ML20154Q053

Forwards FEMA McGuire Nuclear Station Emergency Exercise of 870911-12, Final Rept.Nrc Encourage Util to Assist Appropriate Organizations in Resolving Weaknesses Identified by FEMA

ML20154Q053
Person / Time
Site:	McGuire, Mcguire
Issue date:	05/17/1988
From:	Dan Collins NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:	Tucker H DUKE POWER CO.
References
NUDOCS 8806060169
Download: ML20154Q053 (9)

Text

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. MAY 171988 Duke Power Company ATTN: Mr. H. B. Tucker, Vice President Nuclear Production Department

'422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Gentlemen:

SUBJECT:

FEMA. FINAL REPORT - MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION EMERGENCY EXERCISE OF SEPTEMBER 11-12, 1987 Enclosed is a copy of the report by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) on the McGuire Nuclear Station Emergency Exercise of September 11-12, 1987. As indicated in the report, FEMA identified no deficiencies; however, three areas of Lincoln County's response capability were determined to require corrective actions: (1) the Boger City Volunteer Fire Department needs additional training and practice in vehicle decontamination, (2) emergency workers should be provided information on maximum allowable dose, and (3) emergency medical personnel should be provided with self-reading dosimeters. In Section IV of the enclosed report, FEMA also identified 35 areas recommended for improvement.

We encourage you to assist the appropriate organizations in resolving the weaknesses identified by FEMA. Resolution of these items should be completed prior to the next full-scale emergency preparedness exercise.

We also encourage you to work closely with the State and counties in the development of a scenario for the next full-scale exercise that will effectively test the areas in which the above items were identified.

Your cooperation in this matter is appreciated.

Sincerely, Douglas M. Collins, Chief Emergency Preparedness and Radiological Protection Branch Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards

Enclosure:

FEMA Final Report cc w/ enc 1:

T. L. McConnell, Station Manager bec w/ enc 1: (See page 2) 8806060169 880517 PDR ADOCK 05000369 F DCD y;f

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.. Duke Power Company 2 bec w/ enc 1:

NRC Resident-Inspector DRS. Technical Assistant-D. Hood, NRR.

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[( Washington, D.C. 20472 MP - 5 1900 MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Philip Stohr Acting Director Division of Radiation Protection and Emergency Preparedness Of fice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S Nuclear Regulatory Commission FROM: ic ar

. rim Assistant Associate Director Office of Natural and Technological Hazards Programs

SUBJECT:

Exercise Report for the September 11 and 12,1987, Exercise of Of fsite Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Plans for the McGuire Nuclear Power Station Attached is a copy of the Exercise Report for the September 11 and 12, 1987, full participation joint exercise of the offsite REP plans for the McGuire Nuclear Power Station. The State of North Carolina and Mecklenburg, Catawba, Gaston, Iredell, and Lincoln Counties, all located in the 10-mile plume emergency planning zone (EPZ), participated during this exercise. Thi s exercise report was prepared by the Region IV office staff of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).

There were no deficiencies identified during this exercise. However, there are three areas requiring corrective actions, and several areas recommended for improvement. FEMA Region IV staff will furnish a copy of this exercise report to the State of North Carolina and will obtain a schedule of corrective actions from the State which addresses the areas requiring corrective action.

Region IV will assure completion by the State of the necessary corrective actions.

Based upon the results of this exercise, there continues to be reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be implemented by the offsite jurisdictions around the McGuire Nuclear Power Station to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency. Therefore, the 44 CFR 350 approval granted on June 4,1981, remains in effect.

If you should have any questions, please contact Dr. Joan Hock at 646-2860.

Attachment As Stated

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i, Federal Emergency Management Agency f Region IV 1371 Peachtree Street, NE, Suite 700 Atlanta, GA 30309 MCGUIRE NUCLEAR POWER STATION EXERCISE Conducted on September 11-12, 1987 Exercise Report January 4, 1988 Utility: Duke Power Company Plant Location: Cowans Ford Dam, North Carolina I

Participating State and Local Governments:

State of North Carolina Cabarrus County Catawba County Gaston County Iredell County Lincoln County Mecklenburg County

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e TABLE OF CONTENTS a

EaSit I. EXERCISE

SUMMARY

1 II. DETAILED DISCUSSION 2 State of North Carolina 2 State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) 2 State Emergency Response Team (SERT) 3 Joint Information Center 6 Crisis Management Center 8 Mobile Radiological Laboratory 8 Field Monitoring Teams 9 Lake Warning 11 Traffic Impediments 12 Area "E" Office 13 Catawba County 14 Emergency Operations Center (EOC) 14 Other Activities 15 Cabarrus County 16 Emergency Operations Center (EOC) 16 Cther Activities 16 Mecklenbura County 18 Emergency Operations Center (EOC) 18 Other Activities 19 Iredell County 20 Emergency Operations Center (EOC) 20 Other Activities 22

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l TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

Pane Gaston County 23 Emergency Operations Center (EOC) 23 Other Activities 24 Lincoln County 25 Emergency Operations Center (EOC) 25 Other Activities 26 Incestion Pathway Exercise 31 III.

SUMMARY

LISTING OF INADEQUACIES 32 IV.

SUMMARY

LISTING OF AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT 33 V. APPENDICES 37 A; Evaluator List and Assignments B. Exercise Objectives and Scenario 1

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I. EXERCISE

SUMMARY

The full participation joint exercise of the off-site plans and preparedness for the McGuire Nuclear Power Station was conducted on September 11 and 12, 1987. The exercise was evaluated by a team of 27 Federal evaluators representing four Federal agencies.

Upon termination of the Plume Exposure portion of the exercise, the scenario was moved forward in time and a partial Ingestion Pathway exercise was conducted and evaluated. The evaluation was based on NUREG-0654-FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Repsonse Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants".

The McGuire Nuclear Station, operated by the Duke Power Company, is located ten miles northwest of Charlotte, North Carolina, in Meckle nburg County. The plant has two pressurized water reactor units, each capable of producing 1,180 megawatts of electricity.

The st ation is located just east of Cowan's Ford Dam on Lake Normar. and is surrounded primarily by agricultural and recreational areas.

The State of North Carolina activated both its State Emergency Operations Center and Area "E" Office and deployed its State Emergency Response Team (SERT) to the SERT alternate headquarters in Statesville, North Carolina. Catawba, Gaston, Iredell, Lincoln and Mecklenburg Counties within the Plume Exposure EPZ, and Cabarrus County, a host county, all fully activated their EOCs and emergency response organizations. The Ingestion Pathway EPZ includes those counties listed and Alexander, Anson, Burke, Caldwell, Cleveland, Davidson, Davie, Forsyth, Montgomery, Rutherford, Rowan, Stanly, Union, Wilkes, Yadkin Counties in North Carolina, and Cherokee, Chester, Lancaster, and York Counties in South Carolina.

The exercise included the following major participants:

North Carolina Department of Crime Control and Public Safety, l

Division of Emergency Management North Carolina Department of Human Resources, Radiation Protection Section l

l Juke Power Company 1

All objectives of the exercise were accomplished, and no NUREG-0654-FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1 deficiencies were identified. There were, however, three areas requiring corrective action identified, and several areas were recommended for improvement.

These requirements and recommendations are listed in Sections III and IV of this report.

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II. DETAILED DISCUSSION State of North Carolina State Emercency Operations Center (SEOC) - Raleich An Alert was declared at 12:03 p.m. by the McGuire Nuclear Power Station, and by 12:25 p.m. the Division of Emergency Management members of the State Emergency Response Team (SERT) were mobilized and assembled in the EOC. After a briefing, the team was given instructions to depart at 12:30 p.m. for assignments in Statesville. Notification of other State agency SERT members began by 12:40 p.m. The remaining staff at the State EOC were given their assignments and the EOC was fully operational by 12:40 p.m. The objective to activate and staff the facility was clearly demonstrated. The objective to maintain staffing around the clock was met by presentation of an up-to-date roster and a discussion with the Operations Officer.

A representative from the Radiation Protection Service (RPS) was requested to report to EOC at 1:25 p.m. and reported by 1:59 p.m.

During the early hours of the exercise some problems in maintaining communications with the RPS mobile van were encountered but overcome. The Assistant State Director stated these problems should be rectified when the new state-wide radio system is completed.

The staff at the State EOC functioned as a transition team until SERT was established in Statesville. The staff consisted of representatives from the North Carolina Division of Emergency Management, RPS, State Highway Patrol and amateur radio. Other State agency SERT members were sent to Statesville, and others were placed on stand-by in Raleigh.

The State EOC was effectively managed by the Assistant State Director who was assisted by a capable Operations Officer. The objective to demonstrate the ability to make decisions and coordinate decisions with others was met. Periodic briefings were held and appropriate staff were involved in decision-making.

