ML20151L968

1987 Annual Rept of Facility Changes,Tests & Experiments

ML20151L968
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	12/31/1987
From:	DUQUESNE LIGHT CO.
To:
References
TAC-69045, NUDOCS 8808040198
Download: ML20151L968 (87)

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1987 Report of Facility Changes, Tests and Experiments i TABLE OF CONTENTS FACILITY CHANGES ................................................. 1 thru155 l i

I DESIGN CONCEPTS No. 504, Rev. 1, Improve Response of Feedwater Bypass Regulating Valve .....................'......................... 1 No. 539, Rev. O, Degasifier Recovery Heat Exchanger Cross-Connect Pipe Modifications..................................... 3 No. 602, Rev. 1, Unit 2 Control Room Alarm and CCTV ........... 5  !

u No. 611, Rev. 2, Control Room Emergency Air System for Units 1 )

& 2............................................................ 7 No. 619, Rev. O. Spent Filter Transfer Shield Modifications ... 9 1

No. 632, Rev. O, Pressure Indicators for the Charging Pump RV Strainers ..................................................... 11 No. 635, Rev. O, Unit 2 ERP Computer System Connections to Unit 1 ........................................................ 13 Nr 639, Rev. O, Additicaal Tool Holding Brackets in Refueling Area .......................................................... 15 i

No. 661, Rev. 1, Devatering System for Solid Vaste Liners ..... 17 l No. 692, Rev. O, Chemical Addition Pumps Flov Transmitter ..... 19 No. 697, Rev. O, Inlet Isolation Valves for the Steam Generator Drain Tanks ................................................... 21 No. 710, Rev. O, Feedwater Heater and Drain Receiver Level Control Modifications ......................................... 22 No. 711,-Rev. O, Control Room Ventilation Radiation Monitors .. 24 No. 716, Rev. O, 480V Substation Givand Fault Detection ....... 26 No. 722, Rev 1, Installation of Annubar Flow Instruments in MSR Reheat steam Lines ............................................ 28 lo. 726, Rev. 2, BVPS 1 and 2 ' riping Interconnections South Trench ..............................................r......... 30

CL 8808040198 971231 /

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/ i TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)

DESIGN CONCEPTS (Cont.)

No. 743, Rev. 1, Modify Air Supply to the MSTV's .............. 32 No. 752, Rev. 1, Eliminate Drain Valves (FV-600, 601 and 602].. 34 No. 762, Rev. O, Diesel Generator Protection Relay Trip Indication .................................................... 36 No. 766, Rev. 2, Remove Vall Separating BVPS 1 & 2 Control Room .......................................................... 38 No. 769, Rev. O, Security System Fence Modifications .......... 41 No. 793, Rev. O, Replacement of 4KV Bus Undervoltage Relays ... 43 No. 797, Rev. O, ERF Substation Modifications ................. 45 No. 799, Rev. O, Diesel Generator Strip Heaters ............... 47 No. 803, Rev. 1, Replacement of the Instrument Manifolds for

[F-CH-122), (L-RC-462), [F-RC-414, 415, 416, 424, 425, 426, 434, 435, and 436] ............................................ 49 No. 814, Rev. 1, Control Room Chlorine Detectors .............. 51 No. 825, Rev. O, Hydrogren Recombiner Suction Piping Support Modification .................................................. 54 No. 846, Rev. O, Containment Type 'A' Test Skid Retirement .... 55 TECHNICAL EVALUATION REPORTS (TERs)............................... 56 thru 63 No. 149, Dovngrade of G.V. Disposal Piping (Including Charcoal Filters, Particulate Filters, and Blovers) to QA Category 2... 56 ho. 140, H F1 v Transmitter Drawing Discrepancy...............

2 58 No. 180, Elimination of Pressure Svitches PDS-RV-101A, B....... 60 No. 305, Elimination of Flov Transmitter FT-0S-107............. 62 OPERATING PROCEDURES ............................................. 64 thru 79 OM 1.55A.4 OST 1.1.5(6) "Containment Isolation Trip Test - CIB Train A(B)".................................................... 64 OH 1.55A.4 OST 1/2.33.12 "Fire Protection System Flow Test".... 64 1 l

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TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)

OPERATING PROCEDURES (Cont.)

OM 1.55.4 OST 1.1.10 "Cold Shutdown Valve Exercise Test"....... 64 OH 1/2.8.4A.A "Supplying Unit 2 ' Primary Makeup' Vater from Unit 1"............................................................. 65 OH 1/2.8.4A.B "Transfer Boric Acid from Unit 1 to Unit 2 Boric Acid Tank"..................................................... 65 OM 1/2.8.4A.C "Transferring Liquid from a Coolant Recovery Tank to the Unit 2 Steam Generator Blovdown Evaporator

[2SGC-EV21B]" ................................................. 66 OM 1/2.17.4A.A "Transferring Liquid from Unit 1 High Level Vaste Drain Tank".............................................. 66 OM 1/2.18.4A.A "Transferring Vater from Unit 1 Spent Resin Devatering Pump to Unit 2 Spent Resin Transfer Booster Pump"... 67 OH 1/2.18.4A.B "Transferring Evaporator Bottoms from Unit 2 Evaporator Bottoms Hold Tank to Unit 1 Evaporator Bottoms Hold Tank".......................................................... 67 OH 1/2.19.4A.A "Transfer Gaseous Vaste from Unit 1 Surge Tank to a Unit 2 Waste Storage Tank"................................ 67 TOP 1-86-29 (Rev 2) "Bypass of [1IA-243], [1IA-1D-1] Discharge Check [1IA-1D-1] Instrument Air Dryer and [1IA-TK-1] Station Instrument Air Receiver"....................................... 68 TOP 1-87-01 "Charging of Control Room Emergency Air Tanks

[1VS-TK-7A,B,C,D,E]"........................................... 68 TOP 1-87-02 "Discharging BR Degasifier 1A Vaste Gases Via GV Discharge Header".............................................. 69 TOP 1-87-03 "Flow Rate Determination of Condenser Air Ejector Drains to Tank [1BD-TK-3]'..................................... 69 TOP 1-87-04 "Receiving Demineralized Vater from Unit 2 Vaste Drain Tank to Support Unit 2 Test Procedure S0V-2.17.01"....... 69 TOP 1-87-05,06,07,08,09 "Post Maintenance Test of Control Room Emergency Air Bottle [1VS-TK-6A,6B,6C,6D,6E] Discharge Control Components".................................................... 70 TOP 1-87-14 "Maintaining FPS Pressure Via Filtered Vater"...... 70 TOP 1-87-16 "Operability and Position Verification of

[SOV-1HY-103B1]"............................................... 70

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. JA' TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)

OPERATING PROCEDURES (Cont.)

TOP 1-87-17 "Fire Protection Loop Flow Test"................... 71 TOP 1-87-19 "Hanual Transfer of North Sump Sludge to [1SV-TK-8]

Evaporator Bottoms Hold Tank".................................. 71 TOP 1-87-20 "Pressurization / Leak Test of the 1A Steam Generator"..................................................... 71 TOP 1-87-22 "Control of Temporary Air Supply Through CRPB"..... 72 TOP 1-87-23 "Containment Standby Fire Protection - Support for DCP 833"....................................................... 72 TOP 1-87-24 "Containmen t Hose Station Air Tes t" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 ,

TOP 1-87-25 "Operation Support of Ultrasonic Probe Positioning of [1SI-52,53]"................................................ 73 TOP 1-87-26 "4160 V Fast Bus Transfer Honitoring".............. 73 TOP 1-87-27 "Filling [1VT-TK-10] vith [1FV-P-4] from

[1VT-TK-11] to Varm [1VT-TK-10]"............................... 73 TOP 1-88-01 "Hoisture Separator Reheater Tube Leak Tes t" . . . . . . . 74 TOP 1-88-03 "Air Mixing of Any Group I Ion Exchanger".......... 74 TOP 1-88-03 (Rev 1) "Air Mixing of Any Group I Ion Exchanger". . 74 TOP 1-88-04 "Circulation of Reactor Coolant Loops to Allov Opening the Loop Stop Valves".................................. 75 E0Ps Rev. 1 "Safety Evaluation for E0Ps Rev. 1 and Subcommittee Recommendations"............................................... 75 "Unit 1 Chlorine Detectors Temporary Hodification for Completion of DCP-814"......................................... 77 "CL No. 515148 "Lifted Leads for DCP 814 Replacement of Chlorine Detectors"............................................ 77 "Temporary Air Regulator on 1A Main Feed Regulation Valve"..... 77 "Temporary Installation of Relief Valve on the Outlet of

[CN-80]"....................................................... 77 "Temporary Hodification of [H0V-1RS-156B] Reach Rod"........... 78 "Temporary Hodification to [1VS-20]"........................... 78

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• TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd) ,

.l OPERATING PROCEDURES (Cont.)

"Jumper in Temporary Switchgear Chiller Unit".................. 78 )

OST 1.30.1B, "Auxiliary River ' Vater Pump 9B Test, Temporary Modification".................................................. 78 1

MSP 43.08, "Radiation Area Monitor RM-1RM-215A Containment i Particulate Calibration, Temporary Modification"............... 79 l l

RADIATION CONTROL PROCEDURES ..................................... 80 thru 81 Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1 Offsite Dose Calculation Manual, Issue 2................................... 80 RCH RIP 2.16 Control Room Lov Range Area Monitors.............. 80 J Calculation Package ERS-MHM-87-14, Unit 1/ Unit 2 ODCM Gaseous Alarm Setpoint Determination................................... 80 Calculation Package ERS-ATL-83-27, Rev. 1, Liquid Vaste Dose  !

Pactor Calculations for RCH-RP 6.5, Issue 3........... ........ 81 l RCH, Appendix 4, Routine Radiation Surveys..................... 81 l

RCH RP 5.1, Issue 4 - Exposure Authorization and Control, and RCM, Chapter 1, Issue 4, Rev. 2 - Standards and Requirements... 81 1

1 RCM RIP 1.2 RMS Area Monitor Calibrator (Model 848 Pield l Calibration Kit), Issue 1, Rev. 3.............................. 81 l l

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i t DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION - UNIT 1 Docket No. 50-334 License No. DPR-66 10CFR50.59 ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT DESIGN CONCEPT TITLE No. 504, Rev. 1 IMPROVE RESPONSE OF FEEDVATER BYPASS REGULATING VALVE Description and Purpose of Modification The purpose of this design change is to improve the stroke speed and "lov flow" control response of the main feedvater bypass flow control valves.

The valve stroke time vill be reduced from seventy (70) seconds to less than ten (10) seconds when the controlling solenoid valves are deenergized. Also, the valve trim flow characteristic vill be changed from equal percentage to linear to increase the rate of flow change at "low" flows (less than 1000gpm) when the transfer from bypass flov to main feed flow is begun.

Safety Evaluation 1

1 Implementation of this design change is considered to be safe. No change i to the UFSAR or Technical Specifications is required as a result of this change.

DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY 10CFR50.59

• B:avur Valley Povar Station Unit 1 ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT Docket No. 50-334' License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd) l l

l Unreviewed Safety Question Determination

1. Is the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety-Analysis Report NO (FSAR) increased?

Reason: The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in UFSAR Section 14.1.8-Loss of Normal Feedvater and Section 14.1.9-Excessive Heat Removal Due to Feedvater System Halfunctions vill not be increased. This design change vill improve the stroke speed and lov flow control response of the main feedvater bypass flow control valves. Also, the valve trim flow characteristics will be changed to increase the rate of flow change at lov flows when the transfer from bypass flow to main feed flow is begun. Therefore, the possibility of an accident is not increased since this design change vill provide the required response improvement which should reduce problems with the Feedvater Bypass Flow Control Valves affecting trips due to steam generator level control.

2. Is the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report created? NO  ;

- Reason: The modifications to be incorporated under this design )

change vill not adversely affect the operation of the l feedvater system as described in UFSAR Section 10.3.5 or l Steam Generator Vater Level Control as described in UFSAR l Section 7.7.1.7. Plant trips due to Steam Generator level  !

control problems associated with the Feedvater Bypass Regulating Valves should be reduced.

3. Is the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification reduced? NO ,

Reason: The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification vill not be reduced since there ,

are no Technical Specifications associated with the i Feedvater Bypass Flow Control Valves. The subject valves (

are not- considered Containment Isolation Valves as defined in Technical Specification 3/4-6.3 (Table 3.6-1).

DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY 10CFR50.59 Be:vtr Valley Povar Station Unit 1 ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT Docket No. 50-334 License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd)

L DESIGN CONCEPT TITLE No. 539, Rev. O DEGASIFIER REC 0VERY HEAT EXCHANGER CROSS-CONNECT PIPE MODIFICATIONS Description and Purpose of Modification The design objective of DCP 539 is to replace the rigid 2" diameter pipes cross-connecting the Degasifier Recovery Heat Exchanger pairs (BR-E-12t/12A2 & 12B1/12B2) with flexible lines. This vill be done to ,

alleviate the thermal stresses in the pipe due to the cycling operation of i this portion of the boron Recovery Systen.

I Safety Evaluation l 1

This proposed modification is considered safe since the BVPS-1 UFSAR.and I the bases of the Technical Specifications is not altered. This change does not present an unreviewed safety question.

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Unreviewed Safety Question Determination

1. Is the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an acc dent or malfunction of i

equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety-Analysis Report (FSAR) increased? NO Reason: The replacement of a rigid 5" long pipe with stainless steel bellows expansion joint vill minimize the possibility of veld failure due to thermal gradients.

Therefore, the probability of occurrence of an accident as previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not increased.

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DUQUESNE' LIGHT COMPANY 10CFR50.59 B:ivar Vallsy Powcr Station Unit 1 ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT Docket No.30-334' License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd) J l

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2. Is the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different- I type than previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report created? NO 1 1

Reason: Thermal gradients contributing to ' veld failure are compensated for by expansion bellows. Thus a different l type of accident cannot occur. l

3. Is the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical- )

Specification reduced? NO Reasent The function and design of the intermittent Degasifier  ;

Recovery Heat Exchanger pairs remains as originally )

intended.

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DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY 10CFR50.59 B:sysr Vallty Povar Station Unit 1 ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT Docket No.30-334 License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd)

DESIGN CONCEPT TITLE No. 602, Rev. 1 UNIT 2 CONTROL ROOM t.LARM AND CCTV Description and Purpose of Modification Two modifications are proposed to the present security system to alleviate the expense of security guards at the Unit 2 control room door.

1. A new CCTV camera vill be installed inside the Unit i boundary to monitor the Unit 2 control room door. The Unit 2 door is located behind the missile barrier and cannot be viewed by the present perimeter cameras.

2. A Balanced Magnetic Switch (BMS) vill be installed on the Electrical Tunnel trap door adjacent to the Unit 2 control room door. The tamper and alarm circuits vill be wired to the security computer system. The Electrical Tunnel is situated between Unit 1 6 2 and contains safety related cables for Unit 1. Since this area has been determined to be a Vital Area, the addition of a BMS and camera coverage as stated above vill allow the Security System to remotely monitor these areas.

Safety Evaluation This DCP will improve the security system CCTV and alarm coverage of the Unit.

2 control room door and Electrical Tunnel trap door. Because of this improved remotely monitored security coverage, the current local guard posting can be eliminated, while still maintaining an adequate security level.

This DCP vill not adversely affect the safety of the plant as considered in the Updated FSAR and Technical Specifications and is, therefore, acceptable.

Unreviewed Safety Question Determination

1. Is the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) increased? NO REASON: This DCP vill not affect any safety related equipment or procedures.

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^* DUQUEShE LIGHT COMPANY 10CFR50.59

• Bylvar Umilty Powar Station Unit 1 ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT Docket No. 50-334 License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd)

2. Is the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type i than any previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report created? NO REASON: Because this DCP vill not affect any-safety related Equipment or procedures, it vill not create the possibility for any new, or different types of accidents.

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3. Is the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical i Specification reduced? NO REASON: This DCP vill not affect any safety related equipment or procedures, therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the Technical Specifications is not affected.

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DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY 10CFR50.59

• Belvar Valley Powar Station Unit 1 ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT Docket No. 50-334 License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd)

DESIGN CONCEPT TITLE No. 611, Rev. 2 CONTROL ROOM EHERGENCY AIR SYSTEM FOR UNI?S 1 5 2 Description and Purpose of Modification This modification vill enable the combined BV-1/BV-2 main control room area to be pressurized to 1/8 in. water gauge, for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> after a DBA. The compressed air storage capacity of the existing Control Room Emergency Bottled Air Pressurization System (CREBAPS) vill be increased by the addition of 5 new air storage bottles.

To maintain the control room areas at a positive 1/8 in, pressure after 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, the Emergency Supply fans vill be replaced v'th larger capacity fans (800-1000 cfm). In addition, larger ductvork, heaters and dampers will be installed as required. The controls for the inlet Butterfly dampers vill be modified so that they vill not reopen 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> after a CIB signal. The inlet supply fans vill be a 10 inch schedule 20 pipe containing 1 manually operated valve which bypasses the inlet Butterfly dampers.

An additional tray vill be added to the filter (VS-FL-2), in place of a current blank panel, to improve the removal efficiency for elemental and methyl iodine.

The minimum and maximum outdoor air dampers vill be repaired or modified if necessary to limit the air intake to 300 cfm. This will assure compliance with the safety analyses performed for control room operator dose and chlorine concentration, Safety Evaluation It has been determined that this modification vill not increase the l j

probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated,.nor create a new type of accident not previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

This modification vill also not adversely affect the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification section and an unreviewed safety question is not raised.

