ML20211J367
| ML20211J367 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire  |
| Issue date: | 08/31/1999 |
| From: | Rinaldi F NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | Barron H DUKE POWER CO. |
| References | |
| TAC-MA6324, NUDOCS 9909030128 | |
| Download: ML20211J367 (7) | |
Text
Augus't 31,.1999 y
x L Mr. H. B. Barron -
Vice President, McGuire Site-Duke Energy Corporation
/
12700 Hagers Ferry Road. _
' Huntersville, NC 28078-8985
SUBJECT:
PUBLIC NOTICE OF APPLICATION FOR AMENDMENT TO OPERATING LICENSE FOR MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION, UNITS 1 (TAC NO. MA6324)
Dear Mr. Barron:
The enclosed announcement has been forwarded to the Charlotte Observer in North Carolina for publication. This announcement relates to your application dated August 27,1999, for an amendment to the Facility Operating License NPF-9, seeking a one-time extension of the surveillance frequency for Techninical Specifications Surveillance Requirement (TSSR) 3.1.4.2 beyond the 25% extension allowed by TSSR 3.0.2. This license amendment is effective upon issuance and is to expire upon entering' Mode 3 during Unit 1 startup following the Unit 1 End of 1
Cycle 13 refueling outage.
A separate notice w':1 be published later in the Federal Reaister concerning the amendment.
. Sincerely, Original signed by:
Frank Rinaldi, Project Manager, Section 1 Project Directorate 11 Division of Licensing Project Management
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Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-369
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Public Notice NRC FILF MTM #2P, cc w/ encl: See next page j
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August 31, 1999 Mr. H. B. Barron j
Vice President, McGuire Site i
Duke Energy Corporation 12700 Hagers Ferry Road Huntersville, NC 28078-8985
SUBJECT:
PUBLIC NOTICE OF APPLICATION FOR AMENDMENT TO OPERATING LICENSE FOR MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION, UNITS 1 (TAC NO. MA6324)
Dear Mr. Barron:
The enclosed announcement has been forwarded to the Charlotte Observer in North Carolina for publication. This announcement relates to your application dated August 27,1999, for an l
amendment to the Facility Operating License NPF-9, seeking a one-time extension of the
{
l surveillance frequency for Techninical Specifications Surveillance Requirement (TSSR) 3.1.4.2 beyond the 25% extension allowed by TSSR 3.0.2. This license amendment is effective upon issuance and is to expira upon entering Mode 3 during Unit 1 startup following the Unit 1 End of Cycle 13 refueling outage.
i l
A separate notice will be published later in the Federal Reaister concerning the amendment.
Sincerely, Q w '< WWO Frank Rinaldi, Project Manager, Section 1 Project Directorate 11 Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-369
Enclosure:
Public Notice cc w/ encl: See next page 1
l
McGuire Nuclear Station ec:
Ms. Lisa F. Vaughn Ms. Karen E. Long Legal Department (PBOSE)
Assistant Attorney General
. Duke Energy Corporation North Carolina Department of 422 South Church Street Justice Charlotte, North Carolina 28201-1006 P. O. Box 629 Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 County Manager of Mecklenburg County L. A. Keller 720 East Fourth Street Manager - Nuclear Regulatory Charlotte, North Carolina 28202 Licensing Duke Energy Corporation Michael T. Cash 526 South Church Street Regulatory Compliance Manager Charlotte, North Carolina 28201-1006 Duke Energy Corporation McGuire Nuclear Site Elaine Wathen, Lead REP Planner 12700 Hagers Ferry Road Division of Emergency Management Huntersville, North Carolina 28078 116 West Jones Street Raleigh, North Carolina 27603-1335 J. Michael McGarry, Ill, Esquire Winston and Strawn Mr. Richard M. Fry, Director 1400 L Street, NW.
Division of Radiation Protection Washington, DC 20005 North Carolina Department of Environment, Health and Natural Senior Residen: Inspector Resources c/o U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 3825 Barrett Drive 12700 Hagers Ferry Road Raleigh, North Carolina 27609-7721 Huntersville, Nodh Carolina 28078 Mr. T. Richard Puryear Dr. John M. Barry Owners Group (NCEMC)
Mecklenberg County Duke Energy Corporation Department of Environmental 4800 Concord Road Protection York, South Carolina 29745 700 N. Tryon Street Charlotte, North Carolina 28202 Mr. Steven P. Shaver Senior Sales Engineer Westinshouse Electric Company 5929 Carnegie Blvd.
Suite 500 Charlotte, North Carolina 28209
3 PUBLIC NOTICE NRC STAFF CONSIDERING LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST FOR MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 1 4
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has received an application dated August 27, 1999, from Duke Energy Corporation (the licensee) for an exigent amendment to the operating license for the McGuire Nuclear Station, Unit 1, located in Mecklenberg County, North Carolina.
If approved, the amendment would grant a one-time extension af the surveillance I
frequency for Techninical Specifications Surveillance Requirement (TSSR) 3.1.4.2 beyond the 25 percent extension allowed by TSSR 3.0.2. This license amendment is effective upon issuance and is to expire upon entering Moae 3 during Unit 1 startup following the Unit 1 End of Cycle 13 refueling outage.
The licensee has evaluated the requested amendment against the standards in 10 CFR 50.92, and the NRC staff has made a proposed determination that the requested amendment involves no significant hazards considerations. Under the subject regulation, this means that the proposed amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated, or involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
The licensee's analysis is presented below:
1.
Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident praviously evaluated?