The State plan was readily available, as were other written procedures. All messages were logged, reproduced and distributed efficiently.

The State EOC was well organized and was equipped to support extended operations, if necessary.

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The emergency classification level was posted and clearly visible l as were status boards, which were kept up-to-date. All required l maps were available, posted and utilized throughout the exercise.

The objective to demonstrate adequacy of facility and displays to support emergency operations was met.

Communications in the EOC were well organized and controlled.

While there was no dedicated line from the State EOC to the utility, there wero, however, dedicated lines from the utility to the State Area "E" Office and to SERT Headquarters, as well as to the State Warning Point which is manned 24-hours a day. The )

ability to communicate with all appropriate locations was demonstrated.

The SERT team arrived in Statesville at approximately 3:30 p.m.

and took over Direction and control at approximately 5:00 p.m.

The Governor also declared a proclamation of a State of Disaster at 5:00 p.m. All objectives at the State EOC were met.

Suoerior Items:

1. The dedication and knowledge displayed by the State EOC staff during this exercise.

Deficiencies: None.

Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions: None.

Areas Recommended for Imorovement:

1. Explore alternate means to maintain radio communications with the RPS van while enroute.

State Emercency Response Team (SERT) - Statesville The State activated its alternate SERT Headquarters in Statesville for this exercise. The SERT Headquarters was located in the auditorium of the Iredell County EOC and Agriculture Building, which met the requirements for the SERT staff and enabled a successful demonstration by the State to provide adequate facilities. The SERT staff adapted readily to the unfamiliar environment and oromptly established operations.

Emergency classification levels were clearly posted, as well as appropriate maps and status boards. Each agency had available to them a State plan, which included an Operations Map. All required information was readily available, such as evacuation routes, relocation centers, access control points, radiological monitoring points, and population by sectors. The State successfully demonstrated the ability to provide adequate facilities and displays.

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The North Carolina State Emergency Response Team began to deploy when notified of the Alert emergency classification. Duke Power declared an Alert at 12:03 p.m. and the State Warning Point contacted the State Division of Emergency Management at 12:06 p.m. The State Emergency Response Team Leader and Operations officer were contacted via cellular phone (both in transit) and upon notification went to the SERT Headquarters in Statesville.

Counties within the Plume Exposure Emergency Planning Zone were contacted and requested to activate their EOC's. Six Area Offices were notified and placed on standby. The States of South Carolina, Tennessee, Georgia, and Virginia were notified. The SERT Team Leader and Operations Officer maintained communications with the State EOC via car phone with radio as a back-up.

The SERT Team Leader and Operations Officer, while in transit, received notification from the State Office at 2:25 p.m. that the emergency classification had been escalated to a Site Area Emergency at 2:16 p.m. Other information received by the State Director, in transit, included notification that all county EOC's were fully activated and operational and they were coordinating the activation of the public alert and notification system.

Upon arrival at the SERT Headquarters, the SERT Team Lesder received a phone call from the Duke Power Company advising that a company vice president had been in contact with the Governor and that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) had arrived in Charlotte, North Carolina, and was being briefed on plant status.

In addition to discussing emergency response procedures, they determined that special consideration should be given to public information dissemination in South Carolina because of the Popo's visit in Columbia and to prevent over-reaction by the public and I possible impact on South Carolina personnel resources.

A direct communication link with the McGuire Nuclear Power Station was maintained throughout the exercise and was continuously monitored. All messages emanating from the utility

, to the SERT were verified.

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! At 5:00 p.m. all agencies except the RPS and the Civil Air Patrol l

(CAP) were operational. The counties requested that the SZRT assume control due to the impact on county resources. The State Leader, however, announced appreciation of the emergency response team's ability to mobilize and set up in an expeditious fashion, but decided to delay assumption of control until RPS was fully operational. At 5:20 p.m. the SERT was fully operational and assumed control.

Twenty State agencies were represented at the SERT Headquarters.

A County Commissioner from each of the effected counties was also present. One hundred and sixty individuals reported to the SERT Headquarters in support of emergency response efforts. All

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participants were professional and dedicated in fulfilling their responsibilities. All agencies briefed incoming individuals of events and respective agency activities. Agencies coordinated activities and exchanged relevant information.

The SERT successfully demonstrated ability to mobilize staff, activate facilities, and maintain 24-hour staffing.

The SERT Leader was effectively in charge, as designated in the

. plan. Duke Power declared a General Emergency at the McGuire Nuclear Power Station at 5:20 p.m. The SERT Leader involved appropriate staff in utility briefings and decision-making meetings. The Operations Officer conducted periodic briefings to inform the staff of the current situation. He also involved each agency in the briefings. The Operations officer was also responsible for coordinating message handling and distribution.

Dose assessment and protective action recommendations were generally excellent. RPS was well staffed with personnel who demonstrated their technical and procedural knowledge to deal with the emergency. The Department of Transportation and State Police demonstrated the knowledge and the availability of sufficient resources to implement an orderly evacuation.

Field data from McGuire survey teams were not transmitted from the State Mobile Lab to RPS at SERT. The radio used to monitor field teams' activities malfunctioned; however, communications l were maintained via telephone.

The SERT Leader discussed operational and procedural problems

with key individuals including priorities concerning the use of selective signaling equipment. He identified events, logistics and time factors which had a significant impact on county concurrence of EBS message content. These discussions resulted in positive recommendations for future plan updates addressing each issue.

! For example, the Duke Power representatives were in a room separated from SERT activities requiring the SERT Leader to leave the EOC for utility briefings and updates and to coordinate critical information imperative to decision-making. After a briefing with the utility, the NRC, and RPS, the SERT Leader then l had to return to the operations center to discuss the information with key staff members and the countiss. If questions arose, the Leader had to return to the utility area to obtain answers only the utility could provide. The SERT Leader also had to be absent l

while efforts were being made to obtain concurrence on protective action recommendations with the counties because of the rapidly changing situation at McGuire.

l Further delays were caused by uncertainty at Catawba County due to rapidly changing conditions. After final concurrence by the Catawba County Commissioner liaison at the SERT, planning and coordination of EBS and siren activation was initiated. Once concurrence was received, sirens and tone alert radios were activated and an instructional message was broadcast within the FEMA 15-minute requirement.

During the exerciso the SERT Leader decided to make changes to the setup of the SERT to improve operations and to amend the plans to provide a reasonable time frame for concurrence by counties.

Suoerior Items:

1. Management of emergency operations.

2. RPS's technical knowledge and ability.

Deficiencies: None.

Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions: None.

Areas Recommended for Imorovement:

1. Review and revise procedures on the use of selective signaling equipment and facsimile machines during the protective action recommendation concurrence process.

2. Limit the amount of time for a county to concur in EBS messages. Fifteen minutes is suggested.

3. Provide better communications between the mobile laboratory and field monitoring teams.

Joint Information Center - Charlotte The Joint Information Center (JIC) was activated when the Duke Power News Director notified the Duke Power State / County Liaison Officer, who then notified the appropriate people. Activation and staffing were accomplished, using up-to-date call lists, following the Alert. The first staff person arrived at 1:15 p.m., and staffing was completed at 3:30 p.m.

Representatives from the North Carolina Division of Emergency Management, Duke Power, and Catawba, Gaston, Lincoln, and Mecklenburg Counties reported promptly. The Iredell County representative reported by 5:00 p.m.

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l The training and knowledge of all Public Information representatives appeared thorough and professional. The 24-hour staffing capability was demonstrated through presentation of a roster. _ Staff functions were ably supported by an outstanding l clerical staff.

The Media Center facilities were excellent. Both the JIC staff anG media representatives had adequate space, furniture, lighting, typcuriters, telephones, and supplies. An excess of 200 media personnel could have been accommodated, and private areas were availablw to both JIC staff and media representatives.

Adequate maps and displays were available and the center had back-up power which is tested monthly.

The Me?4a Center used the telephone as the primary comruncation link to tha SERT, county EOCs, Crisis Management Center, the utility, and other points. Back-up communications were provided by amata:1r radio. The JIC could make facsimile transmissions to tne SEPT, county EOCs, the Crisis Managnment Center, and the utility 4 An a.oidable problem arose when the fic transmitted the lengthy text of a press conference to the counties during the time w1.2n the SERT was attempting to obtain concurrence on protective action recommendations.

Tha. JIC staff performed its functions properly. Media kits were available, containing proper background information. Six media briefings were held. They were accurate, complete and technical jargon was absent. Maps and displays vers used effectively, and ccpies of news releases were available for distribution.

JIC Public Information Officers (PIO) did an excellent job of preparing and coordinating news releases. A news monicor section kept track of news the public was receiving and had procedures to correct errors.

The JIC also contained a well-organized ramor control section.

Eight staff members, four each from Duke Power and the N.C.

