Text

Insp Repts 50-313/85-11 & 50-368/85-11 on 850520-24.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Appraisal of Emergency Response Facilities to Ensure Implementation of Suppl 1 to NUREG-0737 Requirements
	ML20155A161
Person / Time
Site:	Arkansas Nuclear
Issue date:	03/28/1986
From:	Hackney C, Yandell L; NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20155A159	List: ML20155A155; ML20155A161;
References
	RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737 50-313-85-11, 50-368-85-11, NUDOCS 8604080254
	Download: ML20155A161 (34)
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APPENDIX

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COWtISSION

REGION IV

NRC Inspection Report: 50-313/85-11 Licenses: DPR-51

50-368/85-11 NPF-6

Dockets: 50-313

50-368

Licensee: Arkansas Power & Light Company

P. O. Box 551

Little Rock, Arkansas 72203

Facility Name: Arkansas Nuclear One (AN0) Units 1 and 2

Inspection At: Arkansas Nuclear One, Russellville, Arkansas

Inspection Conducted: May 20-24, 1985

Inspector: b. b/ 3-lf(-T(d

C. A. Hackney, Emergency Prepar(iness Analyst Date

Headquarters Support:

E. Williams, Reactor Safety Engineer, NRC

Other Accompanying Personnel:

Terc, N., Emergency Preparedness Analyst, NRC

Bethke, G. W. , Reactor Operations, Comex Corporation

McBride, K. C., Senior Research Scientist, PNL

Martin, G. F., Nuclear Scientist, PNL

Swif t, J. J. , Health Physicist, NRC

Lapinsky, G. W., Engineering Psychologist, NRC

Ramsdell, J. V., Senior Research Scientist, PNL

Wohl, M. L., Nuclear Engineer, NRC

Good, M. I., Comex Corporation

Approved: 3/2?2P/o

L. A. Yandell, Chi'ef, Emergency Preparedness 'Da t'e

Section

8604080254 860401

PDR ADOCK O$000313

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Inspection Summary

Inspection Conducted May 20-24, 1985 (Report 50-313/85-11; 50-368/85-11)

Areas Inspected: An announced appraisal of the Emergency Response Facilities

(ERF's) was conducted to determine if the licensee had successfully implemented

the requirements in Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737 and the regulations. The

appraisal included the Technical Support Center (TSC), Operational Support

Center (OSC), Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), backup EOF and TSC, tne

emergency data acquisition systems as well as the instrumentation, supplies and

equipment for these facilities. The appraisal involved 360 hours0.00417 days 0.1 hours 5.952381e-4 weeks 1.3698e-4 months onsite by

11 NRC inspectors and NRC contractors.

Results: Within the emergency response facilities inspected, no violations or

deviations were identified. One unresolved item relating to the habitability of

the backup TSC in the Emergency Control Center and the need for an additional

backup TSC in Russellville, Arkansas, was identifieo. This item was resolved

by the NRC and is addressed to the licensee in this report. Deficiencies were

identified that are to be addressed to the NRC by the licensee are as follows:

1. The absence of backup power for essential equipment for the primary

TSC. (Section 1.1.3.4)

2. The inadequate reliability and validation of the Safety Parameter Display

System (SPDS) and the Gaseous Effluent Radiation Monitoring System (GERMS)

as emergency data acquistion systems. (Section 1.2.2)

3. The point-by point database verification to assure tne reliability of

data communications is not complete. (Section 1.2.2)

4. The inability to make adequate and reliable consequence assessments of

dose. (Section 1.2.4.5)

5. The lack of positive pressure needed to obtain the required

habitability provided by the HVAC system for the primary E0F and the backup

TSC. (Section 3.1.1.3)

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Table of Contents For The Detailed ERF Evaluation

Page Number

1. 0 Techni cal Support Cente r . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

1.1 P hy s i ca l Fa c i l i t i e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

1.1.1 Design ............................................ 6

1.1.1.1 Location, Structure, Habitability / Environment.. 6

1.1.1.2 Size........................................... 7

1.1.1.3 Layout......................................... 7

1.1.1. 4 D i spl ay Inte rf aces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

1.1.2 - Radiological Equipment And Supplies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

1.1.2.1 Radiation Monitoring / Personnel Dosimeters...... 8

1.1.2.2 Protective Supplies ........................... 8

1.1.3 Non-Radiological Equipment And Supplies ........... 9

1.1.3.1 Communications ................................ 9

1.1. 3. 2 Reco rds/D rawi ngs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

1.1.3.3 Support Supplies .............................. 10

1.1.3.4 Power. Supplies ................................ 10

1. 2 In fo rmati o n Manageme nt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

1. 2.1 Vari abl e s Provi ded . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

1.2.1.1 Reg. Guide 1.97 Variables ..................... 11

1. 2.1. 2 O the r Vari abl e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

1.2.1.3 Relationship to Functional Needs .............. 13

1.2.2 Data Acquisition (Safety Parame.ter Display System). 13

1. 2. 2.1 I s o l a ti o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

1. 2. 3 Data Communi cati ons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

1.2.3.1 Reactor Technical Support...................... 14

1.2.4 Data Analysis ..................................... 15

1.2.4.1 Reactor Technical Support ..................... 15

1.2.4.2 Dose Assessment ............................... 15

1. 2.4. 3 Central Processor Capabili ty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

1.2.4.4 Meteorology.................................... 19

1.2.4.5 Conclusions and Recommendations................ 20

1.2.5 Data Storage ...................................... 22

1.2.6 System Reliability ................................ 22

1.2.6.1-Validation And Verification ................... 22

1.2.6.2 Computer Based Systems Reliability ............ 22

1.2.6.3 Manual Systems ................................ 23

1.2.7 On Shift Dose Assessment .............. ........... 23

1.2.7.1 Dose Assessment Proficiency ................... 23

1.3 Functional Capebilities and Wal kthroughs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

1.3.1 Walkthroughs (Facility Demonstration).............. 24

2.0 Operational Support Center (0SC).......................... 24

2.1 Physical Facilities, (Design, Location, Alternate OSC).. 24

2.1.1 Operations Support Center Size / Layout............... 24

2.1.2 Display Interface .................................. 25

2.1.3 Radiological Equipment And Supplies ................ 25

2.1.3.1 Staffing........................................ 25

2.1. 3. 2 A c t i va t i o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 6

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- 2.1.3.3 Onsite-interface and Coordination, Assignment,

Proficiency, and Walkthroughs (Facility

Demonstration)................................ 26

2.1.4 Non-Radiological. Equipment And Supplies ............ 26

2.1. 4.1 Communi ca ti o n s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

2.1.4.2 Support Supplies ............................... 26

3.0 Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)....................... 27

3.1 Physical Facilities .................................... 27

3.1.1 Design (Locations, Structure)....................... 27

3.1.1.1 Size ........................................... 27

3.1.1.2 Layout ......................................... 28

3.1.1.3 Habitability / Environmental...................... 29

3.1.1.4 Display Interface .............................. 30

3.1.2 Radiological Equipment And Supplies ................ 30

3.1.3 Non-Radiological Equipment And Supplies ............ 31

.3.1.3.1 Communications ................................. 31

3.1.3.2 Records / Drawings ............................... 31

3.1.3.3 Support Supplies ............................... 31

3.1.3.4 Power Supplies ................................. 31

3.2 Information Management System .......................... 32

3.2.1 Variables Provided ................................. 32

3. 2.1.1 Regulatory Guide 1. 97, Variables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

