ML20092L769
| ML20092L769 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 01/22/1984 |
| From: | Carey J, Majeski M DUQUESNE LIGHT CO. |
| To: | Murley T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8407020009 | |
| Download: ML20092L769 (32) | |
Text
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DUQUESNE LIGIT OXPANY Beaver Valley Power Station Docket No. 50-334, Li nse No. DPR-66 Report of Facility Oges, 'Dests .
and Experiments Fbr 1983 Prepared by: Age DATE: f# 8Y M
Reviewed by: _
DATE: d' '
Superinthndent of Licensing &
Compliance Approved by: ~
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DATE: 5//7/P4-1 Manager of Nuclear ' /
Services l[kh R
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DUQUESNE LIGHT 00HPANY
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Beaver Valley. Power Station.
Docket No. 334, License No. DPR Report of Facility Changes,' Tests, and Experiments
'me following-is a corrpilation of facility.&anges, tests and experiments ocupleted or partially ocupleted during the year 1983 at Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1. This report is provided in accordance-with the Code of Federal Regulations,
Title:
10; Paragraph 50.59, " Changes, Tests and Experiments". . The safety evaluation for these d anges,-tests and experiments determined that there were no unreviewed. safety questions.
Design Change No.19 - Boric Acid Tank Ievel
-Transmitter Modifications This design change modified ths connections of the Boric Acid Tank .
Level Transmitters (LT-QI-106, '108,161 and 163) to facilitate "on line"
- calibration. -The original design of the transmitters had the level sensors Eattached directly to.the tank with 3 inch' flanged connections. An isolation valve'and spool piece, with vent and drain-valves, were inserted at this flanged Teci==ict. ion. The spool piece assemblies were provided with seismic pipe suwori.s.
The safety evaluation stated that the probability of an occurrence or the lccc==foence of an accident or malfunction of equipnent inportant to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR would not be incr-1.. The. installation of this design dange did not change the systems functions as described in the FSAR.
- .The safety evaluation also stated that.the possibility of an accident or malfunction of.a different type than previously evaluated in the ESAR would not .
%, 'be created.~ The. integrity and operation of the system was not degraded by this.
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. change., Maintaining the systen pressure boundary is the' safety related function .
'of the tmnamitters and the level indication signal is non-safety related. . In addition,'
Administrative controls are provided to preclude the possibility of inadvertent' closing of the. isolation valves.
'In addition, it was determined that the margin of safety as defined in the
? basis to any Technical Specification would.not be reduced. The Technical Specifications (Section.3/4.1.2) were reviewed and it was determined that a change to the Technical Specifications was not involved since the ability of the boric acid tanks to supply the re3uired amounts of borated water is unaffected.
Design Change No. L 139 - Mairi Steam Valve .
Cubicle Ventilation' Modifications
' mis design &ange lowered the operating testperature in the Main Steam
- Valve Cubicle (MSVC) by removing the explosive rupture discs and replacing them with manually operated louvers. During cold weather shutdowns, the louvers may be closed to reduce heat' loss from the cubicle. The louvers, in the open
' position, also provide an exhaust path for the ventilation air supplied by VS-AC-6.
This nodification also provides a method- for sealing off tie existing Supplementary Leak Collection and Release System (SIGS)-in the mVC since maintaining a negative pressure in the cubicle would be impossible with -the cubicle open directly to the atmosphere.
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The safety evaluation stated that the probability of'occurr*d e.or the
- consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment'important to safety as previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis . Report)(UFSAR) d would not be increased. Section D.l.3 of the UFSAR' states'that-the roof of ,
the MSVC has been provided with openings to prevent overpressure and subsequent loss or compromise of building integrity in the event of a high' energy line ,
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b reak~. The manually operated louvers in the open position, provide the
-same level of protection from overpressure. Also the louvers are designdd to ,s V^
open outward such that any pressure buildup sufficient to jeoperdize building. -
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. integrity will cause the louvers to open. The decision sto eliminate radiation monitoring of the MSVC vent has been deemed acceptable,since under accident' '.
conditions- (ie. LOCA and SGTR) radioactive releases. thrbugh this pthway will x be insignificant. The change to the SLCRS does not affect the balance or remainino portion of the system since blocking off the duct in rhe' steam valve cubicle area 'is a reduction in load to the system. This changeLvill not increase the ,'
probability of an accident. The consequences of a design basis LOCN with'out taking credit for collection and filtration of leakage by/ theJSLQRS has been evaluated by the NRC in their SER dated 10/11/74. '
The safety evaluation also stated that the possibility for an' accident i or malfunction of a different type than any previously evfludtEdlin thh Updatjd[' . ['
. Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) would not be created. In ythe,evynt that N?
the manually operated louvers are not opened prior to system operation, and a '
high energy line break occurs within the MSVC, the louvers will been outward to "
relieve,the pressure. Also the Operations Department, has agrded to insert a\ s ,
3 step into the start-up procedures requiring the subject \louverg to boapene,d y _, s a prior to system operation. The louvers have undergone seismic analysis to pt4clude
the possibility of their falling on and damaging safetprelated_eq2ipment '" -
within the MSVC. _-
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basis for any Technical Specification would not be reduced. .
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J s T. S. Basis 3/4.7.8 SCLRS states: .'
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"The operability of the SCLRS insures that radtketive materials D '
- leaking from equipment following a LOCA are filtered prior.,,to reaching j the environment. The operation of this system and the resultant i effect on offsite dosage calculations was assumed in the accident ' (~ s 3 analysis." "~
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.This statement indicates that the contiguous area (Main Stham Valve Area) .
will be ' filtered following a LOCA and with the removal of this system in that area,'.it will not be done. ?s ,
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. However, the 'NRC has evaluated the effect of not chuecting and filtereg - "
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. This design change involves a change in the Technical Specifications ,
incorporated in the license. Section 3/4.7.8 of the Techitcal Specificationt[
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~~ V should be revised, as discussed in the safety evaluation. ,
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. , $ This design: change)also involves a. change to the Updated.FSAR.
? Appendix D,.'Section D.l.3.offthe Updated FSAR provides evaluation of the 4,J ' ' ,@; effects ~of a' pipe This' break' in. the.MSVC. . The roof of:the'MSVC. should- be-changed to evaluation describe louvers describes whichopenings in the in the
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lopen position will; prevent overpressure of the valve cubicle in the event of.
is pipe break. fAlso Figure D.5-6 of. the Updated ,FSAR shows rupture disc assemblies a- .inithe. roof openings of the MSVC. This should be changed to show manually Joperated louvers:in;the openings. The design basis accident analyzed in :
Chapterjl4 ;of the UFhAR 'needs to be- revised to. delete credit for SLCRS filtration g- m of; containment leakagelinto ' the -main steam valve cubicle after a LOCA. i
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Design Change No. 144 - Addition of Air Release ,
. S Valve to Circulating Water System E
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, 1 7 (This; design change provides a method of. removing trapped air in. the .
Leirculating; water lines. :
Air in'the piping and carryover.into the cooling tower i
, ? pumps -isla major cause,'of. lost . system performance. An attempt to remove as l
_ mu'ch air as!possible wa's made by. installing air release (burp) valves on the [
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. .circulatingLwater lines.. . Each air release valve is accompanied by a check valve i "g' . _ f and[ butterfly valve,:both.'of which are located: upstream of the respective - l M s" air release: valve. Maintenance Work Request.No. 777785 installed eight (8) of the-M ir'releas'eLvalves in manholes no. 8 north and= south, and no. 9 north'and south. -l
@Y '- 1The mark numbers were CW-AR-242, 244,.246, 248,- 250, 252, 254-and 256. The !
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iinitial: design -scope called for.a total of twelve (12) air release valve to be' .
My Eins'talled. !Four -(4) other tvalve.' sets (surge l check, butterfly and air release) i
- remained as."open
- items".to;be installed at allater date.. When the "open' items" ;
4~ m Lwere schedule'd to be completed.in 1983, the station'requeste'd'that the "open -
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. items" be ' deleted;and. the l operation of the; installed valves improved by purchasing i
a new type. O The . valve internals - have custained severe corrosion. from exposure _
j Lto circulating water and silt. The replacement-valve lis the Crispin Pressure [
- b. ' Sewer Valve, model'S41B, supplied;with stainless steel internals. This tall:
f body valve is: designed to keep :the corrosive' fluids and silt from ~ contacting .;
~ :the valve linkage.1 This valve 13 equipped with back flushing attachments which '
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allow the upper internals to be" periodically cleaned, if necessary, without !
- 6. - removing-the; valve from service. .
$' 1 kf' ~Since th'e original [ installation, CW-AR-254 and 256 have been removed from L the s system.' r . CW-AR-250-and 252 have been relocated to manholes adjacent
- to ' the crossover : pipe. CW-AR-242,1244,.'246 and 248 remain in the no. 9 north -
![ y - . 'and south. manholes. 'This design change replaced - the installed air release . valves - =f h*'
<s (CW-AR-242, '244,' 246, 248, ,250 and. 252) w'ith :the new style pressure ' sewer valves.
LThe Butterfly -and -surge check valves remained. This . design change affected the - '
N,' : pressure boundary of - the circulating water lines in -~each of the mentioned manholes. ~
y' . . :The_' safety evaluation stated that,-based on the above review, the probability -
ofian occurrence or the ccusequence of an. accident or malfunction of equipment
. , . import! ant, to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR would not be increased. l The ' safety- evaluation also stated that the possibility of an accident or malfunction i
4 Sof a' differ 6nt type than previously evaluated in the FSAR would not be created. [
b., This change does not affect the operation of the circulating water system but y . actually enhances .it by removing air which damages the cooling tower pumps.
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. Bacvar Vallsy Powar Station . . . - f,
~ Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66
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The margin of safety as defined 'in the basis' for any Technical Specification ' ~ f; is not reduced since the circulating water system is not discussed in the ,
- l technical specifications. '
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j Design Change No. 189, Modification for Recirculation Spray and Low x L Head Safety Injection Pumps Net Positive Suction Head (NPSH) [, -
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This design change incorporated several changes in the Quench. Spray (QS);
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i j~ s Low Head Safety Injection (LHSI) and Recire Spray (RS) Systems. .These changes '
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The only work'. done in 1983 under this design change, involved the replacement) +
of -Rupture Discs for. the Chemical Injection Pumps which provided pressure relief /
4 Lback to the chemical addition tank. The rupture discs were' replaced'with' '
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~ qualified' Relief Valves. ,
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. The. safety evaluat.Lon- for this DCP stated th'at 'no unrepiewed safety
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questions ' exist for the following reasons: the modification' does not a'ff5ct i the probability. of _ occurrence of a LOCA because l plant; sys tens. or plant con'di# ions I ; !
