ML20195G796

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Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-254/86-21,50-254/87-11,50-265/86-21 & 50-265/87-11 Re Use of Unqualified AMP nylon-insulated Butt Splices in GE Foi Containment Penetration Enclosures at Facility
ML20195G796
Person / Time
Site: Quad Cities  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 11/21/1988
From: Fieldman J
SIDLEY & AUSTIN
To: Lieberman J
NRC OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT (OE)
References
NUDOCS 8811300041
Download: ML20195G796 (9)


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. . 000 rEtaE .. 4.a November 21, 1988 Mr. James Lieberman, Director Office of Enforcement U.S. 11uclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Attention: Document Control Desk (

Re: Quad Cities Station, Units 1 and 2 Answer to tiot. ice of Violation Report tios. 50-254/8C021; 50-254/87011; 50-265/86021; 50-265/87011 11RC Docket tios . 50-254 and 50-265 Reference (a): October 20, 1988 A. B. Davis Letter to J. J. O'Connor (b): tiovember 21, 1988 L. O. Do1 George Lett..>r to J. Lieberman (c): April 29, 1988 A. B. Davis Letter to J. J. O'Connor (d): June 20, 1988 P. Steptoe Letter to J. Lieberman and L. O. DelGeorge Letter to A. B. Davis and accompanying affidavits of J. Abel, I. M. Johnson, M. S. Turbak, V, tioonan and R. LaGrange (e): October 21, 1988 A. B. Davis Letter to Lee Liu

Dear Mr. LieM cma n :

T' i answer is submitted on behalf of our et4.nt.,

Commonweal'h Edison Company, ("CECO" or "the Compani"' 1 response to the 11RC staff's (the "Staif") letter dis' 1 Octobor 20, 1988, including a 14otice of Violation and proposing imposition of a civil penalty in the amount of $150,000. The proposed civil penalty relates to CCCo's use of unqualified A:'P nylon-insulated butt splices in General Electric F01 containment tC kjjy,;4 ,,

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.. c SIDLEY & AUSTIN CHICAoO Mr. James Lieberman, Director flovember 21, 1988 Page 2 penet;0 tion enclosures at Quad Cities, Units 1 and 2. See Reference (s). Commonwealth Edison's qualified admission of the alleged violation is contained in Reference (b).

Commonwealth Edison maintains that the imposition of an additional civil penalty in this case would be inconsistent with the flRC's Modified Enforcement Policy for EQ Requirements (the "Modified Enforcement Policy" or "Policy"). First, the "violation" alleged in the Staff s October 20, 1988 letter and flotice of Violation ("Second 110V") is identical to the violation alleged in a prior April 29, 1988 A. E. Davis letter to J. J.

O'Connor and accompanying tiotice of Violation ("First 110V"). See Reference (c). Such a double penalty for a single violation is net consistent with the intent of the Modified Enforcement Policy and is patently unfair. Second, the newly proposed civil penalty is inconsistent with the Modified Enforcement Policy for the reasons set forth in CECO's Answer to the First flOV. See June 28, 1988 Steptoo letter to James Lieberman (in Reference (d)).

The Staff's finding that CECO "clearly should have known that the AMP splices were not qualified is based on impermissible hindsight. In addition, the amount of the proposed civil penalty should be reduced because of the f . lure to give any credit to CECO for taking the initiative tt -3t the AMP splices. Third, and finally, the proposed civil pe. .lty should be reduced because it is unfair in light of the smaller civil penalty the Staff has recently proposed for another licensee in virtually identical circumstances.

A. The tiotice of Violation Proposes to Penalize Edison Twice for_a_ Single Alloqed EO Violation.

A licenuee should not be penalized twice for the same alleged environmental qualification ("EQ") violation. The Modif led Enforcement Policy recognizes this obvious principle.

The very first observation of the Policy with respect to determining civil penalties is that "(s]ignificant EQ violations

. . . are to be considered together, in the aggregate. . . . "

The flRC, the Policy reiterates elsewhere, "will consider the EQ violations in aggregate, not based on individual violations."

Indeed, this rule embodies a deliberate and explicit change to prior EQ enforcement policy. See Generic Letter 88-07.

