ML20097F740

Rept of Facility Changes,Tests & Experiments, Covering Nov 1990 to Oct 1991

ML20097F740
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	10/31/1991
From:	Sieber J DUQUESNE LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
NUDOCS 9206160001
Download: ML20097F740 (76)

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-@ggg seg v ney ec or sm.on s' Shippmopod. PA 15077-0004 (412) 393-5255 June 8. 1992 JOHN O SIEBER Vee President. Nees Oroup U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Subject:

Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 2 Docket No. 50-412, License No. NPF-73 Report of Facility Changes, Tests and Equipments ,

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.59, the Annual Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments for the Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit- No. 2, is attached. This report provides a brief description and summary of the safety evaluation for each facility and procedure change. The annual report covers the period of November 1, 1990 through October'31, 1991.

Sincerely, Attachment

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cc: Mr. L. W. Rossbach, Sr. Resident Inrpector Mr. T. T. Martin, NRC Region I Administrator Mr. A. W. DeAgazio,-Project Manager Mr. M. L. Bowling (VEPCO) 9206160001 911031 ,

PDR- ADOCK 05000412 R PDR s'  ;

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Duquesne i_idit Compar1y

'Af BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION UNIT NO. 2 DOCKET NO. 50-412 ,

LICENSE NO. NPF-73 ATTACHMENT 1 1991 REPORT OF FACILITY CHANGES, TESTS, AND EXPERIMENTS I

4 Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2

, , 1991 Repon of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments labit9fDAtents Testine Procemres ,

2BVT 11J).6.6, Unit 2 Baseline Test. . . . .1 Operatine Procedures Test Equipment Installation for OST 2.24.4, Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Test., , .2 Change Normal System Armngement position of [2SWS-MOV308], Service Water Supply To Air Conditioning Unit [2HVP'ACU301] for Alternate Shutdown Panel Cubicle, to Shut... ., , .. .3 i

Normal System Arrangement Valve Position Change to Align the Fuel Pool Ion ~

Exchanger During Normal Operation. . .4 Temporary hiodification - Installation of a Temporary Throttle Valve downstream of Lube Oil to Overspeed Trip Relief Valve [2ThiL-RV205) . .5 2 TOP-91-07, Flushing hiotor Control Center Cooling Coils [2HVP'CLC265A orb],,.., . . .6 Oh12.19.4. A, Gaseous Waste System Startup- .7 Temporary hiodification - Temporary Drain lloses from Relief Path of Condensate Demineralizer Precoat Pump Discharge Line Relief

[2CND.RV103] and Condensate Demineralizer Precoat Return Line Relief

[2CND-RV107] Valves,. . .8 Normal System Arrangement Change for Service Water Pumps Seal Water Pressure Rugulators [2SWS-PCVil7A and 117B] Power Supply from Closed to Open. . . .9 2 TOP-91-04, BV-2 Asiatic Clam Chemical Treatment Program . .10 -

Change Normal System Arrangement Position of Recirculation Spray Cooler Discharge Header Cross-Connection Valve [SWS-82] to Open. . .I1 Temporary hiodification - Defeat Primary Drains Transfer Tank Level Transmitter [2DGS-LT107A] Level Interlock to Pressurizer Relief Tank Drain Valve [2RCS-hiOVS23] and Primary Drains Transfer Tank Vent Header Isolation Valve [2DGS-AOV100A]. .12 femporary hiodification - Jumper on Containment Air lock Door Interlock . .13 Temporary Waiver of Compliance for a 24 Hour Extension to the Action Statement for Technical Specification 3.7.1.2.a Requiring Entry into Mode 4. .14 ONi 2.11,4.C, Filling Reactor Refueling Cavity, and OST 2.47.2, Containment Integrity Verification, Revisions . .15 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump [2FWE*P22] Operating Speed Change from 4350 to 4400 RPht. 16 Temporary hiodification for Flushing of Safeguard Area Air Conditioning Units

[2HVR-ACU207A and 207B] Supply and Return Lines . 17 i

, 1 Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2 - l

. . 1991 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments j i

Table offontrats l 5f aintenance Procedures Hydro Test of SWS Return Lines from Radiation Monitors 2SWS-RQIl00A,B,C,D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . .. .. .. 18 Blocking Open of Control Room Air Conditioning Unit Cooling Coil Inlet Isolation Valve [2SWS-143].. . . . . .. .. .. . . . .. . . . . .. .19 Install Temporary Gag on Reactor Coolant Pump C Cooling Water Supply Relief Valve [2CCP-RV115C] to Stop Relief Valve Leak.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20

. Connection of a Temporary Recorder to Main Feedwater Regulating Valve

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[2FWS-FCV478] .. . . . . . .. . . . . . . , . . . . .. . .. . .. . . . . .

Install Temporary Tubing Between Primary Drains Transfer Tank Pressure and Level Transmitters-[2DGS PT109A] and [2DGS LT107A] Low Side and Recalibrate Level Transmitter, . . . . . . .22 Removal of Emergency _ Diesel Generators Fuel Oil Storage Tanks Level Instruments [2BGF-LE201 A & B] . . ..... . .. . . .23 Computer Oncrations Procedures Jumper and Lifled Lead Modification for Unit 2 Plant Computer System Point F 1000A... .. .. . .... . . . . . . ... . .24 <

Facility Changes Desien Channes DCP 853, PCS - Annunciator Window Point ID/ status.. . . . . 25

, DCP-886, Blowdown Flow Indicator , . ... . .. ., , .26 DCP 891, Modifications for the Plant Safety Monitoring System. .. .27 DCP 906, Control Room Air Intake Duct Smoke Detector.. . . . .. .28 DCP 926, Seal-in (Lockout) for Primary Turbine Trip Circuit (TMAAB) .. .29 DCP 1021, Sampling of the Steam Generator Blowdown Evaporators . . . .30 DCP 1050 Steam Generator Blowdown Demineralizer System.. , .31 DCP 1068, RWST Area. .. . . .. . .

,33 DCP 1105, Turbine Supervisory Instrument System Upgrade. .. . . .35 DCP 1110, Heavy Load Handler Down Ramp PAB El. 774'. . . . .37 DCP 1170, Addition of Pipe Supports to Vacuum Priming Piping to Main Collection Tank 2VPS-TK-21. . . . . 39 DCP 1199,2HVI-FN203 Control Circuit Modification.. .. 41 DCP 1280, Modification of Hotwell Sample Panel.. . . . . .43 DCP 1304, RPI Low Voltage Power Supply Modification.. .45 DCP 1312, Upgrade of Turbine Plant Sample Panel and Hotwell Sample Panel . .47 ii

Denver Valley Power Station Unit 2 1991 Report of Frcility Changes, Tests, and Experiments Inbk_eLContents fatility Chnnect (Lontinued) thslen Chnnues (Continued)

DCP 1354, Replaecment ofinstrument Air Dryer,21AS DRY 21. . 49 DCP 1370, Control Room llVAC Noise Level Reduction . NRC Licensing Commitments lluman Engineering Discrepancies . . .. . .51 DCP 1389, ERFCS ATSC Elimination. . . . . . . .53 DCP 1472, Unit 21&C Shop Ventilation llood. . . . . .54 DCP 1496, hiaintenance improvements for lleater Drain Pumps (211Dil P21 A, D) . . . . . . . . . ... . .56 DCP l$12, hiodi6 cation of the Appendix R Emergency Lighting Controls for the CR, SDP, and ASDP Areas . .. . . . . . , . . .59 DC/1629, Addition of a hianual Drain Valve to Remove Radioactive Parti:les from Fuel Pool Cooling Ilot Spot. . . . . . . . .62 ,

DCP 1664 (TER 5837), Remove Internals from Service Water System Check Valves 2SWS*29,216, 548,1038,1039,1040.. . . . .64 DCP 1799, Diesel Generator Building Fan Control Circuit Changes . .. .66 Technient Evaluation llenort TER 5810, Design Parameter Change for BVPS 2 Supplementarv Leak Collection and Release System Charcoal Filter hiedia. . . . . .67 UFS Alt Chnnues Valve List Normal Ss tem Arranyment Change for Chilled Water System hiakeup Water Isolatiw {2CDS 1L) and Fill isolation [2CDS 275] Valves. . .69 -

Change Updated Final Safety Analysis Report to Remove Battery Duty Cycle and Load Requirements and Rep! ace with Reference to Station Administrative Procear .. . . .70 t

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Heaver Valley Power Station Unit 2

. , 1991 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments Page 1 of 71 CII A NGE TITI.E 2HVT 11.26.6. Unit 2 Baseline Test CIIANGC DESCRIPHON This procedure obtains baseline heat rate performance data fer calculation of Unit 2 heat rate.

Sixteen pressure test gauges and two vacuum test gauges were installed on the condenser and Main Steam System. The pressure and vacuum test gauges were installed on non safety related plant equipment or downstream of the MSIVs. To obtain electrical output data, a watthour treter l was installed into the generator output circuitry which is non safety related Category 11 plant equipment.

SAFETY EVAI,UATION

SUMMARY

The safety evaluation was written to evaluate the potential for a loss of onsite power due to a turbine trip caused by the location of the watthour meter. Small steam leaks from connection of test gauges does not constitute a new type of accident. Loss of condenser vacuum is discussed in ,

the UFSAR and is not considered to be safety related. Offsite power is available and una!Tected by this test. There is no potential for creation of a new type of unanalyzed event because reliable offsite power is available. There is no change to the impact on the margin of safety because tmbine trip availability was unchanged / Based on the above, tbc Safety Evaluation concluded that this test procedure posed no unreviewed safety questiMn.

Subsequent to this Safety Evaluation, a field revision to 2BYT 11.26.6 required another Safety Evaluation to allow a pressure test gauge to remain installed until the Unit is shutdown. The pressure test gauge cannot be removed safely due to a steam leak through its isolation valve. The location of the pressure test gauge is downstream of the MSIVs in a non-safety related area.

There is no potential for creation of a new type of unanalyzed event or impact on the margin of safety because the test gauge is in a non safety related location. Based on the above, the Safety Evaluation concluded that the field revision to this tcst procedure posed no unreviewed safety questions.

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Deaver Valley Power Station Unit 2

, 1991 lleport of Facility Changet. Tests, and Experiments Page 2 cf 71

,GII ANGl' TITIE

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I Test Equipment Installation for OST 2.24.4, Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Test Cil ANGl' DESCitlPTION i l

The temporary modification installed: 1) a proximity probe / tachometer on the Turbine Driven -

Auxiliary Feedwater pump [2FWE P22) chassis adjacent to the shall scal,2) pressure transmitters on the drain valve for pressure indicators [2FWE pilSS) and [2FWE pil56), and 3) controlotrons on the suction and discharge piping of the pump.

The purpose of these temporary modifications was to gather Pump operating data to r.ssist in troubleshooting efforts. The temporary modifications did not affect any operating or design pararneters, or the auxiliary feedwater system. The temporary modifications were for monitoring purposes only.

SAFF,TY FNAI,UATION 9UMM A14Y The temporary transmitters were not valved in uniil Technical Specification 3.7.1.2 was entered (one auxiliary feedwater pump inoperable), and [2FWE P22] taken out of service for performance of OST 2.2 2.4. Prior to :xiting the Technical Specification, the temporary instrumentation was removed. Thus, no Design Basis Accidents were affected.13ased on the above, the Safety Evaluation concluded that the Temporary Modification posed no unreviewed safety questions.

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lleaver Valley Power Station Unit 2

, , 1991 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments Page 3 of 71

('ll A ngl: TITI.I',

Change Normal System Arrangement position of 82SWS MOV308), Service Water Supply To

/W Conditioning Unit [211VP' ACU301] for Alternate Slu lown Panct Cubicle, to Shut Gle'lill;lil:SCitiPTION A/C SW supply to (211VP*ACU301] For ASP Cubicle, valve [25WS MOV308), NSA position was changed to manual and closed. The valve will be placed in automatic by procedure, only when the Alternate Shutdown Room ACU is staned. This action will prevent tube fouling by only supplying cooling water when the ACU is in service.

S Al'I:TY l'NAI,1f ATK)N SUM M AltY -

The service water system is essentially unchanged since only 17 gpm is required with the unit in operation. This portion of the senice water system is isolated on a DBA. Failure of the ACU is decreased due to less tube fouling. The unit is considered to be continuously manned when in service in accordance with UFSAR 9.4.12. Manual action will be taken as needed to operate the system. No Technical Specificatior.; are aflected by this change. No unreviewed safety questions exist.

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lleaver Valley Power Station Unit 2

, 1991 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments Page 4 cf 71 Cil ANGl: TITi,1; Normal System Arrangement Valve Position Change to Align the Fuel Pool lon Exchanger During Normal Operation.

CII A ngl', DESCRIPTION The NSA positions of[2FNC-40,41 and 42] was changed to open; the NSA posit ion of[2FNC-

44) was ch;nged to throttled; and the NSA positions of [2FNC MOV100A and 100ll] was changed to closed. The NSA position change of these valves will align the Fuel Pool lon Exchanger, [2FNC lOE21), during normal operations per plant chemistry request.

E\FETY EVAI,11ATION Sif MM ARY The probability of Spent Fuel Pool Cleanup System failure is unchanged since the purification system is designed for continuous service, and the lon Exchanger may either be lined up or bypassed as described in UFSAR 9.1.3.2. Technical Specifications are not impacted by this change. No unreviewed safety questions exist.

13eaver Valley Power Station Unit 2

. , 1991 Report of Facility Changes. Tests, and Experiments Pt.ge 5 of 71 CII ANGE TITI.E Temporary Modification - installation of a Temporary Throttle Valve Downstream of Lube Oil to Overspeed Trip Relief Valve [2TML-RV205]

CII ANGE I)CSCRipTION Lube Oil to Overspeed Trip Relief valve [2TML RV205] has failed open causing an Auto Stop Oil pressure decrease, which leads to the probability of a Turbine Trip. To increase Auto Stop Oil pressure, a temporary valve was installed downstream of[2TML-RV205) to throttle flow and increase pressure.

