the condenser tube support sheets at the vendor shop in LJ - 13 14 terms of lining up the holes. I couldn't find too 15 auch. I found that they had been inspected. There had 16 been some no-go gauges used there. 17 And I also found that they had been shipped 18 together in units of ten, with plastic on there, 19 strapped, as I recall, together. But there was no real 20 effort to keep the holes aligned, like you might want 21 to, if it was erected. 1 22 So I tracked them back to receiving inspection. 23 and I got hold of the millwright superintendent, who
! 24 I -- he told me was there -during receiving inspection, 1 6 . 1
~
25 at some of the time, he watched them being unloaded,
)
GODFREY & AMES COURT REPORTING ; Metro 469-6100, (817) 460-2048 , p M eY M$ds M - - - -- M.N.E M kN,'M$NM M.M d%e$ge&'b9 W VU O#gndp%
ij 9Y . y y.'
- C, 71 d q
I - 1 and'was interested in.their -- supervise th'eir , { 2 installation, welding and installation. . 3 And he indicated, and -- that -- and, again, I 4 have to go by what people tell me on some of these 1 5 things. He indicated that there was no reason for j 6 them, or no reason for you, to do what you did, to try 7 to line up the holes, and check them as they were 8 received. That the primary purpose of any inspection 9 during receiving was to just check for shipping damage 10 that might have occurred. 11- Okay Right now, the reason we 12 was checking.them, we didn't check them as we received O We- checked them- before we- installed, because we Lu 13 them. 14 found some of them didn't even have holes drilled in 15 them. You have got to have-an equal amount of holes in . . 1 them, you can't push your tubes through. Okay. As we
; 16 ;. 17 was pinning them, we, when we would stack them on top 18 of each other, and we could look through and find out 19 which ones didn't have holes or not, because you could 20 see through the hole, and you oculd see that one below it don't have a hole.
21 22 Okay. When we laid them on top of -each other, lookins for the holes to drill, we found out that they 23 24 was about'three inches off,- the holes were-off, you {"~ 25 know, certain parts of it, put four pins in here, and
. GODFREY & AMES COURT REPORTING ,
Metro 469-6100 (817)'460-2048
+ .e o . .. v
. W
}~'. c ( a
? ]C, 72 i '. .
l 1 the center would be off. I 2 So he personally, h e's.a liar, called Westinghouse : d
.s
( 3 and had them come in. He was the one that called them '! j j 4 to.- "We have.got.a problem.e see what we want to do E 5 about it." $
- A 6- Westinghouse came in and inspected the sheets, and i 7 said, "Well, we feel that just because there's i
i t 8 three-eighths of an inch off, there's no problem." k b 9' When.you have sheets spaced three foot apart, and 10 you're three-eighths of an inch off, when you go the 1.. E 11 next three foot, you're going to be an inch and half, f 12 Il two inches =off.. When you. pull it back to go through y I i 13 the hole again, you're going- to be this way. You know lj
*.:.,5. p . , : ' ' ' '.
-T~, ,. l 14 what I mean? 4C'.M4f.
t- I I 15 Okay. What it boils down to, the sheets were l 16 off. We called in Westinghouse. These people like to 17 lie to you people, because they think they can play 18 head games with you. It's just that simple. 19 MR. HUBBARD: Well, he said that in, progressing
~
20 further on after, ttmy were welded together and put up 21 in piece, that they had used -- they had inserted the 22 large -- the sleeves that are screwed together, that 23 you slip ahead of the tubes to line up the support I 24 sheets. m s . - . . ,, The o m ,ods ,h.t .,e sc,ewed. GODFREY & AMES COURT REPORTING . Metro 469-6100, (817) 460-2048
~
- .. m _. _ . . . . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . . . , _ , _. " ~ ' - - 2 1 HR. HUBBARD: Yeah, the- solid rods that are ], 1 And you run them in to I
. 2 screwed in sections, I guess. . , ,
t , 3 just get the things lined up before you run a tight !,
.4 wire -~
It was so tight we had to burn
~
5 . 6 them out. Anyway. MR. HUBBARD: He said that they were used to line 7 Now 8 up the plates, after which they were successful. 9 they were successful in inserting the tubes. 10 Let me say this, and I think we can go on to the next subject. You can go down there 11 12 right now, and.we have got certain tubes that's n already been cut out, just. laying in there, you can i a ; 13 , 14-- take them, and get- then out of the way. You can run 15 your piano wire through it, and see the holes are off. 16 It's just that simple. 17, HR HUBBARD: Well, the thing th'en leads to the l 18 next part of the allegation, which was, this was -- had 19 to do with actual rolling of the tubes-in there. 20 Right. 21 MR. HUBBARD: And this -- let se read it to you, 22 because it was done by another individual. But let me 23 read you the conclusion, because it's important.