3.2.1.2 Other Variables ................................ 32-

3.2.1.3 Relationship to Functional Needs ............... 32

3.2.2 Data Analysis ...................................... 32

3.2.2.1 keactor Technical Support ...................... 32

3.2.2.2 Dose Assessment ................................ 32

3.2.3 System Reliability ................................. 32

3. 3 Functional Capabilities And Wal kthroughs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

3. 3.1 Op e ra t i o n s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2

3.3.2 Logistical Support.................................. 33

3.3.3 E0F Functions ...................................... 33

3.3.3.1 Dose Assessment ................................ 33

3.3.3.2 Coordination Of Radiological And Environmental

Assessment .................................... 33

3.3.3.3 Walk-throughs (Facility Demonstration). . . . . . . . . . 34

4.0 Exit Interview ........................................... 34

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DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Snellings, D. D.

Poole, J. Computer Support

Baker, T., Technical Analyst Superintendent

Boyd, D. W., Emergency Planning Coordinator

.*Ward, J. R., Training Supervisor

Levine, J. M., ANO General Manager

Smith, A. , Air Quality Engineer, Technical Services

Williams, S. , Air Quality Engineer, Technical Services

Roberson, J., Instrumentation & Controls

Denotes those present at the exit interview

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1. 0 Technical Support Center (TSC)

1.1 Physical Facilities

1.1.1 Design

1.1.1.1 Location, Structure, Habitability / Environment

The primary TSC for Arkansas Nuclear One Units 1 and 2 is located in

the south end of the-third floor of the Administration Building.

This location is within the protected area and is convenient to the

control room and the OSC. Since the primary TSC does not meet the

habitability requirements recommended in Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737,

a backup TSC is provided in a habitable portion of the Emergency Control

Center located 0.65 miles northeast of the plant. If_the E0F building

containing the TSC were to be evacuated, the backup TSC would be

relocated along with the E0F to the AP&L District Offices in

Russellville, approximately 7 miles from the plant.

The Administration Building containing the primary fSC, the Emergency

Control Center building containing the backup TSC, and the AP&L

District Offices containing the back up EOF /TSC were all constructed

according to the Southern Standard Building Code.

The primary TSC has no special design features to ensure habitability

and is, therefore, assumed to have a protection factor of 1. Since

the primary TSC does not meet the recommended habitability requirements,

a backup TSC is provided adjacent to the E0F in the same building.

The primary TSC is equipped with a NMS CAM model CRN-52M system

capable of monitoring particulates and gases and an Eberline SAM 2 is

provided for. analysis of air monitoring cartridges from portable air

samplers. Habitability for the EOF is addressed in section 3.1.1.3.

The primary and backup TSC concept was presented to the NRC in a letter

to Mr. O. G. Eisenhut dated January 17, 1980, and approved in a letter

from Mr. Eisenhut to AP&L dated April 15, 1980.

Environmental conditions are controlled in the primary and back-up TSC

locations to provide air temperature, humidity and cleanliness within

acceptable limits for personnel and equipment.

The issue regarding the need for the Russellville location for an

additional backup TSC was resolved by the NRC on September 11, 1985,

by determining that the backup TSC located in the Emergency Control

Center has the same radiological habitability as the control room.

(See Section 3.1.1) Since there is no need for a TSC in the event

that the control room is evacuated, there is no need for an additional

backup TSC in Russellville. Although the Russellville TSC was

evaluated during this ERF Appraisal the results will not be reported.

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1.1.1.2 Size

a. Primary TSC:

The primary TSC is located on site in the administration building.

The area dedicated to the TSC function is a room of approximately

900 square feet, augumented by an overflow area, "the break room,"

for some members of the dose assessment team. The licensee has

assigned 17 people to the TSC room and 4-5 to the " break room."

The staff's walkthrough demonstrated that this space was. adequate

for approximately 25 people. The licensee has developed the size

requirements based on drills and exercises. The TSC area was

increased to its present size based on experience during exercises.

b. Backup TSC:

The backup TSC is housed in the Emergency Control Center adjacent

to the E0F. It is a dual purpose area, normally used as a

training room. The size is approximately 700 square feet with an

overflow area of the same size in the immediate proximity. Size

recommendations were made based on a pre-construction design

review and were later verified during exercises. The size of the

secondary TSC is adequate to accommodate the estimated 25 personnel

expected to be assigned to the area.

1.1.1.3 Layout.

The layouts of the primary and backup TSCs appear adequate _ to support

the functions of the TSC, considering the expected traffic and

communications flows.

1.1.1.4 Display Interfaces

a. Primary and Backup TSC:

Operations information is displayed by video and status boards.

Status boards are updated in grease pencil by the TSC. communicator

who is in direct telephone contact with the control room. The

status boards contain limited information with emphasis on

actuation of safety systems. The status boards are readable and

use a consistent format throughout the ERFs.

The primary source of operations information is the video display

system. This system is the ANO-1 Safety Parameter Display

System (SPDS). It is a computer-based data acquisition and

display system utilizing both color graphics and monochrome

cathode-ray tubes (CRT). User interaction is via touch screens

and traditional keyboard input. Access to displays is easy and

computer response times are consistently fast.

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The following are recommended improvement items:

(1) The readability of the graphics CRTs was degraded by glare;

the licensee is considering installation of egg-crate-

diffusers to alleviate the problem.

(2) Colors are used indiscriminately and, in many cases, differ

from accepted human factors standards for color-coding.

(3) Trend displays allow as many as eight variables to be

displayed on one page: During the demonstration of the SPDS

several trend lines " overprinted" each other and the

operator had difficulty determining which variable was which.

b. Dose Assessment Information

Although the primary TSC has a status board for dose assessment

information, the primary source of information for meteorological

and radioactive effluent data is a computerized video display

system know as the Gaseous Effluent Radiation Monitoring

System (GERMS). The display interface consists of a Chromatics

graphics display terminal with light pen and keyboard interactive

devices.

1.1.2 Radiological Equipment and Supplies

1.1.2.1 Radiation Monitoring / Personnel Dosimeters

Various radiological supplies and equipment are located in the TSC.

The equipment, which is operated by a health physics technician

assigned to cover the Administration Building during an emergency,

provides the capability to monitor TSC dose rates, radionuclide

concentrations in air, and levels of personnel and surface contamina-

tion. The appraisal disclosed that the monitoring equipment was

within the calibration period and showed that the portable monitor's

batteries were operable. Supplies of 0-200mR self-reading pocket ion

chamber dosimeters and TLDs were available. The emergency locker

contained an adequate supply of protective clothing and canister-type

respirators. The licensee has a procedure for checking the inventory

either quarterly, after use, or if the locker seal has been broken.

1.1.2.2 Protective Supplies

Sufficient radiological supplies are maintained at the back-up TSC

(EOF) to support the function of the relocated facility.