SAFETY EVAINATION SUMM ARY

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The temporary modification will decrease the probability of a turbine trip since [2TML-RV205) is failed open. Failure of the temporary valve will still allow the turbine trip system to function as designed as nscribed in UFSAR 15.2.3. No Technical Specifications are affected since the modification does not a.Tect the turbine overspeed protection devices. No unreviewed safety questions exist.

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Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2

, , 1991 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments Page 6 of 71 l Cil ANGE TITLE 1 2 TOP-91 07, Flushing hiotor Control Center Cooling Coils [2ilVP'CLC265A or B).

CilANGr DESCRIPTION A new temporary procedure was written to allow higher water pressure and How flushes cf htCC cooling coils [211VP'CLC265A or B] along with its supply and return piping This is required to flush out any debris that is causing a flow restriction resultig in unsatisfactory flows. The flush is  ;

intended to restore the hiCC Coolers to OPERADLE and meet Technical Specification 3.7.4.1 l requirements. J SAFETY EVAL,UATION SUh151 ARY F" Flushing water flowrate and pressure limitations have been determined by Site Engineering and have been incorporated into the temporary procedure. Only one train will be flushed at a time while the redundant htCC cooler must be operable per procedure. Flushing will be locally monitored so that any flooding problems due to hose failures may be quickly controlled and stopped. Fire watches will be established while Fire Doors are blocked open. The redundant hiCC cooler will remain Operable during hiodes 1-3 while Technical Specification 3.7.4.1 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> action statement is entered. Two charging pumps shall be maintained Operable during this procedure. No unreviewed safety questions exist.

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11eaver Valley Power Station Unit 2 1991 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments Page 7 of 71 CII ANGE TITIS OM 2.19.4. A, Gaseous Waste System Startup CII ANGI: Ill:SritiPTION When the Gaseous Waste Storage Tanks are purged by procedure 2.19.4.A, there is remaining pressure in the tanks. Procedure 2.19.4.A has been revised to completely depressurize the Gaseous Waste Storage Tanks to allow tank maintenance.

SAFliTY EVAI,tlATION Stim M AltY In accordance with UFSAR 11J, the normal flowpath of Gaseous Waste is to Unit 1. Iloid Tank removal of Unit 2 Storage Tanks from service has no effect on UFSAR alignment. Any failure while performing this procedure will be bounded by the Gas Tank Rupture Event described in UFSAR 15.7, No Technical Specifications are affected since the activity in the tanks has accounted for off site dose calculations by the Discharge Permit. No unreviewed safety questions exist.

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I Deaver Valley Power Station Unit 2

. . 1991 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments Page 8 of 71 CII ANGE TITIE l Temporary Modification Temporary Drain lloses from Relief Path of Condensate Demineralizer l

Precoat Pump Discharge Line Relief [2CND.RV103] and Condensate Demineralizer Precoat Return Line Relief [2CND RV107] Valves CII ANGE DE5CitIPTION Temporary drain hoses have been installed on the relief path of Precoat Discharge Relief Valves

[2CND-RV103 and 107]. These relief valves are relieving demineralized water to a sump due to leak through of any one of ten upstream isolation valves which cannot be isolated and repaired while in an operating mode. This Temporary Modification will recover water to the Condensate System.

SAFETY EVAI,1fATION SilMM ARY This Temporary Modification will not change plant response The relief valves will still continue to operate as designed. No safety systems are affected by this change. No Technical

- Specifications are involved. No unreviewed safety questions exist.

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. l Beet. r Valley Power Station Unit 2

. , 1991 Repcit of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments Page 9 0f 71 j 1

CII ANGE TITI.E I Normal System Arrangement Change for Service Water Pumps Seal Water Pressure Rugulators

[2SWS PCVI17A and 117D] Power Supply from Closed to Open.

CIIANGE DESCillPTION To maintain Seal Water Pressure Regulator valves [2SWS PCV117A and 117D] failed open, their power supply breakers were changed from NSA closed to open. The valves were sluggish or had no response due to bio-fouling and macro-fouling.

SAFETY EVAL,UATION SUMM AlW Failing [2SWS PCV117A and 117D] open has no safety effects. Manual valves are now throttled to maintain proper pressure and are adjusted once a shin to ensure proper pressure. 'lechnical Specifications are not affected by this change. No unreviewed safety questions exist.

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11eaver Valley Power Station Unit 2

. . 1991 Report of Facihty Changes, Tests, and Experiments

! Page 10 of 71 ril ANGE TITI.E 2 TOP 91-04,IW-2 Asiatic Clam Chemical Treatment Program CII ANGE DESCRIPTION A new temporary procedure was developed to provide a means of extermination of Asiatic clams in the BV 2 Sersice Water and Circulating Water systems to maintain design heat transfer and flow path conditions of those systems. The clamicide will be injected at the Unit 2 SWS valve pit and will be controlled by the Chemistry Depanment by temporary equipment.

SAFETY EVAL,tiATION StiMM ARY SWS pumps are utilized by this procedure within pump discharge flow and head limitations so the pumps continue to operate as described in UFSAR 9.2.1. Performance of components supplied by SWS or Circulating Water system is not altered by this procedure. A temporary log for monitoring all heat exchangers with permanent pressure or flow instrumentation will be performed on a shif1ly basis to monitor for possible buiMup of clam shells. In the event of any clam shell buildup identified, proper maintenance will be initiated. Secondary plant component cooling water system described in UFSAR 9.2.7 will not be affected. No Techni:al Specifications are afTected by this procedure. No unreviewed safety questions exist.

11 caver Valley Power Station Unit 2

. . 1991 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Enperimente Page11of71 CII ANGE TITI,E Change Normal System Arrangement Position of Recirculation Spray Coo!:r Discharge IIcader  !

Cross-Connection Valve [SWS-82] to Open.

CilANGE DESCRIPTION Recirculation Spray Cooler Discharge licader Cross Connection, [SWS 82), NSA position was changed from closed to open. Opening this cross connect valve will provide an additional discharge path when one train of SWS is operating and w:ll increase SWS total flow.

SAFETY EVAI,UATION SIIMMARY Operating with [SWS 82) in the open position will not affect the safety function of the SWS.

SWS is affected by flow restrictions or loss of flow. This change and any failure modes will not reduce or restrict flow. This change will enhance the performance of the safety system by allowing increased flow. Restriction or blockage in either discharge line will be mitigated since flow could continue through the cross-connect valve. No Technical Specifications are affected by this change. No unreviewed safety questions exist.

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Deaver Valley Power Station Unit 2

. . 1991 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments Page 12 of 71 4

CII A NG E TITI.E Temporary Modification - Defeat Primary Drains Transfer Tank Level Transmitter [2DGS-LT107A) LevelInterlock to Pressurizer Relief Tank Drain Valve [2RCS MOV523) and Primary  !

Drains Transfer Tank Vent IIeader Isolation Valve [2DGS AOV100A)

Cil ANGE DESCRIPTION Pressurizer Relief Tank Drain Valve [2RCS MOV523] and Primary Drain TK21 Vent Header isolation Valve [2DGS AOV100A] are interlocked shut due to [2 DOS LT107A) failed high. In order to allow operations to vent [2DGS-TK21) and drain the PRT, [2DGS LT107A) has been defeated.

SAFETY EVALUATION SUMM ARY In accordance with UFSAR 5.4.11, no safety related components are involved. This modification has no potential impact on any Design 11 asis Accident. This temporary modification does not affect the Technical Specifications. No unreviewed safety questions exist.

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13eaver Valley Power Station Unit 2

. , 1991 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments Page 13 of 71 Cil ANG E TITI.E Temporary Modification . Jumper on Containment Air lock Door interlock CII ANGC DESCillPTION Contacts in the Containment Air Lock interlock limit switch LS6/9 have failed These contacts provide a permissive to allow opening the outer door provided the inner door is closed. A temporary jumper has been installed to allow opening the outer airlock door to provide access to the failed components.

SAFETY EVAlif ATION S11MM Al(Y There are no operating or design parameters afl'ected by the temporary modification. The only system alrected is the control circuit for the Containment Airlock doors. Accidents requiring Containment Integrity as identified in UFSAR 15 4.8 and 15.6.5 are not affected by this modification. The margin of safety defined in the basis of the Technical Specifications are not reduced. No unreviewed safety questions exist.

13eaver Valley Power Station Unit 2

, , 1991 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and IIxperiments Page 14 of 71 Cil ANGE TITI,1

Temporary Waiver of Compliance for a 24 llour Extension to the Action Statement for Technical Specification 3.7.1.2.a Requiring Entry into hiode 4.

Cil ANGE DEScitlPTION hiode 3 conditions are required to perfonn surveillance testing of the Steam Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump. To place the plant in 110T SilUTDOWN conditions to perform this test places unnecessary thermal cycle on the reactor plant. llence, a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> time extension on the action statement for Technical Specification 3.7.1.2.a (specifically the requirement to place plant in blode 4 with the Steam Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump out of service for 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />) was requested.

S AFETY EVAI,11ATION S115151 AlW The basis for the Auxiliary Feedwater System is to cooldown the Reactor Coolant System to less than 350F on a loss of offsite power. Iloth hiotor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater pumps are operable. Should one of these become inoperable, the plant would be placed in hiode 4 in accordance with Technical Specification 3.7.1.2. Should a total loss of power occur at this time, the decay heat load is considerably less ti,an assumed in the UFSAR and more time would be available to restore Auxiliary Feedwater or provide other means of core cooling to p*cvent core damage. To prevent increasing reactor heat load, the P c,ctor Tr.ip Bredeu v.ill be cleared open; decreasing the probability of criticality occurring. No unreviewed safety questions exist.

Deaver Valley Power Station Unit 2

,, 1991 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments Page 15 of 71 I CII ANGE TITI,E OM 2.11.4.C, Filling Reactor Refueling Cavity, and OST 2.47.2, Containment Integrity Verification, Revisions Cil ANGE DESrillPTION Procedures OM 2.11.4.C, Filling Reactor Refueling Cavity, and OST 2.47.2, Containment Integrity Verification, have been revised to allow the Refueling Cavity drain line to remain closed during plant operation instead of open as described in UFSAR 6.2.1.1.2. This allows operation with the two 4 inch flanges on the Refueling Cavity drain lines to remain in place afler a refueling outage and to reduce human error.

S AFETY EVAI,11 ATION Sif M M AltY lsolating this Refueling Cavity drain lines decrease the NPSil of the Recirculation Spray System pumps. An Engineering Department calculation determined that the new NPSil is still within acceptable limits. There is no change to radiological consequences because all water remains in containment and adequate NPSil is available for the Recirculation Spray pumps to maintain Containment atmosphere. No Technical Specifications are affected by this change. No unreviewed safety questions exist.

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!!eaver Valley Power Station Unit 2

, , 1991 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments

,' Page 16 of 71 Cil ANGE TITI.E Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump [2FWE'P22] Operating Speed Change from 4350 to 4400 RPhi.

CII ANGE 1)ESCillPTION Turbine Drive Auxiliary Feed Pump [2FWE*P22] operating speed was increased from 4350 rpm to 4400 rpm in order to meet the MOP.

SA FETY EVAL,11ATION StiMSI ARY The change willincrease [2FWE*P22} speed to provide adequate flow as specified by the pump MOP. An lacrease in turbine speed by 1% willincrease steam flow to [2FWE*P22] by 1% and is of no consequence during a SGTR. Increasing the operating speed of[2FWE*P22] by 1% will not create or initiate a DDA. This change does not affect any Technical Specification. No unreviewed safety questions exist.

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lleaver Valley Power Station Unit 2

, , 1991 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments Page 17 of 71 CII ANGE TITII Temporary hiodification for Flushing of Safeguard Area Air Conditioning Units

[211VR.ACU207A and 207H) Supply and Return Lines CII ANGE DESCitIPTION l A Temporary hiodification was performed which removed tf inlet and outlet Scryice Water System nozzles on the Safeguard Area ACUS [2!!VR ACU207A and 207D] and connected r, temporary flush rig between the ACU supply and discharge lines. An existing Tempersry Operating Procedure [2 TOP-90 IS) will be used to align Sersice Water to enhance flushing.

SAFETY EVAI.UATION SUMSI AiW Sitc< Engineering has determined limiintions on flushing to ensure continued integrity and performance of systems. Flushing will be rionitored locrily while in operation and any flooding event will be quickly controlled at:d stopped. Only one train of safety related equipment wiU be flushed at a time. The other train will be available to perform itt. designed cafety ftmetion. The margin of safety defined by the Technical Specifications is not reduced by this change. No unreviewed safety questions exist.  !

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Ileaver Valley Powcr Station Unit 2

, 1991 Report of Facility Changes, Tcsts, and Experiments

Page 18 of 71 l Cil ANGl

TITI.l:

liydro Test of SWS Return Lines hoin Ra<liation Monitors 2SWS RQ1100A,B,C,D Cil ANGl: 1)l:SCltlPTION This safety evaluation supported a ore time CMP to perform an ASME Ni hydro on 1 1/2 inch SWS piping which was cut apart and res elded to allow cleaning of the pipe during 2R.

5AFETY 1:VAI.11ATION StiMM AlW The probability or consequences of an accident described in the FSAR will not be increased or created because the performance of this procedure has no effect on systems essential for safe shutdown. For the same reason, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR is not created. No Technical Specification bases are affected by this procedure. No changes to the FSAR are required.

