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Category:SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT--LICENSING & RELATED ISSUES
MONTHYEARML20217G2161999-10-15015 October 1999 Errata Pages 2 & 3 for Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 168 Issued to FOL DPR-63 Issued on 990921.New Pages Change Description of Flow Control Trip Ref Cards to Be Consistent with Application for Amend ML20207G2261999-06-0707 June 1999 SER Accepting Proposed Mod to Each of Four Core Shroud Stabilizers for Implementation During Current 1999 Refueling Outage at Plant,Unit 1 ML20206U5351999-05-17017 May 1999 SER Accepting GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves, for Plant, Units 1 & 2 ML20155E2001998-11-0202 November 1998 Safety Evaluation Approving NMP 980227 Request for Extension of Reinspection Interval for Core Shroud Vertical Welds at NMP1 from 10,600 Hours to 14,500 Hours of Hot Operation ML20154D8401998-10-0505 October 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposed Changes Related to PT Limits in Plant,Unit 1 TSs ML20217F4341998-03-19019 March 1998 SER Related to Proposed Restructuring New York State Electric & Gas Corp,Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station,Unit 2 ML20198H9941997-12-29029 December 1997 SE Supporting Approval of Application Re Long Island Power Authority Aquisition of Long Island Lighting Co,Subject to Discussed Condition ML20197C4771997-01-0303 January 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Nine Mile Point Unit 1 Reactor & Turbine Building Blowout Panels ML20197C4541997-01-0202 January 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Resolution of Nine Mile Point Reactor/Turbine Building Pressure Relief Panel Outside Design Basis Issue ML20056H4751993-08-27027 August 1993 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Proposal for Continued Insp & Repair of Flaw in Weld Joining HPCS Nozzle Safe to safe-end Extension ML20247K2531989-09-11011 September 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 123 & 41 to Licenses DPR-61 & NPF-49,respectively ML20247E3761989-09-0707 September 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 122,34,143 & 40 to Licenses DPR-61,DPR-21,DPR-65 & NPF-49,respectively ML20248C0731989-08-0303 August 1989 Sser Accepting 880601,0909 & 890602 Changes to ATWS Mitigation Sys Actuation Circuitry for Plants ML20246L2571989-06-26026 June 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 118,33,142 & 36 to Licenses DPR-61,DPR-21,DPR-65 & NPF-49,respectively ML20245J0751989-04-25025 April 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 114,30,141 & 33 to Licenses DPR-61,DPR-21,DPR-65 & NPF-49,respectively ML20205R1311988-10-31031 October 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 101 to License DPR-63 ML20205Q5721988-10-31031 October 1988 SER Re Const Mod & Licensing of Company Facility-1 Cpdf. Licensee Technically Qualified to Modify Existing Facility in Such Way as to Assure Adequate Protection of Common Defense & Security ML20205Q5761988-10-31031 October 1988 SER Re Application for CP for Alchemie Facility-2 Oliver Springs.Licensee Technically Qualified to Construct & Operate Proposed Facility in Such Way as to Assure Adequate Protection for Common Defense & Security ML20205M5731988-10-26026 October 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 108,25,134 & 26 to Licenses DPR-61,DPR-21,DPR-65 & NPF-49,respectively ML20155G4801988-09-28028 September 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 107,23,132 & 24 to Licenses DPR-61,DPR-21,DPR-65 & NPF-24,respectively ML20195G5531988-06-24024 June 1988 Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposed Reracking of Util Spent Fuel Storage Pools from Criticality Standpoint.Enrichment of Fuel to 4.5 Weight % U-235 May Be in Conflict W/ 10CFR51 Table S4 & Should Be Investigated by NRC ML20154H2171988-05-18018 May 1988 Safety Evaluation Accepting Util 880414 Submittal Re Reload Startup Physics Test Program ML20147D9631988-02-25025 February 1988 Safety Evaluation Accepting Util 860404 Evaluation of Environ Qualification of Equipment Considering Superheat Effects of high-energy Line Breaks for Plants,Per