The following is a recommended improvement item:

The guidance contained in procedure 1903.30 " Evacuation" states

that 30 minutes can be allowed to determine if evacuation is

necessary once- the dose rate in the TSC is between 100mr/hr and

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1R/hr. Since the protection ' actor for primary TSC is one and

the self-reading pocket dosimeters contained in the TSC emergency

kit have a range of 0-200mr, personnel could receive a dose

greater than the pocket dosimeter limit within the 30 minutes.

Pocket dosimeters with an appropriate range (0-5R or 0-10R)

should be kept in the TSC emergency kit. Emergency kit inventory

sheets and procedure 1903.60 should be altered to reflect.this

change.

1.1. 3 Non-Radiological Equipment and Supplies

1.1.3.1 Communications

The ANO communications system included the Continental telephone

system, the ANO plant telephone system, the Gai-tronics paging system,

the ANO radio system, the NRC Emergency Notification System (ENS)

telephone, the NRC Health Physics Notification (HPN) telephone and the

Arkansas Power and Light sicrowave system. Use of the communications

systems is described in Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures

(EPIP) 1903.10 " Emergency Action Level Response / Notification,"

1903.13 " Notification of Little Rock Corporate Official,"

1903.14 " Emergency Communications, and 1903.62 - Communications

System Operation Procedure," with other guidance located in Emergency

Plan Implementing Procedures specific to a response center or emergency

response position. Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure 1903.61

described communications equipment testing which would provide for

periodic testing of communications systems. The communications system

for the Control Room, TSC, Backup TSC, and EOF had adequate power

supplies except the radio system in the primary TSC as noted in

item 1.1.3.4 below. In addition to plant telephone lines between the

Control Room, TSC, and EOF, a dedicated separated line was installed

between those facilities for the communicators. It was powered from

vital power and had a battery backup.

The EOF activation procedures provided for changing all dual-use

facil5ty phone numbers f rom normal workstation numbers to preassigned

emergency numbers. The same system was used to shift all TSC numbers

to the same numbers in the backup TSC if the backup TSC is activated.

1.1.3.2 Records /Orawings

The Administration Building library, which is one of four onsite

library facilities, is located in the room adjoining the primary TSC.

This library is the area from which publication changes are controlled.

Document control procedures have been computerized and the system ,

provides a high degree of reliability in tracing the distribution and

entering of changes to all technical publications and manuals. The

" main" library for the site is in tha building which houses the

EOF / Backup TSC. The main library receives all document changes from

the Administration Building library and contains a more extensive

stock of less used publications. Engineering drawings are maintained

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at the Administration Building library in aperture card format only

(i.e., no hard copy sticks on file). Access to th.tse aperture cards

is through both hard copy and aperture card indexes. The o.11y

deficiency in this excellent library system is the fact that the

Administration Building library must have an operational aperture card

reader in order to access isost detailed engineering drawings (see

further explanation under TSC Power Supplies).

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1.1.3.3 Support Supplies

The following is a recommended irnprovement item:

The support supplies immediately available to TSC personnel would

be improved by the addition of standard engineering references

such as the steam tables, break ficw calculations and CRC-lype

handbooks on various subjects. Standard engineering references

are available at engineer's desks located in close prcximity to

the TSC but not in the TSC proper. A forraal ir.ventory procedure

is in use to check the contents of the TSC supply lockers.

1.1.3.4 Power Supplies

The Primary TSC in the Administration Building is served by three '

basically different power supply schemes. For the purposes of this '

appraisal, the three types of power will be referred to in as.cencing

order of reliability as follows:

Type 1: receptacles supplied by normal offsite power,

Type 2: receptacles supplied by both offsite pcwer and by the

security system diesel generator as a backup, and

Type 3: receptacles supplied by of fsite power, the security

system generator and a battery backed DC- AC inserter.

Three pieces of key TSC support equipment are presently supplied with

power from the least reliable Type 1 power supply. These pieces of

equipment should be added to the more reliable Type 2 or Type 3 power

supplies. These key pieces of equipment are:

GERMS Terminal: The GERMS Terminal is the primary source of both

release rate and meteorological data for the TSC. The GEFMS also

prc rides the primary means of performing dose assessment ard dose

projection computations for the TSC. The computer systam to

which GERMS is connected does have reliable power, but the system

is only as reliable as the weakest link, which in this case in

the TSC terminal.

Radio Base Station: The radio base station is the TSC is

connected to Type 1 power. It had previously been connected to a

Type 3 power supply, but was recently moved to a new location and

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connected to a normal wall receptacle. The previous radio

location new has a CB radio connected to the high reliability

power supply. Since the radio base statior, is the primarj means

of communicating with offsite monitoring teams, it should be

connected to the most reliable power source available in the ISC.

Library Aperture Card Reader: The reader is currently connected

to Type 1 power. The reason for including the f eader in the

group of equipment to be connectect to upgraded power _ is the fact

that very few detailed engineering drawings (e.g., P& ids

electrical one lines, etc.) are maintained in hard paper copy in

the library. Upgraced power is necessary to ensure access to the

filmed portion of the library.

Equally or less important ISC equipeent such as telephones, the

SPDS console and a CB radio have been placed on the more reliable

Type 3 power (i.e. power available from three redundant sources).

The NRC inspectors observed the following deficiency:

Essential equipment for the primary TSC should be on back-up

power, specifically: GERMS, the Radia Base Station, and the

library aperture card reader. (313/0511-01; 366/8511-01).

1.2 Information Management

1. 2.1 t!ariables Provided

1.2.1.1 _

Regulatory Guide 1.97 Variables

Artansas Power and light (AP&L) has installed satellites of the SPDS

system as the primary Data Acquisition System (DAS) in both the

primary TSC ar.d the EOF / backup TSC. The GERMS dose assessment System

is -installed in both locations. Tne review of parameters a'vailable in

the TSC against Regulatory Guide 1.97 considered parameters availanla

if they were on either the SPDS or on the GERMS. The cdequacy of SF05

or of the selected R. G.1.97 variables with respect to those sacarate

requirements of tidPIG-0737, Supplenet 1 will be addressed by the NRC

in a future inspection.

The following parameter:s f rom R. G. L 97, revision 2 ore not available

on the SPDS or the OERMS in the TSC:

reactor coolant boron level

e containment isolation valve oosition

reactor coolant radiation level (measured in situ)

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reactor coolant Gamma spectrum (measured in situ)

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cor0 flood tank pressure

quench tank level ,

o quench tank pressure

e quench tank temperature ;

containment cooling fan run status

makeup and letdown flo.v

liquid radwaste tank IcVels ,

emergency ventilation damper position

gaseous radwaste radiation ' level l

9 service water flowrate 3

ccntainment sump temperature

The above list of parameters are those for which no current plans .

exist for addition by the plant to the SPDS. There are other !

4 parameters not currently installed which will be added during upcoming

refueling outages. The most important of these enhancement commitments

- appears to be the Reactor Vessel Level indication System (RVLIS). The !

R.G. 1.97 variables which are not being installed or being input into '

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the SPDS are the subject of ongoing discussions with the NRC Division

. .of 1.icensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regul6 tion'(See ANO-1 SPOS SER ,

dated 29 Jene 1984, ANO-2 SPDS SER dated 30 April 1984, and ANO

response to R.G.1.97 dated 25 June 1984). The exceptions which AP&L '

has taken to R.O. 1.97 vill be addressed in a separate report.