The modification requires UFSAR changes to section 9.13.4 and drawing revisions to Figures 1.2-8 and 9.13.3.

This modification requires Technical Specification 3.7.7.1 to be revised I to include the additional air storage bottles and the increased fan flow rate l I

requirements.

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' DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY 10CFR50.59

• B:Evar Valley Povar Station Unit 1 ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT ,

Docket No.30-334 License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd) l l

l Unreviewed Safety Question Determ4. nation

1. Is the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or I malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in I the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) increased? NO (

1 Reason: Sections 1.7 and 9.13.4 of the UFSAR address the emergency j pressurization of the BV-1 and BV-2 Main Control Area for 1 -

hour after a DBA or . chlorine detection. Section 11.3.5 l addresses the radiological dose to control room operators after a DBA. The additional bottled air storage and higher capacity l fans ensure that the bases for these safety analyses remain valid. During a DBA, radioactivity escapes from the containment only during the first hour until the ESP systems return the containment pressure subatmospheric. The modified CREBAPS will pressurize both Unit 1 and Unit 2 control room l areas during this time to prevent inleakage of radioactivity into the control room. After the CREBAPS bottles have been j exhausted the emergency supply fans can be placed in service by i manually opening the 10 inch manual butterfly valve (VVI-15-B-0). This vill supply sufficient filtered air to maintain the control room areas at 1/8 inch pressure.

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2. Is the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type l than previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report created? NO Reason: Increasing the CREBAPS bottled air supply and the emergency I supply fan capacity ensutes meeting the original design ,

criteria of maintaining a positive 1/8 inch pressure in the l control areas. Removing the automatic reopening feature from the inlet butterfly campers and eliminating the connection I between them and the emergency supply fan, then requires )

operator action to open the bypass valve to operate the emergency supply fans and maintain the positive pressure in the i control room areas. Since this is not required until i hour ,

after a DBA there is sufficient time (or operator action. The I radiological consequences of other accidents on the control room operator doses, which were not previously evaluated, vill be required to meet General Design Criteria 19. l

3. Is the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification reduced? NO l

Reason: The margin of safety as defined in the basis for TS-3.7.7.1 is not reduced since the increased bottled air supply and increased fan capacity ensures that the control room areas can be maintained at a pos itive 1/8 inch pressure af ter a DBA.

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' DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY 10CFR50.59

• Bravar Valley Power Station Unit 1 ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT

. Docket No.30-334 License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd)

DESIGN CONCEPT TITLE No. 619, Rev. O SPENT FILTER TRANSFER SHIELD H0DIFICATIONS Description and Purpose of Modification The purpore of this modification is to modify the Unit 1 Spent Filter Transfer Shield so that it can be used for Unit 2. This vill allow the same equipment to be used for both Units 1 and 2.

Safety Evaluation This design change is safe and no unreviewed safety question is involved.

This design change vill only affect the lifting lugs and not the radiation shielding portion of the shield. The addition of the velded brackets to aid in centering the shield in the Unit 2 floor opening vill not affect the safety of the shield.

Unreviewed Safety Question Determination

1. Is the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety-Analysis Report (FSAR) increased? NO Reason: The modifications to the spent filter transfer shield vill rot increase the probability of an accident occurring as previously defined in the Updated FSAR. The Updated FSAR, Section 11.2.5.2 vill not be changed by the modification to the shield. This modification vill not affect the radiation protection of the shield, it vill only affect the lifting lugs on the outside of the shield. This modification vill allow the spent filter transfer shield and its associated tools to be used at Unit 2 also.

' DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY 10CFR50.59

• B:1 var Valley Povar Station Unit 1 ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT Docket No.30-334 License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd)

2. Is the possibility for an accident- or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report created? NO Reason: This modification vill change the lifting lugs and add in brackets to allow the shield to be used in Unit 2 and to properly center it in the Unit 2 floor openings. This modification vill not add in any now type of accident to the Updated FSAR.

3. Is the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification reduced? NO Reason: The spent filter transfer shield is not included in the technical specifications, and this modification vill not.

affect section 3/4.11.3, which discusses the solid vaste system.

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• DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY 10CFR50.59

+ Blivar Valley Power Station Unit 1 ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT i Docket No. '50-334' License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd)

DESIGN CONCEPT TITLE No. 632, Rev. O PRESSURE INDICATORS FOR THE CHARGING PUMP RW i STRAINERS Description and Purpose of Hodification This modification entails the installation of differential pressura gauges across strainers YS-16 and YS-18, both of which are located in the river water system, in order to monitor flov through these strainers. I l

Safety Evaluation f i

It has been determined that this modification vill not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or j malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated, nor create a new type of accident not previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

I This modification vill also not adversely affect the margin of safety as j defined in the basis for any technical specification section and an  !

unreviewed safety question is not raised, j I

Unreviewed Safety Question Determination

l. Is the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as j previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety-Analysis Report I 1

N0 (FSAR) increased?

Reason: The addition of differential pressure gauges across strainers Y-16 and Y-18 in order to determine if the strainers are blocked vill enhance system operation. This modification vill provide a direct method by which operators can determine if a strainer needs to be cleaned and thus ensure that adequate cooling water is provided to the charging pump lube oil coolets and the control room air conditioners. This modification vill ensure greater reliability of this part of the river water system as it is described in Section 9.9 of the UFSAR.

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' DUQUESNE LIGilT COMPANY 10CFR50.59

, Belvar Valley Povar Station Unit 1 ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT Docket No.30-334 License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd)

2. Is the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report created? NO Reason: No new type of accident is created due to the installation of this modification and this modification vill enhance the operation of this portion of the river water system as it is described in Section 9.9 of the UFSAR.

3. Is the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification reduced? NO Reason: This modification vill not adversely affect the margin of safety as described in any section of the Technical Specifications.

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• DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY 10CFR50.59

' Bisysr Vallsy Power Station Unit 1 ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT Docket No. '50-334 License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd)

DESIGN CONC 8PT TITLE No. 635. Rev. 0 UNIT 2 ERP COMPUTER SYSTEM CONNECTIONS TO UNIT 1 D_escription and Purpose of Hodification This Unit #1 design concept is initiated to provide the necessary interfaces (additions to Unit #1 equipment and facilities) for the installation of the Unit #2 ERF computer system. this design concept involves the following changes to Unit 1 Plant: 1) install consoles and printers in the Alternate Technical Support Center, 2) install recorder switching devices in the Alt. TSC, 3) install data multiplexing equipment in the Unit #1 Computer Room Data Multiplexer Panel, 4) install Artel video /F0 converter units and two GTE 3120 TI/F0 converter units in the Unit #1 Relay Room Communications Panel, .and 5) install raceway and cabling. Engineering, labor and material has to be supplied to perform the following in the ERF Building: 1) install Unit #2 ERF computer system in the ERP Computer Room, 2) install Unit #2 ERF computer systems, consoles and printers in the TSC and console in E0C, 3) install recorder switching devices in the TSC, 4) install two GTE 3120 TI/F0 converter units and Artel video /F0 converters in the ERP Communications Room, 5) install data multiplexing equipment in the Computer Roon, 6) install Unit

1. 2 EPP hot line' telephones, 7) perform factory acceptance test, 8) test PSMS/ERFCS data link, and 9) complete and test DRHS/ARERAS data link.

Safety Evaluation In summary, this safety evaluation has shown that the design concept to DCP 635 has no impact on other plant systems. There are no unreviewed safety questions, and the margin of safety in the basis of any Technical Specification is not reduced.

Unreviewed Safety Question Determi.ation

1. Is the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report I (FSAR) increased? NO I

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" DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY 10CFR50.59 i B tvar Valley P:v2r Station Unit 1 ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT Docket No. '50-334 License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd)

I Reason: None of the changes described in the Design Concept of DCP 635 vill impact the safety as evaluated in the Updated FSAR section 7.9.2 which states the following: "A dual Plant Variable Computer System (PVS) has been installed in the computer room of the ERF vith power supplied from redundant uninterruptible power supplies. A Distributed Multiplexer (DMUX) located in the power station collects plant data and sends it to the PVS over redundant communication loops. The PVS computer data base parameter selection was based on Regulatory Guide 1.97, Rev. 2."

None of the changes described in the Design Concept of DCP 635 vill impact the safety as evaluated in the Updated FSAR section 12.3 which states the following: " In support of handling any emergency operations at BVPS Unit No. 1, an onsite Emergency Response Facility (ERF) has been provided... This facility provides the following:

... Computer and Communications Rooms."

None of the changes affect any assumptions used in the Chapter 14 accident analyses.

2. Is the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report created: NO Reason: The changes that are described in the Design Concept DCP 635 require equipment which transmits and/or receives data communication, however, it has no control functions and therefore, it can not initiate a plant trip. This equipment interfaces with Unit #1 communication equipment and therefore it is isolated from equipment having control functions. Thus, no possibility is created for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the Updated FSAR.

3. Is the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical specification reduced: NO Reason: There are no Technical Specifications which cover the changes described in the Design Concept of DCP 635.

DUQUESNE LIGBT COMPANY 10CFR50.59

• Benvar Veljey Power Station Unit 1 ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT Docket No.30-334 License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd)

DESIGN CONCEPT TITLE No. 639, Rev. O ADDITIONAL TOOL HOLDING BRACKETS IN REFUELING AREA Description and Purpose of Modification The objective of this task is to modify and install to seismic requirements the bracket for storing the Rod Control Cluster (RCC) changing tool on the East Parapet vall of the Fuel Pool. The RCC changing tool holding bracket was designed and supplied from Vestinghouse to non-seismic requirements.

In addition, new seismically designed brackets vill be installed for mounting the Irradiation Sample Basket Handling Tool, the thimble plug handling tool, and the burnable poison rod tool.

t Safety Evaluation It has been determined that this modification vill not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated or create a new type of accident than previously evaluated in the UFSAR. This modification vill also not adversely affect the plant's aargin of safety and an unreviewed safety question is not raised.

Unreviewed Safety Question Determination

1. Is the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) increased? NO Reason: The limiting condition or vorst case scenario previously analyzed is detailed in UFSAR Section 14.2.1, "Fuel Handling Accident", 'The vorst case which is hypothesized with respect to the release of fission products to the environment, is the dropping of a spent fuel assembly onto the spent fuel pool floor and the breaking of all the fuel rods'. Also, because of the UFSAR accident analysis, loads in excess of 3000 pounds are prohibited from being carried over the spent fuel pool storage racks. (Ref. Tech. Spec. 3.9.7).

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' DUQUE5NE LIGHT COMPANY 10CFR50.59 4

+ - Belvar Valley Povar Station Unit 1 ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT )

Docket No.30-334 License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd)

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The weight of the refueling tools are not in excess of the j j

imposed technical specification loads and due to the proposed mounting location of the refueling tools, should a bracket (s) .)

fail and the tool (s) fall into the pool, the number of fuel i rods that could be fractured in the spent fuel poal vould be l substantially less than the amount assumed by the UFSAR accident analysis (Ref. letter JVJ-84-27).

Therefore, this modification vould not increase the l probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an l accident nor vould a new accident be created.

2. Is the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report created? NO ,

I Reason: The location of the tooling brackets vill be such that it vill i not impinge upon the operation of the fuel handling system.

(Reference FSAR Section 9.12). Also see item no. 1 above.

3. Is the margin of ' safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification reduced? NO Reason: Per Technical Specification 3.9.7, ' Loads in excess of 3000 pounds shall be prohibited from travel over fuel assemblies in the storage pool'. The tooling veight does not exceed 3000 pounds.

" DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY 10CFR50.59

• BS= var Valley Povzr Station Unit 1 ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT Docket No. '50-334 License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd)

DESIGN CONCEPT TITLE No. 661, Rev. 1 DEVATERING SYSTEM FOR SOLID VASTE LINERS Description and purpose of Modification The purpose of this design change is to modify the existing Solid Vaste Disposal System to provide the following capabilities:

- Transfer spent resin from any one of the eleven (11) Group I, II or III Plant Process Ion Exchangers to a High Integrity Liner located in either the Truck Bay Area or the Liner Storage Area of the Solid Vaste Disposal Building.

- Transfer spent resin from the Resin Vaste Hold Tank (SV-TK-2) to a High Integrity Liner located in either the Truck Bay Area or Liner Storage Area of the Solid Vaste Disposal Building.

- Devater a High Integrity Liner to the Resin Vaste Hold Tank (SV-TK-2) from either the Truck Bay Area or Liner Storage Area of tne Solid Vaste Disposal Building.

- Replace the obsolete level indication (LIS-SV-202) for the Resin Vaste Hold Tank (SV-TK-2) with a new ultrasonic level indication system.

- Installation of a devatering measuring tank to ensure that the High Integrity Liners have had a sufficient amount of liquid removed from them.

- Installation of a reach rod on valve SV-112 to reduce operator exposure during operation of this valve.

Safety Evaluation This design change is considered to be safe and does not constitute an unreviewed safety question, nor does it reduce the margin of safety as de#ined in the basis of any Technical Specification. UFSAR Section 11.2.5 should be revised to address the modifications made 'to the Solid Waste Disposal System.

A revision to UFFAR Figure 11.2-6 is required as a result of this design change. No changes to the Technical Specifications are required.

DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY 10CFR50.59

- Belvar Valley Povsr Statien Unit 1 ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT Docket No. '50-334 License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd)

Unreviewed Safety Question Determination

1. Is the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) increased? NO Reason: The modifications to be incorporated under this design change vill not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in UFSAB Section

14. These changes vill increase radiological safety by reducing the chance of a radioactive spill and by reducing operator exposure during resin transfer operations. Also, as stated in UFdAR Section 11.2.5.2, "Halfunctions in the system do not affect the safety of station operations".

2. Is the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report created? NO Reason: The modifications to be incorporated under this design change vill not adversely affect the operation of the Solid Vaste Disposal System as described in UFSAR Section 11.2.5. This design change vill improve the present system by installing permanent piping to perform operations which presently use temporary hoses, and by replacing the obsolete level indication on SV-TK-2. Therefore, it is concluded that an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created.

3. Is the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification reduced? NO Reason: The margin of safety as defined in the basis for Technical Specification 3/4.11.3, Solid Radioactive Vaste, vill not be reduced. This change vill improve the present system by installing permanent piping to perform operations which presently use temporary hoses. Also, the obsolete level indication on SV-TK-2 vill be replaced.

10CFR50.59

" DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY Barvar Valley Povar Station Unit 1 ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT l Docket No. '50-334 License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd) l 1

DESIGN CONCEPT TITLE No. 692, Rev. O CHEMICAL ADDITION PUMPS FLOV TRANSHITTER Description and purpose of Modification The purpose of this modification is to install a flow meter in line 2 1/2" -

OS-90-153A which vill provide flov indication for the chemical injection pumps OS-P-4A, B, C & D; this vill enable Technical Specification 4.6.2.3.b.4 to be verified. This new matmeter type of flov element vill be flanged and installed inside of the Chemical Addition Building.

Safety Evaluation This modification is considered to be safe and does not present an unreviewed '

safety question nor does it reduce the margin of safety as defined in any technical specification. However, the installation of this design change vill i require a change to UFSAR Figure 6.4-1 to show the addition of the flow meter. l l

Unreviewed Safety Question Determination

1. Is the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) increased? NO Reason: The flow meter vill be installed on the recirculation, non-0 portion of the chemical injection pumps discharge piping which is normally isolated. Failure of the flow meter to perform its function or failure of the flanges to maintain its integrity vill not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR Sections 6.4 and 14.3.

2. Is the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type i than any previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis l Report created? NO Reason: By making this modification the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in UFSAR Section 14.3 vill not.be created, since it vill not affect the flow of the sodium i hydroxide solution from the chemical addition tank to the quench spray pumps.

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" DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPAha 10CFR50.59 Betver Vallty Pnvar Station Unit 1 ANNUAL SAFETf EVALUATIONS REPORT (Cont'd)

~

Docket No.30-334 License No. DPR-66 l

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3. Is the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical  ;

Specification reduced? N' l l

Reason: The margin of safety as defined in Technical Specificativa j 3/4.6.2.3 vill not be reduced, s!nce the flow of the sodium hydroxide solution to the quench spray pumps. Vill not be I affected. Moreover, this modification vill allow the required ,

"Tech Speced" flow rates for the chemical injection pumps to l be verified, thereby maintaining the existing margin of l safety. l l

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" DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY 10CFR50.59

" Ostysr Vallsy Povsr Station Unit 1 ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT Docket No. '50-334 License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd)

-DESIGN CONCEPT TITLE No. 697, Rev. O INLET ISOLATION VALVES FOR THE STEAM GENERATOR DRAIN TANKS Description and Purpose of Modification To add inlet isolation valves to the Steam Generator Drain Tanks (LV-TK-7A &

7B) so the inlet motor-operated valve (MOV-LV-lilA or B) can be repaired while the other Steam Generator Drain Tank can be discharged.

Safety Evaluation Implementation of this design change is considered safe. No change to the Technical Specifications is required. A change to UFSAR Figure 11.2-3 is required as a result of this change.

Unreviewed Safety Question Determination

1. Is the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) increased? NO.

This modification vill not increase the consequences of accidental release of liquid vaste as described in UFSAR section 14.2.2 since leakage from the valves vill be centained within the station.