IE Info Notice 84-90 ML20147E9261988-02-23023 February 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 100,14,125 & 15 to Licenses DPR-61,DPR-21,DPR-65 & NPF-45,respectively ML20236M9631987-11-0606 November 1987 Safety Evaluation Accepting Util Proposed ATWS Mitigating Sys Actuation Circuitry for Facilities,Per 10CFR50.62(c)(1) & Pending Final Resolution of Tech Spec Issue ML20236L2001987-10-30030 October 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 11 to Licenses NPF-37 & NPF-66,respectively & Amend 1 to License NPF-72 ML20195G5501987-10-28028 October 1987 Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposed Reracking of Util Spent Fuel Storage Pool.Licensee May Be Required to Perform Addl Analyses to Verify Maint of Required Subcriticality If Staff Boraflex Studies Reveal Gap Development in Subj Boraflex ML20235A7331987-09-18018 September 1987 Safety Evaluation Re Installation of Alternate Rod Injection (ARI) Sys & Adequacy of Plant Reactor Coolant Recirculating Pump Trip (RPT) Sys,In Compliance W/Atws Rule 10CFR50.62. ARI & RPT Acceptable ML20195G5461987-08-21021 August 1987 Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposed Util Tech Specs Change to Increase Max Allowed Enrichment of Reload Fuel to 4.2 Weight % U-235 ML20236Y0221987-07-0808 July 1987 Safety Evaluation Clarifying Determination of Acceptability of Test Duration for Performance of Integrated Leak Rate Test at Plant ML20214M3361987-05-22022 May 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util Rept Entitled, Rod Swap Methodology Rept for Startup Physics Testing ML20214M1491987-05-21021 May 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util Responses to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 2.1 (Part 2) Re Established Interface W/Nsss or Vendors of Each Component of Reactor Trip Sys ML20153F3851987-05-0404 May 1987 SER Accepting Util 870301 & 0407 Requests for Rev to Tech Specs,Modifying MSIV Actuation Control Sys,Per IEEE Std 279 & GDC 21 ML20153F3671987-04-30030 April 1987 Safety Evaluation Accepting Util 870311 Proposed Changes to Tech Spec Tables 2.2.1-1,3.6.1.2-1 & 3.6.3-1 Re MSIV-closure Setpoint ML20238C7121987-04-0808 April 1987 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Facility May Resume Operation W/O Leakage Control Sys But w/post-accident Leakage Mgt ML20207R6481987-03-11011 March 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Licensee Response to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 2.1 (Part 1) Equipment Classification.Program Acceptable ML20212J4041987-03-0202 March 1987 Safety Evaluation Re Util 831104 Response to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 4.5.2, Reactor Trip Sys Reliability,On-Line Testing. Licensee Meets NRC Position ML20212B5671987-02-24024 February 1987 Safety Evaluation Re Util Response to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 4.5.2, Reactor Trip Reliability On-Line Testing. Response Acceptable ML20211Q2971987-02-18018 February 1987 Safety Evaluation Re Auxiliary Feedwater Sys Reliability (Generic Issue 124) for Prairie Island Units 1 & 2 ML20211G4361987-02-14014 February 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util 831110 Response to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 4.5.2 Re on-line Testing for Reactor Trip Sys Reliability ML20153F3511987-02-0707 February 1987 Safety Evaluation Accepting Util Latest Design Mods to MSIV Actuation Control Sys,Per IEEE 279 & GDC 21 ML20210T2571987-02-0606 February 1987 SER Re Util 850802 Submittal Describing Design Details of Steam Generator Blowdown & Auxiliary Steam Sys to Detect & Isolate High Energy Line Breaks.Sys Design Acceptable, However,Two Deviations from IEEE-STD-297 Criteria Apparent ML20210R2061987-02-0606 February 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util 850517,0802,0823,1211 & 860429 Submittals Re Environ Effects of High Energy Line Breaks in Auxiliary Steam or Steam Generator Blowdown Sys. Design of Blowdown Sys Acceptable ML20238C6501987-02-0505 February 1987 Safety Evaluation Accepting MSIVs for Facility Operation Up to First Refueling,Contingent on Successful Completion of Preoperational Tests & Prototype Testing