ML20235X027
| ML20235X027 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 12/31/1986 |
| From: | DUQUESNE LIGHT CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20235X022 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8710190172 | |
| Download: ML20235X027 (59) | |
Text
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-1986 Report of Facility Changes, Tests and Experiment-
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-TAB 12 0F CONTENTS Design Changes Page
.219'. River and Raw Vater. Pump Seal 1
.vR
'and Bearing Piping Replacement................................
'221-RWST to Fuel Pool Cooling System Cross-Connect for C1eanup......................................
3 5
I 311 Upgrade Charging Pumps 1A; IB and 10..........................
' River Vater Radiation Monitor Sample Line Modification.........
8 7432 10 471 Liquid O ste System Modifications.............................
489.
Quartz Manometer Interface Modification.......................
13 15
- 563 Backup Indicating Panel.......................................
17 568 Waste Handling Building.......................................
615 Turbine Supervisory Instrumentation System 18
- (TSI) Replacemen t Proj ec t -.....................................20-621 Hydrogen Recombiner Modification..............................
622-Automatic Actuation of Reactor Trip Breaker 21 Shunt Trip Coil...............................................
23 640 Reactor Cavity Seal Replacement...............................
~663 BV (1 - Relocate SAS and PAF Interface........................
26 665 Retube Reactor Plant Component Cooling Water Heat Rxchangers with Ferritic Stainless Steel Tubes................
28 673 Replacement of Station Batteries No. 1,2,3,4 and 5............
30 694 Fireproofing of Service Building Structural Steel.............
32 703 Primary Auxiliary Building 34 Automatic Sprinkler Protection................................
36 706 Refueling Pool Cofferdam......................................
38 709-Control Room Carpeting........................................
720 Refueling Modifications 41 (Fuel Pool Elevator, Spent Fuel Pool).........................
722 Installation of Annubar Flow Instruments 43 in MSR Reheat Steam Lines.....................................
45 723 Replacement of Concrete Plugs on Reactor Containment..........
8710190172 071007 PDR ADOCK 05000334 Q
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1986 Report'of Facility Changes, 3
Tests and Experiments TABLE OF CONTENTS
' Procedure Changes Page A
Temporary.0perating' Leak Check-of Reactor-47 Proc'edure'No. 86-12 Coolant Ventilation System Vent Valves v
Opening of [1 RV-60] during 47 Power Operation to Support Flush of Unit II piping Temporary Operating' Circulation of "A" Reactor 47 t
Procedure No. 86-27
' Coolant Loop to-Allow Opening of the Loop Stop Valves Temporary Operating
' Refilling the Fuel Pool via 47 Procedure Not 86-30 the Coolant Recovery Tanks 1.
- Temporary Operating Discharging Turbine Builfing 48
- Procedure'No. 86-39 Sumps to the River Temporary Operating Transferring Turbine Basement 48 Procedure No. 86-40 Sump Vater to the Chemical Vaste Sump for Discharge l
cTemporary Operating Emergency Isolation of River 48 Procedure No. 86-01 Vater Discharge Header i
Temporary Operating EW-P-3B Operability Data 48 q
Procedure No. 86-03' Collection l
Temporary Operating Temporary Seal Vater Supply 49 LProcedure No. 86-05 for River Vater Pumps Temporary Operating Processing Contaminate Blovdown 49 Procedure No. 86-41 via Standby Blowdown System l
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' I, Page Corrective Maintenance Temporary Repair of REJ-26 51 Procedure CMP 1-30VR-REJ-26-IH in Safeguards Revision 0 Corrective Maintenance Testing of Motor Operated 51 t'rocedure CMP 1-75-331, Valves Using MOVATS Revision O Safety Evaluation Report 51-Steam Generator Tube Expansion Temporary Operating Pressurizer PORV 53 Procedure No. 86-42 Stroke Time Determination Radiation Monitor Study Particle Distribution Evaluation 54 Technical Evaluation Report TER 102 Reactor Coolant Pump 55 Technical Manual Revision I
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4 DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY Beaver Valley Power Station
' Docket No.
50-334
, License No.
DPR-66 Design Change No. 219 River and Rav Vater Pump Seal and Bearing Piping Replacement The purpose of this modification is to replace the 1" and smaller carbon steel seal and bearing cooling vater piping and valves to the River Vater Pumps (VR-P-1A, 1B and IC) and Rav Vater Pumps
/"R-P-6A and 6B) with stainless steel tubing and valves.
Internal corrosion of small diameter carbon steel pipe is causing a reduction in flow to the pump seals and bearings, warranting the change to stainless steel piping and valves. Also a valve and a cleanout vill be added to the 2" supply header.
Conclusion - Safety Evaluation This change is considered safe and does not involve a change to the Technical Specifications. A change to the Updated FSAR vill be required.
Basis for Safety Evaluation 1.
Is the probability of occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in l
the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) increased?
NO REASON:
Replacement of the carbon steel piping and valves with stainless steel piping and valves vill mitigate the effects of corrosion and increase the integrity of the River Vater System as described in the UFSAR, Section 9.9.
2.
Is the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) created?
NO REASON:
This modification vill not alter the safety function of the River Vater System as described in the UFSAR.
Also, there are no high energy lines located in the intake structure, minimizing the effects of line breaks.
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DUQUESNE' LIGHT' COMPANY-'
Beaver Valley Power Station or Docket No; 50-334
., License No.
DPR-66' 3.-
LIs the' margin of ' safety; as ' defined in. the ~ basis for any Technical Specification reduced?- '
NO REASON.
.This_ modification vill not reduce the margin of safety as
' defined in.the' basis for any Technical Specification.
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1 DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY
-Beaver Valley Power Station Docket No; 50-334, License No. DFR-66 Design Change No. 221 RVST to Fuel Pool' Cooling System Cross-Connect for Cleanup 1
- The purpose of this design change is to. add permanent piping to. connect.the-
~
RVST to.the Fuel Pool. Purification System.
This design change vill also
. downgrade parts of line 2"-FC-37-152-03 from' safety irelated to non-safety
.related.-
i Conclusion - Safety Evaluation Implementation of this design change is considered to be safe. An addition to UFSAR Figures 6.4-1 and.9.5-1 is recommended as a result of this change.
A change to.the Technical Specifications is not required.
l Basis for Safety Evaluation 1.
-Is the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or. malfunction of_ equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in.the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) increased?
NO j
j I
Reason:
The probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in UFSAR Section 14 vill not be i
increased. The safety-related Fuel Pool Cooling System vill
')
be isolated from the non-safety related new 2" cross-conr.ect i
line by the addition of a new 2" isolation valve. This nev 2" isolation valve vill be added into line 2"-FC-37-152-03 near the Fuel Pool Cooling System, thus allowing most of this line to be downgraded from 03 to non-0 2.
Is the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) created?
NO Reason:
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in UFSAR Section 9.5-Fuel Pool Cooling and Purification System, and UFSAR i
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DUQUESNE. LIGHT COMPANY:
. Beaver Valley Power Station i1
. Docket'No.
50-334
, License No.
.Section'6,4-Containment Depressurization System vill not be created. An isolation valve ~ vill be installed to' isolate 1
h the nev'-non-safety. related cross-connect line from the
.l safety related Fuel. Pool Cooling System.
3.
Is the margin-of safety sur defined in. the basis for any Technical
~
l Speci fication ' redu'ced?.
NO
-)
[ Reason:
'The. margin of safety as' defined in the-besis. for any
. Technical ' Specification vill not be reduced.
The modifications to be1 incorporated under this design change do not affect any equipment or system covered by the Technical 1
Specifications.
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'DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY Beaver Valley Power Station Docket No.
50-334
, License No.
~ Design Change No '311' Upgrade Charging Pumps lA, 1B and 1C LThis design change vas ' initiated by a proposal from the original equipment supplier, Westinghouse, which recommended modifications to the charging pumps and associated equipment to improve reliability.and reduce maintenance. The
.following modifications will be performed:
Hechanical Seals A new housing vill be installed which uses internal pumpage (borated water) to cool and flush the seal cavities, thereby eliminating th ieed for external cooling water.
Lube 011 System Presently, the charging pumps and high-speed gear drive have separate lube oil systems. -This design change vill install a higher capacity lube oil pump in the gear _ drive which vill provide lube oil to both the gear drive and the charging. pump. The lube oil pump which was the shaft driven off of the charging pump will be removed.
The new combined lube oil system vill be completely upgraded to a higher capacity equipment and vill have just one oil cooler and one' oil filter. The Auxiliary' Lube Oil Pump and its AC drive vill also be replaced with higher capacity components.
In addition, a new lube oil temperature controller vill be installed. The new temperature controller vill regulate oil flow between che oil. cooler and an oil cooler bypass line to maintain a constant outlet oil temperature.
The oil temperature controller vill be' designed to fail-in 'the position that allows total oil flow through the oil cooler.
River Vater System The river water piping to the charging pumps vill be modified to accommodate
.the new oil cooler arrangement. The river water piping vill feed just one oil cooler instead of the present two.
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L DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY Beaver Valley Power Station f:
Docket No.
50-334
, License No.