2. Is the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report created? NO.

Accidental release of liquid vaste is already evaluated in UFSAR Section 14.2.2.

3. Is the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical specification reduced? NO.

The bases of Technical Specifications 3.4.11.1,2,3,4 are not affected since the concentration, dose, treatment, and the quantity of radioactive material contained in LV-TK-7A or 7B vill not be changed as a result of this modificatiori.

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'" DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY 10CFR50.59

- B ivar Valley Povar Station Unit 1 ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT Docket No. 50-334 License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd)

DESIGN CONCEPT TITLE No. 710, Rev. O FEEDVATER HEATER AND DRAIN RECEIVER LEVEL CONTROL N0DIFICATIONS Description and Purpose The objective of this design change is to install vent and drain valves on the feedvater heaters level control sensing legs and the drain receiver instrument manifolds. This will provide the station with a means of checking, repairing or calibrating the level control instrumentation without removing the equipment from service.

Safety Evaluation It has been determined that this modification vill not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated or create a new type of accident than previously evaluated in the UFSAR. This modification vill also not adversely affect the plants margin of safety and an unreviewed safety question is not raised.

Unrevieved Safety Question Determination

1. Is the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident important to safety as previously evaluated in the Updated Final SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT (UFSAR) increased? NO Reason: The feedvater heater and drain receivers and their level control instrumentation are only assential for the reliable generation of electricity. No credit is taken for the main feedvater system under the accid =nt analyses per Section 14 of the UFSAR.

Although malfunction or failure of the additional vent and '

l drain valves could cause erroneous readings of the feedvater

heater and drain receivers level and may inadvertently lead to i

' main feedvater isolation, the "LOSS OF NORMAL FEEDVATER I

ACCIDENT" has been previously evaluated per Section 14.1.8 of the UFSAR. l l

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DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY 100FR50.59 -

- Belvsr Vallty Psvar Station Unit 1 ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT Docket No. '50-334 License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd)

2. Is the possibility for an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or a malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the Updated Final SAFETY ANALYSES REPORT created? NO The malfunction of the level control instrumentation is within the bounds of the analysis described in Sections 14.1.8 "Loss of Normal Feedvater" and 14.1.9 ' Excessive Heat Remova.1 Due to Feedvater System Malfunctions'. No new accident scenario is created.

3. Is the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification reduced? t0 j

The technical specifications are not applicable to the feedvater heaters and drain receivers.

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DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY . 10CFR50.59 Bc2vsr Vallsy Povar Sta+1on Unit 1 ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT Docket No. '50-334 License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd) l t

DESIGN CONCEPT TITLE No. 711, Rev. O CONTROL R00H VENTILATION RADIATION HONITORS Description and Purpose This design change vill install two area radiation monitors in the Unit 1 con t ro.1 room. The detectors will be mounted from the ceiling and tie in to the existing RMS rack. A high radiation signal from these monitors vill initiate control room isolation, bottled air and emergency supply fans after one hour.

The purpose of this modification is to maintain the dose to the personnel in

, the control room below GDC 19 limits. This vill resolve a Unit 2 licensing issue.

Safety Evaluation This design change is safe and does not present an unreviewed safety question.

No new accidents are created and the probability of a nalfunction of equipment is not increased. The margin of safety as defined in the applicable Technical Specifications bases is not reduced. A change to the UFSAR is required. A change to the Technical Specifications is required only to incorporate operability and surveillance requirements for the new monitors.

Unreviewed Safety Question Determination

1. Is the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Updatei Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) increased? NO.

REASON: The addition of these area radiation monitors vill not increase the probability of any accident or malfunction evaluated in the UFSAR. The monitors vill be installed to withstand seismic events and without loss of function or affecting any connecting systems. The monitors vill supply a trip signal to the Control Room Pressurization System as described in Section 9.13.4 of the UFSAR. The trip point vill be set to provide a low probability of spurious actuation.

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DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY 10CFR50.59-Be2 var Valley Pawar Station Unit 1 uNNUAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT Docket No. '50-334 License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd)

2. Is the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report created? NO.

REASON: No new accidents are created by the . installation of these radiation monitors, the probability of a malfunction of the Control Room Pressurization System caused by the failure or spurious actuation of these monitors is very lov based on the trip setpoint, the Category I installation, and the component redundancy.

3. Is the margin

• of safety as defined in the basis for any technical-specification reduced? NO.

REASON: The margin of safety as defined in the bases of Technical Specification 3/4.3.3 and 3/4.7.7 is not reduced. The additional monitors vill enhance the capability of the control room operators to perform during an accident.

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DUQUESNE~ LIGHT COMPANY 100FR50.59 Belvar Valley Povsr Station Unit 1 ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT Docket No. '50-334 License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd)

DESIGN CONCEPT TITLE No. 716, Rev. 0 480V SUDSTATION GROUND FAULT DETECTION Description and Purpose of Hodification The primary objective of this design change is to provide a ballast resistive load for the 480V ground detection equipment on the substation 1-8 buses 1N, IN1; and substation 1-9 buses 1P and 1Pl. This vill eliminate high transient voltage oscillations on the secondary side of the ground detection voltage transformer. It vill also prevent relay chattering, ground lights from flickering and the possibility of an incorrect trip of the undervoltage relays.

This modification vill eliminate the temporary 500 ohm load on the secondary side of the ground detection voltage transformers (Jumper / Lifted Tag Nos.

3198, 3199, 3200 and 3201) with the ground detection relays. A 500 ohm non-inductive ballast resistor vill be mounted onto and inside the common instrument compartment door joining the 480V switchgear for the substation 1-8 substation buses 1N, 1N1; and substation 1-9 buses IP, and 1P1 ground detection equipment. The instrument compartments are located in the switchgear room of the Service Building, elevation 713'6".

Safety Evaluation This modification vill be designed, built, and installed according to the applicable electrical standards; (1) BVS-3000 Endorsement Specification for Electrical Vork for Beaver Valley Power Station - Unit No. 1, and (2) BVS-3001 Endorsement Specification for Criteria for Installation and Identification of Electrical Cables for Continuing Service Tasks. The change vill only affect the ground detection relay and the undervoltage detection relay. The 480 volt safety related buses are isolated by the ground detection voltage transformer and vill not be affected. The addition of the ballast resistor vill not affect the normal function of the ground detection relay or the undervoltage detection relay. It vill only eliminate the high transient voltage oscillations in the ground detection circuit.

This DCP vill not adversely affect the safety of the plant as considered in the Updated FSAR and Technical Specifications and is, therefore, acceptable.

'DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY 10CFR50.59 BLIvsr Valley Povar Staticn Unit 1 ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT Docket No. '50-334 License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd)

Unreviewed Safety Question Determination

1. Is the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) increased? NO.

REASON: The ballast resistor vill be a series-parallel arrangement of four 500 ohm resistors of high reliability (mil spec).

Therefore, the probability of failure of this ballast resistor is extremely small. If however, the ballast resistor fails open, the ground detection circuit vill be equivalent to its original, unmodified condition. If the ballast resistor fails by a short circuit, the undervoltage relay vill be tripped, which could also occur due to other causes. Because of the high reliability of the ballast resistor design, this short circuit failure mode has a negligible affect on the reliability of the circuit.

2. Is the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report created? NO.

REASON: Because this modification is so minor, the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type is not created. (See also the answer to question 1)

3. Is the margin of safety as defined in the basis for 'ny Technical Specification reduced? NO.

REASON: This change vill make the undervoltage detection circuit more reliable.

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DUQUESNE. LIGHT ~ COMPANY 10CFR50.59

. Belvsr Vrilty Pcver Station Unit 1 ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT j Docket No. '50-334 License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd) {

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DESIGN CONCEPT TITLE l No. 722, Rev 1 INSTALLATION OF ANNUBAR FLOV INSTRUMENTS IN HSR REHEAT STEAM LINES Description and Purpose of Modification The objective of this design change is to install annubar flov instrumentation upstream of the Moisture Separator Reheaters in the heating steam lines.

By measuring actual flow rates into the Moisture' Separator Reheaters (HSR),

and through the use of a heat balance computer code, the efficiency of the HSRs can be calculated. This information vill be used to determine when the tube bundles should be replaced.

This DCP vill also add two root stop valves on MS-3-1A & 1D crossover piping so temporary pressure gauge can be added. These pressure gauges vill also be used to determine HSR outlet cycle' steam pressure to provide additional baseline thermal performance data.

Conclusion of Safety Evaluation It has been determined that this modification vill not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated or create a new type of accident than previously evaluated in the UFSAR. This modification vill also not adversely affect the plants margin of safety and an unreviewed safety question is not raised.

Unreviewed Safety Question Determination

1. Is the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident important to safety as previously evaluated in the Updated Final SAFETY )

ANALYSIS REPORT (UFSAR) increased? NO.

REASON: The additional instrumentation vill only be local and vill not tie into any existing contrals or the plants P-250 computer.

The instrumentation vill only be utilized to provide plant operating conditions (flow rates) for an engineering study.

Failure of the flov instrumentation vill not affect the plants operation in any way.

l The safety analysis per Section 14 of the UFSAR vill not be affected by this modification.

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'DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY 10CFR50.59

-* Belvtr'Vs11ty Povar Station Unit 1 . ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT l Docket No. '50-334 License No. DPR-66 .(Cont'd)  !

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2. Is the possibility of an occurrence 'on the consequences of an accident' l or malfunction of a different type then previously evaluated in the  !

Updated Final SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT created? NO.  !

No new accident scenario vill be created by adding annubar flow instrumentation to the HSR steam heating lines. No credit will be taken for the instrumentation under an accident condition.

3. Is the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical NO.

Specification reduced?

REASON: The technical specifications are not applicable to the moisture separator rebeaters or their inlet steam-heating lines.

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DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY 10CFR50.59

- BL ver Vallsy Povar Station Unit 1 ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT Docket No. '50-334 License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd)

DESIGN CONCEPT TITLE i

No. 726, Rev. 2 BVPS 1 & 2 PIPING INTERCONNECTIONS - SOUTH IRENCH Description and Purpose of Modification The purpose of this modification is to route piping through the BVPS Unit 1 South Trench to the interfacing boundary between BVPS Unit 1 and Unit 2 and make the final interconnection to BVPS Unit 2 piping. Three of the lines vill be electrically heat traced to prevent flov blockage due to boron precipitation.

Safety Evaluation Performance of this modification is considered safe and does not involve an unrevieved safety question. Installation of this piping vill not create a new accident, nor vill the change increase the probability or consequences for accidents analyzed in UFSAR Subsection 14.2. No safety-related piping vill be installed or affected; tie-ins to Unit 1 piping vill be to either a nonsafety-related line or after a normally closed isolation valve which serves as a classification barrier. No Class 1E, safety-related electrical equipment will be installed or affected; electrical power for heat tracing vill be from a nonsafety-related source. Changes to the UFSAR vill be required. No change to the Technical Specifications vill be required.

Unreviewed Safety Question Dctermination  !

1. Is the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in I the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) increased? NO 1

Reason: This modification vill not increast the probability or consequences of an accident. Each connection to a BVPS Unit 1 ,

System vill be made either to a nonsafety-related portion or j after a normally closed valve which serves as a suitable  ;

Piping to be installed vill be classification barrier.

nonsafety-related. Electrical power for the heat trace l circuits vill be obtained from a non Class 1E, nonsafety-  !

related source. All portions of this modification comply with ,

and are enveloped by the analyses of UFSAR subsections 14.2.2 )

and 14.2.3. ,

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'DUQUESNE' LIGHT COMPANY 10CFR50.59 4 Besvar Vallsy Povar Station Unit 1 ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT Docket No. '50-334 License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd)

2. Is the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type j i

than previously_ evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report I created? NO

. Reason: Liquid piping included _ in this mooi.fication'is routed within, the arcas discussed in UFSAR subsection 14.2.2 such that leakage is collected. No liquid connections are made to  ;

safety-related equipment. j Failure of . gas piping included in th.'s modification is enveloped by the analysis in UFSAR subsection 14.2.3. I

3. Is the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical l Specification reduced? NO 'l 1

Reason: A review of Technical Specifications 3/4.3.3, 3/4.11.1,  ;

3/4.11.2, and- 3/4.11.3 and their bases indicated that the  !

margin of safety is not reduced. l i

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DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY 10CFR50.59 j Besvar Vallsy Povar Station Unit 1 ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT ,

Docket No. '50-334 License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd) -l DESIGN CONCEPT- TITLE l

No. 743, Rev. 1 MODIFY AIR SUPPLY TO THE MSTV'S Description and Purpose of Modification i

I The purpose of this design change is to modify the instrument air supply to l the main steam trip valves (MSTVs, also called MSIVs, main steam isolation ,

valves) power air cylinders. The MSTVs are mark numbers TV-MS-101A, B & C. l The modification consists of the addition of a check valve and two 3/4" I blovdown valves (ball valves).

The check valve installation is undertaken as a response to DLCo. letter NDINSM:1901, "Reactor Trip Reduction Program", December 4, 1985, paragraph 2.

The purpose of the check valve being prevention of "an MSIV closure in response to lov system air pressure and (to) preclude a safety injection on i loss of air". The check valve shall prevent instrument air leakage upstream i of the valve from draining the MSTV power air cylinders to such an extent that i the MSTVs close and the plant trips. l The blevdown valves are 3/4", locked shut, manually operated ball valves, to be located downstream of the check valve and are a Duquesne Light Company '

licensing commitment to the NRC for the station's 10CFRSO Appendix R Fire Protection Program. The blovdovn valves shall allow the manual drain of instrument air from the MSTV power air cylinders to initiate valved isolation of the steam generators from the turbines. This function is desired in the '

event of an Appendix R type fire taking place without a turbine trip. Two ball valves are used to ensure system isolation.

l Safety Evaluation The compressed air systems are designed to provide adequate compressed air ,

capacity, of suitable quality and pressure, as required for normal station l service and in-trumentation.  ;

Operation of the station air system is not required for station safety. i However, since the system is necessary for operation, redundancy of compressors and compressor power sources is provided.

No part of any safety-related equipment requires the supply of compressed air for shutdown. All air-operated valves fail closed. Valves that must respond during a shutdown or after a shutdown to maintain that state are either hand or motor operated.

Therefore, since this equipment is not safety related, this DCP vill not adversely affect the safety of the p] ant as considered in the Updated FSAR and Technical Specifications and is, therefore, acceptable.

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• 'DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY 10CFR50.59 B01 var Vallsy Powar Station' Unit 1 ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT l Docket No. '50-334 License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd)- l i

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Unreviewed Safety Question Determination i

1. Is the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) increased? NO.

REASON: This DCP vill not affect any safety related equipment or l procedures per UFSAR section 9.8.1. ]

2. Is the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis l Report created? NO. '

REASON: Because this DCP is so minor and vill not affect any l safety related equipment or procedures, it vill not create the possibility for any new, different types of accidents. ,

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3. Is the margia of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification reduced? NO.

REASON: This DCP vill not affect any safety related' equipment or procedures, therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the Technical Specifications is not affected.

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'DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY 10CFR50.59 i

. B cvsr Valley Povar Station Unit 1 .

ANNUAL SAFUTY EVALUATIONS REPORT Docket No. '50-334 License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd) l DESIGN CONCEPT TITLE l No. 752, Rev. 1 ELIMINATE DRAIN VALVES [FV-600, 601 AND 602] l l

Description and Purpose of Modification During the SR outage, Maintenance requested per EH 61858 that valve FV-602 be replaced since it was leaking after being furmanited prior to SR.

Nuclear Engineering Department (NED) initiated DCP 752 since a new type of l valve was going to be installed and a support to minimize the possibility l of this low-point drain failing. Since station management did not agree '

with adding this support and due to scheduling constraints, DCP 752 was postponed to 6R and FV-602 was furmanited again.

When reviewing the piping layout, NED decided that low-point drain valve j FV-602 vas extraneous and could be eliminated per EH 726939 response. 1 Operations agreed with NED's decision to eliminate FU-602 and expanded the DCP's scope (Revision 1) to include low-point drain valves FV-600 and FV-601. l The modification requires that the station be shut down and the feedvater system cooled down to ambient temperature. The piping must be drained within the clearance boundary. The lov-point drain valve vill be cut off and a socket-veld end cap be put in its place. The drain line vill then l be insulated. An inservice leak test vill be performed during startup Safety Evaluation I

This DCP will replace a capped drain valve with a socket-velded end cap.

this vill eliminate valve leakage which vill be an operational benefit, '

i and also, indirectly, a slight safety improvement. The mechanical integrity of the socket-velded end cap is at least as good as the existing capped drain valve (intuitively), and vill meet the applicable standards and all requirements (see Design Input List of Ref. 1).

Therefore, this DCP is considered to be beneficial and a safety improvement.

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DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY 10CFR50.59=  ;

- B:2 var Vallsy P var Station Unit 1 ANNUAL SAPETY EVALUATIONS REPORT s i

Docket No. '50-334 License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd)

Unreviewed Safety Question Determination

1. Is the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety-Analysis Report (FSAR) increased? NO Reason: This DCP is considered to beneficial and a safety improvement, and, therefore, the probability of an occurrence and the consequences of an accident or' malfunction of equipment important to safety will be decreased. The failure effects of a rupture or leak of the 3/4 inch drain line or socket veld is bounded by the safety analysis of UFSAR Section 14.2.5.2, "Major Rupture of a Main Feedvater Pipe".