Division of Emergency Management, responded to calls and gave appropriate responses. The rumor control telephone number was publicizud in press briefings and public information materials.

Defiw.' rdan Nene.

Areat_.du "G 3L_C9P f< !ve Actions: None.

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'yAcovement:

1. Rt tis - - a reae o e,0codures for transmitting hard-copy inro e e te " '1 and county EOCs to ensure that non-essen N A, . . ion is not transmitted, and no 8"tornation . <;nsmitted during protective action dseision makins periods.

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j grisis Manacement Center j

a The crisis Management Center (CMC) was located in a new facility.

It housed the Duke Power Crisis Management Group, State liaison representatives and representatives from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

The facility was outstanding in its design, equipment and arrangement. There were sufficient data boards for all to sie

\ plant status and field team readings and locations. The State 3 had four representatives at the CMC.

e The State used the DEM radio network for primary communication and commercial land line as back up. No problems were observed 1 with this system. All communication objectivas vere met.

The State Liaison to the Division of Emergency Management

( reported directly to the SERT Team Leader. The N.C. State Liaison reported to the RPS Director at SERT. He handled all matters that dealt with off-site radiation control matters. The N.C. State Coordinator coordinated field team deployment and information. The utility team captain and State team captain were located in the mobile laboratory.

The new system, designed to facilitate coordination of reports from State and utility field monitoring teams, worked well.

Deficiencies: None.

Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions: Nor.e .

Areas Recommended for Imorovement: Nono.

Mobile Radiolocical Laboratory The State activated and deployed a mobile radiological monitoring laboratory from the Division of Facility Services, Radiation Protection Section, to demonstrate procedures and equipment for field sampling. The laboratory personnel wero well organized, trained and knowledgeable in their specific assignments. The five nomi group included a team leader, communication -

.pucialias, instrument specialist, staff support assistant and a health physics TOREV member.

Proper procedures for checking supplies, equipment and communication systems were followed by the team leader before deployment of the field monitoring teams. Radio and phone communication procedures between the Cield teams, the EOC, and the utility were adequate. Recepticn was adequate at all fitid measuring locations. The staff demonstrated procedures for the identification and quantitative measureaent of radioisotopes from F

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a gamma ray spectra by using a 10 x 10 cm NaI(Tl) gamma scintillation spectrometer interfaced with an IBM computer which had spectrum stripping capability and data storage and retrieval.

The procedures for preparation and measurement of air sample cartridges or filters were demonstrated although no actual measurements were performed.

Calculation of radiation levels at field monitoring locations was discussed and demonstrated by the team leader utilizing theoretical data obtained from the utility via the fax transmitting unit. Performance of the counter was demonstrated by using radioactive standards and check sources. Careful attention was given to overall counter performance. The calibration frequency and procedures were in accordance with those specified in the operating procedures section of the State emergency response plan.

Sumerior Items:

1. The five member radiological laboratory team was well organized, trained and worked effectively as a unit.

Deficiencies: None.

I Areas Reauirina Corrective Actions: None.

Areas Recommended for Imorovement: None.

Field Monitorina Teams y Field Team #1 - The field monitoring teams were activated and mobilized in a timely fashion. Procedures were in place to activate the field teans at any time. After the Alert declaration, a staff briefing was conducted. Equipment included high- and low-flow air samplers, a gasoline generator, and radiological instruments which had been calibrated recently. T.te equipment was checked and loaded into new 4-wheel drive vehicles.

The field monitoring teams ana mobile laboratory were dispatched from Raleigh and assembled at the Pumpkin Center Fire Station.

The appropriate equipment and procedures for determining ambient radiation levels were demonstrated in a professional manner.

Radiological Field Monitoring Team #1 also demonstrated the appropriate equipment and procedures for measurement of airborne radioiodine concentrations. The team also had the equipment to collect samples of soil, vegetation, water or milk. The team was able to follow the map and find the monitoring points, although there was some difficulty in finding roads on the outdated map.

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Team #1 effectively communicated with the Mobile Field Laboratory l at Pumpkin Center, although some "dead spots" did occur. Team #1 also had to relay some messages from Team #2 to the Mobile Field Laboratory.

Repeaters or a back-up radio were not available. The teams did have walkie-talkies for back-up, but these radios were not of sufficient power to reach the Mobile Field Laboratory.

At one location where the field team was positioned, the radiation level increased from background to 400 mR/ hour in 15 minutes. The controller was not sure if he could make an interpolation of the readings to provide a build-up of the radiation levels (from 0-400) and had to inform Team #1, while they were taking an air sample, that their readings were now 400 mR/hr while minutes earlier they only had background radiation levels. The controllers should be allowed to interpolatu these radiation levels to allow a gradual increase.

Suoerior Items:

1. The Radiological Field Monitoring Team #1 performed in a superior and professional manner.

Deficiencies: None.

Areas Recuirine Corrective Actions: None.

Areas Recommended for Imorovement:

1. Provide more up-to-date maps for the field monitoring teams.

2. Provide repeaters or back-up radios to field teams, t

Field Team #2 - Procedures used for radio communications between Field Team #2 and the mobile laboratory were concise and effective. Team (2 had very little difficulty finding it's assignud monitoring points. The team demonstrated correct f procedures for measuring and reporting readings in sevaral locations.

.. e dispatcher at the mobile laboratory kept the teams advised of the status of the plant and meteorological conditions.

Air sampling procedures were demonstrated which could easily detect 10 -7 uc/cc of I-131 in the presence of noble gases. With one exception, instruments, dosimeters and air samplers had been recently calibrated and met ANSI standards and FEMA recommendations.

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Exposure control was well demonstrated by this team by frequently checking their dosimeters and recording the readings on a pocket-

. size card. The card provided instructions concerning the required frequency and maximum mission exposure. Although Team

1. 2 was near the plume centerline, they were.able to complete a very important air sample and exit the plume without exceeding a 60 mR reading in a 400 mR/hr field.

The teams were instructed to take KI after a release was inevitable but were prepared to exercise independent judgment for this protective action. Team #2 was prepared to minimize instrument and personal contamination. Samples of filters were placed carefully in plastic bags while being handled by gloved fingers to avoid contamination.

Suoerior Items:

1. Field monitoring.

2. Excellent new four wheel drive vehicJes have been provided to facilitate state field monitoring and t 8 environment sampling.

Deficiencies: None.

Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions: None.

Areas Recommerided for Imorovement: None.

Lake Warninc

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Initial warning of boaters on Lake Norman is provided by fixed sirens. North Carolina, however, also provides back-up warning.

Duke Power Company, the North Carolina Wildlife Resources

Commission (NCWRC) and Mecklenburg County all sent out teams to warn boaters on the lake.

Mecklenburg County dispatched a Mobile Command Center to coordinate their lake warning activities. The Command Center staff was knowledgeable and proficiently carried out their duties. While they dispatched one boat, they alerted a total of nine boats and two aircraft for lake warning activities.

1 Both the Mecklenburg County team and the NCWRC team had appropriate equipment for warning boaters and for radiological exposure control. Proper procedures were followed by both teams.

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• 1 ;o Deficiencies: None.

Areas Reauirina Corrective Actions: None.

l Areas Recommended for Imorovement: None. l Information/Warnina Sions - Six public-access boat ramps near the McGuire Nuclear Station were visited. All six of these boat ramps had prominently displayed information/ warning signs. The signs were identical, instructing boaters to leave the lake if they heard sirens or saw red flares. Further instructions listed three radio or T.V. statione to tune in for emergency broadcasts.

The signs also indicated where planning brochures for McGuire Nuclear Station could be obtained.

Sumerior Items:

1. Information/ warning signs at public-access boat ramps.

Deficienc(33: None.

Areas Recuirina Corrective Actigng: None.

hr.eas Recommended for Imorovement: None.

Traffic Immediments The ability of North Carolina to deal with traffic impediments was demonstrated by a simulated accident involving a dump truck and an automobile near SR-73 and SR-27. In the simulated accident a dump truck overturned and spilled several cubic yards of gravel onto a two-lans road, blocking passage. An automobile driver was injured in the traffic accident. It was learned later that he was a McGuire worker who had been contaminated during the plant mishap. At the time of the accident a full-scale i

evacuation was in progress around McGuire Nuclear Station. This accident blocked one of the main evacuation routes.

l i The accident was reported by a N.C. Highway Patrolman who was working traffic ccntrol in the area. The report was relayed to the Lincoln County EOC by the Highway Patrol Communications Station. Lincoln County dispatched an ambulance and a State DOT front-end loader. The ambulance arrived on the scene 2. minutes after the initial call from the Highway Patrolman on the scene, and the DOT equipment arrived 16 minutes after the ambulance.

The Highway Patrolman had determined that radioactive material was present and had secured the area.

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After the injured person had been removed from the scene, clearing efforts were simulated. It was estimated that clearing the road would have taken approximately 20 minutes.