DPR-66 Supports for H0V's-CH-275A, B, & C The supports for valves H0V-CH-275A, B & C will be modified to allow removal of the limit switch cover plate.
Conclusion - Safety Evaluation These modifications were recommended by the original equipment supplier to alleviate operational problems which were common to charging pumps of this design.
The present state-of-the-art design of charging pumps by the manufacturer incorporates these changes.
Westinghouse is certifying that the charging pumps, when modified, will meet all the original charging pump operational requirements.
This modification will upgrade the existing charging pumps to the manufacturer's present day standards.
This should improve reliability and decrease maintenance requirements for the following reasons:
The new mechanical seal arrangement vill eliminate external seal water piping, thereby reducing the amount of pressure boundaries which could fail.
The new combined lube oil system vill reduce the number of lube oil components, thereby reducing the number of components which could fail.
Oil temperatu ' is presently controlled by balancing river water flow to either the charging pump oil cooler or the gear drive oil cooler. The new method will control oil temperature on the oil side by regulating oil flow to either the single oil cooler or an oil cooler bypass line.
This method vill eliminate the flow balancing and subsequent oil temperature control problems which are present in the existing control system.
The modifications to H0V-CH-275A, B,
C supports vill provide greater accessibility to the H0V's limit switches.
This modification is considered safe since the changes vill improve the reliability of the charging pumps without adversely affecting their ability to perform their safety related functions.
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DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY Beaver Valley Power. Station Docket No.
50-334'
, License No.
!.N' Basis for Safety Evaluation 1.-
Is the probability of occurrence or the,. consequence of an accident or malfunction ~of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in-the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report.(UFSAR) increased?
NO-REASON::
These.mooxfications vill improve,the. reliability of.the.
charging pumps and' will' thereby, enhance their ability to-perform the' required safety.related functions as described in the UFSAR, Sections'6.3 and 9.1.
2.
Is the possibility for an-accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in 'the Updated Final Safety Analysis
~
Report (UFSAR) created?
NO.
REASON:
These modifications. vill not affect the' safety related aspects of the functional operation of the charging pumps.
These changes only alter the charging pump support systems to make the pump more reliable.
3.
Is.the margin of' safety. as defined in. the basis for any Technical Specification reduced?-
NO-REASON:
These modifications vill not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the. bases for Technical Specification Section 3/4.1.2 since they in no way affect the functional operation of the charging pumps.
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DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY Beaver Valley Power Station Docket No.-
50-334:
, License No.
)
Design Change No. 432 I
~,
River Vater Radiation Monitor Saaple Line Modification
.The purpose of this modification is-.to. provide corrosion resistant sampling lines and valves (replacing ' carbon.with stainless steel) for Radiation Monitors RM-RV-100 and RM-RV-101.
The reason.for this change is.to reduce clogging and corrosion caused by untreated river water.
~Also, RM-RV-100 is to be relocated in the. Turbine Building due to.the piping routing of DCP-129.
Conclusion - Safety Evaluation This' design change is considered to be safe since the proposed modifications neither impact the Safety Analysis for accidents analyzed in Chapter 14 of.'the UFSAR nor does the design change constitute an unreviewed safety question.
Additionally, the design change does not
{
affect the basis of the Technical Specification.
No revision to the Technical Specifications are required, however, Figure 9.9-1A of the UFSAR must be revised.
Basis for Safety Evaluation
- 1..
Is the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any -previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis
-Report (UFSAR) created?
NO REASON:
This modification vill not adversely affect any of the plant safety-related equipment nor increase the consequence of an accident as previously evaluated in Chapter 14 of the UFSAR.
2.
Is the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) created?
NO Page 8
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- j DUQUESNE-LIGHT' COMPANY Beaver Valley Power Station Docket No.
50-334
, License-No.- DPR-66
' REASON' The intended modifications do-not' create the possibility for any new type of accident or' malfunction of.the plant safety-related. equipment. The possibility of a malfunction will be freduced by replacing the carbon' steel-lines with stainless.-
Therefore,. changes to: Chapter.14 'of_ the UFSAR. are not-
. required.
e Is the margin'1of safety. as defined in the basis for any Technical
- 3..
' Specification reduced?
NO REASON:
Environmental' Technical Specification -2.4.2 lists the Component. Cooling / Recirculation Spray River Vater Monitor (RM-RV-100) as a release point-monitor (Table 2.4-2).
This monitor is required to have a radiation alarm, continuously monitor, and measure gross.' activity. Continuous monitoring is further defined in Section 11.3.3.2 of the UFSAR. The limiting conditions for operation as defined in Section 2.4 are not affected by the proposed modification.
The Limiting Condition for Operation as defined'in Section 3/4.3.3 of the Technical Specifications states that RM-RV-100 must be' OPERABLE.
If the monitor is inoperable, effluent may continue via this pathway provided grab samples are analyzed every' eight (8) hours.
The installation of stainless steel lines will enhance the operability of RM-RW-100, therefore the margin of safety is not reduced.
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-r DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY.
Beaver Valley Power Station
' Docket No.
50-334
, License No.
DCR-66 Design Change No. 471 Liquid Vaste System Modifications The purpose of: this. modification is to provide a permanent Liquid Vaste-Demineralized ' System' to' replace the temporary Liquid Vaste Cleanup q
- pemineralizer System presently in
'is e.
This. design change provides a filter / ion exchanger cleanup train'wh.ch acts' as a backup to the Liquid Vaste-Evaporator '(LV-EV-1).
The Liquid 'Vaste Demineralized ~ System vill be
]
. permanently. housed in a shielded cubicle within the Decontamination Building.
- A' piping tie-in to the Boron Recovery System vill facilitate transfer from the l
test-tanks ~to the Liquid Vaste Tanks 7A and 7B.
New piping vill be installed
- to-provide additional vent capacity for SV-TK-8 that includes a new HEPA filter and vents to the Solid Vaste Building's atmosphere.
Conclusion - Safety Evaluation
- This modification is' considered to be safe in that the change vill not create the possibility of a new accident, increase the possibility'of previously analyzed accidents, or reduce the margin of safety as defined in the. Technical i
i Specifications.
Basis for Safety Evaluation 1.
Is the probability of occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in i
the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) increased?
NO REASON:
The accide:it of concern in this case is two-fold.
First., is the "Accidentai Release of Vaste Liquid" discussed in UFSAR q
14.2.2.
Section 14.2.2.3,
" Conclusion",
indicates that protection from this accident is by administrative controls, batch handling, and containing the system within the i
station.
All of these controls vill be in effect in the new system.
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i DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY l
Beaver Valley Power Station 3
, Packet No.
50-334
, License No.
DPR-66 I
i Section 14.2.2.2,
" Analysis of Effects and Consequences" i
does not address the Decontamination Building.
Since liquid i
processing components will also be located in the i
Decontamination Building, this. fact should be included in l
the lead-in statement to. this section.
However, UFSAR j
Section 9.15,'" Decontamination Facility", states that in the l
event of leakage from piping or equipment, all areas of the i
building are provided with drain connections which are
~
routed to the sump.
The second area of concern is the potential for " Missiles 1
and Pipe Rupture" discussed in UFSAR 5.2.6.
This type of 1
accident is addressed due to the provision for a rack of nitrogen
'K' bottles and associated piping. The
'K' bottles q
contain high pressure gas, and therefore represent potential
)
missiles should a rupture take place, j
1 However, the nitrogen bottle rack will not be located near any BVPS Unit i safety-related equipment and is outside of any structures housing such equipment.
Therefore, this i
modification vill not increase the possibility of safety-related equipment damage due to missile hazards.
1
{
The nitrogen backflush piping with a design pressere of 350 i
psig is considered high-energy under the e r.'. t e r i a of Appendix D to the UFSAR. However, no equipment required for safe shutdown is located in the Decontamination Building.
Therefore, no analysis for the consequences of a pipe break is required.
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2.
Is the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type l
than any previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) created?
NO REASON:
The Liquid Vaste Demineralized Cubicle shield vall and curb
{
is designed for seismic loading, as is any piping whose l
failure could result in damage to safety-related equipment.
Drain lines from the sample sink and the shielded cubicle to the Decon Building Sump are provided. This is consistent with the previous Liquid Vaste System design and creates no new type of accident.
The UFSAR contains analyses of the potential hazards of missiles and pipe ruptures which could damage safety-related equipment. As discussed in the response to Question 1, the intended modification does not present any new concerns from these standpoints.
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'.t DUQUESNE. LIGHT COMPANY
~.A Beaver Valley Power Station y,'
s.
., Docket No. 334
,4 License No.
DPR-66 3...
LIs " the ;- margin 'of'. safety; as defined in the.--basis'for any Technical-
- Specification reduced?
N0 '
REASON:
- Monitoring of liquid waste vill be ' performed prior.to
' discharging.-to ensure.that - effluent activity is within the'
. margin of safety :as defined in.the b' asis of. Section 3/4.11.1, " Liquid Effluents".
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1 DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY em,
Beaver-Valley Power Station.
Docket No.. 334'
, License No.