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Ileaver Valley Power Station Unit 2

. 1991 lleport of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments Page 19 of 71 CII A NGE TITI.E Illocking Open of Control lloom Air Conditioning Unh Cooling Coil Inlet isolation Valve

[2SWS-143]

Cll ANGC DESCillPTION Valve 2SWS 143 was temporarily blocked open to allow its yoke nut to be removed for the repair of valve 2 hiss 15. The function of valve 2SWS-143 is to provide 1 isolation of 211VC ACU20ll! When 25WS 143 was blocked open, valve 2SWS 151 was used to isolate the air conditioning unit. This temporary change was required to make valve 2 MSS-15 operable while repair parts were being procured. The function of the control room air conditioning system was not afTected by the temporary change to valve 2SWS 143.

SAFETY EVAI,11ATION S11MM AltY The probability or consequences of an accident described in the FSAll will not be increased cr created because the air conditioning outlet valve 2SWS 151 was used to provide the same function of the valve which was blocked open. The possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAllis not created since system performance is not altered. No Technical Specification bases are affected by this procedure. No changes to the FSAll are required.

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Deaver Valley Power Station Unit 2

. 1991 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments  ;

Page 20 of 71 CII ANGE TITI E Install Temporary Gag on Reactor Coolant Pump C Cooling Water Supply Relief Valve

[2CCP RV115C] to Stop Relief Valve Leak Cil ANGE DESCRIPTION This safety evaluation supported a temporary modification to install a temporary gag or. 2CCP.

RVll5C due to seat leakage until the valve could be permanently repaired during the next outage.

Backup relief protection was provided by 2CCP RV1550.

SAFETY EVAI,UATION

SUMMARY

The probability or consequences of an accident described in the FSAR will not be increased or s ' created because, during normal operation, relief valva protection is not required. If system isolation becomes necessary, administrative procedures require installation of backup protection.

The only po,tulated failure mode would result in leakage of CCP water into containment. This condition is within the bounds of previous analysis, thus the possibility of an accident or inahbnction of a difTerent type is not created. No Technical Specification bases are affected by this procedure. No changes to the FSAR are required.

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13eaver Valley Power Station Unit 2

, 1991 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments Page 21 of 71 Cil A NGr TITI.0, Connection of a Temporary Recorder to Main Feedwater Regulating Valve [?FWS FCV478]

Cl{ ANGE DESCillPTION During troubleshooting of 2FWS FCV478 it was necessary to determine whether poor valve performance was due to mechanical birding or electrical contiel problems. A temporary modification wss made to connect a recorder and a ramp pnerator and slowly ramp the valve open and closed with the valve in automatic.

SAFETY EVAL,UATION SUMM ARY The only postulated accident due to this change is loss of feedwater flow This event is unlikely since the trodification still allows for manual control. Loss of feedwater flow is, however, evaluated in the FSAR; thus the probability or consequences of a previously evaluated accident will not be increased or created. For the same reasons, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a ditTerent type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR is not created No Technical Specification bases are afTected by this procedure. No changes to the FSAR are required.

Deaver Valley Power Station Unit 2

. 1991 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments Page 22 of 71

.Clj ANG E TITI,E Install Temporary Tubing Hetween Primary Drains Transfer Tank Picssure and Level Transmitters [2DGS PT109A) and (2DGS.LT107A) Low Side and Recalibrate Level Transmitter l

l CII ANGE DESCRIPTION 2DGS LT107A failed due to a leak on the sealed sensor unit (low side capillary). A mechanical jumper was installed, via temporary modification, which replaced the leaking sealed system with a ,

non scaled sensing line.

SAFETY FNAI,UATION SUMM AIW This change does riot effect any safety related systems or equipment. Failure of the temporary system can only result in leakage into the containment building. This leakage is within the existing DBA analysis. Thus the probability or consequences of a previously evaluated accident will not be increased or created. For the same reasons, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a ,

different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR is not created. No Technical i Specitication bases are affected by this procedure. No changes to the FSAR are required.

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1 lleaver Valley Power Station Unit 2

. , 1991 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments Fage 23 of 71 Cil ANGE TITLE Removal of Emergency Diesel Generators Fuel Oil Etorage -Tanks Level Instruments

[2BGF-LE201 A & B)

CilANGE DESCRIPTION i

Normal chemistry sample locations for Unit 2 Diesel Generator fuel oil storage tanks were unusable due to contaminatiort/ corrosion concern with the sample points. A sample could be  ;

obtained at the location of the level instruments 2BGF LE201 A & IL Since sampling was required each month, since both instruments were out of service, and because of the difileu; j of removing the detectors for sampling, the detectors were temporarily removed.

A blank flange is installed on the system piping when samples are not being taken.

SAFETY EVAttlATION StiMM ARY This change does not efTect any safety related systems or equipmert. Manual measurements are used to maintain fuellevelin the tanks in compliance with the Technical Specifications. Thus the probability or conuquences of a previously evaluated accident will not be increased or created.

For the same reasons, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR is not created. No Technical Specification bases are afDeted by this procedure. No changes to the FSAR are required.

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Beaver Valley Power ftation Unit 2

. , 1991 Report of Facility Changes, Teats, and Experiments  ;

Page 24 of 7i CilA NGE TITLE .

Jumper and Lined Lead Modification for Unit 2 Plant Computer System Point F1000A Cll ANGE DESCRIPJION The change is installed as a lifled leads modification (Jumper and Lifled Leads Tags 2-5 A 186 and 2 5A 187) for the Coniputer Point F1000A (CNMT VAC PP DISCH FLW) on the PCS because the related Field Device (CV FT101) has failed. The field device input of 23 VDC was causing the PCS DMUX AIMOD module associated with it (DIN 44.:lotl3) to also fail because the card design allows a maximum input of 10.24 VDC. The benefits sained from this temporary change include the e:lmination of nuisance alarms on the On crations Journal Alarm printer and status CRT'S; also, an end of damage to expensive computer modules.

SAFETY EVAINATION SitMM ARY ,

The probability or consequences of an accident described in the FSAR will not be increased or created because the possibility of an accident or malfune'Jon of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR is not created. No Technical Specification bases are affected by this procedure. No changes to the FSAR are required.

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Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2

, , 1991 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments

,' Page 25 of 71 CII A NG E TITI.!i DCP 853, PCS . Annunciator Window Point ID/ status CIIANGE DESCRIPTION The purpose of this modific; tion is to provide BVPS 2 Control Room Operators with a means to i I

check the status of annunciator windows in the Contro! Room via the Plant Computer System. A spare pushbutton on the operator's console will be labeled "ANNUNC" When an operator pushes this button, he will then be able to enter the appropriate annunciator window number and the computer will display the status ofinput signals to the window. The operator will also be able to obtain a printout of this information. No modifications to the station's annunciator system are l required to provide this capability. l i

SAFETY EVAL.lfATION StiMM AItY  !

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The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Updated ri=! Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) will not be increased. The plant computer system is an information acquisition and processing system that performs no control functions for the station. This modification provides another means to allow operators to obtain plant status information, b"! does not substitute for any safety-related instrumentation. This modification also does not affect the Bypassed and Inoperable Status Indication System (BISI) described in DV-2 FSAR Section 7.5.5.

The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report will not be created. This modification does not make any changes to any systems important to safety and does not create the possibility of a previously un-analyzed accident or malfunction because it only provides another means of data acquisition only, and does not add any control functions that could challenge the safety of the plant, The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification will not be reduced.

No Technical Specifications are affected by this modification This changes will not require a change to the Technical Specifications.

This change will not require a change to the UFSAR.

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Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2

, 1991 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments Page 26 of 71 CII ANGE TITI E DCP.886, Blowdown Flow Indicator Cll ANGE l'EFORIPTION Presently the existing steam generator blowdown mass flowme:ers are out of service due to various mechanical and human prob! cms. EM 63022 requested a solutirn to the Unit 2

- ' -- down flow indication problem and suggested that a difTerential pressure transmitter similar to Unit I be used. The purpose of this design mo . ricat on is to remove the existing mass flowmeters and replace them with Annubar differential pressure flow sensors, isolation valves, and

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indicator instruments. By performing this modification, rnore accurate readings shoald be obtained which would allow operators to take credit for blowdown flow while perfbrming the plant heat balance.

SAFETY EVAL,UATION SUMM ARY The probability of an occuirence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Anrlysis Report (FSAR) will not be increased. This design change is removing the steam generator blowdown mass flowmeters and replacing them with difTerential pressure iy; flowmeters. The existing mass flown.eters are not discussed in UFSAR Section 10.4.8.5, " Instrumentation Requirements", nor .

are they relied upon in UFSAR Section 10.4.8.3, the safety evaluation subsection By performing this modification, the intended design function of the flowmeters to proviae steam generator blowdown flow data will not change, and the location of the new flowmeters will still remain within the Turbine Building, a non-seismically designed structure.

The possibility for an accidut or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report v.ill not be created. This modification will remove the existing in.line mass flowmeter spool pieces and install newly fabricated spool pieces for the '

Annubar sensors in their place, and it will also reuse the existing non-Class IE power supply for the new indicators. The new spool pieces and associated instrument tubing will mcet the system design conditions and will be pressure tested to ensure leak tightness. Additionally, UFSAR Section 10 4.8.5 states that the steem generator blowdown sample isolation valves close automatically when the auxiliary feedwater pumps are auto-started or a steam generator has a high radiation sample. In the event of a new spool piece mpture, the blowdown sample isolation valves could be used to isolate the blo.vdown break flow into the Turbine Building The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Sptcircation will not be reduceu The steam generator blowdown system is not included in the Technical Specifications and no changes to the Technical Specifications will be required UFS AR Figures 10.4-23 will need to be revised to show the difTerential type flowmet:rs.

lleaver Valley Power Station Unit 2

. 1991 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments Pape 27 of 71 CII A NGL TITI.I' DCP 891, hiodifications for the Plant Safety hionitoring System Cil ANGE DI:SCRIPTION The purpose of this modification is to correct PSMS deficiencies by rewiring the position indication inputs to the PShiS for 15 main steam safety valves, wiring two switches, and installing and replacing nutaerous EPROhiS (Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory) integrated circuits (see W FCN DMWO 40502, FCN DhiWM 10589, FCN.DhiWht-10690 and FCN-DMWM 10688). The time-code translator will be modified via FCN DMWM-10685. The design change will correct problems that have been in the system since start up.

SAFETY EVAL.UATION SUMM AlW The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFS AR will not be increased The work will be performed on one train at a time and therefore the PSMS displays shall be available throughout the installation and testing of the design change. The changes in no way aher the function and acliability of the PSMS.

The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a difTerent type than previously evaluated in the UFSAR will not be created. The PSMS is an information source and, as defined in the UFSAR Section 7, it is sulliciently isolated to preclude faults from afTecting input sources. The changes will enhance the system's ftmetion and allow it to provide accurate information.

The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification will not be reduced I

The PSMS satisfies a number of Technical 11ulletins, Reg. Guide requirements, and Position Statcments The changes proposed will not afTect any of these documents, This change will not require a change to the Technical Specifications.

This change will not require a change to the UFSAR.

Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2

.- ,- 1991 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments

[# Page 28 of 71 Cil A NG E TITI,E b DCP 906, Cont ol Room Air intake Duct Smoke Detector CII ANGE DESCRIPTION Air duct smoke detectors 2FPM-Dil3 and 14 (TC100D Type; are to be removed from the existing location. 2FPM-Dil3 is to be replaced with a space smoke detector (TC100C Type) inside of the air ir.take duct, 2FPM Dil4 is to be deleted. This modification is required since the air velocity in the duct is below the acceptable minimum for a TC100D type smoke detector. At ncrmal operation, a space detector is compatible with this systems air velocity and duct volume.-

SAFETY EVAL,UATION SIIMMARY

' The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an t.ccident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the final safety-analysis report wi!! not be increased.

The same type of fire detection (ionization smoke detector) is provided at the same location as

originally designed, as described in FSAR Section 9.4.1.2.1 and in accordance with the Design Bases FSAR Section 9.4.1,1.

Deleting the second duct smoke detector will enhance the maintainability and will not adversely affect this systems operation. This second detector does not provide _ a separate redundant function, and is not required. Both detectors _were powered from the same power unit, PU-20.

Since the system is a class "A" supervised system, any malfunction will annunciate a trouble alann in the contwl room.

The possibility for an accident or malfmaction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the final safety analysis report wi'l not be created. This configuration of the smoke detection system performs the same functinn .ts the original' configuration as described in FSAR Section 9.4.1.2.1 and in accordance with the design bases FSAR Section 9.4.1.1. The smoke detector will locally. alarm and annunciate in the Control Room up;n detecting smoke within this duct.

The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification will not be reduced.

The fire detection system is not addressed in the technical specifications. This change will not require a cMnge to the Technical Specifications.

[- The UFSAR will need to be revised :o reflect this modifwation.

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Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2

.. . 1991 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments Page 29 of 71 CHME TITLE DCP 926, Scal-in (Lockout) for Primary Turbine Trip Circuit (TMAAB)

CIIANGE DESCRIPTION The relays 62-TMAAB-XI and 62-TMAAB-X2 are to be replaced by an electroswitch (Tsp.

LOR or Equal) Lockout Relay [86-TMAAB] in the Primary Turbine Trip Circuit. This relay will

= lock-in the trip coil and prevent a momentaiy thmst bearing trip from removing voltage from the "USST" breaker trip coils, inhibiting immediate breaker reclosure. This will increase the reliability of the circuits.

SAFETY EVALUATION SIIMM ADY The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the final safety analysis report will not be increase <!,

because the proposed modification is for a Category 11 control circuit .hich was not previously evaluated in the FSAR.

The proposed modification will only change and rewire components inside Category 11 equipment.

Since' the Category II equipment was not previously evaluated in the FSAR, the proposed modification will not create a possibility for a different accident or malfunction than previously evaluated.

The category II control circk.: is not considered in the basis for any technical specification and therefore does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any technical specification. This change will not require a change to the Technical Specifications.

This change will not require a change to the UFSAR.

