ML20127L909
| ML20127L909 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 01/25/1993 |
| From: | Edgar G NEWMAN & HOLTZINGER, TEXAS UTILITIES ELECTRIC CO. (TU ELECTRIC) |
| To: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| References | |
| CON-#193-13562 OL, NUDOCS 9301280046 | |
| Download: ML20127L909 (41) | |
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DCCKETED t'scaC 1/25/93
'93 Jts 25 P1 :59 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION _
)
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In the Matter of )
Texas Utilities Electric Company ) Docket No. 50-446-pd'
)
(Comanche Peak Steam Electric )
Station, Unit 2) )
)
)
TU ELECTRIC'S RESPONSE TO CFUR'S REQUEST OF JANUARY 13, 1993 On January 13, 1993, Citizens for Fair Utility Regulation (CFUR) submitted a " request for action" (Request),
asking the Commission to issue a notice of hearing on whether an operating license (OL) should be issued for Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (CPSES), Unit 2. As a basis for its request, CFUR raised allegations related to Borg-Warner check valves and Thermo-Lag. In accordance with the Commission's Order dated January 22, 1993, Texas Utilities Electric Company (TU Electric) hereby submits its response to CFUR's Request and urges the Commission to promptly reject it.
CFUR is a former_intervenor in the CPSES OL proceeding.
CFUR withdrew its intervention years'before the proceeding was settled and dismissed. Subsequently, CFUR tried without success to re-intervene in the OL proceeding. It also submitted
' petitions under 10 C.F.R. 5 2.206 requesting the NRC to'take
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actton against CPSES based upon issues related to the Borg-Warner check valves and Thermo-Lag. The NRC denied the petitions' requested relief. Now, literally days before the NRC is scheduled to issue the operating license for CPSES Unit 2, CFUR is requesting Commission action on the very issues which it has unsuccessfully raised in the past.
As is explained in more detail below, CFUR's Request is patently frivolous. More than a decade ago, the NRC took the very action requested by CFUR - - i.e., issuance of a notice of hearing on the CPSES OL proceeding. Furthermore, CFUR's request i obviously does not satisfy the requirements in 10 C.F.R. S 2.206 because it essentially does nothing more than repeat allegations made by CFUR in previous 2.206 petitions that were rejected by the NRC. Specifically, the NRC determined that the matters being l
raised by CFUR do .. c have any substantial safety significance.
In short, CFUR's Request fails to provide any basis whatsoever for Commission action and accordingly, its request should be denied.
1 BACKGROUND On February 28, 1978, an application for operating licenses for CPSES Unita 1 and 2 was filed with the Commission.
On February 5, 1979, the Commission published a notice of opportunity for hearing in the CPSES OL proceeding in the Federal Reaister. (44 Fed. Reg. 6995) (1979). In response to this l
notice, several petitions to intervene were submitted, including
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. petitions by CFUR and Citizens Association for Sound Energy (CASE). The licensing board presiding over the OL proceeding granted these petitions. As a result, a notice of evidentiary hearing was issued on September 23, 1981. (.16 Fed. Reg. 47033)
(1981). CFUR participated in this evidentiary hearing and was a party to the CPSES OL proceeding until it voluntarily withdrew in early 1982. See Order (Following Conference Call), slip op, at 2 (April 2, 1982).
Subsequent to CFUR's withdrawal, hearings in the CPSES OL proceeding continued for several more years. Following lengthy interactions among the NRC Staff, CASE and TU Electric, CASE agreed to settle the proceeding. This settlement was approved by the licensing board, and the proceeding was dismissed on July 13, 1988. See Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-88-18B, 28 NRC l
103 (1988).
! Immediately following the dismissal, CFUR attempted to reopen the OL proceeding by submitting a late petition to intervene. The Commission denied CFUR's untimely petition, and i
l this denial was upheld by the United States Court of Appeals for l
l the Fifth Circuit. See Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-88-12, 28 NRC 605 (1988), aff'd sub nom. Citizens For Fair Utility Reculation
- v. NPC, 898 F.2d 51 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 246 (1990).
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Undeterred, CFUR continued to file further petitions with the NRC. For example, on November 20, 1990, CFUR submitted a petition under 10 C.F.R. 5 2.206 requesting that the NRC institute a proceeding to revoke, modify, or suspend the operating license for CPSES Unit 1. As a basis for this request, CFUR made several allegations regarding the Borg-Warner check I valves installed at CPSES, including allegations regarding failures of the valves, qualification of the internal parts of the valves, adequacy of TU Electric's corrective actions for the i valves, documentation for the valves, and an NRC inspection I
- report of the Borg-Warner facility. The NRC reviewed and i rejected CFUR's petition, concluding that it did not raise any substantial health and safety issues. See Texas Utilities I
Electric Co., (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Unit 1),
DD-91-5, 34 NRC 209 (1991).
Similarly, on August 12, 1992, a group called Nuclear Information and Resource Service (NIRS) submitted an addendum to j its July 21, 1992,-2.206 petition related to Thermo-Lag. This addendum was filed on behalf of L number of groups, including l
CFUR. Among other things, the 2.206 petition and addendum requested a shutdown of CPSES Unit 1 and a halt to construction of CPSES Unit 2, citing for example "five years" of problems with Thermo-Lag at River Bend, a draft NRC Generic Letter dated February 11, 1992, NRC Bulletin 92-01 dated June 24, 1992, and escalated enforcement actions involving Thermo-Lag at CPSES in
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l '1990 and fire watches at CPSES in 1991. On August:19,'1992, the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation issued a letter to NIRS' i
denying emergency relief on the Thermo-Lag issues,ifinding-that-l 1
! they "do not pose an undue risk to the health and safety of the public." 1/
! On January 13, 1993, CFUR submitted its request for-i l hearing on the issuance of the operating license for CPSES Unit l 2. For all intents and purposes, the issues raised in this l Request are identicalLto the issues that CFUR raised in its 2.206-i-
i petitions on the.Borg-Warner check valves and Thermo-L&g that the f
- NRC previously rejected.
I DISCCSSION
! I. The NRC-Has Already Taken the Recuested Action.
l CFUR is requesting that the Commission use 10-C.F.R.
l S 2.104 to issue a notice of hearing regarding issuance of an- -
j -operating license for CPSES. Unit 2. However, the NRC-has already i
issued such a notice.
L As was. discussed above, the:NRC issued a notice of opportunity for! hearing (44 Fed. Red. 6995 (1979)):and a notice
- of evidentiary-hearing (46 Fed.- Reg. 47033 (1981))-related to the CPSES OL proceeding. In fact, CFUR participated.in the hearings-1
! 'that'were held =in response to these notices unt'il-.it voluntarily -
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- . 1/ Letter from Thomas Murley, Director Office of Nuclear.-
4' Reactor Regulation (NRC) to Michael Mariotte (NIRS), dated l Aug. 19, 1992, p. 3.
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, .- .t-L i withdrew its intervention in 1982. Thus,-more than a decade ago, l
! the NRC took the action that is now being requested by CFUR.
! Therefore, CFUR's Request should be denied for this reason alone.
l.
s II. CFUR's Request For Action Does Not Satisfy The-Requiroments Of 10 C.F.R. I 2.206.
i CFUR does not cite any provision of the Commission's I
rules which authorizes the filing of its-Request. Given the 3
nature of CFUR's Request, it is probably best characterized as a request for action under 10 C.F.R. S 2.206. As discussed below, the Request does not satisfy the Commission's standards for-
! granting 2.206 petitions and accordingly should-be denied.
A 2.206 petition-will only be granted if it' raises i " substantial health or safety issues;" a mere dispute over t
factual issues will not suffice, Consolidated' Edison Co. of-New York (Indian Point, Unit No. 1, Unit No. 2,LUnit No. 3),-CLI ,
8, 2 NRC 173, 176 (1975). "The factual basis of the petition should identify new-information regarding_the. issue under consideration." Public Service Co. of Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2),_DD-79-21, 10'NRC 717, 719 (1979). Finally, as the D.C. Circuit stated inl Porter County _
Chacter of the Izaak Walton Leacue of-America; Inc. v. NRC, 606 F.2d 1363, 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1979) in upholding an NRC' decision rejecting a request for hearing submitted under Section 2.206:
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The agency is not bound to launch full-blown proceedings simply because a violation of the statute is claimed. It may properly undertake prelindnary inquiries in order to determine whether the claim is substantial enough under the statute to warrant full proceedings. The appropriate agency official has substantial discretion to decline to initiate proceedings based on this review, at least where, as here, he gives reasons for denying or deferring a hearing.
(footnote omitted).
CFUR has not satisfied any of these standards. All of the information it cites is already known by the NRC. In fact, most of the cited information is contained.in NRC documents that were issued many months, and in some cases many years, ago.
Equally important, the issues CFUR seeks to raise as well as the information upon which it relies were previously addressed by the NRC in response to CFUR's previous 2.206 petitions. 2/
1/ CFUR's Request does raise two issues that were'not discussed in its previous 2.206 petitions. First, CFUR alleges that two Borg-Warner check-valves in the Component Cooling Water System for CPSES Unit 2 failed during preoperational tests.
(Request at 1). As discussed in TU Electric letter TXX-93003 (Jan. 20, 1993) to the NRC, the root causes of the failures were determined, the valves were reworked, and the valves have now been determined to be operating satisfactorily as a result of retests. TU Electric is currently taking action to ensure that other check valves are also operating properly. Second, CFUR alleges that Thermo-Lag was shipped to CPSES with voids and staples in voids. (Request at 2)._ As discussed in TU-Electric _ letters to the NRC (TXX-92589 (Dec. 15, 1992) at 4-6; and TXX-92626 (Dec. 23, 1992), Encl. at 23) CPSES uses visual inspections and weight checks to detect any large internal voids in prefabricated Themmo-Lag panels. CPSES also uses visual inspections to detect delaminations (and staples used to press delaminated material together). CPSES tests of (continued...)
. i The Director's Decision's denying CFUR's 2.20 5 petition regarding Borg-Warner check valves, and the Director's Letter denying the emergency relief requested in NIRS's 2.206 petition, contradict CFUR's claim that these issues are " serious and outstanding issues of safety." 1/ (Request at 1.) The information regarding the Borg-Warner check valves provided by CFUR is essentially the same as the information that was held to be insufficient to support the institution of proceedings as requested by CFUR in its 1990 2.206 petition. After analyzing the information in the 2.206 petition, the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation concluded that no substantial health or safety issue was apparent:
The Staff reviewed the complete text of all nineteen of the documents attached to the Petition as well as many additional documents regarding Borg-Warner check valves at the Comanche Feak Steam Electric Station. The documents relied upon by [CFUR]'in support of the petition were existing NRC and Licensee documents. Based on its entire review, the Staff has not found any substantial health and safety issues that would call into question the continued safe operation-of Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station.
2/( .. continued)
Thermo-Lag provide reasonable assurance that material with undetected delatinations will perform as intended.
3/ No purpose is served by summarizing the Director's technical bases for the findings that the Borg-Warner check valves and the use of Thermo-Lag do not raise significant safety j issues. TU Electric has attached copies of the Director's Decision and Letter which cogently describe the reasons for the decisions, l-I
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. . . no basis exists for taking any action in response to the Petition as no substantial health or safety issues have been raised by
- the Petition.
Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric
- Station, Unit 1), DD-91-5, 34 NRC 209, 227-28 (1991) (emphasis 4
added).