- )
l Design Change No. 489
'Ouartz Manometer Interface Modification
.The purpose'is. to provide a permanent installation for computer interface equipment and cabling for Quartz Manometers PIT-LM-101, & 102, for the Type A
Quartz Manometer PIT-LM-101 vill be converted to an absolute direct' reading manometer with digital output.
Conclusion - Safety Evaluation LThe intent and ' purpose of the design change is. to provide a permanent installation'for a system' used under normal operation and periodic-testing.
l
'The. review of the documentation indicates the system vill not be used for safe shutdown.
It is' concluded.that this design change is Category II and does not constitute an unreviewed safety question.
- Basis for Safety Evaluation 1..
Is the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident of malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UPSAR) increased?
NO REASON:
This system is designed to operate under normal operating conditions and periodic tests, not essential' for safe shutdown. The manometers do not initiate any ESF system or containment isolation, and are not used in prevention or nitigation of any accident.
Therefore the. probability of occurrence'or consequence of an accident is not increased as l
evaluated in the UFSAR.
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F DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY
-Beaver Valley Power' Station
'50-334
, License'No. DPR-66 f
Docket No.-
I
. 2..
.Is'the possibilitycfor an accident or: malfunction of a different type j
than any previously. evaluated _ in the : Updated Final Safety Analysis
, Report-(UFSAR) created?.-
NO-
.s.
?
'REASOM:
- 3.;
LIs:the~ margin
'o f l. s'afety -as. defined in the basis for any Technical Specification reduced?
NO 1
L,. '..
REASONi
- This'is not'a safe shutdown system,:therefore the margin of
.j safety is unaffected.
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m DUQUESNE. LIGHT COMPANY L
Beaver ~ Valley. Power Station 1 Docket No.
50-334-
, License No.
[-
i Design Change No. 563 Backup Indicating Panel i
The purpose of the-Design Concept involves installing category I key _ lock isolation.svitches within Category I' seismic enclosures in the cable vault areas. -This vill allow the control 'pover-.for PCV-RC-455C,. D & 456 to be isolated,.thus preventing the possibility' of -a LOCA at the high-low pressure interface' boundaries if an Appendix R fire should happen to cause hot shorts on.the control circuits and inadvertently open the valves.
Conclusion - Safety Evaluation iThe' Design ConceptLis' considered to be safe and does not involve an unreviewed
.sufety question. This change should be included in the Updated FSAR and
. Technical' Specification 3/4.6.3 requires changing to show that CIB signal to the containment air recirculation cooler isolation valves vill be bypassed when control is transferred to the BIP.
Basis for Safety Evaluation 1.
Is the probability.of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Updated' Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) increased?
NO REASON:
The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident as previously evaluated. in the UFSAR will not increase, since, the transfer switches will be keylocked to prevent tampering of plant signal and control switchovers.
The probability of a malfunction of equipment important to safety vill not increase, since the interfacing Category I equipment vill be bought Category I and vill meet the requirements of IEEE 323 and 344 for environmental and seismic qualification, respectively.
- Also, the BIP and various electrical components will have a seismic mounting analysis performed on them to ensure that they do not become missiles during an earthquake.
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DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY Beaver Valley Power Station Docket No.
50-334
, License No.
DPR-66 i
2.
Is the possibility for-an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) created?
NO REASON:
The BIP, along with local instrumentation and controls vill
?.
provide for-an alternate safe shutdown method.
Most of the monitoring' indicators as referenced in Section 7.4.1.1 of the UFSAR, which are necessary for maintaining a hot shutdown, vill be provided for through the use of the BIP and local instrumentation.
The remaining indicators, i.e.
intermediate range flux level, intermediate range start-up
- rate, and residual heat exchanger temperature, are not included in the alternate safe shutdown method, a safe shutdown of the plant could be maintained without their use.
It is also stated.in Section 7.4.2 of the UFSAR that safety is not adversely affected by an uncontrolled boron dilution, loss of normal feedvater, loss of external electrical load and/or turbine trip, or loss of all A-C power to the station auxiliaries provided that the instrumentation and controls indicated in Section 7.4.1.1 and 7.4.1.2 are available to control and/or monitor shutdown.
Therefore, the use of the BIP to maintain a safe shutdown of the plant, vill not create. an accident or malfunction different than any previously evaluated in the
- UFSAR, but in fact vill eliminate one, by providing backup indication in the event t
that a fire renders the instrumentation of the control room and emergency shutdown panel inoperable.
3.
Is the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification reduced?
NO REASON:
Bases 3/4.3.3.5," Remote Shutdown Instrumentation", margin of safety vill not be reduced by the installation of the BIP.
Moreover, the presence of the BIP should increase the margin of safety by providing an alternate method to achieve a safe shutdown in the event that both the control room and emergency shutdown panel instrumentation is lost due to a fire.
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_DUQUESNE-LIGHT COMPANY U[
.. Beaver Valley. Power Station-
-T
~ Docket-No.' 50-334, License No DPR-66 5
- Design Change No. 568 Vaste Handling BuildinJ -
. Thet purpo'se: of; this - task-is to provide a.-shielded building for storage of Lsolidified radvaste from BVPS-1 and-BVPS-2..
This vaste vill be stored for.
.g
~ eventual shipmentLto.La. lov -level vaste burial = site.
TheiVaste. Handling Building (WHB) will contain. equipment ne'cessary to handle and inspect vaste containers.
.The structural design requirements for the VHB will be described in BVM-173.
CONCLUSION - SAFETY EVALUATION-This change is considered. safe and does not constitute a change to the Te'chnical Specificationsfor:an unresolved safety question.
3 BASIS FOR SAFETY EVALUATION 1.
-Is the probability of occurrence. or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment.important'to safety as previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) increased?
NO REASON:
Storage-of compacted or solidified radvaste'is not discussed in the UFSAR.
2.
Is the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously... evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) created?-
NO REASON:
Storage of' compacted or. solidified radvaste in a separate shielded. building has no more accident potential than if kept in the solid vaste area.
'3.
Is the margin of safety as' defined in the basis for any Technical Specification reduced? '
NO
-REASON:
The Technical Specifications do not address storage of compacted or solidified radvaste.
Only the operability of the Solid Radvaste system is discussed.
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- DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY'
_ Beaver Valley PowerLStation Docket Wo..
'50-334
, License No.
,gg f'
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Design Change No. 615 3-
- Turbine Supervisory Instrumentation System (TSI) Replacement Project
,L' l
'.The'purpo'se of.this modification is to_ replace thel existing Westinghouse l Turbine: Supervisory 1 Instrumentation ' System.vith. a Bently Nevada Corporation-
- (BNC)-packagej.The-newf,systemi will' provide a more' versatile, accurate,;and-
- reliable; state-of-the-artimonitoring system.'
[When iportions of 'the existing supervisory instrumentation have1become cinoperativeh :certain~ ' turbine-generator monitoring-functions: have been conducted with hand-held instrumentation which' is highly undesirable'and raises, questions.of~ accuracy and repeatability in the measurements.
The BNC: vibration.' detection system vill utilize for the most part. probes that employ eddy-current principles rather than fdirect " shaft riders".- Two probes ratherLthan one vill'bellocated. at each bearing.
_Onr ransducer vill be a
'"seismoprobe"fcapable of canceling the-natural structural vibrations inherent toLsuch machinery elements as the bearing housings-and support'in order'to obtain the " free' space"- or; _ absolute' vibratory characteristics-of the shaft.
i Since the two_ probes at each bearing vill be placed at~an included angle of 90', this vill' permit the accurate tracing of the shaft orbits, the production of Bode plots or Polar plots, and the generation of other such data that will contribute'to aisafe and smooth operating turbine generator rotating system.
Other' monitoring functions to: be provided in the BNC package include shaft eccentricity, thrust bearing position,_ shaft differential expansion, and Lcylinder expansion.
Conclusion - Safety Evaluation Implementation of this design change is considered to be safe.
No change to 1-
_the Technical Specifications or Updated FSAR is required as a result of this change.
I
. r Page 18
4 DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY Beaver Valley Power Station Docket No.
50-334
, License No.
DPR-66 Basis for Safety Evaluation 1.
Is the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) increased?
NO REASON:
The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in UFSAR Section 14.1.12, Turbine-Generated Accidents, vill not be increased. The new Turbine Supervisory Instrumentation vill provide a more accurate, versatile and reliable state-of-the-art monitoring system than the existing system.
2.
Is the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) created?
NO REASON:
The proposed addition of the new Turbine Supervisory Instrumentation vill not adversely affect the operation of the Turbine-Generator, Steam and Power Conversion System as described in UFSAR Section 10.3.3.
The New Turbine Supervisory Instrumentation vill provide a more accurate, versatile and reliable state-of-the-art monitoring system than'the existing system.
3.
Is the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification reduced?
NO REASON:
The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification vill not be reduced since the replacement of the Turbine Supervisory Instrumentation vill
)
not affect the basis for Technical Specifications 3/4.3 -
l Instrumentation or 3/4.7.1 - Turbine Cycle.
(
)
i 1
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Page 19 a
d, 5]>
.o-DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY Beaver Valley Power Station
.. Docket No,'.