The total tima required to restore unrestricted traffic flow, based on actual times and estimated cleanup time, was one hour and 20 minutes from the time the reported accident was first called in.

The Highway Patrolman and DOT personnel appeared well qualified to carry out their assignments, and the time required to complete this operation appeared to be realistic.

Deficiencies: None.

Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions: None.

Areas Recommended for Imorovement: None.

Area "E" Office The Area "E" Office was located in the Li 4oln County Courthouse basement. Office staffing was complete during the exercise and shift change procedures (relief by staff of either Area "D" or Area "F" Office) were described. Procedures and staff notification equipment in place would guarantee rapid activation during non-duty hours, and the facility was co-located with Lincoln County's 24-hour warning point. Communication was the primary function performed by this office.

Both office directors present during different phases of the exercise demonstrated full knowledge of procedures and an ability to coordinate internal operations conr.istent with the printed Area "E" SOPS, which were frequently consulted. Moreover, outstanding initiative was displayed by the relief manager in utilizing a third-level redundant system (State radio and landline) to maintain important information flow to the plume exposure pathway counties throughout a period in which transmission from SERT HQ was apparently delayed. Utilization of office staff was effective and efficient throughout the exercise.

The Area "E" Office facility was adequate. However, space may not be sufficient for the additional staff person planned.

Two recommendations from the preceeding exercise report have been implemented with very positive results: 1. The Selective Signal was available and effectively brought the Area "E" Office into the utility /EOC/ State loop during the critical period of the office's most important function, which is the transmittal of information to 10- and 50-mile counties prior to assumption of

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_14 control by SERT Headquarters. 2. The rapid hard-copy facsimile device which was added to the office's equipment brought confirmatory copies of material generated at all EOCs into the office within minutes. Other than a protracted period of continuous use by the JIC, no problems were encountered with the hard-copy device.

The Area "E" Office again demonstrated multiple redundancy in communications to all 10- and 50-mile EPZ counties. Primary and back-ups included State radio, Selective Signal, commercial landline, RAPICOM, REACT (amateur radio), and a landline PC-based communications system that enabled both CRT and hard-copy message transmission.

Superior Items:

1. Effective demonstration of multiple redundant means of communication.

2. Outstanding initiative in maintaining information flow to plume exposure EPZ counties.

RgfiqAoncies: None.

Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions: None.

Areas Recommended for Incrovement: None.

Catawba County Emercency Onerations Center (EOC)

The Catawba County EOC had good facilities and excellent communications resources. Activation and staffing of the EOC were timely. EOC management provided strong direction, good coordination and prompt decisions except for the concurrence on protective action recommendations. The staff was competent and all functional areas appeared to be above the average. More visible display maps, which highlight evacuation routes, traffic and access control points, decontamination and reception centers would enhance operations.

Deficiencies: None.

Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions: None.

Areas Recommended for Imorovement:

1. Prev?de more highly visible. maps with evacuation routes, TCP's, and other facilities.

2. Establish procedures to ensure prompt concurrence concerning protective actions. ,

other Activities Traffic Control - Traffic control points and road blocks were staffed by N.C. Highway Patrol personnel who were knowledgeable and well prepared. They were well versed in the use of radiological monitoring equipment and were well trained in general operational procedures.

Sumerior Items:

1. Performance of North Carolina Highway Patrol.

Deficiencies: None.

Areas Reauirina Corrective Actions: None.

Areas Recommended for Imorovement: None.

Decontamination Points - Personnel observed at both i decontamination points appeared to be well motivated and i interested. Most knew the proper procedures for decontamination and for monitoring personnel and vehicles. Some of the personnel, however, would benefit from refresher training.

Deficiencies: None.

breas Reauirina Corrective Actions: None.

Areas Recommended for Imorovement:

1. Provide refresher training for emergency workers.

Relocation Center - The staffing was adequate. Staff included a Registered Nurse, radiological monitors, transportation and communications personnel, congregate care staff, and others. The ,

facility was large, with extra rooms for shift personnel.  !

Inventory in reserve included blankets, cots and other equipment for use in congregatw care. Showars were available. Radios and ,

T.V.'s were available for use in monitoring the amargency. Two l

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days of school food supplies were on hand and readily available.

Proper procedures were demonstrated in radiological monitoring and registration of evacuees. Procedures for the decontamination site away from the facility and for transportation and medical problems were explained.

Deficiencies: None.

Areas Recuirino Corrective Actions: None.

Areas Recommended for Imorovement: None.

Cabarrus County Emercency Ooerations Center (EOC)

Cabarrus County, which serves as a host county for the plume exposure Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ), was responsible for setting up traffic control points, a roadblock and a congregate care center. The EOC str.ff efficiently coordinated the emergency services involved in this exercise.

The Cabarrus County EOC was activated using a written call list, and staff members efficiently handled their responsibilities.

Communications were excellent and amateur radio provided back-up links with the communications center. This corrected an area recommended for improvement identified during the previous exercise. The EOC facility was adequate and had status boards,

maps and emergency classification level signs necessary for i efficient emergency operations.

l Deficiencigg: None.

l Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions: None.

Areas Recommended for Imorovement: None.

Other Activities Monitorina and Decontamination - The facilities for monitoring and decontamination of persornel were located at the Relocation Centers. Procedures were adequately demonstrated by the Wyncoff Volunteer Fire Department. Fire department staff stated that they were notified to report to the center but not told to bring I equipment with them. The EOC, after notification by the Red l Cross, sent the necessary equipment to the Relocation Center.

Despite this confusion, all procedures were adequately demonstrated.

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The vehicle monitoring and decontamination facility was located at SR 1449 and SR 1394 in conjunction with a traffic control point. Monitoring and decontamination procedures were adequately demonstrated by the Pitt Volunteer Fire Department. The necessary equipment was demonstrated or displayed. Contaminated water would be held in earthen dams on each side of the road for later disposition. Staff indicated they could handle 35-40 vehicles per hour.

Deficiencies: None.

Areas Reauirina Corrective Actions: None.

Areas Recommended for Imorovement:

1. Revise procedures to indicate the agency responsible for providing and transporting equipment to the monitoring and decontamination station.

Traffic Control Points - The four traffic control points evaluated were staffed by State Highway Patrolman, all of whom were knowledgeable about evacuation routes, reception centers, and procedures for charging and reading dosimeters. Each had the necessary equipment and a written SOP for the operation of his post.

Deficiencies: None.

Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions: None.

Areas Recommended for Imorovement: None.

Eglocation Centor - The congregate care center was co-located with the reception center and included monitoring, decontamination and registration of evacuees.

The facility appeared adequate for the anticipated number of evacuees (approximately 1,100). It was located five miles beyond the EPZ. The primary center is the Northwest Cabarrus Middle School. Two additional facilities are available if needed. The local Red Cross has accepted responsibility for operation of the center for the first time. The staff adequately Jemonstrated all areas of operation including staffing, supply, feeding, and communications.

Deficiencies: lione .

Areas Reauirine Corrective Actions: None.

Areas Recommendad for Imoroventnt: None.

L Mecklenbura County Emercency Ooerations Center (EOC)

The activation and staffing of tha EOC was completed efficiently, within 45 minutes after the Alert was received from the utility.

The EOC personnel showed enthusiasm and knowledge in carrying out their responsibilities. They took special care to demonstrate the improvements since the last exercise. Status boards, charts, and maps were effectively used, and periodic briefings were given to the staff. All exercise objectives were demonstrated.

Access to the EOC could have been better controlled. While I.D.

badges with photographs were issued to th e people in the EOC, no one monitored the people going in and out of the EOC. The main operational post was located too close to the door. Noise levels in the EOC were excessive because of the large number of agency representatives present.

After the SERT assumed control of the exercise, there was considerable delay and confusion in receiving official instructions. However, the EOC personnel took appropriate actions on their own initiative. The EOC was located outside the plume exposure EPZ. Facilities were very good and included facsimile and copy machines and a personal computer.

Communication support was outstanding in terms of equipment and operators. The Mobile Command Post and high-power radios were very useful.

Alert and notification of the public was demonstrated by a siren activation and EBS broadcast. The EOC also demonstrated its capability to evacuate disabled people in the EPZ. Personnel demonstrated their knowledge of permanent and self-reading dosimeters and procedures for the issuance of potassium iodine (KI). Procedures for the distribution of dosimeters and record keeping were not demonstrated.

Suoerior Items:

1. Facilities and communication equipment are outstanding.

2. EOC staff were well trained and enthusiastic.

Deficiencies: None.

Areas Reauirina Corrective Actions: None.

_19 Areas Recommended for Imorovement:

1. Reduce overcrowding and noise levels in the EOC.

2. Control access to the EOC.

3. Move the operations desk away from the main door to the EOC.

Other Activities Mecklenburg County field activities were activated and staffed promptly. Communications between finld personnel and support agencies were outstanding, due principally to the use of the Mobile Command and Control Post vehicle maintained by the County Police.