. which could cause 's LOCA are not changed. - Computer analysis shows adequate , ,
_ ' containment depressurization system performance,. in" that' the peak containmeut ,
- pre.ssure. limit of 45 psia is.not exceeded; depressurization still occurs within
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one hour,:and is maintained. Also, Iodine removal capability is = not jeopar'dized, e, ,
- All piping ~ stresses have been analyzad and . judged to be within limits. , ' '
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. Design Change No. 286, Charging Pumps.
g Vibrational Supports
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!The purpose of this. design. change was to install rib plate.su'ppor,ts on the' ;
, ; drip, pockets of_the' charging pumps. The objective was:to reduce vibiefion oflthe_ r j
- drip pocket between ~ the~ pump case and bearing housing at the discharge end _of
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- to CH-P-lC. I Work to be done on CH-P-1B will be done at -a later _. a date. j'
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- The ' safety evaluation stated that the probability..bf an occurrence jor, the w y = x consequence of an accident or malfunction of~ equipment important to safetf-as. ,' , .
previously. evaluated- in the FSAR is not increased. . This ch'adge should7redoed .-
- vibration ,to the shaf t and bearings thus making; the: pumps more, reliable. . The * ~ s o' l safety evaluation also stated that the possibility of -an accideqt or of aldifferent type than previously evaluated in 'the' FSAR is 6tferamalfunctionya ted{ ;Pumpi ,3. f 'i fallure is th' only e possibility and has been previously, evalufted,f Thy'vibrsti,onai [
! supports shouldLreduce the possibility of pump failure o by reduc'ing vibrotf y ,
- induced pump' shaft and bearing failures.
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E -: ? S' f \M/ . , .gi y The Technical Specifications were reviewed and it'was detterminidfthat f .j a ; change tol the Technical Specification-was not-involved since the ability. to 7
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l maintain the . charging pumps at an ' operable status sh'o ule be,ine,rease9'.c ff c7 ej.%
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Design Change No. 290 - Improve Regulation of the C- 480V Dnergency Busses
, his design change improved the regulation of the 480V Dnergency Busses cn 5 -lA hjlB System Station Service Transformers by installing autcmatic load tap !
changers on the'1B and ID busses respectively. '
w me-safety evaluation stated that the probability of an accident or Alfunction, of:equipnent due to separation of safety related equipnent from
$offsite power is reduced since the new transformers will more reliably I ((M,: ~# _ maintain the 480V emergency bus voltages above 90%. Wis is acomplished by maintaining the 4160V busses at a sufficient level. We safety evaluation also [
iW - stated that the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than the' loss of AC analyzed in section 14.1.11 of the FSAR is not created. I j
'/,, In addition, it was determined that the margin of safety described in
- addu to3/4 section the,.8 of the Tech.that Specs. will voltage not be reduced since thetomodification
' assurance the proper will be available supply
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safety relcted eIuipnent during both normal operation and accident conditions.
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v Design Change No. 296 - Plant Variable Computer k W K, f'TQ System (PVS); Safety Parameter Display Systrsn (SPDS) 91 3
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,Wid change irriolves the installation of a PVS in the Emergency Response
^ Facility milding; (ERF) and the SPDS in the control room. Consoles frczn both ccmputer systans are to be located.in the ERF, control room, and alternate technical reqport. center.
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,3 ~ We accGr?, of work completed so far includes:
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- t - - ?Distallation of ocanputer hardware for PVS. Forty-three percent (43%)
fof the inputs are operable. Remaining inputs to be completed later.
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consoles for PVS have been installed in the ERP only. Remaining 4 ' conroles for control. room and alternate TSC are-to be e m pleted at 3 1 a'later date. !
SPDS cmputer system is to be installed later. f
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%e safety evaluation stated that the prnhability of occurrence or the ,
M.' c consegwnce of an accident or malfunction of equipnent important to safety as ,
W [I Mpreviously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) would not be increased.
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% e PVS and SPDS provide a display of critical plant variables. Inputs E/Dg/
~ 'i t. ; peyd,erived from thW reactor protection circuits are isolated by means of isolation
. M,arplifiers or equivalent buffering circuits and have no effect on equipnent or m
sensors that are in use for safety systems as described in Section 7.5.
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'l DUQUESNE: LIGHT CDMPANY !
.W Beaver Valley Power Station ;
,vi < Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 !
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%e safety evaluation also. stated that the possibility for an accident j
~ ~or malfunction.of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Updated ,
Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) would not be created. %e aanputer display- !
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systems included in this modification are for preaa monitoring only and does ;
~noc control any plant process. Failure of-the output of an isolation amplifier
.will have no effect on the input circuit.
-In addition, it was Cetermined. that the margin of safety as defined in the I basis 'for any Technical Specification would not be reduced. 2 3 paraneters i Elisted in the Technical Specifications Section 3/4.3, Instrumentation, are not-
-'affected by installation of the PVS and SPDS. ;
'n i1 Design Change No. 311 - Upgrade Charging Planps
-1A, 1B and 1C -' Lube Oil Modifications :
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%e purpose of this design change was to upgrade Charging Pumps j
, CH-P-1A,1B and IC. Modifications consist of an improved seal housing design, l
_ lube oil tenperature control, and cannon lube oil cooling systems for each charging ,
pump.- S e lube oil. cooling system design modifies the five existing ptxop gears i
4 rather than providing three new gears. ;
2e scope of work canpleted during the third refueling outage was limited :
to the installation.of the new seal housing design on CH-P-lC. %e remainder '!
of.the design change will~be completed at a later date.. !
%e ~ safety evaluation stated that the prnhability of .an occurrence or the !
consequence of.an accident or malfunction of a:Juipnent important to safety as . :
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- previously evaluated in the FSAR would not be increased. This partial installation
- of the design change did not change the systems function as described Jin the FSAR.-
lThe safety evaluation also stated that the possibility of an accident
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, or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR would ;
- not- be' created. i Wis design should inprove -the pe'rformance of the charging '!
punp lube oil syetan. : .
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~ a me Technical Specifications _(Section 3/4.1.2) were reviewed and it was I determined.that a d ange to the Technical Specifications was not involved- . j
- since the ability of the charging' punp to perform its safety related functions !
is not reduced.
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i Design Change No.- 314 - Check Valve for control Room i Emergency P.;ssurization System Manifold j t
. ?%e pirpose,of this design change is to protect the control. room pressurization U 1 air wiyassorslagainst storage tank back ressure E or'non-safety related system j failures during' the tank filling sucass. ..In the event 'of a wigassor failure,
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. 'the ' storage' tank being' filled could r& charge through the wipessor rendering :l
. the systen innparable. %is check valve provides system isolation without t manually closing the' isolation valves (VS-16, 17, 18,-19 and 20). We check valve t
'is located between the tee-leading to VS-C-3 and the manifold upstream of VS-16, 17, !
4 18, 19~and 20. j i
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.' Beaver Valley Power Station Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 I t
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- %e safety evaluation stated that the probability of an occurrence !
Jor the consequence of an Wdant or malfunction of equipnent important to i safety _as previcusly evaluated in the FSAR would not be increased. The l
. safety evaluation also stated that the possibility of ~an aoniaant or malfunction ;
3 of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR would not be created. '
This change does not affect the operation of the control room pressurization air- '
cw p.assors but provides protection against storage tank blowdown during the '
filling process., i
'In addition, it was determined that th:: margin of safety as defined in the l
. basis for any~ Technical Specification would not be reduced because the. installation - ,
. of the check valve does not decrease the. ability to maintain the bottled air
, pressurization; system omrable.
Design Change No. 340 - Add Isolation ~ Valves - Engine .
Control Panel Pressure Gages; Add Tham =lls - Coolant !
~ and Lube Oil Temoerature Indicators '
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., The purpose of this design change was to. install isolation valves'in !
ithe pressure signal tubing line of each pressure gage mounted on the Dnergency Diesel' Generator Engine Control Panels. . .The valves were nounted in the control i panels ;betmK:n the gages and the related tubing manifold blocks. . l In. addition,-tba m = lls were installed on the existing thraadad .
temperature indicator openings so that the tanperature indicator can be .
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u- renoved and calibrated without' removing the Diesel Generator dun service. j
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. %e safety evaluation stated that' the probability of an occurrence or the l ccir==roence of an accident or malfunction:of equipment important to safety !
Eas geviously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) would not r ibe increased, i
' maMars 8 and 14 are not.affected by this design change. Specifically 1 Mie=18.5.2 of the FSAR does not discuss the use of the temperature and l prosaure indicators on the'D.G. Section 14.1.11 discusses the " Loss of Offsite i
-Power to the Station." This section does not discuss details in instrumentation !
on the D.G. !
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l Also, it was stated-that the possibility for;an' accident or malfunction
--of a different. type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis j Report would not be created. mis change will improve the serviceability of !
the tanperature and pressure indicators and should enhance D. G. availability. >
, Further, the same change is being furnished by the D.G. manufacturer for the Unit 2 ;
eD.G.:and is recognized to_ be the best design. ,
In addition, it was determined that the margin of safety as defined in l
-the basis for any Technical-Speci2ication would not be reduced. ;
P . Raaaa 3/4.8 (Electrical Power Systems) does not establish any criteria for l l= l instrumentation on the D.G. %erefore, the margin of safety is not reduced by !
this design change.
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Beaver. Valley Power Station j Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66
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_ Design' Change No. 351', Replacement of Unqualified Electrical Equignent f
. IE Bulletin 79-OlB required that a review be conducted of certain safety t related electrical equipnent in BVPS Unit 1 to determine if the quignent was environmentallf qualified. m is DCP covers replacement, modification [
and qualification testing of such items required as a result of that review. [
, h e scope of work conpleted during 1983 involved replacement of the ,
Westinghouse OT2 control switches for motor control centers MJCl-E3, E4, l E5 and E6.. l
. S e safety Evaluation stated that there was no unreviewed safety question l M= this design dange replaces, modifies, or tests items identified as ;
lacking sufficient documentation to assure environmental qualification. !