Similarly, the concerns regarding the use of Thermo-Lag i
in the July 21, 1992, 2.206 petition and the August 12, 1992,
! addendum were found to be insufficient to warrant the emergency relief. The Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation concluded i
that these concerns do not pose a substantial safety issue: A/
, The licensee can compensate for weaknesses found in one area by enhancing the protection
- capabilities in the remaining areas. ...
! Recent fire endurance testing ... confirmed that certain Thermo-Lag fire barrier i configurations compromise one-facet of the fire protection " defense-in-depth". The licensees established fire watches.as a compensatory measure. ... Such actions constitute compliance with overall NRC fire protection requirements, provide an adequate
- level of protection, and do not oose an undue i
risk to the health and safety of the public.
The NRC Staff has concluded that-the immediate suspensions of the operating licenses for River Bend Station,. Comanche Peak Unit 1, Shearon Harris, Fermi-2, Ginna, WNP-2, and Robinson facilities are not warranted. The NRC Staff also determined l
4/ Letter from Thomas E. Murley, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRC) to Michael Mariotte (NIRS), dated 4
Aug. 19, 1992, pp. 3, 6.
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} i j that the issuance of a "stop-work" order:or.
L the suspension of'the construction permit for ;
- Comanche Peak Unit 2 is not warranted. The l
NRC staff will, in the near future, issue the.
generic letter mentioned in the Petition. ... ;
1 i (T]he request to accelerate the issuance of
! the generic letter is not deemed'necessary.
j Accordingly the request for emergency relief 7 is denied. 1/ '
i In summary, CFUR's claim that there~are significant
! outstanding safety issues relating to the Borg-Warner check;
! valves or the use of Thermo-Lag is plainly meritless. The NRC i
i has alrecdy fully and thoughtfully considered each of these 4 - .
l issues and concluded that neither raises any undue risk to the
! health and safety of the public. CFUR's request that the l
Commission take further action should therefore be denied, and j
l CFUR's letter should be referred to the NRC Staff for its l consideration as the Staff completes its review of CFUR's 2.206
- petition relating to Thermo-Lag. 6/ .
I l-
! 5/ On December 17, 1992, the NRC issued Generic Letter 92-08, entitled "Thermo-Lag 330-1 Fire-Barriers."' 1N Electric l provided the NRC with a response for CPSES Unit 2 in letter
! TXX-93038 (Jan. 19, 1993). The' response concluded:that the L
Thermo-Lag fire barrier systems installed in CPSES Unit 2-
! are qualified based upon the fire endurance tests and evaluations described in TU Electric letters TXX-92626
-(Dec. 23, 1992) and TXX-93023 (Jan.-19, 1993).
6/ No' plausible argument could be made that CFUR's Request e should be considered a motion to reopen the record in the-l CPSES OL proceeding under-10 C.F.R. S 2.734(a). In order to -,
meet the requirements.of S-2.734(a), .the moving party shoulders a-heavy burden to demonstrate that its motion:
(1) is timely;- (2) involves a_ significant - saf ety -issue; Land; (3) offers evidence that would lead to a materially.
different result. Kansas Gas and Electric Co. (Wolf Creek (continued...)
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CONCLUSION
- More than a decade ago, the NRC issued a notice of-i hearing on the.CPSES OL proceeding, and CFUR participated in 4
l those hearings until it voluntarily withdrew from'the proceeding.
i
[ CFUR's current request is nothing more'than a thinly veiled' i
- attempt to avoid the consequences of its action. ~The request s fails to raise.any issue worthy of consideration by the l Commission and it should, therefore,. be denied.
1
- -Respectfully submitted, i
l s' i
{ Robert A. Wooldridge,-Esq. Georgeg'.Edgfr
{ .Worsham, Forsythe, Sampels & Thom W A. Schm z
' Wooldridge Steven P. Frantz 2001 Bryan Tower Paul J. Zaffuts
, Suite 3200 Newman & Holtzinger, P.C.
j Dallas, TX 75201 1615 L. St, N.W.
i (214) 979-3000 Washington, D.C. 20036 l (202) 955-6600 i Attorneys for TU Electric p
January.25, 1993
[
! 6/(... continued)
. Generating Station, Unit No. 1), ALAB-462, 7 NRC-320, 338
- (1978); Louisiana Power & Licht Co. (Waterford-Steam
!- Electric.-Station,--Unit 3), CLI-86-1, 23 NRC 1 (1986). .CFUR-
- j. cannot meet any of these requirements. The issues it seeks' i to. raise and the supporting information are not new and thus i its request is not timely. Nor can any argument be madeE .
! that the request ~ involves a'significant safety issue. The--
- j. NRC has1already concluded directly to the contrary.
j Finally, in. light of the NRC's previous conclusion thatsthe Borg-Warner check valves and the use c2 Thermo-Lag.do not ,
. involve any significant safety issues, it clearly follows ;
that! the-information CFUR seeks to introduce into the. record-3 would not cause a different result in the OL proceeding for 1- CPSES Unit 2.
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- UNITED STATES OF AMERICA f NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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l In the Matter of )
} Docket No. 50-446-OL j Texas Utilities Electric Company )
I )
4 (Comanche Peak Steam Electric )
4 Station, Unit 2) )
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 1 '
I hereby certify that copies of TU Electric's Response i To CFUR's Request of January 13, 1993 were served upon the j following persons by deposit in the United States Mail ~(except as indicated below), postage prepaid and properly addressed, on the
, date shown below:
2 i Office of the Secretary
- i U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention
- Chief, Docketing and Service Section (Original Plus Two Copies)
Thomas E. Murley, Director i Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
! U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Charles Mullins l'
Office of the General Counsel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-Marian L. Zobler, Esq.
Office of the General Counsel l U.S.' Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555
!
- Served by Hand t
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l Betty Brink Board Merber Citizens for Fair Utility Regulation 7600 Anglin Drive Fort Worth, TX 76140 Dated this 25th day of January, 1993.
ls Isaul {/ (6ffujs Newman & Holtzinger, P.C.
Suite 1000 1615 1 Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 955-6600
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- + c, UNITED STATES l y s .r. ( i NUCLE AR REGULATORY COMMISSION C C
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/ ,Aug.ust_19, 1992 -' -
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(10 CFR 2.206) .c , ,,
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i Mr. Michael Mariotte l Executive Director Nuclear Information and Resource Service Suite 601 1424 16th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
Dear Mr. Mariotte:
i I am writing to acknowledge receiving a Petition filed by you on behalf of the t
Nuclear Information and Resource Service and other organizations (Petitioners) with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) dated July 21, 1992, as supplemented by the addenda of August 12, 1992, pursuant to Section 2.206 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Reoulations (10 CFR 2.206). Joining with the Nuclear Information and Resources Service in filing the Petition are the Alliance for Affordable Energy, Citizens Organized to Protect our Parish,
' Citizens for Fair Utility Regulation, Don't Waste New York, Citizens Against Radioactive Dumping, Coalition _for Alternatives to Shearon Harris, Conserva-l tion Council for North Carolina, Safe Energy Coalition of Michigan, Steve Langdon, Essex County Citizens Against Fermi-2, Natural Guard, and Northwest l- Environmental Advocates. The original Petition presented concerns regarding I
the use of Thermo-Lag 330 (Thermo-Lag) fire barrier material for protecting against fire in the nuclear industry and requested immediate actions related
} to Gulf States Utilities' River Bend Station. The addenda of August 12, 1992, requested immediate actions related to the Comanche Peak, Shearon Harris,
} Fermi-2, Ginna, WNP-2 and Robinson nuclear facilities. The Petition has been
! referred to my office for preparation of a response.
1 The Petition alleged a number of deficiencies with Thermo-Lag material including f ailure of Thermo-Lag fire barriers during 1- and 3-hour fire endurance tests, deficiencies in procedures for installation, nonconformance with NRC regulations for quality assurance and qualification tests, the combustibility of the material, ampacity miscalculations, the lack of seismic d tests, the failure to pass hose stream tests, the high toxicity of substances i emitted from the ignited material, and the declaration by at least one utility, the Gulf States Utilities Company (GSU) of the material as inoperable I
at its River Bend Station. The Petition also alleged that a fire watch cannot substitute for an effective fire barrier indefinitely and that the NRC staff
) has not adequately analyzed the use of fire watches.
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Mr. Michael Mariotte August 19, 1992 Based on these allegations, the Petitioners request emergency enfcreement action to immediately suspend GSU's operating license for the River Bend Station pending a demonstration that the facility meets NRC fire protecticn requirements. The Petitioners also request the NRC issue a generic letter by September 5,1992, which would require licensees to submit information to the NRC demonstrating compliance with fire protection requirements. Where facili-ties cannot demonstrate compliance, the Petitioner requests immediate suspen-sion of the operating licenses for the affected facilities until such time as.
! compliance with NRC fire protection requirements can be shown. The scope of I
the Petition was expanded by addenda of August 12, 1992, which reouested that i
the NRC imediately suspend the operating licenses for Comanche Peak Unit 1, Shearon Harris, Fermi-2, Ginna, WNP-2, and Robinson and to issue a "stop-work" order regarding the installation of Thermo-Lag at Comanche Peak Unit 2.
The NRC staff has examined the issues stated in the Petition. The NRC staff I also addressed Thermo-Lag fire barrier concerns in Information Notices (IN)
- 91-47, " Failure of Thermo-Lag Fire Barrier Material to Pass Fire Endurance 2
Test," IN 91-79, " Deficiencies in Procedures for Installing Thermo-Lag Fire Barrier Materials," IN 92-46, "Thermo-Lag Fire Barrier Material Special Review
{ Team Final Report Findings, Current Fire Endurance Testing, and Ampacity Calculation Errors," IN 92-55, " Current Fire Endurance-Test Results for
' Thermo-Lag Fire Barrier Material," and Bulletin 92-01, " Failure of Thermo-Lag 330 Fire Barrier System to Maintain Cabling in Wide Cable Trays and Small Conduits Free from Fire Damage."
In June 1991, the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) established a l special review team to investigate the safety significance and generic applicability of technical issues regarding allegations and operating experi-ence concerning Thermo-Lag fire barriers at the River Bend Station. In the l " Final Report of the Special Review Team for the Review of Thermo-Lag Fire
! Barrier Performance," which was an attachment to IN 92-46, the special review team made the following conclusions:
?
The fire-resistive ratings and the ampacity derating factors for the
- Thermo-Lag 330-1 fire barrier system are indeterminate.
Some licensees have not adequately reviewed and evaluated the fire endurance test results and the ampacity derating test results used as the licensing basis for their Thermo-Lag barriers to determine the
- validity of the tests and the applicability of the test results to their plant designs.
2 .
Some licensees have not-adequately reviewed the Thermo-Lag fire barriers installed in their plants to ensure that- they meet NRC requirements and guidance such as that provided in Generic Letter 86-10,'" Implementation 4
of Fire Protection Requirements," April 24, 1986.
Some licensees used inadequate or incomplete installation-procedures during the construction of their Thermo-Lag barriers.
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) Mr. Michael Mariotte August 19, 1992 The Final Report, ins, and Bulletin are available for public inspection at the NRC's Public Docement Room and Local Public Document Rooms.
The NRC staff has prepared an action plan to resolve technical issues on Thermo-Lag' fire barrier systems. The action plan includes working with industry to identify the Thermo-Lag issues, coordinating efforts with the Nuclear Management and Resources Council (NUMARC) to resolve these issues, issuing inspection guidance to the NRC regional offices and conducting a testing program using small and large scale experiments to determine fire endurance performance and cable ampacity derating.