Siren activation demonstrated the ability to alert the public on the portion of Lake Norman within the plume exposure EPZ. County Police boats supplemented the Duke Power boats, which provided supplemental warning to all boaters and swimmers to leave the Lake.

Traffic control units were promptly activated at three locations by the State Highway and County Patrol personnel. All officers were radiologically trained and equipped with monitoring equipment. KI procedures were not included in their plans.

Communication and back-up support were simulated.

Two of the traffic control points were primarily vehicle decontamination stations. These locations were equipped with fire department water storage vehicles. Vehicle decontamination was demonstrated at one location and simulated at the other. It l took from 12 to 14 minutes to decontaminate one vehicle. Should l a number of contaminated vehicles enter the evacuation routes, l the small wash-down areas would create a traffic bottleneck.

Vehicle and personnel decontamination procedures at the UNCC relocation were excluded from this exercise due to construction on campus which blocked the entrance to the designated decontamination area. Radiological monitoring was demonstrated by the County Fire Department.

The UNCC mass care facility was capable of sheltering 5000 l evacuees. Back-up shelter was available in nearby schools for an

! additional 15,000 people. Food stores and preparation and I serving facilities were available for 15,000 meals before restocking is required. Cots and blankets for the sheltered people can be supplied within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. Separate accommodations l

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were available for speciaL'.-needs individuals and mothers with babies. Management, and coordination between shelter participants, was outstanding. A real-life medical problem was encountered and resolved by the American Red Cross nurses and State Troopers.

Listings of mobility-impaired individuals were available.

Superior Items:

1. Mecklenburg Mobile Command and Control Post communications network.

2. La'W enforcement coordination and support.

3. Initiation of warning procedures at Lake Norman.

4. Radiological training and availability of monitoring equipment.

Deficiencies: None.

Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions: None.

Areas Recommended for Imorovement:

1. Develop procedures to expand decontamination locations to alleviate potential traffic bottlenecks.

l 2. Train emergency workers in the lake area regarding the policy and procedures for the issuance of KI.

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3. Install radio equipment on Duke Power and County Police boats to enable them to communicate directly with one another.

4. As appropriate, include procedures for the use of KI for traffic control personnel.

Iredell County Emeraency Operations Center (EOC)

P The Iredell County EOC was well suited to support emergency operations and was effectively managed by the Emergency Management Coordinator. The Coordinator held frequent briefings, and discussed actions with appropriate staff. Access to the EOC was controlled by County Sheriff's Deputies. The Board of County Commissioners were represented during the entire exercise and were advised by the Emergency Management Coordinator when important decisions were made.

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Communications systems were adequate. They included the Selective Signal telephone to the utility, radios and sufficient commercial telephones. The ring-down telephone, however, was not located in the EOC because the SERT had taken over the space they would normally occupy.

The facility was activated promptly, using an up-to-date call list. The Emergency Management Coordinator decided to minimally  :

activate the EOC at the Alert level; other emergency workers were placed on standby until :he situation escalated. -

The Iredell County EOC staff demonstrated its ability to deal with impediments to evacuation by planning alternate routes for evacuation traffic in response to a bridge collapse and the closure of the interstate. The staff also planned a response to an accident involving a school bus and a gasoline truck under these conditions.

There was an adequate supply of dosimetry and EOC staff appeared

knowledgeable of its use. The dosimetry packages contained  :

standard operating procedures for their use, r The coordination of public alerting and the issuance of an EBS message appeared cumbersome. The draft message was faxed to all the EOC's for concurrence. After concurrence was received, Mecklenburg County gave a countdown for the siren activation and

, EBS broadcast. The activation of the public alert and notification system was within the required time frame.

Following the declaration of a General Emergency by the utility,

! the Media Center chose to send a 23-page fax to all local EOC's.

At the same time, the SERT was attempting to send a draft EBS message out for concurrence. Iredell County did not receive the draft message until a runner was sent to the SERT to obtain copies of the message.

Deficiencies: None.

Areas Recuirina Correctivs Actions: Nane.

3 Areas Recommended for Imorovement:

1. Improve concurrence procedures for EBS messages.

2. Place a drop for the ring-down line in the alternate County EOC.

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& 4 Other Activities School Evacuation - Ten school buses, to be driven by school staff, were available to evacuate the Mt. Mulrne Elementary School. The County EOC instructed the school principal by commercial telephone to evacuate students in accordance with existing plans. One bus and one class of students were involved in a token evacuation during this exercise. Each student was approprActely tagged.

All parents were sent a letter from the school principal informing them of the possible need for evacuation in the event of an accident at the McGuire plant and that contingency plans had been developed. The Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) contained detailed instructions for the school staff. Because the buses do not have 2-way radio communications, a maintenance vehicle, which was equipped with a radio, would provide communications for the bus convoy. The principal and the county representative were knowledgeable of their duties in the event of an emergency.

Deficiencies: None.

Areas Recuirine Corrective Actions: None.

Areas Recommended for Imorovement: None.

Relocation Center - South Iredell High School was recently designated as a reception center and shelter. Its capacity was 3,370. Two radiological monitoring teams were on hand and well-trained. Standard ARC forms were used for registration. Cots, blankets, and food for protracted operations were on hand.

However, those in charge stated that procurement of these items was possible from sources only 12 miles away from the shelter.

The Shelter Director and staff were alert and enthusiastic about their emergency assignments and used the written SOP. All were trained in shelter management. Seventy persons were assigned from the County Welfare Office and were available for 24-hour operations. The facilities and staff training were adequate.

Emergency medical service was provided by trained emergency medical teams, composed largely of volunteers.

Deficiencies: None.

Areas Recuirine C?Irective Actions: None.

Argas Recommendeu for Imorovement: None.

1 Traffic and Access Control Points - Five traffic control points were evaluated. Typically, each point was manned by one county policeman and one State Patrolman. Both State police e.nd county police performed their assigned tasks well. A State Phtrol vehicle checked access control points and advised them of the current situation every 30 minutes. Radio communications were effective. Use of radiological instruments was also demonstrated. County police were not equipped with needed dosimetry, but were able to use State Patrol dosimeters.

Deficiencies idone .

Areas Reauirina Corrective Actions: None.

Areas Recommended for Imorovement:

1. Revise procedures for issuance of dosimetry.

Gaston County Emeraency Operations Center (EQQL The Gaston County Emergency Operations Center (EOC) was staffed quickly and effectively. It was fully operational at 12:45 p.m.

All significant offices and agencies were represented. The staff was well prepared and organized. Most had plans access to them.

Even the new people on the staff appeared to understand their responsibilities and performed well. ,

The staff was lead effectively by the County Emergency Management Director who kept them informed on a continuing basis and encouraged participation in all decision-making. Messages were read to all the participants and copies were available in a convenient location.

Internal county communications syatens worked well. Difficulties in communicating with the SERT and the McGuire Plant were encountered. Messages were frequently delayed and difficult to understand. The communications personnel incorrectly transcribed at least two messages from the utility which resulted in misreporting of technical information. The source of the problem was the unfamiliarity of the communications staff with technical terminology used by the utility.

The EOC itself was an excellent facility that met all i

requirements. The only equipment problem arose in connection I I

with the highway patrol's reliance on "walkie-talkies", which did not have sufficient range. ,

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The staff understood, and was prepared to follow, all coordination requirements effectively; however, delays in the concurrence process with the other counties hindered their activities. An unconfirmed report of General Emergency and a delay in communications prompted a decision to evacuate Zones R and S before recommendations for evacuation were received.

All public alerting activities went smoothly once all counties had concurred with the EBS message.

Superior Items:

1. EOC staff knowledge and skills.

Deficiencies: None.

Areas Rt7uirino Corrective Actions: None.

Areas , Recommended for Imorovement:

1. Provide additional training in technical terminology.

2. Decisions to take actions should be based upon information received from an authorized source.

Other Activities Six field activities were evaluated: five traffic control points (TCP's), and one decontamination facility and relocation center.

No deficiencies were identified during the exercise.

All personnel were extremely knowledgeable of their duties and demonstrated the necessary procedures to perform their responsibilities.

Suoerior Items:

1. Shelter operations at the South Point High School, and the Public Safety officials.

Deficiencies: None.

Areas Recuirino Corrective Actions: None.

Areas Recommended for Imorovement: None.

Lincoln County Emercancy Ocerations Center (EOC)

The Lincoln County EOC staff, consisting of over 20 members, participated on both the lith and 12th of September. The staff exhibited a thorough knowledge of the county plan and procedures.

They were a cooperative team and worked effectively together.

The exercise objectives were met and a corrective action from the previous exercise was accomplished.