The Second 110V contravenes this rule. It alleges an EQ violation identical in overy respect to the one alleged la the First flOV . Indeed, the only conceivable rationale for the proposed double penalty is that CECO's decisions regarding the AMP splices happened to be implemented at two stations at once --

1 SInt.uv & AUSTIN CnicAco Mr. James Lieberman, Director flovember 21, 1988 Page 3 Dresden and Quad Cities. These are sister stations built in the same time period with virtually the same design.

The facts underlying both proposed civil penalties are identical. General Electric ("GE") contemporaneous 1y furnished CECO with AMP nylon-insulated butt splice components, for installation in GE F01 containment penetration enclosures at both Dresden and Quad Cities. The EQ documentation for the splices installed in both plants was the same and consisted primarily of test reports generated by GE prior to 1978.

In 1978, the flRC issued Inspection Report tios. 50-254/78-24 and 50-265/78-25 for CECO's Quad Cities Station. This inspection included, among other things, an examination of the qualification of AMP butt splices in GE penetrations. The flRC concluded:

Electrical cable splices located in the drywell. The RIII Inspector determined that the "Butt Splices" were constructed using AMP preinsulated butt connectors (nylon window splices). Qualification of these butt splices was accomplished during the electrical r,netration test and is documented in GE letter dated

'fril 28, 1978 (Chron 8878). The Inspector determined that the results were satisfactory.

The 11RC examined the qualification of AMP splicos again during a May 19-23, 1986, EQ inspection at Dresden. Although CECO's basis for qualification of these items was the same as it had been in 1978, the f1RC questioned whether the EQ file adequately demonstrated similarity between the tested splices and those installed at Dresden and Quad Cities. This issue was reasonably treated by the Staff and CECO as a documentation problem, not. calling int o question continued operat. ion of the Dresden and Quad Cities units. To resolve this question, CECO, at its own initiative, conducted a test to confirm the qualification of the splices at both stations on October 2-7, 1986 as part of ongoing LaSalle Ray Chem splice tests. A second test of four splices removed from the Quad Cities drywell was conducted on flovember 21-26, 1986. Both of these tests were conducted according to the LaSalle County profile. After discussion with the f1RC, CECO decided that. this profile was inaccurate and too stringent for Quad Cities and Dresden Stations. Accordingly, four splice samples were removed from the Quad Cities drywell and tested using a Dresden/ Quad Cities profilo on Decembor 4-5, 1986. The samples failed, to the surprino not only of CECO, but of pcrsonnel at f1RC Region III.

Sne June 28, 1988 Irene M. Johnson affidavit (in Reference (d)).

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SIDLEY & AUSTIN '

CIHCAco Mr. James Lieberman, Director November 21, 1988 Page 4 Dresden Unit 3 and Quad Cities Unit 1 were shutdown the next day, December 6, 1986, for the repair of the splices. Dresden Unit 2 and Quad Cities Unit 2 were in refueling outages and repairs were made in the course of these outages. The NRC witnessed these repairs.

Based on CECO's test results, the NRC and CECO contacted other licensees to alert them of the AMP splice problem. As a result Iowa Electric Light and Power Company shut down its Duane Arnold station to repair AMP splices installed in the drywell penetrations there.

The complete identity of the violation alleged in the First and Second NOVs is reflected in the two NOVs themselves.

The Staff's analysis of whether CECO "clearly should have known" that the splices were not qualified is word for word the same in the April 29, 1988 and October 20, 1988 letters. The Staff's '

analysis of the four escalation / mitigation factors is also virtually identical.

In short, the facts and the two NOVs establish that at no point did either CECO or the NRC make any decision or engage in any conduct differentiating the AMP splices installed in Dresden from those installed in Quad Cities. Thus, there is but a single alleged violation. Accordingly, a double penalty would be unfair in light of the Modified Enforcement Policy.

1 The Second Proposed Penalty Is Inconsistent with the Modified Enforcement Policy for the Reasons Set Forth in CECO's An_swer to the First NOV.

CECO's Answer to the First NOV maintains that the proposed civil penalty is inconsistent with the Modified Enforcement Policy. First, the finding that CECO "clearly should have known" that thn AMP splices were not qualified is based on impermissible hindsight. Finding that CECO clearly should have known of the alleged violation prior to the November 30, 1985 deadline is particularly inappropriate in view of the NRC's 1978 determination that the splices were qualified. Second, the amount of the proposed civil penalty should be reduced because the Staff's analysis of two of the mitigation / escalation factors warrants reconsideration.

