ML20138R086
| ML20138R086 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 01/22/1985 |
| From: | Carey J DUQUESNE LIGHT CO. |
| To: | Murley T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8511180431 | |
| Download: ML20138R086 (39) | |
Text
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'Af Telephone (412) 393-6000 N."o.'*e'o'x 4 Shippingport, PA 15077-0004 August 1, 1985 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection & Enforcement Attn: Dr. T. E. Murley, Regional Administrator Region 1 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406
Reference:
Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1 Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 1984 Report of Facility Changes, Tests and Experiments Gentlemen:
This letter forwards the 1984 annual Report of Facility Changes, Tests and Experiments, in accordance with 10CFR50.59. The report covers the period January 22, 1984 to January 22, 1985 to coincide with the annual FSAR update. A brief description of each facility and pro-cedure change is provided along with a summary of the safety evaluation for each change.
Very truly yours, V' e President, Nuclear cc:
Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (39)
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn:
Mr. R. C. DeYoung, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement Washington, DC 20555 Mr. W. M. Troskoski, Resident Inspector U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Beaver Valley Power Station Shippingport, PA 15077 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission c/o Document Management Branch Washington, DC 20555 8511180431 850122 PDR ADOCK 05000334 R
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e-DUQUESNU LIGff COMPAtW Beaver V911ey Power Station Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 Design Change No. 42 - Manual Syncronizing of 4160 V Dnergency Busses to Normal Busses
%e ob ectives of this design modification were two fold. First, to provide J
the ability to manually synchronize the 4160 V emergency busses to the station service (normal) busses without dropping the emergency bus load or energency diesel generator feed; and secondly, to prevent the possibility of sinultaneously connecting more than one potential transformer voltage to an incoming or running synchronizing bus using synchronizing switches.
n Ebr operating conditions where there exists a loss of coolant accident or normal lower is not available to safety related busses, engineered safety features (ESP) equipnent mamary for the safe shutdown of the power plant receives power fran the energency diesels. After a safe shutdown of the power plant and when it is desirable to return the load to the station service (SS) bus, all ESF equipnent loads nust be shed by opening the individual breakers to the aqid==nt; station service power is then aligned to emergency bus; and individual treakers which supply lief nd n=nt are then closed to establish station service power. mis i
unloading of the diesels and loading the station service bus (ses) requires operator tire, increases the chance for operator error, and represents a severe operating c:mdition for the ed==nt.
We modifications set forth in this Design Change Package Erhvides for the ability to parallel the emergency diesel with tue station service bus, thus eliminating the presently used lengthy procedure.
Se second objective of this design modification, to prevent the possibility of sinultaneously connecting nore than one potential transformer voltage to an "inccming" or " running" synchronizing bus using synchronizing switches, entails the following:
Syn-switches are provided-with a handle that is removable caly in the "OFF position.
Regardless of the number of syn-switches s2pplied, only cme (1) handle is Irovided for the entire synchronizing system. Since two new General Electric SB-1 switches were addad to Section C of the main control board, the four remaining Westinghouse type W switches were replaced in order that all switches be operated with the same handle.
S e probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipnent important to safety as greviously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) was not increased. The emergency AC power system is designed to provide the Erotective function assuming a single failure. %e accident analysis gresented in the FSAR requires that at least one of the redundant diesel generators accomplish its intended function. Se modifications maintain this redundant character and no single failure will grevent the Erotective function. Additionally, a failure of the syn-switch (off normal position) is annunciated.
Se sessibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report was not created. Se nodification allows paralleling and transfer of load redundancy and single failure criteria is maintained. Additional operational capability resulting from the pur-ed change does not affect these design characteristics.
DUQUESNE LIGIT CDMPANY Beaver Valley Power Station Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 Design Change No. 42 - (00NTINUED)
'Ihe margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification was not reduced. BVPS-1 Technical Specification Section 3/4.8, " Electrical Power System', requires in the bases that at least me msite AC power source be operable during accident conditions coincident with the loss of offsite power and single failure of the other AC source. A single failure of the syn-switch g oposed in this modification would not affect the redundant system; therefore, the margin of safety was not reduced.
Design Change No. 129 Pennanent Steam Generator Blowdown Demineralizers
'Ihis design change installed a new, higher-capacity, blowdown system.
It tied-in with the gesent blowdown system. The new portion of the system will be used for normal operations and the old portion will be used for isolation of blowdown flow frcm a steam generator that experiences a detected gimary-to-secondary side BCS leak. 'Ihis modification increased the steam generator blowdown flow capacity and permitted ccmtinued plant operations at higher levels of leakage.
It also provided for better control over the secondary side water chemistry.
h scope of work done in 1984 was limited to the tie-ins to the old portion of the Blowdown System and 60% of new portion piping.
'Ihe probability of occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipnent important to safety as geviously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) was not increased. 'Ihe design modification cnly increaari the flow capacity of the existing ncn-safety related portion of the Steam Generator Blowdown System.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any geviously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report was not created. h modification did not affect any safety-related systems or compnents.
'1ho margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification was not reduced. The rate of BCS leakage frcan the trimary to the secondary side as limited by the Technical Specifications was not affected by this design change.
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DUQUESNE LIGfT COMPANY Beaver Vality Power Station Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 Design Change No. 174 Water Treatment System Modification
'lhe p2rpose of this design change was to increase the reliability and capacity of the domineralized water system; to supply domineralized water to 1-Unit 2, WP-TK-10 and WP-TK-ll; and supply demineralized water from WP-TK-26 to users Ireviously supplied from the surge line between WP-TK-ll and CN-SC-1A.
The scope of the work installed in 1984 consists of the new water 2
tank, 90% of the ra?>irad piping, and 20% of the electrical work.
P The probability of an occurrence or the n=wance of an accident or malfunction of equipnent important to safety as previously evaluated in the
. Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) was not increamarl. The modification did not adversely affect any of the plant safety related canpanents or equipnent nor increase the Erobability of likelihood of any accident or malfunction of amanr iated equipnent as described or evaluated in Section 14, Safety Analysis 4
of the UFSAR.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report was not created. The modification did not adversely affect the operation of any safety related equipnent as described in Sections 9.11 and 10.3.5 of the UFSAR.
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The nargin of safety as defined in the basis for any 'ny+mir al Specifications i
was not reduced. 'Ihis modifi@imi did not adversely affect the nargin of i
safety as described in the basis for Section 3/4.7.1.3 or any other section of j
the 'Dechnical S;acifications.
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Design Change No. 296 BVPS #1 Emergency Respone Facilities Monitoring i
Equipnent (NUREG 0696)
This change involved the installation of Plant Variable Computer System (PVS) in the Emergency Response Facility Building (ERF) and the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) in the control room. Consoles fra both ~==+er systems are located in the ERF, control room, and alternate technical support center. A Bypassed and l
Inopetable Status Indication Panel was installed in the ocmtrol rom which interfaces j
with PVS Comp 2ter.
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'Do date, the PVS nr=n*ar System is emplete and operational, while the SPDS
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Ce==+=r System is installed hit is not yet operational.
The Erobability of occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction j
of a?ti-i important to safety as Ireviously evaluated in the Updated Final j
Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) was not incraamarl. The PVS and SPDS }rovides i
a display of critical plant variables. Inp2ts derived fra the reactor r vi.ection j
circuits are isolated by means of isolation amplifiers or equivalent buffering circuits and have no effect on agiir==nt or sensors that are in use for safety systems as described in Section 7.5.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any greviously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report was not created. The campater display systems included in this modification are for i
process monitoring only and do not control any plant process. Failure of the outp2t of an isolation amplifier has no effect on the input circuit.
The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any 'Dechnical Specification i
was not reduced. The parameters listed in the Technical Specifications Section 3/4.3, Instrumentation, are not affected by the installation of the PVS and SPDS.
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DUQUESNE LIGIT 0]MPANY Beaver Vallny Power Station Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 Design Change No. 311 Upgrade Qiarging PumrA lA, 1B, and 1C
'Ihis design change was initiated by a poposal from the original equipnent supplier, Westinghouse, which r5-,==mhi modifications to the diarging pumps and associated equipnent to imgave reliability and reduce maintenance.
The following modifications were performed on the OI-P-1A charging pJmp in 1984:
A new seal housing was installed which uses internal pampage (borated water) to cool and flush the seal cavities, thereby eliminating the need for external cooling water.
In the pst, the charging pumps and high-speed gear drive had seperate lube oil f
systems. This design change installed a higher capacity lube oil pJmp in the gear drive sich govides lube oil to both gear drive and the charging pump. The lube oil pump *ich was shaft driven off of the charging pump was removed. The new combined lube oil system is ampletely upgraded to higher capacity equipnent and has Just one oil cooler and one oil filter. Before each of the separate oil systems had its own cooler and filter. The Auxiliary Inbe Oil Pump and its AC drive wre also replaced with higher' capacity components. In addition, a new lube oil temperature controller was installed. 'lhe new temperature controller regulates oil flow between the oil cooler and an oil cooler bypass line to maintain a omstant outlet oil temperature. The oil temperature controller was designed to fail.in the position that allows total oil flow through the oil cooler.