1.2,1.2 Other Variables '

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In addition to the R.G. 1.97 vartiables discussed in item 1.2.1.1 above,

the TCC has a dedicated internai-communications line between the e

control room, the TSC and the '0F over which additional plant parameter .

data can be passed. I

Telephone access to both National Weather Service and a private

meteorological consultant pruvides weather forecasting information.

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AP&L has installed a post accident sarnpling system (PASS) to comply

with item II.B.3 of NUREG-0737 and in addition to normal cold and hot

lab facilities has located an Nuclear . Data-60 spectrometer at the

nearsite E01. Chemical and radiological analysis data available from

this equipment are passed to the TSC via telephone.

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The list of area radiation and process radiation monitor (ARM /PRM)

points available on SPDS appears to go beyond the intent of R.G. 1.97

with nearly all such instruments provided to the SPDS.

1. 2.1. 3 Relationship to Functional Needs

The SPDS systems and ANO were designed to support the specific entry

conditions and critical safety functions (CSF's) of each of the two

different plants Emergency Operating Procedures (E0P's). Combined

with the GERMS and the variables available by phone circuit, the

variables.available in the TSC (and the EOF) are sufficient to provide

the information necessary for TSC personnel to perform their functional

responsibilities, Variables available would allow evaluation of the

challenges to or failure of the major fission product barriers as well

as breaches in the radwaste and spent fuel areas.

1.2.2 Data Acquisition (Safety Parameter Display System)

A computer-based SPDS was implemented to provide real-time data

acquisition and display for critical plant parameters. The SPDS in-

operation has been described in AP&L's generic letter Number 82-83,

April 15, 1983, " Response to Supplement 1 to NUREG 0737 Requirements

for Emergency Response Capability." The SPDS design includes one

computer system for ANO Unit 1 and one for ANO Unit 2. Each of the

SPDS computers gathers data continuously from both of the units (1 and

2) and are fully redundant systems, Each SPDS consists of a SEL 32/77

central processing unit with one megabyte random access memory, a

three hundred megabyte hard disk, a 1600 bit per inch 9 track magnetic

tape drive, and a RAMTEK colcr graphic display CRTs. A total of eight

RAMTEK CRTs have been installed (two in the ANO Unit 1 Control Room (CR),

two in ANO Unit 2 CR, two in the primary TSC, and two in the secondary

TSC (EOF), one for each of the SEL CPUs in each of the locations listed

above).

Sensors monitored via SPDS include 594 analog (range) and 131 digial

(two state). There are 319 analog and no digital safety sensor

channels monitored for ANO Units 1, 275 analog and 131 digital safety

parameter sensor channels monitored for ANO Unit 2. The digital

sensors provide data for control rod position. All safety parameter

sensor data is acquired at a maximum rate of 4000 sensor channels per

second. Every 10 seconds, all safety parameter sensor data are stored

on disk. Currently, historical data for a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months period are

maintained on disk and the capability exists to store disk files on

magnetic tape. Therefore, the safety parameter sensor data can be

archived on demand.

Software has been developed to allow SPDS users to display safety

parameter data readily using touch screen or keyboard commands in a

menu format. Trends of any safety parameter sensor may be requested

and displayed on the RAMIEK CRTs in the Control Rooms and EOF. The

i

. ._ . . .

-,

m ,

t

14

SPDS has been implemented with a UPS (uniterruptable power supply)

which assures continual operation for at least two hours in the event

of a power loss.

Data transmission between the SPDS computers and ERF-CRTs is

accomplished using RGB (red green-blue) video signal format with finer

optics serial links. Data communications between keyboard and black

and white CRTs in the ERFs and SPDS computers are accomplished with

asynchronous serial fiber optic links, but do not employe error

detection / correction techniques for data verification. NUREG-0737

requires that the ERF data communication be reliable. Therefore, an

error detection / correction capability should be implemented on SPDS

i computer as well as on ERF input / output devices to assure the

reliability of data communications.

.To aid the user', it is recommended that a " HELP" feature be added to

the SPDS software. Another deficient area is to complete the point-

by point database verification currently in progress, to ensure

accurate and reliable safety parameter reporting.

The NRC Inspectors observed the following deficiencies:

,

An error detection / correction capability should be implemented on the

- SPDS computer as well as the ERF input / output devices to assure the

reliability of data communications. (313/8511-02; 368/8611-02).

The point-by point database verification should be completed to ensure

accurate safety parameter reporting. (313/8511-03; 368/8611-03).

The following is a recommended improvement item:

" Help" feature should be added to the SPDS software.

1.2.2.1 Isolation

Isolation of data acquisition systems was accomplished using several

different isolation devices. These included isolation devices from

Foxboro, Energy Incorporated, and Rochester Instruments. Several of

the SPDS inputs were parallel from the 8600 plant process computer

which was previously isolated. Drawings were examined which had

incorporated isolation devices when the SPDS was installed.

1.2.3 Data Communications

See Section 1.2.2.

1.2.3.1 Reactor Technical Support

The combination of reference material, staffing plan, workspace,

communications systems, and data acquisition systems provide adequate

facilities to allow both real time and projected analysis of reactor

. __ _ _ _ - - -

. . _ .

r

.

l.

.

15

plant conditions. The elaborate trending features of the SPDS and the

design of the system to support the symptomatic E0P's provide an

integrated response capability, with the TSC using most of the same

procedures and data as that being used by the control room operators.

1.2.4 Data Analysis

1.2,4.1 Reactor Technical Suppart

The data available from various systems and dedicated communicators

appeared adequate to support the TSC functions during an emergency.

The SPDS had the capability to display and trend reactor plant and

site parameters that would allow the TSC personnel to access plant and

radiological conditions. The GERMS has the capability to display and

trend dose assessment informaticn that would assist decision making

for protective action reccamendations. Hard copy capability was

available for both systems through the use of a high quality camara

system. A dedicated co:nmunicator and status board keeper was utilized

between the Control Room, TSC, and EOF to manually track reactor

status and retrieve information required by facility personnel.

Technical support agreements and emergenc,y phone lists were available

in the TSC that would support requesting assistance from Institute

Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), Babcock and Wilcox, Bechtei.

Combustion Engineering, the railroad, and other support activities.

1.2.4.2 Dose Assessment

Dose assessment procedures for the ANO Emergency Respense Faci?ities

provide for dose assessment by two modes. The primary moae is an

automated, fully computerized mode. The secondary mode uses a pocket

computer together with hard-copy maps and overlays. Although r,ot

included in the EPIPs, there is a third possibility, consisting of use

of the maps and overlays from the second mode together with hand-

calculated approximations.

The primary dose assessment system at ANO is utilized for dose

assessment from the Control Room, from the Technical Support Center

and from the primary and backup Emergency Operations facilities, and

is referred to as the GERMS (Gaseous Effluent Radiation Monitoring

System) system. The GERMS computers are two redundant Nuclear

Data 6650 computers, each of which receives data from the ANO

meteorological tower, processes it, and distributes it to Chromatics

terminals and other outlets. Principal user access is via one of a

number of Chromatic terminals which include a color monitor and user

interaction with the display by means of a light pen. Two redundant

data concentrators, Eberline Control Terminals, collect data from the

Radiation Monitoring System, including the ten SPING-4 systems, and

feed it to the GERMS computers.