50-334
, License No.
DPR-66 I
Design Change No. 621.
Hydrogen Recombiner Modification This modification vill environmentally qualify the Hydrogen Recombiners, (HY-RT-1A~& lB), to 10CFR50.49, -(January 1983),
and IEEE 323-1974. ~Qualifled spare parts vill also be provided by this DCP.
~
Conclusion - Safety Evaluation
.This modification to environmentally qualify the hydrogen recombiners is safe.
}The modification does not change any Technical Specification basis, nor does it constitute an unreviewed safety question.
An Updated FSAR change is required by this change.
Basis'for Safety Evaluation i
1.
Is the probability or an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously avaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) increased?
NO REASON:
Section 14.3.4.4,
" Post DBA Hydrogen Generation" already allows both recombiners to be inoperable. This modification vill reduce the possibility of both recombiners being inoperable due to harsh environmental conditione in the f
safeguards area after a DBA.
'2..
Is the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) created?
H0 REASON:
Section 14.3.4.4 already addresses both recombiners inoperable.
3.
Is the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical j
Specification reduced?
NO REASON:
Technical Specification basis 3.6.4.2
& 3 is not reduced since the recombiners operation vill be improved after a DBA.
Page 20 O _
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E;
-DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANT Beaver Valley Power Station Docket No.
50-334-
, License No.
DPR-66 Design Change No. 622 Automatic Actuation of Reactor Trip Breaker Shunt Trip Coil The' purpose of-this. design concept was to provide a backup capability to the undervoltage trip attachment for-automatic cip of the main breakers.by
- installing the shunt trip' attachment to 52/F'3 and 52/RTB..In addition to this, the revised concept includes adding position indicating lights to the main control board section:B for each of the main reactor trip breakers and each'of the bypass: breakers.
Conclusion - Safety Evaluation
- The modifications of the reactor trip circuits involved in this design change
- vill increase.the safety.of the plant by providing another automatic reactor
. trip working with the undervoltage relay.
Its installation does not affect the present system enough to cause an unreviewed safety question. The equipment vill be ' installed seismically and its installation vill not overstress other equipment directly affected by the alterations. The position indicating lights vill not affect any accident previously analyzed nor vill they create.a new type of-accident since they do not degrade the operation of the trip breakers..The lights also do not decrease the margi_ of safety in any technical specification.
This installation is Category I and seismic.
l Basis for Safety Evaluation 1.
Is the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) increased?
NO REASON:
The modifications presented in the design concept enhance the present reactor trip system by supplying a backup means to automatically trip the reactor trip breakers in the event of a failure of the undervoltage trip circuit.
The equipment vill not lengthen the response time of the undervoltage trip and meets or exceeds the speed of the present system.
- Also, the equipment vill be seismically qualified and installed as stated in UFSAR Section 7.2.1.10.
Page 21
'I L
- -s '
..H A
l DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY Beaver Valley Power Station Docket No.
50-334
,-License No.
DPR 1 2.
Is the possibility'for an accident or malfunction of a different type.
than any. previously evaluated in.the= Updated ~ Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) created?'
. NO j
REASON:-
'Although the addition of-the shunt trip circuit-vill-increase'the probability of inadvertent reactor trips, no accident.or malfunctions pertaining to safety of a.different type than 'any previously evaluated is possible. as the modification cannot affect-the operation of the existing system.
?
l 3.-
Is the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification reduced?
NO-REASON:
As stated before, the modification is an increase in safety since it provides a backup to the undervoltage trip which acts at the same time.
Also, no increase in response time vill occur as the shunt trip speed meets or is faster than
~
that of the undervoltage trip.
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Page 22
7-<
4 DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY Beaver Valley Power Station 4
Docket No.
50-334
, License No. DPR-66 Design Change No. 640 Reactor Cavity Seal Replacement The purpose of the modification is to replace the existing segmented reactor cavity seal with a new single piece seal.
Also a storage rack and a control (valving) panel vill be installed.
The new seal vill provide shorter installation / removal time, and vill be capable of maintaining water level in the refueling cavity with a leak rate of below 3 gpm.
Conclusion - Safety Evaluation The cavity seal ring is a non-safety related component.
The seal ring is designed seismically during its operating and storage positions. The seal ring was designed, manufactured, fabricated, and controlled under Combustion Engineering nuclear QA program and with the ASME Code section specified in the design concept.
)
i The wedge pneumatic slot seals assures that there vill be minimal leakage with l
the cavity full even if the inflatable sesl deflates. Two locator pins which will be installed in the embedment ring assures proper positioning of the seal to maintain uniform gap dimensions.
Steel pins inserted every 3 inches plus or minus 1 inch across the top of the pneumatic slot seals provides additional push through resistance. Test results shoved the pneumatic seal with these pins provides a push through resistance up to the equivalent of 9 times the normal operating water level in the refueling cavity.
1 Deck plate segments protect the seal ring from damage when work is being performed around the seal ring once it is installed and if a fuel assembly is l
dropped during fuel movement.
Refueling procedures will be required for the inspection and installation of the seal ring each time it is installed. The rubber seals vill be replaced in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendation.
l Based on the above protective measures gross seal failure as described in IE l
Bulletin 84-03 is not considered probable.
I 1
l l
1 Page 23 l.
i a--_-_-
DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY Beaver Valley Power Station Docket No.
50-334
, License No.
DPR-66 A major seal failure of one pin and the complete severance of a 6 inch radial section of the pneumatic seal was considered. This seal failure would result
'in a conservative leak rate of 1570 gpm. Given a major seal leak of 1570 gpm, it vill take 51 minutes to uncover the top of a fuel assembly held in the manipulator' crane at the full-up position with only reactor cavity water available. The probability of uncovering a fuel assembly is extremely remote
'due to:
The fuel assembly can be transferred to a safe-water-covered position in less than 10 minutes by personnel per Abnormal-Operating and/or Refueling procedures.
A coffer dam between the refueling cavity and the transfer canal vill be provided to prevent the water level from decreasing below elevation 743'10".
Therefore, a fuel assembly lowered into the transfer canal or spent fuel pool vill be in a safe, water-covered position. The reactor vessel is also available to store a fuel assembly.
No operator action for 10 minutes.
This assumption is overly restrictive since there are audible alarms and visual level line for detecting leakage.
Makeup water from the Lov Head Safety Injection Pump (3200 gpm) vill be available during the refueling.
Other makeup paths including charging pumps (600 gpm) and the RWST recirculation pumps (375 gpm) can be made available.
The lifting device and the lift ribs will be load tested in accordance with NUREG 0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants", to assure that the cavity seal vill not be dropped on the vessel head during installation or removal.
The storage stand for the cavity seal ring vill be seismically designed to hold the seal ring in a horizontal position on the operating deck floor and in a vertical position against the Steam Generator A shield vall.
Based on the above evaluation, this design change does not involve an unreviewed safety question.
Basis for Safety Evaluation 1.
Is the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) increased?
NO Page 24 l
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L j.DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY A,
Beaver Valley. Power Station N
' Docket No.
50-334=
,. License'No.,DPR-66 I
The probab'ility'of occurrence or consequence of.any accident REASONS.
'previously evaluated vill. not be increased.. Specific. ally the fuel handling accident inside containment evaluated in UFSAR Section 14.2.1, vill not 'be affected by replacement of.
the cavity' seal ring since the new cavity seal' ring performs the same function in a similar manner as.the' current cavity J
'obal ring, w
2.
Is the possibility forsan accident or malfunction._of adifferent type 1
.than previously evaluated in the Updated Final Analysis Report created?
l; i.
t NO y
V i, f
. REASON:
The Aer reactor cavity seal ring. is' a' one for one repla'em.'nt of the current reactor. cavity seal ring and t
serves' tee same' function in a siitilar manner. -Therefore no rifferent' types of' accidents or malfunctions are considered
- ponsible.
Failure of the cavity; seal has;been evaluated inL
.the' response to I E.
Bulleti'n. 84-30 Land this safety evaluation.
l.
3.
Is the margin of. safety as; defined 'in the' basis for any Technical
,T Specification. reduced?
NO REASON -
Technical Spe6.f.fcation 3.9.10 requires at least 23 h et of vater be maintained over <the top of the reactor pessure vesseldlaye during movement of fuel assemblies or control rods withhi.' the reactor pressure.vescel 'while in mode 6.
The ney ' reactor cavity seal ring vill not affect this technical specification.
(
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1.
I Page 25
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\\
~DUQUESNE LIGHT C0APANY Beaver Valley Power Station n n' d Docket No.
50-334
, License No.
DPR-66 mk k
p.
Design Change No. 663 BV #1 - Relocate SAS and PAF Interface r*
?"
The modification vill be completed:in four phases. They are as follows:
' Phase 1:1 Unit #1 vill install Unit
- 2 purchased equipment in the
' E guardhouse located-in Unit #1 site. Equipment and raceways vill
--n be installed in the Unit #1 guardhouse to allow viring of the
' Unit,#2 CAS andisupply power to Unit'#2 Security Syrtem. This
_ vill allow Unit.#2 to power-up its system and permit startup and'
- checkout of their equipment.