The river water piping to the charging pumps was nodified to +7(--Mte the new oil cooler arrangement. 'Ihe river water piping feeds just cme oil cooler instead of the two in the past.
The gabability of occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipnent important to safety as geviously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) was not increamarl. These modifications improved the reliability of the charging panp and thereby enhanced its ability to perform the required safety related functions as described in the UFSAR, Sections 6.3 and'9.1.
The posibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report was not created.
These modifications did not affect the safety related aspects of the functional operation of the charging panp. These danges cnly altered the d arging pump supprt systems to make the pump more reliable.
The margin of safety as defined in the bases for any 'Dechnical Specification was not reduced. These modifications did not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the bases for Technical Specifications Section 3/4.1.2 since they in no way affected the functional operation of the diarging pump.
DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY Beaver Valley Power Station Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 Design Change No. 320 Post Accident Sampling System
@ e Post Accident Sampling System (PASS) was designed to enable sampling and chemical analysis of highly radioactive liquids and gases during severe post-accident cmditions. The PASS allows sampling of the reactor coolant system, containment sump, and containment atmosphere within cme (1) hour following an accident. % e PASS includes a shielded cabinet Milch is maintained at a slightly negative pressure to control airborne contamination. Most of the manual valves in the system are operated frm outside the cabinet using reach rods. New, environmentally qualified containment isolation valves are installed on existing sample line penetrations as part of the PASS modification. Diluted samples can be drawn from outside the cabinet using a diluted sample isolation valve and tubing which penetrates the cabinet.
We probability of occurrence or t;e consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipnent important to safety as previously evaluated in the Up3ated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) was not increased. Since the PASS is normally isolated until after an accident has occurred, the probability of occurrence of an accident is not increased. Containment isolation capability is enhanced by the installation of environmentally qualified isolation valves in the sample lines. Redundant radiation monitors sample exhuast air from the shielded PASS cabinet, and shut the containment isolation valves for the sampling lines in the event of high airborne activity. mus consequences of an accident were not increased.
We possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report was not created.
Section 9.6.3 of the UFSAR evaluates the effect of a sample line rupture. Since the PASS is normally isolated, the probability of even this occurrence remains low.
Redundant radiation tronitors automatically close the sample system containment isolation valves in event of high airborne activity within the PASS sampling box.
We margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification was not reduced. Replacement of the containment isolation valves with enviromentally qualified valves enhanced valve operability. As long as the design closure time of the new valves do not exceed the time specified in Table 3.6-1, the margin of safety is not redumd. Technical Specification 3/4.3.3.8 is based on r=.w.i ndations of Regulatory an 1.97, Revision 2 and NUREG 0578. Since the PASS is based on the recomendations of these documents, there is no effect cm the basis for 3/4.3.3.8. Changes to the Technical Specifications are required to incorporate PASS operability requirements. The basis for Technical Specification 3/4.3.3.8 should be changed to include NUREG 0737 as a reference.
DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY Beaver Valley Power Station Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 Design Change No. 333 Reactor Vessel Ievel Instrumentation System (RVLIS)
'1he objective of this modification was to povide additional instrumentation for the detection of inadequate core cooling. The modification required connections of the Reactor Vessel Head, Reactor Coolant Hot Iag Piping, and In-Core Instrumentation Conduits. Instrumentation tubing and cabling penetrate the containment to level tra=nitters located outside the containment. 'ihe instrument signals are wired from the transmitters and temperature sensors to mivwgccxssors in the control room. Alarm signals from the microprocessors will be sent to the annunciators on the main control board.
'[he probability of occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipnent imIortant to safety as previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis kport (UFSAR) was not increaded. 'Ibere as no change to the accident or transient analysis as described in Section 14.3 resulting fran the implementation of RVLIS.
'Ibe rossibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Uplated Final Safety Analysis Report was not created.
The connection of the RVLIS to the reactor coolant Iressure boundary satisfies the closed system isolation criteria. mactor coolant is present in the tubing up to the high volume sensors. '1he tubing from the high volume sensors, through the containment penetration to the hydraulic isolators does not contain reactor coolant. The hydraulic isolators and high volume sensors serve as an isolation device in the event of failure of the tubing.
'1he margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification was not reduced. The RVLIS is not Iresently addressed in the Technical Specification, although a change to Technical Specification 3/4.3.3.8 (Accident Monitoring Instrumentation) will need to be revised to include the RVLIS as indicated on NURH3 0737 Section II.F.2.
'1he RVLIS may enhance the margin of safety by supplementing the Core Rhling Monitor.
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DUQUESNE LIGHT C)MPANY Beaver Valley Power Station Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 Design Change No. 366 BVPS #1 Emergency Response Facilities
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Category I Interface Equiptent Various @ Category I instrumentation and equignent are required to be monitored by DCP 296 as inpits to the Plant Variable Computer and the Safety l
Parameter Display System (SPDS). This nodification provides the required isolation arrangements to Monitor Category I inputs with the Category III SPDS and Plant Variable Ccznpiter.
In 1984, approximately 50% of the inputs which interface with Category I instrumentation were ocepleted.
The probability of occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipnent important to safety as previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) was not incrmaul. This design change installed qualified isolation equipnent between @ Category I instrumentation and equipnent and @ Category III Monitoring equipnent. With proper isolation, the Category I instrumentation and equipnent will not be degraded by any failure of the installed monitoring equipnent beyond the isolator. Therefore the gcbability of failure of any safety related instrumentation or equipnent has not been increased.
The passibility for.an accident or malfur.ction of a different type than any geviously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report was not increased. Propr isolaticn is provided for all Category I instrunentation and equipnent monitored by DCP 296. Therefore all design criteria (such as single failure, separation of control and gotection circuits, channel independen, etc.)
of the Reactor Trip System, Engineered Safety Features Actuation System, Accident Mon.itoring Instrumentation and equipnent connected to lE power sources are not altered. Thus no new pssibility for an accident or nulfunction es created.
The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification was rot reduced. The performance of the various Category I instrumentation and equipment for which isolaticn was govided is not degraded by this chsign change.
Therefore the margin of safety for the applicable Technical Specifications for the various instrumentation and equipnent is not reduced. A change in the Technical Specifications is required, since the BVPS Unit 1 Technical Specifications does not spcifically address the isolaticm of monitoring equipnent connected to safety related items.
DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY Beaver Vall*,y Power Station Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 Design Change No. 368 Charging Pump Spool Pieces In the past, station personnel had considerable problems omoerning the removal of charging pumps CH-P-1A, CH-P-1B, and CH-P-lC for maintenance.
This design change fabricated and installed discharge line spool pieces for CH-P-1A (CH-P-1B and CH-P-lC were modified in 1983). A seismic analysis was also performed for this modification. 'Ihe installation of spool pieces in the Charging Pump discharge lines will help in two ways. It will aid in removal / installation of the pmp for maintenance, reducing both radiation exposure and chances for damaging adjacent equipnent. It will also lessen pipe stress that can result from misalignment of the pump to pipe discharge flange.
'Ihe probability of occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipnent important to safety as geviously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) was not increased. The new portion was designed with the strictest seismic considerations, as delineated in Appendix B of the UFSAR. Also, if one flow path or charging pump became inoperable due to a faulty flange ccnnection, the remaining 2 would still be more than adequate to perform the CVCS or ECCS functions.
h possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any geviously evaluated.in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report was not created. Malfunction probabilities are kept to an absolute minimum due to the design inputs mentimed in sections '6.3.1.1 and 6.3.1.2.
Isakage from flanged joints have already been analyzed in the UFSAR, sections 6.3.1.2, 6.3.3.8, and table 6.3-9 and any leakage would be of a gradual nature and would be isolated before it could reach dangerous levels.
h margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification was not reduced. 'Ihis change will not alter availability or capacity of the charging pm p as defined in Section 3/4.5.
DUQUESNE LIGff COMPANY Beaver Vality Power Station Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 Design Change No. 369 Insert Typa River Water System Check Valves The prpose of this modification was tc replace failed Carbon Steel River Water System Insert Typ Check Valves (RW-110,111,112,113,158, and i
159) with similar all stainless steel check valves in order to prevent failure of the sub]ect check valves due to corrosion.
The probability of occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipnent important to safety as geviously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) was not increased. The replacement of the carbon steel check valves with similar all stainless steel check valves s
will mitigate the effects of corrosion and increase the integrity of the River Water System as described in the UFSAR, Section 9.9.
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'1he pssibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Uplated Final Safety Analysis Report was not created. This modification will not alter the safety function of the River l
Water System as described in the UFSAR, Section 9.9.
The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification was not reduced. '1he margin of safety defined in the basis for 'Ibchnical Spcification 3/4.7.4 was not affected by the installation of this nodification.