- -

- - - . _ . _ . . _ _ _ _ ,

,

.

16

.

The normal Chromatics presentation is a graphical display of the

position of the plume superimposed on 10 or 50 mile site maps. The

results of the cose computations can be displayed in numeric form.

Hard copy of a Chromatic display may be obtained using a camera and

Polaroid film. If paper copies of the GERMS output are required, a

DECWRITER terminal may be used in place of a Chromatics terminal.

When this is done, the map display is not reproduced. However, the

plume extent may be sketched on a map.

The master program (operating system) for the GERMS computers executes

user commands to run programs, manipulates files, etc. The primary

dose assessment program in GERMS is named the Emergency Dose

Calculation (EDC) program.

_ The primary dose assessment mode uses the EDC program with the most

recent 10-minute average of the meteorological data and the Radiation

Monitoring System data to calculate release plume doses dowrwind, and

once initiated, will continue automatically to produce updated

calculations at intervals of about 10 minutes. The EDC program uses a

variable trajectory segmented Gaussian plume model that satisfies the

ir requirements for a Class A model specified in Appendix 2 to NUREG-0654,

? Rev. 1. This dose assessment mode is the mainstream mode of the GERMS

1 system. However, it is not a dose projection; it essentially

[ calculates in near real time an estimate of where the plume is, i.e.,

g it does plume tracking.

! The GERM system also permits dose calculations, using much of the same

b framework, in parallel to the mainstream calculations. In this way

a

"

the licensee can make timely plume exposure dose projactions for

adequate protective action recommendations for the 10 mile EPZ.

k The GERMS dose assessment program estimates dose commitment rates and

B total dose commitment for lung and thyroid inhalation pathways using

dose conversion factors for 17 radionuclidas taken from Regulatory

E Guide 1.109. The conversation factors used are for a child. Whole

'

body rates and doses from the plume and ground shine are also computed.

4 A semi-infinite cloud approximation with a correction for off-centerline

f distance is used in the computation of external whole body rates and

, doses due to the plume. Dose rates and doses are estimated for

(5 receptors located at 6 distances in each of 16 directions from the

plant.

i In addition to the computation madc using the segmented plume model,

s i GERMS makes the following site boundary computations: MPC fraction,

l whole body dose rate, and thyroid dose commitment rate (child's).

- These computations are made using default meteorological conditions in

k the form of standard X/Q values and real time meteorological conditions.

5 The results of these computations are compared with emergency class

[ criteria and the appropriate classification is displayed on a GERMS

, Chromatics terminal.

6

w

=

m

F'

.

..

17

The GERMS system can also calculate doses and deposition of

radionuclides out to 50 miles, which can provide the information basic

to protective action recommendations for the food pathways and also-

serve for determining the necessity to deploy radiological monitoring

teams and the locations thereof. The system and procedures provide

.for the use of field monitoring data to correct or modify the dose

calculations, by modifying recirculation factors to adjust calculated

concentrations to match those observed, and oy modifying the ratios of

chemical groups, e.g. the ratio of iodines to noble gases.

Provisions have been made to supply the necessary variables to the TSC,

in most cases by direct input to the GERMS system. '

The secondary mode for dose assessment calculations utilizes a TRS-80

pocket computer with storage on a mini-cassette recorder. This

procedures uses stored-source terms; meteorological data must be input

by hand. It calculates centerline doses for a straight-line Gaussian

plume; the implications of the calculated doses for selection of

protective actions, etc., can be judged by selecting the appropriate

map overlay for the meteorological conditions. In this mode, only

releases of noble gases and iodine are considered.

1.2.4.3- Central Processor Capability

The following discussion applies to source term evaluations in the

Technical Support Center (TSC). The principal release points for

leakage of radionuclides to the environment are the Unit 1 Containment

Purge Vent, the Unit 1 Radwaste Area, the Unit 1 Fuel Handling Area,

the Unit 1 Emergency Penetration Room, the Unit 2 Containment Purge

Vent, the Unit 2 Radwaste Area, the Unit 2 Fuel Handling Area, the

' Unit 2 Emergency Penetration Room, the Post Accident Sampling Building,

the Unit-2 Auxiliary Building Extension, and a Composite Site Total

4

Unmonitored Pathways point. See section 1.2.2 for additional

discussion on data systems.

3

Concentrations in uCi/cm and release rates in Ci/sec are directly

monitored for the above release points for the following radionuclides:

I-131, I-132, I-133, I-134, I-135, Kr-85, Kr-87, Kr-88, Xe-135, Ru-106,

Te-132, Cs-134, Cs-137, La-140, Ba-140, and Ce-144. These radionuclides,

their concentrations and release rates (computed from monitored flow

rates) are directly input to the GERMS computer / graphics system for

computation of offsite doses.

Source terms may also be determined from liquid grab samples, CAM

(continuous air monitors) measurements, or PASS samples of various

gaseous effluent streams. Examples of manual procedures for a variety

of source terms include source term determinations via the High Range

Hydrogen Purge Monitor, the dose rate reading (mr/hr) is multiplied by

the Vent flow rate (CFM) recorded by Flow Monitor and the product

multiplied by two conversion factors. This yields the gross noble gas

release rate in Ci/sec. The iodine release rate is estimated by

, . - .

.

18

multiplying the noble gas release rate by the appropriate value of the

I/NG time-dependent ratio (as pre-calculated in EPIP 1904.04). Grab-

samples may be analyzed using the ND-60 Multichannel Analyzer. PASS

samples can be drawn from the RCS letdown line, hot leg, pressurizer

surgelines, pressurizer steam volume, and containment sump. Constituent

radionuclide concentration determinations of these samples are performed

in'the PASS building with an ND-6620 gamma-ray spectroscopy unit which

utilizes a high purity Intrinsic Germanium Detector with gamma peak

resolution sensitivity in the 80 kev-2 Mev energy range. This system

identifies gamma ray peaks with high resolution.

Coupling these radionuclide concentrations with the appropriate flow

rate, source term release rates may be computed.

Additionally, dose calculations may be made based on samples taken by

licensee radiological monitoring team in the field, which can be

dispatched via an emergency response vehicle. Silver-zeolite is used

in field counting equipment with an RM-14 used to monitor filter

cartridges. These samples may then be analyzed for radionuclide

content on the ND-60 Multichannel Analyzer. Also available in the

field are 44 licensee TLD's and the same number of NRC TLD's

(monitored by State of Arkansas personnel). TLD readings may be

evaluated by a Harshaw-2271 TLD counter in the E0F.

Core damage estimation is partitioned into fuel conditions: (1) no

damage, (2) cladding failure, (3) fuel overheat, or (4) fuel melt.

The core conditions best describing the "no damage" state are that all

the core exit thermocouple (CET) readings indicate that core damage is

unlikely and that no excess amount of hydrogen is found in the

containment atmosphere. The core conditions best describing cladding

failure are that one or more of the CET readings indicate the

possibility of cladding failures and that (a) no excess amount of

hydrogen is found in the primary system and (b) no detectable hydrogen

is found in the containment atmosphere. If the ratio of the activity

of any of several isotopes (Kr-85m, Kr-87, Kr-88, Xe-131m, Xe-133, I-131,

I-133, I-135, Te-132, Ba-140, Ru-103, Cs-136, Cs-137, and Cs-138) to

the total gap release activity estimate is greater than 1, there is a

possibility that some fuel overheating or fuel melting has occurred.