The replacement, mnMNtion, or_ qualification testing of such items will not l
lead to degradation of the systems involved. As new equipnent be==s available ;
1more work will be done under this DCP in the future. i Design Change No. -3' 6 6 Dnergency Response Facilities I Category I Interface Equignent ;
- .. e Various QA Category I instrumentation and equipnent are required to be t monitored by DCP-296 as inputs to the Plant Variable Ctrnputer (PVC) and the Safety
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Standard Parameter Display Systesn (SPDS). h is modification provides the rq uired isolation arrangements to monitor Category I inpits with the Category III SPDS and PVC.
I To 'date, approximately 30% of the inputs which interface with Category I instrunentation are complete.
- % e safety evaluation' stated that the probabilimy'of occurrence or the l consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated 'in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Ibport -(UFSAR) would not be incraaaari. mis design dange installed qualified: isolation equignent between
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QA Category I instrunentation and equipnent and QA Category 'III Itmitoring equignent.
- With groper isolation the category I instrumentation and equipnent will not be degraded by any failure of the installed nonitoring equignent beyond the isolator.
Therefore the probability _of failure of any safety related instrumentation or equipment has not been~ increased. ,
me safety evaluation also stated that.the possibility for an accident.or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) would not be created. Proper. isolation is provided 4for all Category I instrumentation and quipnent monitored by DCP-296. Therefore all design criteria (sud as single failure, separation of control and protection ,
circuits, channel independence, etc.) of the Beactor Trip System, Engineered
- Safety Features Actuation System, Accident Monitoring Instrumentation and equipnent ;
connected.to lE power sources are not altered. Bus no new possibility for an accident or malfunction is created. .
In addition, it was determined'that the margin of safety as defined in the Lbasis for any technical specification would not be reduced. The performance of the various Category I instrumentation and equipnent for which isolation is provided
'is.not degraded by this design change. %erefore the margin of safety for the applicable Technical Specifications for the various instrumentation and quignent is not reduced.
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. 'y . Beaver Volley Power Station ,
1 Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 l m -
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Design' Change No.-3'68 - Charging Pump
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, Discharge Spool Pieces !
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p,' . . . Bis design' change installed: flanged spool pieces on the discharge -l lines of &arging ptmps CH-P-1B'and lC. We installation of spool pieces in
~~
- the Charging Punp discharge lines will help in two ways. It will aid in removal / !
installation of the peps for naintenance, reducing both radiation exposure and j
, -chances for damaging adjacent equipnent. It will also. lessen pipe stress that .;
A can result' frun misalignment of the pmp to pipe. discharge flange. !
he safety evaluation stated that the probability of an occurrence or the -
consequence of an accident or malfunction .of equipnent important to safety as !
previously evaluated in the FSAR would not be incraaaM. . W e new portion was mai-ically designed as delineated in AgaM4v B of. the ESAR. . Also, if one flow l l path or charging pany became inoperable due to a faulty flange uaumbetion, the
,. remaining.two would still be more than~ adequate to perform the CVCS or ECCS functions. q n In~ addition, any laakaga would be of a gradual nature and could be isolated. !
%e safety evaluation also stated that the. possibility of an accident or
. malfunction.of a different type'than previously' evaluated in the FSAR would ,
not be. created.: - Teakaga from flanged joints has already been analyzed in l
- FSAR Sections 6.3.1.2, 6.3.3.8,- and Table 6.3-9..
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- In addition, it was determined that the margin of safety as defined in the !
~ ~ basis.to any Technical Specification would not be-reduced.E B is change does not.
_ alter the availability or capacity of the charging punp. j Design Change No. 378 - Liquid Waste Evaporator
. Bottoms Cooler (LW-E-4) Replacement
[ 2e following modifications were performed under this design change:
7; .(1) : Replacement of Liquid Waste Evaporator Bottoms Cboler (LW-E-4)
-(2)1 Addition of-a recirculation line to bypass IM-E-4
,(3) Installation of heat trace cm new recirculation line
, J(4) Replacement of heat trace circuits LT-54 and ET-55 on lines 1" -IM-84-152
~
4 and~1"-LW-85-152.
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-%e safety evaluation stated that the probability of an occurrence or the s
,< consequences off an accident or malfunction of eIuipnent important to safety as j previously evaluated in the FSAR would not be increased because:
l Evaporator Bottoms Cooler LW-E-4 was replaced with'a unit which j was similar in all respects to the old cooler with the exception of (
the tube side material. We new tube side material, Incoloy 825, l
provides' excellent corrosion resistance to concentrated acids within !
the tenperature range normally found in the Liquid Waste Disposal System. !
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.DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY-
- - ' ^.M Batvar Vallay Powar Station
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y .- Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 e
i- The new recire. line which bypasses LW-E-4 for recire flow, will
" help to -reduce plugging and fouling problems, and thus will add to 4 .-the -increased' efficient operation of the Bottoms Cooler. The new recirc. .line does'.not perform any . safety related function nor tie into
} .any. safety'related lines.
The ' new lrecire. line is ' heat traced to maintain the - temperature of
~t he fluids at:170*F for prevention of boron solidification.
Chemelex heat trace cable was used and ties into existing heat trace
- circuit ET-54. on- line 1"-LW-84-152.
~
s Heat trace circuit ET-55 on line-1" LW-85-152 was Nelson heat trace n 4 and was damaged as a result'of work being performed to install the new recire. line (i.e., removal of insulation and- heat trace on line 1"-
LW-85-152). Therefore, the old Nelson. heat trace was replaced with Chemelex heat trace cable. ' The old Nelson controllers and thermostats were not; replaced.' Since the Chemelex cable meet or exceeded the design
~
requirements, and can be'used with the existing controllers and
-thermostats, there was no reduction of safety as described in the FSAR.
' Heat trace circuit ET-54 on itne:l"-LW-84-152, was Chemelex heat-trace and was replaced with the Lsame heat' trace cable as is presently installed.
L Therefore, . there was no reduction .in safety for heat trace circuit ET-54.
The~ safety evaluation also ' stated .that the possibility of an accident .or of a
' malfunction of safety related e,quipment different than any already evaluated in -
'the FSAR will not;be created -because as mentioned in all of the cases, the icomponents. will beireplaced- with equipment of; similar or better de sign.
, , . In addition,~ it was. determined that:the margin of safety as defined in the
- bases to.any Tea.hnical Specifications would not'be reduced- .
Design Chang'e No.- 389 - Re-Location of Gaseous Nitrogen Supply- System This design: change relocated the Nitrogen, Supply System to an interim location at--the south wall of the boric acid-tank BR-TK-7 cubicle. .The interim location n' '
.'will be utilized for approximately two or three years until the cryogenic system isf nstalled'.
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The o1d location of the Nitrogen Supply System is needed'to accomodate the-new. Solid Waste' Building.
The; safety evaluation stated that the probability of occurrence or the
- consequence of anl accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as y
- previously~ evaluated in the Final Safety --Analysis Report (FSAR) would not be increased.. The Nitrogen vessels are not located ' adjacent to.any equipment essential for' maintaining a safe reactor' shutdown. In~ addition, the vessels have overpressure' relief protection which precludes missile generation caused by
. overpressure bursting ~of the vessels.-
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DUQUESNE LIGlT COMPNE '
f Beaver Valley Power Station
- Docket No. 50-334,' License No. DPR-66
, % e safety evaluation also stated that the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final
- Safety Analysis (FSAR) would not be created. The same supply system is being utilized and is just being rel.ocated. % e interim location is still external to any bd1Aing or structure ocntaining safety related equipnent. %erefore, the response to FSAR Question 9.23 is unchanged..
. his modification does not involve a change to the technical specification
.but does involve a change to the UFSAR.
.In addition,'it was determined that the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification would not be reduced. The Accumulators, the passive uuponents of the EOCS, are pressurized with the nitrogen gas at 605-661 psig. We Limiting condition for operation requires the inoperable Am=12 tor to be restored to Operate status within one hour. %e noving of the present '11trogen Supply System to an interim location does not affect the system capability, since the general system design is not altered.
Design Change No. 397 - Upgrade Peak Shock R e rder (XR-ER-101) his design charge replaced the Triaxial Response Spectrum Recorder (XR-ER-101) located in the Beactor Containment. The Reactor Containment units are the only units that contain reed switches that did not hold its setpoints.
The other units (Control Room XR-ER-100 and Auxiliary Building XR-ER-102) were not replaced. . The containment peak shock recorders, Engdahl Model PSR 1200, were replaced _with new Engdahl Model RSR 1600-H/V-A recorders. We modification replaced the three recorders with new recorders for a triaxial installaton. Three right angle type connectors attached the existing cables to the new recorders. A maximum of 24 indicators, engraved with the appropriate frequencies, were installed on the existing annunciator. Additionally, a raised concrete pedestal (39" x 39" x 18".high) was required to support the three recorders. We pedestal makes it easier to insert and renove record plates and is high enough to avoid occasional flooding and periodic washdown.
We safety evaluation stated that the probability of an occurrence or the
- consequence of an accident or malfunction of aguipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) would not be increased. W e FSAR section 14 does not address seismic instrumentation.
However, Agendix B part B.3.6 makes reference to seismic instrumentation in .
.5.2.8.1. This section has a thorough description of the instrumentation but no change is re y due to this design change. '
The safety evaluation also stated that the possibility for an accident or malfunction of-a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR would not be created. We installation of an instrument from which reliable and accurate data will be available after or during a seismic event will enable the proper evaluation of the seismic event to be made. h is will determine if the station is to be shutdown or if it is safe to start up.
In addition, it was determined that the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification would not be reduced. %e margin of safety
, as outlined in the Technical Specifications 3.3.3.3 and Tables 3.3-7 and 4.3-4 is not reduced because this ' design change only replaced a non-reliable seisnic instrument with a nore reliable one.
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- DUQUESNE LIGff CNPANY i W Beaver Valley Power Station Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 ri '
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~_ Design Change No. -398 - Beaver Valley Power Station ;
- Eiher v ency Daarmaa Facility Substation-Consnon Facilities i
'the.parpose of this modification is to provide a Non<ategory I, Non-1-E, - '
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iDiesel Generator hacked offsite power source for the Energency Response Facility ,
l(ERF) and other Non<ategory I items. The following will be powered from the ;
Substation:- '
~
.Bnergency Response Facility (ERF) k 1 -
- Equipnent Associated ~with the ERF i Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) Items .