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D(.QUESNE LIGff CDMPANY Beaver Valley Power Station Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 Design Change No. 390 Diesel Generator Fuel Tank Itdification
%e parpose of this design change as to govide an 8000 gallon diesel oil storage tank and two low flow pumps for storage, sampling, and transfer of makeup oil to the anergency Diesel Generator Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tanks.
A capped winection as also installed on each of the Ebel Oil Storage Tanks to provide for 7 ing these tanks in accordance with ASTM 0270. %is change 1
tied into the Dnergency Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank fill lines and manways.
The Erobability of an occurrence or oansequence of an accident or malfunction of equipnent important to safety as geviously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) was not incrmaarl. This modification involved a connection to an existing system at an existing normally closed valve and installation of sample connections on the existing Emergency Diesel Fall Oil Storage Tank manways. %e installation of this new equipnent has not affected any postulated failure of the existing system.
The g.ossibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any g eviously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report as not created. This modification govides a new system Wich ties the new 8000 gallon fuel oil tank to both Bnergency Diesel Fuel Oil Tanks. S e new 8000 gallon tank govides cm-site storage of fuel while analyses of the fuel oil, in accordance with ASIM 75-77, is being conpleted until such time as the anergency Diesel Fuel Oil Tanks require filling. Failure (i.e. leakage) of the 8000 gallon tank during this storage period oculd result in contamination of the tank contents with mter and/or solids. Transfer of this contaminated fuel oil to both anergency Diesel Fuel Oil Tanks could result in the failure of both anergency Diesels to operate when required. This can be pecluded by incorporating, into the system operating gucodures, steps that require sampling of the 8000 gallon tank and obtaining satisfactory results for (1) Specific or API Gravity, (2)
Water or sediment, and (3) Viscosity innediately pior to filling the anergency Diesel Fuel Oil Tanks from the 8000 gallon tank. We need for incorporation of these steps in the filling gwadure has been acknowla+Jarl by the Operations Department. A memo to file has been generated to ensure that operating Erocedures include these steps. Failure of operations and/or &amistry personnel to properly reinstall the cap at the new Bnergency Diesel Generator Storage Tank sample connection after miing could result in contamination of the storage tank with eter and/or solids. Again, administrative controls are required to ensure the sample connection caps are poperly reinstalled. With caps poperly installed on both tanks in accordance with the design code (ASME VIII), failure of a sample connection is equivalent to failure of a tank sich is evaluated in the UFSAR.
A memo to file has been generated by the Chemistry Department to ensure the sample gocedures for the Dnergency Diesel Generator Ebel Oil Storage Tanks will contain the proper gocedure for reinstalling the caps.
Se margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specifications was not reduced. This modification did not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications, Section 3/4.8 which addresses Emergency Electrical Power Systems.
DUQUESNE LIG1T COMPANY Beaver Valley Power Station Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 Design Change No. 398 BVPS Dnergency Response Facility Substation Coninon Facilities The p.trpose of this modification was to provide a Non-Category I, Non-lE, Diesel Generator backed offsite power source for the Dnergency Response Facility (ERF) and other Non-Category I items. The following will be powered from the Substation:
Dnergency Response Facility (ERF)
Equipnent Associated with the ERF Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) Items Administration Building 350 HP Fire Pump Future Unit 2 ERP and SPDS Items Future Unit 2 4000 HP Startup Beed Pump Additional Non-lE items (QA Category II, III, or F) to be identified in other design changes will be powered frcan the subject Substation.
Details of this Design Change include:
Construction of a Substation Building Relocation of the Existing #2-23 Shippingport Sub-station Installation of Service Transformers and Related Protection, Control, Duct, Cable, Ground, Ground Resistor, and Deluge Fire Protection System Installation of Petor Control Centers (MCC)
Installation of Ioad Center Installation of Feeder Lines Installation of a Diesel Generator l
To date, this nodification is approximately 97% complete.
The probability of occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipnent important to safety as geviously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UPSAR) was not incrwaaarl. %e subject modifications did not involve or interface with any safety related equipnent geviously evaluated in Secticn 14 of the UFSAR. NOTE: Equipnent to be installed under separate DCP's which will be powered from the Substation will interface with existing Category I equipnent. Those changes were not inicuded in this analysis.
The possibility for an accident or alfunction of a different type than any geviously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report was not created.
The equipent Wilch was installed does not grform any safety related functions and does not interface with any safety related equipnent. merefore, an accident or nalfunction of the equipnent installed cannot degrade existing safety related equipnent.
The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification was not reduced. The margin of safety is not affected since the equipnent and its functions are not safety related and the basis of the Technical Specifications l
are not affected.
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DUQUESNE LIGff (DMPANY Beaver Valley Power Station Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 Design Change No. 432 l
River Water Radiation Monitor Sample Line Modification h e purpose of this modification a s to g ovide corrosion resistant sampling lines and valves (replacing carbcat with stainless steel) for Radiation Monitors RM-RW-100 and hRW-101. W e reason for this change e s to reduce clogging and corrosion tww by untreated river wter. Also, Itt-RW-100 was relocated in the Turbine Bdiding due to the piping routing of DCP-129.
To date, the modification performed on NRW-100 is amplete and hRW-101 is 97% canplete.
me posibility for an accident or nnlfunction of a different type than any geviously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) was not created. Wis modification does not adversely affect any of the plant safety-related equipnent nor increase the consequence of an accident as previously evaluated in Chapter 14 of the UFSAR.
We possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different typ than any previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report was not created.
The modifications do not, create the psaibility for any new type of accident or nalfunction of the plant safety-related equipnent. me posibility of a malfunc-tion is reduced by replacing the carbon steel lines with stainless steel. Berefore changes to Chapter 14 of the UFSAR are not required.
%e margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification was not reduced. Se Limiting condition for operation as defined in Section 3/4.3.3 of the Technical Specifications states that Iti-RW-100 must be OPERABIE.
If the monitor is inoperable, effluent may continue via this pathway g ovided grab samples are analyzed every eight (8) hours. We installation of stainless steel lines enhance the operability of RM-RW-100, therefore the margin of safety is not reduced. RM-RW-101 is not covered in the Technical Specifications.
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DUQUESNE LIGHT CI)MPANY Beaver Valley Power Station 4
Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 i
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Design Change No. 466 Relocation naaanas Hydrogen Supply System to Ammvkte the New Solid Waste Railding i
'Ihe past location of the Bulk Hydrogen Storage was naariari to acconmodate construction of the North Office Shop Building. '1his nodification relocated the i
Bulk Hydrogen Manifold and associated tanks to an area north of the clarifier l
settling tank and west of the Chlorination Building. The Bulk Hydrogen Manifold I
was modified to designate two high gressure bottles for the Erimary plant supply.
l These bottles are separated fran the six generator supply bottles by double j
isolation valves dilch are administratively closed. Connection to the generator supply is maintained for darging and emergency surposes only.
'1his modification was started in 1983 with the final 40% installed in 1984.
The ;robability of occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipnent imgx>rtant to safety as graviously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) was not increased. The R11k Hydrogen Storage
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Tanks are not safety related and they were not located adjacent to any safety related equipnent.
In addition, the vessels have overpr===nu relief puuict. ion which grecludes missile generation nanaarl by overpressure bursting of the vessels.
The possibility for an accident or nalfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report was not created.
The R11k Hydrogen Storage Manifold was modified, as greviously discussed. '1he new location is still remote from any building or structure caritaining safety related equipnent.
The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification 1
was not reduced. The Technical Specification criteria does not address the Hydrogen Supply System.
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DUQUESNE LIGff CDMPANY Beaver Vall:y Power Station Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 Design Change No. 496 BVPS #1 Radio and Cormunications Modifications
'the p.trpose of this modification was to install a new 450 MHz radio comunication system for use by security personnel; new remote consoles in the control rom, remote shutdown panel, and ERF on the 153.47 MHz band; and, two antennae for use by the state of Ohio. '1he 450 MHz system includes repeater stations, mobile radios, and "Handie-Talkies". New mobile units for Rad Monitoring Personnel on the 153.47 MHz band are also govided.
'1he probability of occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipnent important to safety as geviously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) was not increased. '1his modification provides
'aGiitional or upgraded non-safety related connunications apipnent.
s '1he possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report was not created by this modification.
'1he margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specifications was not reduced. '1his modification does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the Technical Spcification 3/4.9.5 which addresses comunication 4
between the refueling area and control rom during core alterations.
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DUQUES!E LIGC COMPAtTI Beaver Valley Power Station Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 Design Change No. 539 Degasifier Recovery Heat Exchanger Cross <.cnnect Pige Modification
'1he design objective of DCP 539 was to replace the rigid 2" diameter pipes cross-connecting the nagasifier Recovery Heat Exchanger pairs (BR-E-12Al/12A2 &
12Bl/12B2) with flexible lines. 'Ihis was done to alleviate the thermal stresses in the pipe due to the cycling operation of this portion of the Boron Recovery System.
The scope of work completed so far was limited to the E-E-12Bl/12B2 heat exchanger. Work on the BR-E-12Al/12A2 heat exchanger will be completed at a later date.