2. Is the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type thaa previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report created? NO Reason: This DCP is minor and doesn't change the failure modes of the equipment involved, a rupture or leak of the drain line. It does not create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type.

3. Is the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification reduced? NO Reason: This DCP vill eliminate valve leakage and is a slight safety improvement. therefore, the margin of safety of any i Technical Specification can only be increased.

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DUQUESNR LIGHT COMPANY 10CPR50.59

• B svar.Vallsy Powar Station Unit l ' ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT Docket No. '50-334 License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd)'

l DESIGN CONCEPT TITLE No. 762, Rev. O DIESEL GENERATOR PROTECTION RELAY TRIP INDICATION l

Description and Purpose of Modification The purpose of this modification is to provide for the reliable operation of the trip targets and annunciator relays of Diesel Generator No. 2 Loss of Field, Reverse Power, Phase Overcurrent, and Ground Overcurrent  ;

Trip target and annunciator relay operation was protection circuits.

affected by modifications previously performed under DCP 556.

Safety Evaluation ]

It is concluded that the modifications to be incorporated under this design change are safe and do not involve an unreviewed safety question.

In addition, no change to the UFSAR or Technical Specifications _is required. 1 Unreviewed Safety Question Determination

1. Is the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as l previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety-Analysis Report l (FSAR) increased? NO Reason: The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in UFSAR Section 14 vill not be increased. This design change vill provide for the reliable operation of the trip targets and annunciator relays of Diesel Generator No. 2 Lost of Field, Reverse Pover, Phase Overcurrent, and Ground Overcurrent Protection circuits.

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DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY 10CFR50.59 B3tysr Vallsy~Povsr Station Unit 1 ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT Docket No. '50-334 License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd) i

2. Is the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report created? NO

, Reason: The possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in UFSAR Section 8.5.2, A.C. Emergency Power System vill not'be created.

This design change vill provide for the reliable operation.

3. Is the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification reduced? NO Reason: The margin of safety as defined in the basis for Technical Specification 3/4.8.1 - Electrical Power Systems-AC sources, vill not be reduced since the operability of the AC power Sources vill not be adversely affected.

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10CPR50.59 l

' 'DUQUESNE LIGRT COMPANY Betvar Vallsy Povsr Station Unit 1 ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT l I

Docket No, '50-334' License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd) l DESIGN CONCEPT TITLE .

)

NO. 766, REV. 2 REMOVE VALL SEPARATING BVPS 1 & 2 CONTROL R00H  ;

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Description and Purpose of Hodification  !

The original design was to have a common control room area for BVPS Unit #1 and BVPS Unit #2. In order to operate Unit #1 prior to Unit #2's completion, I a temporary vall was installed between the two control room areas. The objective of this design change is to remove the temporary vall and install a new partition. The Honeywell Fire Detection Systems for Unit #1/ Unit #2 also )

vill be totally segregated. As part of segregation, fire detection monitoring j of Unit #2 control room, the Unit #2 Control Room Ventilation Room vill be l transferred from the Unit #1 to the Unit #2 Honeywell Fire Protection System.  !

Revision 2 of this DCP deleted from the QA checklist in Section 7.4.

l Safety Evaluation - Conclusion l

This modification is required so that the common systems between the control rooms vill function properly. Its design vill feature a seismic frame assembly shatterproof, sound-absorbing glass. The installation of the new partition is considered to be safe and does not prevent an unreviewed safety question, however, the Unit i design changes listed in Section 14.1 must be I

operational prior to entering Mode 4 of startup following the outage. A change to UFSAR Figure 7.8-1 and Technical Specification 3/4.3.3.6 is involved, and therefore they shall be revised.

Unreviewed Safety Question Determination

1. Is the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) increased? NO Reason: The frame assembly of the new partition vill be seismically designed and restrained in a manner capable of preventing damages to control room equipment important to safety during and after a seismic event. Additionally, the partition vill be designed so that it vill not interfere with the function of any

• 'DUQUEGNE LIGHT COMPANY 10CFR50.59

- Besvar-Valley Povar Station Unit 1 ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT Docket No. '50-334 License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd) common safety related equipment required to operate during an accident, such as the Control Room Emergency Bottled Air 1 Pressurization System. Therefore, the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in UFSAR  !

Section 7.8.1 vill not be increased. The removal of the Unit 2 control room smoke detector power units from the Unit 1 alarm panel vill not increase the probability of an accident or i malfunction of equipment as' previously evaluated in UFSAR Section 7.8.5 and 9.10.2.3, since the power units will be reconnected to the Unit 2 alarm panel, which is povered from the Unit 2 Uninterrupted Power Supply, to restore operability and maintain smoke detection on the Unit 2 side of the control room. However, in the interim (until the Unit 2 alarm panel is operable) a fire vatch must be established on the Unit 2 side of the control room to notify Unit 1 personnel of any abnormal conditions.

2. Is the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report created? NO Reason: As long as a fire watch is established to report prompt detection of any fire in the control room area during and af ter the removal of the 3-hour fire rated steel plate vall, the removal of the control room temporary vall vill not create a new type of accident, since it vill be removed in a controlled manner during a plant shutdown outage. Also, since the new partition vill be constructed out of non-combustible material, and has a seismically restrained frame assembly and shatterproof glass, the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated  !

in UFSAR Sections 7.8.5, 14.1.14, and Appendix B vill not be I increased. l

3. Is the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification reduced? NO Reason: This design change vill segregate the fire detection systems between Unit 1 and Unit 2. Implementation of this modification i vill require disconnecting the Unit 2 smoke detectors from the Unit 1 alarm panel. As a result of this, Technical  !

Specification 3/4.3.3.6 needs to be revised to delete the Unit l 2 control room (zones 7, 8, 9) smoke detectors from Table 3.3-

10. Consequently, once the Unit 2 Control Room smoke detectors are disconnected they become inoperable, and the Action I Statement of Technical Specification 3.3.3.6 becomes effective until the detectors' operability is restored. However, per the at tached memorandum f rom J. Haracek to L. R. Freeland, the Unit l 2 control room areas alarming into the Unit 2 alarm panel vill l i' be considered operable provided:

DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY 10CFR50.59 Be vsr V211sy P:vsr Station Unit 1 ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT Docket No. '50-334 License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd)

1. The applicable sections of the BV-1 Technical Specification are followed and mairtained to cover thic portion of the system.

2. BV-2 control room personnel acknowledge and respond to any alarms or inoperable _ conditions, and notify BV-1 personnel, accordingly.

Therefore, the intent of Technical Specification 3/3.3.3.6 is met, and the margin.of safety as defined in its basis vill not be reduced. In addition, as long as the Emergency Pressurization System, Control Room Radiation Monitoring System, and Multiplexer Upgrade are installed and operational, either prior to or during the outage, the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification vill not be reduced.

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' 'DUQUESNE LIGIIT COMPANY 10CFR50.59 Benvar VallGy Povar Station Unit 1 ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT Docket No. '50-334 License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd)

I DESIGN CONCEPT TITLE No. 769, Rev. O SECURITY SYSTEM FENCE MODIFICATIONS Description and-Purpose of Modification Modify the Unit 1 security system perimeter in order to support the future integrated Unit 1 and Unit 2 security system as follows:

1. Complete the south fence tie-in between the Unit 1 and Unit 2 fences including new E-field installation and camera 6 relocation.

2. Complete the north fence tie-in between the Unit 1 and Unit 2 fences including E-field, microvave, and camera modification. The north fence tie-in vill be completed by Unit 2.

3. Remove the section of common security fence including detection and sorveillance that runs north and south between the Unit 1 and Unit 2 sites.

Safety Evaluation The design change is safe in that the modification of the Unit 1 security system perimeter in order to support the future integrated Unit 1 and Unit 2 4 security system vill not affect any equipment important to safety as l previously analyzed or create any new malfunctions or accidents. The i Technical Specifications are not affected and nn changes to the Updated FSAR l have been identified. This design does not present an unrevieved safety l question. l 1

Unrevieved Safety Question Determination

1. Is the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) increased? NO.

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a DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY 10CFR50.59

• Belv3r Vallsy Povsr. Station Unit 1 ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT Docket No. '50-334 License No. DPR-66 '(Cont'd)

Reason: This proposed modification does not increase the possibility of accident referenced in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report in Section 12.7. Vith the proposed modifications, the security of the plants vill be maintained as it is nov.

2. Is the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type then previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report created? NO.

Reason: The integration of Unit 1/ Unit 2 fence vill not create the accident or malfunction- of a different type than previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report.

3. Is the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification reduced? NO.

Reason: This modification has no effect on the margin of safety in the basis of any Technical Specification.

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' ' DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY ' 10CPR50.59

-Benvar Vallsy P: var Station Unit 1 ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT i Docket No. '50-334 License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd)

DESIGN CONCEPT TITLE No. 793, Rev. O REFLACEMENT OF 4KV BUS UNDERVOLTAGE RELAYS

'l Description and Purpose of Hodification The objective is to provide a suitable replacement for ITE undervoltage relays t Type 47H, Catalog 211F0171 in the following applications:

27VE100 4160V Emergency Bus 1AE Undervoltage 2,'VE1100 4160V Emergency Bus 1AE Undervoltage 27VF100 4160V Emergency Bus 1DF Undervoltage 27VF1100 4160V Emergency Bus 1DF Undervoltage The 211F0171 relay is no longer manufactured and has been replaced with 211N0171 which is identical except that the output contacts do not change state on loss of de control voltage. The relays in question are used in the 4160V emergency bus undervoltage scheme to start the emergency diesel generator, strip loads from the emergency busses, and isolate the emergency -

busses from the normal busses. As such they are safety-related.

The design approach vill ne to replace the ITE 47H Catalog #211F0171 vith ITE 49H Catalog 211N0171 relays. The difference between the original and replacement relay styles has been evaluated with the conclusioa that there vill not be significant affect on ti.e operation of the undervoltage circuit and that all applicable design requirements vill be met.

The 211N0171 relay operates in a manner identical to the existing 211F0171 with the exception that the contacts do not change state when the relay's d-c

! power cupply is de-energized; i.e. the new relay would fail in a non-tripped condition. For the particular relay application in question, this difference is not important since loss of 125 Vdc to the undervoltage relay circuit would

, also de-energize the timer and auxiliary relays and no breaker trips or diesel i generator start vould occur.

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• 'DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY 10CFR50.59

" B2cvsr Valley Powar Station Unit 1 ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT Docket No. *50-334 License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd) 3 Safety Evaluation The only effect on safety due to this change vill be a slight benefit due to the elimination of a spurious relay trip for the case of a failure of-the relay's internal'pover supply. If the relay's internal power supply failed, the original relay would cause a spurious trip and the new style relay would not. This _is a slight safety benefit since inadvertent isolation of an emergency bus or starting of diesel is not desirable from a safety point of view. (see Ref. 3)

The nev relay vill have no effect on the . response to a loss of d-c control power as discussed in the above section. The undervoltage relay circuit vill i not initiate a protective action when d-c control power is lost, either with the old or new relays.

Therefore, the only safety effect is the slight benefit mentioned above, and the proposed change is acceptable from a safety point of viev. j l

J Unrevieved Safety Question Determination

1. Is the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or a malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) increased? NO 1 i

Reason: As discussed in the "Safety Evaluation" section above, the probability of a malfunction (spurious relay trips) would be reduced. The normal operation and reliability of the

, undervoltage relay circuit vill not be affected.

2. Is the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report created? NO Reason: The normal operation and failure modes of the undervoltage i relay circuit vill not be affected by this change.

I l 3. Is the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical 1

Specification reduced? NO Reason: Because the normal operation and reliability of the undervoltage relay circuit vill not be affected, the margin of safety as described in the bases of technical specification 3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2 is not reduced.

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DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY 10CFR50.59 d Be var V0lley Powar Statien Unit 1 ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT j Docket No. *50-334 License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd)

DESIGN CONCEPT TITLE No. 797, Rev. 0 ERF SUBSTATION MODIFICATIONS l i

Description and Purpose of Modification The purpose of this modification is to correct the following problems with ERFS Diesel Generator and Substation equipment and circuitry.

1. ERFS Diesel Generator (DG) Overload only those loads needed to meet the requirements of various accidents vill be povered from the ERFS DG. Unavoidable loads vill be automatically loaded on the ERFS DG. Commitment loads to meet licensing requirements vill be manually loaded to ERFS DG per procedure (s). DG overload capacity vill account for non-continuous type loads. The Auto- I loaded and Non-automatic loads vill be capable of being added or removed ,

from the ERFS DG by the Operator as stipulated by procedures (s). j i

2. ERFS DG Load Sequencing i i

The present ERFS DG loading sequence vill be revised to reflect the i changes made in Item 1 above. The new loading sequence vill still meet the required licensing criteria while increasing the engic.e's life since fast loading is not required.

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3. DCP 398 Deficiencies l l

I Minor viring changes due to DCP 398 installation vill be made as identified in DCP 797 Design Concept.

l 4. Appendix R Problems j

Due to a common control fire, the concerns of spurious alarms requiring operator intervention at the ERFS Substation vill be corrected by l i revising the solid state controllers viring so these alarms can be corrected from the BV #1 Switchgear Area. BV-2 (4000 HP) startup  ;

feedvater pump controls vill be segregated so the pump can be stripped from the bus so the ERFS DG can load. These Appendix R concerne are already addressed in BV-2's FSAR Section 9.5 and 9.5A.  !

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• 'DUQUESNE LIGHT CONPANY 10CFR50.59

• Be:vsr Vallcy P:vsr Staticn Unit 1 ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT Docket No. '50-334 License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd)

5. ERF Breaker Controls Present controllers (programmable) system vill be expanded to trip

' breakers to non-essential loads that do not trip on a Loss-of-Offsite '

Power (eg heater loads in the SOSB) so the ERFS DG can load properly.

Safety Evaluation f

6 f

Implementation of the design change is considered to be safe. No change to the BV-1 Technical Specifications is required. A change to BV-1 UFSAR Figure 8.3-1 vill be required as a result of this change, i

Unreviewed Safety Question Determination s

d

1. Is the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in  :

the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) increased? NO Reason: The failure of the ERGS DG to opetate is not evaluated in i Section 14 of the BV-1 UFSAR or Section 15 of the BV-2 FSAR,

- Accident Analysis.

2. Is the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type 3

than previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report l created? NO Reason: The modification of the ERFS DG and associated circuitry vill

' ensure that this DG vill meet DLCo's Emergency Preparedness j Plan and BV-2 FSAR commitments. BV-1 UFSAR Section 10.3.5.2.3 ,

a "Dedicated Auxiliary Feedvater System", and 8.4.5, "Emergency l t

Response Facility Power Systems" are being made more reliable

' by this design change. (Note: Section 9.5 and 9.5A of the BV- l 2 FSAR has been amended to include the Appendix R portion of this design change and this is the reason why this modification must be completed by BV-2 Fuel Load) i

3. Is the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification reduced? NO

Reason

There are no BV-1 Technical Specifications (T.S.) affected by 1 this modification. There are no BV-2 T.S. affected by this change; however, OSC is requested to check this due to the BV-2 T.S. status.  !

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DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY 10CFR50.59

- BIIvsr Vollsy Powsr Ststion Unit 1 ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT Docket No. '50-334 License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd) 1 DESIGN CDe"EPT TITLE No. 799, Rev. O DIESEL GENERATOR STRIP HEATERS J

Description and Purpose of Modification The purpose of this modification is to install strip heaters near the '

j generator vindings of the Emergency Diesel Generators. The strip heaters are necessary to keep the vindings dry while the Diesel Generators are not in '

service, improving reliability and service life of the generator vindings.

The strip heaters are designed to shut off while the Diesel Generator is running to prevent adding additional heat to the vindings, and will re- ,

energize automatically when the Diesel Generator is shut dovn. The heaters vill be povered from a non-Class lE power source.

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Safety Evaluation This modification is censidered to be cafe. No changes to the Technical Specifications are required. A change to the UFSAR is required to reflect this modification to the Diesel Generators.

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1 Unreviewed Safety Question Determination l

1. Is the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or

. malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) increased? NO Reason: The strip heaters do not affect the operation of the Emergency Diesel Generators as described in Sections 8.5 and 14.1.11 of the UFSAR; however, reliability of the generator vindings is improved due to the removal of moisture by the heaters while j

the Diesel Generators are idle.

2. Is the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type d

than previously evaluated in the Updatad Final Safety Analysis Report 1 created? NO a Reason: Same reason as Question No. 1 above. Additionally, malfunction I of the strip heaters vill not affect the reliability of the Diesel Generator since the strip heaters are povered from a j non-Class lE source, t

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' ' DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY 10CFR50.59 Beaver Vrilley Power Station Unit 1 ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT Docket No. '50-334 License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd)

3. Is the margin of safety es defined in the t '9r t a) Technical Specification reduced? NO Reason: No Technical Specification basis is acted by this modification.

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' 10CPR50.59

DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY

• Besysr Valley Povar Station Unit 1 ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT '

Docket No. '50-334 Licenso No. DPR-66 (Cont'd) l

)

DESIGN CONCEPT TITLE No. 803, Rev. 1 REPLACEMENT OF THE- INSTRUMENT MANIF 0LDS FOR

[F-CH-122], [L-RC-462], [F-RC 414, 415, 416, 424, 425, 426, 434, 435, and 436]

Description and Purpose of Hodification The existing Kerotest three-valva maaifolds for the subject transmitters vill each be replaced by three individual Whitey (or equivalent) instrument valves because the manifolds were repaired but continue to leak by. The individual valves vill function as isolation and bypass valves for each transmitter, which is the same purpose the three-valve manifold serves.