To determine whether either of those conditions has occurred, indicators

are: (a) one or more CET readings indicating the possibility of fuel

pellet overheat, followed by detection of excess hydrogen in the

containment atmosphere or the primary system; and (b) the presence of

any low-volatility fission products indicating that some fuel melting

may have occurred. (Te-132, Ba-140, or Ru-103). The core conditions

best describing fuel overheating are that there has been an abnormal

shutdown and a possibility that the fuel has been partially uncovered

for a period of time greater than a few minutes. Other parameters

verifying that there has been fuel overheating are: (a) one or more

CET readings indicating the possibility of fuel pellet overheat; and

(b) excess hydrogen is found in the primary coolant or a detectable

amount of it is found in the containment atmosphere. Procedures

.

19

involving ratios of specific isotopic noble gas inventories to total

core inventories of these radionuclides allow a determination of

broad-scale range of the degree of fuel overheating (5 50%). If

low-volatility radionuclides (Te-132, Ru-103, or Ba-140) are detected,

fuel melting may have occurred. The core conditions best describing

fuel melting are that there has been a severe accident and the core

has been uncovcred for a long period of time. Parameters indicating

that there has been fuel melting are: (a) more than one CET reading

indicating the possibility of fuel pellet overheat; (b) one or more

CET readings indicating the possibility of fuel pellet melt; and

(c) an excess amount of hydrogen is found in the primary coolant or a

detectable amount of hydrogen is found in the containment atmosphere.

The fuel melting estimates are primarily based on the data from

low-volatiles (Te, Ba, Ru) since Xe, Kr, I, and Cs radionuclides are

--

released in significant quantities during fuel overheating.

An additional source of fuel damage indication is certain key isotopic

abundance ratios in the reactor coolant. Isotopic abundance may be'

calculated from Table VII and VII.A of the Core Damage Procedures.

Additional ratios from releases can be calculated from the release

fractions of Attachment B to the Procedures. The ratios are

I-131:I-133; I-133:I-135; Cs-137:Cs-136; and Cs-137:Cs-138. Relative

values of these ratios indicate whether the reactor coolant is

exhibiting radionuclide activity which is (a) normal, (b) due to

transient spiking, (c) due to gap release, or (d) due to fuel matrix

release. Recommended spiking factors are given in Table VII of the

Core Damage Procedures.

1.2.4.4 Meteorology

Meteorological data collected from the ANO tower include wind

direction and speed at the 10 m and 55 m levels, sigma theta at the

55 m level, dry-bulb and dew point temperatures at the 10 m level,

and temperature difference between the 10 m and 55 m levels. The

data are transmitted to the GERMS computers at 10 minute intervals

where they are stored for later use. In addition, wind direction

and speed, temperature difference, and sigma theta are continuously

recorded on strip charts in the Unit 1 control room. AN0 does not

have a backup tower and does not make precipitation measurements. If

meteorological data are needed when site data are not available,

procedures exist for obtaining information from the National Weather

Service, Weather Services International, or the Middle South Utilities

System dispatcher by telephone. Weather forecasts for use in the TSC

and E0F may be obtained from the same sources. Forecasts of extreme

weather are supplied to the control rooms by the Middle South Utilities

dispatcher.

Atmospheric dispersions estimates are made in one of three ways. The

primary method uses the GERMS computers, and a variable trajectory,

Gaussian, segmented plume model. Transport and diffusion are based on

the atmospheric conditions at the ANO tower. This method is available

.

20

for use in the control rooms, the TSC, and the EOF. The second method,

which uses a straight-line Gaussian plume model, is a backup to GERMS

and is programmed on a TRS-80 pocket computer. The backup procedures

can be used in all locations. The third model is a manual approximation

to the primary method. It is available for use in the TSC and E0F.

The GERMS system estimates dispersion from 12 release points; 10 of

these points are associated with monitored release paths, the eleventh

is for unmonitored releases, and the twelfth is for special dispersion

estimates. The monitored release pathways vent to the atmosphere at

the top of the containment building and are treated as if they were

through a free standing stack of the same height. Unmonitored releases

are assumed to be ground-level releases.

1.2.4.5 Conclusions and Recommendations

The GERMS programs are capable of providing dose rate and dose

estimates within 15-minutes. The program does not explicitly treat

uncertainties in either atmospheric dispersion or dose estimates.

Written procedures-in the 1904 EPIP series compensate for uncertainties

in plume location when the plume is near major terrain features.

The dose assessment provisions appear adequate. However, they are

strongly oriented around releases of radioactivity that are currently

taking place or have already occurred; the projection of impacts of

potential releases that are not yet taking place receives less emphasis.

The following are recommended improvement items:

a. Map showing topographic features to a distance of at least 10 and

50 miles should be provided for use in the TSC and EOF and backup

E0F.

b. The GERMS treatment of winds.below instrument threshold and

invalid meteorological data should be reviewed to ensure that the

treatment is appropriate. Specific attention should be given to

the number of times that past data may be substituted for invalid

data without explicit action on the part of the operator.

c. The dose assessment programs in GERMS should be reviewed and

revised if appropriate to decrease the time required to make dose

projections. The review should consider simplification of the

basic models, optimization of the coding of the models, and

addition of utility programs to simplify and speed-up user

interactions in the manual mode of operation.

d. Printers should be supplied for each of the GERMS Chromatics

terminals.

__

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21

.

e. Much stronger emphasis should be given the concept of dose

projection sufficiently in advance to permit effective

implementation of protective measures.

f. An upgraded severe. accident source term and dose assessment

capability effort (to augment'the Core Damage Procedure -

Attachment B release fraction matrix) should be instituted,

factoring in current and emerging PWR sequences, such as EVENT V

or TMLB'. This should also include assessment capabilities for

the generation / projection of immersion, inhalation, ingestion,

skyshine, and groundshine sourcet. These types of analyses are

important in generating real-time emergency response actions as

described in NUREG-0396 (see, for example, Figure I-II) and in

NUREG-0654.

g. Methods of approximating Ci/sec release rates inferred (back

calculated) from field emplaced TLD's should be developed and

incorporated in the EPIP's.

h. The dose assessment and dose projection results should contain a

representation of their uncertainty, so that the uncertainty can

be more readily taken into consideration in arriving at protective

action recommendations.

i. The Chromatics terminal display and other GERMS system outputs

.should provide the units for each dose output.

The NRC inspectors observed the following deficiency:

,

Tne licensee does not have the ability to make adequate and

reliable consequence assessments of dose. (313/8511-04;

368/8511-04).

.

The summary factors leading to this conclusion are:

(1) Treatment of release from the vents at the top of containment

as elevated releases.

(2) Use of the default (annual average) X/Q values for

determining dose rates for comparison with criteria for the

Notification of Unusual Event and Alert emergency classes.

The default values may be non-conservative in some cases.

(3) Meteorological data availability for 1984 was less than 90%.