.Pelminiatration Building 1 Backup Auxiliary Feed Punp Future Unit 2 ERF and SPDS Items
' Rature Unit 2 4000 HP Startup Feed Punp :
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. . Additional Non-1-E-items (QA Category II, III, or F) to be identifiarl in other.DCP's will_ be powered from the subject Substation.
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- ; The .following work will be performed under this design change
- -
4 Construction of a substation Building. .
LRelocation of the Existing.#2-23 Sh W inaport Substation- _
9, ~ . Installation of Service Transformers and Related PiOLE:ct. ion, Control Duct, Cable, Ground,. Ground Resistor, and Deluge Fire Protection Systems
~
Installation or Utor Control Centers (MOC) ;
Installation of.Ioad Center - .
Installation of- Paarlar Lines Installation' of a Diesel Generator
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. .. 1The scope of. work completed so far includes.the installation of:
~
, , The Service Transformers arxi associated spi-ant, E.R.F. Substation Battery- ,
- and aaamiated breakers,; safety switches, and battery charger, a portion of the- .
Motor Control Centers, the 480V Substation and'aamm iated Maaaa,:a portion of l
- the 4 KV Switchgear, 'a portion of- the D.C. circuits, and a A. C. Panel. Also, Jthe existing #2-23 Shippingport Substation.was; relocated.
c ,
Thefsafety evaluation stated that the probability of occurrence or the
~
I consequence of an accident or ' malfunction of equipnent-important to safety as -
previously evaluated in the Fiol Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)'would not be
, increased. The . subject modifications do not involve or interface with any safety ;
- ; related equipnent previously evaluated in Section 14 of the FSAR.. NorE: Equipnent ,
to be installed under separate DCP's W11ch will be powered from the Substation will-interface with existing Category I equipnent. Those changes are not included . .
7 - -infthis Analysis.
The' safety evaluation also stated that the possibility for an' accident -
,or malfunction of. a differentitype than ~any previously evaluated in the Final ;
-w Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) would not be created. ~ The aIuipnent to be-installed 1 does not perform any safety related functions and does not interface with any . .
'. safety, related equipnent. . Therefore, an accident or malfunction of the aguipnent !
to be installed cannot asyc ie existing ' safety related equipnent.
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' A change tci the technical specifications is not required since the subject i change is'not' safety related.- 01anges to the FSAR were r+>_-,+rmied. - j a
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.s DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY
.. 's Beaver Valley Power Station !
Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 ,
In addition, it was determined that the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification would not be reduced. The margin of safety is not affected since the equipnent and its functions are not safety related and the basis of the Ibchnical Specifications are not affected.
Design Change No. 446 - Charging Pump Discharge ,
Isolation Valve Torque Increasers This design dange installed bearings in some of the darging plunp >
discharge isolation valve operators to obtain more valve disc seating force by reducing the amount of closing torque lost to friction in the valve operator.
A reduction in torque lost to friction increases the anount available to close the valve. The manufacturer has indicated in their letter of 5/29/81 to DIC that the closing torque required after the dange will be approximately 90 - 100 ft - lb. l This change was also implemented to prevent a reoccurrence of the situation where the-suction piping of the 1C charging pump was over pressurized. A malfunction of i the discharge block valve with leakage past the discharge check valve allowed a high differential pressure to exist across the block valve (CH-27) which prevented its ocanplete closure by one station operator.
The safety evaluation stated that the probability of an occurrence or the consuguence'of an accident or malfunction of a:Juipnent important to safety as previously evaluated in the FSAR would not be increased. FSAR section 6.3.1.2,
- 6.3.2.1 and chapter 14 have considered various leaks from different components but have not considered the overpressurization of suction piping as the result of
--leaking check and block valves and the resultant leakage from flange gaskets.
This change enables better valve closure and should prevent a reoccurrence of the problem.
The safety evaluation also stated that the possibility for an accWnt or-
- malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR would not be created. The FSAR has considered %e malfunction of a single component.
of the EOCS by designing to the single failure criteria. However, the FSAR has not specifically covered the inability to close a valve tightly due to a high differential pressure existing across the valve seat. 7his design change modified the valve operators in a manner that would allow for easier opening ard closing of the valve by reducing discharge valve closing torque. Therefore, the possibility of
- an accident not previously evaluated is decreased.
In addition, it was determined that the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification would not be reduced. Technical Specification :
bases sections 3/4.5.2 and 3/4.5.3 have not specifically addressed the charging pumps discharge block valves. However, the margin of safety shall not be reduced because the basis require operability to be maintained by or through the l surveillance requirements. In addition, the change will reduce friction which will enable more torque to be used in seating the valve and less will be lost to friction.
Design Gange No. 466 - Relocation of Gaseous Hydrogen Supply System to Accomodate the New Solid Waste Building
.This. design change relocated the Bulk Hydrogen Manifold and associated tanks to'an area north of the clarifier settling tank and west of the Chlorination i Building. She past location of the Bulk Hydrogen Storage is needcd to accomodate l construction of the North Office Shop Building. The Bulk Hydrogen Manifold was
- modified to designate tw high pressure bottles for the primary plant supply.
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'3 DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY f Beaver Valley Power Station [
- Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 :
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2ese bottles'are separated from the six generator supply bottles by double !
isolation valves which are administratively closed. Connection to the generator i s.upply is maintained for charging and energency purposes only.
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i % e safety evaluation stated that the probability of occurrence or the us apence of an accident or malfunction of equipnent inportant to safety as r
i previously evaluated-in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) would inot be increamad. % e Bulk Hydrogen Storage Tanks are not safety related and i are not located' adjacent to any safety related aluipnent. .In addition, the vessels have overpressure relief protection which precludes missile generation j
. y manaad by overpressure bursting of the vessels.
i g, %e safety evaluation also stated that the possibility for an accident or '
imalfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Updated' l Final Safety. Analysis. Report (UFSAR) would not be created. W e Bulk Hydrogen :
-Storage Manifold was modified, as previously discussed. %e new location is
_ . still remote from any, building or structure containing safety related aIuignent. ;
m .
In addition, it was determined that the margin of safety as' defined in-
. the basis for-any Technical Specification would not be reduced. . ' %e Technical Specification criteria does not address the Hydrogen Supply System. ,
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This modification does involve a change to the UFSAR but does not involve i a change to the technical specifications. ;
' Design Change No. 480'- Wall Modification For j p
LW-E-4 Replana= nt .i
! I 1 . Bis modification removed the masonary blockwall (AB1-31) on the 722' - 6" >
f
' elevation of the Primary A=iliary milding in- the ' cubicle that houses Liquid Waste Evaporator: Bottoms Cboler (LW-E-4) in order to remove and replace.the Tcooler. %e wall provides adequate radiation shielding, is removable and 'i
- _ sei=4cally designed. In addition, distribution panels (ANN-LW-01 and .
AC-PNL-IhM)l),- W11ch were originally mounted on the masonary blockwall were l relocated and =ai _inally mounted on an adjacent, permanent wall. Seismic i
- mounting was required to ensure that the panels would not damage adjoining g safety related equipnent during a aai=nin event. ;
, he safety evaluation stated.that the probability of an occurrence or the - .
. consequence of an accident or nelfunction of equipnent importart to safety as- l previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) would not be !
increanad. This innaification was merely the removal and replacanent of a shielding wall which provides adequate radiation shielding and is seismically
- designed. ;
E . .
R . l % e safety evaluation also stated that the-possibility for an accident or i i
malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety ;
- Analysis' Report would not be created. With proper radiation shielding and 'l seismic design, the removable wall will~not create the possibility.for an accident j
- or. malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in ESAR Section i
-11.3.2 and 14. !
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. . =, Dugussm: LIWT ONPANY
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Beaver Valley Power Station
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Docket No. 50-334, ' License No. DPR _
LI n' addition, it was determined that the margin of safety as defined in the n
- basis for Technical Specifim+ 4m would not be aded. The Technical Specificatims
< - -do not address the'onnstruction of walls. However, Section 5.7 (Seismic
- Classifimtim) on design features does indicate that structures identified in
. A = andii B of the.FSAR shall be maintained i.e., as seismic Category I. Therefore, Jthe margin'of. safety, even though undefined, will not be reduced.
- Design Change No. 513 - Rockwell Edwards T-58 valve Replacement l%e purpose of this design dange was"to. evaluate the feasibility of using the new style Rockwell-Edwards MMel.# 36124 Globe Valve as a suitable c, ' replacement for the diamntinued Rockwell-Edwards Model # 3624 Globe Valve.
L
- Replacement parts for the old model are only available for 2 or 3 more years.
Engineering evaluated the feasibility of using the newer style valve to meet
, : the same functional requirements when replammant is made by Power Stations m an "as rmadad" basis. To date, valves01-294, 295 and SI-107, 109, 118, 299, and 384 have been replamd with the new style valve. Also, the new valves were supplied according to the original specification W11ch required the valves to be aa4=mim lly qualified. A seismic. review was performed and determined that the new valves had.no effact on the applicable-lines.
The safety evaluation stated that the. probability.of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of azuipment important to safety as previously. evaluated in the Final-Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) would not be increased. Replacement of the T-58 valves do not alter the function of safety related equipnent evaluated in the FSAR.
' 2 e' safety evaluation also stated.that the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) would not be created. his nodification will not
- alter the design or function of the systens as described in the ESAR.
- In addition, it was ' determined that the nargin~ of safety as defined in the basis for any Te& nical; Specifications would not be reduced. his modification
-will not affect the parameters ~ listed in the Technical Specifications.
This tradification does not involve a change to the technical specifications or the UFEN..
Design Change'No.-520 - Auxiliary milding Colunn
~
_ Modifications at Elevation 752'-6" his design dange addad an additional steel column on level 722' .6" and 735' 6" in the Auxiliary hilding to correct a deficiency in the original b ilding design..
h e safety evaluation stated that the probability of occurrence or the ccrosguance of an accident or nalfunction of equipnent inportant to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) would not be increased.z The accident of concern in this case is that due to the external
'envi m _ _dal causes-(FSAR 14.1.14), primarily earthquake. B is modification does not increase the probability of occurrence of this accident. ~ Because
'it serves to strengthen the structure, it will not increase the consequences of the accident nor will it' increase the probability of malfunction of aguipnent inportant to safety. 1 2e safety evaluation also stated that the possibility for an accident
- or malfunction of a different type than any. previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) would not be created. As this is part of the Auxiliary Building structure, and the scope mly involves the addition of two steel s beams,there is no increase in possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than those previously analyzed in FSAR 14.1.14.