Safety Evaluation Replacement of the three-valve manifolds with individual instrument valves vill not increase the probability of an accident or malfunction nor vill this create a different type of accident or malfunction. It does not reduce the margin cf safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

This modification does not involve an unrevieved safety question. No change to the UFSAR is required. Therefore, this modification is safe.  ;

Unreviewed Safety Question Determination

1. Is the probability of an cccurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) increased? NO j Reason: The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the IFSAR is not increased because the individual instrument valves vill be designed for Reacto, Coolant System operating and design conditions (just as the  !

original three-valve manifolds were designed) and the failure of an instrument valve to maintain the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary is boended by the small break loss of coolant accident analysis of UFSAR Subsection 14.3.1.

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DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY 10CFR50.59 BIsvar Vallty Povar Station Unit l' ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT i Docket No. '50-334 License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd) l

2. Is the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report created? NO Reason: No_ possibility for an accident, or malfunction of a different type than previo:isly evaluated in the UFSAR is created because the individual instrument valves vill function like the valve manifolds and- vill be operated and maintained in.the same manner.

3. Is the margin of safety - as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification reduced? NO Reason: Replacement of the valve manifolds with individual instrument valves does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the  ;

bases for Technical Specification 2.2.1 and Technical Specification 3/4.3.1 because the methods and frequencies of performing the pressurizer cold level calibration and reactor i coolant flev loops 1, 2 and 3 calibrations are not affected by '

J this replacement.

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DUQUESNE. LIGHT COMPANY 10CFR50.59

• Bssver Valley Povar Station Unit 1 ANNUAL SAPETY EVALUATIONS REPORT Docket No. '50-334 License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd) l 1

l DESIGN CONCEPT TITLE i

No. 814, Rev, 1 CONTROL ROOM CHLORINE DETECTORS j Description and Purpose of Hodification l

To replace the chlorine detectors installed by DCP 156 since their response time can_ not prevent the chlorine toxicity limits of the control room 2xceeding NRC Regulatory Guide 1.95 and 1.78 requirements. The new chlorine detectors vill be duct mount probes alth local process and control units as installed in BVPS #2. No changes to the 2/3 logic to solid state protection system vill be made at this time. The chlorine probes vill be installed above air intake damper VS-D-40-1A.

Safety Evaluation It has been determined that this modification vill not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated, nor create a new type of accident not previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

This rodification vill also not adversely affect the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification section and an unreviewed j safety question is not raised.

This modification requires BV-1 UFSAR Figure 9.13-2 to be revised. No changes  !

to BV-2 FSAR are required by this change.

BV-1 Technical Specification 3.3.3.7 does not require a revision as a result  !

of implementing this change.

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DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY 10CFR50.59

. Brsysr Vclley Power Station Unit 1 ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT Docket No. '50-334 License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd)

Unreviewed Safety Question Determination

1. Is the probability of an occurrence or the consequence ot an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Updats4 Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) increased? NO l

Reason: UFSAR Sections 2.1.5, 7.8.5 and 9.13.4 discuss control room habitability due to an accidental chlorine release. The duct mounted chlorine probes vill detect a chlorine concentration of less than or equal to 5 ppm. The response of the chlorine probes and associated equipment will limit the chlorine concentration in the cogtrol room -to less than or equal toA 15 ppm by volume (45mg/cm ) within 2 minutes of detection.

high chlorine signal or loss of power vill trip the associated chlorine detectors bistable in the solid state protection system and alarm in the control room. Should 2/3 detectors alarm, the control room vill be automatically isolated and pressurized by the control room _ emergency bottled air supply system (CREBAPS). Revision 1 of the design concept added channel trip switches to facilitate surveillance of the detectors, access to the new probes and deleted a probe failure from automatically tripping the associated bistable in solid state protection. The additions of thz svitches and access to the probes do not impact the results of the safety evaluation since these changes provide added maintainability and operability to the chlorine Jetector system. The deletion of ,

the probe failure from tripping the associated bistable in l solid state protection does no: invalidate the conclusion of this safety evaluation because: ]

(1) The revised inputs of tripping the solid state protection system i (high chlorine and loss of power signals) do not reduce the original I margin of safety of the chlorine detection system described in the UFSAR. The local processing units vill still be administrative 1y checked by operations for probe failures as the original drip-type chlorine detectors were checked.

(2) The high probe failure rate at Limerick Power Station as documented by 40 LER's indicates the probe is extremely sensitive and can cause a false trip signal to be generated. If during testing or normal operation 2/3 probes alarm the control room would be isolated and the CREBAPS vill be initiated. If the bottled air supply system drops belov 1825 psig, the plant vill be required to be-shutdown by Technical Specification 3.0.3. The present high probability of probe failure causing spurious actuation of the bottled air supply r system outweighs the added conservatism of tripping the solid' state bistable on a probe failure.

DUQUESNE LIGilT COMPANY 10CFR50.59

. B:svar Valley Pownc Station Unit 1 ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT Docket No. '50-334 License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd)

(3) BV-2 chlorine probe failure does trip the solid state bistable.

This inconsiste cy between BV-1 and BV-2 inputs tripping the. solid state protection does not invalidate the licensing basis for either Unit as described in Item 1 above.

2. Is the possibility for ~an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report created? NO Reason: Accidental release of chlorine is already addressed in UFSAR sections 2.1.5, 7.8.5 and 9.13.4. See question #1 for details.

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3. Is the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification reduced? NO j l

Reason: This modification vill not reduce the margin of safety of Technical Specification 3.3.3.7 since the duct-mounted probes and associated equipment vill limit thechlorineconcentratign inside the control room to a maximum 15 ppm by volume (45 mg/m )

within 2 minutes of detection. The setpoints of the new chlorine concentration of less than or equal to 5 ppm.

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' 'DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY 10CFR50.59

. B5sysr Valley Povar Station Unit 1 ANNUAL SAFETY EV/LUATIONS REPORT Docket No. '50-33^ License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd)

DESIGN CONCEPT TITLE No. 825, Rev. O HYDR 0GREN RECOMBINER SUCTION PIPING SUPPORT l H0DIFICATION 1

1 Description and Purpose of Hodification The purpose of this modification is to modify the supports for containment vacuum line 2"CV-151-02 to meet the criteria of NUREG-0800 and FSAR seismic design criteria.

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Safety Evaluation I 1

This design change is considered safe. No cha nges to the FSAR,or the ,

Technical Specifications are required as no unreviewed safety questions exist. l l

Unreviewed Safety Question Determination

1. Is the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety' Analysis Report (FSAR) increased? NO Reason: This modification does not affect the operation of the Hydrogen Recombiners as described in FSAR Sections 6.5 and 14.3.4.4; however, it reduces the probability of a line break which could endanger public health and safety during a design basis earthquake, since the system is modified to meet the more stringent criteria of NUREG 0800, SRP Section 3.6.2, Branch Technical Position HEG 3-1.

2. Is the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report created? NO Reason: No new accidents are created by this modification since it allows for hydrogen recombiner operation during a derign basis earthquake.

3. Is the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification reduced? NO Reason: No Technical Specification basis is affected by this modification.

DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY 10CPR50.59 B;avar Valley Power Station Unit 1 ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT Docket No. '50-334 License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd)

DESIGN CONCEPT TITLE No. 846, Rev. O CONTAINHENT TYPE 'A' TEST SKID RETIREHENT Description and Purpose of Hodification The purpose of this modification is to retire the Reactor Containment Type 'A' Test Skid from service. ,

Safety Evaluation The design change is safe in that the retirement of the Containment Type 'A' Test Skid will not affect any equipment important to safety, as previously analyzed, or create any new malfunctions or accidents.

No technical specifications are affected by this design change. UFSAR Figure 5.4-3 vill require revision to delete identification of specific components comprising the fabricated test skid.

Unreviewed Safety Question Determination

1. Is the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or i malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in )

the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) increased? NO l l

Reason: The Reactor Containment Type 'A' Test Skid is not mentioned in I the UFSAR, is not safety relate., and is not involved in any I accident analysis.

2. Is the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report -l created? NO j l

Reason: The Reactor Containment Type 'A' Test Skid is not permanent plant equipment, and no changes are being made to the plant.

3. Is the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification reduced? NO Reason: No Technical Specifications apply to the Containment Type 'A' Test Skid.

' DUQUESNE LIGIIT COMPANY 10CFR50.59 l

- B::vur Vallsy Power Station Unit 1 ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT Docket No. '50-334 License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd)

I

" ECHNICAL EVALUATION 'j REPORT TITLE l 1

149 D0VNGRADE OF G.V. DISPOSAL PIPING (INCLUDING CIIARC0AL )

FILTERS, PARTICULATE FILTERS, AND BLOVERS) TO QA l l

CATEGORY 2 1

Description and Purpose of Hodification This TER will document the change from QA Category I to QA Category II for a portion of the Gaseous Vaste Disposal System.

l l

l Safety Evaluation j 1mplementation of this TER to downgrade a portion of the Gaseous Vaste  ;

Disposal System (including Charcoal Filter, Particulate Filters, Blovers, and j Radiation Monitors) from QA Category I to 0A Category II is safe because it vill not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety, vill not create the ,

possibility for a new type of accident or malfunction, and vill not reduce the l margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. No j change to the Technical Specifications is required. Changes to UFSAR Figures j 5.4-3, 9.2-4, 9.4-2, 9.7-3, 10.3-2, 11.2-1, and 11.2-2 are required as a  !

result of this TER.

Unreviewed Safety Question Determination

1. Is the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or l malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in 1 the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) increased? NO l Reason: The Gaseous Vaste Disposal Piping which vill be downgraded to 0/. ,

Category II is downstream of the Surge Tank and Decay Tanks. I Downgrading this piping vill not increase the probability of rupturing the Surge Tank as discussed in UFSAR Subsection 14.2.3, nor vill it increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety.

)

' ' , ')UESNE LIGHT COMPANY 10CFR50.59

, irar Vallcy Powar Station Unit 1 ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT Docket No. '50-334 License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd)

2. Is the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluateo in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report created?

Ng Reason: Dovngrading this portion of the Gaseous Vaste Disposal System vill not alter the operation of the system as discussed in UFSAR:

Subsection 11.2.3, nor vill it change the operation of the Gaseous Vaste Effluent Monitors as discussed in UFSAR Subsection 11.3.3. This downgrading vill not change the probability of aligning the wrong decay tank 'or discharge because the administrative controls remain the ,are. It will increase the probability of the Gaseous Vaste Process Vent Radiation Monitors functioning ~ nonconservatively because the monitors vill no longer be maintained under the Quality Assurance Program; however,. by complying with Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation 3.11.2.5 (which restricts the quantity of radioactivity contained in each gas storage tank), no exposures which exceed applicable limits vill result from an uncontrolled release of the tanks' contents. No new accident or malfunction is created because the event of an uncontrolled release of a Decay Tank's contents is bounded by the accident analysis discussed in UFSAR Subsection 14.2.3. The radiation monitors and'other downgraded components vill be maintained in accordance with normal Station practice. Since this piping provides no safety related function and the operation and configuration of the system remain unchanged, no possibility for a different type of accident or malfunction is created.

3. Is the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification reduced? NO Reason: Technical Specification 3/4.3.3.10 basis -discusses the operability and use of the Gaseous Vaste Process Vent Radiation Monitors, the Vaste Gas Decay Tanks Oxygen Monitors, and the Vaste Gas Decay Tanks Radiation Monitor. Technical Specification 3/4.11.2 bases discuss the dose limits, the dose calculation methodology, the limiting quantity of radioactivity contained in each gas storage tank, and the limiting concentration of potentially explosive gas mixtures contained in the vaste gas holdup system. This TER involves piping classification changes and vill not affect the margin of safety as defined in the bases.

' 'DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY 10CFR50.59

- BeIvar Vallcy PovIr Station Unit 1 ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT Docket No. 50-334 License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd)

TECHNICAL EVALUATION REPORT TITLE 140 H2FLOV TRANSMITTER DRAVING DISCREPANCY Description and Purpose of Modification FSAR Figure 6.5-1, Post DBA Hydrogen Control System Flow Diagram, was revised to show changes made to Flow Transmitter FT-HY-101 in the line from the containment atmosphere purge blover and Hydrogen analyzer calibration discharge.

Safety Evaluation

1. Vill the probability of an accident previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report be increased? NO Vill not effect the capability of the Post DBA H9Control System (UFSAR Section 6.5) to respond to an accident condition as described in UFSAR Section 14.3.4.4 - Post DBA H2 Generation. Flow Transmitter FT-HY-101 is used as a back-up to redundant H recombiners only to mitigate accidents, and vill not increase t$e probability of an accident.

2. Vill the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report be increased? NO Vill not effect the capability of the Post DBA H9Control System (UFSAR Section 6.5) to respond to an accident condition as described in UFSAR Section 14.3.4.4 - Post DBA H9 Generation. Flow Transmitter FT-HY-101 only monitors containment atmosphere purge blower release.

The purge blower release is only used as a back-up to the redundant H3 recombiners.

3. Vill the probability of a malfunction of equipment important to safety be increased? NO Vill not effect the capability of the Post DBA H Control 7 System (UFSAR Section 6.5) to respond to an accident condition as described in UFSAR Section 14.3.4.4 - Post DBA H2 Generation. Flov transmitter does not provide control signal to any equipment important to safety.

0 L

• DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY 10CFR50.59.

. BenvIr Vallsy P:ver Station Unit 1 ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT Docket No. 50-334 License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd)

4. Will the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety be i increased? N_O

_ l Vill not effect the capability of the Post DBA H 7Control System (UFSAR Section 6.5) to respond to an accident condition as described in UFSAR Section 14.3.4.4 - Post DBA H Generation. Flow transmitter I does not provide control signal to any 2equipment important to safety. I l

5. Vill the possibility of an accident of a different type than any previously analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report be created? NO l

Vill not change the capability for flov ceasurement of the Backup Purge System as described in UFSAR Section 6.5.1.7.9. No new failure j modes will be introduced which would create a new leak path which cannot be isolated.

6. Vill the possibility of a malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report be created? NO Vill not change the capability for flow measurement of the Backup Purge System as described in UFSAR Section 6.5.1.7.9.

7. Vill the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification be reduced? NO Vill not effect the bases of Technical Specification 3/4.6.4.

l l

t

DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY 10CFR50.59

. Be vsr Valley Pavar Stetion Unit 1 ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT Docket No. 50-334- License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd)

TECHNICAL EVALUATION REPORT TITLE 180 ELIMINATION OF PRESSURE SVITCHES PDS-RV-101A, B Description and Purpose of Hodification Pressure Svitche? PDS-RV101A and B and electrical connections have been eliminated. Documentation vill be revised to reflect this. PDS-RV101A and B originally had an input to the Control Room air conditioning units VS-R-4A and 4B. This input was electrically eliminated, but the pressure switches were never removed.

1 Safety Evaluation

1. Vill the probability of an accident previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report be increased? NO Elimination of pressure switches vill not affect any accident as ,

analyzed in UFSAR Section 14 or operation of the River Vater I System as described in UFSAR Section 9.9. The pressure switches i are not necessary to provide control room cooling. I

2. Vill the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report be increased? NO Elimination of pressure switches vill not affect any accident as analyzed in UFSAR Section 14 or operation of the River Vater System as deceribed in UFSAR Section 9.9. Removal of pressure switches vill not affect the control room emergency ventilation systems.

3. Vill the probability of a malfunction of equipment important to safety be increased? NO Elimination of pressure switches vill not affect any accident as analyzed in UFSAR Section 14 or operation of the River Vater System as described in UFSAR Section 9.9. Pressure indication is still provided to monitor pump performance.

' 'DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY 10CFR50.59

. Be; var V211sy P wsr Station Unit 1 ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT Docket No. 50-33# License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd)

4. Vill the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety be increased? NO Elimination of pressure switches will not affect any accident as analyzed in UFSAR Section 14 or operation of the River Vater System as described in UFSAR Section 9.9. Removal of the pressure svitches vill not affect the control room emergency habitability systems.

5. Vill the possibility of an accident of a different ty pe than any previously analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report be created? NO Removal of pressure switches does not affect the ability of the control air conditioning units or the River Vater System to perform their functions.

6. Vill the possibility of a malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report be created? NO Removal of pressure switches does not affect the ability of the control air conditioning units or the River Vater System to perform their functions. No new failure modes of the systems vill be introduced by removal of the switches.

)

7. Vill the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification be reduced? NO Vill not effect the bases of Technical Specification 3/4.7.7.

1

' ' 'DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY 10CFR50.59

. Be; var Vallsy Pavar Station Unit 1 ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT Docket No. 50-334 License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd)

TECHNICAL EVALUATION REPORT TITLE 305 ELIMINATION OF FLOV TRANSHITTER FT-0S-107 Description and Purpose of Modification Flow Transmitter FT-0S-107 vas removed for Maintenance and not replaced. DCP-692 installed a new Flov Transmitter (FT-0S-108) which measures the flov to verify the surveillance requirements of Technical Specification 3/4.6.2.3.

Therefore, FT-0S-107 is not required.

