L-99-139, LER 99-S01-00:on 990813,uncompensated Loss of Ability to Detect within Single Intrusion Security Detection Zone Occurred.Caused by Procedure non-compliance.Involved Personnel Received Counseling Re Event.With
| ML20216E416 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 09/02/1999 |
| From: | Hart R, Ostrowski K DUQUESNE LIGHT CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| L-99-139, LER-99-S01, NUDOCS 9909130048 | |
| Download: ML20216E416 (7) | |
Text
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Nuclear Group ln?pp%p* ort, e4 iso 77 ooo, September 2, 1999 L-99-139 Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. I 1)ocket No. 50-334 License No.1)PR-66 LER 99-S01-00 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
~ Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 in accordance with 10 CFR 73.71(d), Licensee Event R.epon 99-S01-00,
" Uncompensated Loss of Ability to Detect Within a Single Intrusion Security Detection Zone" is submitted. This event is applicable to the reponing criteria of 10 CFR 73.71 Appendix G, Pan 1.(c), for "any failure, degradation, or the discovered vulnerability in a safeguard system that could allow unauthorized or undetected access to a protected area, material access area, controlled access area, vital area, or transpon for which compensatory measures have not been employed."
This LER contains no Security Safeguards Information.
- h. hwab K. L. Ostrowski Division Vice President Nuclear Operations and Plant Manager Attachment IE1 '
I w ,
The Nuclear Professionals 9909130048 990902 1
l-LER 99-S01-00 L-99-139 Page 2 4
cc: Mr. H. J. Miller, Regional Administrator United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region 1 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 Mr. D. S. Collins BVPS Project Manager United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Mr. David M. Kern BVPS Senior Resident Inspector United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr. J. A. Hultz Ohio Edison Company 76 S. Main Street Akron, OH 44308 INPO Records Center 700 Galleria Parkway 1
Atlanta, GA 30339-5957 Mr. Michael P. Murphy Bureau of Radiation Protection Department of Environmental Protection RCSOB-13th Floor l P.O. Box 8469 j Harrisburg, PA 17105-8469 Manager, Nuclear Licensing and Operations Support Virginia Electric & Power Company 5000 Dominion Blvd.
Innsbrook Tech. Center
. Glen Allen, VA 23060 i
i
l NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REIULATORY COMMISSION APPRiVED BY OMB N3. 3150-0104 EXPIRES (6-1998) 06/30/2001 Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory information l LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) eacMn request 50 hrs Reported lessons leamed are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to srktustry. Forward commerus regarding burden
, estimate to the Records Mana0ement Branch (T 6 F33). US Nuclear (See reverse for required number of Regulatory Commission. Washin . DC 20555-0001. and to the Paperwork digits / Characters for each block) oNY[o*rmetMconectN"NpNeYntty **"E"Es
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FACluTY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER 12) PAGE (3)
Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1 05000334 1 OF 5 TITLE (4)
Uncompensated Loss of Ability to Detect Within a Single Intrusion Security Detection Zone EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACluTIES INVOLVED (8)
MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQU NTIAl. R SiON MONTH DAY VfAR FActuTY NAME DOCKET NUMBER Beaver Valley Unit 2 05000412 8 13 99 99 S01 00 9 02 99 OPERATING THis REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUmfMENTS OF 10 CFR 6: (Check one or more) (11)
MODE (9) 1 20.2201(b) 20.2203(aH2Hv) 50.73(aH2)(0 50.73(aH2Hv660 POWER 20.2203(a H1) 20.2203(aH3HI) 60.73(aH2)tli) 50.73(aH2)(a) .