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Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2 -

. , 1991 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments Page 30 of 71 Cil ANGE TITLE

< DCP 1021, Sampling of the Steam Generator Blowdown Evaporators CII ANGE DESCRIPTION The purpose of this modification is to provide for continuous flow sampling of the evaporator bottoms for 2SGC-EV21B instead of the existing 3-5 ml bite sample; also, to relocate the sample point to a location downstream of the evaporator bottoms cooler (2SGC E24) to reduce the sample temperature to 140 - 150F. Currently, the sample is too hot to handle by Chemistry personnel. Continuous sampling capability will be provided by replacing existing sample valves SGC-362 and SGC-363 with tees. Controls for 2SGC-A0V102A & B and 2SGC-A0V10SA & B will be relocated to nearby the sample station for ease of operation. Heat tracing and insulation will be removed from lines being modified and new heat tracing and insulation will be instated on new sections of piping.

SAFETY EVALUATION SUMM ARY The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the BVPS-2 Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) will not be increased. Section 11.2 of the BVPS-2 FSAR is not affected by this modification.

This modification will serve to improve 'he sampling process of evaporator bottoms and improve personnel safety while sampling.

The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the BVPS-2 Final Safety Analysis Report will not be created. No failures of the sample tubing create -

any new accidents or malfunctions; replacement of the sample valves with tees will reduce the possibility of flowpath blockage due to boric acid crystallization and malfunction of the valves without afTecting the sample flowpath. Relocation of controls for SGC-A0V102A & B and SGC-A0V103A & B will allow for easier and safer sampling of evaporator bottoms by one person and creates no new accidents or malfunctions. No safety-related equipment is affected by this modification.

l The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specitication will not be reduced.

No Technical Specification bases are affected by this modification. This change will not require a change to the Technical Specifications.

UFSAR Figures 11.2-4 and i1.2-6 will need to be revised to reflect this modification.

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Beaver Valley Powcr Station Unit 2 1991 Repon of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments Page 31 of 71 CII A NGE TITIE DCP 1050, Steam Generator Blowdown Demineralizer System CII ANGE DESCRIPTION The existing permanent design of the Steam Generator Blowdown (BDG) System normally directs the BDG to the feedwater fourth point heaters where it becomes mixed with condensate flow. The Condensate Polishing System is unable to remove the BDG impurities afler they are diluted with condensate; therefore, the required secondary side chemistry cannot be achieved.

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A temporary BDG dunineralizer system, located between the blowdown tank [2BDG-TK21] and the main condenser, is currently in operation. It uses rented demineralier skids to condition the BDG prior to its discharge to the condenser hotwell. This modification proposes to permanently install a BDG demineralizer system by performing the following:

- replacing all temporary hoses (both metal and rubber) with piping,

- rotating the two heat exchangers presently used 16 in order to facilitate tube removal and minimize pipe runs,

- adding new cooling lines for these heat exchangers from condensate (CNM) and secondary plant component cooling (CCS),

- removing the temporary circulating water cooling pump, piping, and hoses that are presently used as cooling for these heat exchangers,

- adding temperature control valves to the heat exchangers' cooling water outlet lines, and

- adding a temperature indicating switch upstream of the demineralizers that will terminate flow to the demineralizers and divert it to the fourth point heaters on a temperature 120 F.

The rented demineralizer skids will be used as the permanent demineralizers with these modifications:

- relocating the skids to facilitate resin removal for regeneration,

- piping in all three skids in parallel with isolation capabilities so that two can be on-line with one in standby, and

- adding an in-line flowmeter downstream of the skids to read total BDG flow.

A sample panel will include instrumentation to monitor total conductivity, cation conductivity, pH, sodium, anJ silica levels. A temperature control unit will maintain samples at a desired temperature for uniform analysis. All data will be trended on a multi-point strip chart reccrder

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Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2

,. 1991 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments Page 32 of 71 and will be continuously transmitted to a computer located in the Unit 2 Chemistry Lab. This computer will be a commercial grade personal computer (PC) and w!!! be equipped with software especially designated to monitor and trend water chemistry. If present levels of conductivity, pH, silica, or sodium, are exceeded, a trouble signal will annunciate locally and at the PC.

MFETY EVAL,UATION SUMM ARY The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment 3 important to safety as previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) will not be increased. The purpose of this modification is to provide a method of demineralization to the steam generator blowdown water so that the required secondary chemistry limits can be adhered to. All components that are afTected by this modification are non safety-related. The safety evaluations and system analyses of USFAR Sections 9.3.2,10.4.8, and 15.6,3 remain valid.

The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report will not be created. No new failure modes or potential hazards will be created by the implementation of this modification.

The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification will not be reduced.

The implementation of this modification will not alTect the bases of any Technical Specifications, including 3.4.6.2, " Operational Leakage" and 3.11, " Radioactive EfIluents" This change will not require a change to the Technical Specifications.

This change will require changes to the FSAR. Section 10.4.8. will need to include the demineralizers and all associated equipment and alarms. Figure 10.4-23 and Table 10.4-12 will need to be revised to include applicable components.

Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2

., 1991 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments

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Page 33 of 71 Cil ANGE TITI,E DCP 1068, RWST Area CIIANGE DESCR:PTION The instrument lines affected by DCP 1068 are RWST and chemical addition tank lines for level transmitters 2QSS*LT100A/B,101 A/B,104A/B/C/D and 2QSS-LT102A/B. Freezing problems had been experienced with these lines. -The modification will protect these lines via higher wattage heat tracing and insulation. This modification willinclude the installation of another heat trace cable on the sensing lines of 2QSS*LT104A/B/C/D and new conduit to accommodate the additional circuits. An eyewash station which will be seismically installed and used for personnel safety is also included in this DCP.

Eyewash stations are not routinely described in the 'JFS AR, it does not meet the criteria of 50.59 (a)(1)(i), and has no adverse impact on any plant system. The addition of an eyewash station is not, thereforc, included in this evaluation.

- SAFETY EVALUATION SUMM ARY There are no BVPS Unit 2 Chapter 15 design basis accidents impacted by this DCP because heat tracing is not specifically addressed in the accident analysis.

The RWST Level Transmitters and the CAT L.evel Transmitters are part of the quench spray subsystem; however, the proposed new heat tracing will not adversely afTect safety because the replacement heat tracing is installed to the same requirements as the original.

The probability of an occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the safety analysis will not be k~ eased. This change does not affect any Chapter 15 analysis, ati does not, therefore, affect the probability of those accidents.

The consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the UFSAR will not be increased. oft-site dose will not be increased. This DCP is minor and replacing the heat tracing will not afTect any other safety systems or components.

The probability of a malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR will not be increased. The single failure analysis as defined in UFSAR Sectic .3.1is not changed. This DCP only modifies heat tracing; this type of a malfunction was not previously evaluated.

The consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR will not be increased. This DCP will not adversely affect any parameter which would increase the consequences of a malfunction. TNs DCP will not adversely afTect any safety system used to mitigt.te an accident. Therefore, there should be no efTect on the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety.

Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2 5

.; 1991 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments Page 34 of 71 :j t

This DCP will not cause any new credible failure modes because the fundamental design features rand functions of the heat tracing }"s not been altered. The new heat trace cable associated with 2QSS*LT104A/B/C/D shall be installed such that the heat trace on the sensing lines fur two transmitters are orange powered and for the other two transmitters is purple powered. No sensing line will have both orange and purple powered heat trace. This meets Reg. Guide 1.75.

The possibility for an accident of a different type than previously evaluated in the UFSAR will not

-be created.= This DCP is minor, and the existing heat tracing will be replaced by heat tracing with a higher rating; therefore, the change is not signi6 cant enough to create the possibility for an accident of a different type than analyzed in the UFSAR. -

The possibility for a malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR will not be created. Again, because this DCP is so minor, and the proposed new heat tracing would have the same type of malfunctions as the original tracing, the possibility of malfunction of a difTerent type is not created.

I The Technical Specification index and Specification 3/4.1.2,3/4.6.2 and 3/4.6.3 were reviewed to determine if any bases might be afTected. It was determined that this DCP will not adversely

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affect the margin of safety as d. efined in the basr for any Technical Specification because the reliability of the heat tracing will be maintained, and no other equipment will be afTected. This change will not require a change to the Technical Specifications.

UFSAR Section 8.3.1 will need to be revised to accurately reference circuits powered from IE

' sources.'

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• A subsequent UFSAR review determined that no clunges were requ;7eg_

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Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2

., , 1991 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments Page 35 of 71 Cil ANGE TITLE e DCP 1105, Turbine Supervisory Instmment System Upgrade Cil ANGE DESCRIPTION This design change will replace the original Westinghouse Turbine Supervisory Instmment System (T.S.I.) with a Bently Nevada Corporation (BNC) Model 3300 T.S.I. System which provides a more reliable, accurate, versatile and state-of-the-art rotating machinery monitoring system.

3 The turbine-generator monitoring functions to be provided by the BNC package include the following:

1) Vibration Displacement

2) Eccentricity

3) Keyphasor

4) Rotor Thrust Position

5) High Pressure Rotor Dif1'erential Expansion

6) Low Pressure Rotor Differential Expansion

7) High Pressure Casing Expansion

' 8) Speed The T.S.I. System monitors will be housed in a cabinet provided by BNC. The cabinet will be delivered with the system monitors installed and internally wired to output terminal strips in accordance with DLC specifications. The cabinet will be mounted on the Turbine Building elevator. This location is directly over the Turbine Building to service building cable penetrations which serves to minimize cable installation requirements.

- The BNC monitors will be powered from essential Bus Panel (PNL-ESSBS2-5C) located in the Service Building, Elevation 760'-6". One (1) cable will be installed along existing cable. trays between (PNL-ESSBS2-5C) and the T.S.I. cabinet. The essential bus power supply maintains the j' present degree of electrical reliability for the turbine thrust bearing failure turbine trip function.

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SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The only DBA atrected is UFSAR Section 15.2.3, Turbine Trip. The rotor thrust position circuit will initiate a turbine trip when thrust bearing failure is detected. The discussion addresses only

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Beaver Valley Power Str. tion Unit 2 y , 1991 Rej* ort of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments Page 36 of.71-the efTects of a turbine trip on the reactor power. This design change will have no effect on the analyzed accidents.

No safety systems will be affected by this design change. It is basically a one-for-one change out

-with reliable state-of-the-art equipment that is to function as the present system does.

The probability of occurrence of a previously evaluated accident will be unaffected by existence and/or functionality of this rnonitoring system._The Turbine Supervisory Instrumentation does not perform any nuclear safety function.

The consequences of previously analyzed accidents will remain unchanged. The turbine is used to convert internal energy to Linetic energy. The T.S.I. ensures the integrity of various turbine mechanical parameters. Accident analysis takes credit for other methods of removing the energy from the core during an accident.'

No increase in probability of malfunction of equipment important to safety will occur because the T.S.L _could only affect the operability of the turbine-generator unit and/or its support sy;tems.

None of the afTected equipment is QA Category I, safety-related.

'No equipment important to' safety could have an increase in the consequences of a malfunction due this design change. There are no dependencies, whether direct or indirect, between the T.S.I.

and safety equip _ ment.

- A failure of any one of the T.S.I. capabilities would not result in a scenario to be evaluated within the scope of the' accident analysis.

The proposed design change will not create the possibility of an accident of a different type than previously evaluated in the safety analysis report.. There is not impact on the primary system nor the ESF support systems by the proposed modification.

LThe proposed design change will not create the possibility of a malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the safety analysis report. The T.S.I. is only a monitoring system and does not provide any contr_ol nor protection any ESF equipment, It in no way will affect the operability

- of safety equipment.

The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification will not be reduced.

- The design change will in no way.afrect the parameters-that influence reactor kinetics, fission product barriers, or any other safety concern. The design change has no direct nor indirect impact on the margin of safety used in the bases for the Technical Specifications. The T.S.I. will in no way alTect e' quipment required by the limiting conditions for operation. This change will not require a change to the Technical Specifications.

This change will require a change to UFSAR Figure 10.2-6.

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Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2 1991 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments Page 37 of 71 Cil ANGE TITLE

- DCP 1110, Heavy Load Handler Down Ramp PAB El. 774' CII ANGE DESCRIPTION A housekeeping tour conducted on 3/11/88 identified a need to provide a means of safely transporting heavy loads and equipment on the ramp, located in the PAB at elevation 773'-6",

which leads to the reactor containment personnel air lock area. The purpose of this design change is to install a concrete pier which will be anchored on the existing floor slab at elevation 773'-6" and in front of the existing exhaust fan motor at the top of the ramp. A motor operated winch with a suflicient length of cable will then be installed on the pier. This winch will then be capable of pulling heavy loads along the ramp and should help reduce the risk of personnel injuries while moving heavy load.; along the ramp.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evalua.ed in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) will not be increased. This design modification involves installing a concrete pier on an existing floor slab in a seismic structure and attaching an electrically powered winch to the pier. This, however, should not cause any concerns since the new installation will be designed to maintain its integrity during seismic events. Additionally, this design modification will not involve or alTect any safety-related equipment or Class IE power supplies, The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report will not be created. Failure of the winch cable, electrical malftmetion, or separation of the winch from the concrete pier while moving a heavy load could create a gravity generated missile, consisting of the heavy load rolling down the ramp towards containment. However, this gravity missile would be stopped by the two-feet thick concrete wall in front of the personnel air hatch before it could strike the air hatch or containment building wall.

The only damage which could possibly result from the missile would be the failure of radiation monitoring equipment - 2RMR*RL206, 2RMR*RL207, 2RMR*RQ202A, 2RMR*RQ202B, 2RMR*DAU201, and 2RMR-DAU203, which are located in front of the concrete wall.

However, none of these components are listed in UFSAR Table 3.6B-2 as components outside containment required for safe shutdown of the reactor.

Since this design change will add a non-safety-related concrete pier and motor operated winch which are seismically designed, it should not adversely afTect any safety-related equipment and will not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluded in the UFSAR.