The existing Security UFS vill be modified to correct
> maintainability deficiencies noted by I & C Maintenance.
- Also, the-Security power feed from Emergency Bus E9 vill be transferred to MCC-1-37 vhich has back-up emergency power from the Security System Diesel.
Phase 2 -
_CongestionLin the Ur,it #1 control room makes it impossible to install-the Unit #2 SAS'in the same location as' Unit #1 SAS. To alleviate: _this' problem new Unit. #1 SAS equipment will be installed in the Primary Access Facility on the Unit #2 site.
The Unit #2 CAS vill be installed in the Guardhouse with Unit #1 CAS.
Phase 3:
Installation of cables to the new Unit #1 SAS will occur at this 4
phase snd transfer of functions vill commence.
The signal transfer from the old SAS to 'the new SAS will be done slowly so that no loss of security vill result.
When all functions are transferred the existing SAS vill be abandoned until removal during 5R.
I 1 Phase 4:
Removal of the existing SAS in the Unit #1 Control Room during 5R.
Conclusion - Safety Evaluation p
This design change is considered to be safe since the proposed modifications neither impact the Safety Analysis for accidents analyzed in Chapter 14 of the UFSAR nor does the design change constitute an unreviewed safety question.
Additionally, the design change does not affect the basis of the Technical Specification.
Page 26 llg
- d;,-
6
- 1..
DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY Beaver 1 Valley Power Station
. Docket No.-
50-334
, License No.
DPR-66 Basis for Safety Evaluation
-1.
Is the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment.important to safety.as previously evaluated in
.the Updated Final' Safety. Analysis Report (FSAR) increased?
-NO
-REASON.
.This proposed modification does not increase the possibility of accident referenced in the Updated Final Safety Report in :
Section 12.7.
Vith the proposed modifications, the security 1 of the plants vill be maintained as it is now. The CAS i
continues to reside in the Guardhouse.
The SAS will be moved to the Primary Access Facility.
This modification increases security, since its movement farther away from.the l
CAS makes sabotage' of 'these areas more difficult.
Power supply changes increase-reliability of the system'vith a-lighter loaded. power supply and ease of maintenance'is enhanced with circuit breaker utilization in the power connection..
2.
Is.the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) created?
NO REASON:
Since the security plan still includes a CAS, SAS and security fences with the same type of surveillance equipment as presently used, no new types of accidents will be created.
3.
Is the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification reduced?
NO
. REASON:
This modification has no effect on the margin of safety in the basis of any Technical Specification.
I i
1 Page 27
- '~
DUQUESNE LIGHT. COMPANY Beaver Valley Power Station L
-Docket No.
50-'334
, License No.
DPR-66 Design Change No. 665 Retube Reactor Plant Component Cooling Water Heat Exchangers with-Ferritic Stainless Steel Tubes l'
The" purpose of,this modification is to replace the 304L Stainless Steel, 18 BVG,. tubes.in the Reactor Plant Componet Cooling Water Heat Exchangers, CC-E-1A, CC-E-1B, and CC-E-10 with tubes made of 20 BVG, Sea-Cure, a ferritic-stainless' steel alloy.- Thesmaterial change to Sea-cure vill provide better
- resistance to crevice' corrosion, and should, in fact, eliminate this. type of l
corrosion due.to manganese ' dioxide deposits.
Also, by reducing the vall thickness of the tubes, the heat transfer capabilities should be improved.
Conclusion -- Safety Evaluation
.This design ch'ange.is considered to be safe and does not affect the bases'of the technical specifications.
Additionally, the new tube material and vall thickness shall-provide services which are as good as or better than the existing tubes. By making. these modifications an unreviewed safety question does not' exist.
A' change-to UFSAR Table 9.4-1 is required to show the nev tube material in the CCR heat exchangers.
Basis for Safety Evaluation i
1.
Is the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or
}
malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) increased?
NO REASON:
By replacing the existing tubes with Sea-Cure, which has a slightly lover density, and maintaining this modification as a seismic Category I
- design, the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in 1
UFSAR Section 9.4.3.1 vill not be increased.
I 4
Page 28
R' x v p
(.
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~
- DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY Beaver Valley Power' Station Docket No.
50-334
, License No.
DPR-66 a
2.
Is the possibility for an ' accident or -malfunction.of a different type
-than previously evaluated.in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) created?
N0 REASON:
The rupture of' component cooling water heat exchange tubes c
or shel1~is considered unlikely, because of the system's low operating pressure and temperature, as stated in Table 9.4-4 of the UFSAR. However, if such a rupture occurs to one of the heat exchangers, it can be isolated, with the remaining two heat'exchangers. performing 100 percent of the system capability. Moreover, in the event 'of a complete loss of component cooling water, a safe. shutdown of the reactor can be achieved and the plant 'may. be maintained in the hot standby condition indefinitely..
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type'than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created.
3.
Is the margin of safety as defined-in the basis for.any Technical Specification reduced?
NO
. REASON:
The margin of safety as defined in the basis of Technical Specification 3/4.7.3 vill-not be reduced as a result of this modification.
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Page 29 l
i
g DUQUESNE. LIGHT COMPANY a;
Beaver Valley Power Station Docket No.
50-334'
., License No.
'DPR-66 Design' Change No.-673 Replacement of Station Batteries No. 1,2,3,4 and 5 The Unit'l Station batteries ' numbers 1 and 2 vill not pass BYT-1.1-1.39.2-which tests.the. batteries over, the design. basis duty cycle. ~This design change vill replace the Unit. 1 station batteries with the Unit 2' station l batteries.
Conclusion - Safety' Evaluation LThe'two station batteries,' BAT 1 and BAT 1-2 are class.1E safety-related batteries, environmentally.andL seismically qualified.
The. racks for these batteries are'also seismically qualified.
The currently installed batteries are Gould 'NAX-1800 lead antimony batteries with a 1800 amp-hour rated capacity., The' replacement" batteries being obtained from Unit 2 are Exide 2GN-21: lead calcium batteries with an original 1700. amp-hour rated-capacity.
The replacement; batteries have been requalified to- 'a 1780 amp-hour capacity and meet the design criteria and functional. requirements of the original batteries
- including' allowances'for aging.and' temperature effects.
The racks vill be modified if required to accomodate the replacement' batteries and analyzed'for
' seismic qualification.
The replacement batteries' meet or exceed the sizing criteria listed in UFSAR Section 8.5.3 and.the requirements of IEEE-485.
Basis for Safety Evaluation
-1.
Is the. probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of' equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) increased?
NO REASON.
The replacement batteries are sized sufficiently to carry the emergency loads for the accidents analyzed in UFSAR Chapter 14.
They are equivalent to the currently installed batteries.
1 Page 30
- - - - = - - _ - - _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _
i
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.r DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY:
Beaver' Valley Power Station.
' Docket'No.
50-334'
, License No.
DPR L 2. -
Is.the' possibility for.an accident or malfunction-of a different type than previously evaluated in the Updated.LFinal Safety Analysis Report
-(UFSAR) created?
NO
. REASONS.
..The' replacement batteries perform the same function as the original batteries and are environmentally and seismically
. qualified.
L.-
Is the margin of' safety as' defined.in' the basis for.any Technical 3
= Specification' reduced?
NO REASON:.
The margin of safety as defined inf the basis for Technical..
Specification 3.8.2.3 and 3.8.2.4 vill not be reduced since the replacement batteries meet. the design requirements of the' current batteries.
i Page 31 l
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DU'QUESNE LIGHT COMPANY Beaver Valley Power Station Docket No.
50-334
', License No. 'DPR-66 i
Design Change No.- 694
'Fireproofing of Service Building Structural' Steel i the steel beams supporting the service building-This design change vill coat floor atLelevation 725'-6".. The. fireproof coating,is a plaster type material "which will be' applied in 'a. contour fashion. on. the exposed surfaces of-the steel beams. This vill' provide a :1 1/2 hour fire barrier to comply with the-exemption granted by.the.NRC to' Appendix R Section III.G.2.
Conclusion - Safety Evaluation-1 LThis design change is considered to.be safe and presents no unreviewed safety questions.
Basis for' Safety Analysis 1.
Is the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of' equipment important.to safety as previously evaluated in j
the Updated Final Safety' Analysis Report (UFSAR) increased?
NO
- REASON:
The fireproofing vill be applied only to structural steel and therefore vill not effect any systems necessary for any
.j accident previously evaluated.
I 2.
Is the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
{
(UFSAR) created?
)
I NO
- REASON:
Safety related equipment in the service building basement will be protected while the fireproofing is being applied.
The steel beams have been analyzed and are adequate to support the added weight of the fireproofing.
-1 l
Page 32
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j?l3, DUQUESNE' LIGHT COMPANY q.
H Beaver Valley Power Station.
Docket No.
50-334
,iLicense No. 'DPR-66' l.
' asis for any Technical b
!3.
-Is the margin-iof ' safety-as defined -in the-
. Specification' reduced?
NO REASON L There are no : technical ~
specifications-on the service.
=
s.
-i' building structural steel.