The NRC's " defense-in-depth" fire protection requirements rely on protecting safe shutdown functions by achieving a balance in (1) fi . prevention activi-ties; (2) the abili'ty to rapidly detect, control, and suppress a- fire; and (3) physical separation of redundant safe shutdown functions. The licensee can compensate for weaknesses found in one area by enhancing the protection capabilities of the remaining areas. The NRC foresaw cases in which fire barriers would be inoperable end required licensees, through technical specifications or approved fire protection plans, to provide compensation for the deficient condition. The concept of allowing alternative actions to compensate for an inoperable condition or component is used in various programs associated with the operation of nuclear power plants and has always been an integral part of NRC regulato y requirements.
Recent fire endurance testing described in Bulletin 92-01 confirmed that' certain Thermo-Lag fire barrier configurations compromise one facet of the fire protection " defense-in-depth". The licensees established fire watches as a compensatory measure. Personnel assigned to fire watches are trained by the licensees to inspect for the control of ignition sources and combustible materials, to look for signs of incipient fires, to provide prompt notifica-tions of fire hazards and fires, and to take appropriate actions to begin fire suppression activities. Therefore, fire watches compensate for the degraded fire barriers by providing enhanced detection capability to find fire hazards and, in the case of a fire, initiating suppression activities before the barrier's ability to endure a fire is challenged.
NRC regulations, f acility operating license conditions, technical specifi-cation action statements, and the generic communications described above address the establishment of either continuous or periodic fire watches to compensate for deficiencies in the licensee's fire protection program. The NRC staff has carefully evaluated the issues associated with using Thermo-Lag material, including the use of fire watches to compensate for any degradation in the effectiveness of required fire barriers. Such actions constitute compliance with the overall NRC fire protection requirements, provide an adequate level of protection, and do not pose an undue risk to the health and safety of the public.
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4 l Mr. Michael Mariotte August 19, 1992 f The Petitioners also make the legal argument that compliance with NRC require-ments is necessary to ensure that licensed facilities operate safely.
i Licensees have implemented measures such as fire watches to compensate for the
- Thermo-Lag issues and have thereby ensured continued compliance with NRC j requirements. It should be noted, however, that the failure.to comply with a-
- i. particular NRC requirement does not necessarily mean that there is no longer j reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety, particularly when the NRC staff has evaluated the area of alleged'noncompli-l ance and fo:ind that it does not pose an undue risk to the public health and l
safety.
On October 26, 1989, the licensee for the River Bend Station declared all-l Thermo-Lag' fire barriers inoperable after an unsuccessful- fire endurance. test.
j The licensee immediately established fire watch patrols in compliance with the compensatory action required by the plant's technical specifications. These fire watch patrols have been in continuous operation since October 1989. The
- NRC staff has found compensatory actions, such as fire watches, continue to provide adequate protection of the public health and safety. Therefore, the NRC staff has concluded that the start-up of the River Bend Station from the
- . current refueling outage need not be prohibited due to the-issues related to
- Thermo-Lag fire barriers.
1 L
TV Electric also began a-fire endurance testing program to qualify Thermo-Lag fire barrier systems for'the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station. Upon j reviewing the results of the. testing program, the licensee adjusted Unit 1 I fire watch routes as a compensatory action on June 18,-1992. In Bulletin i 92-Ol', .the NRC staff discussed the testing sponsored by TU Electric and
( requested all licensees to identify the plant areas in which Thermo-Lag is-installed and implement compensatory actions' consistent with an inoperable fire barrier if Thermo-Lag was being used to protect wide cable trays or small conduits. The NRC staff found compensatory actions such as fire watches to be adequate.
l The NRC staff and representatives of TV Electric have discussed the continued installation of Thermo-Lag at Comanche Peak Unit 2. The installation of Thermo-Lag in those configurations for which the licensee has high confidence.
that existing or planned testing will verify operability is a discretionary decision by TU Electric, i.e., it is undertaken at-the applicant's risk that the Thermo-Lag will be found:to not satisfy its performance requirements. In
. reviewing the application for an operating license for Unit 2, the.NRC staff l will ensure that issues related to Thermo-Lag at Comanche Peak Unit 2 are
sufficiently resolved to ensure adequate protection of the public and health and safety. Therefore, the NRC does not find it necessary.to issue an order to stop the continued installation of Thermo-Lag at Comanche Peak Unit 2 or to suspend the facility's construction permit.
4 i
Mr. Michael Mariotte -
5- August 19, 1992 i
The remaining facilities addressed by the Petition, Shearon Harris, Fermi-2, j Ginna, WNP-2, and Robinson, were identified by the Petitioners as having i installed Thermo-Lag in fire wall configurations. The-Petitioners cite IN 92-55 as a basis for determining that the use of. Themo-Lag for this-i application results in the licensees being out of compliance with NRC l regulations. In their responses to Bulletin 92-01,- Rochester Gas and Electric i
and Carolina Power and Light, the licensees for Ginna and Robinson, stated i that Thermo-Lag was not installed in those facilities. Based upon this i information, no action with respect to Ginna or Robinson is warranted. The l responses to Bulletin 92-01 for Shearon Harris, Fermi-2, and WNP-2 included-descriptions of the compensatory actions taken regarding the use of Thermo-Lag
. to protect electrical cable trays and conduit.
i
' The NRC staff recognizes that the performance of Thermo-Lag panels and other configurations not yet tested may not satisfy original design basis _ require-ments. The staff considers the relative safety significance to be-low for those applications of Thermo-Lag not addressed by Bulletin 92-01 and for which
! a definitive demonstration of effectiveness. is not yet available. This initial assessment is based on the factors discussed in this letter which--
) include the protection provided by other aspects of fire protection programs,
- such as detection and suppression capabilities, and the-expected conditions -
associated with a real nuclear plant fire. In an actual fire-situation, the
- fire resistance required of a barrier depends on the expected severity of the fire to which it is exposed. Typical nuclear plant fire loads are not great
', ' enough to produce a fire approaching the severity of a test fire. An actual fire at a nuclear power plant would yield a much slower-temperature rise than did the test fire. Moreover, although the fire resistance ratings of certain
[ Thermo-Lag fire barriers are considered indeterminate, the NRC staff has evidence that the barriers will provide some level of fire protection. In -
addition, most plant areas have controlled ignition sources, which helps reduce the occurrences of fires, and are equipped with other passive and i
active fire protection features which contribute to early fire detection and suppression activities. Therefore, the NRC has concluded that the-Thermo-Lag i
fire barrier concerns being addressed by its staff and industry do not pose an i
immediate threat to public health and safety and does not. find it necessary to suspend the operating licenses for Shearon Harris, Fermi-2, or WNP-2 l facilities.
t l
The NRC will perfcrm additional small-scale tests 'at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and will continue to assess the significance
- of its findings; However, the small-scale tests similar to those described in IN 92-55 are not qualification tests. Although the tests will give valuable insight into the thermodynamic behavior of the Thermo-Lag fire barrier material itself, they cannot be used in and of themselves to determine the fire resistance ratings of the various Thermo-Lag fire barrier systems. If testing sponsored by the NRC, an individual licensee, or an industry organization finds a configuration or application which might compromise the safe shutdown capability, the NRC will immediately take appropriate actions.
i
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i Mr. Michael Mariotte August 19, 1992 The Petition alleges that Thermo-Lag emits extremely high amounts of hydrogen cyanide gas which could overcome fire watch personnel while perfoming their duty. NIST performed tests for the NRC staff in which it demonstrated that the products of the combustion of Thermo-Lag do not include high; amounts of i hydrogen cyanide. Fires in nuclear power plants would be expected to emit
- toxic gases from a variety of combustible sources and it has been determined i
that Therm'o-Lag does not introduce unique concerns regarding either the
' quantity or composition of toxic materials. The NIST testing determined that the products of combustion of Thermo-Lag are comparable in toxicity to the burning of Douglas Fir lumber. Fire watches can perform their function of finding fires, notifying appropriate response personnel, and beginning fire j
suppression activities without sacrificing personal safety, including not being overcome by smoke and toxic gases. In addition, fire fighters and other utility personnel trained for fire brigades are taught proper techniques for i fighting fires, including the use of _self-contained breathing apparatus, when toxic gases are present.
The Petitioners have requested that the NRC issue a generic letter which-i addresses the various issues _ associated with the use of Thermo-Lag fire i barriers. The NRC staff has not completed its processing of the draft generic i
letter 92-XX, "Thermo-Lag Fire Barriers," of February 11, 1992 in accordance l
with the staff's action plan and the Comission's policy and procedures, which call for a public comment period and a thorough analysis of the current l regulatory requirements and the effect of any new requirements. Upon i
completing this process, the NRC will issue the final generic letter to all holders of operating licenses and construction permits for-nuclear power i
reactors. During an August 12, 1992, public_ meeting with NUMARC, the NRC staff stated that it had considered the coments it had received on the draft l letter, that it was preparing the final = letter in accordance with the action t- plan, and that it assigned a high priority.to issuing the letter. _The NRC
!. wiil issue the final generic letter in the near future.
The NRC staff has concluded that the immediate suspensions of the operating licenses for River Bend Station, Comanche-Peak Unit 1. Shearon Harris, Fermi-2, Ginna, WNP-2, and Robinson facilities are not warranted. The NRC staff also determined that the issuance of a "stop-work" order or the suspension of
-the construction permit for Comanche Peak Unit 2 is not warranted. The NRC staff will, in the near future, issue the generic letter mentioned in the Petition. Issuance of the generic letter will be in accordance with the l staff's action plan and the Comission's policy and procedures and, therefore, the request to accelerate the issuance of the generic letter'is not deemed necessary. Accordingly, Petitioners' request for emergency relief-is denied.
l l'
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- . - -. ~ - . . -- . _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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- e 4
Mr. Mariotte -August 19. 1992 . !
s i
! As provided by 10 CFR 2.206, the NRC will take appropriate action on the-
, specific issues raised in the Petition within a reasonable time. I have. ;
1 enclosed a copy of the notice that is.being filed with the Office of the
] Federal Register for publication.
I
- Sincerely, Original Signed By i
- Thomas-E. Murley, Director .
j .
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosure:
! j j Notice
. , he.- eb'altp, h office PDIV-2/LA PDIV-J/Py PDIV-2 % TECH ED* NRR:DSTk OGC[h'A ha EN 07idettYe SBlac k JMain AThadani L h. bwu Date 8/\9 /92 8/tB /92~ -8/ld/92 8/5/92 8/8/92 8//i/92
\ -A) a.
cffico ADR4/5 D:DRPW , 0:BEPE lEhk NRhb/W b:D .
l ha MVirgilk BBogerku Ska N)tkow JMiraglia TMurley
! cuo 8/ d /92 8/ d/92 8/M/92 8[\ h2 '8/tk/92 8/N /92
- Document Name
- b:\NIRS-2 Y; I c, y
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.- . , _ . . - _ - , _ . _ . . _ . . - , ~ _ , ,_ ,
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Mr. Michael Mariotte )
i DISTRIBUTION: '
Docket File (w/ incoming)
- PDIV-2 Reading )
TMurley/FHiraglia '
JPartlow BBoger .
SVarga i
MVirgilio DPickett EPeyton AThadani CMcCracken FGillespie utchfield
.ssell IBergman EHolian BMozafari TColburn AJohnson T0uay NRR Mailroom (EDO-7930)
DMorris (EDO-7930)
LChandler, OGC JGoldberg, OGC RHoefling, OGC
, JMTaylor JSniezek
, HThompson
- JBlaha rtin, Region I
,neter, Region 11 t0 avis, Region III JMilhoan, Region IV JMartin, Region V SShankman JLieberman PHarrell, Region IV OCA OPA L.