'.I 24 #To air conform the TRT, they plan to re-tube and i
in 25 replace both the unit one and unit two condensers GODFREY & AMES COURT REPORTING Metro 469-6100, (817)460-2048 _ . ^^ - *'w. P k 2 t <' e - a_ m .a g we. e ,,
. c 1 .
,- 46 74 1
1 the'near future,'due to corrosion conditions -- 2 considerations." So-wipes.out. 3 _ It's not due to corrosion, 4 ~because they was overrolled, the sheets.were busted.
~
5 See that's when I first started getting the problems. _ 6- That's when I reported -- 7 MR. HUBBARD: Whatever, they're replacing it, so 8 the-safety significance of it all goes -- 9 They're replacing it, because 10 everything I said is true, the thing was a totally 11 disaster. You don't dr'ive tubes in with sledge 12 hammers. You.use nr air hammer on copper nickel. The LJ 13 tube. sheets was spli{.. ~ - . 14 Just the biggest mess I ever seen. When I first
~
15 started getting trouble with these people, is when I 16 reported the tube' sheets being cracked. That was back 17 in 8 79 or '80. 18 From that point on, I had people on my butt all 19 the time. Because nobody wanted to admit the tube 20 sheets were cracked. It's just that simple. And 21 they're cracked right.now. Andthak'sthereason 2.2 they're replacing all that stuff, is because it's a 23 hunk of junk. . W.. . 24 MS. GARDE: Is that you said to TUAC to your , 25 response in identification of this problem, or. GODFREY & AMES COURT REPORTING Metro 469-6100, (817) 460-2048 - - - - -- _ _ _ _ _ - - .--- _m._,,,~__.m.mraum_..._. ~.
,w . . atw_u mi o-rg.n.me~ . - ec u e.gw;gg;weiwe-' -
- i, . ;.7 - .
c-_ -: ,
.s- ,
C 75
~
1 independently? , l 2 MR. HUBBARD: This was a decision done-3 independently. 4 - MS. GARDE: And when did they make this decision? 5 MR. HUBBARD: Let me see if I have it. No. There 6 is no date. 7 MR. PHILLIPS: I think the decision was made the
~
8 summer of '84v . 9 MR, MASTERSON: Didn't that happen at some other 10 plants, and that was the major reason? I think I 11 recall -- 12-That was in Florida probably.
"U 13
~
Westinghouse sat right there and said we- have a plant
~
.V '. . .; l - "'
} ,
. 14 in Florida. 'We- did the- same intergrooving sheet. We 15 have no problem whatsoever. 'Since then, I hear'd they
~
16 replaced the whole outfit. ! 17 .MR. HUBBARD: Well, we were told it was due to i 18 corrosion considerations, that they we'e r both going to 19 he replaced. 20 ___Due to -- anyway. 21 MR. POSLUSNY: So does the'probles go away -- 22 MR. PHILLIPS: I looked into that issue also. And 23 that's correct. The reason -- reasoning behind 24 re-tubing, and they will be re-tubing unit one and un"it 25 two, is to protect the steam generators. It's just a i GODFREY & AMES COURT REPORTING : s . . Metro 469-6100, (817) 460-2048 l
= _ _ _ .. _ _ ,. _ _ . _. - _ ~ -. _ - _ . - _ _ - - . - - - --
s ,' '
~
k 76 1' corrosion consideration. Again --
~
. 2 K perfect roll, when you get 3 through rolfing a. tube, inside diameter point, 69. We i i
4 ,ot g some of them .091. Just terribly overrolled. . We !