Section 5.7 of the Technical
- Specifications requires. 'that structures identified as Category I'in FSAR Appendix B~be maintained to the. original
' design provisions.
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DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY Beaver Valley Power Station Docket No.
50-334
, License No. DPR-66 Design Change No. 703 Primary Auxiliary Building Automatic Sprinkler Protection The purpose of this modification is to add sprinklers and detectors over designated storage areas in the Primary Auxiliary Building.
By installing this design change, temporary storage of combustible materials in these.
storage areas during refueling outages will be allowed, by complying with 10CFR50, Appendix R,
Section K and Test specification Appendix A, NRC amendment No. 18, Section 5.11.6.
Conclusion - Safety Evaluation Installation of this design change is considered to be safe and does not constitute an'unreviewed safety question, nor does it affect the bases of the
' Technical Specifications. However, a change to the UFSAR is required and an addition to the Technical Specifications is recommended.
Basis for Safety Evaluation 1.
Is the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety-Analysis Report (UFSAR) increased?
NO REASON:
The fire protection systems installed under this modification vill be designed so that rupture or inadvertent operation vill not significantly impair the safety capability of structures,
- systems, or components important to safety or designed to seismic Class I requirements, as stated in UFSAR Section 9.10.1.
2.
Is the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) created?
NO REASON:
The installation of this design modification vill not create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluted in UFSAR Section 14.
Furthermore, this modification should prevent any fire-related accidents which could occur by extinguishing the fire before it can destroy any safety related equipment.
Page 34
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pg{3.9 n
e DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY Beaver Valley Power = Station LDocket No.
50-334
, License No.
. 3.?, Is the margin.of safety as. defined in the basis.for any Technical l Specification. reduced?.
NO 4
REASON :
The margin-of safety as' -defined in. Technical Specification
'3/4.3.3 and 3/4.7.14 vill notl reduced by installing this design change.-
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Page 35
W DUQUESNE' LIGHT COMPANY Beaver Valley Power Station Docket No.
50-334
, License No.
DPR-66 Design Change No. 706 l
Refueling Pool Cofferdam The modification vill add a five foot cofferdam to the transfer canal and a removable drain plug to the transfer. canal drain piping. This modification vill maintain the spent fuel in the spent fuel pool or transfer canal in'a
- safe water-covered position'in the unlikely event of a' gross reactor cavity seal failu're..
. Conclusion - Safety Evaluation
.The reactorLeavity pool ~ cofferdam and drain plug vill be seismically designed,
' fabricated and installed under the applicable portions of the DLC QA program and~the ASME code specified. in' the design concept.
The cofferdam vill be visually inspected prior.to each refueling to assure its structural integrity is'being maintained.
The single failure of the cofferdam vill not cause an accident that vould endanger the public's safety.
The-' cofferdam provides additional assurance that:a catastrophic reactor cavity seal failure ~ vill not cause the spent-fuel assemblies'in the spent. fuel pool or a fuel assembly in the transfer: canal to become uncovered resulting in high radiation exposures.
The drain plug assures the cofferdam's water retaining capabilities vill not be compromised during a seismic event.
The' drain plug vill require installation, inspection and removal procedure (s) to maintain its passive integrity.-
Changes _to operations and/or refueling procedures vill be necessary so personnel vill-be aware of the drain plug's function and neoprene gasket replacement criteria.
Basis for Safety Evaluation 1.
Is the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) increased?
NO REASON:
The fuel handling accident inside containment assumptions and outcome remains valid by the addition of the cofferdam and drain plug.
Page 36
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iW r
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.- y LDUQUESNE; LIGHT COMPANY y.;s 9 '. '
('
j Beaver Valley = Power' Station
. Docket.No.
50-334-
, License No.
DPR-66 y
or-malfunction of a'different type 1<>
- 2..' tis:the. possibility for an' accident
..than any.lJpreviously evaluated 'in the Updated Final Safety Analysis
~g
,J 3 Report (UFSAR) created?.
NO REASON:
'C The cofferdam-provides'an additional protective measure that
.the fuelLinlthe-spent'- ' fuel pool' or in/the' transfer canal.
Will. remain in a safe. vater-covered' position if'a remote
~
catastrophic failure of-the reactor cavity seal failure-
~
vould occur. The drain plug. assures.the protection. feature m.
~offthe-cofferdam vill not be compromised by a'. failure'of-the.
M transfer.. canal: drain piping.
._e j
'3.
Is';the margin! of -safety as defined in the bas'is for any Technical' i
d 1 Specification' reduced?=
.N0
-REASON:
~ Technical.. Specification 3.9.10' requires at least 23' feet of
~
water be maintained over 'the top ;of the reactor pressure-
. vessel'. flange during movement of. fuel assemblies of control rods within.the reactor' -pressure vessel while'in Mode 6.
The new. cofferdam and ' drain plug vill,.not affeet this technical specification.
L L
a Page 37 1
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DUQUESNE' LIGHT, COMPANY.
Beaver Valley Power Station
-Docket No.
50-334
, License No.
DPR I Design Change No. 709 Control Room Carpeting TThis modification is to install carpeting in' the control toom (CR-1) to i
provide a' quieter, more aesthetically pleasing conducive working environment.
I Conclusion -' Safety Evaluation I
It: 'has been determined that this modification vill not increase-the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction L
of equipment.important to safety as previously evaluated, or create a new type of accident than previously evaluated in the UFSAR. This modification vill
,also not a'dversely affect the plant's margin of. safety and an unreviewed safety question is not raised.
D' asis for Safety Evaluation 1.>
Is the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the' Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) increased?
NO REASON:
This design change does not involve any impact on plant system or components.
The carpeting modification is confined to the control Room, fire area CR-1, excluding the computer room. Per this evaluation, it was determined that:
a)
Fire loading must be documented per Appendix R Table 3.4-1.
The fire barrier for CR-1 is I
presently rated at 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> with a previously estimated (before carpeting) fire duration of 11 minutes. The additional fire loading due to the carpeting is negligible.
b)
Present amount of fixed suppression equipment is sufficient to handle additional fire loading due to the carpet.
i l
l Page 38 I
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7
- 4,1
['m DUQUESNE LIGHT. COMPANY' lg a
D a.
,D:
1 Beaver Valley Power' Station
~ Docket No.
'50-334
, License No.
DPR '
L
},*
c)
- Although smoke or toxic fumes could be'given off by
.t the. carpeting while burning and the levels.have'not been identified per this design concept, provisions
'are already documented per FSAR_Section 7e8.2.- "It
~is considered that.the event leading 'to the
-evacuation of 'the control-room will be the-Accumulation of a concentration of smoke that would render the control room uninhabitable".
Provisions..
exist through the Backup. Indicating Panel (BIP) and "
[
the Safe Shutdown Panel (SDP) to safely shut down the ~ plant' should -fumes -make the control room uninhabitable.
_d)
Anti-static mating; will be administratively T
. controlled per letter number NDINEM:0561 when the control room circuit ' boards are being worked on.
This is necessary'to ground personnel of any static H
charge prior to maintenance.
- ).
Only minor revisio'ns
'ppendix R, are.needed,to A
UFSAR and operating manual Ch. 56B.- The revisions are limited to only listing the additional fire loading'and listing the carpeting as a combustible.
material in the control room.
1
'2.
Is;the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) created?
NO-REASON:
An accident or malfunction of a different type vill not be created.
See reason in Item No. 1 above.
3..
Is the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification reduced?
NO REASON:
Technical Specifications are not applicable.
Page 39 j
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/'
DUQUESNE: LIGHT. COMPANY
. Beaver Valley Power Station
- e
' Docket No'.
50-334-
, License No.
DPR-66 g
Design Change No. 720
' Refueling Modifications (Fuel Pool' Elevator, Spent Fuel Pool Handling Crane and-the Pit Side-Fuel Transfer Upender)
The. objective is to. reduce 'the possibility of operator error when handling
-fuel...This vill be. accomplished by. an additional limit switch, changing an A
. existing limit switch setpoint and removing a seal-in contact on the fuel pool.
~
. eleva tor.'
- This ' design change ~is limited to the electrical systems for the fuel pool elevator.and the movable platform,vith' hoist.-
i Conclusion - Safet'y Evaluation
.It has 'been determined : ' th'at this modification vill not increase the
. probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction M
.of. equipment important to safety as previously evaluated or create a new type of accident than'previously evaluated in-the UFSAR. 'This modification vill also.not adversely. affect-the plant's margin of safety and'an unreviewed
'l
-safety question is not raised.
4~
Basis for Safety Evaluation 1.
Is the probability of an occurrence or the conseque'nces of an accident f
or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) increased?
N0 i
REASON:
The limiting condition or vorst case scenario previously analyzed is detailed in UFSAR Section 14.2.1 Fuel Handilsg j
Accident, "The worst case which is hypothesized with respect j
to the release of fission products to the environment, is
.]
the dropping of a spent fuel assembly onto the spent fuel
]
pool floor and breaking of all the fuel Rods."
The modifications to the electrical system per this DCP cannot result in an accident of increased magnitude of l
Section 14.2.1.
]
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1 Page 40 l
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n DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY su" Beaver Valley Power Station g
Docket No.