Given t. hat the Pirat and Second NOVs are based on an identical set of decisions and facts, this former Answer is also applicable to the new Notice of Violation. Accordingly, such Answer is hereby incorporated by reference along with the accompanying affidavits of Irene M. Johnson, Michael S. Turbak,

l SIDLuv & AUSTIN CIIICAGo i

I Mr. James Lieberman, Director November 21, 1988 Page 5 James S. Abel, Vincent S. Noonan and Robert G. LaGrange. All discussion of Dresden Unit 3 in such Answer applies equally to Quad Cities. Enclosed with this Answer is a supplemental affidavit submitted by Mr. Abel confirming that there was no difference in CECO's decisionmaking or conduct with respect to the AMP splices at Dresden 3 and Quad Cities 1 and 2. CECO will also submit in the near future an affidavit by Philip Holtzman,

, President of Star Strategic Resources and Technology, Inc.,

underscoring the benefit of CECO's Ray Chem testing program to other licensees.

C. The Proposed Civil Penalty Is Unfair Given the Civil Penalty Proposed in A Similar Case.

CECO's Answer to the First NOV requested the Staff to reconsider its analysis of two of the mitigation / escalation factors. The merit of this request has been substantially bolstered by a Notice of Violation the I;RC issued October 21, 1980 to the Iowa Electric Light and Power Company ("Iowa Electric"). See Reference (e). This Iowa Electric NOV concerns the very AMP butt splice issue addressed in the First and Second NOVs.

Iowa Electric discovered that the AMP butt splicos installed in its Duane Arnold station were unqualified based on CECO's testing of the AMP splices in December, 1986. Like CECO, Iowa Electric was required to shut down to repair the splices.

The Staff found that Iowa Electric had operated the plant from November 30, 1985 to December 9, 1986 with unqualified equipment, or three days longer than it had taken CECO to shut down Dresden Unit 3 and Quad Cities Unit 1. The Staff also found that Iowa Electric suffered the very EQ documentation deficiency as had CECO: the splices tested by the manufacturer were not demonstrated to be identical to the installed splices. The Staff found that the Iowa Electric vio'.ation involved several hundred unqualified splices and recommended a base civil penalty of

$150,000.

Despite these striking similarities, the Staff concluded that with respect to two of four mitigation / escalation factors, Iowa Electric deserved mitigation. On the other hand, the Staff concluded that CECO was not entitled to mitigation or even deserved escalation. Thus, Iowa Electric's penalty was mitigated to $50,000, whereas CECO's double penalties remain at

$150,000 each., or $300,000 total.

In regard to the first mitigation / escalation factor, the Staff concluded that CECO's penalty should be escalated 501

4 Stunny & AUSTIN CIHCAGO Mr. James Lieberman, Director November 21, 1988 Page 6 because "the NRC identified this violation and the licensee failed to take advantage of the identification of the degrading

" In Iowa Electric's case, the splices in Dresden Unit 2 . . . .

Staff found mitigation appropriate because the violations, it found, were identified by the licensee. The fact is that the violation was identified not by Iowa Electric, but as a direct result of Commonwealth Edison's voluntary testing activities.

With respect to the third mitigation / escalation factor the Staff found that CECO was not entitled to mitigation because "while the licensee did shut down Unit 2 on October 11, 1986 and Unit 1 on December 6, 1986 and repair the splices, these actions were not done in a reasonable time in that the unqualified splices were identified at Dresden in May 1986." In the case of Iowa Electric, 50% mitigation was applied for "prompt and extensive corrective actions," namely, that Iowa Electric shutdown and promptly repaired or replaced the splices.

As set forth in CECO's Answer to the First NOV, CECO did not have prior notice that EQ deficiencies might exist.