Two County Commissioners and the County Manager attended the entire exercise. All organizations were represented by responsible officials and displayed back-up rosters.

Lincoln County was fully staffed on the lith by 12:55 p.m., which was 40 minutes after the Alert and well within the time limit required by their plan. Upon staffing, the County Director gave a briefing of the incident. The EOC staff included two County Commissioners, the Sheriff and other agency chiefs from the various county agencies participating. 24-hour staffing capability was demonstrated by presentation of a roster. The EOC was set up in horse shoe fashion with 15 telephonsa placed on the work tables, which corrected a problem identified during the previous exercise.

Siren /EBS warnings were coordinated with Mecklenburg County and SERT. Each time the sirens and EBS were activated, emergency vehicles were dispatched to provide back-up notification for the area.

The County Emergency Management Director made recommendations to the Chairman of the county Commissioners and the County Manager who coordinated the recommendations with appropriate organizations and then made the decisions. This method proved to be very effective.

The facility was adequate to support emergency operations.

Twelve wall charts were prominently displayed and kept current.

Although more space would be an asset, the space was adequate, and noise did not interfere with operations.

A list was available indicating those residents with special evacuation needs. Mental Health and the Council on Aging coordinated activities concerning these individuals.

Emergency workers were furnished permanent record devices (TLD's), as well as pocket dosimeters and chargers. All emergency workers present at the EOC (Highway Troopers, Sheriff's Office, Lincolnton Police Department, and Lincolnton Fire Department personnel) questioned were familiar with the dosimeters and their use.

l Suoerior Items:

1. Attitude, cooperation, spirit of EOC personnel.

2. Interest shown by elected officials. ,

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3. Communications capability, primary and back-up, including RACES.

Deficiencies: None.

Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions: None.

Areas Recommended for Imorovement:

1. Install an additional facsimile machine to allow for the simultaneous transmission and receipt of messages.

2. Adopt the Phonetic Alphabet for all voice communication regarding sector identification.

3. Ensure that all messages begin and and with, "This Is An Exercise Message".

Other Activities Traffic Control and Decontamination - Four traffic control points j were observed in this exercise. One was a roadblock, two were for direction of traffic to decontamination centers, and the last was for direction of traffic to shelters. All four were staffed by the State Highway Patrol, and two were also staffed by the Lincoln County Sheriff's Department. The State Highway Patrol and the Sheriff's Department at the traffic and access control points demonstrated that they knew the evacuation routes, their assignments, their capabilities for communication with the local and State EOCs, and the source of tow trucks if needed. The State Highway Patrol knew the procedures for allowing the entry of people into controlled areas and presented the forms and equipment they would provide for such entry. The Lincoln County Sheriff's Department knew that they were there to assist the State Highway Patrol.

Two decontamination stations were observed, one operated by the Pumpkin Center V.F.D. and one operated by the Boger City V.F.D.

The Pumpkin Center V.F.D. had the proper equipment, demonstrated the procedures for monitoring contaminated vehicles, kept potentially contaminated vehicles isolated, and knew how to dispose of radioactive waste.

The Boger City V.F.D. procedures did not provide for a thorough monitoring of vehicles. The radiological monitors stated that they would not monitor the inside of a vehicle, and if traffic were badly backed-up, they would only monitor the air filter.

Proper procedures were not followed to prevent contamination.

They did not have a method for isolating contaminated vehicles from uncontaminated people. (0.4.b.)

Each emergency worker in the field had the proper equipment for exposure control and followed proper procedures with respect to recording the readings. However, there was a great variety of opinion with respect to the acceptable maximum dose allowed without authorization. (K.4.)

Deficiencies: None.

Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions:

1. O.4.b. - The Boger City V.F.D. needs additional training and practice in vehicle decontamination functions.

2. K.4. - Emergency workers should be provided maximum allowable dose information.

Areas Recommended for Imorovement: None.

School Evacuation - The Catawba Springs Elementary School evacuation demonstration involved the loading of school children onto their school buses within five to ten minutes of the notice to evacuate. The principal announced to the school that an evacuation had been ordered and that teachers and children should prepare to evacuate. He then ordered an evac'tation on a grade-by-grade basis. The loading of the school children onto buses was orderly. Teachers and children were assigned by grades to specific buses. The demonstration ended when all the buses were full.

The school also demonstrated the ability to communicate with the School Superintendent's Office. However, the message received in the school's office on the tone-alert monitor was unclear; it was difficult to hear. A back-up call by the Superintendent's Office was made to verify the message.

While nothing else was actually demonstrated, the school principal was well aware of the procedures to be followed regarding verification of messages; calling in the regular bus drivers; methods for assuring that all students were accounted for; the location of the shelter to which he would direct the

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drivers; the availability of traffic control at his school; and what information had been provided to parents. Further, the procedures to follow are included in a school emergency response plan.

The bus drivers were not provided with maps to direct them to their shelter. While the buses are to follow each other, and the shelter is apparently within 8 to 10 miles, a map for each driver would provide additional guidance. Although parents had been informed previously by the schools and power company in letters and brochures, after the evacuation of the school it might be desirable to leave a message at the school regarding the shelter location.

Conversations with the School Superintendent and Emergency Management Coordinator at the Lincoln County EOC indicated their knowledge of procedures to be followed in the event of a school evacuation. They stated that sufficient buses were available to take care of the public schools and private schools (day care centers) in the EPZ, as long as high school students who drive to school are permitted to drive their cars to the shelters.

In sum, the organizational ability and necessary resources to effect an orderly evacuation of the schools within the plume EPZ are available in Lincoln County.

Suoerior Items:

1. The school was very well organized in the loading of the children'onto the buses.

Deficiencies: None.

I Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions: None.

Areas Recommended for Imorovement:

1. Provide a better means of notifying schcols of protective actions.

2. Provide information regarding protective actions taken to parents calling schools.

3. Provide bus drivers with evacuation route maps.

l Reception and Concrecate Care - Procedures for registering i evacuees at the Lincolnton Jr. High School shelter were I

efficient. The procedure for checking individuals for contamination was followed very thoroughly in the two instances observed, including checking the soles of shoes. Available l

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. I equipment was adequate and probes were covered. Although procedures for personnel decontamination were not demonstrated, except for the repeat monitoring aftor decontamination, the shelter representative described in detail the process that would be followed in personnel decontamination.

Those organizations listed in the county plan, and others, opened and staffed the shelter. All members of the shelter staff had received shelter management training. A 24-hour staffing capability existed.

The shelter certainly would have been able to provide food for evacuees (they will use the school cafeteria, if need be), health care, and general counseling. There were provisions for keeping the evacuees informed of events in the EPZ. The shelter had adequate communications with the EOC. The Shelter Manager (who is the school principal) was not aware that according to the plan 2,075 evacuees could be accommodated. She indicated that 200 could be comfortably accommodated in the gym and others in the classrooms. School enrollment is 715 and all can be assembled in the gym. If the facility had reached its limit, the Shelter

. Manager indicated she would inform the EOC.

Finally, this facility was not accessible to handicapped individuals.

Deficiencies: None.

Areas Reauirina Corrective Actiona: None.

Areas Recommended for Imorovement:

1. Reassess the capacity of the shelter with the school principal's participation.

2. Provide access for the handicapped.

Medical Services - The medical services drill began when a Highway Patrolman at the simulated accident scene called in an accident with possible radioactive contamination. The Lincoln l County Hospital Emergency Medical team arrived within ten l minutes. The team dressed out, approached the accident scene, l but then discovered the radiation monitor was left in the vehicle. After retrieving the instrument, the EM personnel l monitored the patient and ascertained the location and level of l sone of the contamination. The team handled the patient as well l as could be expected considering they had to remove the patient i

from the vehicle and place him on a back board. Additional l

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• training is needed for EM personnel on monitoring techniques and contamination control. Upon departure from the site, the EM team notified the Lincoln County Hospital that they would arrive in about ten minutes. The EM personnel did not have self-reading dosimeters. (K.3.a.)

The hospital was not informed that the accident victim was contaminated until the ambulance left the scene. As a result, the hospital was not completely prepared for the patient's arrival. The patient was attended outside by a physician and EMT personnel until preparations were completed. The patient was then moved to the treatment room. The contaminated areas (lantern mantels) were discovered by the staff during monitoring, and clothing was removed. Because of a suspected back injury and need for x-rays and medical treatment, further decontamination was not pursued after removal of the mantels. The exercise controller, however, was not prepared to provide contamination levels to the hospital staff to pursue the decontamination activities.

Superior Items:

1. The hospital staff attitude and approach to the decentamination problem was very professional.

Deficiencies: None.

Areas Reauirino Corrective Actions:

1. K.3.a. - Provide emergency medical personnel with required self-reading dosimeters.

Areas Recommended for Imorovement:

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1. Revise procedures to provide for hospital notification of accidents involving possible radioactive contamination at the same time the ambulance is dispatched.