50-334
, License No.
DPR-66 i
Also should both of the redundant limit switches fail, per I
'Section 9.12.2.3 of the UFSAR v3oth the vertical lift range J
JE of the spent fuel, hoist and the length of the long handling tool are designed to limit the maximum lift of a spent fuel l
assembly. A sufficient depth of water is thereby-ensured for safe shielding above 'the fuel being handled."
No increased-threat. of radiation exposure-within the fuel building'let alone potential offsite exposure would exist.
2.
_ Is'the possibility for_an accident or a malfunction of a different type-m
'than~previously evaluated in' the Updated.. Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) created?
NO.
REASON:
The modifications are confined to the electrical system and' E
do not affect the 'overall function or operability of the' fuel pool crane and elevator.
.No new accident' scenario is created.
i
-A.
Per Section 6.1 of the design concept; the seal-in contact is being eliminated.. This vill not permit the elevator to move automatically without operator l
interaction. This involves no new equipment.
B.
Raise the Intermediate Upper Limit per Section 6.2 of the design concept. 'This only involves a change in the set point.
Should this switch' fail, there exists an upper' limit switch which provides redundancy.
Also as was previously referenced under question No.-
1, it is' physically impossible to raise the spent fuel to a level where sufficient water would not be covering the assemblies.
C.
Per Section 6.3 of the design concept, this limit switch adds redundancy to the measures on Section 6.2.
Should this switch fall the crane may not be able to operate.
If it fails in the passive mode it would not affect the crane's operation or reduce safety in any way.
Page 41
s'
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1 DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY It ' Jf Beaver. Valley l Power Station 50-334'
, License No. 'DPR-66' Docket No.
}([,
J ;hig' L3?
Is'the margin:.:of ' safety: as' defined. inthe -basis.for any Technical 1
t
' Specification reduced?-
.N0 i
. REASON:
Technical' Specification-Section.3/4.9,7f" Crane Travel-Spent
~
g/f.
-Fuel Storage: Building" wasfreviewed for applicability. This section refers only. to. lifting capacity.and' ensuring.that-5 excessive' lifting. force is.no t. applied. The modifications
~ hange.~
doesi no t ' affect the-present
_per. this design c
operability requirements.
The-cranes-interlocks and
.,E physical ~ stops. which -prevent crane travel with loads in H
Lexcess of 3000 pounds-~_over the fuel are not affected.
y Therefore the accident scenario is not affected.
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I Page 42
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DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY f.
Beaver Valley Power Station
' Docket No.'
50-334
, License No.
DPR 66 Design Change No. 722
.T Installation of Annubar Flow Instruments in MSR Reheat Steam Lines.
The' objective of this design change is to install annubar flow instrumentation upstream of'the Hol'sture' Separator Reheaters in the heating steam lin'es.
By' measuring actual flow rates into the Moisture Separator Reheaters (HSR),
- and through the-use of a heat balance ' computer code, the efficiency of the
'MSR's:can be' calculated.,This.information vill be used to determine when the-tube. bundles should be replaced.
Conclusion - Safety' Evaluation It has been determined that this modification vill not increase.the
. probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accideiit or malfunction of equipment,important.to safety as previously evaluated or create a new type of accident than previously evaluated in the UFSAR. This modification vill also not adversely. affect the plant's margin of safety and an unreviewed safety question is not raised.
Basis for Safety Evaluation 1.
Is the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident important to safety as previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety
. Analysis Report (UFSAR) increased?
NO REASON:
The additional instrumentation vill only be local and vill not tie into any existing controls or the plants P-250 computer.
The instrumentation vill only be utilized to provide plant operating conditions (flow rates) for an engineering study.
Failure of the flow instrumentation vill not affect the plant's operation in any way.
Page 43 q
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' N DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY.
Beaver' Valley Pover-Station'-
(
,l l Docket'No.
50-334
,. License No.
' L,. 6i l
I oro malfunction of a different type.
l
'12( q Is_thelpos'sibility for an l accident
".than previously. evaluated in
.the.. Updated Final. Safety Analysis Report f
e
.. JA.
-: (UFSAR)' created?.
NO
~
jf. r R. -
y-t W
- REASON '
LNo'new accident scenario will' be created by' adding annubar flov, instrumentation to the MSR ~ steam heating lines.
No-credit: -will' be taken for the-instrumentation under an
? accident: condition.
O, j"
13.
lIslthe margin. of safety as, defined in the basis-for~any technical..
specification ~ reduced?'
N0 m
-REASON :
- The ' technical ~ specifications are not applicable to the i
a ' ; "/.,
moisture separator' reheaters or their.- inlet steam heating.
lines.
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~DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY Beaver Valley Power Station Docket No.
50-334
, License No.'
.m Design Change tio. 723 Replacement of Concrete Plugs on Reactor Containment' Operating Deck with Steel Grating The purpose of this design change :is to replace the concrete floor _ plugs on the operating deck (El. 767'-10") of the Reactor Containment with heavy steel grating of equivalent load carrying capacity-- (at least 300 p.s.f.,
the design live _ load for-the operating deck).
Safety Evaluation - Conclusion This design change is safe in-that the replacement of the: concrete floor plugs by heavy steel grating vill not affect any equipment.important_to safety as previously analyzed-or create any new malfunctions or accidents.
The Technical Specifications are not affected and no changes to the Updated FSAR-have been' identified.-
This design change does not_present an unreviewed safety question.
The heavy loads handling procedures CHP-1-75-212 vill remain valid and f
unchanged.
The cost benefit of using grating rather than concrete plugs shows a favorable ratio based on the following assumptions. The benefit is 9 shifts (3 days) of critical path time.for each refueling outage at $300,000 per day or a total of
$900,000 per outage.
The' cost associated with using the grating is a potential increase'in radiation exposure.
Assuming a manpower loading of L20,000 man-hours in containment. on the operating deck for each refueling outage (i.e. 100 day outage with 10 people on the operating deck full time for 20 hr/ day) and an' exposure reduction cost factor of $5000 per man-rem results in a change' in exposure rate of 9 mr/hr to be equivalent to $900,000.
Therefore, if using the concrete plugs in the containment operating deck does I
'not reduce the dose rate by 9 mr/hr then the use of the concrete plugs is not i
'I cost' beneficial. 'Since the normal dose rate has historically been lov, use of the grating is justified.
- However, in the event of increased exposure rate levels on the operating deck, the concrete plugs vill be available.
Page 45
'g ~4,g" vn
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.DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY-
-Beaver Valley' Power Station; Docket'No. 334~
_,- License No.
DPR :
}
p 7
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. Basis'for-Safety Evaluation.
s Is th'e probability of an occurrence.or-the consegaence of an accident or
' 1 '.
~
- malfunction of. equipment <important to safety as.previously evaluated in-i the. Updated Final Safety Analysis l Report (UFSAR) increased
NO REASON:
The replacement of the concrete floor: plugs on the operating
~ deck of.the' Reactor. Containment 'with heavy steel grating.of
+
3 equivalent.. load. carrying capacity vill not.affeet the-
, operation of the plant as required in any accident analysis n
idescribed in Chapter 14.of the UFSAR.
The openings in the operating deck' floor must remain open-
, during operation ~to; allow' pressure; relief into the upper
~
parts of containment in the event of a 1arge pipe break:in
'the lover part~of containment. -Since the concrete plugs are currently not in place' during operation, placing grating on the floor openings vill-.not affect the accidents. analyzed.
'2.
Is'the possibil'ity for an accident -or malfunction of a different~ type
- thanLpreviously, evaluated in the Updated Final Satety Analysis Report 1
. created?c'
.N0'
. REASON:
LSince the' grating 'is designed to' the same load carrying capability as;the concrete plugs no new types of-accidents vill be created.
3.
Is the margin of safety as. defined in the basis for any Technical Specification reduced?-
NO
. REASON:-
The margin of safety as defined in the basis for Technical Specifications 3.6.1, 3.6.2 and 3.6.5 are not reduced.
i l
i Page 46
-)
DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY B::ver Valley Power Station Docket No.
50-334
, License No.
DPR-66 i
TOP No. 86-12, Leak Check of Reactor Coolant Ventilation System Vent Valves (SOV-RC-102A, 102B, 103A, 103B) l This TOP was written to detect which of the SOV vent valves was leaking so~that the faulty valve could be fixed. The Reactor Coolant Vent System (RCVS) is not used for analysis in any of the accidents addressed in the FSAR.
It has been analyzed that we could break off the RCVS and still Charging Pump because of orffices installed keep up with the leak with one (FSAR 4.2.11.).
No unreviewed safety question exists.
Opening of [1RV-60] During Power Operation to Support Flush of Unit II Piping Unit I River Vater Valve [1RV-60) was required to be open to support a flush of the Unit II Service Vater System. The FSAR assumes a rupture of one header, only one RV header is necessary to carry out the safety function of the river water system.
An operator remained at [1RV-60] while 1
it was opened.
An "open-ended" flow through [1RV-60] to Unit II piping l
vould be no worse than the FSAR evaluated pipe rupture of a 24" header.
Current Tech. Specs permit operation with only one river water header for up to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. No unreviewed safety questions exist.