"of the' Commission DD 915 Cito os 34 NRC 209 (1991)
.R. I 2.206(c).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA hl
! NUCLEAR !.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION si 4 TORY COMMISSION
'[
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION :
Murley, Director j
duclear Reactor y Thomas E. Murley, Director
d iI.
.i in the Matter of q=
Docket No. 50 445 l i,:i TEXAS UTILITIES ELECTRIC COMPANY jIIl (Comanche Peak Steam Electric y .
Station, Unit 1) September 27,1991 l
h !
ne Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, denies a Petition filed ! '
by Ms. Betty Brink requesting that a proceeding be instituted to determine if the I operating license issued to Texas Utilities Electric Company (TU Electric) for j 1" the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Unit 1, should be revoked, modified, '
O or suspended. As bases for the request, the Petitioner asserts concerns regarding the continued failure of Borg-Warner check valves at Cornanche Peak and the }I failure of TU Electric to take adequate corrective actions to resolve these check.
valve failusts. ($
! i.
RULES OF PRACTICE: S110W CAUSE PROCEEDINGS ne NRC will not institute a show-cause proceeding where the petition fails l{
e to raise any substantial heahh or safety issue.
DIRECTOR'S DECISION UNDER 10 C.F.R. f 2.206 l[h i
,1 (
'l I. INTRODUCTION ,,
!I On November 20, 1990, Ms. Betty Brink (the Petitioner) filed a request (the Petition) with the Executive Director for Operations in accordance with ii
,j :
section 2.206 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regularierts (10 C.F.R. I 2.206)
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. . . . . . 1 i
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h on behalf of the Citizens for Fair Utility Regulation (CFUR) for action to be had
'I ! taken regarding the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station. Speci6cally, CFUR had cou k
requested that a proceeding be instituted or such other action as rnay be proper to determine if the operatmg license for the Comanche Peak Steam Electric ind Station should be revoked, modified, or suspended. The Pedtion argued that
{ tha
" issues of safety" exist at Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, based on
- n l. CFUR assertions that (1) Borg-Warner check valves continue to fail and have bot 8 .
never been able to perform their design function at the Comanche Peak Steam Sys I'f, ; )' Electric Station; (2) the safety of certain Borg Warner check valves installed at Comanche Peak is questionable because of the use of internal parts in the saf Inte jL valves from suppliers who were not adequately qualiSed and the possible use Co h ;
rep l of questionable replacement parts; (3) the Texas Utilities Electric Company l! ];
(the Licensee) failed to take adequate corrective actions to resolve the Borg.
l i Warner check valve failures at the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station; (4) the Eh
'! 'li! competence and integrity of the Texas Utilities Electric Company's management ins I , is questionable; and (5) there was a failure to provide adequate documentation val
, ]! regarding the adequacy of the Borg Warner check valves at the Comanche Peak off Steam Electric Station.
f[I
]'
In my letter of December 24,1990, I acknowledged receipt of the CFUR bel ch Petition and stated that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) would -
take action on the Petitioner's request within a reasonable time I have now sul
- }
h* .
completed my evaluation of the CFUR Petition. I have determined, for the thr
!k reasons set forth below, that no adequate basis exists to institute a proceeding, or va' for other such action to revoke, modify, or suspend the license for the Comanche l};L Peak Steam Electric Station, Unit 1. 19 53 thc r' '
El.
L' II. BACKGROUND gy ai d} L In support of the request the Petitioner cites a series of events involving Borg- St; i; Warner check valves that have occurred at Comanche Peak. De Petitioner used i[ these events, described below, to identify a number of the issues in the Petition.
.L During hot functional testing performed before the plant was licensed, two n' events (one on April 23, 1989, and another on May 5,1989) occurred at the p!l Cornanche Peak Steam Electric Station involving the flow of feedwater back
- n through Borg-Warner check valves installed in the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) in u h' , system. During these events, manual isolation valves were operated concurrently of n3 ;' when they should have been operated sequentially. His a: tion resulted in (I
'( secondary system water flowing from the steam generators through stuck open de
- j . Borg-Warner check valves in the AFW system to the condensate storage tank. W During subsequent evaluations, both the Licensee and the NRC Staff found that of q the bonnet-disc assemblies in the Borg-Warner check valves in the AFW system *
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f i 1 (CFUR) for action to be ation. Specifically, CFUR had been improperly adjusted in the vertical elevation. His improper adjustment ! j had allowed the discs to lodge under the upper seat surface such that the valves h.
r action as may be proper (
could not fully close. He NRC sent an Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) to j iche Peak Steam Electric independently investigate the events and determine the root causes -
The Petition argued that During the evaluations following these two events, the investigators found
.lectric Station, based on that a swing arm (used in the check valves to connect the valve disc to the continue to fail and have b6nnet) had failed in a Borg-Warner check valve in the Station Service Water te Comanche Peak Steam System, his failure raised concerns regarding use of commercia!-grade parts in o ,
et check valves installed safety-related systems. Responding to this concern, the NRC inspected BW/IP o e of internal parts in the International, Incorporated, the supplier of the Borg Warner check valves to ,
fied and the possible use ihties Electric Company Comanche Peak. He inspection was conducted in September 1989, and the report was issued on January 12,1990.
5 h
ons to resolve the Borg. On January 5,1990, during postwork testing at Comanche Peak Steam m Electric Station;(4) the j
Electric Station Unit 1, the Licensee radiographed Borg Warner check valves t Company's management installed in the steam supply to the turbine-driven AFW system and found one
. adequate documentation i valve with its disc lodged under the seat, while one other valve disc was laying i I es at the Comanche Peak off, but not lodged under, the seat, t
In April and May 1990, during the startup test program after licensing and ted receipt of the CFUR before commercial operation, feedwater flowed back through the Borg-Warner ,
a ommission (NRC) would check valves in the AFW system on three separate occasions. The 1.icensee ma! .ime. I have now subsequently performed tests. and found that the feedwater had flowed back uve determined, for the through the check valves because of low differential pressure across the check institute a proceeding, or valves, ne Licensee found that the check valves were not stuck open.
license for the Comanche An additional event involving Borg Warner check valves occurred on April 19, 1991, which was after the Petition was filed. The event involved one of ,
the Borg Warner check valves in the AFW system at Comanche Peak Steam Electric Stanon that stuck open during testing of a downstream motor-operated ,
isolation valve. This testing was conducted while the plant was shut down for of events involym, g Borg- a maintenance outage. The Petitioner was informed of the event by the NRC starr,
'eak. The Petitioner used the issues in the Petition.
p
. plant was licensed, two III. DISCUSSION ;
5,1989) occurred at the i
flow of feedwater back ne basis for the Petitioner's request is its assertion that the information cited tillary feedwater (AFW) I in nineteen documents, attached to the Petition, identifies a wide range of" issues ;
- re operated concurrently of safety" at the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, including the following:
his crtion resulted in '{
(1) check valves continue to fail and have never been sble to perform their ;[
alors thmugh stuck open ,
design function at the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station; (2) certain Borg. 'i condensate storage tank.
Warner check valves installed at the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station are itr the NRC Staff found that of questionable safety because they contain internal parts from suppliers who . O, alves in the AFW system were not adequately qualified and possibly include questionable replacement - i'6 h,
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211
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,l parts; (3) the Licensee failed to take adequate corrective cetions to resolve the Perform i Borg Warner check valve failures at the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station; beckflow id (4) the competence and integrity of the Licensee's management is questionable; adequate Ii and (5) adequate documentation was not provided to support the adequacy of valve is c
' the Borg. Warner check valves at the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station. D e Pt he NRC will also address a number of miscellaneous issues raised in CFUR's during hc l Petition. Unit 1, w j The NRC Staff acknowledges that the performance of Borg. Warner check considers
'> valves installed in Comanche Peak has been poor. Our inspection program However, and operations evaluation program are aimed at 6nding such poor equipment corrected performance problems and requiring the Licensee to take corrective actions. began m .
These regulatory processes have been followed by the Staff in the case of In NRt l] Comanche Peak, and the results are discussed in the following sections. discussed
,l Each of the speci6c issues raised by the Petitioner is characterized below, Warner ci
'j followed by the Staff's evaluation. report cot i g A.
disc jamn check valt Check Valves Continue to Fall and Have Never Been Able to of postma -
Perform Their Design Function reassembl.
( Re Petitioner contended that the check valves have leaked on three different Placed bec
! he Licen occasions: April and May of 1989 during hot functional testing at Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station Unit 1; on January 5,1990, before licensing; and, in to the NF
!! April and May 1990, during the startup test progrPm. The Petitioner claimed that I4. 1989-
~,
the continued leakage indicates that the check valves have failed and continue check vah
$)I to be jammed open in such a way that they are unable to perform their design In additio
) )- function. The Petitioner aM stated a concern regarding ongoing disassembly perform 11 j?~' of Borg Warner check valves at the Comanche Peak Steam Electric' Station to in the Con correct the leaking, using citix j~r In addressing this contention, a brief explanation of the safety functioni of sufficient :
check valves is helpful. Piping systems often have multiple branches that supply corrective I-liquid or vapor to other components in the plant (such as tanks, heat exchangers, check vah is steam generators, and the reactor vessel). Check valves are installed in these system is :
i piping systems to prevent the liquid or vapor from one of the branches from The Sta flowing backwards through another branch of tne piping system while the system erenced le operates, his design ensures that the liquid or vapor will continue to flow to the fective in
}; component being supplied in sufScient quantity for the Supplied component to Will Perfoi no Borg-V
) t its associa-q he Piauan., arm io ee -date am<ti. ef 64 varm che tves 6.v. : d.ign n uons, mented its li ) ,7 includans aDowing forward Row and peuvenung newme Row. De surr is primar0; sacerned osth es safety l functims of chedt valves,in hns with lu responsibibiy to ensure the public heahh and sarmy. In shan, the g Paitse deals wkh issues that relate to the safay function of the aort Warner check valves, and act the armin 1, '
scope of design fanctions. he suf! wiH. because of the two sforerneuioned swances, only address the safety j faction of the Borg Warner chedt valves in ks rurpense. I he tacemses ns i
212
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actions to resolve the Perform its own safety function. When a check valve cannot prevent suf6cient j.
- team Electric Station; backflow during system operation to ensure that supplied components have 3
- l! -
ement is questionable; adequate flow to perforn the supplied components' safety function, the check i ,
valve is considered to have failed to perform its safety function. .T '
pport the adequacy of team Electric Station. De Petitioner contends thai the events that occurred in April and May 1989 Lh ,
,(
, sues raised in CFUR's during hot functional testing of the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station. .
q Unit 1, were the result of failures of Borg Warner check valves, ne Staff also af Borg Warner check considers these two events to be related to failures of Borg-Warner check valves. ,, ;
ir inspection program However, these probleias with the Borg-Warner check valves were found and i such poor equipment corrected during the testing program before the plant received its hcense or .
i le corrective actions. began to operate. Dese problems, therefore, did not present a safety concern i In NRC AIT Report 50-445/89-30,50-446/89-30 of July 10,1989, the Staff
? I E
Staff in the case cf awing sections, discussed the root causes and contributirq factors for the failure of the Borg- -
s characterized below, Warner check valves in April and May 1989. Two significantissues raised in this a , i report concerning the check valve failures were (1) the root cause of the valve 6 disc jamming under the valve seat as a result of vertical misalignment of the ,
check valve disc because of inadequate maintenance procedures, and (2) a lack I ,
leen Able to of postmaintenance testing to ensure that the Borg-Warnet check valves, when 6 .
reassembled, would perform their safety function before the associated system is i aked on three different Pl aced back into operation, a contributing cause to the failure of the check valves.
d te dng at Comanche ne Licensee's corrective actions in response to these issues were stated in letters h efa censing; and,in to the NRC. TXX-895962 of August 18, 1989, and TXX-89744 of October _ i Petitioner claimed that 14, 1989. The Licensee revised the reassembly procedures for Borg-Warner ac failed and continue check valves and provided for postwork testing of Borg-Warner check valves.
o perform their design In addition, to ensure that the check valves were aligned properly and could r 3 ongoing disassembly perform their safety function, the Licensee tested all Borg& amer check valves
.m Electric Station to in the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Unit 1, and common systems, p using either reverse flow testing (which ensures that the check valves prevent a L '
the safety functioni of sufficient amount of bacicflow) or radiography. The Licensee performed these ,
le branches that supply corrective actions to provide assurance that, following work on Borg Warner K taaks, heat exchangers, check valves, any problems are identified and corrected before the affected h s are installed in these system is restored to service. ,
i of the branches from he Staff reviewed and evaluated the Licensee's actions speci6ed in the ref- ; y ystem while the system erenced letters he Licensee's actions were found to be appropriate and ef. l t 1.