DUQUESNE LIGIT COMPANY
.. 3 Beaver Valley Power Station Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 In addition it was determined that the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification would not be reduced. (Section 5.7)
This design change will eliminate the administrative controls placed on the auxiliary hn41 ding by LER 81-82/OIT. i Design Change No. 524 - Hydrogen Rerrnhiner Heater Lead Wire Replacement h purpose of this nodification is .to replace the hydrogen recombiner heater leadwires and install heater cover standoffs. % e new leadwires inculation is rated at 302~F as cmpared to the original wires rating of 194~F.
The heater cx:rver standoffs raise the heater cover 1-5/8 inches above the inner cylinder of the heater and improve cooling of the leadwires environment. he
' modification increases the design life of the leadwires and therefore lengthens the operable lifetime of the hydrogen rpmmhiners. The scope of work conpleted so far w s limited to hydrogen recombiner HY-RT-lA. HY-RT-1B will be done at a later date. ,
4 k h safety evaluation stated that the probability of occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of quipnent important to safety as previously evaluated in the Updated. Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) would not be increased.. This modification did not alter the hydrogen recombiner system
- cmponents or operation as evaluated in UFSAR Section 14.3.4.4.
% e safety evaluation also stated that the possibility for an accident or t malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR would not be created. Since the system operation was not altered, an accident or malfunction other than those previously evaluated in the UFSAR would not be created.
In addition, it was determined that the margin of safety as defined in the basis.for any Technical Specification would not be reduced. Neither the operability requirements of the rammhi_ner system (Technical Specification 3.6.4.2), nor the surveillance requirements (Technical Specification 4.6.4.2) are affected by this design. modification.
Design Change No. 540 - Unit Station Service Transformer Replacement ,
We purpose of this modification was to replace Unit 1 Station Service '
Transformers 1C and 1D with more reliable transfonaers, including design features capable of withstanding the load conditions (which caused insulation deterioration ,
due to overheating). '
h safety evaluation stated that the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipnent inportant to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) would not be increased. FSAR Section 8.4 ." Station' Service Systems" description and criteria
- is not altered by this design improvement for reliability and maintainability as the basic function of this non-safety related quipnent is not affected.
. h safety evaluation also stated that the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) would not be created. h urxlification is for increased reliability and maintainability of non-nuclear safety equipnent. No new safety related function is created by this change.
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,, ~ v DugUESNE LIGff CEMPANY !
,l Beaver Valley Power Station - !
" Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 q ;
I .. . In addition, it as determined that the. margin of safety as-defined in the ;
,, basis of any Te&nical Specification would not be reduced. Technical Specification i Section 3/4.8.1, "Ac Sources":is not applicable to power sources from the IC and j
-1D transformers. y Des 43 Change No. 551 - Softner Punps WF-P-llA, llB Continuous operation ;
m .
'this design dange installed two (2) jumpers across the relay contacts of "ll'E 12 on SD and 1 & 2 on SDX which will result ~ in the pumps WFP-llA & B to run during Brine Regeneration. 'Ihis design change supernaba the E & D PS-3074 iannad in 1976 which shut off the pumps during Brine Regeneration.
The safety evaluation stated that the probability of an occurrence or the l consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipnent important to safety as ?
previously' evaluated in the Updated Final. Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) would .
.not be incranaad.~ The BVPS-1 Updated FSAR Section 9.11 " Water Supply and Treatment Systans" states that _ operation _ of these systems are not nama==aJy for safety and are -
inot required for safe. shutdown of. the reactor.
l The safety evaluation also stated that the possibility for an accident or; malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Updated -
Final Safety Analysis Report would not be created. This is a non-safety related ;
system and junping across the relay ~ contacts of the softener punps would not '
create any possibilities of different accidents or malfunctions as previously 3 evaluated in the UFSAR. ;
In addition, -it ma determined that the margin of safety as defined in the l
' basis for any Te&nical Specification would not be reduced. The softner pznps are l not safety related. :
Design Change No. ' 553 - Halon System For Cable Tunnel-(CV-3) j t
'Ihe purpose of' this design dange as to provide a fire detection and a total
. flooding Halon' fire suppression system to poi.act..the cable tunnel area (CV-3). '
This design dange reduces the probability of a fire diaahling several vital pieces l of eplipnent required to naintain safe shutdown conditions by protecting the i electrical trains located in the cable tunnel, including the safety related diesel ..
_ generators and river eter_ punps. l
'Ihe safetv evaluation stated that the probability of an occurrence or the t
weiquence of an accident or malfunction of aIuipment inportant to safety as previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) would not l be incraaaad. The installation of a total flooding Halon system in the cable ;
, , _ tunnel'will mitigate the effects of a fire in this area thus reducing the :
probability of the fire' causing malfunction of aguipnent important to safety. ;
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., DUQUESNE LIGWf COMPANY b ,' -
Beaver Valley Power Station Ducket~ No.~ 50-334,' License No. DPR-66 Uhe safety evaluation also stated that the possibility for an accident or :
. malfunction of a different type.than any geviously evaluated in the Final t
, ? Safety Analysis ~ Report would not be created. The proposed installation does not create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than {
_ any geviously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report for the '
same above mentioned rm anns.. *
.. . . l In addition, it was determined that the margin of safety as defined in the !
basis for any Technical = Specification would not be radonad. The installation '
- of the sq-:--4 system will.not adversely affect the margin of safety of any i
, isystem. ,
l - Design Change No. 559 - Page Party Modifications t 1his d' esign diange included the ' installation of handsets, speakers, [
conduit, cable and aa h in supports to various plant areas in which the present-page-party systen is not audible. This design diange will act to improve the i onsite page party ocumunication system by permitting connunication to and from :
the:various plant area in which the equipment is installed. !
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The safety evaluation. stated that the probability. of an occurrence or the _
- consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment.important to safety as :
previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report would not I 3 be increased. The equipnent installed is for nr-mications purposes caly and 'I
- ' does not adversely affect any of the plant safety related equipnent nor increase :
," . the w..=yuences of an accident or malfunction of associated equipnent. !
11he safety evaluation also stated that the possibility for an accident or ,
i: malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the Updated
- Final Safety Analysis Report would not be'incraaaad. The equipment installation l does' not create the possibility of any new type of accident or malfunction of plant safety related equipnent. I i
In addition,~ it was stated that the margin of safety as defined in the '
' basis for any Technical Specification would not be reduced. She installation
- ' of the new conmunication equipnent to the 'various plant areas would not ;
adversely affect the margin of safety of any of the systems. ;
i
' Design Change No. 560 - Relocation of M-lW-ll3D, !
Supply to Diesel Generator Heat Exchanger EE-E-1B
- i This design change installed an inlet motor-operated valve (MOV-%113Dl) ;
L -
on the 4"-4R-94-151-Q3 River Water Line Icoated inside the Diesel Generator ;
[4 b2ilding DG-2 and' locked open the existing inlet motorpted valve (M-%113D). ;
These dianges were made for fire potection purposes to eliminate the possibility.
of coincident loss of river water cooling water to both emergency diesel
- i generators.in the event of.a fire in the 00 storage 2
/PG pump area.
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DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY-Beaver Valley ~ Power Station-
. Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66
- , . S e safety evaluation stated that the probability of an occurrence.or
-the consequence of an accident or malfunction of. equipment important to safety
~as greviously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) would
- not be increased.. %e' installation of this design change will not increase
- the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction
- of : equi,m=.* important to safety as previously evaluated in the BVPS-1 UFSAR Section 9.9 " River Water System" (specifically Sections 9.9.1.2, 9.9.2, 9.9.3, and-
. 9.9.4) and.mw+4nn 8.5.2 "A-C Dnergency Power Systans" (specifically Sections 8.5.2.3, .8.5.2.4,. 8.5.2.5, and 8.5.2.6) . . . Moreover, this design change will decrease the probability of losing cooling water to the diesel generators
'in the event of a-fire in the 00 storage 2
/PG pump area.
h safety evaluation also stated that the possibility.for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Updated Final
. Safety Analysis-Report would not be created. Since the equipment installed under this arviification'is-Seismic Category I, there is no possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR Section 8.5.2.4 and 9.9.1.2.
In addition, it was determined that'the. margin of safety as defined in the-basis for any Technical Specification would not be rarit ari. Se margin of safety as defined in the hawa of the Technical Specifications 3/4.7.4 " River Water Systans" and 3/4.8.1 "A.C. Sources" will not be reduced since the modifications made were during the refueling mode and redundant River Water Cooling Systems were maintained.
h seismic requirements were met by seismic calculations and a =iamic certificate ofM14 arm from Walworth Valve Co. and a seismic review and verification letter from Stone & Webster Engineering Corp.
Design Gange No. 564 - MOC Control Power
' Transformer Modification
- Sis =nriifination' replaced the presently installed control power transformers in the safety related E C's with new transformers. Sis was done hacanaa in the Fire Pwi.ection Appendix R Review for BVPS-Unit 1, the transformers were identifi<x1 as a potential ignition site if there was a short circuit on the
.., _ secondary side of the. transformers. %e new transformers will not have an ignition. potential if there is a secondary side short circuit.
1 h safety evaluation stated that the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of egpnent inportant to safety as previsouly evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) would not be increased. h new transformers put in will not increase the probability'of an
. accident as defined in UFSAR Section 8.4.3 or Gapter 14. h is is because the new transfonners will be environmentally qualified and seismically designed.
h safety evaluation also stated that the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report would not be created. We new transformers are similar to the ones previously installed except that the new ones will not have an-Ignition potential' if there is ^ a secondary side short circuit.
y DUQUESNE LIGff COMPANY
- ,' Beaver Valley Power Station Docket No. 50-334r License No. DPR-66 ~
. In addition, it was-determined that the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification would not be reduced.
The~ MCC's and their Power Control Transformers are not di==ad in the f Teduiical Specifications Section 3/4.8.1 and 3/4.8.2.
esign Change No. 565 - Hydrogen Recombiner Zero Fire Modules
- 2e hydrogen zwmhiner control ~oonsoles HY-CCA-lA and 1B will be backfitted with new solid state SCR control units. mis backfit is to ensure thellongLterm reliability and spare parts availability of the Hydrogen Recombiners.
g ;The timar relay from the control circuit will also be removed and permanent Ljmpers will be installed in its place. The timer can be removed without
' decreasing the recombiner's reliability and/or safety as r+>---rded by the manufacturer.