Prior to the November 30, 1985 EQ deadline, CECO justifiably relied on its EQ documentation which had been found to be satisfactory by the NRC during its 1978 inspection. The Dresden, Unit 2 splicos identified by CECO in September, 1985 as degraded had been subjected to a high-temperature event. Inspection of splices in other units did not reveal any degradation. The inspection report following the Staff's May, 1986 inspection emphasized only a documentation deficiency. CECO monitored the AMP snlices and also undertook to test them. It was only this testing -- undertaken at CECO's own initiative -- that revealed, to the surprise of both CECO and the NRC, that the splices were not qualifled and alerted other licensees to this fact. Such conduct is hardly dilatory or irresponsible and should not be penalized. Indeed, the very documentation defect emphasized in escalating CECO's penalty was also present in Iowa Electric's EQ files in May, 1986 and never discovered by that licensee until it was alerted to the results of CECO's tests.

The Staff's disparate analysis of these two factors unfairly fails to mitigate CECO's penalty when CECO took steps --

on its own initiative and to the benefit of other licensees including Iowa Electric -- to resolve conclusively whether or not the AMP splices were environmentally qualifjed. At the same time, it grants mitigation to Iowa Electric despite the fact that t

that company took no action until CECO conducted its test program and then merely followed CECO's lead in shutting down and repairing the splices. Indeed, Ceco shut down within one any of

9 SInLur & Ausrix Cnicaoo Mr. James Lieberman, Director flovember 21, 1988 Page 7 the final test results whereas Duane Arnold took several days longer to shut down.

Given the penalty proposed for Iowa Electric in these circumstances, any penalty on CECO, with respect to either Quad Cities or Dresden, should in no event exceed $50,000.

Ver truly yours,

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAD REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE COMMISSION In the Matter of: )

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COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY ) Docket Nos. 50-254 and

) 50-265 (Quad Cities, Units 1 and 2) )

SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES S. ABEL I, James S. Abel, being first duly sworn, depose and state as follows:

I am employed by Commonwealth Edison Company as Boiling Water Reactor Engineering (BWRE) Department Manager. BWRE is responsible for plant design and technical service for the Commonwealth Edison BWR plants which are Dresden, Quad Cities and LaSalle County Stations. Included in the technical services provided is coordination of the establishment of the Environmental Qualification Program and preparation and review of the environmental quallfication documentation files. Prior to this present assignment, I was employed by Commonwealth Edison as Station Nuclear Engineering Department (SNED) Manager from 1981 to 1987. In this assignment my responsibilities were the same as the BWRE manager except the plants included al1 Commonucalth Edison operating nuclear plants. During the 1981 to 1987 period, SNED was responsible for engineering activities associated wit h the Quad Cities and I have Dresden of a Bachelor Stations ScienceEnvironmental in MechanicalQualification Engineering Programs.

degree from the Rose Nulman Institute of Technology, and over 20 years of experience as a mechanical engineer in the nuclear industry.

The purpose of this affidavit is to confirm that Ed' ~:on always understood and treated the AMP butt splice issue raised by the NRC at its May 19-23, 1986 inspection as equally concerning the splices installed at Quad Cities, Units 1 and 2 as well as at Dresden Unit 3. The problem was understood to be a unitary one.

At no time did Edison make any significant decision or take any signifiCant action that distinguished between the AMP splices installed at Dresden, Unit 3 and Quad Cities, Units 1 and 2.

T e

Indeed, the basis of the qualification of the AMP splices at both Dresden and Quad Cities was the same documentation, the testing program CECO undertook at its own initiative applied to both stations, the monitoring program for both stations' splices was the same, the CECO engineer making the EQ decisions regarding the AMP splices was the same and the management decision makers and decisions were identical.

The statements made in my July 5, 1988 affidavit (attached hereto) with respect to Dresden Unit 3 are equally true for Quad Cities, Units 1 and 2, subject to the following clarifications:

1. Third paragraph: The Company shut down Quad Citles Unit 1 on December 6, 1986. Quad Cities Unit 2 was already in a refuel outage.
2. Fourth paragraph: The evaluation of the Quad Cities penetration splices was performed prior to tJovember 30, 1985. The Quad Cities Units 1 and 2 inspectiono were performed on tJovember 29, 1985 and October 24, 1985, respectively.
3. Seventh and ninth paragraphs: The May, 1986 tJRC inspection occurred at Dresden.

These minor clarifications excepted, all references to Dresden Unit 3 in my July 5, 1988 affidavit should be read to include Quad Cities, Units 1 and 2.

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, . -. James S. Abel EUBSCRIBE' A!JD SWORf1 to befcce x4 this df 2 day of '_' g gb a , 1988.

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