. 5 busted everything. It's just a -- people didn't know _
/
6 what they was doing.. t 7 MS. GARDE: Is it the NRC's position that whether i 8 they're;overrolled or not is no safety significance? l t l 9 MR. PHILLIPS: There will not be any safety ! I , 10 significance. However, somehow again, we looked at i 11 this particular item that the mechanical team was I 12 looking at. , l pd i _ 13 .And.ve-found that.. yes, there were -- our bottom
. . . - sg . . . -
-s .
l 14 line will be, yes, there were installation problems. 15 They said that there were.- We'll have -- if you want i 16 to wait until I give -- have mine, that will be 17 tomorrow afternoon, I'll give you the specifics. t 18 But the bottom line is, yes, they did have some 19 fabr.ication problems up front. So in part your 20 allegation is true. 21 And the fact that they're going to change 22 materials, that's also something that's going to 23 happen. But that's for a di,fferent consideration. Now 24 f{~} -the testing, the' bottom line that'I'll be giving 25 tomorrow, is that.the testing proved that, even though GODFREY & AMES COURT' REPORTING Metro 469-6100, (817)460-2048 ww o e-w
~ ~'
" .-.---...,g
- j. :7 ; .-y- _
-l
' ' ~
-l 6 77 1
. I they did.have some fabrication problems and so-forth, s 2 they,.in process, did. correct the problems eventually. #
~
3 And the leakage tests and so forth showed that the 4- condenser is adequately constructed for commercial 5 considerations adequate to do the job. And beings that 6-it does not have any safety relate'd function performed,
~
7 then we are going to -- we turned that over to him for 8 commercial considerations and nothing further. 9
'The reason that we took the tube 10 sheets off the condenser to start off with, and took 11 the ones from unit two, and had them intergrooved and 12 put on unit one, is because the steam generator and the Pi
.. 13 condensers didn't jive with each another, on account of materiall But Westinghouse came in there and
.. 14 15 intergrooved the sheets._ Said it.would hold more 16 pressure in between, so we can get the water leakage 17 into it. '
18 The steam generator for containment two was 19 supposed to have been built for the condensers. The 20 reason they weren't built for the condensers on 21 oontainment one because they built the steam generators t 22 before the the condensers asse in. 23 That's not the reason they're doing it. That 24 might be the reason they're telling you that. But 25 that's the whole; idesof spending:them hundreds of GODFREY & AMES COURT REPORTING Metro 469-6100, (817)l460-2048 ,
....w.-,...-
s .- . ,2 , 1 Y. * ' k 78 so 1 thousands'or dollars.of g'rooving those tube sheets, i 2 that we could use it.' We took th'e tube sheets.from l intergrooved them, and put them on unit one. 3, unit two, 4 , MR. PHILLIPS: Well, we have -- we do have test 5~ results and sorrespondence that indicates that the 6 bottom line tests results was that the present 7 condenser, as constructed, is sufficient for commercial 8 considerations. 9
. However, they intend not to immediately replace A year or two f 10 it. This is somewhere down the line.
11 years, whatever. 12' _ Unit one or unit.two?' a
- J 13 HR. PHILLIP5:. I. would. have to get specifics to .
Both. units, as I understand 14 give you that. answer.. 15 eventually they will replace the tubes. Did anybody look at the cracked 16 3 17 tube sheets? 18 HR. PHILLIPS: Well, one question I would like to 19 ask you, I would have looked to ha,ve asked you during 20 the time we were doing the inspection, we had someone 21 who triedito look just from certain positions, how 22' would you get up into the area at this point in time to - do a real detailed inspection? We found it so I 23 congested that -- 24
~
I l You can open - you have got -- 25 GODFREY & AMES COURT REPORTING Hetro 469-6'100, (817) 460-2048 _.__ _ _ __ _
.m .
- A Y
ON%We4N8M4% mig-Migi.,gg
- - - - - - - ee.n. ,. _.;- ews-. r m, . _,_ _ . ,
I '[ * *.e,"
* ~~ / :- .y ,,
l' HR.:PHILLIPS: Unless you reopened the-thing.
'Teah. Just take -- you have got 2
3 four bolts on the manhole. Open up that up, and lay 4 ,you a booring on your pipe, and take a crescent wretch. You have got two rubber plugs in there. Just 5 6- unscrew them and pull them out, and you can see. You 7 would have to get somebody a scaffold to go up to the 8 water box. 9 MR. PHILLIPS: I know the engineer did look at 10 the areaa But his ability to.get into.the area was -- 11 they- would have- had to have done some special thing.5.
' An& by virtue of the fact that it was a ocin.ercial q
12 i 1 -11 , iteme . we did not ask' them: to do that. - .