Program.Briefing for Commissioner Asselstine Re MSIVs & SALP Input Also Encl ML20238C5801987-02-0202 February 1987 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Facility May Resume Startup Testing & Operation for First Operating Cycle W/ Installed Refurbished Msivs.Necessity of Addl Leak Testing to Be Determined After Review of Prototype Test Results ML20209B1511987-01-28028 January 1987 SER Supporting Util Responses to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 4.5.2 Re Reactor Trip Sys on-line Testing ML20209C3571987-01-23023 January 1987 SER Supporting Facility Design,Per Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 4.5.2, Reactor Trip Sys Reliability,On-Line Testing ML20209C2151987-01-21021 January 1987 Safety Evaluation Re Auxiliary Feedwater Sys Reliability (Generic Issue 124) at Prairie Island Units 1 & 2.Util Actively Pursuing Improvements in Sys Reliability & Reducing Sys Challenges ML20215E0061986-12-12012 December 1986 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util Responses to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 2.1 (Part 1) Re Equipment Classification of Reactor Trip Sys Components ML20214J9911986-11-24024 November 1986 SER Re Conformance to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 2.1 (Part 1) on Equipment Classification (Reactor Trip Sys Components) at Selected GE BWR Plants.Part 1 Requirements Met 1999-06-07
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217G2161999-10-15015 October 1999 Errata Pages 2 & 3 for Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 168 Issued to FOL DPR-63 Issued on 990921.New Pages Change Description of Flow Control Trip Ref Cards to Be Consistent with Application for Amend ML20216J9251999-09-30030 September 1999 Suppl to Special Rept:On 990621,11 Containment Hydrogen Monitoring Sys Chart Recorder Was Indicating Below Normal Operating Range.Caused by Excessive Wear on Valve Body & Discs of Bypass Pump.Sample Pump Replaced ML20217K4631999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Nine Mile Point, Unit 1.With ML20212F7301999-09-21021 September 1999 Special Rept:On 990907,CR Operators Declared 12 Containment Hydrogen Monitoring Sys Inoperable for Planned Maint.Cause of Low Flow Condition Was Determined to Be Foreign Matl. Replaced Sample Pump Valve Discs ML20212B9081999-09-14014 September 1999 Special Rept:On 990901, 12 Containment Hydrogen Monitoring Sys Was Declared Inoperable for Planned Maint.Caused by Planned Maint Being Performed as Corrective Action.Check Valves with O Rings Were Replaced ML20216F5141999-08-31031 August 1999 Rept on Status of Public Petitions Under 10CFR2.206 ML20212C4601999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station,Unit 1.With ML20210U4591999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Nine Mile Point, Unit 1.With ML20209D0291999-07-0202 July 1999 Special Rept:On 990621,operator Identified That Number 11 Hydrogen Monitoring Sys (Hms) Chart Recorder Was Indicating Below Normal Operating Range.Cause Indeterminate.Licensee Will Complete Troubleshooting of Subject Hms by 990709 ML20210B9081999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Nine Mile Point Unit 1.With ML20209F8811999-06-0808 June 1999 Rev 1 to NMP Unit 1 COLR for Cycle 14 ML20207G2261999-06-0707 June 1999 SER Accepting Proposed Mod to Each of Four Core Shroud Stabilizers for Implementation During Current 1999 Refueling Outage at Plant,Unit 1 ML20196E2111999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Nmp,Unit 1.With ML20207B0241999-05-18018 May 1999 Safety Evaluation of Topical Rept TR-107285, BWR Vessel & Intervals Project,Bwr Top Guide Insp & Flaw Evaluation Guidelines (BWRVIP-26), Dtd December 1996.Rept Acceptable ML20206U5351999-05-17017 May 1999 SER Accepting GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves, for Plant, Units 1 & 2 ML20196L2301999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Nmp,Unit 1.With ML20205L0541999-04-0101 April 1999 Nonproprietary Replacement Pages to HI-91738,consisting of Section 5.0, Thermal-Hydraulic Analysis ML20205S5701999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for NMP Unit 1.With ML20207M9231999-03-12012 March 