I

' Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2 1991 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments Page 38 of 71 The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification will not be reduced.

This design change is not covered by any Technical Specifications and no change to the Technical Specifications will be required.

This change will not require a change to the UFSAR.

M P

. Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2 1991 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments -l Page 39 of 71  !

CHANGE TITLE N . DCP 1170, Addition of Pipe Supports to Vacuum Priming Piping to Main Collection Tank 2VPS.

TK 21 CIIANGE DESCRIPTION A vacuum priming system is provided to prevent air binding in the condenser waterboxes and sections of the circulating-water piping, and to maintain a siphon to the cooling tower pump suction. Due to inadequate supports on the vacuum priming lines, excessive pipe movement occurred on the 6" and 3". diameter lines from the air separating tanks to the collection tank wheaever the level control valves (2VPS LCV-101's and 103's) actuated.

The purpose _of this modification is to add new pipe supports, revise existing pipe supports'

- functions, relocate pipe support strut and shim existing pipe support to take excessive movements out of the pipes.

SAFETY EVALUATION SUMM ARY There are no UFSAR design basis accidents which are potentially impacted by the proposed design change.

There are no safety systems which will be afTected by the proposed design change.

The probability _of an occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the safety analysis report will not be increased because the circulating water system and its vacuum priming system are not safety-related and are independent of the emergency cooling requirements.

The consequence of an accident previously evaluated in the safety analysis report will not be increased because the inoperability of the circulating water system and its associated vacuum priming system do - not impact safety-related equipment, and therefore affect no accident consequences.

The probability of a malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report will not be increased because the proposed changes will not affect any safety-related equipment. Besides, this more reliable vacuum priming system will enhance the circulating water system's operability _ Thus, the probability of a malftmetion of equipment will not be increased.

The conscquence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report will not be increased because the proposed design changes will not afTect the consequences of any malfunction of safety-related equipment.

= The possibility of an accident of a different type than previously evaluated in the safety analysis report will not be created b cause the installation of extra supports on the vacuum priming piping

1 4

Beaver Valley power Station Unit 2 -

1991 Report of Facinty Changes, Tests, and Experiments Page 40 of 71 will reduce the chance of pipe failure, damage to nearby equipment, and personnel injury. No possibility for an accident of a different type will be created, The_ possibility for a malfunction of equipment important to safety of a different type than 3 i

previously evaluated in the safety analysis report will not be created because the safety analysis report did not take credit from the circulating water and vacuum priming systems and therefore the malfunction of the vacuum priming system will not create a different type of malfunction of safety equipment.

Failure modes of the proposed design change which were reviewed included the failure of the vacuum priming system. liowever, since the circulating water and vacuum priming systems were not accounted for by the accident analyses, their failure will not affect the reactor safety.

@w The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification will not be reduced because the proposed design changes do not impact any Technical Specification requirements. 3 This change will not require a change to the Technical Specification.

This change will not require a change to the UFSAR.

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Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2 -

,, 1991 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments Page 41 of 71 CII ANGE TITLE

'DCP 1199,2HVI-FN203 Control Circuit Modification CilANGE DESCRIPTION The auxiliary boiler area electrical equipment room vent fan [2HVI-FN203] does not operate properly in fast speed in the automatic mode. A mechanical interlock exists between the slow and

. fast speed contactor coils. The slow speed coil does not de-energize when the fast speed coil is energized. As a result, the fast speed coil shorts out attempting to overcome the mechanical interlock.

2HVI-TH203 will be changed from a two-output to a three-output temperature controller. The first output will be set at 75 F, the second output at 80 F and the third output at 85 F.- The cor; tact associated with the st and output can then be used to de-energize the slow speed coil

- - before the fast speed coil receives a signal to energize.

This change will result in the fan operating as follows:

Case 1 - Temperature Rising - The fan will turn on at slow speed at 75 F and turn off 80 F. With no air flow, the temperature will continue rising and the fan will turn on at high speed at 85 F.

Case 2 - Temperature Falling - Assume the fan is operating at fast speed with temperature above 85 F. As the heat load falls below the heat removal rate, the temperature will drop. When the i

temperature falls below 85 F, the fan will turn oft. With no air flow, the temperature will rise, and the fan will turn on at 85 F again at fast speed. The fan will continue cycling On and Ofr at fast speed until the heat load is low enough that it can bridge the gap between 85 F and 80*F at which time the fan will turn On at slow speed and continue the cool dowrt Although this may not be the optimum mode of operation (no air flow between 80-85 F), the lead engineer has indicated that it is acceptable and is considered to adequately maintain the ventilation required for this room.

Therefore, this design change will maintain the reliability, integrity, and operability of the Electrical Equipment Room Vent Fan (EERVF) and will have no adverse efTects on any other equipment.

l-l SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

7 No design basis accidents will be affected because this design change does not adversely afTect l any safety or non-safety systems, does not exacerbate any existing accidents, and does not l introduce any new hazard beyond that already consideied in the UFSAR.

This design change will not adversely affect the safety function of any system. The reliability, j integrity, and operability of the EERVF will be maintained and no other systems will be alTected.

5 Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2 1991 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments Page 42 of 71 The probability of an occurrence of any accident previously evaluated in the UFSAR will not be increased. This design change will maintain the reliability, integrim, and operability of the EERVF, and it will have no efTect on any other equipment; therefore, no probabilities of occurrence of any accidents will be increased.

The consequences of an accident previcasly evaluated in the UFSAR will not be increased because the reliability, integrity, and operability of the EERVF is being maintained, and the change will have no efTect on any other equipment. This design change will not affect any parameter which would increase the consequences of an accident beycad that previously

- considered in the UFSAR. This design change will not adversely affect any safety system used to mitigate an accideni.

The probability of a malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR will not be increased because this design change will not adversely affect, either directly or indirectly, any equipment, including the EERVF.

The consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR will not be increased. This design change will not adversely afTect any parameter which would increase the consequences of a malfunction. This design change will not adversely ,

afTect any safety system used to mitigate an accident. Therefore, there will be no efTect on the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety.

This design change will not cause any new credible failure modes because the fundamental design feature and ftmetions of the equipment have not been significantly altered. This is a relatively minor change.

The possibility for an accident of a different type than previously evaluated in the UFSAR will not be created because nothing is being added or altered in a way which creates the possibility of a different type of accident. This design change is minor, and the reliability, integrity, and operability of the EERVF will be maintained, and no other equipment will be afTected.

The possibility for a malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR will not be created because of the fundamental design features and functions will not be changed in a way that creates a possibility of a malfunction of a difTerent type. This design change is minor, and the reliability, integrity, and operability of the EERVF will be maintained.

This design change will not change any parameter which affects the course of any accident analysis supporting Technical Specification bases. The Technical Specification index was reviewed to determine if any bases might be affected. It was determined that this design change will not adversely affect the margin of safety as dermed in the bases for any Technical Specifications because the reliability, integrity, and operability of the EERVF will be n.aintained, and no other equipment will be a!Tected. This change will not require a change to the Technical Specitications.

This change will not require a change to the UFS AR.

Deaver Valley Power Station Unit 2

., 1991 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments l ,

Page 43 of 71 CII ANGE TITI,E DCP 1280, Modification of Hotwell Sample Panel Cil ANGE DESCRIPTION Six (6) small diaphragm type positive displacement pumps supply condensate samples from the hotwell to the Hotwell Sample Panel. The pumps operate at a ccnstant 172 strokes per minute.

The pulsed flow from these pumps prevents accurate adjustment of the panel flowmeters, prevents dissolved oxygen analysis from being performed accura:ely, and rattles the entire peel.

Each sample passes through a resin exchange column en the Sample Panel. Because of the constant pulsation of the fluid, the potential exists for the resin retention screens to wear out or rupture. Since the Sample Panel efiluent is designed to be returned to the hotwell, re. sin beads could be introduced into the condensate.

The pump diaphragms are oil actuated. Each pump contains about one pint of oil. If the diaphragm should rupture, the oil would be drawn into the hotwell The oil would break down into organic acids that would disrupt the carefully controlled condensate chemistry. It would also

" poison" the cation columns and the various electrodes that monitor conductivity, pH, sodium, etc. To prevent resin and oil from contaminating condensate, the return line to the hotwell has been disconnected and the efiluent from the Sample Panel is currently routed to the Turbine Building floor drain system. Approximately 20,000 gallons of condensate per month are discarded in this manner. ,

The solutions to these problems are to replace the existing diaphragm pumps with pulseless rotary pumps and add a strainer to the line that returns panel efiluent to ths hotwell. The strainer should be large enough to trap all the resin contained in one (1) cation column.

SAFETY EVALUATION SUMM A RY The Hotwell Sample System does not afTect any safety-related equipment.

The proposed design change will not increase the probability of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the safety analysis report. The proposed design change will improve the reliable operation of the Hotwell Sample System and allow the system to operate as intended.

The strainer will ensure that no resin that escapes in the unlikely event of an ion exchanger failure will enter the condenser hotwell.

The proposed design change will not increase the consequences of an acci' lent previously evaluated in the safety analysis report. The consequences of accidents described in Section 9.3.2.2 of the UFSAR are not increased by this design change.

The proposed design change will not increase the probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report. The Condenser Hotwell Sample System does not alTect any safety-related equipment as described in

Deaver Valley Power Station Unit 2 1991 Feport of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments -

Page 44 of 71-

-- Section 9.3.2.2 of the UFS AR. This modification will reduce the probability of a sample panel ion exchanger to lose resin into the hotwell and to eliminate the possibility of a diaphragm failure of

- the sample pumps by replacing the pumps.-

' The proposed design change will not increase the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report. The Condenser Hotwell i

Sample System does not affect any safety-related equipment as described in Section 9.3.2.2 of the UFSAR.

No new credible failure modes of the proposed design change can be identified.

The proposed design change will not create the possibility of an accident of a different type than previously evaluated in the safety analysis report. This modification will correct deficiencies in the previous design to permit the system to operate as originally designed per Section 9.3.2.2 of the ,

UFSAR.

a The proposed design change will not create the possibility of a malfunction of a different type than ,

previously evaluated in the safety analysis report. New malfunctions are being created under this design. ,

There are no changes in parameurs_which afTect the course of any accident analysis supponmg Technical Specification bases and resu't in exceeding the acceptance criteria for fuel cladding, RCS boundary, or containment integrity. The proposed design change will not reduce the nurgin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. No Technical Specifications or bases are affected by this design change. This change will not require a change to the Technical Specifications.

UFS AR Figure 93-10 will need to be revised to show the location of the strainer to be added by this design change.

t-d

- , . + c -, -n n , ,, , . - , - - , -s .- -

Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2

., 1991 Rept rt of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments Page 45 of 71 Cil ANGE TITLE F

^ DCP 1304, RPI Low Voltage Povar Supply Modification CII ANGE DESCRIPTION The accuracy of the Analog Rod Position Indication System (AIU'IS) is dependent upon the systems four 13 volt D.C. power supplies.

The current system configuration provides annunciation for any power supply failure via 4 monitor relays. This arrangement does not provide indication for power supply drift A reactor trip on 2/7/87 revc2 7 stem inaccuracies due to power supply drift prompting NRC concerns about system degradation.

This DCP will replace the four non-adjustable monitor relays with four relays with an adjustable trip point to provide immediate annunciation due to power supply dnft Steps can then be taken to correct the power supply drift problem and thereby maintain the accuracy of the A'lPIS.

The specific location of equipment associated with this change is the rear of ARPIS cabinet RPI-3 in the Process Control Room.

The DCP will maintain the reliability, integrity, (accuracy) and operability of the ARPIS and will have no adverse efTects on any other equipment.

SAFETY EVALUATION SUMM ARY No design basis accidents will be affected by this DCP because this DCP does not adversely affect any safety or non-safety systems, does not exacerbate any existing accidents, and does not introduce any new hazard beyond that already considered in the UFSAR.

This DCP will not adversely affect the safety function of any system. The reliability, integrity ,

and operability of the ARPIS will be maintained and no other systems will be affected.

The probability of an occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the UFSAR will not be increased. This DCP will maintain the reliability, integrity, and operability of the ARPIS and it will have no efTect on any other equipment; therefore, no probabilities of occurrence of any accidents will be increased.

The consegaences of an accident previously evaluated in the UFSAR will not be increased because the reliabi!ity integrity, and operability of the ARPIS is being maintained and the change will have no effect on any other equipment. This DCP will not affect any parameter which muld increase the consequences of an accident beyond that previously considered in the UFSAR. This DCP will not adversely alTect any safety system used to mitigate an accident.

_ __ _ __ _ _ . . _ _ ___ _ _ ___._._..._____.__.m _

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- Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2 -

., L 1991 Repon of Facihty Changes, Tests, and Experiments Page 46 of 71_

- The probability of a malfunc! ion of equipment important te safety a previously evaluated in the UFSAR will not be increased because this DCP will not adversely affect, either directly or F -- indirectly, .any equipment, including the ARPIS. - This DCP only afTects non-safety related equipment.

The consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR will not be increased. This DCP will not adversely affect any parameter which would - ,

Lincrease the consequences of a malfunction. This DCP will not adversely afTect any safety system used to mitigate an accident. Therefore, there will be no efTect on the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety.

This DCP will not cause any new credible failure modes because the fundamental design features and functions of the equipment have not been significantlya 'ltered. This is a relatively minor change.

The possibility for an accident of a difTerent type than previously evaluated in the UFSAR will not c - s be created because nothing is being added or altered in a way which creates the possibility of a different type of accident. This DCP is minor, and the reliability, integrity, and operability of the ARPIS will be maintained, and no other equipment will be atTected.

The possibility for a malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR will not be created because the fundamental design features and functions will not be changed in a way that creates the possibility of a malfunction of a difTerent type. This DCP is minor and the reliability, integrity, and operability of the ARPIS will be maintained. This DCP only affects non-safety related equipment.