.. .,m.,_
14 S'; . Well,. I got QC, after everybody tried to convinced me it worked now, the crack. Stick 15
- 16. your fingernail through it.. I got QC to come down and 17 run,a test. Anyway, it's an un-Q, but they also run a 18 PT on it, and verified it was cracked..
19 MR. PHILLIPS: We're not saying that condition -- 20 we didn't find that condition.- We're not saying that 21 we did a detailed inspection. If we got up very close 22 ito it, maybe we would see what you're talking a' bout. 23 MS. GARDE: But what you are saying is, even if I' 24 there were cracked tube sheets, it doesn't matter to because it has nothing to do with'the potential
~
25 you, GODFRET & AMES COURT' REPORTING , Metro 469-6100, (817) 460-2048 .
)
y+r, . 3 "g -
'fCL 80 i meltdown or' serious accident?
?
2 MR. PHILLIPS: T' hat's correct. 3 .MS.. GARDE: It only has to do with actual 4 . production of power. . 5 iMR. PHILLIPS: That's correct. 6 'MS. GARDE: And they're replacing the stuff 7 anyway, so don't. worry about it. 8 HR. PHILLIPS: That's the bottom line. 9 Somewheres down the line? Eight 17 years, ten years.from now.somewheres? 11 HR 7 PHILLIPS: They're -- I think they're planning
. 12' on next -- well, I'_d rather get the specifics, rather 7
'J
_ 13 than to guess. " But it's relatively soon. Year, two
' ; - r' - - ;y k.~ . . . - ' =
14- years, three years, that they would be -- - l ,i 15 'MS~. . GARDE At first fuel load or something? 16 ' The one we built in North 17 Carolina, the tubes were leaking, where we got no 1 18 line. And they allowed it to run for eight years with 19 tubes licking. They had to take sawdust, and pour the 20 intake. And your radiation level was so high on turbin 21 deck, 'you had press out, jus.t like inside the - 22 containment. l 23 But yet they allowed the plant to operate for 24 eight years with-holes in the condensers, you know. {' l 25 .MR. PHILLIPS: What' type of unit was that over l l GODFREY & AMES COURT REPORTING
~
, Metro 469-6100 (817) 460-2048 ?
t --__-_ _ - _ - - - - - - _ - . - - I MM '. M dI$ b E5t'ES P M 5-d$? $ $ C$ b Y N b N N
P . . , .. .
. - 3 81 I;
, . .. o
- .y d 1
there7/ '
'2 It was a water vault. ,
MR. PHILLIPS: See that's a totally different -- 3 4- bottom water reactor, you mean?
~
Yeah. But they're more dangerous 5 f 6 than pressure vessels because your radiation leaks into The pressure 7 the reactor, and,goes to you turbin data. 8 vessel stays inside your container. MR. PHILLIPS:- see, the thing of it is though, 9 10 your BWR is a. totally different concept in terms of 11 your primary coolant. Your primary coolant goes all I mean through 12 the way down to your isolation valves.
~ .
D . 13 your- steam theree 2 .a . In 14
- Tou have- an isolation, your primary.
secondary isolation and.'BWR, you don't have: that same
-15 16 situation. -
MR. POSLUSNY: I think we're going a little 17 18 beyond what we need to. s 19 MR. HUBBARD: Yeah, thate s all I'have to say. t Okay. 20 ( 21 MR. POSLUSNY: Yeah. It's' Bob's turn. MR. MASTERSON: Okay, I had three concerns. fj 22 I ,' 23 The first one is allegation number AH-5, mechanical and d 24 piping category number 15. fi [} - And it was concerned.was that there were E 25 -
?
1 GODFREY & AMES COURT REPORTI.NG Metro 469-6100, (817) 460-2048 __L___._--==.___._==._-=_-=_-________ I
- - - - - - am m.m me
. ~. - .. . . . . . . . . . . .
~ '
.s .
C 1 v
- * }y l.