Safety Evaluation

1. Vill the probability of an accident previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report be increased? NO FT-0S-107 vas located on the recirculation, non-safety related portion of the chemical inj ec tion pumps discharge piping, therefore, it is concluded that the integrity of the Containment Depressurization System will not be affected nor will the probability of an accident previously evaluated in UFSAR Section 14.3 be increased.

2. Vill the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report be increased? NO FT-0S-107 was located on the recirculation, non-safety related portion of the chemical injection pumps discharge piping, therefore, it is concluded that the integrity of the Containment Depressurization System vill not be affected nor vill the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in UFSAR Section 14.3 be increased.

3. Vill the probability <f a malfunc tion of equipment important to safety be increased? NO Removal of FT-0$-107 vill not increase the probability of a malfunction of equipment i: spor tant to safety since FT-0S-107 vas located on the recirculation, non-safety related portion of the chemical injection pump discharge piping, therefore, the integrity of Le Containment Depressurization System, as described in UFbAi. Section 6.4, vill not be affected.

' 10CFR50.59

' 'DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY

. Belvsr V:llsy Povsr Staticn Unit 1 ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT Docket No. *50-334 License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd)

4. Vill the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety be increased? NO Removal of FT-05-107 vill not increase the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety since FT-0S-107 was located on the recirculation, non-safety related portion of the chemical injection pump discharge piping, therefore, the integrity of the Containment Depressurization System, as described in UFSAR Section 6.4, vill not be affected.

5. Vill the possibility of an accident of a different type than any previously analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report be created? NO Removal of FT-0S-107 vill not create the possibility of a different type of accident since the flov of Sodium Hydroxide solution from the Chemical Addition Tank to the Quench Spray Pumps vill not be affected as described in UFSAR Section 6.4.

6. Vill the possibility of a malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report be created? NO Removal of FT-0S-107 vill not create the possibility of a different type of accident since the flov of Sodium Hydroxide solution from the Chemical Addition Tank to the Quench Spray Pumps vill not be affected as described in UFSAR Section 6.4.

7. Vill the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification be reduced? NO The margin of safety, as defined in T/S 3/4.6.2.3, vill not be reduced since the flow of Sodium Hydroxide solution to the Quench Spray Pumps vill not be affected.

DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY 10CFR50.59

- B nvar V211ty Povar Station Unit 1 ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT Docket No. '50-334 License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd) l l

OM 1.55A.4 OST 1.1.5(6) "Containment Isolation Trip Test - CIB Train A(B)"

The OST has been revised to verify Unit 1 and Unit 2 Control Room isolation from outside air on the receipt of the Train A(B) CIB signal, as i described in Unit 2 FSAR Sections 9.4.1.2.1 and 9.4.1.5. The Control Room Emergency Bottled Air Pressurization System (CREBAPS) headers are isolated during the test to prevent depressurizing the CREBAPS tanks so that the CREBAPS can perform its design function as described in Unit 1 UFSAR Section 9.13.4 and Unit 2 FSAR Section 9.4.1. The OST requires a dedicated operator to unisolate the CREBAPS header in the event of a Control Room high radiation, Unit 2 CIB, or Chlorine detection signal from either Unit. While isolated, Tech. Spec. 4.7.7.2.a CREBAPS header  ;

pressure limits are not violated. The OST was revised to satisfy Tech. I Spec. 4.7.7.1.1.d.2 and 4.7.7.1.2.d.2 requirements for isolating all Control Room (CR) outside air dampers for a CIB test signal. The Train A(B) CR dampers at Unit 1 and Unit 2 are placed in a safe position during the test. Tech. Spec. 3.7.7.1.C will not be violated since the dampers l are tested to the closed position. The CR dampers are restored to the as I found position at the end of the test. Tech. Spec. change 1A-143 (Unit 1) and Unit 2 Tech. Spec. 3.7.7.b allow for CREBAPS isolation up to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> for CREBAPS testing. No unreviewed safety question was involved.

OH 1.55A.4 OST 1/2.33.12 "Fire Protection System Flow Test" This new procedure was developed from OST 1.33.12 to flow test the fire l protection loop around Unit 1 and Unit 2 to satisfy the SAP 9D Surveillance Requirement a.6. The fire pump testing of OST 1.33.12 was l also incorporated in the test. The testing is in accordance with Unit 1 (

UFSAR Section 9.10 and Unit 2 FSAR Section 9.5.1.5.5. The accidents evaluated in the Unit 1 UFSAR Section 9.10 and Unit 2 FSAR Section 9.5.1 and Appendix R Reviev all assume an Operable fire suppression system. All areas containing safety-related equipment vill have fire suppression capability available during the test. The fire suppression system remains operable per Unit 1 Tech Spec. 3.7.4 and SAP 9D. No modifications are made to the system by the new procedure. The redundant fire pump is verified to be operable before aligning the other fire pump for test. No unreviewed safety question exists for this procedure.

OH 1.55.4 OST 1.1.10 "Cold Shutdown Valve Exercise Test" This test was revised to stroke test the Control Room Emergency Bottled Air Pressurization System (CREBAPS) trip valves [TV-1VS-101A,B,C,D,E]. A dedicated operator was stationed to unisolate CREBAPS in the event of an actual CIB, Control Room High Radiation, or Chlorine Detection Signal from either Unit 1 or Unit 2. During the test, the action statement for Unit 1 Tech. Spec. 3.7.7.1.b vill be entered; however, Unit 2 Tech. Spec. 3.7.7.b allows isolation of CREBAPS air bottles for up to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> duri'1g testing, and a aimilar test exception is requested for Unit 1 (Tech. Spec, change request 1A-143). Since the Control Room dampers are closed during the

DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY 10CFR50.59 i

- B nysr Valley Povsr Stetion Unit 1 ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT )

Docket No. '50-334 License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd) 1 test, Tech. Spec. 3.7.7 vill not be violated. The test resets CREBAPS .I signal at Unit 1 and Unit 2 and returns the dampers to their as found )

position after the stroke testing. j l

I OM 1/2.8.4A.A "Supplying Unit 2 Primary Makeup Vater from Unit 1" l This new operating procedure provides instructions to supply primary grade makeup water to Unit 2 from Unit 1. Design Change Package (DCP)-726 installed the cross connect piping between Unit 1 and Unit 2 for the primary grade water subsystem. If a rupture or a leak of a yard tank I occurs during the performance of OM 1/2.8.4A.A, the accident has been  !

analyzed and is enveloped by Unit 1 UFSAR Section 14.2.2. All Unit 2  ;

tanks have been considered for release by Unit 2 FSAR Section 15.7.3. 1 This procedure provides instructions to operate the Boron Recovery Systen (BRS) in a manner as described in Unit 1 UFSAR Section 9.2.2 except that the cross connect feature was not described. However, Fig. UFSAR Section 9.2-3 sheet 3 depicts the system arrangement that facilitates the transfer ,

of primary grade water to Unit 2. The procedure operates the system, l including supplying primary grade water to Unit 2 from Unit 1, as described in Unit 2 FSAR Section 9.2.8. The performance of OH 1/2.8.4A.A vill not increase the quantity of radioactive material in the primary water stcrage tanks, as specified by Unit 1 Tech. Spec. 3.11.1.4. No Unit 2 Tech. Spec. applies to Unit 2 BRS. The performance of OH 1/2.8.4A.A l vill not change the as-built condition of Unit 1 or Unit 2. No unreviewed l safety question is involved. j l

l OM 1/2.8.4A.B "Transfer Boric Acid from Unit 1 to Unit 2 Boric Acid Tank" j The procedure provides instructions to transfer boric acid solution from I the Unit i Boric !.cid Hold Tank (LAHT) to a Unit 2 Boric Acid Tank (BAT). l DCP-720 installed the cross-connect piping between the units. In the {

event of an accidental spill of the contents of the BAHT, the spill vould not result in any significant release and is enveloped by Unit 1 UFSAR Section 14.2.2.2. Unit 2 BAT vas not considered a liquid source by Unit 2 FSAR Section 15.7.3. The BAHT inventory was not described by Unit 1 UFSAR Section 9.1.1.2. The BAHT will be operated as described by Unit 1 UFSAR l Section 9.2.2. Any leak of the BAHT is collected by a sump, Unit 1 UFSAR I

Table 9.2-2. Although a written description of the transfer of boric acid from Unit 1 BAHT to Unit 2 BAT could not be located in the UFSAR, Unit 2 ,

FSAR Fig. 9.3-22 and Unit 1 UFSAR Fig. 9.2-3 depicts the system configuration that supports the boric acid transfer. DCP-726 Safety Evaluation stated that a change to Unit 1 UFSAR Section 9.2 is required.

The procedure required the BAHT boron concentration to be within limits before trans: erring to Unit 2 BAT to ensure the BAT boron e m entration to be within '..mlts before transferring to Unit 2 BAT to ensure the BAT boron concentration is naintained as specified by Unit 2 Tech. Spec. 3.1.2.8.

The procedure vill not reduce th Unit 2 BAT inventory as specified by Unit 2 Tech. Spec. 3.1.2.8. No unreeleved safety question exists with this procedure.

' 10CFR50.59

DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY

. Be.v;r Valley Psysr Station Unit 1 ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT ,

Docket No. *50-334 License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd) )

OH 1/2.8.4A.C "Transferring Liquid from a Coolant Recovery Tank to the Unit 2 Steam Generator Blowdown Evaporator [2SGC-EV21B]"

This new procedure provides instructions to transfer the contents of a  !

coolant recovery tank (CRT) to the Unit 2 steam generator blovdown system evaporator for processing. The Unit 1 and Unit 2 cross connect piping was installed by DCP-726. In the event of a malfunction or accident during the performance of OH 1/2.8.4A.C, the CRTs and piping have been analyzed and is enveloped by Unit 1 UFSAR Section 14.2.2. All tanks at Unit 2 were ,

considered for radioactive releases, including the CRTs, reference Unit 2 )

FSAR Section 15.7.3. 0H 1/2.8.4A.C operates the Boron Recovery System )

(BRS) as described in Unit 1 UFSAR Section 9.2 except for the use of the cross connect piping to Unit 2 evaporator. However, Unit 1 UFSAR Fig 9.2- i i depicts the systems arrangement that facilitates water transfer from the i CRTs to the Unit 2 evaporators. DCP-726 Safety Evaluation stated that a l change to Unit 1 UFSAR Section 9.2 is required to mention the connections. l Unit 2 FSAR Section 11.2 states the cross connect is provided from Unit 2 j CRTs to the Unit 2 evaporator. The BRS CRTs and evaporators are non- l safety-related and no Tech. Spec. applies. No unreviewed safety question I exists for this procedure.

l l

OM 1/2.17.4A.A "Transferring Liquid from Unit 1 High Level Vaste Drain Tank to i Unit 2 Vaste Drain Tank" 1

The new procedure provides instructions to transfer the contents of a Unit 1 1 High Level Vaste Drain Tank (HLVDT) to a Unit 2 Vaste Drain Tank (VDT).

The cross connect piping was installed by DCP-726. If the contents of a j Unit 1 HLVDT vere accidentally released, the accident has been analyzed I and is enveloped by Unit 1 UFSAR Section 14.2.2. The Unit 2 VDTs vere considered for release and are analyzed and enveloped by Unit 2 FSAR Section 15.7.3. OH 1/2.17.4A.A operates the Liquid Vaste System in a ,

manner described by Unit 1 UFSAR Section 11.2.4. The description did not l mention the cross-connect capabilities; however, UFSAR Fig. 11.2-3 SH1 depicts the piping interface with Unit 2 that supports the transfer. Unit 2 FSAR Section 11.2.1 describes the Unit 1 and Unit 2 cross connection of the Liquid Vaste Systems as added availability in the design bases. The performance of OH 1/2.17.4A.A does not prevent the Liquid Vaste System from functioning as specified in Unit 1 Tech. Spec. 3.11.1.3 and Unit 2 Tech. Spec. 3.11.1.3. No unreviewed safety question exists for this procedure.

' 10CFR50.59 j

' ' DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY '

B % var Vclley Power Station Unit 1 ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT Docket No. '50-334 License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd) l l

OM 1/2.18.4A.A "Transferring Vater from Unit i Spent Resin Devatering Pump to ,

i Unit 2 Spent Resin Transfer Booster Pump" l The new procedure provides instructions to transfer water from Unit 1 spent resin devatering pump to the Unit 2 spent resin transfer booster pump. The cross connect piping was installed by DCP-726. In the event the spill of the Spent Resin Devatering Tank occurred, the spill vould oe contained and~is analyzed and enveloped by UFSAR Section 14.2.2. All l tanks at Unit 2 have been considered for radioactive releases by Unit 2 I FSAR Section 15.7.3.1. OH 1/2.18.4A.A operates the Solid Vaste System in )

a manner described in UFSAR Section 11.2.5. The description does not mention the Unit 1 and Unit 2 cross-connection piping; however, UFSAR Fig.

11.2-6 depicts the system configuration that supports the cross-connection and transfer capability. Unit 2 FSAR Section 11.4 System Description describes the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Solid Vaste System cross-connection as ,

provided for additional capability. DCP-726 Safety Evaluation stated that  !

a change to the UFSAR Section 11.2 is required. The performance of OH l 1/2.18.4A.A vill not prevent the Solid Vaste System from functioning as 1

specified in Tech. Spec. 3.11.3 or Unit 2 Tech. Spec. 3.11.3.1. No unreviewed safety question exists for this procedure. 1 l

OH 1/2.18.4A.B "Transferring Evaporator Bottoms from Unit 2 Evaporator Bottoms Hold Tank to Unit 1 Evaporator Bottoms Hold Tank" This new procedure provides instructions to transfer the contents of the {

Unit 2 evaporator bottoms hold tank to the Unit i evaporator bottoms hold 1 tank. The system is being operated in a manner consistent with the safety I evaluation and does not present a condition not previously evaluated. No equipment important to safety is boing operated in a way not previously addressed. The performance of this procedure does not modify the as-built condition nor violate the intended operation of plant equipment. No  !

unreviewed safety question exists for this procedure.

1 I

OH 1/2.19.4A.A "Transfer Gaseous Vaste from Unit 1 Surge Tank to a Unit 2 j Vaste Storage Tank" '

)

1 This new procedure provides instructions to transfer the contents of the Unit 1 gaseous vaste surge tank to a Unit 2 waste storage tank. The cross connect piping was installed by DCP-726. In the event that the contents l of the Unit 1 GV surge tank would be released to the environment while  ;

performing OH 1/2.19.4A.A, the resulting site boundary dose values vould l be much less than the dose limits suggested in 10CFR100 as analyzed'in l UFSAR Section 14.2.3. The maximum amount of vaste gas assumed to be transferred by OH 1.19.4A.A vould be a batch discharge of the contents of the Unit 1 GV surge tank. Therefore, the transfer of viste gas from the GV surge tank to the Unit 2 GV storage tank (s) is aveloped by UFSAR Section 14.2.3. OH 1/2.19.4A.A operates the GW sptem in the manner described in UFSAR Section 11.3.3.2, except for the cross connect I

' ' DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY 10CFR50.59

. Belvar Valley Power Station Unit 1 ANNUAL EAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT Docket No. '50-334 License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd) features. DCP-726 Safety Evalua+. ion states that a change to UFSAR Section 11.3 is required. The Unit 2 GW storage tanks are designed to accept all of the gas generated by BVPS Unit 1 when going to cold shutdown.

Reference BVPS Unit 2 FSAR Section 11.3.2.3 Tech. Spec. 3.3.3.10 Table 3.3.13.4 requires the Oxygen Analyzer [02-AS-1GV-110-1, 110-2] to be operable when a vaste gas decay tank is being filled. Initial Condition No. 4. addresses this requirement. The Unit 2 Tech. Spec. 3.3.3.10 requires the Vaste Gas Storage Vault Radiation Monitor [2RH0-R0I303] to be operable. Initial Condition No. 7 addresses this requirement. _No unreviewed safety question exists for this procedure.

TOP 1-86-29 (Rev 2) "Bypass of [1IA-243], [1IA-1D-1] Discharge Check

[1IA-lD-il Instrument Air Dryer and [1IA-TK-1] Station Instrument Air Receiver" The Temporary Operating Procedure (TOP) was revised so that a bypass can be installed to allow maintenance to repair [1IA-243] and (1IA-1D-1]. TOP 86-29 Rev. 2 specifies use of 1 1/2" standard fire hose which is tested to 500 psig. The maximum design pressure of the Station Instrument Air System is 150 psig and its safety valves are set for 120 psig. Hose capacity vill not be a problem since the Station Instrument Air Loads are minimal with the station shutdown. Reference UFSAR Section 9.8.1 Compressed Air Systems. The UFSAR states "Operation of either the station air system or the containment air system is not required for station safety." No part of any. safety-related equipment requires the supp>j of compressed air for shutdown. UFSAR Sections 14.2.1, 14.2.2 and 14.2.3 Fuel Handling Accident, Accidental Release of Vaste Liquid and Accidental Release of Vaste Gases take no credit for the operation of the station or containment air systems. No unreviewed safety question exists for this procedure.