The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification wih not be reduced This DCP will not change any parameter which affects the course of any accident analysis supporting Technical Specification bases. The Technical Specification index was reviewed to determine if any bases might be affected. It was determined that this DCP will not adversely affect the margin-of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specifications because the reliability, integrity, and operability of the ARPIS will be maintained, and no other equipment will be affected. This change will not require a change to the Technical Specifications.

This change will not require a change to the UFSAR.

l l

Deaver Valley Power Station Unit 2

., 1991 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments Page 47 of 71 Cil ANGE TITIJ;

- DCP 1312, Upgrade of Turbine Plant Sample Panel and llotwell Sample Panel Cil ANGE DESCRIPTION Presently, BVPS-2 does not have the capt.bility to detect chemistry changes on a continuous basis for the Turbine Plant Sampling System. Various in-line monitors are not in service, and the status ofimportt.nt chemistry parameters are determined, once a day, by analyzing grab samples.

A review of the existing sampling equipment has determined that most of the equipment is obsolete and should be replaced. This modification proposes to update the Turbine Plant and llotwell Sampling Panels by deleting extraneous equipment, replacing outdated equipment, and installing new equipment. The Turbine Plant Panel will be reworked and the Hotwell Panel will be replaced, in order to accommodate the changes. A Data Acquisitioning System Management Station will be installed in the Secondary Chemistry Lab, along with the conduit required for the connecting cable. Four (4) new tubing runs will be installed; one (1) tubing run from each of the three (3) steam generator discharge lines, and one (1) tubing run from the heater drain pumps discharge header will all provide samples to the Turbine Plant Sample Panel y

SAFETY EVAIEATION SUMM ARY This modification will not impact any of the design basis accidents discussed in JFSAR Chapter 15.

No safety systems will be affected by the proposed design change. The Turbine Plant Sampling .

System performs no safety-related function. The failure of this equipment will not af" et the safety functions of other equipment.

The proposed design change will not increase the probability of occurrence of an accident g previously evaluated in the safety analysis report. No safety-related components, systems or structures will be alTected in any way by this modification.

The proposed design change will not increase the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the safety analysis report None of the equipment required to mitigate any of the previously analyzed accidents will be afTected in any way by this modification.

The proposed design change will not increase the probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report. No safety-related equipment or functions will be affected by this modification. Even the non-safety related function of the Turbine Plant Sampling System will remain essentially unchanged. This modification serves only to update the existing system with more modern and reliable sampling equipment.

The proposed design change will not increase the consequences of a malftmetion of equipment

Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2 1991 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments Page 48 of 71 imponant to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report. This modification will have no effect on any safety-related equipment functions.

The modified sample panels and all associated components will meet applicable requirements for a QA Category 11, non-seismic instailation. None of the Turbine Plant Sample System components performs a safety-related function; therefore, there are no instrument failures that could occur that would be immediately detrimental to plant equipment or to personnel or public safety. Also, since the equipment will be installed to appropriate standards, the possibility ofleaking components will not be increased from what presently exists.

The proposed design change will not create the possibility of an accident of a different type than previously evaluated in the safety r.nalysis report. No other components, systems or structures will be adverselv afTected by this modification.

The proposed design change wfl not create the possibility of a malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the safety analysis report. No new failure modes or potential hazards will be created by the ii ementation of this modification.

There are no changes in parameters which afTect the course of any accident analysis supporting Technical Specification bases and that result in exceeding the acceptance criteria for fuel cladding, RCS boundary, or continment integrity. The proposed design change does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification (T.S.). T.S. 3/4.4.7 and 3/4.4.8 deal only with the Reactor Coolant System chemistry and specific activity. T.S. 3/4.7.1.4 specifies the activity limits on the secondary coolant system to ensure that the resultant offsite radiation dose, in the event of a steam line rupture, will not exceed 10CFR Part 100 limits. The requirements ofMis T.S. will continue to be adhered to and the margin of safety will not be afTected by this modification. This change will not require a change to the Technical Specification.

UFS AR Section 9.3.2.2. and Figures 9.3-9 and 9.3-10 will need to be revised to reflect this modification.

Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2 l

., , 1951 Report of Facihty Changes, Tests, and Experiments

,' Page 49 of 71 CII ANGE TITI E i DCP 1354, Replacement ofInstrument Air Dryer,21AS-DRY 21 CII ANGE DESCRIPTION This design change is to replace the existing dryer with a larger capacity dryer to correct a design deficiency and therefore, improve the instrument air supply system with standard ISA S7.3.

Another design objective of this DCP is to install a particulate filter in the copper line immediately after the transition to trap any particulate that may be within the lines due to corrosion of the carbon steel pipe and receiver tank downstream of the dryer.

SAFETY EVAI,UATION SUM M ARY UFSAR, Chapter 15 design basis accidents were reviewed to identify what design basis accidents could be impacted by the proposed modification. The station air system is non-safety-related and not required for safe shutdown of BVPS Unit 2. None of the UFSAR Chapter 15 safety analysis will be affected by this modification.

All safety systems that utilize air from the non-safety related station instrument air wid be affected; however, the effect will be favorable in that the quality of the air provided to the safety systems will be improved by the removal of any particulate that may have entered the air stream due to degradation of the instrument air receiver tank and any other carbon steel line and by removal of moisture within the air stream that previously was not removed by the undersized dryer.

The design change will not increase the probability of occurrence of a loss ofinstrument air or any --

other accident previously evaluated. The existing system has an undersized dryer that has required excessive maintenance. The new dryer has a large enough capacity so as not to overload and is flow regcaerative vs. a heat regenerative type that the existing unit is. Flow regenerative dryers require less maintenance than h:at regenerative dryers. Therefore, the system will be in the bypass mode less frequently, decreasing the time safety system vulnerable to excessive moisture must use non-dried air.

No equipment or systems required to mitigate the consequences of any previously analyzed accident will be affected by this modification. Desiccant-type cartridge removal filter bypass system would be utihzed to supply dry air to instrument air system in case of air dryer ruptures or malfunctions. Containment isolation valves' closure will not be affected by this modification.

The modification of the instrument air dryer and the receiver tank does not create a situation which would increase the probability of a malfunction. Air dryer ruptures or malfunctions and filter clogs have been reviewed. They should have the same reliability and will not increase the probability of a malfunction.

There should be no effect on the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety j 1

Beaver Wiley Power Station Unit 2

., 1991 Repon of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments Page 50 of 71 as previously evaluated in UFSAR. All safety-related instmments that utilize air from the non-safety related instmment air system and the containment isolation will not reduce their safety function.

Air dryer ruptr es or malfunctions and filter clogs were reviewed. No new credible failure modes will be createa by the implementation of this modification. There will be no functional changes to any safety related equipment, system or structures.

There is no configuration change such that an accident of a difTerent type is created. Air dryer ruptures or malfunctions will not affect desiccant-type cartridge removal filter bypass system to be utilized to supply dry air to instrument air system.

The proposed design change . vill not create the possibility of a malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the safety analysis report. No new failure modes or potential hazards will be created by the implementation of this modification. The failure of this equipment has no effect on safe plant operation and shutdown of the plant, and the failure of this equipment will not affect the safety function of other equipment.

There are no changes in parameters which affect the course of any accident analysis supporting Technical Specification bases and result in exceeding the acceptance criteria for fuel cladding, RCS boundary, or containment integrity. The proposed design change does not reduce the margin of safety as defined iri the basis for any Technical Specification. No TS basis will be afTected in any way in this modification. This change will not require a change to the Technical Specifications.

UFS AR Section 9.3.1.1.2 will need to be updated to reflect this modification.

Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2 -

.. 1991 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments Page 51 of 71 CIIANGE TITI E

'DCP 1370, Control Room HVAC Noise Level Reduction - NRC Licensing Commitments Human Engineering Discrepancies CIIANGE DESCRIPTION Considerable background noise and drafts exist in the Unit 2 control room due to high air velocity in:the supply and return ductworki Also, compressor / condenser units 2HVC-REF24A, B _

continuously start and stop during low cooling periods, . damaging motor starters and compressors. New setpoints for the control room ventilation were calculated. The design objectives are to reduce air velocities in the ductwork by 20% in order to reduce control room noise and to re-balance the air system flows as a result. A 30 KW heater will be added to each air handler _ to increase the heat load during the winter and shutdowns to prevent the compressor / condenser units from excessive cycling. If possible, for further noise reduction, the

+ existing fans in Radiation Monitors 2RMS-RM11-1,2 will be replaced with quieter fans.

SAFETY EVAL,UATION

SUMMARY

None'of the accidents in Chapter 15 of the Unit 2 UFSAR are affected by this design change. The control room isolation functions that occur during a CIB resulting from an accident described in Chapter 15 will continue to operate as described in the UFSAR Section 9.4.1.

No safety systems will be affected by the proposed design change. The changes to be made under this design change will not afTect the Control Room Emergency Bottled Air Pressurization System (CREBAPS) or the outdoor emergency air supply system. The operation of these subsystems is not affected.

The proposed design change will not increase the probability of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the safety analysis report. The probability of a chlorine leak or a design basis accident that would cause a control room isolation is not increased. A 20% reduction in air flow to the control room will still provide adequate air flow for equifment cooling and habitability and will reduce wind noise in the control room.

L j_ The proposed design change will not increase the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the safety analysis report. The signals and initiating events that cause the control L

room to isolate are not affected by this design change. The control room will isolate and l

pressurize as presently described in Section 9.4.1 of the UFSAR. The 200 CFM exfiltration of air from the control room used to comply with dose assessment calculations will not be changed.

The proposed design change will not increase the probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report. All installations will be seismic and will not affect any part of the system that will respond to an accident (CREBAPS, outdoor emergency air supply systems).

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- Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2  ;

. ,-, 1991 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments Page 52 of 71

~

The proposed design change will not increase the consequences of a malfunction of equipment

'in portant to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report. This design change will 4 not increase the consequences of a malfunction of the control room isolation and pressurization equipment because none of this equipment is affected by this design change. ,

The only credible failure modes in this design change are the electrical failure of the 30 KW preheater and the failure of the new fan blowers on 2RMS RMI1-1,2.

None of the changes will create the possibility of a new accident scenario not previously evaluated '

in the UFSAR.L The Control Room Air Conditioning System is~ designed to respond to accidents external to it and is not listed as a cause fo. .uiy accidents (Chlorine Spdl or CIB).

The proposed design change will not create the possibility of a malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the_ safety analysis report. All modifications will be seismically installed.

.No part of this installation affects any part of the system (CREBAPS, outdoor emergency air system) required to function in the event of an accident.

._There are no changes in parameters which affect the course of any accident analysis supporting Technical Specification bases and result in exceeding the acceptance criteria for fuel cladding,

- RCS boundary, or containment integrity.

. The proposed design change will not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any 3 Technical Specification. 'This design change does not. affect any of the equipment required to be operable 'in Technical Specification 3/4.7.7. This change will not require a change to the

- Technical Specification.

UFSAR Sections 9.4.1.1.13 and 9.4.1.21 and Figure 9A-1 will need to be revised to reflect these modifications.

I l

l

Beaver Valley Power Station ' Unit 2

., , 1991 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments

,- Page 53 of 71 CilANGE TITI.E

' DCP 1389, ERFCS ATSC Elimination CII A NGE DESCRIPTION This design change proposes to eliminate the Alternate Technical Support Center (ATSC) as approved by the NRC on 4/20/88. The modification will affect only non-safety related mmon .ats ad will remove one console table and two wireways. Associated cables will be disconnected and spared. The proposed change will have no affect on any safety related systems or components.

SAFJTY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

+ 'There tre no Chapter 15 design basis accidents impacted by this DCP because the ATSC is not specifit ally add esce? in the accident analysis.

The prc bability of an occurrence and the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the safety a talysis will not be increased. This change does not affect any safety-related components, and does not, therefore, affect any Chapter 15 analysis.

The probability of a malfunction and consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR will not be increased. This DCP will remove a non-safety related computer system from service. This DCP will not atTect any safety system used to mitigate an accident. Therefore, there should be no effect on the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety.

. ' This DCP will not cause any new credible failure modes because the ftmdamental safety features and functions of the plant have not been altered. This DCP removes the ATSC from service.

The possibility for an accident of a different type than previously evaluated in the UFS AR will not be created. This DCP is minor, and the task will affect only non-safety related electrical systems; l

therefore, the change is not significant enough to create the possibility for an accident of a different type than analyzed in the UFSAR.

l The possibility for a malfunction of a difTerent type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR will not be created. Again, because this DCP is so minor, and the ATSC has no safety functions.

l i-The possibility of malfunction of a different type is not created.

l This DCP will not change any parameter which afTects the course of any accident analysis l supporting Technical Specification bases. The Technical Specification index and Section 5, Design Features, were reviewed. The ATSC is not addressed in the Technical Specifications.

This change will not require a change to the Technical Specifications.

This change will not require a change to the UFSAR.

r ~

Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2 1991 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments

- Page 54 of 71 CII ANGE TITLE DCP 1472, Unit 21&C Shop Ventilation Hood Cll ANGE DESCRIPTION Several INPO findings and an incident during the past year demonstrate the need for a fume exhaust heiod in the SOSB Instrument and Control (l&C) Shop. The objective of this design change is to provide a means of exhausting fumes from the SOSB I&C Shop. This will provide a safe method oihandling chlorine and other hazardous materials during calibration procedures.

SAFETY EVALUATION SUMM AP.Y ,

UFSAR Chapter 15 design basis accidents were reviewed to identify what design basis accidents could be impacted by the proposed modification. This design change is non-safety related and in no way afTects design basis accidents. It has no impact on any safety function of any system. The ventile* ion system has a negligible impact.

This DCP will not adversely atreet the safety function of any system. The fume hood will not be pewered from an IE power source. It does not ha e a signibcant impact on the ventilation system because the cyhaust totals only 800 cfm.