1
'1he probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of vir= ant important to safety as Ereviously evaluated in the d
U5 ated Final Safety AnalyEis Reix)rt (UFSAR) was not incraad. The replacement of a rigid 5" long pisa with stainless steel bellows expansion joint will minimize the possibility of weld failure due to thermal gradients. 'Iherefore, the probability of an occurrence of accident as Ereviously evaluated in the UFSAR is not incraa d.
The possibility for.an accident or malfunction of a different ty5e than any previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report was not created. Thermal gradients atmtributing to weld failure are ocupensated for by expansion bellows. Thus a different type of accident cannot coeur.
i ihe nargin of safety as defined in the basis for any 'Dechnical Specification was not reduced. 'Ihe function and design of the intermittant nagaaifier Recovery Heat Exchanger pairs remains as originally intended.
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DUQUESNE LI T T COMPANY Beaver Valley Power Station j
Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 i
Design Change No. 556 i
Diesel Generator Circuit Modifications The objective of this task was to resolve the items described in Section 6.10 of the Fire Protection Appendix R Review for Beaver Valley Power Station l
Unit 1 by making the rw waaary modifications.
Specific goblems that were addressed include:
i 1.
Fire irvhv=d short circuits and open circuits due to a fire in various plant areas including the Control Rom, Cable Speeding Area, Belay Rxzn, control Rom Air Conditioning Room, Process Instrument Room or Normal Switchgear Area that could result in loss of both emergency diesel generator control circuits, or control circuits for one diesel generator and power cables of the other diesel generator.
2.
Fire induced short circuits in the Cable Speeding Rom that could disable control circuits for all Emergency Diesel Generator Pael Oil Transfer Pumps.
l Specific Modifications made include:
1.
The generator differential puis:ct.icn relay 87-VF-109 and amamiated relays are moved out of thq relay room to the switchgear room. But there was the installation of a test switch to isolate relay 87-VF-109XX fr a the overcurrent relays in the relay rom. Dnergency gocedures are being developed to use this test switch to isolate the relays fra the relay rom in the event of a fire in that room.
4 2.
'No relays associated with the No. 2 Diesel Generator Pael Oil Transfer Pumps were noved frun the No. 2 Dnergency Switchgear room to the Diesel Generator Building. This change removed cables associated with these relays drich run through fire areas d are the No. 1 diesel generator is assumed lost. This also eliminated all remote cables amamiated with the No. 2 diesel generator fuel oil transfer punps.
3.
It was found that there are power cables for the No. 2 diesel and control cables for the No.1 diesel in the gocess rack room. To gevent a fire in this room disabling both diesels, interposing relays were installed on the control circuits for the No. 1 diesel generator.
4.
The d-c power cable naamiated with the No.1 diesel generator field flash circuit were rerouted out of the control room air conditioning rom, where the No. 2 diesel generator is assumed lost, to another fire area.
To date, this modification is 95% W ate. The remaining portion will be
_ cmpleted at a later date.
I The probability of an occurrence or the cmsequence of an accident or malfunction of equipnent important to safety as previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) was not increanad.
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DUQUESNE LIGiT GJMPANY Beaver Valley Power Station Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 Design Change No. 556 - (CONTINUED)
This nodification will improve the overall safety of the plant by reducing the possibility that a fire in any one fire area will otrnpletely disable both diesel generators. %e novement of relay 87-VF-109 does not affect the evaluation of any accident. The addition of the test switch into the circuitry for relay 87-VF-109XX will increase overall plant safety by being used to prevent a fire in the relay room frm disabling both diesels. mis increase in overall safety will negate the small chance of affecting the circuit if the switch fails.
The relocation of two No. 2 diesel generator fuel transfer pump relays to the diesel generator building does not incream the probability of an accident occurring. This change will increase the safety of the system by eliminating the remote controls for the fuel oil transfer punps. %e installation of interposing relays m the safety injection start circuits for the No.1 dieml generator, in the process rack room does not decrease the safety of the plant as described in the UFSAR. This change will increase overall plant safety by geventing a fire in the process rack room frm disabling both diesel generators; the No.1 diesel will be protected by the interposing relays, and the No. 2 diesel will be disabled by its power cables burning. The rerouting of the No.1 diesel generator field flash circuit d-c power cable will not adversely affect the safety of the plant as described in the UFSAR. This change does not modify any equignent, it just naves the pwer cable out of a fire area ocanon to both diesel generators.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the Uplated Final Safety Analysis 14eport was not created.
The installation of this Design Change will not create a new accident or malfunction as defined in the UFSAR. % e installation of the test switch in the circuitry for relay 8700-VF-109XX will not create a new type of accident. We failure of the test switch would, in the worst case, disable tha No. 2 diesel; and the plant has already been analyzed for the loss of one diesel generator.
The movement of two relays for the No. 2 diesel generator fuel oil pumps will not create a new typ of accident. This change improves the safety of the plant by eliminating all retrate cables associated with the No. 2 dieml generator fuel oil transfer gangs controls. We installation of interposing relays on the safety injection autcmatic start signal for the No.1 diesel generator, will not create a new type of accident. If the relays fail, mly cxie diesel generator is affected, and the single failure criteria is still valid. %e rerouting of the d-c power cable will not create a new typ of accident. mis change helps to gevent both diesels frcan being disabled due to a fire in one area.
We margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification was not mAmd.
We modifications to the circuitry for the diesel generator and its auxiliary equipnent will not affect the basis for Technical Specification 3/4.8.1. These changes assure that conformance to the Appendix R criteria are maintained.
DUQUESIE LIGT COMPAlff Beaver Valley Power Station Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 Design Change No. 558 Replacements For Crane Globe Valms
'1his design change will enable Duquesne Light Company to either repair or replace Crane gobe valves originally p2rchased by Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation (P.O. Numbers BV-154 and BV-155). Spare parts and identical replacement valves are no longer available from Crane or their distributors.
Therefore, requirerrents will be specified so repair parts for large globe valves rray be fabricated at the Crane Bepair Facility in Ambridge, PA, and a model offered by a qualified supplier will te chosen to replace small Crane globe valves.
The valves range in size from 1/2" to 10", are rated from 150 lb. to 1500 lb.,
and are located in the following systems:
1 Chemical and volume control 2
Boron Recovery 3
Safety Injection 4
Containment Vacuum 5
Containment Depressurization 6
Beactor Plant Cmponent Cooling Water 7
Liquid Waste Disposal 8
Condensate 10 Extraction Steam and Heater Drain 11 Steam Generator Feedwater 12 Steam Generator Blowdown 13 Main Turbine and Condenser 14 Auxiliary Steam 15 Turbine Plant Omponent Cooling Water 16 Gilled Water 17 River Water 18 Water Treating 19 4 KV Station Service 20 milding Service 21 Nitrogen Gas To date, only the following valves have been replaced; BD-10, BD-ll, BD-12, BD-13, BD-14, and BD-15.
'1he gebability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipnent important to safety as geviously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Reprt (UFSAR) is not increased. For each valve repair or replacement a technical evaluation will ensure that the new valve meets or exceeds the original design requirements.
'1he pssibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any geviously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Reprt is not created since Technical Evaluations will ensure that each repair or replacement meets or exceeds the original design requirements.
The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced since the replacement valves will ensure that original design requirements are met or exceeded.
DUQUESNE LIGT COMPAZE Beaver Valley Power Station Docket No. 50-334, License tb. DPR-66 Design Change No. 561 Ventilation System Modifications For the Charging Pump Cubicles
'Ihe pirpose of this nodification was to provide a level of fire protection equivalent to the criteria of 10CFR 50 Appendix R, Secticn III.G.2, as determined by the NRC letter, Docket No. 50-334, Dated 3/14/83. 'Ihis was achieved in the Charging Pump Cubicles by:
1.
Eliminating the conmon supply air opening cn elevation 722'6" for the nuddle cubicle, G-P-1B, using a qualified fire sealant.
2.
Adding metal plates under the existing hatch cover grating for cubicles G-P-1A and G-P-lc at elevation 735'6".
3.
Protecting the existing exhaust ductwork frca a 90 minute chalying pump lube oil fire by:
Installing fire dampers in the exhaust duct openings for pxnp a.
cubicles G-P-1B and G-P-lC and in the ductwork through the wall between punp cubicles G-P-1A and G-P-1B.
b.
Insulating the ductwork in pznp cubicles G-P-1B and G-P-lC with a 90 minute fire barrier material.
'Ibe gebability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipnent important to safety as geviously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) was not incrm wi.
h installation of this modification does not increase the gebability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or nalfunction of equipnent imprtant to safety as geviously evaluated in Section 9.13.2 " Auxiliary Building" Ventilation Systems since the required flow rates for the ventilation g(stem of the panp cubicles to maintain a maximum ambient air temperature of 104'F will still be provided. 'Ihis modification does not affect Section 6.6 " Supplementary Icak Collection and Release System" of the UFSAR.
h possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any geviously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report was not created. Since this Design Change was designed to gevent the spread of fire frcm one cubicle to the other cubicles, it will prevent the loss or malfunction of all three charging punps due to fire. Also because, the ductwork was analayzed for strength and seismic qualification, the pssiblity for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any geviously evaluated in the UFSAR was not created.