I continue to flow to the fective in providing reasonable assurance that the Borg. Warner check valves i e supplied component to will Perform their safety function. As a result of these corrective actions, i t i no Borg-Warner check valve has failed to perform its safety function with I h
its associated system in service during plant operation. De Staff has docu- kI
. hm .m nidaisir e eu. mented its evaluations in Inspection Reports (IR) 50445, 50-446/89-30, 89-52, g@
.m ayancm
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- checi vehm, .nd not es ernut i 8tasord. only .ddress me safay g g g g ,
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89-71, 89-73, 90-03, and 90-09. Areas of inspection included witnessing the testing, corrective maintenance and reassembly of Borg Warner check valves, checi hung
- j and performing followup inspections on open items resulting from the AIT re- print t
port. Based on the NRC inspections and the Licensee's corrective acuons, the The :
Staff has determined that the Licensee has adequately addressed the root causes actio q of the April and May 1989 events. caus<
The Peddoner contends that the January 1990 event also indicated a failure subs of Borg Warner check valves to perform their safety function. This event redut occurred while the Licensee was conducting postmamtenance radiography as disc part of the corrective action program resulting from the April and May 1989 T1 events. 7he Licensee found two Borg-Warner check valves in the main steam actio supply to the turbine-driven AFW system in abnormal configurations. The asses q abnormal configuradons could have rendered one of the valves inoperable, which durin 3 indicates that the valve may not have performed its safety function if the plant repor b had been licensed and operating. In June 1989, the Ucensee had performed addn 1 mairitenance on this valve, but had not conducted the postmaintenance testing irs!
'i until January 1990. The Staff considers this event to be an extension of the progi l April and May 1989 events, since the Licensee found the abnormal conditicas the s.
jg as part of the corrective actions to verify before plant licensing that all Borg- inspc g ;i Warner check valves were aligned properly and could perform their safely effec
}j function, as described above, The Licensee evnLated this event, as documented the v
- s. In Technical Evaluation WC 90-79 (described in Staff IR 50 445,446/9043), T1
(! and determined that forward- and reverse-flow testing, and radiographic testing, of Be y of all Borg Warner check valves verified that the remaining Borg-Warner check i
j; valves would not exhibit the same problem. In Staff IR 50-445, 446/90 49, corre the / -
ji the Staff documented its evaluation of the Licensee's actions and noted that of B<
I j; the two valves found in the abnormal configurations had been disassembled, funct j
inspected, reassembled, and successfully air tested in the reverse-flow direcuon. *Il 5
]; ;
Based on the information in IR 50-445, 446/90-09, the Staff found that the quen Licensee's correedve action for this event was adequate to ensure that the two whic j l3,l i.
affected Borg Warner check valves would perform their safety function during ure o I
plant operation-state.
Il The Petitioner contended that the April and Mrl 1990 events, involving inadc q leakag'e back through Borg Warner check valves in the AFW system, also this i indicated a failure of Borg Warner check valves to perform their safety function.
p:
j In the Licensee's letters TXX-90172 of April 27, 1990, and TXX-90188 of (disc Tl M May 18,1990, the Licensee stated that the leakage through the AFW check The j ,
! valves was minor, and that there v,as assurance the AFW check valves would 90 0..
gb perform their safety function because of the required surveillance testing and j j jt rework with postwork tesung conducted during the transition from operadonal
) ,!! Modes 6 through 1. In addition, the Licensee conducted tests and monitored the 3
)
i H temperature of the AFW piping to quantify the leakage rates across the AFW M
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. .I cluded citnessing the check valves. As a result, the Licensee found that the check valves had not t in !
Warner check valves, hung open. He Licensee condluded that the check valves would perform their ,-
i
. ting from the AIT re- primary safety function of stopping backflow during an upstream pipe treak. ,.
corrective actions, the ne Licensee did consider these events to be an operational concern because ,[
tressed the root causes actions were required by the operators to mini;nize the heating of AFW piping caused by the AFW check valve leakage during plant startups. The Licensee i Iso indicated a failure subsequently modified the Borg Warner check valves in the AFW system to function. This event reduce the operational effect on the operators, by adding a counterweight to the ,
j nance radiography as disc to enhance the seating characteristics of the valve. ,
April and May 1989 .ye Staff has reviewed and evaluated the Licensee's assertions and corrective
<cs in the main steam actions stated in the referenced leuers. The Staff agrees with the Licensee's- ,
configurations, ne assessment that the backleakage through the check valves in the AFW system -
Ives inoperable, which during the April and May 1990 events was minor. Based on NRC inspection .
[
y function if the plant reports, the Staff considers the Licensee's corrective actions appropriate to D s
- ensee had performed address the operational concerns. The Staff documented its inspections in ,
)stmaintenance testing irs 50-445,446/90-13,90-19,90 22, and 90-45. He Staff inspected the test ,
' l e an extcasion of the program to quantify reverse flow through the AFW check valves and evaluated i
- abnormal conditions the safety implications of the April and May 1990 events. Based on NRC censing that all Borg- inspections, the Staff determined that the minor backleakage has had no adverse ,
9, perform their safety effect on AFW system operabilityS and does not affect the safety functon of ,
event, as documented the valves. _j 1 50-445, 446/90-03), The Petitioner also cited a general concern regarding ongoing disassembly d radiographic testing, of Borg Warner check valves at the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station to . i b- _
ig B~g-Warner check correct the leakage problems. He Petitioner cites as a Staff concern, stated in :
R. 45, 446/90-09, the AIT Report (NRC IR 50-445,446/89-30), that disassembly and reassembly ictions and noted that of Borg Warner check valves may have contributed to the problems during hot 16 been disassembled, functional testing.
reverse flow direction. De Licensee evaluated this issue and determined that the practice or fre- t s Staff found that the quency of disassembling check valves to allow their use as flush and drain paths, to ensure that the two which was the actual concern identified by the AIT. did not contribute to the fail- ,
safety function during ure of the Borg-Warner check valves. In the Licensee's response to the AIT, they st.ited that the failures of the Borg-Warner check valves resulted instead from !
990 events, involving inadequate installation procedun:s. ne Licensee documented its response to te AFW system, also this issue in a Texas Utilities Electric Company memorandum, CPSES-9001379 l n their safety function. (discussed in NRC 1R 50-445,446/90-03). ,
'), and TXX-90188 of he Staff reviewed and evaluated the Licensee's response to this issue. I ough the AFW check he Staff documented its inspections in irs 50-445, 446/89-30, 89-73, and I !
- check valves would 90-03. The Staff agreed with the Licensee's evaluation that the frequency j uveillance testing and gi sition from operational -
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-a -i-eo the rates across the AFW %. ,,,, ,m, ym, es, ,,mp ,,, , m,_p s m s_ s-g.m %,m%
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~d of disassembly of Borg Warner check valves did not contribute to the AFW backflow events. program enat i[ before returni l
De April 18,1991 event (an event that occurred after receipt of the Petition) involved one of the eight Borg Warner check valves in the AFW system. The The NRC l: '~ events cited I check valve involved was in the flow path used to conduct Motor Operated Valve Testing (MOVAT) of an isolation valve downstream of the affected Borg Warner condition iso -
- l,
> check valve. The Licensee submined a Licensee Event Report (LER) of May indication of 21,1991, that documented its analysis, evaluation, and corrective actions. . check valves.
, After testing a downstream motor. operated valve (MOV) during a mainte- In summa nance outage, the Licensee conducted reverse-flow testing of the associated of Borg Wan AFW Borg-Warner check valve, in accordance with its corrective action pro- Staff also ast l April and M gram for the 1989 cvents. During the reverse-flow testing, the Licensee identi-6ed excessive reverse flow through the check valve he Licensee radiographed ne Staff ha:
.' raised by the
'} the check valve and determined that the valve was stuck fully open with the
- disc fully raised. His dc6cient condition is different from the failures of Borg- or safety issi I Warner check valves identified in April and May 1989, when the disc was i {!
jammed under the valve seat. In addition, the Licensee found the April 18, B.
1991, condition during postwork testing of a specific valve, and not during an l; integrated functional test as was the case during the April and May 1989 events.
i
! After disassembling the valve, the Licensee discovered that the counterweight, he Petit installed to improve the seating characteristics of Borg-Warner check valves, had Warner che4
)
become lodged above a casting remnant,' causing the failure during reverse-flow certam swir testing. De Licensee disassembled and inspected the other seven check valves De Petitioi In the AFW system, and none of the other valves had this casting remnant vendor insp.
k; ne Licensee remcved and it.spected the remnant, reassembled the valve, and reported in j; successfully forward-flow- and reverse. flow-tested the valve. To verify that no The NR(
other failure mechanism comribuied to this event, the Licensee tested the other service wat ll
[ AFW isolation valves in a manner similar to the tests of MOVs that initiated Licensce's q: the event. The Licensee also conducted reverse-flow testing on all eight AMV with 10 C.
check valves to ensure that the valves would perform their safety function before and May 1 restoring the AFW system to operation, meet certai De Staff has evalu'ted this event and documented its review in IR 50 445, 99900030A I 446/91 14, he Staff concluded that because the AFW piping was not observed the qualific I to have an elevated temperature before the maintenance outage, it is unlikely that However, i L
the Borg-Warner check valve with the casting defect was lodged open before the at Comanc U:
Licensee tested the MOVs. Derefore,it is likely that the affected Borg Warner developed
- I'i check valve would have performed its safety function in the operatmg period installed in l '
I: before the maintenance shutdown. Ibrthrmore, the Licensee identified the Station.
1989, wit!
f (),I condition during postwork testing that was performed as a result of the corrective oecember I 'TMs casting manant was an oppiomimmely Wsuh wwe rWas left an die vim ihroat at the oppsr paa af dw
.n-r- Peak Stea
$ u s.*r ou r *s ,.i hh 216
- I a
G
4 t, i
l i i'
antribute to the AFW action program implemented to address the 1989 failures. His corrective acdon i j
program enabled the Licensee to identify the de$cient condition and correct it l i receipt of the Petition) before returning to operation after the maintenance shutdown. ,
I he AFW system. De ne NRC Staff also evaluated this event in the context of the preceding , jt Motor Operated Valve events cited by the Petitioner. Dis most recent event resuhed from a descient , '
j affected Borg Warner condition isolated to one Borg Warner check valve, and therefore provides no ;
Report (LER) of May indication of a generic deSciency in the design or manufacture of Borg Warner o arrective actions.
check valves. l' I !