2. Provide additional training for EMT personnel on monitoring techniques and contamination control.

3. Provide additional training for hospital personnel regarding decontamination procedures.

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Incestion Pathway Exercise - Partial Participation All agencies designated in the State Plan were represented at the Ingestion Pathway tabletop exercise. Initial discussions by participants identified respective roles and responsibilities as outlined in the State Plan.

Critical areas that were discussed included: Land-use evaluations; on-going environmental sampling and analysis; pasture land and dairy animals; public information and instructions for protective actions; water supply; identification of types, locations, and volume of agricultural samples; 24-hcur staffing; and communications.

Several areas were not discussed. These included embargos or quarantines of food, treatment of local fruits and vegetables, water cor.cerns, rumor control, legal matters, and types of Federal assistance. When questioned about these areas, the participants responded satisfactorily.

Deficiencies: None.

Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions: None.

Areas Recommended for Imorovenent:

1. Identify Ingestion Pathway Public Information responsibilities in the plan.

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SUMMARY

LISTING OF INADEQUACIES Eaqility or EVEEE ~ Corrective Scheduled Activity Item Action Date of Completion.

Deficiencie.g None Areas Recuirina Corrective Action s

Lincoln O.4.b. The Boger City V.F.D. needs County additional training and practice in vehicle decontamination functions.

K.4. Emergency workers should be provided maximum allowable dose information.

K.3.a. Provide emergency medical personnel with required self-reading dosimeters.

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SUMMARY

-LISTING OF AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT Facility or Activity Areas Recommended for Imorovement SEOC 1. Explore alternate means to maintain radio communications with the RPS van while anroute.

SERT 1. Review and revise procedures on the use of selective signaling equipment and facsimile machines during the protective action recommendation concurrence process.

2. Limit the amount of time for a county to concur in EBS messages. Fifteen minutes is suggested.

3. Provide better communications between the mobile laboratory and field monitoring teams.

Joint 1. Review and revise procedures for Information transmitting hard-copy information to Center SERT and county EOCs to ensure that non-ossential information is not transmitted, and no information is transmitted during protective action decision making periods.

Field 1. Provide more up-to-date maps for the Monitoring field monitoring teams.

Team #1

2. Provide repeaters or back-up radios to field teams.

Catawba 1. Provide more highly visible maps with County evacuation routes, TCP's, and other facilities.

a

Facility or Activity Areas Recommended for Imorovement

-Catawba 2. Establish procedures to ensure prompt County concurrence concerning protective (Continued) actions.

3. Provide refresher training for emergency workers.

Cabarrus 1. Revise procedures to indicate the agency County responsible for providing and transporting equipment to the monitoring and decontamination station.

Mecklenburg 1. Reduce overcrowding and noise levels in County the EOC.

2. Control access to the EOC.

3. Move the operations desk away from the main door to the EOC.

4. Develop procedures to expand decontamination locations to alleviate potential traffic bottlenecks.

5. Train emergency workers in the lake area regarding the policy and procedures for the issuance of KI.

6. Install radio equipment on Duke Power and County Police boats to enable them to communicate directly with one another.

7. As appropriate, include procedures for the use of KI for traffic control personnel.

Iredell 1. Improve concurrence procedures for EBS County messages.

2. Place a drop for the ring-down line in the alternate County EOC.

3. Revise procedures for issuance of dosimetry.

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. 1 Facility or

. Activity Areas Recommended for Imorovement

-Gaston 1. Provide additional training in technical county terminology.

2. Decisions to take actions should be based upon information received from an authorized source.

Lincoln 1. Install an additional facsimile machine County to allow for the simultaneous transmission and receipt of messages.

2. Adopt the Phonetic Alphabet for all voice communication regarding sector identification.

3. Ensure that all messages begin and end with, "This Is An Exercise Message".

4. Provide a better means of notifying schools of protective actions.

5. Provide information regarding protective actions taken to parents calling schools.

6. Provide bus drivers with evacuation route maps.

7. Reassess the capacity of the shelter with the school principal's participation.

8. Provide access for the handicapped, i 9. Revise procedures to provide for j hospital notification of accidents I involving possible radioactive contamination at the same time the ambulance is dispatched.

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10. Provide additional training for EMT l personnel on monitoring techniques and I contamination control.

11. Provide additional training for hospital personnel regarding decontamination procedures.

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~36-Facility or Activity Areas Rece2 mended for Imorovement Ingestion 1. Identify Ingestion Pathway Public Pathway. Information responsibilities-in the Exercise plan, i

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G V.

V. APPENDICES A. Evaluator List and Assignmer.'s c

B. Exercise Objectives and Scenario 1

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FEDERAL EVALUATOR ASSIGNMENTS MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION EXERCISE September 11-12, 1987 CHIEF EVALUATOR AND RAC CHAIRMAN Glenn Woodard (FEMA)

STATE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER (EOC) -

(RALEIGH)

Al Lookabaugh (FEMA)

STATE EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM (SERT) HEADOUARTERS - (STATESVILLE)

John Heard (FEMA)

Anna Hart (USDA)

Peter K. W. Chin (DOE)

MEDIA CENTER - (CHARLOTTE) '

Tom Hawkins (FEMA)

Ed Hakala (FEMA)

CRISIS MANAGEMENT CENTER - (CHARLOTTE)

Frank Wilson (FEMA)

RADIOLOGICAL MOBILE LABORATORY - (PUMPKIN CENTER)

Walt Kisieleski (FEMA)

RADIOLOGICAL FIELD TEAMS - (PUMPKIN CENTER).

Fred Oleson (FEMA)

George Goforth (FEMA)

AREA "E" OFFICE - (LINCOLNTON)

Chris Saricks (FEMA)

MEDICAL ACTIVITIES Brad Eichorst (DHHS/FDA)

CATAWBA COUNTY - (NEWTON)

Bill Chambers (FEMA)

Bill Leuders ** (FEMA)

GASTON COUNTY - (GASTONIA)

John Eley (FEMA)

Bill Beattie ** (FEMA)

IREDELL COUNTY - (STATESVILLE)

Larry Robertson (FEMA)

• John Devlin ** (FEMA)

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LINCOLN COUNTY - (LINCOLNTON)

Josh Moore (FEMA)

• Margaret Singh (FEMA)

MECKLENBURG COUNTY - (CHARLOTTE)

Raj Sakar (FEMA)

Martha Willis ** (FEMA)

CABARRUS COUNTY - (CONCORD)

Bill Small (FEMA)

Tom Carroll (FEMA)

MOBILE EVALUATOR Al Mall (DOT)

FEDERAL OBSERVERS Chuck Wakano (EPA)

School Evacuations in Iredell and Lincoln Counties scheduled for 11:00 a.m. on September lith will be evaluated as listed below:

IREDELL COUNTY LINCOLN COUNTY John Devlin Margaret Singh Tim Dowd

• • Lake Warning Activities scheduled for 2:30 p.m. on September lith will be evaluated as listed below:

Bill Leuders Bill Beattie Martha Willis John Devlin Tim Dowd 1

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MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION EXERCISE OBJECTIVES September 11-12, 1987

1. Demonstrate ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities promptly. (All) (1)

2. Demonstrate ability to fully staff facilities and maintain staffing around clock. (All) (2)

3. Demonstrate ability to make decisions and to coordinats those decisions and resulting emergency actions with adjoining counties and support agencies. (All) (3)

4. Demonstrate adequacy of facilities and displays to support emergency operations (All) (4).

5. Demonstrate ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations and field personnel. (All) (5)

6. Demonstrate ability to assess recommendations from the McGuire plant and to determine appropriate protective measures, based on PAG's, evacuation time estimates and all other appropriate factors.

(All minus Cabarrus) (10)

7. Demonstrate the ability to implement protective actions for ingestion pathway hazards. (State)(12)

8. Demonstrate ability to alert the public within the 10-m11e EPZ and disseminate an initial instructional message within 15 minutes from the time the message is concurred in by all parties necessary. (All minus Cabarrus County) (13)

9. Demonstrate ability to formulate and distribute appropriate instructions to the public in a timely fashion. (All minus Cabarrus) (14).

10. Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to manage an orderly evacuation of all or part of the plume EPZ, to include the mobility impaired, and to control access to evacuated area (s). (All) (15)

11. Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to deal with impediments to evacuation, as inclement weather or traffic obstructions. (State)(16) 1

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12. Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to effect an orderly evacuation of schools within the plume EPZ. (Lincoln, Iredell)

(19)

13. Demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure. (All) (20)

14. Demonstrate the ability to make decisions, based on the situation; when or whether to distribute and issue KI to emergency workers and/or institutional-ized persons. (All) (21)

15. Demonstrate the ability to provide advanced coordination of information to be released, to effect rumor control and be prepared to brief the media in a clear, accurate and timely manner.