1999 Amended Part 21 Rept Re Cooper-Bessemer Ksv EDG Power Piston Failure.Total of 198 or More Pistons Have Been Measured at Seven Different Sites.All Potentially Defective Pistons Have Been Removed from Svc Based on Encl Results ML20207G2671999-03-0101 March 1999 Special Rept:On 990315,Nine Mile Point,Unit 1 Declared Number 12 Containment Hydrogen Monitoring Sys Inoperable. Caused by Degraded Encapsulated Reed Switch within Flow Switch FS-201.2-1495.Technicians Replaced Flow Switch ML20204C9971999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Nine Mile Point,Unit 1.With ML20207E9311999-02-26026 February 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Sprague Model TE1302 Aluminum Electrolytic Capacitors with Date Code of 9322H.Caused by Aluminum Electrolytic Capacitors.Affected Capacitors Replaced ML17059C5501999-01-31031 January 1999 Rev 0 to MPR-1966(NP), NMP Unit 1 Core Shroud Vertical Weld Repair Design Rept. ML20199M0891999-01-22022 January 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Failure of Square Root Converters.Caused by Failed Aluminum Electrolytic Capacitory Spargue Electric Co (Model Number TE1302 with Mfg Date Code 9322H).Sent Square Root Converters Back to Mfg,Barker Microfarads,Inc ML20210R8441998-12-31031 December 1998 1998 Annual Rept for Energy East ML20199K9331998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1998 for Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station,Unit 1.With ML20206P2391998-12-31031 December 1998 Special Rept:On 981222,operators Removed non-TS Channel 12 Drywell Pressure Recorder & Associated TS Pressure Indicator from Svc.Caused by Intermittent Measuring Cable Connection in non-TS Recorder Circuitry.Replaced Cable ML20206P2421998-12-30030 December 1998 Special Rept:On 981219,number 12 Hydrogen Monitoring Sys (Hms) Was Declared Inoperable When Operators Closed Valve 201.2-601.Caused by Indeterminate Failure of Valve 201.2-71. Supplemental Rept Will Be Submitted After Valve Is Repaired ML20198M3571998-12-23023 December 1998 Special Rept:On 981210,operators Declared Number 11 Inoperable,Due to Failure of CR Chart Recorder.Caused by Inverter Board in Power Supply Circuitry of Recorder Due to Component Aging.Maint Personnel Replaced Failed Inverter ML20198D9361998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1998 for Nine Mile Point,Unit 1.With ML20155E2001998-11-0202 November 1998 Safety Evaluation Approving NMP 980227 Request for Extension of Reinspection Interval for Core Shroud Vertical Welds at NMP1 from 10,600 Hours to 14,500 Hours of Hot Operation ML20195J4141998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1998 for Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station,Unit 1.With ML20154D8401998-10-0505 October 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposed Changes Related to PT Limits in Plant,Unit 1 TSs ML20154P1821998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station,Unit 1.With ML20153B2001998-08-31031 August 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1998 for Nmpns,Unit 1.With ML20237C6351998-07-31031 July 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1998 for Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station,Unit 1 ML20236T5911998-07-20020 July 1998 LER 98-S01-00:on 980618,security Force Member Left Nine Mile Point,Unit 2 Vehicle Gate Unattended Without Ensuring,Gate Alarm Had Been Reactivated.Caused by Inadequate Work Practice.Vehicle Gate Alarm Was Activated ML18040A3491998-07-0202 July 1998 LER 98-017-00:on 980602,control Room Ventilation Sys Was Declared Inoperable.Caused by Original Design Deficiency. Mod Designed,Tested & Implemented Prior to Startup from RF06 to Correct Design deficiency.W/980702 Ltr ML20236Q1701998-06-30030 June 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1998 for Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station,Unit 1 ML17059C1011998-06-24024 June 1998 LER 98-014-00:on 980525,noted Differences Between Actual Valve Weights & Weights Shown on Engineering Drawings.Caused by Vendor Failing to Provide Accurate Valve Weights.Revised Valve Drawings & Associated Calculation,Per 10CFR21 ML20151P1751998-06-16016 June 1998 Rev 0 to