'Ihe margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification was not reduced. 'Ihe ventilation system for the charging pump cubicles is not covered in the Technical Specifications and section 3/4.7.8 " Supplemental Leak Collection and Release System" does not apply for this modification.
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DUQUESNE LIGIT CDMPANY Beaver Valley Power Station Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 Design Change No. 562 Dedicated Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Modification The purpose of this modification was to install a new dedicated Auxiliary Feedwater Pump capable of providing demineralized water to the three steam generators should the existing three Auxiliary feedwater pumps be incapacitated by fire.
The Erobability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as Ireviously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR's was not incrm -wi.
The new dedicated auxiliary feedwater Eump is installed to Irovide a level of Erotection equivalent to that required by 10CFR50, Appendix R, s1bsection III.L and to reduce the consequences of an accident involving a less of normal feedwater, as described in UFSAR Section 14.1.8, a loss of offsite power, as described in UFSAR Section 14.1.11, and a loss of Auxiliary feedwater as a result of a fire that incapacitates the auxiliary feedwater gumps.
%e Auxiliary Feedwater System delivers cooling water to the Steam Generators i
in the event cooling ster flow frm the normal Feedwater System is lost. If a fire occurs W11ch incapacitates all three Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps it is I
imperative that cooling ster from the new dedicated Auxiliary Feedwater pump reach the Steam Generators. 'Do ensure a long term dedicated shutdown capability i
following the start up of the dedicated Auxiliary Feedwater Pmp, stop/ check valves MOV-fW-156A, B and C will be de-energized open and feedwater isolation signals to these valves and the ByEass Feedwater Control valves will be disabled. A Feedwater isolation signal is initiated by:
1)
A Safety Injection Signal, 2) 2/3 Steam Generator Ievel (High-High) in 1/3 Steam Generators, OR 3)
A low Tavg following a Reactor Trip.
The disabling of a feedwater isolation signal to the above mentioned valves will not diminish the safety of the plant since cooling star will be able to reach the dehydrated Steam Generators. Also this feedwater isolation signal i
disabling should not be a safety concern since the current Auxiliary Feedwater System is not isolated by a feedster isolation signal.
The Eossibility for an accident or malfunctial of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report as not created.
A new type of accident will not be mnaad by the installation of the ocdicated Auxiliary Feeduter System.
The margin of safety as chafined in the basis for any 'Dechnical Specification was not reduced by this installation.
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DUQUES?E LIGff COMPANY Beaver Valle.y Power Station Docket No. 50-334, Li nse No. DPR-66 Design Change No. 563 Backup Indicating Panel (BIP)
'Ihe cbjective of this task was to provide alternate shutdown capability for Agendix R design basis fires in various areas for W1ich redundant instrument and control channels could be lost, including:
Fire Area CR-4, Instrument Room - Potentital loss of No. 2 (Purple) diesel generator, the Emergency Shutdown Panel, and the Process Packs and associated Control Rom instruments.
Fire Area CS-1, Cable S geading - Potential loss of No. 1 (Orange) diesel generator and various Control Room instrumentation and controls.
Fire Area ES-1, Orange Switchgear - Potential loss of Vital Bus 1, 3, 4 and all Orange train shutdown equipnent.
Fire Area ES-2, Purple Switchgear potential loss of Vital Bus 1, 2, 3, 4 and all Purple train shutdown equipnent.
Fire area NS-1, Normal Switchgear - Potential loss of Vital Bus 2, 3 and all Orange diesel generator.
The following items were'provided to support the above main objective:
1.
Redundant 120 V ac power supplies to the backup indicating panel (BIP) to operate instrument power supplies and the de pywer source for key solenoid valves.
2.
'Ibe capability of transferring certain plant variable signals to the BIP and to display the transferred signals cn direct reading indicators on the BIP, in the event that a fire gevents the normal instrument system frm operating.
3.
'1he capability of transferring control of 1 train of the reactor vessel head and gessurizer vent solenoid valves to the BIP and use the BIP as an alternate dc power supply for them valves. 'Ihis will allow the reactor vessel head vent valves to be used as an alternate letdown path and the gessurizer vent to be used for depressurization.
4.
'Ihe capability of powering the incore tMwaple reference junction box TB-195 heater frm the BIP.
5.
The capability of monitoring source range indication at the BIP.
6.
The capability of transferring control of the B containment air recirculation cooler solenoid valves to the BIP and use the BIP as an alternate de power supply for these valves. This will govide a flow path for containment cooling in the event that a fire disables normal valve control, men operaticn of these valves is transferred to the BIP, the CIB signal to the valves will be bypassed, since fire damage to process racks and associated cables could result in spurious tripping of the valves under the accident cmditions which require activation of the BIP.
DUQUESIE LIGlT COMPAtE Beaver Vallcy Power Station.
Docket tb. 50-334, License No. DPR-66
_ Design Change No. 563 - (CONTINUED) 7.
A dc breaker panel to aid in repair gocedures involving the reactor vessel head vent solenoid valves.
8.
Category I key lock isolation switches within Category I seismic enclosures which govide a means of isolating certain high-low reactor coolant gessure boundary valves which could be opened inadvertently due to fire induced hot shorts. Potential leakage paths identified are:
a.
Ietdown inlet isolation valves ICV-CH-460A and B could both open inadvertently as a result of hot shorts in certain fire areas.
b.
Pressurizer PORV's PCV-BC-455C, 455D or 456 could be energized inadvertantly, coincident with loss of power or control cables for the associated ICV isolation valve in some fire areas.
These nodifications were 90% canplete in 1984, the final 10% will be completed at a later date.
'1he probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipnent important to safety as geviously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) was not increased. The probability of an occurence or the consequence of an accident as previously evaluated in the UFSAR was not increased, since, the transfer switches will be keylocked to gevent tampering of plant signal and control switchovers. 'Ihe probability of a malfunction of equipnent important to safety was not increased, since, the interfacing Category I equipnent was be bought Category I and meets the requirements of IEEE 323 and 344 for environmental and seismic qualifications, respectively.
Also, the BIP and various electrical components had a seismic mounting analysis performed on them to ensure that they do not become missiles during an earthquake.
The pssibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Reprt was not created. The BIP, along with local instrumentation and controls pavide for an alternate safe shutdown method. Most of the monitoring indicators as referenced in Sectial 7.4.1.1 of the UFSAR, whicn are necessary for maintaining a hot shutdown, are govided for through the use of the BIP and local instrumentation.
The renaining indicators, i.e., ir*amaaiate range flux level, ir*amMiate range start-up rate, and residual heat exchanger temperature, are not included in the alternate safe shutdown nethod, since, a safe shutdown of the plant could be naintained without their use.
It is also stated in Section 7.4.2 of the UFSAR that safety is not adversely affected by an uncontrolled boron dilution, loss of normal feedwater, loss of external electrical load and/or turbine trip, or loss of all A-C power to the station auxiliaries provided that the instrumentation and controls indicated in Section 7.4.1.1 and 7.4.1.2 are available to control and/or monitor shutdown. Sherefore, the use of the BIP to maintain a safe shutdown of the plant, does not create an accident or malfunction than any geviosly evaluated in the UFSAR, but, in fact eliminates cne, by gaviding backup indication in the event that a fire renders the instrumentation of the control room and energency shutdown panel inoperable.
DUQUEStE LIGHT CDMPANY Beaver Valley Power Station Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 Design Change No. 563 - (00trlINUED)
'Ihe margin of safety as defined in the basis for any 'Ib:hnical Spcification was not reduced. Bams 3/4.3.3.5, " Remote Shutdown Instrumentation", margin of safety, was not reduced by the installation of the BIP. Moreover, the presence of the BIP shculd increase the margin of safety by providing an alternate nethod to achieve a safe shutdown in the event that both the control room and emergency shutdown panel instrumentation is lost due to a fire. In addition, Technical Spcification 3/4.6.3 requires changing to show that CIB signal to the containment air recirculation cooler isolation valves will be bypassed when control is transferred to the BIP. The margin of safety as defined in Bases 3/4.6.3 will not be reduced since a CIB signal to isolate containment should not be gesent for an Appndix R design basis fire.
Design Change No. 565 Hydrogen Recmbiner Zero Fire Modules
'Ihe hydrogen recombiner control cx:nsoles HY-TA-1A and IB were backfitted with new solid state SCR ccntrol units. 'Ihis backfit is to ensure the long term reliability and spare parts availability of the Hydrogen Becembiners.
The timer relay from the control circuit was also removed and permanent jumpers were installed in its place. 'Ibe timer could be removecl without decreasing the reccrnbiner's reliability and/or safety as reccanended by the manufacturer's letter dated February 16, 1984.
'Ihe scope of work done in 1984 was limited to the Hydrogen Peccznbiner HY-RT-1A.
HY-RT-1B was modified in 1983.