TOP 1-87-01 "Charging of Control Room Emergency Air Tanks [1VS-TK-7A,B,C,D,E]"

This TOP provides instructions to fill the five additional Control Room Emergency Breathing Air Pressurization System (CREBAPS) tanks installed by DCP-611 in order to leak test the CREBAP System. Four out of five CREBAPS tanks are operable during this TOP to supply 100 percent capacity required air flow rate to the Control Room. The fifth bottle is isolated. The TOP addresses this condition and ensures a caution is placed on BSP CREBAPS indication informing operators to unisolate the fifth tank following a CREBAPS actuation. Valves [1VS-6,7,8,9 or 10] are isolated one at a time when its associated air tank is filled in order to prevent backflow from the other tanks during CREBAPS actuation. This condition ensures adequate air flow per UFSAR Section 9.13.4 vill occur. The TOP uses compressor

[1VS-C-2(3)] in conjunction with approved procedure OH 1.44A.4.J(N) to ensure grade D breathable air is charged to the tank. Only four out of five CREBAPS headers are available during this TOP, the TOP contains precautions to ensure the Tech. Spec. action is complied with. The margin of safety in the basis is not reduced since the TOP contains steps for filling the unavailable tank to meet the Tech. Spec. 3.7.7.1 action statement. No unreviewed safety question exists for this procedure.

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• DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY 100FR50.59 B Avar Valley Povar Station Unit 1 ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT Docket No. 50-334 License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd)

TOP 1-87-02 "Discharging BR Degasifier 1A Vaste Gases Via GV Discharge Header" The TOP was prepared to purge vaste gases (0 H ) from the 1A boron recovery degasifier via the gaseous vaste disp $s,al 2header. The oxygen concentration prevents the use of the delay beds. The radioactive discharge is through an approved discharge path, monitored by [RM-1GV-108], reference UFSAR Section 11.2.3. The procedure complies with Tech.

Spec. 3.11.2.1,'2,3 and is used in conjunction with an approved Radioactive Vaste Discharge Authorization. The TOP was field revised (OMCN 87-24) to use a temporary calibrated pressure indicator to enhance the use of the TOP. The pressure instrument was installed, removed, and administratively controlled in accordance with SAP 36. The temporary gage was installed at the normal point for monitoring pressure [TP-1BR-103A]. No change was made to the basic system configuration and no automatic actions or functions are affected. The tank's contents are known so that a catastrophic failure vould not be unanalyzed. The discharge vill not exceed Tech. Spec. limits or 10CFR per ODCH and discharge permit 0833. No unreviewed safety question exists.

TOP 1-87-03 "Flow Rate Determination of Condenser Air Ejector Drains to Tank

[1BD-TK-3]"

This procedure was written to evaluate the capacity of pump [1BP-P-3] and to confirm the air ejector condensate flow rate. A jumper between valves

[1AS-981, 978] is installed to increase the drain rate frcm [1BD-TK-3].

While the condenser is important to power, safe shutdown can be achieved without the condenser. Although a loss of vacuum could tesult from loss of an air ejector, vacuum is not required for safe shutdown. No Tech.

Specs, are applicable. No unreviewed safety question exists.

TOP 1-87-04 "Receiving Demineralized Vater from Unit 2 Vaste Drain Tank to Support Unit 2 Test Procedure 50V-2.17.01" The TOP provides instructions to align Unit 1 to recei're demineralized water from Unit 2 to support Unit 2 liquid vaste system testing. This procedure vill not cause plant operation outside of the analysis described in Unit 1 UFSAR for accidental release of vaste liquids, Section 14.2.2.

The requirements of the Unit 2 startup and test program, Section 14.2.12.21 of the Unit 2 FSAR are met (Flush Test 1T-17-726-9 and Pressure Test 1T-17-726-26 are completed SAT). This procedure vill not cause plant operations outside of the analysis of the Unit 2 FSAR for liquid )

radioactive releases Section 15.7.3. Since primary grade (PG) water is to l be used for this procedure, the radiological consequences of any release vould be a small fraction of the 10CFR100 guidelines. This procedure utilizes existing Unit 1 piping and cross-connect piping from Unit 1 DCP-726, Unit 1 and Unit 2 Cross Connections. A review of Tech. Spec.

3.11.1.1, 3.11.1.2, and 3.11.1.3 has indicated that their margin of safety vill not be reduced, as this procedure does not provide for any discharges to the environment. No unreviewed safety question exists for this procedure.

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' 10CFR50.59 l

• 'DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY Belvar Valley Power Station Unit 1 ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT l Docket No. '50-334 License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd)

I TOP 1-87-05,06,07,08,09 "Post Maintenance Test of Control Room Emergency Air Bottle [1VS-TK-6A,6B,6C,6D,6E] Discharge Control Components" These five TOPS were prepared to verify the control room emergency air bottle [1VS-TK-6A,6B,6C,6D, 6Ej discharge control components are functioning correctly after. maintenance and/or adjustments to .the components. The TOPS and their safety evaluations are similar for each air bottle. UFSAR Section 11.3.5 considers control room personnel exposure based on automatic operation of this system. Immediate manual operation to re-align [ 1VS-TK-6 A , 6B, 6C, 6D and 6E]-to service vill restore full system capacity if required as assumed in UFSAR Section 14.3.5.2. The system operation vill be. as described in UFSAR Section 9.13.4. When [VS-TK-6A] is tested, an operator vill. be stationed continually to re-align tanks [1VS-TK-6B,6C,6D and 6E] to service if a DBA or toxic gas condition arises. No change is made to the system as described in the Tech. Spec. No unreviewed safety question exists for 1 these TOPS.

TOP 1-87-14 "Haintaining FPS Pressure Via Filtered Vater" This procedure provides instructions to supply filtered water to [1FP-338]

through a temporary hose so that the hydropneumatic tank line may be cleared for maintenance while naintaining Fire Protection Header System 4 pressure. As required by FSAR Section 9.10.2.1, the motor driven fire pump vill still start at 105 psi and the diesel driven fire pump vill still start at 95 psi. The filtered water supply through a temporary hose vill just replace the Hydropneumatic Tank System. This TOP is similar to an OSC approved procedure (1.33.4K) with the main difference that filtered water taps into the Fire Protection System at [1FP-338) instead of [1FP- ,

28] (nov inside the clearance boundary). The Fire Protection System is  !

still operable per Tech. Spec. 3.7.14.1 and SAP 9D Table 2, since the Hydropneumatic Tank system is not described and the Fire Protection system vill still start at design pressures. No unreviewed safety question vill exist for this TOP.

TOP 1-87-16 "Operability and Position Verification of [S0V-1HY-103B1]"

This procedure provides instructions to verify the operability of

[SOV-1HY-103Bl] using a nitrogen supplied test rig. Should a DBA event occur during the performance of this test, [1HY-168] will be immediately closed by operator action per procedure. This will isolate the test rig and maintain containment integrity. The hydrogen analyzer supply line vill not be overpressurized because a pressure regulator vill limit line pressure to 5 psig which is belov UFSAR Sections 5.2.2.4, 5.3.1.3 rated minimum of 45 psig and Type C Test pressure. The test rig is also rated for 45 psig. This test cycles the hydrogen analyzer valves which does not effect the hydrogen analyzer, Tech. Spec. 3.6.4.1. This TOP leaves the containment isolation valves [S0V-1HY-103B1,B2] closed and de-energized, Tech. Spec. 3.6.3.1. No unreviewed safety question exists for this TOP.

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' 'DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY -10CFR50.59 '

'Bravar Valley' Power Station Unit 1 ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT Docket No. '50-334 License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd)

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TOP 1-87-17 "Fire Protection Loop Flow Test" This TOP provides instructions to flov' test the fire protectica loop around Unit I and Unit 2. OST 1.32.12 only flow tested around Unit 1.

Accidents evaluated by UFSAR Section 9.10, Appendix-R Review, and Unit 2 FSAR Section 9.5.1 all assume an operable fire suppression system. The l fire protection system vill remain operable during this test. Testing is in accordance with Unit 1 UFSAR Section 9.10.4 and Unit 2 FSAR Section 9.5.1.5.5. All portions of the fire protection system serving safety related equipment vill be operable. The requirements of Tech. Spec. are currently being met. No unreviewed safety question exists.

l TOP 1-87-19 "Hanual Transfer of North Suup Sludge to [1SV-TK-8] Evaporator Bottoms Hold Tank" This procedure provides instructions to transfer the contents of the north sump to the evaporator bottoms hold tank using an air operated pump and temporary hose. This procedure follows requirements of Radeon Manual Chapter 1, Part III, Procedure P and IEC 80-18. Procedure initial conditions requires Radeon to sample pit sludge and water and ensures

[1SV-TK-8] Evaporator Bottoms Hold Tank has adequate capacity. All hoses used in this procedure are required to have a minimum pressure rating of 105 psig by the procedure. The temporary hose path is contained in radiologically controlled areas. FSAR Section 14.2 "Accidental Release of Vaste Liquid" concludes that accidental spillage of vaste liquids is contained within the station and does not result in any significant release of activity. No unreviewed safety question exists for this TOP.

TOP 1-87-20 "Pressurization / Leak Test of the 1A Steam Generator" i This TOP provides instructions to pressurize the secondary side of the 1A steam generator (S/G) with water so that an inspection for leaking tubes ,

can be performed. In the event the steam generator- tube (s) would ,

malfunction, the water vould not cause a dilution of the RCS since the '

l procedure requires the RCS loop stop valves to be closed. The probability of a RCS dilution accident in reduced and the assumptions used in UFSAR Section 14.1.4 are not compromised. The auxiliary feedvacer system used for this test is operated as described in UFSAR Section 10.3.5.2.- UFSAR Section 10.3.1.1 Desiga Bases otates the main steam system piping hus been ,

hydrotested and has been analyzed for solid vater condition. Procedure j steps ensures the secondary pressure does not reach the lift setpoint of-  !

the S/G safety valves or the S/G atmospheric relief and cause water relief through the valves. UFSAR Section 4.3.1 states the steam generator is designed to withstand a maximum pressure at 1,100 psig across the tubes and tube sheet from the secondary side. The procedure only pressurizes the secondary to 790 1 50 psig. UFSAR Section 9.7.2 states the Main Steam Valve Area floor drains are conveyed to the sump in the pipe' tunnel. The

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'DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY 10CFR50.59

. BI vsr Valley Power Station Unit 1 ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT Docket No. 50-334 License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd) procedure requires the plant to be in mode 5 as an initial condition so that Tech. Specs. 3.7.1,2,3,5 are not applicable. An initial coadition requires that the S/G drain tank level indication Tech. Spec. 3.3.3.9 be operable. The procedure provides two precautions to address Tech. Spec.

3.4.1.3 and Tech. Spec. 3.11.1.4. The procedure contains a step to ensure Tech. Spec. 3.7.2.1 is not violated. The TOP requires the use of 2 temporary pressure gages with a range of 0 to 1000 psig rating. The temporary hose and gages are installed and removed in accordance with SAP

36. No unreviewed safety question exists for this TOP.

TOP 1-87-22 "Control of Temporary Air Supply Through CRPB" This TOP provides administrative controls to ensure the temporary spool piece through the control room pressure boundary (CRPB) installed by Construction does not violate SAP 49. The procedure ensures the spool piece is isolated when compressed air through it is not in usa, and that an air povered tool is connected when in use, so that no additional opening in the CRPB vill exist. The TOP ensures all control room penetration boundary openings are resealed and the spool piece isolation valve is isolated following any Unit 1 or Unit 2 CREBAPS activation, Unit 1 UFSAR Section 9.1.3.4. The procedure ensures the spool piece is controlled so that its use does not violate the requirements of SAP 49, thus Tech. Spec. 3.7.7.1 basis margin of safety is not reduced. No unreviewed safety question exists for this procedure.

TOP 1-87-23 "Containment Standby Fire Protection - Support for DCP 833' This TOP provides instructions to route a temporary fire hose through che personnel air lock to provide backup fire suppression capability to 1 containment. UFSAR Section 14.2.1 does not postulate a fire with a

/ dropped fuel assembly. Appendix R Review is based on the ability to achieve safe shutdown. The plant v311 already be defueled. The procedure prevents movemerit of irradiated fuel while in effect in accordance with Tech. Spec. 3.9.4. This procedure provides the backup fire suppression required by the action statement of Tech. Spec. 3.7.14.4. The level of fire protection described in UFSAR Section 9.10 and the Appendix R Review remains equivalent. No unreviewed safety question exists for this procedure.

TOP 1-87-24 "Containment Hose Station Air Test" This TOP provides instruction to verify that no flov blockage exists to the containment fire hose stations and the isolation valves are operable in accordance with Amendment No. 89 Tech. Spec. 3.7.14.4. UFSAR Section 14.2.1 does not postulate a fire concurrent with a dropped fuel assembly.

Appendix R Reviev is based on the ability to achieve safe shutdown, the plant vill be shut down when the TOP is performed. The fire hose stations are not postulated to mitigate the consequences of any UFSAR Section 14

J DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY 10CFR50.59 Banvar. Valley Power Station Unit J ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT Docket No. '50-334 License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd)

I accident. Per UFSAR Section 9.10.2.3 the primary means of fire suppression are the containment. deluge systems which are unaffected by this TOP. Fire suppression capability to contain and extinguish fires where safety-related equipment is located remains operable per the basis of Tech. Spec. 3.7.14.4. No unreviewed safety question exists.  ;

i TOP 1-87-25 "Operation Support of Ultrasonic Probe Positioning of [1ST-52.53}"

The procedure provides instructions to start and stop RHR flov through i I

[1SI-52(53)] to align the probe on the check valve. An accident involving a loss of one RHR loop discharge flovpath has not been previously evaluated in the UFSAR, Section 14. RHR is not an ESF system, reference UFSAR Section 9.3.2.1. The RHR system is used for normal cooldown and is l not considered essential to attain or maintain a safe shutdown (UFSAR i I

Section 9.3.1). The loss of one RHR loop discharge flovpath is not important to safety, as flov vill pass through the other discharge valve reference UFSAR Table 9.3-3, Issue 5. Flow through the RHR loop will be continuously maintained by procedure by preventing the closure of both RHR loop discharge valves at the same time. The RHR system vill be maintained operable and able to meet its design function as defined in Tech. Specs.

vith one discharge flovpath blocked. No unreviewed safety question exists for this TOP.

TOP 1-87-26 "4160 V Fast Bus Transfer Honitoring" This procedure provides instructions to test the fast bus transfer of each of the 4KV Busses individually using jumpers with momentary pushbuttons.

The jumper pushbuttons simulate a trip signal to the Tl trip coil. The breaker is designed to trip and cause an automatic closure of the opposite breaker when the Tl coil is energized. In a review of FSAR Section 14, no accident was found whose consequences vould be increased since the electrical supplies required by Tech. Spec. 3/4.8.1.2 vould be maintained.

Only one Bus vill be tested at a time with the opposite electrical power supplies required by Tech. Spec. 3/4.8.1.2 verified OPERABLE. Testing of the A Bus vill not prevent the #1 D/G from starting, as necessary, if it is available. The same applies to the D Bus and #2 D/G. No unreviewed safety question exists for this TOP.

TOP 1-87-27 "Filling [1VT-TK-10] with [1FV-P-4] f rom [1VT-TK-11] to Varm [1VT-TK-10}"

This TOP provides instructions to transfer water from the turbine plant demineralized water storage tank [1VT-TK-11] to the primary plant demineralized water storage tank [1VT-TK-10] using the dedicated auxiliary feed pump. The piping and pump utilized is not considered in the accident analysis. The accident analysis does not utilize the equipment in TOP 1-81-27 to mitigate the consequences of an accident. [1VT-TK-10] is not required by Tech. Specs. In Modes 4, 5, or 6 and [1FV-P-4} is not required by Tech. Specs. No unreviewed safety question exists for this TOP.

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• 'DUQUESNE LIGliT COMPANY 10CFR50.59

-B nvar Valley Power Station Unit 1 ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT Docket No. '50-334 License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd) 1 l

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TOP 1-88-01 "Holsture Separator Reheater Tube Leak Test" This TOP provides instructions to test the HSR tube bundle for leaks by filling the head chamber and tubes with demineralized water, drawing a ,

vacuum on the head, and observing air bubbles through a plexiglass manvay (

cover. The HSRs vill not be stressed beyond its design or operating l limits. The HSRs are not required by any accident evaluated in the UFSAR.

The HSRs are.not important to safety. No Tech. Specs, apply to the HSR.

No unreviewed safety question exists for this TOP. l l

TOP 1-88-03 "Air Mixing of Any Group I Ion Exchanger" This TOP provides instructions to use station air to mix the resin bed of 1 any Group I lon exchanger. The procedure requests Maintenance to remove a I blank flange between the station air system and the solid vaste system to establish an air flovpath. In the event of a leak from piping that ,

contains radioactive liquid, the liquid vill be collected in building sumps, Reference UFSAR Section 14.2.2 and UFSAR Section 11.2.5. The solid vaste demineralizers design pressure is 200 psig. The station air pressure vill not exceed 125 psig and vill not cause overpressure of the 1 demineralizers. Station air pressure vill be greater than the solid vaste l piping process pressure. This will prevent radioactivity from entering the station air system. If station air is lost, a check valve in the line i vill seal to prevent radioactive water from entering the station air l system. IE Information Notice No. 74-08 addresses concerns of l radioactivity entering air systems used to supply a source of breathing j air. The notice stated that operating procedures should provide for controls to prevent breathing air from being contaminated. The procedure installs a padlock to administratively control the cross connect closed while the blank flange is removed and when a demineralizer is not being air mixed. The procedure verifies that the blank flange has been re-installed upon completion and the padlock removed. The station air system j currently is not used to supply breathing air for HSA air tanks. The system is operated as described in UFSAR Section 11.2.5 except the cross-connect of station air to solid vaste system. Figure 11.2.0 (UFSAR) i depicts the cross-connect feature. The purpose of the air mix is to prepare the resin bed for solidification and packaging as required by Tech. Spec. 3.11.3.1. No unreviewed safety question exists for this TOP. l l

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TOP 1-88-03 (Rev 1) "Air Mixing of Any Group I Ion Exchanger" The TOP was revised to have Radeon specify a vent rig construction as an initial condition. The procedure verifies the Radtech is stationed at the vent to monitor the discharge prior to venting. In the event of the vent rig malfunction, the Radtech vill notify the operator to isolate the air supply. The vent path and vent valve is installed for the purpose of venting the ion exchanger. This change does not modify the solid vaste system. Venting the ion exchanger vill not affect the operability of the supplementary leak collection system, reference Tech. Spec. 3.7.8.1. No unreviewed safety question exists for this revision.