OY) during a mainte- In summary, the NRC Staff inspected the Licensee's maintenance and testing dng of the associated of Borg Warner check valves at the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station. De , ,
corrective action pro- Staff also assessed the Licensee's corrective aedons in response to the events in '
1 g, the Licensee idend- April and May 1989. January 1990, April and May 1990, and April 19,1991.
Licensee radiographed ne Staff has concluded that the Licensee has satisfactor0y addressed the issues I l
i k fully open with the raised by the Petitioner and that these issues do not present a substantial health n the failures of Borg- or safety issue. ,
i 7, when the disc was e found the April 18 1 r B. The Questionable Safety c,f Borg Warner Check Valves Because of tve, and not during ar Internal Parts from Suppliers Not Adequately Qualined and May 1989 cvents.
h.t the cournerweight, ne Petitioner contends that questions exist regarding the safety of Borg. !
irner check vahes, had Warner check valves at the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station because of i ,
[
ur ing reverse-now certain swing arms that may be installed in the Borg Warner check valves. i i wr ven check valves ne Petitioner cites as evidence the problems found by the NRC durit.g a I ['
this c: sting remnant.
embled the valve, and vendor inspection at BW/IP International, incorporated, in September 1989, and [
+
reported in IR 99900G30/89-01 of January 12,1990. ,
I Jve. To verify that no The NRC inspected BW/IP as a result of the failure of a swing arm in the _
- ensee tested the other service water system at the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station and the ;f
.I MOVs that initiated Licensee's subsequent Sling of a construction de6ciency report in accordance , d ting on all eight AFW with 10 C.F.R. 550.55(e) for the failed Borg Warner check valves in April safety function before and May 1989. The inspection determined that BW/IP activities failed to , _
meet certain NRC requiremenu and BW/IP procedures, in particular, in IR i 4 review in IR 50 445, 99900030/89-01, the Staff found that BW/IP did not adcquotely document I h-Pi ng was not observed the qualincation of certain swing arms installed in Borg Warner check valves. I b
nage, h is unlikely that However, since TU Electric remains responsible for safety-related equipment ,
lodged open before the at Comanche Peak, independent of Staff activities at BW/IP, the Licensee affected Borg Warner :teveloped a test program to evaluate the acceptability of the swing arms -
n the operating penod installed in Borg Warner check valves at the Comanche Peak Stearn Electric ! {-
.irensee identified the Stadon. The Licensee's program, described in TXX-895% of August 18, i j}
result of the corrective 1989, with modincations and additional details provided in TXX 89860 of ,g December 20, 1989, involved testing conducted by Al'I'ECH Engineering l ' 14
.m,, u, Services, Inc., on all Borg Wamer check valves installed in the Comanche ,,
Peak Steam Electric Station, Unit 1, and common systems to determine if ;
217 i;it i ,
._ - . . . _ _ . . _ m .i
i gy t/f
!: 1 Q< 1 l 't i i .
the swing arms are suitable for use in safety related systems. During the
< /, test progam, some of the swing arms that were manufactured using a sand
- that the unaccept
(
h casting method were found unacceptable and were replaced with swing arms manufactured using investment-casting methoos, ne investment-cast swing l 1,
[!;}'
. arms successfully passed the required tests and inspections for unrestricted operation. All replacement sanc -csst swing arms installed in Unit 1, including C. Te:
Ac some swing arms from Unit 2, were also tested using the AFTECH test program.
!" AFIECl! found these sand-cast swing arms to be suitable for use in safety
- ne) inidal p'
'[
related systems for at least three fuel cycles, ne Licensee commlued, in leners petitgom TXX 90139 of April 9,1990, and TXX 90149 of Apr012,1990, to replace all ne Ped sand-cast swing arms with investmem-cast swing arms, procured with acceptable on AF%
qurdity assurance programs, before starting up from the ditrd refueling outage. gej i
De Staff rt: viewed and evaluated the Licensee's testing program and replace-nodcedi f ment of sand cast swing arms and found that the prograru is appropriate for g, page d determining the suitability of swing arms for use in safety related systems. De agoye) g
!j Staff also found that there is reasonable assurance that the semaining sand cast DeStal 3 swing arms are acceptable for three fuel cycles. The NRC Staff inspections are deter,wir
.j documented in IR 50-445,446/89 30,89-64,89 73, and 90 22. The Staff found event ta g the Licensee's program to evaluate the continued use of sand cast swing arms "
leuer of
,y acceptable as documented in NUREO 0797," Safety Evaluation Report Related made cl.
g ', to the Operadon of Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2," g9gg ey, Supplement No. 24 April 1990. The Staff concluded in the Safety Evaluation gey g, Report that the Licensee's commitment to replace all sand-cast swing arms with and Jam investment cast swing arms was approp iate.
I ,: , respomc
, he Staff reviewed the programs for testing and replacing the swing arms in and eva
!f l ,, Borg Warner check valves, ne Staff concluded that the Licensee satisfactorily aedom t I addressed the issues raised by the Staff and cited by the Petitioner. Therefore' i '< Peak Su
," these issues do not present a substantial health or safety issue. Subsequent to to addre the filing of this Petition, the Licensee discussed, at a public meedng held on corteeds June 12,1991, in Rockville, Maryland, their technical bases for a finding that gg, 39gt l i, j n the sand-cast swing arms in Borg Warner check valves are acceptable for long-Ej 3 term operation. He Licensee subsequently submined its detailedjustification by TXXN hr j leuer dated June 21,1991 (TXX 91229), based on extensive testing conducted April 21 t I q' by Southwest Research Institute on arms removed from Comanche Peak Steam TXX 90 ge s l 4, Electric Station Unit I and commoa system Borg-Warner check valves. He identifih
[ q' NRC Staff concluded that de sand cast Borg-Warner check valve swing arms Peak St.
y still installed in Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station Unit I and common ji j adequau systems are acceptable for long-term service. His conclusion, documented in its evalt
- j' A[ NRC leuer dated September 16,1991, is based on examination of actual material 90-03,9 properths of sand cast swing arms removed from service from Borg Warner n {> r! check valves during the APTECH testing described above, which demonstrated
, , s m,%
Q M8 3
.) 218 Q
___ _ -~
I' l
4 l
l iystems. During the i lictured using a sand- that the criteria used during the APTECH testing adequately screened out I unacceptable swing arms. '
ced with swing arms '! i i I i
ovestment cast swing i tions for unrestdcted C. Texas Utilities Electric Company failed to Take Adequate Corrective
' i i in Unit 1, including Actions to Resche the Borg Warner Check Valve Failures '
i '
I'ECH test program.
sie for use in safety
- The Petitioner contends th.t the NRC objected to most of the Licensee's i committed,in letters initial plans to correct the check valve problem before loading the fuel. De .
I 1,1990, to replace all Pcdtioner cited an October 27,1989 NRC report' as containing these objections. !
cured with acceptable ne Petitioner then cited a spec!fic Staff concern regarding testing methods used ,
{
iird refueling outagd* on AFW piping that the NRC identified in a letter of September 14,1989.
-q program and replace- he NRC issued the October 27,1989 letter to nodfy the Licensee of a '
un is ap;nopdate for noticed rnecting and enforcement conference, ne enclosure. to this letter listed related systems. De the potential violations of NRC requirements identifar e the AIT (discussed , ,
s remaining sand-cast above) for problems that led to the check valve failures in April and May 1989,
- Staff inspections are ne Staff viewed the May 1989 cvent as nearly identical to the April event and
)-22. De Staff found determined that the Licensce's ineffective corrective actions following the April l tand cast seing arms event could jusdfy the issuance of a Notice of Violation (NOV). In the Staft's lation Report Related lever of January 25,1990, which attached the NOV that follond, the Staff i v
made clear that the Licensee's corrective actions taken in response to the April Y ion, Units 1 and 2," I he Safety Evaluadon 1989 cvent should have prevented recurrence of the May 1989 event. I ca ring arms with he Peddoner is correct in staung that the Staff letters of October 27,1989,
[
and January 25,1990, document the Licensee's ineffeedve corrective actions in ng the swing arms in response to the April 1989 event. However, the Staff has subsequendy reviewed Jcensee sausfactorUy and evaluated the overall issue of the adequacy of the Licensee's corrective !
acdons to correct the problems with Borg Warner check velves at the Comanche
.l Ydtioner. Derefore, L issue. Subsequent to Peak Steam Electric Station. De Licensee has taken extensive corrective action 0 blic meeting held on to address the Burg Warner check valve issues. De Licensee documented these I ses for a finding that correcdve acdons in letters TXX 89424 of June 19,1989; TXX 895% of August ,
- acceptable for long- 18,1989; TXX-89744 of October 14,1989; TXX 89849 of December 21,1989; l l TXX 90139 of April 9,1990; TXX 90149 of April 12,1990; TXX-90172 of tailedjustification by ive testing conducted April 27,1990; TXX-90188 of May 18,1990; TXX 90215 of June 18,1990 amanche Peak Steam TXX-90253 of July 27,1990; and TXX 91076 of March 22,1991, '
l r check valves. De Ihe Staff has teviewed and evaluated the Licensee's responses to all the issues idendfied following the failures of Borg Warner check valves at the Cbmanche
]l ck value swing arms i Unit I and common Peak Steam Electric Stadon and has concluded that the Licensee has taken ,
asion, dccumented in adequate correcdve aedons to resolve these issues. De Staff has documented yr ion of acusal material its evaluations in irs 50-445, 446/89 30, 89 52, 89-64, 89-71, 89-73, 89 75, i e from Borg-Warner 90-03,90-09,90-13,90-19,90 22,90-45, and 9105.
h which d:monstrated 8
l.i-:d
- n. eued rire,.n is ecs . ,.p.n.% ihei k do i denen - . . p .i. sup.cuo. ., andinsi, tus is e i.u.,
nd.nnfying puurmal violadens b...d e e pnar inspecuan npost. 9 lC
'?
'e 219 I
~,
p i:
y l
i ne petitioner takes exception to the Staff's ultimate acceptance in IR 50- 4
' 445,446/90 03 of the Licensee's use of ultrasonic inspections to verify that no
- i l 'i plasde defoimadon occurred in AFW piping. The petitioner's exception was 1 based on the Staff's concern expressed in the Staff's September 14,1989 leuer i that changes in piping (the specific type referred to by the Licensee as " plastic I deformation) cannot be deermined without knowing the original configuration 8 i;l of the piping. In response to this Staff concern, the Licensee tevised its use I i) of ultrasonic and radiographic testing to ensure that the piping met minimum i j thickness requirements and that no deterioradve damage had occurred. De i
! Licensee provided its descripdon of this approach in TXX 89744, of October i 14,1989, I s
} %e Staff has reviewed and evaluated the Licensce's evaluations and inspec.
! tion program for identifying any damage to the AFW piping at the Comanche 1
,g Peak Steam Electric Stadon, Unit 1. The Staff considers the Licensee's evalua-
'4 c .
tions and inspection program sufficient to determine the adequacy of the AFW f F
i piping for the remainder of plant life. The Staff documented its inspections S of the issue of AFW piping damage raised by the Petitioner in irs 50-445, 11 446/89 30,89 73,89-75, and 90-03.