The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipnent important to safety as geviously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) was not increased. Section 14.3.4.4, " Post DBA Hydrogen Generation" allows both reccanbiners to be inograble.
This modification reduces the possibility of both recombiners being inoperable since the control console SCR units neet BV-1 environmental qualification criteria.
'Ihe possibility.for an accident or malfunction of a different typ than any previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report was not created. Section 13.3.4.4 already addressed both recombiners being inoperable.
'Ihe margin of safety as defined in the basis for Technical Specification 3.6.4 was not reduced.
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DUQUESNE LIGlT CXJMPANY Beaver Valley Power Station Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 Design Change No. 574 Modify Blank Flanges For Type C Ieak Testing he p2rpose of this design nrdification was to modify the blank flanges on Type C Isak Test Valves by replacing the blank flanges with replacement flanges and fabricated test fittings. Bis new test flange will then be plugged den not in use and can be connected directly to the testing apparatus to conduct the Type C Ieak Test. By installing this design change, time will be saved by eliminating the intermediate step of having to renove the gevious blank flanges and replacing them with a test flange in order to conduct the Type C Isak Test.
This modification was initially started in 1983 with the final 25% installed in 1984.
Se gabability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipnent important to safety as geviously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) was not increarl. The BVPS-1 UFSAR does not go into great enough detail to cover test flanges for type C Ieak Test. However, since the replacement flanges and their test fittirqs were made from the same material which the corresponding previous blind flanges were made of, the probability of an occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipnent important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR was not increased.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report was not created. Since there are normally closed isolation valves upstream of the test flanges and the test fittings will be plugged with a screw cn cap when not in use, the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created.
Se margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification was not reduced. The margin of safety as defined in the bams of Technical Specification 3/4.6.1.2 " Containment Isakage" was not =had since the modificaitons made under this design change do not alter the ccntalrunent leakage rates defined in Section 3.6.1.2.
DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY Beaver Vallcy Power Station Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 Design Change No. 581 Modifications to Air Eiector Isolation Valves his modification entailed the replacement of four valves in the lines connecting the condensor with the air ejectors. The valves geviously contained bronze internals and have exhibited corrosion due to artmonia which is gesent in the fluid stream. We valves were replaced with new valves which have iron internals to minimize the corrosion problem.
%e probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipnent imprtant to safety as previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) was not increased. The valves that were replaced are not part of a safety system although their failure could ptentially release a small amount of radioactivity if a primary to secondary leak was gesent. m placement of the valves with valves of a more corrosion resistant design will decrease the probability of a failure of this equipnent.
Elimination of the bronze also removes a ptential copper source which has been associated with steam generator tube failures in scme plants.
Se pssibility for an accident or malfunction of a different typ than any previously evaluated in the Upiated Final Safety Analysis kport ses not created. Se replacement of the valves with valves of similar design and different materials will.not create the pssibility of any new malfunctions or accidents.
The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification was not reduced since there are no '1bchnical Specifications associated with the operation of the air ejectors.
DUCVESIE LIGHT GJMPANY l
Beaver Valley Power Station Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 Design Change No. 591 4KV Bus Under Voltage Ioss of Control Voltage Alarm
'Ihe alarms, which nonitor the transformer fuses on each of the 4160 volt busses, were nodified to annunciate on a loss of 125 vdc control pwer to the undervoltage relays.
'Ibe p obability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipnent important to safety as geviously evaluated in the Uplated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) was not increased. By goviding annunciation on a loss of 125 vdc control voltage to the undervoltage relays, the reliability of generating a reactor trip signal due to reactor coolant pump bus undervoltage is enhanced.
'Ihe Iossibility for an accident or malfunction of a different typa than any geviously evaluated in the Uplated Final Safety Analysis Report was not created by the implementation of the Design Change.
'Ihe margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification was not reduced. According to the Technical Specification basis for section 2.2.1, the Undervoltage Reactor Coolant Pump bus trip trovides reactor core gotection against DNB as a result of loss of voltage to nore than one reactor coolant rump. 'Ihis modificatim will assure that annunciation will occur cn a loss of 125 vdc control power to the sensing relays, thus enhancing the reliability of this protection system.
Design Change No. 597 Unit 1/ Unit 2 Electrical Interface Modificatim Q.A. Category II I
l
'Ihis modification provides an electrical control, protection and indication interface between Beaver Valley #1 and #2 Main Generator and Transformer System. This nodification also govides an electrical interface between the BV-1 and BV-2 comunication system.
'Ihe scope of the work aanpleted in 1984 consisted of:
Statim service transformer IA & IB primary and backup pilot wire modification.
Addition of shorting switches to lC & 1D unit service transformers and
- 1 main transformer neutral C. T. Circuit.
'1he rest of the modification will be installed at a later date.
'1he Erobability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipnent important to safety as geviously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) was not increased. Section 8.3,
" System Connection" addresses the BV-2 Offsite Power System. Section 9.17,
" Communication Systems" addresses BV-2 construction comunication system and this change just expands this comunication system.
'1he Enssibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any geviously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Ibport was not created. Secticn 8.3, " System Connection addresses grid stability due to a loss of a large power station. Expanding the comunication network is already mentioned in Section 9.17, "Camunication Systems".
The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification
}
was not reduced. '1he margin of safety of Technical Specification 3/4.8.1 and 3/4.8.2 is not redu d since emergency power is still available, also these Technical Specifications will increase surveillance requirements cn the Emergency Power Systems.
DUQUEStE LIGHT COMPANY Beaver Vality Power Station Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 Design Change No. 611 Control Rom Emergency Air System for Units 1 & 2 The design objective of this design change package was to modify the existing Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) Unit 1 Control Room Emergency Bottled Air Pressurization System (CREBAPS) to e v w 4 te the BVPS Unit 2 control room area. Ttus modification will govide automatic emergency pressurization of both control room areas during a Unit 1 or a Unit 2 containment isolation Phase B (CIB) or a high dilorine cmdition and will enable the BV-1 & BV-2 main control room area to be pressurized to 1/8 inch of water gauge for me hour after the DBA. This safety function will be govided despite of a loss of offsite power, a single failure or operating status of BV-1 or BV-2.
The scope of work installed in 1984 amounted to 40% of the total nodification.
The rest of the modification will be installed at a later date.
The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipnent important to safety as geviously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis IWport (UFSAR) was not increased. Section 1.7 & 9.13.4 addresses the emergency pressurization of the BV-1 and BV-2 Main Control Area for one hour after a DBA and dilorine detection. The additional bottled air storage will ensure the above criteria will be satisfied.
The Iossibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any geviously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Ibport was not created. 'Ihis nodification will not adversely affect the control rom emergency gessurization system as described in Section 1.7 and 9.13.4 since it increases the bottled air supply.
The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any %chnical Specification was not reduced. The nargin of safety as defined in Technical Specification 3.7.7.1 basis is not IM M since the bottled air supply is being increased A
by this modification.
DUQUESNE LIGIT ODMPANY Beaver Valley Power Station Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 Design Change No. 620 Evaporators Bottms Sample Systen Revisions to 10CFR61, effective 12-26-83, require any licensee d o transfers radioactive waste to a land disposal facility nust classify the waste according to paragraph 61.55. BVPS intends to have waste samples sent to independent labs for classification prposes. % is modification provides a means for conveniently and safety drawing samples of the Spent Resin and Evaporator Bottms waste being transferred to the mixer-feeder for solidification. This modification added a sample sink in the Solid Waste area and ran tubing frm process piping to the sample sink.
The probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equignent important to safety as previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) was not increased. Liquid leakage or releases frm cmpnents modified or added by this change will be locally collected and disposed of in the liquid waste disposal system and therefore will not increase the probability or consequences analyzed in UFSAR Section 14.2.2 Accidental Release of Waste Liquid.
We possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated geviously,in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report was not created. There is no pssibility of an accident of a different type other than the accidental release of liquid waste perviously analyzed in UFSAR Section 14.2.2
%e margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification was not reduced. This modification does not reduce the margin of safety defined in the basis for either Technical Specification 3/4.11.1 Liquid Effluents or 3/4.11.3 Solid Radioactive Waste.
DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY Beaver Valley Power Station Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 Design Change No. 667 Fire Wrapping CH-P-1B Power Cable at 735 PAB Be objective of this design change was to nodify cable raceways 1TH720P, 1TH721P and pwer cable 1CHSBPH300 to protect the 1B charging pmp power cable in the primary auxiliary building, level 735', from an expsurn fire.
The design change entailed the design and installation of a one hour fire barrier around the perimeter of the raceway and cable. We material used was an approved one hour fire barrier and is supported by the cable raceway.
The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipnent important to safety as previously evaluated in the Uplated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) was not increased.
The malfunction of a charging pump is evaluated in the single active failure analysis of the ECCS in Section 6 of the UFSAR. his design diancp. does not affect the consequences of a loss of one charging pmp. The prob eility of a malfunction of the 1B charging pump is not increased by this changa. %e pywer cable anpacity and the cable tray support were reviewed to assure that the effects of the fire barrier are acceptable.