Three of 12 periods of reduced onsite meteorological data

availability extended for more than 100 hours0.00116 days 0.0278 hours 1.653439e-4 weeks 3.805e-5 months , while only

one period was less than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months in duration.

(4) Use of the semi-infinite cloud assumption for computing

whole body doses from elevated releases.

~ _ .

- _

.

22

-1.2.5 Data Storage

See Section 1.2.2.

1.2.6 System Reliability

1.2.6.1 Validation and Verification

a. SPDS:

The ANO-1 SPDS was subjected to a verification and validation

(V&V) process. The SPD5 verification included a system require-

ments review and a design review based on the system requirements.

Validation included testing and evaluation of the completed

. system, hardware and software, to ensure compliance with design,

function, performance and interface requirements. This testing

confirmed field input calibration; input source to computer point

identification relationship; software programs for the acquisition,

conversion, manipulation and display of data from field inputs;

and proper operation of the central processors, related circuits

and memory, and peripheral devices. In addition, the primary

SPDS display has been reviewed and studied by Sandia Labs during

the Interim Reliability Evaluation Program and by a Honeywell

study team for EPRI. These reviews concluded that the ANO-1

primary display is useful in providing the operator with

information necessary for assessment of plant safety status.

Furthermore, A?&L has included the SPDS in the scope of the

Control Room Design Review (CRDR) program to formally evaluate

the proper incorporation of human factors principles including

equipment location, display formats and characteristics, operator

interfaces, and compatibility with the E0Ps.

b. GERMS

The GERMS system, hardware and software, was procured as a

package from Nuclear Data (N.D.). According to AP&L staff

neither APAL nor N.D. performed a V&V on the system. AP&L did

correlate GERMS data with readings from control room indicators

as part of its acceptance testing program.

1.2.6.2 Computer Based Systems Reliability

a. SPDS:

AP&L did a " rough calculation" of system availability based on

hardware specifications. The result was an established

availability of greater than .90. Although the system has been

in use for over a year, no reliability data has been gatnered,

e.g., software change requests, maintenance logs, time-on-line.

The only evidence of system reliability is the reportable event

-

.

23

log; AP&L considers it a reportable event when both SPDS computers

are down for more than 15 minutes simultaneously. According to

the AP&L staff such an event has never been reported.

b. GERMS:

AP&L'could not provide any estimate of system reliability for the

GERMS system. The vendor provided no data or estimates of

reliability to AP&L'. The licensee has not kept availability

records or maintenance logs on the system. Although the general

configuration would appear to be highly reliable, i.e., two

redundant computers with an uninterruptible power supply, the

licensee has experienced failures of the system during exercises.

The NRC inspectors consider the reliability of these data systems

to be inadequate, as stated in 1.2.2 above. It is recommended

that AP&L initiate a system of record-keeping for the purpose of-

tracking the reliability of the SPDS and the GERMS systems. It

should include measures that are reflective of hardware and

software reliability.

1.2.6.3 Manual Systems

In order to assure that manually gathered data are reliable, AP&L

provides pre-formatted status boards and checklists in the TSC for use

by the operations communicator and the assessment specialist.

1.2.7 On Shift Dose Assessment

The GERMS system is complicated, and not user-friendly. However, the

licensee demonstrated that their staff included at least four people

(two on-site and two in the Little Rock, Arkansas office) who were

satisfactorily proficient with the system. These people would be on

staff of the TSC and E0F, to operate the GERMS system. The same GERMS

system is accessible for dose assessment from the control room of

either unit at ANO. The shift Administrative Assistant in each

control room is a GERMS system user designated to do dose assessment

calculations, thus providing an on-shift capability in the Control

Room until the TSC is manned.

1.2.7.1 Dose Assessment Proficiency

The GERMS programs are capable of providing dose rate and dose

estimates within 15 minutes. The program does not explicitly treat

uncertainties. (Section 1.2.4.5 above)

1.3 Functional Capabilities and Walkthroughs

The functional capability of the TSC was evaluated by presenting a NRC

developed accident scenario to key members of the licensea's staff normally

assigned to the facility during an emergency. Licensee personnel responded

.

..

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24

to the postulated circumstances by describing their actions a,nd how the

equipment and supplies available in the TSC and backup TSCs would be used.

The evaluation showed that the primary TSC would be adequately staffed and

that the secondary TSC located in the E0F could be adequately staffed and

capable of performing assigred TSC functions. Procedure 1903.30 " Evacuation"

provides for relocation of the on site TSC to the E0F location with

uninterrupted operation of the primary TSC functions. However, no provisions

could be found to ensure that TSC personnel in the secondary TSC would be

provided with the necessary physical access to the Control Room.

1.3.1 Walkthroughs (Facility Demonstration)

The walkthrough technique utilized was refined to concentrate more on

the facilities and less on the flow of the scenario. In two or three

instances where the licensee team seemed unsure of the terminal aspects

of the scenario, the walk-through leader provided correct answers so

that discussions did not digress into questions of personnel knowledge

of the plant and procedures.

The following is a recommended improvement item:

Appropeiate procedures should be developed and implemented to

ensure rapid physhal access of TSC personnel traveling between

the secondary TSC and the cuatrol room under accident conditions.

2.0 Operational Support Center (OSC)

2.1 Physical Facilities (Design, Location, Alternate OSC)

The entire ANO administration building is considered the 05C. OSC

functions are carried out in various locations within the building. Health

Physics functions are on the 1st floor, dosimetry is or. the 4th floor,

administration is on the 5th floor, and medical, mechanical, IEC, and

chemistry are on the 2nd ficor. OSC personnel operate out of thelv normal

working space unless evacuated. The building structure is the same as the

primary TSC previously aescribed in section 1.1.1. No radiological

h @itability design features are incorporated into the structure. The

ventilation system does provide temperature and humidity control.

In the event that radiological, or other conditions necessitate the

abandonment of the OSC, the licensee has identified an alternate location

for these functions. The alternate location is on the 1st floor of the EOF

which is provided with the same radiological protection as the EOF.

2.1.1 Operations Support Center SizeA ayout

The entire administration building is considered by the licensee to be

its OSC. Certain floors are dedicated to certain functions. OSC

managers are assigned to the TSC area of the Administration building

and communicate with their respective teams and team leaders by phone

or direct face-to-face contact. Emergency classification and general

.

e

.

~

25

plant conditions are announced over the public address system. A

conference' room is available that appears adequate to accommodate

assigned OSC personnel.

The adequacy of the size and layout of the OSC facility has been

demonstrated at previous exercises. The environmental conditions are

standard office building conditions, i.e., temperature-controlled,

low-noise, well-lit.

2.1.2- OpplayInterface

The only displays used in the OSC are status boards in the health

physics area.

The following is a recommended improvement item:

The health physics and maintenance areas should be equipped

with a series of plant maps that can be marked with grease pencil

to show radiatioa levels in different areas of the plant.