'I The Staff reviend the adequacy of the Licensee's corrective aedon with s;
v
{ regard to the Borg Warner check valve failures and has concluded that the issues
- it raised by the Petitioner have been satisfactorily addressed by the Licensee and 11
]- ,
do not present a substantial health or safety issue. B tl D. The Questionable Competence and Integrity of Texas Utilities Electric Company's Management
' o, j De Petitioner contends that serious questions are raised about the rompe. ti tence and integrity of the Licensee's officials and their commitment to thu safe 4-operation of a nuclear facility. He Petitioner bases the contendon on the follow.
, (1 ing two assealors. He first assertion is that the Licensee's maiugement "made i
ii commitments cymcally simply to expedite the licensing" of the Comanche Peak P'
te i
!- Steam Electric Stadon. Unit 1. De second assertion is that the Licensee's man- st i agement has made misleading statements to the NRC Staff that the Borg Warner se f R check valves would be corrected and able to perform their design function be- O i
fore licensing.
I at I ',
The Petitioner's contention that the Licensee's management "made commit . LI i I ments cynically simply to expedite the licensing" of the Comanche Peak Steam as 4 Electric Station, Unit 1. Implies that the Licensee's management made com-(S mitments without intending to comply with the commitments. The Licensee's l 1i corrective actions and commitments are provided in letters TXX 89424 of June W
>)q. 19,1989; TXX 89596 of August 18,1989; TXX 89744 of October 14, 1989; 11 m thi TXX 89849 of December 21,1989; TXX 90139 of April 9,1990; TXX-90149
\l ad
,' , l .
220
.;v
_ J
i acceptance in IR 50- of April 12,1990; TXX 90172 of April 27,1990; TXX 90188 of May 18,1990; .m
- tions to verify that no TXX 90215 of June 18,1990; TXX 90253 of July 27,1990; and TXX 91076 of tionets exception was March 22,1991. ne Staff has reviewed and evaluated the Licensee's responses l'
, I xember 14,1989 letter to all the issues idendfied following the failures of Borg Warner check valves at
- d6 he Licensee as "plasde the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, including technical, operational, and l 3 original con 6guration management issues. ne Staff has determined that the Licensee has adequately ; i Icensee revised its use met its commitments, and that there is no justificadon to support the contention l 3 piping met minimum that the Licensee made ist commitments without intending to meet those com- l,.
ge had occurred. ne mitments. De Staff h s documented its evaluations in irs 50 445,446/89-30, l .l; 89 52, 89-64, 89-71, 89 73, 89 75, 90-03, 90-09, 90-13, 90 19, 90-22, 90-45, I XX 89744, of October r and 91-05, I i
evaluations and inspec- De Petitioner's contention that the Licensee's management has made mis- -l leading statements to the Staff that the Borg Warner check valves would bc , o iping at the Comanche
. the Licensee's evalua- corrected and perform their design furction before liccasing is based on the adequacy of the AFW Pedtioner's assertion that the Borg Warner check valves at the Comanche Peak i ,
unented its inspections Steam Electric Station continue to fall and have never been able to perform -
titioner in irs 50-445, their design function. Based on its review and evaluation as discussed in re-sponse to Contention (A) above, the Staff believes that the Borg-Warner check corrective action with valves at the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station will perform their safety ,
function. The Staff fmds, therefore, that this conantion is not supponed ard
~
! I oncluded that the issues -
ed by the Licensee and that the Licensee's management has corrected the identified problems with the l Borg Warner check valves at the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, and a I
there is reasonable assurance that the Borg Warner check valves will perform their safety function. The Staff considers this contention to be without meriL -
Texas Utilities ne Pedtioner quesdoned the competence and integrity of the Licensee to operate a nuclear facility. De Staff evaluated the Licensees management in two special inspections, the Operational Readiness *Itam Inspection (IR 50-445, 5 ai.ed c about the compe. u commitment to the safe 446/89-200) conducted befom licensing, and a Special Performance Assessment ontention on the follow- (IR 50-445, 446/90 20) conducted before the facility exceeded 50% of rated
- e's management "made Power. Based on these inspections, the Staff found the Licensee's management ( ,-
- of the Comanche Peak responsive, sound, and reliable. De Staff further found that the Licensee's i l tat the Licensee's man. staff had demonstrated the proper concern to safely operate the reactors and had q iff that the Borg Warner successfully made the transition from a construction to an operations-based 4i' hei7 design function be. organization ne Staff has continued to evaluate the Licensee management's ability to operate the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Stadon and has found the m igement "mnde commit . Licensee's management accepable. De most recent summary of the Staff's ,
- Comanche Peak Steam assessment is provided in the jystematic Assessment of Licensee Performance :
)f nanagement made com. (SALP) Report 50-445,446H-46 of May 10,1991. , ;
itments. The Licensee's The Staff reviewed the Ll:ensee's resolution of the issues related to Borg- .]
- ters TXX E9424 of June Warner check valves at the Conanche Peak Steam Electric Station, has assessed ip i 64 of October 14, 1989; the Licensee's management, and concludes that the Licensee's management has t vil 9,1990; TXX 90149 adequately implemented its commitments and has the proper concern to safely i3 221 ;'
h II l
operate the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station. The Staff, therefore,6nds sym
.' ' that the Petitioner's contention is without merit and does not present a substantial I#
t health or safety issue, I E. suita Failure to Provide Adequate Documentation Negarding the i Acceptability of Borg. Warner Check Valves Peak inter k at &
De Peddoner contends that the Licensee and its vendors consistently have
'i failed to provide documentadon to support the adequacy of Borg. Warner check valves at the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station. The Petitioner cites speci6c
(' examples, including one issue regarding the Licensee's revision of the root cause F.
!,- of a 1985 event that was a precursor to the April and May 1989 events and several issues regarding BW/IP International, Incorporated.
i Citing from irs 50-445,446/89 73 and 89 84, the Peddoner conterds that y,
the Staff inspectors determined that there was "no documentadon" to support h
k h the Licensee's revision of a root cause analysis regarding a failed Borg. Warner il check valve in 1985. The Staff has reviewed the irs cited by the Petidoner valve h and found that the irs cite extensive documentation provMed by the Licensee
'(' fallm i
to support the basis for the revised root cause of the 1985 fadure of a Borg- M Warner check vJve. The documentadon included tivo Failure Analysis Reports, ne1 analytical documentation, vendor informadon, a Problem Report, and two leaks internal Licensee rnemoranda. However, this docurnentation did not include a Cl record of one of the Licensee's discussions with the vendor, BW/IP International, disk incorporated, his discussion led to the Licensee reevaluating the original, and body
,i uldmately correct, root cause of a 1985 event that was a precursor to the April Elect
' and May 1989 evenu. 'Ihus, the Licensee had provided extensive documentation is bo li' tojustify its determination of the revised root cause for the 1985 precursor event, ring I even though the revised root cause was incorrect. The Staff issued a violation bonn.
j;) ]
related to this event because the Licensee did not take adequate corrective acdon leaka to follow up on the original, and ultimately correct, root cause, not for lack of the il t
'j documentation. Derefore, the StalY concludes that the Petidoner's contention valve
!s without merit.
- bonm l
De Petitioner's other examples relate to a more general contention regarding conce g l1 lack of documentation by the check valve r vendo', BW/IP International, incorpo.
relate rated, to support the quality assurance of swing arms installed in Borg-Warner thus i
}[ .
check valves for use in safety-related systems. The Petitioner identined the ex.
y, safet)
- j, amples as being contained in IR 99900030/89-01, in the subject IR, the Staff in identified the lack of documentation as e nonconformance with NRC regula. the b.
.; l ;; tions. The vendor evaluated its programs and identified corrective actions to discut ensure that future internal parts would include an adequate assurance of quality, with documentadon to certify that the pans are suitable for use in safety rsisted h
ll 222
'l I
m- -
!i Staff, derefore, 6nds systems. De vendor discussed its correcdve actions in letters of February 22, ,
at present a substantial 1990, and May 4,1990. , ;
ne Staff has evr,luated the effect of this lack of documentation. De ij Staff has determined that, because the Licensee's program for evaluating the n; suitability of sand-cast swing arms in Borg Warner check valves at Comanche Li irding the Peak Steam Electric Station is acceptable, the lack of documentadon at BW/IP -
i ,
International, incorporated, does not present a substantial health or safety issue a iors consistently have at the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station.
af Borg Warner check i L ;
'etitioner cites speci6c F. Other Concerns Sq1 sed by the Petitioner !
ision of the root cause May 1989 cvents and he Petitioner identified the following additional issues: i
- d. i;
- titionet contends that 1. Body to Bonnet Leglage in Borg Warner Check Valves '
mentation" to support l a failed Borg Warner he Peddoner implied that body to-bonnet Icakage in Borg Warner check 3 ited by the Petitioner valves at the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station is equivalent to the seat j t eided by the Licensee failures experienced irl April and May of 1989, De Petitioner referred to IR
+85 failure of a Borg. 50-445,446/90-03 as stating "that several of the check valves continued to leak." i iure Analysis Reports, ne Petidoner alsc coptended that the correcdve actions for the body to-bonnet l em Report, and two leakage are questionable.
tion "1 not include a Check valves have a safety function of preventing reverse flow by having a q
,B. / International, disk sit against a seating surface (both the disk and seat are inside the valve r ating the original, and body). In the Borg V(arner check valves that failed at the Comanche Peak Ste4 m precursor to the April Electric Station, the disk is attached to a bonnet on top of the valve. He bonnet tensive documentation is bolted into the upper portion of the valve body, and, in conjunction with a 1985 pecursor event, ring that seals the small gap between the body of the valve and the edges of the l taff issued a violation bonnet, closes the valve body from the external environment. Thus, because !
leakage between the body and the bonnet (* body to-bonr.et leakage") is not in quate corrective action cause, not for lack of the flow path through the valve, it does not affect the safety function of the Petitioner's contention valve. In IR 50-445, 446/90-09, the Staff also stated that because the body-to- '
L bannet leaks do not affect the operability of the check valves, there is no safety 1 il contention regarding concern with the body to-bonnet leakage. Dus, body to-bonnet leakage is not i International, incorpo. related to 1".akage past the seating surface of the Borg-Warner check valves, and j ,
talled in Borg-Warner thus is not related to a failure of the Borg Warner check valves to perform their i l oner identi6ed the ex. safety function, "j (
- subject IR, the Staff in IR 50-445,446/90-03, the Staff stated that the Licensee had identi6ed ice with NRC regula. the body-to bonnet leakage in Borg Warner check valves, The referenced IR
{
i corrective actions to discusses the Licensee's betions to correct the leakage, including honing and hot i {:
c assurance of quality, x use in safety related ll[;j
{ih I
223 I
I
, l
y - - _ _ -
l :
1 1;
't torquing.' De Staff reviewed and evaluated the Licensee's corrective acdons raise (
!yj and determined that the aedons were effective in correcting the body-to-bonnet the s.
leakage with the ex.cepdon of minor leakage on two of the Borg Warner check conte h
valves at the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station nc Staff has determined 1990 l '; that the ternalning minor leakage raises no safety concerns, in irs 50-445. almo I
446/90-03 and 9049, the Staff documented the Licensee's corrective actions, thatt and the Staff's evaluadon of the Licensee's corrective actions. becat Based on the Staff's inspections which evaluated the significance of, and Com corrective aedons related to, body to-bonnet leakage in Borg Warner check ther.