l LEVEL (10) 100% 20.2203(aH2Hu 20.2203teH3Hii) so.73teH2Heio X 73.7i ab) 20.2203taH2H10 20.2203(aH4) . 50.73(aH2Hiv) OTHER 20.2203taH2Hiin 50.36tcH1) 50.73(aH2Hvi l
20.2203(aH2Hav) 50.36(cH2) 50.73(aH2Hviu {
l UCENSEE CONTACT FOR TH!S LER (12)
NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (include Atos Codel R. D. Hart, Senior Licensing Supervisor (412) 393-5284 i
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN TH18 REPORT (13)
CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTE M COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE i TO EPIX TO EPIX 1
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) MONTH DAY YEAR YES NO ,$c,gu (if yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE). X DATE (15)
ABSTRACT (Lindt to 1400 spaces, i.e., approalmately 15 eingle-spaced typewritten lines) (16) on 8/13/99, at approximately 1412 hours0.0163 days <br />0.392 hours <br />0.00233 weeks <br />5.37266e-4 months <br />, the Security Response Team was placed in " post out" positions in response to multiple perimeter intrusion detection system runoffs resulting from extreme environmental conditions. Compensatory measures were established on the security perimeter and the affected perimeter zones were concurred inactivated in the cutomated security system. Environmental conditions improved and actions were completed, et approximately 1554 hours0.018 days <br />0.432 hours <br />0.00257 weeks <br />5.91297e-4 months <br />, to restore and reactivate the affected perimeter zones. At approximately 1627 hours0.0188 days <br />0.452 hours <br />0.00269 weeks <br />6.190735e-4 months <br />, a routine Inactive Point check revealed that previously affected perimeter Zone 211 was still inactive and without compensatory measures. Security response was dispatched, Zone 211 was satisfactorily tested and activated at approximately 1630 hours0.0189 days <br />0.453 hours <br />0.0027 weeks <br />6.20215e-4 months <br />, and a search revealed no unauthorized activities, alarms, or personnel. NRC notification of this event was made, at approximately 1727 hours0.02 days <br />0.48 hours <br />0.00286 weeks <br />6.571235e-4 months <br />. The root cause of this event is failure of the involved Unit 2 central Alarm Station (CAS) and Secondary Alarm Station (SAS) Operators (three contract security supervisors) to comply with steps 3.1.2.4 end 3.1.3.3 of Security Procedure 9.0, " Assessing and Inactivating Alarms," and failure to use good self-checking techniques. The involved CAS and SAS supervisors were counseled, placed on suspension, and subsequently returned to duty. Remedial training for all CAS/SAS Supervisors in CAS/SAS procedures, self-checking techniques, and Management expectations regarding this event will be completed by 9/10/99. Lessons learned from this event will be incorporated into Security annual self-checking / human performance training by 10/8/99.
This report contains no security Safeguards Information.
NRC FORM 366 (6-1998)
NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REzULATORY COMM% ION (6-1998)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION )
4 FACluTY NAME (1) DOCKET (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)
NUparR f21 l YEAR SE OU T AL REV S N Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1 05000334 99 S01 00 2 OF 5 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (1h PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) Units 1 and 2 Westinghouse Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR)
BVPS Unit 2 Security Perimeter Intrusion Detection System {IA}*
- Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS), system and component function identifier codes appear in the text as {XX/XX). I CONDITIONS AT EVENT DISCOVERY !
Unit 1 - Mode 1, 100 percent reactor power Unit 2 - Mode 1, 100 percent reactor power EVENT _ DESCRIPTION This report contains no Security Safeguards information.
On August 13, 1999, at approximately 1412 hours0.0163 days <br />0.392 hours <br />0.00233 weeks <br />5.37266e-4 months <br />, the Security Response Team was placed in their " post out" positions in response to multiple perimeter intrusion detection system runoffs (constant alarming) resulting from extreme environmental conditions. Compensatory measures were established on the security perimeter and the Unit 2 Secondary Alarm Station (SAS) Operator (contract security supervisor) inactivated the affected perimeter zones {IA/DET} in the automated security system. The Unit 2 Central Alarm Station (CAS) Operator (contract security supervisor) then concurred with this action. Alarm Zone 211 was one of the affected zones placed in concurrence and inactivated. The SAS Operator entered the information for the inactivated zones in a handwritten log. However, at the time the subject log entries were made it was not recognized that inactivated Zone 211 had been incorrectly identified and transposed into the log as Zone "212".