- 2e scope of work completed so.far was limited to hydrogen ramhiner HY-RP-1B. HY-RP-1A will be done at a later date.
The safety evaluation stated that the probability of an occurrence oc the consequence.of an accident or malfunction of equipnent inportant to safety as previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) would
~
not be' increased. Section 14.3.4.4, " Post DBA Hydrogen Generation".already
- allows both recombiners to be inrw=rahle.. This modification reduces the possibility of both recombiners being innv=rahle since the contro1~ oonsole !KR units will meet BV-1 environmental qualification criteria.- t The safety: evaluation also stated that the possibility for an accident. j 1 ior malfunction. of a different type than any greviously evaluated in the Updated l Final. Safety Analysis Report would not be created. Section 14.3.4.4 already '
addresses both recombiners inoperable..
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'In addition, it was deterndned that the margin of safety as defined in the [
basis for any Technical Specification would not be reduced. Technical '
- Specification basis 3.6.4 is not reduced. ;
Design Gange No. 570 - Third Refueling Bergen-
.Patterson Snubber Modifications ;
his =ndifination changed'all existing Bergen Patterson snubbers i and reservoir seals to ethylene propylene due to the shortened life of '
unadulterated polyurethane seal material. -Work also performed included: ;
1.- Gland and ram modification on 20 Bergen-Patterson sniaewrs. ,
'2.- Repair of any "as found" gouged rams. '
. 3. - INnctionally testing all 36 Bergen-Patterson Snubbers at the design' load for lock up and bleed rate. .
,4. The 3" Reactor Coolant Punp "B" Oil Drain line was cut and flanged in two places so that the interferring piping can be easily-removed and reinstalled.
anubber removal.would be very difficult, if not impossible without the tanporary removal ~ of this line, p
DUQUESNE LIGHT (I)MPAtE 2
Beaver Valley Power Station Docket No. 50-334,- License No. DPR-66 h safety evaluation stated that the probability of an occurrence or
~
the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipnent important to safety as previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) would not be increased.. N Updated FSAR Section 9.10.2 specified that the RCP oil collection systan will collect any leaking Reactor Coolant Pump oil to a sealed ccmtainer. Wis modification does not reduce the system's ability to perform its intended function. Also, in UFSAR Section 5.2.2.3, these snubbers are required as supports for thermal expansion and to prevent quick movement of the Reactor Coolant Pumps and the Steam Generators. We dianging of materials will not affect the snubbers performance during an earthquake or accident situation.
%e safety evaluation also stated that the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analsysis Report would not be created. Wis nulification of the oil drain line does not create a new type of accident or malfunction to the oil drain systen. Also, in this modification the function of the snubbers as shown
~in UFSAR Section 5.2.2.3 is not changing.
In addition, it was determined that the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification would not be reduced. Technical Specification B 3/4.4.1 is not affected by this modification to the Reactor Coolant Pump oil drain line. Technical specification 3/4.7.12 does not specify the material to be used in the snubbers.
Design Change No. 572 - Page Party Installation, Administration Building he pirpose of this nodification was to install a page party unit in the Administration Building which will make for better ocumunications in the DOP during an anergency.
We. safety evaluation stated that the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) would not be increased. N installation of this design change will nc.t increase the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipnent inportant to safety an evaluated in the BVPS-1 Updated FSAR Section 9.17.6 " Station Page Party Telephone System."
he safety evaluation also stated that the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report would not be created. %s design change should enhance connunications between the EOF and the plant during an energency and will not create the possibility of any different type of accident or malfunction than oreviously evaluated in the UFSAR.
In addition, it was &termined that the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification would not be reduced. The margin of safety as defined in the Bases of Technical Specification 3/4.9.5 "Coninunications" during refueling operations will not be reduced.
Ji', .[ , DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY C _
.Bmnr Vallsy Power Station Docket No. 50-334, License Na. DPR-66 T,
. Design Change No. 573 - Turiine 011 Bearing Lift Pumps This design _ change involved the installation of two new turbine oil
~. bearing lif t pumps to individually supply lif t oli to bearings No. 5 and 6 of 1the low pressure turbhe (LP element No. 2). The existing lift pump is being Jused~to supply bearings No. 3 and 4. The ner pumps are powered from MCCl-3 and controls and indication are installed in-the control room. The purpose of this . modification is to prevent damage to the bearing and journal surface areas
- . .of the low pressure turbine which can occur at startup and low speed cperation.
- In addition, the control circuit for LO-M-8 was modified by removal of a . time delay relay.
.The safety evaluation stat'ed that the probability of an occurrence or the
. consequence-of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as
- previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety taalysis Report (FSAR) would not be increased. The' addition of the two. oil lift pumps does'not affect any piece of equipment which is safety-related. The turbine is not required for a-safe ' shutdown of the reactor. Modification of the control circuit of L(Hi-8 by removal of. the ten second time delay relay does not increase the
- probability of a malfunction of this equipment.- The purpose of the time delay
. relay, was to start the lif t pump automatically ten seconds af ter the turbine started turning:if .it was not already running and to stop the' pump ten seconds af ter the
~
. turbine stopped' spinning.. - Removal of the relay will'not affect the starting of the pump when the turbine speed reaches.600 rpm.
The. safety evaluation' also l stated that the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the. Final .
' Safety Analysis Report would not be created. The modification of the existing equipment and the addition of the new pumps and controls.does not affect any equipment important to' safety so as to create any new accidents or malfunctions.
The pumps and the ^ motor control' center are protected by over-current trips..
Removal:of the time delay relay does not affect the. circuit as to create any new malfunctions.. The' Seismic -analysis for the-benchboard was reviewed to assure that the additional switches and indicators did not create an unacceptable condition.-
In addition, it was determined that the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification would not be reduced. The turbine and ~
associatedJlube oil pumps are not safety related and therefore are not'a part of
( the : bases - for any Technical Specification. . Removal of the time delay relay from the control circuit of LO-M-8 does not affect the load on the diesel
- generator.
Design Change No. 574 - Modify Blank Flanges- for Type C Leak Test The . purpose of this design modification was to modify the blank flanges on Type C Leak Test Valves by' replacing the blank flanges with replacement flanges and fabricated ~ test fittings. This new test flange would then be plugged when not
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DUQUESNE LIGff CDMPANY
-[ L Beaver Valley Power Station Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66
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- in use and'could be u ..
- n ed directly to the testing apparatus to conduct the Type C Isak Test. ' By installing this design diange, time would be saved by l eliminating the in&armadiate step of having to remove the existing blank flanges
~
j f and replacing ~them with a test flange in order to conduct the Type C Isak Test.
Radiation exposure to plant personnel would also be reduced..
Thil safety evaluation stated that the probability of an occurrence or the consequence' of an accident or malfunction of. equipment inportant to safety as
.previously evaluated in the Updated-Final Safety Analysis Heport (FSAR) would-not be increaaad. 'Ihe BVPS-1 UFSAR does not go into great enough detail to t cover test flanges for Type C Isak Test. However, since the replacement flanges .
' and their test fittings were made from the same material which the corresponding l existing blind flanges are made of, the probability of an occurrence or u==wquence i of an accident or malfunction of equip important to safety as previously.
s evaluated in the UFSAR was not incraaaad. :
.. t
> The safety evaluation also stated that the possibility for an accident ,
or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Updated l Final Safety Analysis Report would not be created. Since there will be normally 1
- clnaad isolation valves upstream of the test flanges and the test fittings will be plugged with a screw on cap when not'in use, the possibility for an accident l
,- or malfunction'of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR was :
'not created.. i In addition,~ it was determined that the margin of safety as defined in the !
L basis for any Technical Specification would not be' reduced. 'Ihe margin of safety as defined in the namaa of Technical Specification 3/4.6.1.2 " Containment Isakage"
~
will not be reduced since the mndifications made under this design diange will not. j alter the containment laah= rates defined in Section 3.6.1.2. t
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Design Qiange No. 575 - Chemical Addition '
Pung Vent Valve The purpose of this modification was to install valves on the casing of !
the dismical injection. pmps. 'Ihese valves are used to vent off any air which ;
could became tr= W in the p m p.
The safety evaluation stated that the probability of an occurrence or- f the consequence of an accident or malfunction of'equipnent. inportant to safety i
.as previously evaluated in the Updated Final ~ Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) ;
@ .would not be incraaaad. The vent valve was put on an existing plugged-hole j
.in the casing and the valve was Category I and seismically analyzed. Because ;
of this valve' replacing the plug, there is no diange in the probability of an j
-accident' occurring. . !
V .
1C . 'Ihe safety evaluation also stated that the possibility for an accident or '!
M nalfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Updated 5 Final Safety' Analysis Report would not be created. An existing penetration of the ;
pep casing was uned therefore, no new type of accident is created. !
, . In addition, it was determined that the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification would not be reduced. The basis for l
, Technical Specification 3/4.6.2.3 is not affected by the addition of a vent valve l l.
- to the punp casing.. !
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'DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY
- b. T Bravar Vollsy Power Station
, , . , Deckat No. 50-334. Lictata No. DPR-66
' ^
_ Design Change No. 579 - PORV Vent Port
- Restrictton Modification This 4dificat' ion entailed the removal of the restricting orifices from the' exhaun jorts of SOV-RC-455C-1 C-2,' D-1 and D-2 and the installation of flow con.rol- valves on'the cylinder air tubing lines between SOV-RC-455C-2 and PCV-RS455C, and SOV-RC-455D-2 and PCV-RC-455D.
The, restricting orifices were removed from the vent ports of the internally
$ piloted - solenoid operated _ valves since' it has been demonstrated that when the
. vent port-is sufficiently restricted, the PORV could' fail to close.