j
' valves at the Comanche Peak Stearn Electric Station, the Staff has concluded *11 that the Licensee has sathfactorily addressed the issues raised by the Peutioner, was
' nerefore, these issues do not present a substantial health or safety issue. Infor Doct RID:
- 2. Use of flydraulle 14fts on McIn Freducter Isoladon Yahts ne Petitioner contends that the Licensee used a hydraulle lifting device to evida help operators lift the Main Feedwater Isolation Valve (MFWlV) discs off their 199C i seats on April 27, 240. On May 9,1990, at a public meeting with the Staff, the of th Licensee discussed this issue, and the Staff identified a concern about possible A damage to the MFWlVs. De Licensee evaluated the effect of using hydraulic licen lifdng devices on MFWlVs and determined that the MFWlVs would not be Com overstressed. De Licensee provided its evaluatinn in letter TXX 90lS8 of May Pro}
g-1B,1990. De
- f
- ne Staff reviewed the Licensee's evaluation regarding this concern and Staf) found it acceptable. The Staff documented its inspections in irs 50-445,446/90 Stafi
,.lI 19 and 90-20. De i ne Staff conducted tnese iney stions to determine if the MFWIVs could be the-
{ damaged by the use of hydraulic lifting u.<,r Stased on these inspections, the the*
Staff concludes that the Licensee has satisfactorily vidressed the issues raised NR(
l by the Staff and identified by the Petitioner and that ti.-se issues do not present pren a substantial health or safety issue. "I at I Jl g*
arm
- 3. Ascilabl!!ty of the Report of the Vendor Inspeedon at BWI!!' g;ge
};;
,. international, incorporated ,ggn k), De Petitioner contends that the availability of the January 12,1990 report dete arm (j of the vendor inspection at BW/IP International (" vendor inspection report"),
safe l,, ,
ind(
t *-um ionpane is u. ushunina or 6. nu. Se hold $. bon. in e. bud, or s.a-w.rn. 6ea w. m vah l1] 1 he (n-maienircumpuu=> conda . wwn ha % bay, bonna. .nd . d. we o" '"" " con-l i, ; bang Labiened aD expand. w%n nghiened at has condinans,u. espanded studs aDow add 4 anal tagtsening of g,j- the nuts. se that when the vehe coola, the muds emusca,incessains the pnamus en the baJy to bonna seat i if
{ 224 4;
i 4 -
i
pg vi I- f t
's corrective actions raised serious questions regarding the integrity of the licensing pmcess and I the safety of Comanche Frak Steam Electric Station, Unit 1. De Petitioner {
- the be6y to bonnet , j i Borg Warner check contends that Region IV did not receive the referenced repon until October 16, ,i ; ,
Staff has determined 1990; therefore, the Petitioner had no way of knowing about the report undt I
Tis. In irs 50 445, almost 10 months after the licensing decision. The Petitioner funher contends ,
s corrective acdons, that serious quesdons about the integrity of the licensing process were raised ,
ons.
because the vendor inspection report was in existence less than a month before .
Comanche Peak Urt I was licensed and Region IV may not have known about [
signi6cance of, and .
Borg Warner check the teferenced report at the time of licensing.
i De Staff has evaluated the Petitioner's contention. The referenced report Staff has concluded sed by the Petitioner. was distributed through the NRC's internal distribution system (Regulatory or safety issue. Information Distrioution System [ RIDS]) to numerous of6ces and to the Public j l I
Document Room. De distribution code idendfied for the inspection Report, ;
RIDS IE:09, includes all regions, including Region IV. De distribution made
' through this system is made within approximately 2 weeks of issuance, as ulic lifting device to evidenced by receipt of the vendor inspecdon repon in the PDR on February 1, 1990. Thus, the teferenced report was available to CITTR, as it was to the rest ,
FW1V) discs off their -
ing with the Staff, the of the general public, shortly after it was issued. '
At the time the Vendor inspection Report was issued and throughout the , 1 mrem about possible ;
xt of using hydraulic licensing of Comanche Peak Unit 1, the inspection and licensing activides at ) }
, e Comanche Peak were being managed by the Associate Director for Special
- W1 would not be r TXX 90188 of May Projects (ADSP), Office of Nuclear Reactor Reguladon, and not Region IV. l 4 he Vendor inspecdon Repon was received by the appropriate ADSP inspection 1'I Staff, all of whom were located on site, and by ADSP management and licensing ing this concern and n irs 50 445,446/90 Staff at NRC licadquarters Rockville, Maryland, shortly after it was issued, he ADSP licensing and inspection staff evaluated the information contained in he MFWlVs could be the vendor inspection report prior to licensing Comanche Peak Unit 1. Since i ,
i these inspections, the the vendor inspection report was available and was evaluated by the appropriate f
- ssed the issues raised NRC Staff prior to the licensing decision, the Staff considers the underlying premise for the Petitioner's contention to be invalid. (
s issues do not present ne vendor inspeedon evaluated the quality assurance certl6 cation t.;xess l .
g at BW/IP and would not have directly determined the safety of the swing ,
I arms actually installed at Comanche Peak. De 1.icensee't test program, as at BW/IP discussed in detail in Section B of this response, tested all of the swing arms actually installed in Comanche Peek Unit 1 prior to licensing. De NRC Staff g
,i ,!
i '
determined that the rt3ults of this test program provided assurance that the swing ; I muary 12,1990 report '
arms actually installed in Comanche Peak Unit I were acceptable for use in or inspection reprt").
I safety related systems. De NRC Staff, therefore, had suf6clent information, , h independent from the BW/IP inspecdon, to determine that the AFW check j.d valves at Comanche Peak were acceptable prior to licensing, and the information iI or sca.w.m. 6.i ve,. m N gyggy 4
contained in the vendor inspection report did not alter the NRC Staff conclusions
. . o. wmb-in. t t
4 225
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p i .}
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' I4 regarding the acceptability of the swing arms installed at Comanche Peak
'l '! Unit 1. ,fg,
' g, .
Thus, the NRC Staff considers the questions raised by the Petitioner regarding
,, the integrity of the licensing process and safety of the plant itself based on ins)
) gg the existence and availability of the Vendor Inspection Report of BWAP to be
,i without merit.
gg, gal
- 4. The Director, NRR's Knowledge and Use of the information in the val
} Vendorinspeedon Rtport the ava The Pethioner contends that the Director of NRR knew of tie Vendor gice Inspecdon Report of BW/IP and its $ndings prior to issuance of a low-power sait license and chose to ignore it.
g De Director of NRR was not specifically aware of the vendor inspection report at the time of low power licensing, although the subject of the adequacy of Borg Warnet check valves was reviewed by the Director at the time. ne
'l ADSP Staff had conducted an evaluation of the impact that the results the *
[ vendor inspection may have had on the safety of Comanche Peak Unit 1 prior to of :
'f licensing. The ADSP Staff appropriately determined, based on its review of the reps Texas Utilides Electric Company test prograrn of all of the swing anns installed wh3 I in Borg Warner check valves at Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station Unit 1, sho
,! that the swing arms installed at the time of low power licensing were acceptable, to I
.! and the quality assurance problems identified at BW/IP in the vendor inspection vah
.{ report did not alter the NRC Staff conclusions regarding tie acceptability of the and
.?
Borg Warner check valves installed at Comanche Peak Steam Electric Stadon War Unit 1. Because the issues in the vendor inspection report did not affect the 1 l ! safety of the Borg Warner check valves actually installed at Comanche Peak and e) Steam Electric Stadon Unit 1, the vendor inspection was not identined to the by I ll Director of NRR as an issue in licensing the facility. nitu
, ii Because of the natu;e of this additional assertion, a copy of the Petition was doc
[ provided to the NRC Inspector General on December 24,1990, for action as Elet j appropriate.
peti tI the S. NRC Knowledge of and Use of the informadon in the Vendor 5tg Inspection Report l l. 3 I ne Petitioner contends that the Commission may not have known about the 10 (
d January 12, 1990 Vendor ln'spection Report of BW/IP in making its decision i havc to issue the full power license for Comanche Peak. As discussed in detail in 1, 2 i ,
f} response to additional Contentions F.3 and F.4, above, the ADSP Staff evaluated 88P1 a
1 i,
Mt !
the information in the vendor inspection report and determined that it did not (193 i toit f-u 4 ,
ll 226 w
Fi
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i
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, i ded at Comanche Peak the Petitioner t arding affect the conclusions regarding the acceptability of the swing arms installed in Borg Warner check valves at Comanche Peak Unit 1. Derefore, the vendor il l l
l P
inspection report was not idendried to the Commission during the full power lL I licensing deliberadons.
m Report of BW to be Based on Staff assurance of the safety of the Borg Warner check valves actually installed at Comanche Peak Steam Electric Stadon Unit I that was gained through plant-specific evaluadon of the internals of Borg Warner check j r Iq/ormation in the valves, and that the vendor inspecdon report did not change that assurance, ,
the Staff has concluded that the contendon raised by the Pedtioner that the l :
availability of the vendor inspection report raised serious questions about the :
RR knew of the Vendor licensing process is without merit, and does not present a signl6 cant health or i i l
' issuance of a low powe'
[ 'i safety issue.
of the vendor inspection e subject of the adequacy IV, CONCLUSIONS Director at the Ome, ne 1 pet that the results the De NRC Staff reviewed the arguments in CIUR's Pet! don that the failures anche Peak Unit I prior to of Borg Warner check valves at ;he Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station tesed on its review of the represented issues of safety" sufficient to require the Licensee to show cause (the swing arms installed why its license to operate Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Unit 1, m Electric Station Unit 1, should not be revoked. De Staff found that the Licensee's coirective actions i i lice- g were acceptable, to resolve failur'es and other problems associated with the Borg Warner check Pin .s vendor inspection valves were appropriate and responded to the Staff's concerns and to the safety L ng the acceptability of the and operadonal issues involved in the failures and other problems with Borg- l ak Steam Electric Station Warner check valves at Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station.
r report did not affect the ne NRC Staff assessed the speci6c references and citauens in the Petition
.talled at Comanche Peak and all of the technical analyses, inspections, reviews, and evaluations conducted ,
was not identified to the by both the Licensee and the Staff. De Staff reviewed the complete text of all i nineteen of the documents attached to the Pedtion as well as many additional a copy of the Petition was documents regarding Borg Warner check valves at the Comanche Peak Steam '
- 24, 1990, for action as N Electric Station. De documents relied upon by the Petitioner in support of the i petition were' existing NRC and Licensee documests. Based on its entire review, j i l the Staff has not found any substantial heals and safety issues that would call ' '
I into qtestion the continued safe operation of Comanche Peak Steam Electric i l
t in the Vendor Stadon. )1 t
, ne institution of proceedings in response to a request in accordance wiai ,
not have known about the i 10 C.F.R. 5 2.206 is appropriate only when substantial health and safety issues ! l )
i have been raised. See Consolidated Edison Co. ofNew York (Indian Point, Units IP in making its decision i l I As discussed in detail in 1,2, and 3), CL175-8,2 NRC 173,176 (1975), and Washington Public Powr ji the ADSP Staff evaluated SuPPl y Sy3 tem (WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 2), DD-84 7,19 NRC 899,923 ;I determined that it did not (1984). This standard has been applied to determine if any action in response ~l t to the Petition is warranted. Ibr the reasons discussed t.bove, no basia ex15ts for i 4.
4 227 ; i f
n .
.I
I l h
I taking any action in response to the Petition as no substantial health or safety i
' issues have been raised by the Petition. Accordingly, no action pursuant to section 2.206 is being taken in this matter.
,I f *Ihe Staff will file a copy of this Decision with the Secretery of the Commis-s
' sion for the Commission's review in accordance with 10 C.F.R. 6 2.206(c).
FOR TiiE NUCLEAR
' REGULATORY COMI'.lSSION Thomas E. Murley, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor
- Regulation
,1 Dated at Rockville, Maryland,
" this 27th day of September 1991.
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