Environmental conditions improved and the Unit 2 SAS Operator began to restore the zones that had been placed inactive and into concurrence, in preparation for these zones to be reactivated by the Unit 2 CAS Operator. During this effort, the OAS Operator called up Zone 212 and noted.that it was already active. At approximately 1554 hours0.018 days <br />0.432 hours <br />0.00257 weeks <br />5.91297e-4 months <br /> (same day), following concurrence by the CAS and SAS operators, perimeter alarm zone testing was completed and the compensatory measures were NRC FORM 366A 16-1998
NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REtVLATORY COMMIS!aON (6199D UCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION a
FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)
NUMKR(21 NU NU% R Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1 05000334 99 S01 00 3 OF 5 TEXT tif more space is require $ use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (11)
EVENT DESCRIPTION (continued) withdrawn. Subsequently, at approximately 1627 hours0.0188 days <br />0.452 hours <br />0.00269 weeks <br />6.190735e-4 months <br /> (same day), a SAS Operator (contract security supervisor) performing a routine Inactive Point Check discovered that Zone 211 was still inactive and without compensatory measures. Security response was dispatched to ,
the affected area and Zone 211 was satisfactorily tested and activated, at approximately 1630 hours0.0189 days <br />0.453 hours <br />0.0027 weeks <br />6.20215e-4 months <br /> (same day). A search was
)
performed for any unauthorized activities and no unauthorized alarms or unauthorized personnel were discovered.
l The NRC Operations Center was notified of this event, at approximately !
1727 hours0.02 days <br />0.48 hours <br />0.00286 weeks <br />6.571235e-4 months <br /> on August 13, 1999.
I REPORTABILITY !
1 This event is reportable under the criteria of 10 CFR 73.71 (b) (1) and 10 CFR 73.71, Appendix G, Part I.(c), due to the discovered 1 vulnerability in Zone 211 that could have allowed unauthorized or l I
undetected access through the zone for approximately 33 minutes.
There was no media interest involved with this event. l l
CAUSE OF EVENT The root cause of this event is procedure non-compliance due to human performance errors by the involved SAS and CAS operators (three contract security supervisors). This occurred when these individuals did not comply with steps 3.1.2.4 and 3.1.3.3 of Security Procedure 9.0, " Accessing and Inactivating Alarms ". These steps require that the CAS/SAS Supervisors ensure that the current status of all accessed or inactivated alarm points is secured / activated and properly tested prior to allowing any authorized compensatory measure, assigned to ;
compensate for the alarm points, to be withdrawn, and determine that the current status of the alarm point (s) is secure / active. A contributor to this event was failure of these individuals to use good self-checking techniques.
After the SAS Operator misidentified and transposed inactivated Zone 211 into a handwritten log as Zone "212", opportunities were missed to identify and correct the error. These missed opportunities occurred when the SAS operator failed to use the automated security system to verify the points that were placed in access and failed to use a NAC F ORM 366A (6-1998)
NRC FC,RM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR RE1ULATORY COMMI'SION (6-1998)
UCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION
- DOCKET (2)
. FACILITY NAME (1) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)
NUMRFR (2)
YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1 05000334 99 S01 00 4 OF 5 TEXT (11more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366Al (11)
CAUSE OF EVENT (continued) hard copy printout to verify the status of the alarm points. Also, after the environmental conditions had improved, the SAS Operator called up Zone 212 and noticed it was already active. However, by not using good self-checking techniques, he missed an opportunity to recognize and correct this event. In addition, the CAS operator failed to use good self-checking techniques to verify the status of the alarms when restoring the zones that had been placed inactive and into concurrence.
RAFETY IMPLICATIONS This event did not involve an equipment failure and there were no plant safety implications as a result of this event. Following event discovery, a search found no unauthorized alarms or unauthorized personnel. During the event, closed Circuit Television coverage of Zone 211 was available in both the CAS and SAS. In addition, during the event normal response tours were being conducted and a Security Response Officer was performing duties outside the protected area and within view of the affected area. l CORRECTIVE ACTION
- 1. The involved Security Supervisors received counseling concerning this event and were placed on suspension pending results of the event investigation. These individuals were subsequently returned to duty.
- 2. Remedial training for all CAS/SAS Supervisors in CAS/SAS ;
procedures, self-checking techniques, and Management expectations )
regarding this event will be completed by September 10, 1999.
- 3. Lessons learned from this event will be incorporated into Security annual self-checking / human performance training by October 8, 1999.
SIMILAR EVENTS Review of documentation for Security-related occurrences for the past two years did not reveal a prior similar occurrence.
NRC f ORM 366A (6-t998)
g a b NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR LEiULATORY COMMISilON 111999)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION
. FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET (21 LER NUMBER (61 PAGE (3)
NUMRFR f 2)
YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1 05000334 99 S01 00 5 OF 5 TEKT (tf enore space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (171 KNOWLEDGEABLE CONTACT David R. Kline, Director Nuclear Security Operations (412) 393-7420 l
NRC FORM 366A (61998)