I e% UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ,: h /, / 2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION [/, I j-/ TECHNICAL REVIEW TEAM
- O 3 -
"pi i t Ri.T M - s. :.a.;DOn,t
;, ,o. .u r' >N".>.g 1 4
4 i 5 TECHNICAL INTERVIEW G 6 - 7 . t 8 Wednesday, August 8, 1984 St'ephenville, Texas ' 9 10 This interview was commenced at 1:15 p.m. i l l 11 ! l 12 PRESENT: s _ i 13 MR. DICK 5fESSMAN, Technical Review Team Staff . Nuclear kegulatory Commission ! 14 Washington,ND.C. 20555 i , V i MR. ROBERT HUBBARD, Technical Review Team Staff i 15 Nuclear Regulat'ory Commission I 16 Washington, D.C. 20555 g7 MR. VERN WATSON, Technical Review Team Staff Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 18 20 ALSO PRESENT: Mr. Eloy Gaitin y 23 rn ~. ,"n.:
~
s y y7.s s.. .w. . . :e . - u. . I I 25 FCIA-85-59 4
i' '].* N C, 36. j procedure. 2 MR. WESSMAN: Do you have any NCR numbers that you 3 can give us where you feel that
,. had an inexperienced-4
, inspector sign off?
5- 7 _ , No. Not now. I think I've given you -- 6 unless you want to pursue NCR's anymore. 7 MR. WESSMAN: No. I'm ready to leave NCR's. l Good. 9 uJo MR. WESSMAN: Let's talk about some of the documents 10
. j ., , that you are prepared to share with us at this time, @on3 II And if you would, describe the documents that you brought I
for us, what the issue is that they relate to, and what, 13 in your viewpoint, appears to be improperly done.
" ~
Okay. This is a hanger that goes , 15 through a penetration. 16 MR. WESSMAN: You say a hanger for a penetration? Yeah. In a penetration, going from the
~~ I auxiliary building into the reactor.
, ,.g 2 Mk. WESSMAN: Okay. Go ahead and keep describing 20 what it-is that we're talking about then.
. 21 ~
,.g This is the case whereas when I went to 22
, ) .,
inspect this hanger, it was on a class II item, the iso 23 number is SI20734'OlS32R rev 0, and there are CMC's involved, 24 but the rest of the information will be in the folder in S
. the package in the vault. Okay. Piece number 5, on a final
- i
37, s' ,.
- I incpection, there was no heat number. You have to verify
. 2 heat number for traceability. I pointed it out that there 3 was no heat number, and therefore, I would not, at this 4 time, until I did some research, sign it off. So, the 5 general foreman -- by the way, had come from the
.: 6 crafts and I came from the crafts, and it was kind of
- 7 hard for me to change my ways. Now, as soon as they get 8 a foreman or a general foreman over there and get over 9 there and start talking, it's, " Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, 1! 10 yeah." This happened. The general foreman come over and
~
11 he started giving me excuses why there was no heat number. 12 So, I said, "Well, I don't care why there is no heat 13 number. I cannot, in ala. honesty, sign this off until , 14 I go to the vault and start looking to see if we can 15 make it believable; make it traceable." I went to the 16 vault, and as I stated, this is item number five. In 17 the vault, all I could find was that they had shipped two
,.3
'. 18 item number,six's, an item number two and an item number 91 I9 three. There is nothing on the job site in the vault or
- m. 20 in the receiving inspection records that showed that this
.. 21 item ever arrived on the job site, so I came back and I
.. U said, "Well, I'm sorry fellows, but that's the way it is."
l l 23 So, they said, "No. They made a mistake. One of these l 24 two item number six's is actually item number five." I 25 said, "Well, I can't help that. There is no traceability 1 N lTJTEdMEM
' ~'
1c 38. that says that this is item number five." So, off goes a general foreman and this again and they start talking in the corner, and the last thing I heard i 4 say was, "I'll take care of it." Okay. So, they come i _back and there's a heat number on there and it reads on ,_ i 6 the MIL, H30 3 8 2, and ther)., it says it's vendor item , y lined through, dated and initialled. 3 MR. HUBBARD: Do you have it there? The document? That's the MIL. handed j
- . 10 document to Mr. Hubbard.)
MR. HUBBARD: Okay. We're up here where it's marked 12 '
over, item number five. Item number five. That's correct. - MR. HUBBARD: Vendor item -- Oh, it had originally ! l 15 been marked vendor item, and then, it had been marked ! l through and this number written on there.
' Well, that's stating that, "Okay.