(All) (24,25,26)

16. Demonstrate adequacy of procedures for registration and radiological monitoring of evacuees. (All minus State) (27)

17. Demonstrate adequacy of facilities for mass care of evacuees. (All minus state. (28)

18. Demonstrate adequate equipment and procedures for vehicle decontamination stations. (All minus State) (29)

19. Demonstrate the ability to augment on-site medical and fire personnel and adequacy of ambulance facilities' and hospitals' procedures for handling contaminated injured individuals. (Mecklenburg on-site, Lincoln off-site) (30,31)

20. Demonstrate ability to estimate total population exposure. (State) (34)

21. To retest those response actions found deficient or inadequate during the last scheduled exercise.

These items to be listed within the exercise instructions as special emphasis items. (Iredell, Mecklenburg) 2

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North Carolina Department of Crime Control and Public Safety James G. Atartin. Governor Division ofIUnergency Alanagement Joseph W. Dean, Secretary 116 W. Jones St., RaMgh, N. C. 2 7611 (919) 733 3867 June 26, 1987  :

Mr. Glenn C. Woodard, Chief Natural and Technological Hazards Division Federal Emergency Management Agency Region IV 1371 Peachtree Street, NE Atlanta, Georgia 30309 -

Dear Glenn:

. Reference is made to letter from this Agency dated June 1, 1987 transmitting the exercise objectives for the September 11-12, 1987 McGuire Nuclear Station exercise.

Request the objectives listed below be added to the twenty-one submitted on June 1, 19C7 The additional objectives are necessary because of expanded play by the State of North 1 Carolina. These objectives also correspond to FEMA's August 5, 1983 memorandum titled "Procedural Pv. icy in Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plan Reviews, Exercise Observations and Evaluations and Interim Findings".

22. Demonstrate ability to mobilize and display field monitoring teams in a timely fashion (State) (6).

23. Demonstrate appropriate equipment and procedures for determining ambient radiation levels (State) (7).

24. Demonstrate appropriate equipment and procedures for <

measurement of airborne radioiodine concentrations as low as 10-7 uCi/cc in the presence of noble gases (State) (8).

25. Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to control acceF:s to an evacuated area (State)

(17).

26. Dev.onstrate the organizational ability and resources nr,cessary to effect an orderly evacuation of mobility-impaired individuals within the plume EPZ (All minus State and Cabarrus) (18).

i 512 N. Salisbury Street e P. O. Ikn 27687 e Raleigh, N. C. 27611-7687 An Equal Opporturmy / Affirmarne Action Ernployer

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. - r Mr. Glenn C. Woodard June 26, 1987 Page 2 ,

27. Demonstrate ability to identify need for, request and obtain ,

Federal Assistance (State) (32).

This agency continues to be appreciative of you and your staff's cooperation in making each of our exercises the very best.

Sincerely, *

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I Joseph F. Myers, Director JFM/jgm t

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• LIMITED ACCESS

• EXERCISE INSTRUCTIONS MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION SEPTEMBER 11-12, 1987 Annex F - Exercise Scenario and Schedule of Events DATE/ TIME (EOST) (ITEM) EVENTS (Real Scenario)

Sept. 11 (Day 1) 1100 Non-Scenario Lincoln and Iredell Counties

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execute school evacuation plan (Ref: FEMA Guidance Memo EV-2)

Note: Controller injected scenario 1200 1200 1 Seismic alarm activates indi-cating a small earthquako at 0.09g acceleration of 10 second duration. Note: SERT Con-troller to provido earthquake report from National Earthquake Information Center listing intensity after receipt of ALERT.

1215 1215 2 ALERT DECLARED Notification to offsite auth-orities. Alert and Notif-ication plans to responding agencies implemented. Minimum staffing of State and County EOCs begins. Area E Office initiates State support inter-face between Mecklenburg, Gaston, Lincoln, Iredell, Catawba and Cabarrus Counties and the State EOC. SERT element deploys to alternate SERT Headquarters in States-ville, N. C.

• LIMITED ACCESS

• l This is a controlled access document distributed only on a need to know basis. It is generally limited to the Exercise Director, Controllers and Evaluators for control and evalu-ation of the exercise.

F-1

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6 DATE/ TIME (EDST) (ITEM) EVENTS (Real Scenario) 1330 1330 3 Seismic alarm activates again ,

indicating an aftershock at r 0.13 g acceleration. Note:

SERT Controller to provide earthquake report at 1400 hours0.0162 days <br />0.389 hours <br />0.00231 weeks <br />5.327e-4 months <br />.

1345 1345 4 Leak from undetermined sources

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discovered in Unit 2 auxiliary feedwater pump room. Approx-imately 3 feet of water on floor.

1400 1400 5 Complete loss of Auxiliary feedwater (CA), Volume Control (NV), Component Cooling (KC) and Decay Heat Removal (ND)

. pumps and Power Operated Relief Valves (PORV).

1430 1430 6 SITE AREA EMERGENCY DECLARED Notification to offsite auth-orities. County EOCs fully '

staffed and in control. State support continues through Area E office. SERT element in l route. Sirens, EBS and Lake Warning activated. Note:

Simulate backup route alerting. ,

1600 1600 7 SERT Advance element on site.

Counties petition the Governor I to assume direction and con-trol. Note: County Con-trollers to ensure message ,

injection. l 1630 lb30 8 State assumes direction and control.

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• 1700 SUSPEND EXERCISE ULTIL 0730 SEPTEMBER 12, 1987.

Chief Controller will ensure SERT has assumed direction and i control prior to suspension of exercise.

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DATE/ TIME (EDST) (ITEM) EVENTS (Real Scenario)

(Sept. 12)(Sept. 11)

Day 2 Day 1 0730 1700 Exercise continues. Time is adjusted to reflect 1700 hours0.0197 days <br />0.472 hours <br />0.00281 weeks <br />6.4685e-4 months <br /> Day 1. RPS field ' "ns deploy along downwind zone measure background radiatic levels.

Mobile lab in place.

0744 1714 9 Seismic alarm activates again

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indicating an aftershock at 0.13 g acceleration. NOTE:

SERT Controller to provide earthquake report at 1744 hours0.0202 days <br />0.484 hours <br />0.00288 weeks <br />6.63592e-4 months <br />.

0745 1715 10 Unit 2 experiences a complete loss of main feedwater (CF).

0815 1745 11 GENERAL EMERGENCY DECLARED.

Notification to offsite auth-orities. Recommendation to offsite authorities is to evacuate zones A,B,C,M,N & L and to shelter zones D,E,F,G, H,I,J,K,0,P,0,R,S. Note: This only requires Mecklenburg and Lincoln Counties to execute evacuation. Chief Controller will inject supplemental exercises at this time to maintain acceptable EOC acti-vity for Gaston, Iredell, Catawba and Cabarrus Counties.

SIMULATE: Siren and EBS activation, Lake Warning and route alerting.

0900 1830 12 Vehicle accident on N.C.

Highway 73 blocks main evacu-ation route for Lincoln Coun-ty. Involves Dept. of Trans-portation truck loaded with '

gravel and a private auto-mobile. Note: Lincoln County Controller to inject message to State Highway Patrol EOC Representative of accident F-3

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. i DATE/ TIME (EDST) (ITEM) EVENTS (Real Scenario) to include an injured person in the automobile appearing to have radiological contam-ination. Dept. of Trans-portation and Lincoln County Emergency Medical Service to j respond.

Contaminated injured person transported to Lincoln County Hospital (Ref. FEMA Guidance Memo MS-1).

0930 1900 13 Steam generators boil dry.

Primary system (NC) pressure begins to increase.

1000 1930 14 Containment Purge (VO) valve fails to isolate on containment

. isolation alarm.

1030 2000 15 Reactor Core uncovers.

1045 2015 16 Plant updates its protective action recommendation to include zones D,G,H,I,J,K,0, P and R for evacuation and continue sheltering in zones E, F,0 and S. Sirens, EBS and backup route alerting acti-vated. Simulate: Lake Warning.

1215 2145 17 Airborne radiological release made through stack vent. RPS field assessment teams deploy along projected plume path and

! verifies plume.

1245 2215 18 Containment Purge Valve (VO) closed terminating release.

1300 Chief Controller may terminate State and County EOC play 1

whenever evacuation, evalu-ations and exercise objectives have been completed. Excep-tion: RPS will require addi-tional time to complete plume tracking and fomulation of radiological data to meet their objectives.

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DATE/ TIME (EDST) (ITEM) EVENTS (Real Scenario) 1300 - 1400 In-place agency critiques conducted.

1430 - 1600 Table Top Exercise (Partial Ingestion Pathway Exercise.

See Annex E) o F-5

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