This design change will not increase the probability of occurrence of an accident of the ventilation system or any other accident previously evaluated. It has no safety function. Tnis will provide a safe method of handling chlorine during calibration procedures.

This DCP will not affect any parameter which wouhl increase the consequences of an accident beyond that previously considered in the UFSAR This equipment does not impact the ability of safety systems to respond to an accident, and therefore will not increase the consequences.

The probability of a malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety ana'4ysis report will not be increased because it will not be pov ered from an IE power source. It has na safety function. It will not de:rease the reliability of other equipment.

The consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR will not be increased. This DCP will not adversely affect any parameter which would increase the consequences of a malfunction. This DCP will not adversely affect any safety systems used to mitigate an accident. Therefore, there will be no effect on the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety.

Failure modes of the proposed design change which were reviewed included the equipment failure of the ventilation system and power failure in the SOSB I&C Shop. Since it is not safety-related, it does not introduce a new accident.

The proposed design change will not create the possibility of an accident of a ditTerent type than

Deaver Valley Power Station Unit 2

. , 1991 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments Page 55 of 71 previously evaluated in the safety analysis report. No possibility for an accident of a ditrerent type than those that have already been evaluated is foreseen. The accident of a different type will not be created.

The proposed design change will not create the possibility of a malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the safety analysis report. No new safety-related component functions are being created. This equipment is not safety-related. The fume hood will not be powered from an IE power source. It has negligible impact on the ventilation system. The failure of this equipment will not afTect the safety function of other equipment.

There are no changes in parameters which affect the course of any accident analysis supporting Technical Speci0 cation bases and result in exceeding the acceptance criteria for fuel cladding, RCS boundary, or containment integrity. The proposed design change does not reduce the p margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. No T.S. basis will be affected, in any way, by this design change. This change will not require a change to the Technical Specifications.

This change will not require a change to the USFAR.

Y

13eaver V,Miey Power Station Unit 2 1991 Repon of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments Page $6 of 71 Cil ANGI: TITIS DCP 1496, Maintenance Improvements for lleater Drain Pumps (211Dil P21 A,11)

Cil ANGl: 11F.SCillPTION The purpose of this design change is to provide clearance and cooling water line modincations to allow the heater drain pumps (211Dil P21 A and 11) to be removed for maintenance. This will be accomplished by re routing the overhead obstructions consisting of two cable raceways (2Til710N and 2Til711N), a conduit (2CC960YA), and an extraction steam line (2 ESS 002-124 4), it will also include minor piping modi 6 cations made to the secondary component cooling water lines supplying the heater drain pumps to allow for isolation of eithe. pump without affecting the operation of the other or for isolation of both pumps simultaneously. Additionally, four valvu will be added to the coolir.g water supply lines to be used as blowdown valves for clearing out any bk... oes which occur in the lines.

SAFI:TY EVAL,UATION SUMM AltY UFSAR Sectior,s 15.1 and 15.2 were reviewed and will not be impacted by this proposed design change. No credit is taken in any of the safety analyses of Chapter 15 for a icactor trip on a turbine trip.

The Secondary Component Cooling Water System (CCS), Extraction Steam System (ESS), and the lleater Drains System (llDH) are non safety related. Any modi 6 cations made to these systems as pan of this proposed design change will not airect any safety systems. The modi 6 cations made to conduit 2CC960YA afTects turbine trip /reactoi trip cables; however, these are not required for reactor safety.

The proposed design change will not increase the probability of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the safety analysis report. The modi 6 cations n' de to the CCS and ESS are simple piping modi 6 cations whose failure would not afTect any safety related components.

Any failures associated with the re-routing of the electrical cable trays which house cables for the heater drain pumps would not affect safety related components. Modi 6 cations made to the conduit and cables which provide turbine trip signals to the ShPS will have electrical tests performed upon completion to ensure that it does not degrade the reactor trip on turbine trip function.

Deaver Valley Power Station Unit 2 1991 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and lisperiments Page 57 of 71 The proposed design change will not increase the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the safety analysis report. The CCS, ti% and 11D11 systems are all non safety-related, and any postulated failures of these :;ystems as a result of this design change will not I increase the consequences of any previously evaiuated accident. The reactor trip on turbine trip function, as stated in UFSAR Section 7.211.2, provides additional protection and conservatism

)

beyond that required and is included as part of good engineering practice and prudent design llowever, no credit is taken in any of the UFSAR Chapter 15 safety analyses for this trip, and therefore its failure will not increase the consequences cf any accidents previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

The proposed design change will not '. crease the probability of occurrence of a nndfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report. As stated above, CCS, ESS and 11D11 nave no safety functions, and their failure will not alrect the safety functions of other equipment. The reactor trip on turbine trip function is part of good engineering practice and provides additional protection and conservatism Moreover, mechanical and electrical test specifications will oc written a ensure that these modified compor,ents are tested and deemed operable, and have r.~i c.ca degraded from performing their original ftmetions.

i The proposed design change will not increase the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report. Only the work performed

,_ on conduit 2CC960YA could affect equipment which is important to safety. Ilowever, the consequences of a turbine trip accident, as discussed in UFSAR Section 15 2 3, would not be increased since no credit is taken for a direct - : tor trip from a turbine trip signal.

The credible failure modes have been identified and it has been concluded that these modes were previously evaluated.

Pipe 11reaks:

CCS - Resulting flood water would be contained inside of the Tmbine Building and would not affect safety related eqtopment, break can be isolated.

ESS - Resulting steam release would be inside of the Turbine lluilding and would not alrect safety-related equipment, break can be isolated Electrical Malfunction.;:

llDl! - System is non-lE and any failures would not alTect any IE equipment.

SSPS Input - Loss of reactor trip on turbine trip signal, no credit is assumed in accident analyses for this feature.

The proposed desig . change will not create the possibility of an accident of a cifTerent type than p:eviousl3 evaluated in the safety analysis report Modifications performed under :his proposed design change are minor piping modifications and cable raceway and conduit re-routes. All work will be performed in the Turbine Building and will meet the original design requirements.

---_-_.------------.__-_---_--__-_m.._____%__,,_2_ _ _

Deaver Valley Power Station Unit 2

. , 1991 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments ,

Page 58 of 71 The proposed design change will not create the possibility of a malfunction of a different type than  !

previously evaluated in the safety analysis report. 'lhls proposed design change consists of minor  !

cable tray and conduit re routing and piping modifications to provide clearance so that the heater drain pumps can be removed for maintenance. It will be designed and installed so that the original system design is maintained.

The implementation of this design change would not change any parameters which could affect the course of any accident analysis supporting Technical Specification Bases and result in exceeding fuel cladding, RCS boundary, or containment integrity acceptance criteria. The proposed design change wil! not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. The margin of safety as dermed in Technical Specification Bases 3/4.8.2 will not be reduced since the operability of Vital Bus IV will be maintained in the same manner j which currentl3 exists. This change will not require a change to the Technical Specificatio j UFSAR Figure 9.2-29 will need to be revised to show the piping modifications performed on the Secondary Component Cooling Water System, I

F

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Deaver Valley Power Station Unit 2

, , 1991 Report of Facilit" Changes, Tests, and Experiments I sge 59 of 71 Cil ANGE TITi,I; DCP 1512, Motification of the Appendix R Emergency Lighting Controls for the CR, SDP, and ASDP Areas CllANGE DESCRIPTION During the design and licensing process for BVPS Unit 2, a commitment was made to supply e minimum illumination level of ten (10) foot candles in the control areas critical to a safe plai.,

shutdown. These areas include the Control Room (CR), the Shutdown Panel (SDP), and the Alternate Shutdown Panel (ASDP). Results of tests conducted in these areas indicate that the minimum illumination levels required can only be obtained if either additional lighting is installed or if the operation of the existing Appendix R lighting is modined.

This modification proposes to modify the operation of the existing Appendix R lights. The

- Appendix R lights consist of ilolophane fluorescent lighting fixtures. .These lights are not normally illum!nated; they receive necessary AC power only to trickle charge their 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> battery packs and to provide indication of the availability of normal AC lighting power. On a loss of normal AC lighting power they are designed to illuminate, being powered by their 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> battery packs. Currently, the AC power being supplied to the Appendix R lights is backed up by the non-safety related black diesel. This is a conservative design for lights that are illuminated by AC power; however, since the Appendix R lights illuminate on the loss of AC power, they only illuminate if both the origmal AC power source and the black diesel are lost. These lights have been shown to illuminate for approximately 30 seconds only on a loss of AC power since they will extinguish when the blad diesel starts to supply the AC power.

This modification proposes to provide the necessary AC power to the Appendix R lights from sources that are not backed up by the black diesel. This will allow the Appendix R lights to operate in tandem with exis ag emergency lighting that is powered from the black diesel, in this -

case, the Appendix R lights will not be considered as emergency lighting themselves, but they will provide an additional source ofillumination for up to eight (S) continuous hours following a loss ofnormal AC power.

Also to be implemented under this modification is the work that has already been approved under DCP 1019. This involves the installation of a lloiophane fluorescent lighting fixture in the Unit 1/2 CR vestibule area and the installation of approximately ten (10) feet oflighting conduit. This fixture, being located in an access / egress area, will be continuously illuminated by normal AC lighting power and will be illuminated by 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> battery backup on the loss of normal AC. Since the steel plate roof of this area is considered to be part of the CR pressure boundary, Nuclear Group Administrative Manual (NGAM) 815 must be adhered to during' any breaching and re-sealing of this boundny.

Deaver Valley Power Station Unit 2

, , 1991 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments Page 60 of 71 SAFETY EVAI,liATION StiMMARY None of the previously analyzed accidents will be impacted by the proposed modification. This modification will have the clTect of better illuminating the plant control areas when normal AC lighting power is lost. The existing Appendix R lighting will ilbminate using power from 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> battery packs until the time when the normal AC lighting power is restored.

No safety systems will be adversely alTected by the proposed design change. The Appendix R lighting is considered as QA Category F. Currently it receives an AC power input from a non.

Class IE source that is backed up by the non safety related diesel generator (the black diesel).

The lights, in effect, receive an AC power input from one of two " normal" AC power sources.

Power for illumination comes from their 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> batten packs and this occurs only during the loss I of both the original AC power signals. This modification will cause the lights to illuminate during ,

the loss of the original AC power source and continue to illuminate when the black diesel is operating. In this way they will work in tandem with emergency lighting that is illuminated from black diesel power. The Appendix R lights will then extinguish when the original AC power signal is restored.

The proposed design change will not increase the probability of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the safety analysis report. No safety related system or component functions will be adversely affected by this modification The-proposed design change will not increase the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the safety analysis report. No components required to help mitigate any of the previausly analyzed accidents will be affected by this modification.

The proposed design change will not increase the probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report. No safety- .

related equipment will be adversely affected by this modification. The implementation of this modification will help to ensure that a minimum illumination level of 10 foot eandles is met for at least 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. Appendix R lights and their associated power sources are not safety-related; however, they are still designed with a vey high degree of reliability. This modification will actually help to enhance the ability of station personnel to safely shut down the plant by providing better illumination at the three control locations.

Tne proposed design change will not increase the consequer.ces of a malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report. All equipment directly involved with this modification is non safe *y related except for the vestibule ceiliny which is part

.of the CR pressure boundary. Adherence to NGAM 8.1$ willinsure that an acceptable boundary .

is kept therefore, maintaining adequate CR habitability.

No new failure modes or potential hazards will be created by the implementation of this modificatin.. The equipment involved in this DCP is considered to be QA Category F but will be mounted seismically due to its location in close proximity to safety related equipment.

t

-The proposed design change will not create the possibility of an accident of a different type than previously evaluated in the safety analysis report. The functions of all safety-related equioment

Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2 1991 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments Page 61 of 71 will remain unchanged. The involved electrical equipment, although non safety related, is adequately sized to facilitate this modification.

The proposed design change will not create the possibility of a malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the safety analysis report. The Appendix R lights will still be illuminated by their 8-hour battery power units. This modification will cause them to illuminate on the loss of normal AC power and allow them to continue to illuminate aller the black diesel supplies AC power, This will not degrade the function of these or any other lights; it will simply allow the Appendix R lights to work in tandem with emergency lights in the event of a loss of normal AC

- lighting power.

There are no changes in parameters which affect the course of any accident analysis supporting Technical Specification bases and that result in exceeding the accef tance criteria for fuel cladding, RCS boundary, or containment integrity. The proposed design change does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification (T.S.). No T.S. or their bases, including that of T.S. 3/4.3.3.5, 3/4.8.1, 3/4.7,7 or 5.7.1 will be affected by the 4

implementation of this modification.

This change will not require a change to the UFSAR.

l

Denver Valley Power Station Unit 2 l

., 1991 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments Page 62 of 71 Cil ANGE TITLE DCP 1629, Addition of a Manual Drain Valve to Remove Radioactive Particles from Fuel Pool Cooling Hot Spot CHANGE DESCRIPTION A capped 3/4 inch pipe nipple,6 inches long is located or .i six inch pipe, 2 FNC-006-17-4, the inlet side of Fuel Pool Cooling Pump 2FNC-P24A. The proposed modification is for the addition of a 3/4 inch drain valve to remove the accumulated radioactive debris.

The need for this modification is based on the stations' need for adherence to ALARA concerns.

Adding a valve to the pipe nipple will allow the hot spot to be eliminated by removing the radioactive debris.

SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

No credible failure modes associated with the change have been identified. The valve will be normally shut with the end plugged. Also if the valve should leak the fuel pool cooling system consists of two trains, so it may be isolated.

The proposed change will not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated previously in the UFS AR.

' The change and/or the failure modes associated with the change will have no effect on the probability of failure of the systems identified. Addition of a drain valve would not impact the performance of the safety system. Addition of a drain valve would remove the hot spot concern.

The proposed change will not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an -

accident evaluated previously in the UFSAR.