%e possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated,in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report was not created. This change decreases the probability of a loss of redundant charging pumps due to a fire in the 735 ft level of the PAB. his event was not previously evaluated in the UFSAR, but was identified as a result of the 10CFR50 Appndix R plant review. The lA charging p mp m r cable exits the pump cubicle via the top and traverses the 735 ft lev;l of de PAB to the IM-P-2B cubicle. From there it drops to the LW-P-2B cubicle and exits the PAB on the north wall. The pwer cable for CH-P-lC exits the pmp cubicle on the north side and leaves the PAB via the north wall of the LW-P-2A cubicle.
Separation and/or fire barriers exist between the 1A and 1C ca-les. %e power cable for CH-P-1B exists the cubicle via the south wall traverses elevation 722 then is routed up to the 735 elevation along a column Miere it exits the PAB via the west wall. Separation of at least 20 feet is maintained between the IB charging pump pwer cable and the other two, however no autcaratic fire suppression system is avai1able in this area.
Design Change 580 provided protection of the power cable for CH-P-1B by wrapping the cable on the 722 elevation. This Design Change continued the fire protecticn to the 735 elevation. Given the spacing and layout of the area and the cubicles acting as heat shields, a fire induced failure of both trains is not considered feasible.
We margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Spcification was not reduced. This change does not affect the basis for Technical Specification 3/4.1.2 since the probability of a malfunction of the charging pmp is not increased and the safety analysis assumes cnly cxie charging pump is operable.
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DUQUESNE LIGHT CDMPAtrl Beaver Valley Power Station Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 Design Change No. 626 Addition of Iocal Pressure Gauges J
On Main Steam Ekwlar In the event of a loss of use of the Control Room and Emergency Shutdown Panel during a fire, plant control will be accomplished locally. To observe various station functions a backup indicating panel (BIP) is tied into terminals steam generator level. However, to read the actual steam generator level, tha in the east cable vault. One of these functions at the BIP is to monitor the indicated level needs to be conpensated for the changes in eter density as
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the plant cools down. Since density is a function of pressure, steam Eressure will be morntored and used for water density campensaticm. This modification installed Iressure gauges oming off the previously existing gressure transmitter instrument tubing, in the main steam valve room, which will gravide the required local ressure indication.
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The Erobability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or 4
malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) was not incraamaa. Since the pressure gauges are located upstream of the main steam isolation valves,they are seismically qualified. The gauges were seismically installed arri their effect on the pipe to which they were attached was analyzed to meet the criteria stated in UFSAR section 10.3.1.1.
Therefore, the probability of an accident or malfunction as previously evaluated will not be incraaaad.
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The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report was not created. The only type of accident drich could occur would be a rupture of the pressure gauge connection. However, UFSAR section 10.3.1.3 analyzes a main steam line break, which would result in a greater loss of fluid than a ruptured pressure gauge connecticm. 'Iherefore, since the steam line break has been analyzed, no different type of accident than greviously evaluated can occur.
The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification was not reduced. In the event of a break of the gressure gauge a loss of main steam will occur. The rate of loss would be very anall and easily controllable.
If by see chance the affected steam generator is rendered inoperable plant shutdown will be forced by Technical Stacification 3/4.4.5. Therefore, the margin of safety will not be reduced.
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Beaver Val 1@y Power Station Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 i
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Design Change No. 646 Modify SOV Manifold to TV-E-101A, B & C During a test (OST 1.21.4) it was found that the Main Steam Trip Valves, TV-MS-101 A, B, & C, did not close in the specified 5 second closure time. '1he diagnoses to the goblem as determined by station personnel was that the SOVs for the Trip Valves were not venting the air cylinders quick enough. h modificatims to the SOV Bleed-Off Manifold drich incraad the venting rate were accmplished by replacing the existing 3/4" ASCO 3 Way Solenoids Model No. 8316-C-47 with a 1" solenoid of equal to or better quality.
'Ihe Irobability of an occurrence or the ocmsequence of an accident or m1 function of aqdr==nt important to safety as geviously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) was not incrm W. '1his modificaticn enables TV-MS-101A, B & C to meet UFSAR requirements to close within 5 seconds without flow, since the pistons holding up the flapper are able to bleed-off air pessure faster.
h possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different typ than previously evaluted in the UIxlated Final Safety Analysis lhport was not created.
Loss of station air frm.any event is discussed in Section 9.8, a malfunction of the new parallel SOV's would mu.= the plant to trip and be in a safe position which agrees with Section 9.8.
'1he margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification was not reduced. Technical Specification 3.7.1.5 surveillance limit of full closure within 5 seconds is being maintained.
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DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY Beaver Valley Power Station Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 Design Change hV. 660 Gaswus Waste BV-l/BV-2 Interconnectims
'Ihe pirpose of this design change is to enable Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No.1 to use the Gaseous Waste Systen storage tanks of Unit No. 2 if additional capacity is required. 'Ihis design change will also permit Unit No. 2 to use the Discharge of the Gaseous Waste decay tanks of Unit No. 1.
'Ihis modification will be mlished by omnecting line 1/2"-GW-27-N812 to 2-GE-500-241-3 and line 2-G6-500-289-3 to 1/2"-GW-68-N8-Q2. 'Ihis design change r
only enompasses work within the Unit No.1 boundary.
'Ihe scope of work ompleted so far includes:
Adding line 1/2"-eW-184-N812 to 1/2"-G-27-N8-Q2 and capping the end.
Adding line 1/2"H3W-185-N8-Q2 to 1/2"-GW-68-N812 and capping the end.
Line 1/2"-GW-184-N8-Q2 will be cmnected to 2-GE-500-241-3, and line 1/2"-GW-185-N8-Q2 will be omnected to 2-GWS-500-289-3 at a later date.
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'Ihe gabability of an occurrence or the omsequence of an accident or malfunction of equipnent.important to safety as geviously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) was not incraswl. 'Ihe probability of an occurrence or the car =aq=nna of an accident or malfunction of equipnent important to safety as geviously evaluated in UFSAR Section 14.2.3, Accidental Release of Waste Gases, will not be incIn d. 'Ihe addition of the two cross-connect lines, with two manual isolation valves in series, does not increase the gabability of any accident described in UFSAR 14.2.3 (i.e.
rupture of either the Volume Control Tank or the gas airge tank).
t The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than geviously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report was not created. The addition of the two cross-connects does not adversely affect the operation of the Gaseous Waste Disposal System as described in UESAR Section 11.2.3.
'Ihe change will allow BVPS Iklit No.1 to use the Gamarus Waste System Storage tanks of Unit No. 2 if additional capacity is required or allow Unit No. 2 to use the discharge of the Caswus Waste Decay Tanks of Unit No.1.
The nargin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification was not reduced. The margin of safety as defined in the basis for Technical Specification 3/4.11.2.4 - Gaseous Radwaste Treatment will not be = W. 'Ihe crose-connects will povide either BVPS Iktit 1 or 2 with additional waste gas storage if required.
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DUQUESNE LIGHT CI)MPANY Beaver Valley Power Station Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 Design Change No. 673 Replacement of Station Batteries Numbers 1 and 2 h Unit 1 station batteries nanbers 1 and 2 did not pass BVT-1.1-1.39.2, which tests the batteries over the design basis duty cycle. This design change replaced the Unit 1 station batteries with the Unit 2 station batteries.
The gabability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or m1 function of equipment important to safety as geviously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) was not incraaaarl. '1he replacement batteries are sized sufficiently to carry the energency loads for the accidents analyzed in UFSAR Chapter 14. They are equivalent to the previously
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installed batteries.
I The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different ty);e than previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report was not created.
The repla==nt batteries perform the same function as the original batteries and are environmentally and seismically qualified.
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The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification was not re ari. The margin of safety in the basis for Technical Specifications 3.8.2.3 and 3.8.2.4 was not reduced since the replacement batteries met the design requirements of the original batteries.
Technical Evaluation Report No. 45 Rockwell-niwanie 01eck Valve Replacement Rockwell was discontinued goduction of Model #3674-F316J Piston Check Valve (Westingnouse Designaticxt C-58).
The purpose of this modification was to replace valve No. G-69, a 1" Rockwell lift check valve used to isolate the volume control tank H -N7 gas inlet piping during RCS degassing operation gior 7
to opening the RCS for refueling, with a suitable replacement valve. This suitable replacement valve was a new style Rockwell Model #36174-F316T4 Piston Check Valve (C58-1), sdtich meets the same functional requirements as the original nodel.
The gabability of an occurrence or the um5equence of an accident or malfunction of equipnent important to safety as geviously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) was not incraaaarl. The replacement 4
of valve CH-69 with the newer version of Rockwell check valve model #36174-F316T4 (C58-1) will not alter the function of safety related equipnent, the pessure rating of the replacement valve aw=arie the design conditions, and the weight is the same as the existing valve.
The pnaaihility for an accident or nelfunction of a different type than any geviously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Ibport was not l
created. The repl-nt of valve m-69 will not alter the design or function of
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the CVCS systen.