SIR-98-067, Evaluation of NMP Unit 2 Feedwater Nozzle-to-Safe End Weld Butter Indication (Weld 2RPV-KB20, N4D) ML18040A3451998-06-0404 June 1998 LER 98-004-01:on 980302,TS Required LSFT of Level 8 Trip of Main Turbine Was Missed.Caused by Knowledge Deficiency of EHC Sys.Revised Applicable LSFT Procedures Prior to Refueling Outage 6.W/980604 Ltr ML20249B4971998-05-31031 May 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1998 for Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station,Unit 1 ML20248F3531998-05-21021 May 1998 Part 21 Rept Re Electronic Equipment Repaired or Reworked by Integrated Resources,Inc from Approx 930101-980501.Caused by 1 Capacitor in Each Unit Being Installed W/Reverse Polarity. Policy of Second Checking All Capacitors Is Being Adopted ML20198B4991998-05-15015 May 1998 Non-proprietary Replacement Pages for Attachment F to Which Proposed to Change TS 5.5, Storage of Unirradiated & Sf ML20247R1141998-04-30030 April 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1998 for Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station,Unit 1 ML20217B0621998-03-31031 March 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1998 for Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station,Unit 1 ML17059C1681998-03-19019 March 1998 Revised Niagara Mohawk Powerchoice Settlement Document for NMPC PSC Case Numbers 94-E-0098 & 94-E-0099, Vols 1 & 2 ML20217F4341998-03-19019 March 1998 SER Related to Proposed Restructuring New York State Electric & Gas Corp,Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station,Unit 2 ML17059B9051998-02-28028 February 1998 NMP Unit 1 Boat Samples Analyses Part Iii:Tension Tests, RDD:98:55863-004-000:01 1999-09-30
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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION q_ D..g RELATED TO THE MSIV ACTUATION LOGIC DESIGN Tf r.'
AT NINE MILE POINT, UNIT 2 3'<"
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
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( The main steam isolation valve (MSIV) actuator control system for Nine f;g Mile Point, Unit 2 (NMP-2) was rrodified recently to compensate for GQ.
deficiencies found within the mechanical portion of the original MS!V f ,]
actuator design. The original actuator design consisted of a mechanical 9 -[
latching mechanism to hold the valve open and two normally energized
"*p';*]
g
{ solenoid operated spring plungers to release the mechanism and pemit spring closure of the valve. Each solenoid was powered from a separate, h independent Uninterruptable Power Supply ((!PS) system, and it took tile deenergization of both solenoid spring plungers to initiate closure of the associated MSIV (i.e., disengage the mechanical latch). Testing of the 5 original design revealed that in some cases the force produced by the h solenoid operated spring plungers was inadequate to trip the trechanical 3 latch.
e Subsequently, the licensee decided to eliminate the use of the mechanical iatch trip system described above and to utilize the hydraulic system, originally intended only to open the MSIVs, to maintain the MSIVs in the g open positic'1. This re-design proposes using the solenoid operated valves m
(SOVs) which are part of the original hydraulic system. These S0Vs will g be normally energited to keep the solenoid valves closed, thereby maintaining the hydre,'alic pressure to keep the MSIVs open. Decnergiration of any one of the SOVs will cause rapid closure (release of hydraulic F pressure) of the associated MSIV. In an attempt to enhance MSIV
[ availability and to be consissent with the original MSIV design, the r-8809070234 880e10 L PDR FOIA KUDLICKGB-356 PDR ,/fp
licensee proposed to provide power to each SOV from either of two independer.t UPS systems through automt. tic transfer circuitry in order to assure that the loss of one power supply system would not deenergize (open) either SOV. After review of the modifications performed on the MSIVs, the staff informed the licensee by letter dated Jenuary 14, 1987 that the autcratic transfer logic was not in full compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion (GDC) 21 and IEEE Standard 279 [10 CFR 50.55 a(h)).