!The~ original'PORV exhaust system utilized two solenoid operated valves t
.' aligned in such a way-that if one.SOV failed-the PORV could still vent through ithe other SOV.. To maintain the' PORV exhaust redundancy two flow control
- valves were installed it a parallel configuration in each of;the two PORV
- cylinder air lines.- ';1th this configuration, one flow control valve failure
.would not inhibit the PORV from closing as air can still pass through the other
~
Lyalve.-
'The' safety: evaluation stated that the probability of an occurrence or the (consequence cf-an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as
.previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR)
- would not be increased. The removal of L the restricting orifices from the vent-
. ports 'of :the solenoid operated valves. reduce the probability of an SOV failure thus improving:the reliability of the PORVs'to'close after relieving reactor coolantisystem overpressure. Two flow control ~ valves were installed in a parallel' configuration in each of the two PORV cylinder air lines, so that, in the event-
~
one; flow control valve fails each PORV still is able to vent air out through n 1the other flow control: valve. ;Although-each flow control valve allows 50% of the' total flow rate needed to meet.the ten minute operator response criteria and
-the failure of one valve will. reduce this flow rate as noted, it is much better to allow for reduced flow than. to totally inhibit PORV operation as.was shown
.-possible with the present configuration-of this system. This modification does not affect.any' accident evaluation concerning operation of the PORVs as addressed
-in UFSAR seetions. 14.1.2, 14.1.3,"14.1.7,.14.1.8, 14.1.9,.14.1.10, 14.l'.11, 14.1.15, 14.1'.16,(14.2.5, ' or 14.2.7 or any. other section of the Safety Analysis of the UFSAR.'
No section of, Chapter 14; Safety Analysis of the UFSAR, considers-the malfunction or failure ofithe PORVs in any accident situation and generally does not take credit for PORVl operation, specifically in sections 14.1.7, 14.1.8,~14.2.5,.and 14.2.7.
~ '
Thejsafety evaluation also stated that; the- possibility for an accident or malfunction
% of 's different ' type than any previously~ evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report'would not be created. Although the failure of one of the new flow control
(, ; valves is possible, the installation of two flow control: valves in a parallel Jconfiguration precludes total.PORV failure. This modification does not affect the
, operation 'of the PORVs as described in UFSAR section 4.2.2.'7 - Power Relief Valves, r
L or Section 4.3.4. - Pressure Relief, and does not cree /e a new. type of . accident
- :than any; previously: evaluated in' the UFSAR..
r: .
In. addition, it'uas determined that the margin of' safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification would not be reduced. .The margin of
-safety as defined in the basis 'of section 2.1.2 - Reactor Coolant System Pressure;
~
'Section 2.2.1 - Reactor Trip Set Points, 'as 'it applies to Pressurizer pressure; 3/4.3.1 - Reactor Coolant Loops, as it applies to limits of. Appendix G to 10CFR Part 50; Section 3/4.4.2 and 3/4.4.3 - Safety Valves; and 3/4.4.11 - Relief Valves is not adversely 'affected.-
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,e a: ' DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY .. .
- .( ..
Beaver . Valley Power Statim' l
? ,
i*' Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 l l
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1 Design O)ange No. 580 - Fire Wrap CH-P-1B Power Cable ;
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..'Jhe ~cbjecti=t of this design change was to modify the power cable 1CHSBPH300 j to pG. d the 1B charging pump power cable ir. the primary auxiliary Nilding, i level:722'-6" fra an exposure fire. This modification was initiated as a result (
..of circuit analysis' performed for the DIC Appendix R response, which identified thati i Ethe cable seperation for the charging pmps-in the primary auxiliary building did 1 J not meet the r= qui == ants of 10CFR 50 Appendix R. The design change entailed the l Edesign and installation of a one hour fire barrier around the perimeter of the cable.
l
'The material.used is ANI/MAERP a[ proved one hour fire barrier and is supported j
- by the cable raceways. ;
~
- Jhe safety evaluation stated' that the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident ~or malfunction'of equipment important to safety l
- as previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) l would not be increased. - The malfunction of a darging pump is evaluated in the !
single ' active failure analysis of the ECX:S in Section 6 of the Updated FSAR. i
' This design &ange does not affect the' consequences of a loss of one &arging pump.
The prnhability of a malfunction of the 1B charging pmp will not be incmaad by this dange. '1he power cable anpacity and the cable tray support were reviewed to assure that the effects of the fire barrier'are acceptable.
The safety evaluation also stated that the possibility for an accident
- or malfunction of a different type.than any previously evaluated in the Updated .
-Final Safety Analysis Report would-not be created. This dange will decrease the probability of a loss of. redundant darging pups due to a fire in the 722 ft.
level of the PAB. This event was not previously evaluated in the Updated FSAR,
- but was identified as a result of the 10CFR50 Appendix R plant review. The 1A charging punp power cable exits the pmp cubicle via the top and' traverses the 735 ft. level of the PAB to the LW TK-2B cubicle. From there it drops to
.the LW-P-2B cubicle and exits the PAB on the north wall. The power cable for CH-P-1C exits the pmp cubicle. on the torth side and leaves the PAB via the north-wall of the LW-P-2A cubicle. Seperation and/or fire barriers ~ exist between the 1A and 1C' cables. 'Ihe power cable .for CH-P-1B exits the cubicle via the south wall. *paration of at least-20 feet is' maintained between the 1B charging pump power cable and the other two, however'no autmatic fire suppression system
, tis available in'this area.
The NRC has evaluated this per==d modification and determined that the protectim provided is aguivalent to that required by 10CFR50 Appendix R, Section III,'G. On this basis _ an exenption was granted fraa the requirements
._of providing an automatic fire suppression system for this area. '1he evaluation L considered all safety related equipment located in this area which included all three charging pumps. Given the spacing and. layout of the area and the cubicles acting as heat shields,.a fire inducad failure of both trains is'not considered feasible.
. In addition, it was determined that the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification would not be reduced. This dange does not
- affect the bases for Technical Specification 3/4.1.2 since the probability of a malfunction of the charging punp is not incraaaad and the safety analysis assumes only me &arging pmp is operable.
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DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY 7 Batyrr Vallsy Power Station
'1*:
Docket No. 50-334.' License No. DPR-66_
Design' Change No. 588 =Feedwater Control Valve Modification
- The purpose of .this modification was to modify the current design of the mainL feedwater: control valves to eliminate the effects of flow induced
- vibration which. results in stem breakage, t
' The ; safety evaluation stated that the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction' of equipment important to safety evaluated 'in 'the Updated . Final Safety - Analysis -Report (FSAR) would not be
- increased.- The modifications male to the Main Feedwater Control Valves under
. this design . change still. keep the valve stroke- times within their specified limits.
t . This was verified- by performing a stroke test on the valves. Therefore, the probability of an. accident or malfunction of equipment important -to safety as
-previously 'evaluated in Section 10.3.5.1.l'of 1the UFSAR would not increase.
The safety evaluation also stated that the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously cvaluated in ' the -Updated
~
Final Safety Analysis Report would not be created.- A loss of normal feedwater has been~ evaluated in Section 14.1.8 and " Excessive. Heat Removal Due to Feedwater l System Malfunctions",- Section 1.4.1.9 was also evaluated. The possibility of a different type of accident or malfunction; will not' be created as a result of the
.m;odifications made to the valve under this design change.
In addition, it was determined that the margin of safety as defiu J in the ibasis forJany. Technical Specifications would not be reduced. Section 3.6.3.1
'" Containment:IsolationL Valves" states that containment isolation valves specified in, Table 3.6-1. shalli be operable with the isolation times shown in the table.
Since ithese modifications made to -the~ valves will'not exceed the maximum stroke times,of,10 seconds'as specified'~in Table l3.6-1, the margin of safety as defined
, in bases 3/4.6.3 would ;not be reduced.
Design. Change No. 596~- Replacement of Cooling Tower Fill Material 1This modification involves replacement of the Abestos Cement Board (ACB) fill ~and eliminators with-polyvinyl chloride alpha bars (fill) and eliminators.
= Also,' five stainless steel- fire barrier walls will be installed. in the cocling tower expansion joints.to satisfy ANI requirements. The purpose of this imodification is to provide BVPS Unit l'with a more reliable cooling tower with less maintenance. As of-the end of'1983, a total of 41 of the' towers 80 fill bays have~ had new' PVC fill installed. The present schedule calls for the remaining
_ - 39 bays of. ACB fill to be' replaced during the next scheduled refueling outage, n' ; All:of the recommended firewalls have been installed.
'The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction
. of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Updated Final 1 Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) would not be increased. Modification of the cooling
~ tower 'does not affect any safety related equipmer.t or any accident previously analyzed-in the Updated FSAR. The cooling tower is not needed for a safe shutdown of the . reactor or to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
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.-DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY-BxvarLVallsy Power Statien ri
$ ^ Docket No. 50-334. License No. DPR-66
. 1The safety evaluation .also ~ stated that the possibility for an accident or
~
_ malfunction of ~a' different type than any previously evaluated in the Final M .SafetyLAnalysis Report would not be created.- Changing the fill material in the cooling tower will not create any new accidents or malfunctions of equipment r
s important to safety. Increased ~ reliability' of the fill material as provided
-by'a'whole.this
'as- change'should improve.the performance of.the cooling tower and the plant
[. g In addition it was determined that the margin of safety as defined in the basis: for 'any Technical Specification would not -be'~ reduced. The Circulating Water System is not safety related. and is not required to be operable in the
- basis for.any Technical Specifications..
Le 8 4 . Design Change No. 603 - Tube Lane Blocking Devices for Steam Generators This modification' entailed the replacement of the formerly installed welded
. type S/G ' tube lane blocking devices :with a Westinghouse design bolted type t Lblocking device..
sThe purpose f- this modification was to provide ~a method for removal and M , reinstallation of L the tube lane blocking devices that requires no grinding or
, weld ing. .. This allows greater ease in the removal of .these devices to' perform
. refueling maintenance activities such as inspections, testing, chemistry control, L or? sludge lancing; and reduces radiation exposure to the workers performing the '
- removal of these~ devices.
.The safety evaluaton stated that the probability:-of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident-or malfunction of equipment important to safety as
- previously evaluated -in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) would not be. increased. The replacement of the currently installed welded ' type S/G tube 11ane blocking devices with a bolted type device would not. increase the probability-of 'an occurrence or the consequence of an accident such as a Steam Generator Tube' Rupture as described 'in UFSAR Section '14.2.4,- because the bolted type devices
~
- are seismically designed and -installed to ensure that they maintain their
' structural integrity.during normal operation and also during a seismic event.
. The safety _ evaluation also stated that the possibility for on accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety
-Analysis Report would:not be created. The proposed modification does not
. adversely affect the operation of the steam generators as described in UFSAR Section 4.2.2.4 nor does 'it create a new type of accident or malfunction than Tany previously evaluated in-the UFSAR.