4 18 l- So, there's a possibility that they made one in the ! t. 19 fabrication shop." i . '. 20 MR. HUBBARD: Oh, I see. Except for one thing. They had a 22 request to the warehouse for parts of a hanger, that said, 23 "Below to be filled out by warehouse A." Okay? So, - i l 24 they listed different parts and they listed part number j 25 five, and for a heat number, it says, "NA vendor supply." l
~
.+ -_ __ -__ - __ _ _ _ _ _
-~
[ I qualifications are, but you're familiar with the vendor 2 way of doing things, and you do have a vendor heat numbe r . 3 It could be a V. It could be a combination of different things. speakin~g to Mr. Watson.) MR. WATSON: Yes. 6 c-( MR. WESSMAN: Okay. Is there anything about this 7 pack of documents that you want to share with us or 8 either of you folks want to ask g 9 MR. HUBBARD: I understand what 'has been talking 10
. about.
In other words, I've just given you a, 12 couple of examples of how things ~have been running and 13 I've been saying, "No. I won't do it," and they're saying, 14 "Well, that's fine. Okay. We'll just go around you." MR. WESS N : do you have some other examples 16 that you want to-share with us at this time of where the -- 17 either on handling of NCR's or relating to the inspection? Yeah. I'll share one more with you. 19 In unit one, you have a vertical heat exchanger. It's a 20 l Very large one. It extends from elevation 790 to approximately 93
~
8 something. Okay? Down in 790, it starts in one of those 99
'~
little rooms, you know, that comes through the floor.
'3
~
MR. WESSMAN: Would this be one of the big steam 24 generators? There's four big steam generators. Is this 25 one of these four big steam generators, when you say vertica:
4C i:' 44. probably some day say "yes" or "no". MR. WESSMAN: Can I borrow that for a minute? handed Mr. Wessman document.) In summary, I think, 4 if we understand you -- if I understand what you're describ-: , 5 ing with the packet of papers that you are offering to us is': We have an installed hanger. There is scme documenta- ' 7
. tion that indicates it should have been a vendor supplied 8
part. There is confusion in the numbers on the material 9 -
. tracer. At one time, there was no heat number on the 10
. piece number 5 in the plant, and subsequently, a heat ,
t I 11 number has appeared on piece number 5 in the plant. And . 12 i some QC inspector signed off an inspection form, indicating j 13 ; that that heat number had then been transferred to piece I 14 number 5. He's right. But actually the heat 16 number, according to the paper work, that he claimed, was j l 17 actually on piece number 6.
- c. ! 13 MR. WESSMAN: So, it appears an incorrect heat number t9 l was put on a piece and the heat number should never have
- ..S 20 been put on that piece in the first place.
Right. MR. WESSMAN: Okay. I think we have a reasonable 23 understanding.of it. Let us -- l
]Thisgentlemanoverhere--Didyousay I
95 l you are far$iliar with QA procedures? I don't know what yourg s
- ~ ~ ' ' -
9 t qc
- 43. !
5734NF, 84, 83. ; MR. WESSMAN: So, this individual, based upon this a 3 piece of paper, was supposed to have verified that this 4 heat number was transferred onto item 5? Yeah. 6 MR. WESSMAN: Which originally was supposed to be a 7 vendor supplied item. 8 Yeah. - MR. WESSMAN: Which originally had no heat number 10 on it at all when you inspected it.
]
It would have a -- No. It didn't have i 12 no heat number visible at all. 13 U. MR. HUBBARD: Now, is this heat number either one )
' t 14 of the two shown as item 6 on the other paper?
i q -; Yeah. But it's shown as the second
}
item 6. The one that could have been the mistake and 17 - been an item 5 would be an 8391NF. . 18 . MR. HUBBARD: Was there a heat number on item 6 19 on the hanger that you observed? I', I forget. I've inspected so doggone
'l
~ I many things on -- As an inspector on two nuclear power l
on
~~
plants and as a craftsman on three, so -- j . 23 MR. WESSMAN: I understand. i 3 5 4 I can't tell you that because I don't
'S
~ I know. I guess if I sit here and search my mind, I could j i
1
'o I
f 1
42. So, they got some poor 'ol inspector 2 that wasn't too bright, and'he says here -- as soon as I .. 3 find it. They also gave him a hard time and sent him on
,the road. He quit. is looking through papers.)