By letter dated January 15, 1987, the licensee comitted to remove the automatic transfer system and informed the staff of a revised method of supplying power to the electrical SOVs associated with the MS!V actuttion system. Tho staff's evaluation of the latest MSIV design i modifications propnsed for the MS!V actuator control system is provided s below. {
2,0 EVALVA110E The modified NMP-? MS!V actuator logic control circuitry will utilize relaylogic(coil-to-contact)operationtoassurethatactuationofa single emergency trip sensor (i.e., one-out-of-two in trip system A or B) will not cause inadvertent closure of the MSIVs. This is consistent with the original design basis of NMP-2 whereby the logic is set up as a one-out-of-two taken twice logic (i.e., one-out-of-two in trip system A l and B are required to close the MSIVs). To reiterate, the automatic h transfer between the redundant Class IE reactor protection system (RPS)
UPS systems has been rcr.oved. Thus, a loss of a single RPS UPS system will deenergize its associated 50V and result in the closure of the associated MSIVs which is consistent with the fail-safe design feature.
Also, the relay logic design alle, s th., i kensee to perforr, their required Technical Specification monthly channel functional test surveillance requiremetics and provides coil-to-contact isolation between
(
the redundant logic channels. The staff questioned the use of these relays as cualified isolation devices. In response (letters dated January 15 and February 4, 1987), the licensee described the relays and comitted to perform maximum credible fault tests to qualify the relays as acceptable isolation devices. The device has been identified as a
, ITE/Telemechanique (Gould-Type J10) relay. The relay contains a metal barrier that separates the coil section and its associated wiring from the contact section of the relay and its wiring. The licensee has confirmed that the subject relays are seismically and environmentally cualified for their safety-related application in accordance with IEEE 344-197G and 10 CFR 50.49 respectively.
in the February 4,1987 letter, the licensee provided an outline of the test procedure used to qualify the Gould J10 relays and provided a sumary of the test results. The staff audited the test procedure used to demonstrate the qualification of the subject relays as acceptable isolation devices. The test procedure identified the maxirum credible fault voltagu and current to be 119 Vac and 15 amps respectively. After review of the analysis (supplied by letter dated January 15, 1987) used to detemire these fault values, the staff considers 110 Vac/15 amps to be acceptable fault test values fe qualification of the relays. The nereistance eritpris penvided 1H the telt ifrutedute wat found (b be acceptable (i.e., upon application of the r:aximum credible fault, the isolation between the coil and contact will be maintained and no spurious signals will be transmitted across the barrier). The test sunmary (provided in the February 4,1987 letter) shows that the relay perfomed in accord 0nce with the established acceptance criteria stated above (i.e., no spurious signals were observed when the mhximu:n credible faults were applied in the transverse modes). Based on the results of the tests and the actual relay configuration (metal barrier between the coil and contact portions of the device), the staf# concludes that the Gould J10 relays as installed in the MSIV actuator control system are acceptable isolation devices.
i
. 4 f Upon further review of the HSIV logic design modifications, the staff l 3 questioned the use of redundant fault fnterrupting devices for isolation between the Class IE and non-Class 1E circuits. The latest modifications E show that the non-Class 1E MS!Y partial stroke test solenoid valve will
$ be powered from the RPS Class 1E bus through redundant 3 amp fuses. The
( licensee has stated that the fuses are procured and installed as Class 1E
~
,- devices and that both are properly coordinated with the upstream
[ protective devices. In their February 4, 1987 letter, the licensee E confirmed that a continuous 3 ampere load will not degrade thz ability of E , the Class IE sy: tem to perfom its required protective function (i.e., . -
S the Class IE system is designed for and rated to support the 3 ampere currentdraw). Further, the licensee has verified that the replacement i of fuses is covered by the hMP-2 Standing Order No.14. "Operations h Departnent Fuse Control Program," which will enstre, through quality g assurance review, verification that a correct size fuse will be -
installed. The staff finds this acceptable.