The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specifications was not reduced. The parameters listed in the Technical Specifications are not J
affected by the nodification of the Piston Check Valves. The replacement valve is equal to or better than the original valve.
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DUQUESNE LIGIT COMPANY I
Beaver Valley Power Station Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 Technical Evaluation Report No. 46 New Style Rockwell-Edwards T-58 Valves Rockwell has discontinued production of the Model #3624 Glcbe Valve (Westinghouse Designation T-58). 'Ibe p2rpose of this nodification was to replace valve No. 01-29, a normally closed globe stop valve used to bypass FCV-CH-122, with a new style Bockwell-Edwards Model #36124 globe valve (T58-1).
This replacanent valve meets the same functional requirements as the original model.
'Ibe probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipnent important to safety as previously eraluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) was not increased. '1he replacement of valves 01-29, with the newer style valve will not alter the function of safety related equipnent. Also the pressure rating of the replacement valves exceed the design conditions.
'Ihe possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different typ than any geviously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report was not created. '1he replacement of valve 01-29 will not alter the design or function of the CVCS System.
The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specifications was not reduced. '1his nodification does not affect the grameters listed in the Technical Spcifications. 'Ite replacement valve is equal to or better than the original valve.
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DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY Beaver Valley Power Station Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 Temporary Operating Procedure (TOP) 84-10, Return [DG-TK-1] and [DG-TK-2] Effluent to the RCS The purpose of this procedure was to decrease the amount of water used during plant operation by recovering the effluents of the primary drain transfer tanks [DG-TK-1] and [DG-TK-2] via the degasifier and the volume control tank. The system will be in an alignment already considered by UFSAR Section 9.2.1 and Chemistry shall periodically sample and verify the Reactor Coolant System limits listed in Technical Specification Table 3.4-1 prior to addition to the volume control tank.
Temporary Operating Procedure (TOP) 84-12, Maintaining Steam Generator Level Using Auxiliary Feed Pumps During a Main Feed Pump Outage This procedure details valve and equipment line-ups necessary to maintain steam generator levels using motor-driven auxiliary feed pump
[1FW-P-3A and/or 3B] and primary plant demineralized water storage tank
[VT-TK-10] during a main feed pump outage from 4 to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> into Mode 2 or in Mode 3.
The Safety Evaluation stated that since the motor-driven auxiliary feed pumps could handle the expected heat load, the turbine-driven auxiliary feed pump would be available, if needed, and existing Technical Specifications and FSAR cover the feedwater system boundaries and malfunctions, no unreviewed safety question exists.
Temporary Operating Procedure (TOP) 84-14, Manual Transfer of Spent Resin from [SW-TK-2] to High Integrity Container (HIC) Liner The purpose of this TOP was to transfer spent resin from Solid Waste Spent Resin Storage Tank [SW-TK-2] to a High Integrity Container (HIC) liner using a portable positive displacement pump, since the metering pump [SW-P-6] was out of service. The requirments of 10 CFR 20 and 10 CFR 71 were incorporated into this TOP. The intent of this procedure is consistent with those proceures described in BVPS Unit 1 UFSAR 11.2.5.2.
The use of all temporary hoses in this procedure was in compliance with BVPS No.
1 Radeon Manual, Chapter 1,
Part 3,
Procedure F,
"Use of Temporary Hoses".
Technical Specification 3.11.3.1 was adhered to when performing this procedure.
The TOP satisfies the criteria set forth in IE Circular 80-18.
No unreviewed safety questions were involved with this procedure.
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DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY Beaver Valley Power Station Docket No.- 50-334, License No. DPR-66 Temporary Operating Procedure (TOP) 84-15, CCR Heat Exchangers Tube Integrity Test The purpose of this procedure was to verify CCR Heat Exchangers
[CC-E-1A, B, C) tube integrity by pressurizing the shell side of the heat exchangers under cicarance at'CCR System pressure while monitoring tube sheets for possible leakage.
Leaking tubes were to be identified, marked and sealed. The BVPS Nuclear Engineering Department indicated their agreement via EM 61,131 that the testing method set forth in this procedures is adequate to verify heat exchanger tube integrity and to return a CCR heat exchanger to service. The procedure was not intended to introduce any abnormal conditions to CCR heat exchangers, therefore, increase probability of tube degradation or damage to good tubes should not have occurred.
The CCR System is in Normal System Arrangement during this TOP. No unreviewed safety question was involved with this procedure.
Tempo'rary Operating Procedure (TOP) 84-18,
. Sampling Group I Ion Exchangers This procedure, details the necessary steps for removing Ion Exchangers (CH-I-1B]
and (CH-I-3A]
from service, obtaining resin samples for isotopic analysis and returning the ion exchangers to service.
The Safety Evaluation stated that since the procedure only provides guidance for sampling and does not affect any system operation and the maximum amount of activity that could be released by an accident relative to this procedure is well within amounts previously analyzed by the UFSAR, no unreviewed safety question exists.
Temporary Operating Procedure (TOP) 84-19, Solidification of Contaminated Oil This procedure gives detailed instructions for equipment operation; sequence of operation and radiological precautions used with the Chem Nuclear Systems Cement /011 Solidification Units.
No unreviewed safety questions were found concerning the Safety Evaluation which addressed regulations, codes and standards, equipment arrangement, ALARA compliance and postulated accidents.
Temporary Operating Procedure (TOP) 84-21, Leak Test of Degasifier Recovery Heat Exchangers Cross-Connect Expansion Joints This procedure leak tested the Degasifier Recovery Heat Exchangers to determine if leakage occurs at the cross-connect expansion joints installed per DCP 539. Test pressure was achieved by use of a hydro-pump and does not exceed ASME recommended pressure. The test utilized temporary hosing installed in accordance with an approved procedure to 2
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DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY Beaver Valley Power Station Docket Noc 50-334, License No. DPR-66 address radiological safety concerns for handling radioactive fluids.
Temporary Operating Procedure 84-22, Purging the Degasifier With Nitrogen i
The purpose of this procedure was to individually purge the 2A and 2B Degasifiers with nitrogen to return them to a non-flamable environment without the risk of explosion, since oxygen buildup in the degasifiers is eliminated. All temporary hoses used in this - procedure were installed in accordance to BVPS Unit 1 Radeon Manual, Chapters 1, Part 3,
Procedure F.
The procedure. contains appropriate RadCon
-controls to prevent contaminating the PAB during venting operations.
.The degasifier to be burped was shutdown and isolated per initial conditions prior to performing this procedure. No unreviewed safety question was involved with this procedure.
Temporary Operating Procedure 84-23, Stroking Rockwell Valves The purpo'e of this procedure was to determine and document the s
number of turns required for stroking (full open to close) the 1 1/2" and 2" Unit 1 Rockwell valves. The Licensing and Compliance Department (Duquesne Light) evaluated the results of this TOP and compared these results against data from Rockwell to identify any inconsistencies.
This TOP was performed under Mode 5 conditions.
It included stroking Rockwell valves in the charging, safety injection, reactor coolant, reactor drains and RHR systems. The probability of occurrence or the
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consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated in FSAR (BVPS No. 1) were not increased due to this procedure.
No unreviewed safety question was involved with this procedure.
Temporary Operating Procedure (TOP) 85-01, Checking Alignment of Rod F-10 This procedure was to verify the alignment of Rod F-10 which was assumed to be misaligned. The procedure was drafted from a recommended Westinghouse generic -procedure and utilized a visicorder to monitor Stationary Gripper Coil Voltage while the subject drive line was withdrawn.
The Stationary Gripper Coil Voltage was then compared to a Westinghouse graph to verify alignment. Reactor Power was less the than 50%. Delta-Q is not limiting below 50% reactor power and penalty minutes accumulated as a result of AQ being outside the target band will be maintained.
Bank D misalignment will only be two steps and will be replaced to where AQ is within the target band so there will be no affect upon core geometry.
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DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY f
Beaver Valley Power Station Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 Maintenance Surveillance Proceure (MSP) 2.01, Revision 7 Nuclear Instrument Rate and Comparator Drawer N37/N46 Calibration This revision to MSP 2.01 raised the alarm setpoint of N-46,
" Power Range Comparator Deviation", to eliminate alarms determined to be spurious by Operations thus restoring the bistable to a condition
~ where it is able to perform its design function.
The UFSAR Section 7.7.1.3.1 describes the alarm function of N-46, and it is described again in Section 7.7.2.2,
" Analysis of Response Consideration of Reactivity".
In Section 7.2.2,
" Analysis", seven. transients and accidents analyzed in Chapter 14 are referenced with reactor trip setpoints given credit for protecting the health and safety of the public.
The N-46 alarm's function as defined by the UFSAR is to alert the operator to a power imbalance caused by a misaligned rod. The setpoint given in the PLS is annotated to explain that the setpoint is expected to be adjusted during startup and subsequent operation such that it is just beyond the range of normal operating variations. No unreviewed safety question was involved with this procedure revision.
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