No. Performance of the TSSR during power operations would result in a higher probability of an accident as compared to performing this testing during an outage. If performed at power, a trip could be initiated through the 1 AC Power Cabinet while repairing or replacing components or through the inadvertant actuation of other rod l
control circuitry. For example, McGuire has experienced past reactor trips while performing maintenance on rod control and reactor trip circuitry at power. In addition, continuation of surveillance testing at power also introduces the potential for a reactor
T trip. McGuire PRA analyses indicate that react,or trips at power do contribute to the Core Damage Probability. For the proposed outage repairs and testing, adequate controls will be in place and the timing of the repairrvtesting would be coordinated to prevent any negative consequences associated with a Rod Control System failure.
The equipment failure which affected movement of the Group i rods associated with Control Bank A, Control Bank C and Shutdown Bank A has not caused the affected rods to be inoperable. The intent of TSSR 3.1.4.2 6 to, in lieu of tripping the reactor, verify rod movement in order to provide confidence that the control rods can trip the reactor.
The BASES for that TSSR state that, if a control rod experiences movement problems, but remains trippable and aligned, the control rod is considered to be operable. All Unit 1 control rods currently satisfy the alignment criteria of TS 3,1.4 and TSSR 3.1.4.1.
The BASES for TSSR 3.1.4.2 indicates that confidence as to the trippability of the control rod (s) can be obtained by verification that a rod movement problem is due to an electrical related control system failure and not the result of mechanical binding of the rods. The equipment failure which is preventing movement of some of the Unit 1 control rods is due to an electrical control system failure which does not affect the ability of the control rods to trip the reactor. There is no evidence of any mechanical binding of the rods.
As a result, the affected control rods are trippable. Since all Unit 1 control rods are trippable and properly aliguad, they are operable and, in the absence of any other failures, should remain operable until repairs and surveillance testing can be effected in the 1EOC13 refueling outage.
The inability to move the Group i rods associated with Control Bank A, Control Bank C and Shutdown Bank A will not impact th' ability to safely control the reactor during e
steady state power operations prior to the 1EOC13 refueling outage. The remaining unaffected control rods are sufficient for proper power distribution and temperature control under those plant conditions, in addition, plant procedures and processes will ensure the safe controlled shutdown of Unit 1 at the start of the 1EOC13 outage.
McGuire PRA analyses indicate that a failure of the rod movement logic for a portion of the control rods does not directly contribute to the failure of any function modeled in the PRA. The control rod drive system impacts the McGuire PRA model directly only in its ability to cause a reactor trip and to release the rods when a reactor trip when required.
The problems with the 1 AC Power Cabinet may cause the control rods to respond to some transients differently from what would normally be expected. Consequently, the failure increases the probability of a reactor trip for those events which would normally only result in a runback in reactor power. However, given the short time period of the extension and the relatively low frequency of transients that would be expected to cause a p" alem, no meaningful impact on the estimated CDF is anticipated. The problems with the 1 AC Power Cabinet do not increase the probability of a failure to drop the l
Group i rods associated with Control Bank A, Control Bank C and Shutdown Bank A rods upon a reactor trip. Therefore, cor.Fnued operation until repair and testing of the failed equipment during the 1EOC13 outage should not result in an increase in ATWS contribution to the CDF.
Note that the banks that have not been fully surveillance tested constitute approximately 98 percent of the total rod worth. However, the likelihood of any rod, much less all of
t 3-these rods, not fully inserting is extraordinarily remote. In addition, McGuire Nuclear Station's design incorporates the AMSAC (ATWS Mitigation System Actuation Circuit) for the worst case such event. The worst case event is the failure of reactor tip breakers to open when called upon by a valid reactor tip signal. The current condition is clearly bounded by that postulated occurrence.
2.
Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
No. No changes are being made to actual plant hardware or processes which will result in any new accident causal mechanisms. Also, no changes are being made to the way in which the plant is being operated. Therefore, no new accident causal mechanisms will be generated.
3.
Does this change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?
No. Margin of safety is related to the ability of the fission product barriers to perform their design functions during and following accident conditions. These barriers include the fuel cladding, the reactor coolant system, and the containment system. Based upon the response to question #1, the performance of these barriers will not be degraded by the proposed changes.
If the proposed determination that the requested license amendment involves no significant hazards consideration becomes final, the NRC will issue the amendment without first offering an opportunity for a public hearing. An opportunity for a public hearing will be published in the Federal Reaister at a later date and any hearing request will not delay the effective date of the amendment, if the NRC staff decides in its final determination that the amendment does involve a significant hazards consideration, a notice of opportunity for a prior hearing will be published in
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the Federal Reaister and, if a hearing is granted, it will be held before the amendment is issued.
Comments on the proposed determination of no significant hazards consideration may be (1) telephoned to Richard Emch, Section Chief, by collect call to 1-415-1485 or by facsimile to 1-301-415-2102, (2) e malled to INTERNET:RLEO NRC. GOV. or (3) submitted in writing to Chief, Rules and Directives Review Branch, Division of Administrative Services, Office of Administration, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001. All written comments received by close of business on September 3,1999, and all telephoned or e-mailed
1 k
, comments received by 4:15 p.m., September 3,1999, will be considered in reaching a final determination.
A copy of the licensee's application may be examined at the NRC's Local Public Document Room located at the J. Murrey Atkins Library, University of North Carolina at Charlotte,9201 University City Boulevard, Charlotte, NC, and the NRC's Public Document Room, the Gelman Bui! ding,2120 L Street, NW, Washington, DC 20555.
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