In the event of a loss of fuel pool cooling and normal make up water, a supply of water is c . provided from seismic Category I service water system, described in UFSAR Section 9.1.3. If the valve would leak makeup water will be supplied. Also there are two trains so the valve can be isolated for repairs.

There are no design basis accidents for which failure modes associated with he change can be an p initiating event. Addition of a 3/4 inch plugged drain valve is not necessary for system operation.

l The change.will have no efTect on the probability of occurrence of the design basis accidents.

l Addition of a 3/4 inch plugged drain valve does not contribute to the severity of a leak in the fuel pool cooling system.

The proposed activity will not create the possibility of an accident of a different type than any evaluated previously in the UFSAR.

L

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Ileaver Valley Power Station Unit 2

. , 1991 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments Page 63 of 71 A new type of accident situation is net presented. Addition of the valve will allow any

" radioactive debris" to be removed installation of this valve will prevent excessive radiation exposure to equipment operators.

The proposed activity will not create the possibility of a malfunction of equipment important to safety of a different type than any evaluated previcusly in the UFSAR.

-There are no failure modes of equipment important to safety created by addition or a plugged

- drain valve.

This change has no impact on the acceptance limits which form the basis for the TECliNICAL SPECIFICATIONS Technical Specification 3.9.11 requires a minimum of 23 feet of water over the top ofirradiated fuel assemblies. The proposed activity will not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. Each train can be isolated, and the ' drain l

valve will be plugged, l/

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Ileaver Valley Power Station Unit 2 1991 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments ]

- Page 64 of 71 'l I

CII ANGE TITI.E DCP 1664 (TER 5837), Remove Internals from Service Watcr System Check Valves 2SWS*29, 216,548,1038,1039,1040 Cil ANGE Di SCRIPTION The internals af Service Water System check valves 2SWS*29,216,548,1038,1039 and 1040 are being iemoved to increase cooling water flow to the charging pump coolers 2CllS'E25 A ,B,and C. -

SAFETY EVAL,UATION

SUMMARY

With fewer parts, no new failure modes are associated with this change. The original pressure [

boundary and flow paths are being retained.

The proposed change will not increase the probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated previously in the UFSAR.

Removal of check valve internals will not increase probability of failure of SWS. Non priority train manual valves are locked shut administratively when not supplying cooling water to the charging pump coolers and thus provide adequate train separation, The proposed change will not increase the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated previously in the 1 TS AR.

The SWS flow path is not changed and no decrease in flow to' the charging pump coolers will occur. Redundant charging pumps on separate trains plus one swing pump are available to prevent single failure criteria from becoming an issue. Train separation is maintained by administrative controls on manualisolation valves 2SWS*16),163,164, and 165.

The proposed change will not increase the consequences of an accident evaluated previously in the UFSAR.

UFSAR Chapter 15: Sections 15.5 " Increase in Reactor Coolant System Inventory" and 15.6,

'Decicase in Reactor Coolant System Inventory" have been reviewed for potential impact by the change. This change has no impact on assumptions and radiological consequences of the above design basis accidents because no changes in the SWS flow paths to the CilS pump coolers are being made that will reduce SWS tlow.

The proposed change will not. increase the probability of occurrence of an accident evaluated previously in the USFAR.

This change is not an initiating event for any of the above design basis accidents; the charging pumps respond to mitigate the consequences of the above accidents. This change has no effect on

. _~ - _ _, _ _ _ - - _. _ . ~ _ .

5 Deaver Valley Power Station Unit 2

, , 1991 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments Page 65 of 71 the probability of occurrences of any of the above design basis accidents.

The proposed activity will not create the possibility of an accident of a different type than any evaluated previously in the UFSAR. Tidc thange creates no new failure modes because safety train separation is maintained via administrative controls that exist on the manual isolation valves for the non priority train.

The proposed activity will not create the possibility of a malfunction of equipment important to safety of a different type than any evaluated previously in the UFSAR. Since no new failure modes are created, none represent a new unanalyzed type of malfunction.

This design change has no impact on the acceptance limits which form the basis for the Technical Specifications. Technical Specifications 3.1.2A,3.5.2, and 3.5.3 are not afrected. This change will not affect the operability of the charging pumps because cooling water flow via SWS to the CIIS pump coolers will not be adversely affected. The proposed activity will not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

h

, _._m _ _-.. _.

Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2

, , 1991 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments Page 66 of 71 CIIANGE TITI E j DCP 1799, Diesel Generator Building Fan Control Circuit Changes CII ANGE DESCRII TION A seal-in contact will be added to the auto start circuits of the emergency diesel generator 1

- building ventilation fans,211VD'FN207A and B. This will modify the start circuit such that once l the fans start due to a emergency diesel generator start, via relays 3 EGGAAX3 and 3EGGBAX3, they will continue to run until manual operator action shuts the fans down. These fans should auto start at load step 3 and continue to run when their respecting oiesel generator stans. However, the existing control circuit will stop the fans if the initiating signals are cleared.

SAFETY EVAL,UATION SUMM ARY The credible failure modes for these fans are a failure to start or a failure to run. This change does not alter the auto start function and does not introduce any new failure to start mechanism.

The existing design will cause a failure to run it the initiating signal is removed. This change will eliminate that failure mechanism and it does not introduce a new failure to run mechanism.

The proposed change will not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety eva b ated previously in the UFSAR. This change will bring the operation of the fans into agreement with their original design function. These fans are required to operate and maintain environmental conditions in the diesel generator building suitable for equipment operation for all DBAs which require the diesel generators to start and run.

The proposed changes will not increase the consequences of an accident evaluated previously in ahe UFSAR. It will result in the fans operating as originally described in the UFSAR. There will be no changes in the assumption or radiological consequences of any DBA.

The proposed chnnges will not increase the probability of occunences of an accident evaluated

. previously in the UFSAR. . A failure of these fans would not initiate a DBA. None of the DBA initiating events will be affected by this change.

The proposed activity will not create the possibility of an accident or a malfunction of equipment important to safety of a different type than any evaluated previously in the UFSAR. This change will bring the plant response into agreement with the intended design. There are no new failure modes. The original design of the motor staner device accommodates the adding of additional auxiliary contacts and does not adversely impact seismic qualification of the de^e.

The proposed activity wid not reduce this margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification. It _will not alter any acceptance limits in the Technical Specifications.

The diesel generator ventilation fans are not explicitly mentioned as required equipment in Technical Specification 3.8.1.1.

I Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2

, , 1991 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments  !

Page 67 of 71 CII A NGE TITLE TER 5810, Design Parameter Change for DVPS 2 Supplementary Leak Collection and Release S- ; tem Charcoal Filter Media CII ANGC DESCillPTION UFSAR Section 6.5.3.2 rpecifies a sole manufacturer of carbon and also sieve specifications that differ from A'NSI Standard N5091980. Also section 1.8 dealing with exceptions to Reg Guide 1.52 specifies testing methodology and humidity values that conflict with ANSI standards.

These deviations from standards require the station to incur considerable expense in the procurement of charcoal. The sole source reference requires only one supplier, while the deviations from standards require special efrorts in the manufacture and test of nuclear grade carbon, while providing no added operational benefit over ANSI N509-1980 spec. carbon.

The SLCRS System will maintain all operating parameters and the system will remain operationally unafrected by the change. Design parameters of the carbon will be changed to reflect industry standards of ANSI N509-1980.

S A FETY EVA LUATION SUMM AltY This change does not affect any parameter within 9.hich the system operates. It only clarifies the guidelines for replacement carbon procurement.

The proposed change will not increase the probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated previously in the UFSAR. This change does not increase the probability of failure nor does it decrease the probability. The failure modes remain the same because no panmeter within which the system operates is changed. Only the guidelines for replacement carbon are clarified.

The proposed change will not increase the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated previously in the UFSAR. This change has no effect on system performance because the system was designed to ANSI N5091980. Therefore clarification of charcoal specification to those of ANSI N509-1980 does not affect the system's performance.

The proposed change will not increase the consequences of an accident evaluated previously in the UFSAR. The assumption and radiological consequences of accidents are not changed by the USFAR change requested. The Unit 2 SLCRS radiological control of process air is unaffected by the requested changes.

The proposed change will not increase the probability of occurrence of an accident evaluated

j. previously in the UFSAR. This change does not cause or create any failure mode or have a failure mode of its own Activated ANSI N509-1980 Charcoal has a finite longevity, and therefore requires change out periodically. Failure of the charcoal, I cwever, cannot become the initiating l

Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2

. , 1991 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments

'd Page 68 of 71  !

event of an accident. No change in probability of occurrence of DBAs are possible due to this >

change, as the change only clarifies charcoal specifications and requirements.

The proposed activity will not create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the UFSAR. There are no system or component failure modes associated with this change. The SLCRS will operate and perform under the same parameters.

The proposed activity will not reduce the margin of safety as dermed in the basis for any TECilNICAL SPECIFICATION. This change does not have any impact on the acceptance limit J for Technical Specification 3.7.8.1. This Tech Spec is based on ANSI N5091980 and ANSI NS10-1980 Limits.

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Deaver Valley Power Station Unit 2

. , 1991 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Expesiments d

Page 69 of 71 filANGE TITI E

' Valve List Normal System Arrangement Change for-Chilled Water System Makeup Water Isolation [2CDS 156] and FillIsolation [2CDS-275] Valves CII ANGE DESCitiPTION Change NSA for [2CDS 156] from "S" to "0." Change NSA for [2CDS-275] from "T" to "S".

These valves are in the chilled water makeup line from the demineralized water supply system.

[2CDS-156) is shown in the FSAR as open. [2CDS-275) is a ball valve and is not suitable for

- throttling. One of these valves is required to be shut to prevent overfilling of the chilled wate ,

system.

MFETY EVAL,UATION SUMM ARy No credible failure modes are associated with the change. The valves are designed to be opened and closed.

The proposed change will not increase the probability of occurrence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated previously in the UFSAR. The chilled water system is non safety ralated.

The proposed cht.nge will not increase the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety evalueted previously in the UFSAR. The chilled water system is non safety-related.

The proposed change will not increase the consequences of an accident evaluated previously in 4 the UFSAR. The chilled water system is a non safety related system and a non radioactive system that does not affect the accident analysis.

The proposed change will not increase the probability of occurrence of an accident evaluated previously in the UFS AR. No failure modes are associated with this change.

The proposed activity will not create the possibility of an accident or a malfunction of equiprnent important to safety of r different type than any evaluated previously in the UFSAR. No new failure modes are created The chilled water system is non safety-related. -

The proposed activity wiU not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any TECHNICAL SPECIFICA710N. This change has no impact on the acceptance limits which form the basis for the Technical Specifications.

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Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2 199. F.et irt of Facility Changee, Tesh, and Experimerts Page 70 of 71 Cll ANGC TITI C Change Updated flnal Safety Analysis Repott to Remove Battery Duty Cycle and Load Requirements and Replace with Reference to Station Administrative Procedures Cil ANGE DESCIUPTION The battery duty cycles, load requirements (Tables 8.3 7,-8, 9) and the sentence referencing these tables (Pg. 8.3 75) are being deleted from the UFSAR. Infr:mation on the calculation program '

to control de loads will be added to the UFSAR. A sentence is being tdded to allow jumpering of cells from the battery sets. There will be no unforeseen effects since the electrical calculation program (NED SI E003, Rev 2) and present calculations 10080 E 201,-202,203, and -204 ensures the capacity of the batteries continues to be adequato to power the loads. The calculations per the calculation program are I(. vised as required te assure any load changes are ,

eva!uated.

With the duty cycles deleted from the UFSAR, the UFSAR will not have to be changed for every load change. Also, a 50.59 safety evaluation will not have to be performed every time the batteries are tested to their duty cycle during outages except as required by NGAM 7A for jumpering cells. At that time the duty cycle does not match the UFSAR because of outage changes to loads. The duty cycles will be maintained in the calculatior.s.

EAFETY EVAI,11ATION StiMM AHY No credible failure modes are associated with the change. Transferring information to the calculations from the UFSAR will have no affect on the ability of the batteries to supply the de loads for the required two hour duty cycle.

The proposed changes will not increase the probability of occursence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety evaluated previously in the UFSAR. Deleting the duty cycle from the UFS AR has no effect on the probability of failure in the de system because all the information being deleted will be maintained in calculationt The calculations show that the batteries are capable to supply their two hour duty cycle even when a cell is jumpered.

t L The proposed change will not increase the consequences of a malfunction of equipment imponant to safety evaluated previously in the UFSAR. There is no change in performance of the de system since by calculations referenced the battery capacity will not be exceeded and the two hour duty cycle can be met, The calculations will be updated periodically as required by the electrical calculation program (NED-SI-E003).

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o Beaver Vallcy Power Station Unit 2 1991 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments

• Page 71 of 71 The proposed changes will not increase the consequences of an accident evaluated previously in the UFSAR. Section 15.2.6.1 of the UFSAR states "following a loss of ac power with turbine and reactor trips plant vital instmments are supplied from emergency de power sources" The assumptions and radiological consequences of this accident remain unchanged The referenced calculations show that the batteries still have the capacity for the two hour duty cycle. The calculations will be updated periodically as required by the electrical calculation program (NED-SI E003).

The proposed change will not increase the probability of occurrence of an accident evaluated previously in the UFSAR. There will be no change in the performance of the de system.

The proposed activity will not create the possibility of an accident of a difTerent type than any evaluated previously in the UFSAR. There will be no change in the performance of the de system.

The proposed activity will not create the possibility of a malfunction of equipment important to safety of a different type than any evaluated previously in the UFSAR There are no new unanalyzed types of malfunctions.

The proposed activity will not reduce the margin of safety as dermed in the basis for any TECilNICAL SPECIFICATION. No acceptance limits will be affected by this change Calculations will show that the batteries will have the capacity to meet the two hour duty cycle and there will be no change in the operation of the de system.

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