In addition, it was determined that the margin of safety as defined in the lasts for any Technical Specification would not be reduced. The margin of Isafety, as defined in the basis of Technical Specification Section 3/4.4.5 -
Steam Generators and Section 3/4.7.7. - Steam Generator Pressure / Temperature
- Limitation,is not adversely affected.
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m DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY j ., N 1 Beaver Valley Power Station !
in , c Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 j
! Design Change No. 606 - NUREG 0737 Pressurizer Safety
' and Relief Valve Piping Modificat$ons j
As 'a result of TMI, the NBC requires nuclear plant operators to provide l added assurance of the structural integrity of the pressurizer. safety and relief 1
, Jvalve installation. Rall scale testing was performed by EPRI and resulting l data was used by Westinghouse (W)-to adjust and verify adequacy of their analytical methods.-. R ose methods were used to determine the structural response !
of BVPS-Unit No. 1 pressurizer and-safety valve piping syst s to expected transients. l
- The =ndifimtions required by this evaluation were as follows: l 5 l1. Progide a mgans to maintain safety valve loop seal water tmperature between
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'i300 7 - 400 7 , thus allowing flashing of the loop oeal water downstream l of the safety valves sich will reduce the structural response of the
- piping system to the pr===ri=r relief tank. This was ==plished by i
- - enclosing each of the seal loops with an insulated box dich receives heat '
L . from the pr m rizer through a window cut in the pressurizer insulation. j f- 2. . Tensioning of sane anchor bolts on ISO 6.24-349 and 350 to allow the use of I
' higher allowables sich are naadad to qualify the supports for structural- :
, strength. ,
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ani**=r within the vendors required space erivelope. j The safety. evaluation stated that-the probability of occurrence or.the'
- consequence of an accident or mlfunction of equipnent important.to safety as ,
previculsy evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) would ;
not be increased. .2e system design and operation as die =aad in Section 4.2
- and 4.3.4 of the UFSAR remains unchanged. Operation of the' safety valves as j
. discussed in m=+4m 4.2.2.7 remains the same. Se insulated box installed ;
,around the-loop seal' maintains the seal water at a tenperature'such that in the event l l' 7the valve lifts, the water will flash to steam as it is discharged to the !
. .pressurizar relief tank. his would minimize the possibility of a water slug :
traveling through the discharge lines. . >
' me safety; evaluation also stated'that the possibility for an accident or-
. malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Updated- -
-Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) would not be created. %e described
- andifimtim does not alter the function of safety related equipnent as ;
. evaluated in the UFSAR. This mndiHmtion is intended to reduce the ~ structural I response of the. piping system in the event of overpressure protection of the :
Reactor Coolant System by means of the safety valve (s). . j In a:klition, it was determined that the margin of safety as defined in
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,the basis for any Technical Specification would not be reduced.
i The parameters listed in Section 3/4.4, Reactor coolant System, are not -;
(affected by this modification. NOTE: The safety valve setpoints were verified j J to be in accordance with the Technical Specification limitations.
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- h is modification does not affect the operability of the Reactor Coolant System
. as required by technical specification 3/4.4, therefore a change to the technical ;
p . specifications is not required.
[ /Also, a revision to Section B.2.1.8 of Appendix B of the UFSAR was r--x-wisbi. .
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.DUQUESNE LIGHT. COMPANY 1 V7 '; 1
, . . _ Bravsr. Vallsy Powar Station 7h *2 '
- Docke t No. 50-334. ' License No. DPR-66 ~
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Temporary Operating Procedure:(TOP) 83-21 (22),
Qt Pressurization'and Leak Tests of B -(C) Steam Generator.
,. . ., This procedure detailed the valve and equipment line-ups needed to - !
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c fill the B- (C) steam -generator secondary side and pressurize to 790 + 50 psig 2
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, ; to; locate ta' leaking tube', Land; to subsequently. leak test the repair (plugged tube).
. # (Thef safe.ty ' evaluation stated that since the limits' of UFSAR 10.3.1.1 Design
-Basis are lnot exceeded, the. primary system is isolated from the m steam generator, !
tha--limits:of-technical specification 3.7.2.1 are not exceeded, and other methods-m :
of decay heat / removal are available, that no unreviewed' safety question existed. - ;
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r, Temporaryj 0perating Procedure (TOP) 83-23, Filling and Venting Drained
- Reactor- Coolant Loops with Reactor Defueled m LThis: procedure describes ~ the steps 'necessary to fill and vent reactor
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coolant . loop's with the reactor vessel defueled.1 The existing operating manual
- procedure i" Filling ' and Venting a _ Drained Coolant Loop" ~ was revised - to install J and remove jumpers on the cold leg loop -isolation valve opening interlocks, .
since with the reactor defueled, there is no need to ensure' against an accidental
[ start-up of. an unborated and/or cold isolated _ loop. The initial condition on-
, boron concentration was changed.to specify boroc at 2050 1 50 PPM, as required
- by Tech. Specs.Jfor refueling operations, instead of a' boron concentration equal to that of .the reactor coolant system..
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The safety. evaluation: stated that since the reactor vessel is defueled
..and the loops will be filled with coolant at a boron concentration of ~ 20501
- 50 ~ Pt'H, ' as required by Tech. Spec. for refueling operations, this did not -
' increase 1the risk of any : accident or malfunction of safety systems, and no new
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Laccident or malfunction would be created. It was.also determined that the margin J ofisafety would not be reduced. The OSC also commented.that with the RCS in.
a defueled condition, a. reactivity excursion- is not possible, ~ therefore the loop
, aisolation valve interlocks are not-required.
Temporary Operating' Procedure (TOP) 83-25, Filling the SI Accumulators from SI' Hydro Test Pump Thru Nitrogen Fill Header
' This procedure provided detail' ed steps to add makeup water to the SI accumulators from the SI-hydro test pump thrugh the accumulator nitrogen fill-line' via a temporary hose, in order to meet BVPS Unit -1 technical ~ specification -
3.5.1. requirements. . This alternate fill path was used since the normal flow.
- path'was out of service. The probability'of an occurrence or consequences of an accident orfsafety related~e'quipment' evaluated in the FSAR is not increased.
The same yater for filling the' accumulator is used in this procedure. The 4
procedure; satisfies temporary hose requirements of BVPS Unit 1 Radeon Manual,
- > ' Chapter'1, Part 3,' Procedure F~ "Use of Temporary Hoses".
e The possibility of an accident or malfunction different from that evaluated in - the - FSAR is not ' increased. The unused portions of the nitorgen fill header
.areL" double-valve toolated". The nitrogen fill header is also monitored for radioactivity leakaga to prevent' discharge into the atmosphere. A permanent relief valve- at: the SI hydro test pump discharge is set below the nitrogen fill line design pressure to prevent overpressurization. The nitrogen fill system was returned
~to normal ~ operating status when filling the accumulators was completed. No unreviewed-safety question exfsted.
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- i DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY . _
Beaver V?.lley Power Station ' I.~
'2 8- *- Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 ^
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Tmporary Operating Procedure ('IOP) 83-28, PurgincfIOxyge.n '
Fran the Degasifier With Nitrogen \'
s Wis procedure described the necessary stegi, valve and equipnent t lineups to individually purge the 2A and 2B Degasifiers with nitrogen, to return '
c them to a non-flamable environment. Although the Degasifier is non-nuclear safety related, the prnhability of damaging safety related equipnent in close proximii.yr '
is decreased by purging the Degasifier with nitregen. 'On the oxygen buildup fr the Degasifier is eliminated, the possibility of splosion is significantlydecr%s6d.
All temporary hoses used in the procedure were installeddn v:cordance to BViq Unit 1 Radeon Manual Chapter 1, Part 3, Procedure F, "Use c( hnporary Hoses". Wat +
procedure contains appropriate Radcon controls tp@weat contaminating the Primary.
Auxiliary Building during venting operatices. 7hexefore, no unreviewedwsafety question existed. -
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Temporary Operating Procedure (TOP) 83-29, Verifying Operability and 4 y -
Position of Hydrogen Analyzer Containment Isolation Valve lSOV-HY-104B\ fg ,
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Wis procedure details the steps necese,ary to verify operability and de position of Hydrogen Analyzer Containment Isolation Valve lSOV-HY-104Bl\. 'Since*
dual valve position was indicated, it was necesary to apply nitrogen preesurs ,
(3-5 psig) on the isolation valve and by cycling the valve and observin pressure ,
_ changes, valve operability and position were verified. ' ' -
%eequipnentinstalledunderthisTOPmaintainscontai$mentintegrityani was pressure rated at greater than DBA ccnditions. Weaffectsofdischargik g, a full N bottle to containment were negligible and would not effect peak p
con t pressure under any accident ccnditions described in Section 14 / jc \
of UFSAR. Temporary hosing was installed in uccordance to 101 Qvoter .1 \,
'and meets all Circular 80-18 concerns. For the ato/e reasoM theNCC o'yCared .
that there was no unreviewed safety question, y A q
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? T5 AF Telephone (412) 456-6000 Nuclear Division P.O. Box 4 Shippingport, PA 1507NKl04 June 1, 1984 7, U S. ' Nuclear Pegulatory Catmission f' ffice of Inspection & Enforcement Attn: Dr. T. E. Murley, Pegional Administrator
~N Region 1
.; 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406 Peference: Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1 Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66
. 1983 Report of Facility Changes, Tests and Experiments Gentlemen:
This letter forwards the 1983 annual Peport of Facility Changes, Tests and Experiments for Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 1, in accordance with 10CFR50.59. 'Ihe report covers t'e period January 22, 1983 to January 22, 1984 to coincide with the annual FSAR update. A brief description of the changes, tests and experiments are provided along with a suninary of the safety evaluation for each.
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Very yours,
.s i J. . Carey
~' Vice President, Nuclear
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cc: Director of Nuclear Peactor Pegulation (39)
( U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Carmission
,b , Attn: Mr. R. C. DeYoung, Director
'\ Office of Inspection and I:nforcement Washington, DC 20555 Mr. W. M. Troskoski, Resident Inspector U. S. Nuclear Pegulatory Camission Beaver Valley Power Station Shippingport, PA 15077 3
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Camissicn c/o Docuniif}t Kanagement Branch Washington,ljC' 20555l y. ,
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