2.1.3 Radiological Equipment and Supplies

The OSC has been supplied with appropriate equipment which has been

st.ored in emergency lockers located in the hallway outside the health

physics area. The radiological instruments available provide

measurement of the. anticipated dose rates under accident conditions,

measurement of the containment levels and collection of samples of

airborne activity. Protective clothing, including respiratory

protective equipment, is available. However, the raain supply of

protective' clothing and instrumentation is provided at the access

control point. A variety of personnel monitoring devices, including

0-SR, 0-200R, 0-200mr direct reading pocket dorimeters and TLDs are

kept in the emergency lockers. The inspection disclosed that the

monitoring equipment was within the calibration pericd and tests

indicated that the batteries in the portable instruments were in

working condition. The emergency lockers contained radiologically

related supplies such as survey maps, signs, clastic sheets, rope, and

procedures. The emergency lockers are inventoried in accordance with

procedures 1903.60 " Emergency Supplies and Equipment" and 1000.09

" Surveillance Test Program Control."

In the event the primary OSC is abandcoed radiological instrumentation

would have to be transported to the back-up location and other

supplies would be available at the secon'Jary location.

2.1.3.1 Staffing

The OSC is staffed by key foreman level personnel in the disciplines

of maintenance, health physics, operations, and chemistry. For the

most part, these managers and their personnel coerate from their

pormal office spaces within the administration building.

..-

.

26

2.1.3.2 Activation

Activation of the OSC occurs at the Alert classification. Key

personnel carry all lists on laminated plastic cards to perform the

notification and call in of other non-represented personnel. Craft

personnel are called in through use of the normal overtime call list

which is maintained by the key foreman.

2.1.3.3 Onsite Interface and Coordination, Assignment, Proficiency, and

Walkthroughs (Facility Demonstration)

The OSC walkthrough consisted of a series of question from the OSC

section of the ERF appraisal module followed by a problem solving

session involving the front to back planning of an emergency

maintenance task.

2.1.4 Non-Radiological Equipment and Supplies

2.1.4.1 Communications

The communications systems available for use have been discussed in

section 1.1.3.1 above.

The OSC function at Arkansas Nuclear One was fragmented into several

areas within the administration building. This was apparently done in

an attempt to allow major areas (i.e. Health Physics, Maintenance,

Administration Support, etc.) to work out of their normal work areas.

The communications flowpath for information transfer was between the

applicable area manager in the TSC to the area manager in the OSC.

There was not a single OSC manager which managed all OSC functions in

a central OSC area. Briefings to the entire OSC function on plant and

radiological conditions during an emergency were not provided for and

were carried out on a functional area basis. This meant that on a

plant status change each TSC manager would brief his OSC counterpart

rather than dedicated communicators passing information to the OSC and

having and OSC manager given all OSC personnel one briefing. This

would appear to " tie up" key TSC managers passing updated information

in parallel to several OSC functional managers during critical times

in an emergency when plant conditions are changing.

The following is a recommended improvement item:

Provide a means for briefing all OSC personnel simultaneously on

plant and radiological conditions without tying up key TSC managers.

2.1.4.2 Support Supplies

Drawings, Technical Manuals, and other plant reference material were

available to the OSC from the Technical Library on the 3rd floor of

the Administrative Building. The TSC and OSC use the Technical

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I

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27

Library as a source of information rather than prestaging selected

plant drawings and reference material in a centralized area.

Provisions were made for adequate staffing during emergencies to

provide needed reference material. There were no prestaged status

boards in the OSC that would allow for visual indication of repair and

maintenance team locations, desired routing of teams to avoid high

radiation areas, compositions of teams by name, team leader by name,

or other information that would allow efficient coordination of

-various plant teams during an emergency.

The follow)ng is a recommended improvement item:

Provide prestaged status boards in the OSC to allow for

indication of repairs and maintenance team locations, desired

routing of teams, composition of teams, and other applicable

information. +

3.0 Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)

3.1 Physical Facilities

3.1.1 Design (Location, Structure)

The ANO Emergency Operations Facility (E0F) is located approxiniately

0.65 miles northeast of the Reactor Buildings on a hill overlocking

the facility. This same building houses the backup TSC and OSC. The

heating ventilation air conditioning (HVAC) system for the EOF provides

temperature and humidity control of the facility. The HVAC system for

the E0F, which includes high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters,

can be manually placed in a recirculating mode of operation. The

failure of the HVAC system to operate satisfactorily during a demon-

stration requested by the inspectors indicates the need for a routine

testing and maintenance program. The licensee was unable to confirm

whether the system had undergone initial testing to determine if the

installed system met the design specifications or to verify the filter

efficiency. The E0F has adequate lighting, restroom facilities, and

other features essential for its operations. The facility has been

constructed to meet the Southern Standard Building Code.

Calculations provided by the licensee indicate that this facility has

a protection factor of approximately 4 and its radiological

habitability is essentially the same as the control room for a design

basis accident assuming the worst case meteorology. This habitability

was evaluated af ter the completion of the ERF Appraisal and verified

by NRC on September 11, 1985.

3.1.1.1 Size

a. Primary EOF:

The primary E0F for ANO is a building known as the Emergency

Control Center or ECC. It is a multi-use building, used normally

as a training center and as an EOF during emergencies.

_ _. _ _ _ _ .. __ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ ____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .

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The building has approximately 72,000 square feel of useable

space and provides ample space for the estimated 45 people

assigned to the EOF. Space requirements were developed during a

pre-construction design review and later verified during exercises.

b. Back-up EOF

.The back-up EOF is housed in the AP&L local office in Russellville.

The areas designated as E0F areas are approximately 2,000 square

feet. The areas appear to be marginally adequate to accommodate

the estimated 45 people assigned to EOF.

The following is a recommended improvement item:

The space allotted for the back-up E0F should be increased

to 3,000 square feet minimum to better accommodate the

estimated 45 people assigned to it.

The licensee has not verified the adequacy of the size of the

back-up EOF during exercises or drills, nor has any design review

been done to verify that adequate space is available for all

response team members.

3.1.1.2 Laynut

a. Primary EOF:

The primary E0F appears well laid out with appropriate

consideration given to necessary communications and traffic links.

The adequacy of the layout has been verified by the license

during exercises.

b. Back-up E0F:

The layout of the back-up E0F appears to be suboptimal. The

radiological / environmental assessment manager and dose assessment

supervisor are isolated from each other, as are the health

physics supervisor and the maintenance coordinator. The

communications manager and the telecommunications / radio staff are

at opposite ends of the building.

The following are recommended improvement items:

Review functional interfaces and consider arranging those

groups accordingly.

Drills and exercises should be conducted to verify the size

and layout of the backup EOF.

l

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4

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3.1.1.3 Habitability / Environmental

A survey of the EOF /HVAC syster was performed. This review resulted

in an appraisal deficiency. A description of the deficiency is

provided below:

The west end of the EOF building is separated from the east end by

sets of double doors on both the upper and lower floors. Under

accident (potential plume exposure) conditions, the doors separating

the two ends of the building are to be shut and the ventilation system

shifted to a mode which takes outside air through sets of HEPA and

charcoal filters to pressurize the emergency facility end of the

building above outsioe atmospheric pressure. A test of the HVAC

system to demonstrate the system's capability of maintaining a

positive pressure in the emergency facilities failed. When in the

emergency configuration, the system actually crates a negative

pressure on the bottom floor and a positive pressure on the upper

floor. This pressure gradient would draw unfiltered airborne

particulates into the building on the bottom floor and distribute them

throughout the building. The problems appeared to be caused by one or

ML20155A161

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