The staff pursued the issue related to periodic verification of operation _
of the redundant emergency trip SOVs associated with each MSiv. The licensee previded information in their January 15 and Febmary 4,1987
[ letters to avdress this issue. The correct performance of tbs NSIV 4
) emergancy trip actuatien solenoid valves can be verified during MSIV full .
I closure testing. The MSIVs will be full stroke tested at each cold '
p shutdown in accordance with Section XI of the ASMF Boiler and Pressure Yessel Code (Part IWV 3412). This commitment is described in the NMP-?
preservice inspection plan pump cnd valve program and is based upon Technical Specification Section 4.0.5 which requires compliance with ASME g _
Section XI. The licensee has further co rtitted to revise Operating _
L Surveillance Procedure (OSP) NP-MSS-CS-001 to require positive confirma-a tion of the functioning of each MSIV actuator solenoid during each cold
=
shutdown full stroke test. Reed switch position indication is provided in h -
the control room for the SOVs whereby the operator can verify proper solenoid valve operation. The OSP identified above should be revised
i i 4
)
prior to the next full stroke test required by ASME Section XI. The licensee has also verified that the Electrical Protection Assembly (EPA) f setpoints are coordinated with the load requirements of the SOVs and that calculations were perforred to ensure that both the high and low voltage i EPA trip setpoints maintain the operating voltage within allowable values.
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3.0 CONCLUSION
1
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Based on the above evaluation, the staff concludes that the latest design nodifications made to the MSIV actuation control system comply with the 1
applicable regulatory ecceptance criteria including the requirenents of 1 IEEE 270 and GDC 21 and are, therefore, acceptable.
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i ENCLOSURE 2 E!CSB/ DBL SALP INPUT FLANT: Nine Mile Point, Unit 2 LICENSEE: Niagarc Mohawk Pcwcr Corporation DOCKET NO: 50-410 LICENSEE STATUS: OR SER SUBJECT- Safety Evaluation Report INPUT PERFORMANCE PARAMETER $:
Management Involvement in 4 suring Quality Approach to Resolution of Technical Issues From a Safety Standpoint Response to NRC Initiatives (4 Staffing (IncludingManagement)
Reporting and Analysis of Reportable Events Training and Qualification Effectheness ,
I Any Other SALP Functional Area !
t ;
PERFORMANCE NAARAtiVE LEERIPTION OF CATEGORY / {
PAPAMETER RATING AOPL!tANi&lfENSEE'S PERFORMANCE 1 The licensee did not appear to adequately 3 l understa/.d staff policies ano did not make decisions based on Ldequate managerent ievolvement. An appropriate level of manacement was not present and significantly involved at the various review reett.ngs held with i the licensee. '
2 The licensee's submittals showed that there 3 was not an adeouate understanding as to the infomation necessary to resolve various issues. The approach to resolve the issues appeared to be viable but the infomation
2-PERFORMANCE NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF CATEGORY /
, PARAMETER APPLICANT / LICENSEE'S PERFORMANCE RATING provided to resolve the issues was lacking significantly in thoroughness and depth and net minimum requirerrents. Much effort was expended by the staff to provide guidance to the applicant necessary to resolve many of the issues. Repeated requests and clarifications of requirements had to be made to obtain necessary information. The lack of sufficient information has caused much delay in the resolution of the issues.
3 Thelicenseerespondedpoorly(lackof 3 thorouanness) to concerns raised by the staff.
In particular, where design changes were made ,
that required staff re-review, the applicant !
was reluctant to provide sufficient details to allow the staff to complete its review, The staff has spent considerable effort to obtain an acceptable resolution of the issue (i.e., the NRC staff had to generate specific guidance on inferr.ation needed to resolve the issues).
OVERALL APPLICANT / LICENSEE PERFORMANCE RATING 3 I
l l