MR. W5SSMAN: Who is this? The' poor little inspector? Yeah. He wasn't too bright. 7 MR. WESSMAN: Do we know who this guy is? l 1 I'll let you know in a second. . M is fumbling through documents.) 10 MR. WESSMAN: Okay. MR. WESSMAN: is this inexperienced ,. inspector? Yeah. In this package, you'll find -- la
, I've got it around the house here someplace -- where he 16 identifies a heat number as being 5734NF. Now, you've got 17 to remember-there is an ite,m 6 on here, but not this item t >
18 we're talking about and the heat number we're talking about 19 is item 6, so it's in a different location on the drawing.
.r. 20 MR. WESSMAN: 'Okay. Now, you're reading from the 21 aaterial identification log; is that right? ~
Right. And the verification right 23 : here. (Referring to log.) l 94 MR. HUBBARD: Verifying. heat number transfer of l. '. ,5 item 5 -- then, where do I read?
1C 41. . k}$ 1 Y vendor supplied." So, once agai'n -- 3 2 MR. WESSMAN: So, here's a second piece of paper that 3 b# appears to confirm that it was a vendor supplied item. 8' However, it doesn't show up as being on ) 5 the job site. at this particular time, and is already 6 welded in place is item 2, item 3, and two item 6's. EE MR. WESSMAN: Do we know what happened on these two N 8 item 6's? Is it possible it's a genuine typo and we're 9 scrambling around because of a typo or is there something t 10 subtler that we don't understand? p What we're saying is that we can't prove 12 or I could not sign a document stating that that item % y w 13 4 came from the vendor onto the job site and was used in g
' -st 14 that particular place. There is no way I could sign -- M M
15 nor could anybody else because it doesn't exist paper work r-j 16 wise. However, on an inspection report, the multiple weld 5M 17 M-- data card, you'11 notice there's two item number 6's, 18 two different heat numbers. If there was a mistake, it $ 19 would be that the top one would be item number 5 and the 20 bottom would be item number 6.
'l MR. WESSMAN: Possible. Yes. Sounds like it should oo 3*
~~
go that way, w Chronological order; two, three, five, . 4 six. ,
'S
~
MR. WESSMAN: I agree, 'g-3i+ (4 3 l- 55 ,
O 40. I had ever arrived on the job site.
. 2 MR. HUBBARD: This is the one that you were telling us
. 3 -
earlier where there was one 2, one 3 and two 6's. Right.
~
5 MR. HUBBARD: Now, on the two 6's, there'.s different 6 material. _And two different heat numbers. 8 MR. HUBBARD: What is the 67 and 327 Do you know? 9 What does that mean? Quantity? Rev and item. II MR. HUBBARD: No. See, it says -- Well, it could be quantity and I don't ! 13 know what else. i I MR. HUBBA'RD: Well, this would all be in a file. 15 ( Definitely. Everything that I've shown ; 1 16 you is in a package. MR. WESSMAN: No. But this collection of paper 18 helps us understand what you're talking and it helps us
'! 19 go into the. package, so it's very useful that we keep on O
going through the paper and -- 21 Ask me as many questions as you want. 22 MR. WESSMAN: We're trying. 23 Stay as long as you want. Okay? So, ! 24 they come back with this hanger request for the fab shop: 25 item five is lined out, and item five down here says, "NA
' , - ,- .O 39,
. 1 I
MR. WESSMAN: That sounds to me like that whole part came from the vendor. l Supposedly. But there's a heat number 4 on there. You'll see a heat number on there. There was 5 - no heat number present nowhere on that thing. 6 MR. WESSMAN: There was no heat number on it when you 7 first saw it and you refused to inspect it. No. Because I went to another man; 9 I said, "Come here. I want you to look at this." Because 10 using mirrors and the location that it's at, it's possible 11 that you can miss something in this particular case. 12 And he looked 8.t it thoroughly, and he said, "There is 13 no heat number on this item." 14 MR. HUBBARD: Do you know who that.was? 15
.'_Of course, he will deny 16 it because -- I'll explain to you why,later.
U MR. WESSMAN: Okay. Keep going. 18 So, they came back with a material 19 re_que s t , and they say," Item number five, one and three 20 quarter plate, twelve and a quarter by twelve and a quarter, 21 heat, lot, and serial number, RIR 21236." But.21236: this 22 is the what-you-call-it -- 23 MR. HUBBABD: Receiving' inspection report? 24 Well, that's from MPSI. It says that 25 it was never shipped. You know, there's no proof that they}}