• 'DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY 10CFR50.59 Bravar Valley Povsr Station Unit 1 ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT Docket No. *50-334 License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd)

TOP 1-88-04 "Circulation of Reactor Coolant Loops to Allov Opening the Loop Stop Valves" This TOP coordinates and revises previously approved procedures 10P 86-27, OH 1.6.4.AA,AI in order that TOP 86-27 instructions apply to any loop.

This procedure is withirs the envelope of the UFSAR description of the startup of an isolated RCS lcop and ensures all interlocks are met, reference UFSAR Section 14.1.6.1.2. The conditions in the procedure vill not exceed the assumptions in UFSAR Section 14.1.6.2.2. This procedure meets the intent and wording in all applicable Tech. Spec. 3.4.1.4,5 and 3.7.2.1. No unreviewed safety question exists for this TOP.

E0Ps Rev. 1 ' Safety Evaluation for E0Ps Rev. 1 and Subcommittee Recommendations" This safety evaluation was written for the first revision to the Unit 1 Emergency Operating Procedures OH 1.53A. The immediate actions, steps 9 through 20 (Rev 0) of E0P E-0, have been reduced. The steps for verifying CCR pumps running and CNMT air recirculation fans running are no longer immediate action steps. In accordance with UFSAR Section 9.4.1.1, the CCR system is not required for accident purposes and is not ESF equipment.

BVPS Unit 1 CNMT air recirculation fans are not ESF equipment and are cooled by the chilled water system, UFSAR Sections 9.4.1.2 and 5.4.1.3.

The remaining immediate action steps in E-0 were rearranged for human factors considerations. Previous E-0 immediate actions for total AFV flow greater than 350 GPM and the step for checking Tavg vere also changed to follow up actions since ERGS do not address these steps as immediate actions.

ESF Checklists were revised to clarify the reset of an ESF signal. The checklists ensure that at least one of two CNMT isolation valves of each set or redundant valves is verified closed before an ESF signal is reset.

The CIB checklist also reflects the Control Room ventilation outside air dampers and fans CIB alignment as altered by DCP 611. A step was added for performing an RCS 9 hour1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br /> soak if not all CRDH fans are running during natural circulation cooldovn. This step is consistent with the ERG background document and analysis for ES-0.2. Steps 1 of E-1 and ECA-1.2 (LOCA procedures) have been revised to verify CREBAPS is activated only when a CIB or control room high radiation signal has occurred. The step also verifies proper Unit 1 and Unit 2 control room damper alignments have occurred, consistent with Tech. Spec. Amendment 109 basis. Step 1 of E-2 and E-3 activate CREBAPS independent of any activation signal within 30 minutes of the initiation of a SGTR or main steam line break to ensure control room radiation doses are within 10CFR50 Appendix A GDC-19 limits, according to the May 1987 S&V Control Room Dose Analysis for EVPS, Calculation #12241/14110.39-UR(B)-456-0.

' 'DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY 10CFR50.59 l Beaver Valley Power Station Uni. 1 ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT Docket No. *50-334 License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd)

An attachment for restoring CCR flov to the RCPs in one train has been included for Rev. 1. This attachment contains conditione requiring one train of RPRV to sufficiently remove heat loads from Recirculation Spray heat exchangers while the other RPRV h;ader can be swapped back to the CCR heat exchangers. Thus ESF equipment vill continue to be cooled by both RPRV headers during the performance of this attachment. The design basis of UFSAR Sections 9.9.1 and 9.9.3 are met. Because CNHT pressitre will not exceed 3 psig, the CIA checklist of E-0 has been added to E0P ECA-0.0.

The 10 psig CIB setpoint vill not be reached according to the ECA-0.0 ERG analysis, thus a CIB checklist is not required. A step has been added to ECA-1.1, to ensure one train of HHSI flow is maintaincJ (suction from RVST) for a short period until either a long-term ruirculation flovpath is established or HH3I flow is reduced to meet decay heat removal requirements. This step does not deviate from the intent of ECA-1.1 since core cooling is a high priority critical safety function. The "SI

\ccunulator Ise% tion /V: iting" document, approved by the V0G, allowed additional steps for isolating accumulators to be added to several E0Ps.

These steps are V0G approved changes and reflect the accumulator isolation cri teria of the r'. cument s te ted above.

The changes stated above remain within the UFSAR analysis and the ERG Revision 1 analysis and approved V0G changes to the ERGS. Beccuse no sigrificant deviations from the ERGS have been made in the Revision 1 ECPs, the E0Ps vill continue to take credit for the ERG analysis and Rev 1 ERG SER. The changes made under Revision 1 vill ensure the margin of safety is maintained ar.d human factor improvements. There have been additional steps added in the E0Ps to maintain compliance with the following ' lech. Specs, during an accident:

Tech. spec. 3.3.1.1 -

Installation of the source range dettetor fuses in the immediute actions.

}

Tech. Spec. 3.6.1.1 - ESF checklists ensure containment integrity is met before an ESF signal is reset.

Tech. Spac. 3.1.1.1 3.1.1.2 - Changes a de to ES-0.2 ensure that the entire RCS will De ,, orated for adequate shutdown margin.

Tect. Spec. 3.4.9.3 - A step to place the celd Overpressure Protection System in service when RCS temperature is reduced belov s t 300 F.

p . $, .

n The Tech. Specs. provide limitations used for normal plant t. .mutions so

[t('v p 'at i the plant is in an analyzed condition. During an ac:ident under E0P

[' , J' yidance, the E0Ps ensure the Tech. Specs, are followed, when possible.

'herefore, no T" h. Spec. changes are required. No unreviewed safety qiiestion '

p331

9 -xists due to Revision 1 of the E0P.

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'DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY 10CFR50.59 Basvar Valley Power Station Unit 1 ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT Docket No. '50-334 License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd)

"Unit 1 Chlorine Detectore Temporary Modification fo_ Completion of DCP-814" Lifted leads on relays 62 ACAX3 and ACBX3 vill permit completion of DCP 814 "Vait 1 Chlorine Detector Replacement" without isolation of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 ventilation system during Mode 5 only. With the plant in Operational Mode S, the protection from CL2 gas releases is not required for safe shutdown '

of the plant. Tech. Specs. do not require CL2 protection in Modes 5 and 6.

In Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4, the Control Room vill be operated in full recire. I The CL2 detectors vill be tcplaced under DCJ 814. Entry into Mode 4 vill be completed under the current action statement as 3.0.4 is not applicable. No unreviewed safety question exists for this change.

l "CL No. 515148 "Lifted Leads for DCP 814 Replacement of Chlorine Detectors" l The leads were lifted for the clearance of the chlorine detectors to i prevent blowing SSPS input fuses and to prevent CREBAPS from operating during  !

the detector replacement. Unit 1 Tech. Spec. requires the chlorine detectors i to be operable in Modes 5 and 6. In Modes 1 - 4, the Control Room vill be operated on full recit:ulation while DCP 814 is being completed. UFSAR Section 4.13.4 describes the availability of portable, self-contained breathing apparatus should plant shutdown be required, even though the Control Room would be on full recircult. tion. With the plant in Operational Mode 5, protection from CL2 gas is not required for safe shuti vn of the plant. Tech.

Spec. does not require CL2 detection in Modes 5 and 6. In Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4, the Control Room vill be op3 rated in full recirculation. The CL2 detectors vill be replaced under DCP 814. Eutry into Mode 4 vill be completed under the current action statement as 3.0.4 is not applicable. No unreviewed safety question exists for these changes.

"Temporary Air Regulator on 1A Main Feed Regulation Va3ve" The temporary air regulator was installed to provide local manual control  ;

of 1A MFRV should the pneumatic controller further degrade. Feedvater ,

Isolation is still available since the cie-in is upstream of the FVI  ;

solenoids. The EFS signal functions in the same manner as original des!gn with no time response change. Any malfunction created by the misoperation of this installed jumper vill be bounded by protcetive actions that vill trip the l FVI solenoids and terminate the malfunction. No unreviewed safety question .

exists for this modification.

i "Temporary Installation of Relief Valve on the Outlet of (CS 80]"

The relief valve was added to the outlet of vent valve CN-80, located on I the main condenser hotvell high vater level divert line to the turbine plant dcmineralized water storage tank. The pipe is designed for 30 psig operating pressure and 275 psig design pressure. If the line is isolated, valves may leak by and pressurize -the line to 600 psig. The installation of the I

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'DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY 10CFR50.59 i Bravar Valley Povar Station Unit 1 ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT (

Docket No. '50-334 License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd) )

temporary relief valve vill enable operations to test for leak by. If. leaks j occurred, the relief valve vill relieve to prevent overpressurization. The-relief valve is an added safety precaution. during testing.of condensate valves. The modification provides more margin of safety by preventing overpressurization. The valves to be tested are not Tech. Spec. required. No unrevieved safety question exists for this modification. '

I "Temporary Hodification of [MOV-1RS-156B] Reach Rod" This modification enlarged pin holes from 1/4" to 5/16" and installed two solid AISI 4140 ins to [H0V-1RS-156B], 2B Outside Recirculation Spray Pump Discharge Isolation. Assuming total loss of [H0V-1RS-156B] and its associated j header, the Recirculation Spray Subsystem remains capable (with a single '

failure) of performing its accident analysis function (UFSAR Section 14.3.2). ,

The basis for Tech. Spec. 3.6.2.2 ensures containment depressurization and l subsequent return to subatmospheric pressure in the event of a LOCA. No  ;

unreviewed safety question exists. l "Temporary Hodification to [1VS-20]"

This temporary modification used reinforced teflon valve seats rather than ,

polyethylene on (1VS-20], control Room Compressed Air Storage Tank 6E Fill l Isolation. Replacement parts are Category 1 for temporary use (EH 62146). I The system still consists of 5 - 25% capacity compressed air pressure vessels, I satisfying the single failure criteria.

"Jumper in Temporary Svitchgear Chiller Unit" l l

A temporary jumper was installed to trip switchgear chiller units on a i black diesel generator start. This was required to prevent overloading of )

black diesel in the eviat of an undervoltage condition or less of power to the '

R buc. This change was in accordance with DCP 797 safety evaluation and no unreviewed safety question exists.

I OST 1.30.1B, "Auxiliary River Vater Pump 9B Test, Temporary Hodification'-

Tvo temporary test gauges were installed to provide indication of differential pressure across Auxiliary River Vater Pump 9B after [PDI-1RV-109]

vas found to have failed. 'Inis temporary modification vill provide an indication of flow for OST 1.30.1B. Verification of pump operability per Tech. Spec. 4.7.13.la and 4.0.5 is not sffected. The operability of the Aux.

RV Pump vill not be degraded by the addition of these gauges because the failed instrument is replaced with gauges with accuracy and ranges consistent with the original instrument. No unrevieved safety questions are involved.

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• * # 10CFR50.59 DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY

- Betvar Valley Power Station Unit 1 ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT Docket No. 50-334 License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd)

MSP 43.08, "Radiation , Area Monitor RM-1RM-215A Containment Particulate l Calibration, Temporary Modification" A new terminal block vas added to [RM-1RM-215A] to provide capability of defeating purge SOV actuation for calibration of monitor. This vill prevent >

disconnecting piping to perform a purge. The modification is electrically equivalent to present design, and the monitor is not safety-related. No Tech.

Specs, are involved and no unrevieved safety questions are involved.

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" " 'DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY 10CFR50.59 H

- Bravar Valley Power Station Unit 1 ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT Docket No. 50-334 License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd)

Beaver Valley Pover Station, Unit No. 1 Offsite Dose Calculation Manual, Issue 2 Issue 1 of the ODCM vas revised (1) to provide compatibility between the two ODCHs, (2) to incorporate the sharing concept for liquid vaste and the elevated gaseous radvaste and,.(3) to revise the effluent monitor setpoints as i required by revisions to monitor efficiencies and revised percentages of site l' dose limits.

No unreviewed safety question exists. 1. The ODCM is an administrative document that has no influence on the occurrence or consequences of an accident or the malfunction of equipment important to safety. 2. T'ie ODCM contains no operating procedures. 3. The ODCH contains the limits and methodology used for the basjs of implementing procedures designed to comply with Series 3.11 Technical Specification limits on dose rate and dose due to radioactive effluents. ,

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RCM RIP 2.16 Control Room Lov Range Area Monitors

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l This new procedure was written to provide description and operating )

instructions for the RM-218A and RM-218B monitors of the Radiation Monitoring  ;

System. These are redundant, Category I, safety-related, control room area j monitors. They vill, upon a high radiation signal, initiate the Control Room Emergency Bottled Air Pressurization System (CRtBAPS). j Mo unreviewed safety question evists. These monitors have been installed to increase the level of safety. Their associated automatic actions are bssed i on FSAR evaluated accidents. They are decigned :o increase the margin of safety because of their associated automatic actions.

Calculation Package ERS-HHM-87-14, Unit 1/ Unit 2 ODCH Gaseous Alarm Setpoint 1 Determination )1 Revised gaseous effluent monitor setpoints are derived and documented.

New monitor efficiencies vere incorporated and new engineering conversion factors were calculated. Unit 1 and Unit 2 source terms v :e combined for ,

continuous release (shared release point). Determinations for purging )

containment via the process vent were added. The primary monitors affected are VS-101B, VS-107B and GS-108B.

There is no unreviewed safety question. The revisions were based on updated approved documwntation and calculated in accordance with methodology described in the ODCH. The setpoints are not related to any accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the FSAR. This is the basis for negative responses to safety evaluation questione a, b and c.

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• 100FR50.59 j'DUQUESNE LIGIIT COMPANY

• Bervar Vallsy.PovG Station Unit 1 ANNUAL SAFETY EVALUATIONS REPORT Docket No. 30-333l License No. DPR-66 (Cont'd)

Calculation Package ERS-ATL-83-27, Rev. 1, Liquid Vaste Dose Factor Calculations for RCM-RP 6.5, Issue 3 This calculation package documents revisions to 0DCM Table 1.3-1 and RCM-RP 6.5 by deriving new liquid dose factors for Sb-124 and Sb-125. These factors are derived using bioaccumulation factor -for freshwater fish from R.G.1.109, Rev. O, which was not available for the original calculation package.

No unreviewed safety question exists. The change is not related to any accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the FSAR.

R_CM, C Appendix 4, Routine Radiation Surveys This procedure specifies uni f ouri radiation survey programs in the Radiation Control Manual for both Units 1 & 2 and vill require a change to the ,

U-2 FSAR to make its survey requirements consistent with the U-1 FSAR. The i U-2 FSAR differed in that it specified gamma surveys "weekly" while the U-1 FSAR specifies surveys on an "as needed" basis. j No unreviewed safety question exists. The U-1 prescribed practice is in I accordance with R.G.8.2 Guide for Administration Practices in Radiation i Monitoring which is referenced as "acceptance criteria" in the U-2 Standard Review Plan. The procedure is not related to any accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the FSAR.

RCM RP 5.1, Issue 4 - Exposure Authorization and Control, and RCH, Chapter 1, Issue 4, Rev. 2 - Standards and Requirements These procedures were revised to add multi-badge dosimetry criteria and to specifically address controlling limits for whole body extremity and skin ,

doses with more specific instructions. l The changes pertain to administrative rules to control personnel radiation )

dose. The dose limits are in full compliance with 10CFR20. There are no unreviewed questions. The procedures are not related to any accident or i malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in the FSAR.

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RCM RIP 1.2 RMS Area Monitor Calibrator (Model 848 Field Calibration Kit),

Issue 1, Rev. 3 A change was made in this procedure to add a new GM detector reference and its associated acceptance criteria for proper calibration.

No unreviewed safety question exists. The addition of the detector reference and acceptance criteria assures a proper calibration. The monitor design is based on FSAR evaluated accidents. Proper calibration of the I

monitor increases the margin of safety.

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Telephone (412) 393 6000 Nuclear Division P.o. Box 4 Shippingport, PA 150774404 July 22, 1988 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn Document Control Desk Vashington, DC 20555

Reference:

Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1 Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 1987 Report of Facility Changes, Tests and Experiments Gentlemen:

This letter forvards the 1987 Annual Repot t of Facility Changes, Tests and Experiments, in accordance with 10CFR50.59. The report covers the period January 23, 1987 through January 22, 1988 to coincide with the annual FSAR update. A brief description of each facility and procedure change is provided along with a summary of the safety evaluation for each change.

Vcry truly yours,

^ 1,

. D. Sieber Vice President, Nuclear cc Mr . 1. Beall, Sr. Resident Inspector Mr. V. T. Russell, NRC Region I Administrator Mr. P. Tam, Project Manager Director, Safety Evaluation & Control (VEPCO)

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