TOP No. 86-27, Circulation of "A" Reactor Coolant Loop to Allov Opening the Loop Stop Valves The TOP was prepared to recover the "A"
reactor coolant loop, by circulating the loop for the Tech.
Spec.
required 125 gpm for 90 minutes (T.S.3.4.1.5) to allow opening of the loop stop valves using jumpers.
FSAR 1
section 14.1.6 discusses startup of an inactive RCS loop with the loop stop k
valves closed.
Although this section discusses interlocks with the
{
procedure jumpers out, the procedure administratively assures all FSAR concerns are appropriately covered. The procedure also meets the intent and wording in all applicable Tech.
Specs.
No unreviewed safety question exists.
1 TOP No. 86-30, Refilling the Fuel Pool via the Coolant Recovery Tanks l
The procedure provides a hose from [1BR-583]
to a capped pipe connection between [1CH-88 and 89], to allow transfer of water from Coolant Recovery Tanks to the spent fuel pool.
The FSAR takes no credit for Fuel Pool boron concentration in assuming K vill be < 0.95 (section 14.2).
Thus, any dilution from this procedure 6k$1 be of no consequence.
Section j
9.5 describes the concentration of (H B0 ) >2000 vith respect to corrosion.
l 3
3 Any boron concentration less than thIs 0111 result in less corrosion.
If I
the bypass hose broke, all vaste vould be contained in the Aux. Bldg. and would be able to be isolated.
q Page 47 1
-DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY j
Beaver Valley' Power Station Docket No.
50-334'
, License No.
DPR-66 Tech. Specs., discuss.-boron concentration only in Mode 6.
Any dil'ution vill affect Fuel Pool boron concentration; however, the concern is during refueling..The procedure vill not lover the water level, so the 23
'ft. Tech. Spec. requirement vill not be violated.
No unreviewed safety questions. exist.
. TOP No. 86-39, Discharging Turbine Building Sumps to the River
...This procedure'provides instructions for recirculation, dilution and
. discharge of' turbine building northwest sumps and northeast sumps, in the event'they become contaminated due to S/G tube leakage to the secondary side of.the plant.
Discharging directly from the sumps:vould be required due to the Chemical Vaste Sump being unavailable.
All discharges are carried out using the. requirements.. stated in the FSAR, section 11.2.4.3, and all releases' vill be verified to be within liquid effluent limits (Tech. Specs.
3.11.1.1).
No unreviewed safety question vas involved with this procedure.
~
. TOP No. 86-40,. Transferring Turbine Basement Sump Water to the Chemical Vaste Sump for-Discharge This procedure provided instructions for transferring contaminated
' Turbine Building Northwest or Northeast Sumps to the Chemical.Vaste Sump, to enable it to be'. discharged to the river. via the normal liquid vaste.
' discharge flovpath.
This procedure was required due to potential S/G tube leakage to the secondary side.
All discharges vould have been carried out using the requirements of FSAR section 11.2.4.3, with all Radeon precautions observed.-
All releases vould have-been verified to be within liquid effluent limits (Tech. Specs. 3.11.1.1).
No unreviewed safety question was
- involved with this procedure.
TOP 86-01, Emergency Isolation of River Vater Discharge Header This procedure provided an alternate flovpath to maintain cooling to safety related systems and subsystems in the event of river water discharge header expansion joint deterioration to the. point of obstructing flow or rupturing.
It-vas written to reduce the consequences of flooding as described in UFSAR 2.3.1.2, 2.7.3.,
9.7.2, and 14.1.14.
No Technical was reduced because the procedure provided Specification margin of safety controls to ensure the basis of T.S.
3.7.6 on flood protection. No unreviewed safety question was involved.
l l
TOP No. 86-03, FV-3-3B Operability Data collection This procedure was'vritten in response to an Engineering Memorandum concerning insufficient data in determining pump operability.
Pump l.
performance data was collected with the pump running and discharging to the RCS at operating pressure.
i l.
Page 48 j
-_____2___-_.__-
^
i l
DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY Beaver Valley Power Station Docket No.
50-334
, License No.
DPR-66 Actuation of the auxiliary feedvater system delivering water from VT-TK-10 (temperature range of 35F to 120F) into the steam generators is analyzed for in FSAR section 10.3.5.1.2.5; therefore, probability of a3 l accident vill not be increased.
All evolutions taking place in this TOP l
have been previously evaluated. The auxiliary feed pump is in operation and the auxiliary flow control valves are in the operator's control, so there is no reduction in the Tech.
Spec.
margin to safety.
No unreviewed safety questions exist.
TOP No. 86-05, Temporary Seal Vater Supply for River Vater Pumps i
This procedure supplies means for an alternate method of supplying seal water to VR-P-1A and VR-P-1C vhile piping modifications are being made to normal seal supply lines by a design change. The modification, which supplies seal water thorugh temporary hose, vill be performed in Modes 5 or 6, and the pump still has seal vater available from its own discharge in case of failure of the temporary supply.
This vill maintain the margin to safety. No Technical Specifications are involved and unreviewed safety questions are involved.
TOP No. 86-41, " Processing Contaminate Blowdown Via Standby Blowdown System This TOP places the standby SG Blowdown System in service with temporary ion exchangers in line to remove contaminants from the SG blowdown of the SG vith a primary-to-secondary tube leak.
This TOP is used while Tech. Spec. 3.4.6.2 RCS leak rate limits are not exceeded or during plant shutdown with an SG tube leak.
1.
This TOP provides instruction for installation and operation of placing the standby blowdown system in service with the temporary blevdown demineralizers. The TOP contains 3 stages. The first stage includes installation of 2 or 3 temporary blowdown ion exchangers downstream of the blowdown drain heat exchanger [1FV-E-79] using temporary piping, Temporary hoses are to be rated for up to 100 psig.
Pressure vill a.
be limited to 50 psig by the TOP.
No potentially explosive mixtures vill be transported through this system.
No fire barriers are penetrated with this setup.
b.
A second temporary 1 1/2" fire type hose with a pressure rating of greater than 150 psig vill be installed in place of [TV-1UT-820C].
The hose vill be long enough to discharge flow
The hose vill be secured to prevent whipping hazards.
This hose vill be used by TOP 86-41 only for flushing the standby blowdown system prior to re-establishing blowdown from the SG vith the tube leak.
l Page 49 l
1
_a
b V
DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY p'
Bravar Valley Povar Station j
50-334
, License No.
DPR-66 j.
Docket No.
0 c.
A second temporary hose vill be re-routed by using only one section of hose from the pipe adapter in place of [TV-1VT-820C] to a flanged adapter installed on check valve [CV-1VT-828). This will direct blowdown flow to the condensate system. Leaks in the connections vill be directed to either the Chemical Vaste sump or l
the. Turbine Basement sumps.
The hose vill have a rating of up to 200 psig. Trnnsfer pump
[1LV-P-11] design discharge pressure is 116 psig.
Blowdown pressure from [1FW-TK-1] should exceed 50 psig. These combined pressures are belov 200 psig.
2.
The second phase of the TOP includes steps to install a tenporary hose at the water treatment area temporary blowdown demineralizers to flush i
the blowdown system to either the Chem Vaste sump or the Turbine Basement, sump if the Chem Vaste sump is 0.0.S.
The blowdown system is then flushed for.approximately 30 minutes using clean blovdown from the "B" or "C" SG.
During this time the "A" SG blovdown is directed to the new blowdown system.
a.
Steps include an initial purge of the blowdown line from FV-TK-1 to drain valve [BD-213] during the initial flush of the blowdown system.
This purge ensures removal of contaminants from the
)
blowdown line that would otherwise inject into the condenser.
b.
Another step allowed operators to open the FV-TK-1 purging vent only during the initial purge and flush of the blowdown system using clean blowdown from SG "C" or "B".
c.
The "B" or "C" SG vill be sampled and its blowdown used to flush
[FV-TK-1] to the Chem Vaste sump or Turbine Basement sump.
d.
The TOP vill request Chemistry or RadCon to sample the contents of the Chem Vaste or ~ Turbine sump for activity to ensure 10CFR20, Appendix B, Table 2 limits are exceeded.
The Turbine Basement sump, if used for flushing vill be discharged in accordance to TOP 86-39, if necessary. Then, the TOP realigns blovdown flow to the condensate system and removes the temporary hose to the sump.
3.
The third phase of the TOP includes stopping the clean blowdown flow I
from "B"'or "C" SG and re-establishing blowdown flov from the "A" SG to the blowdown system, through the temporary blevdovn ion-exchangers, through the temporary blovdown demineralizers to the condensate system.
The SG blowdown demineralizers will also be used if available for a.
additional cleanup.
The TOP requires sampling of the blowdown flow to ensure proper operation of the ion exchangers and, if used, the blovdown demineralizers.
b.
During this TOP, SG blevdown flow is maintained at greater than 50 gpm or as required by Chemistry to ensure proper SG Chemis'try conductivity levels are not exceeded.
l Page 50
DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY =
B:nvar Valley Povsr Station Docket No.
50-334
, License No.
.The blowdown flovpath to the condensate system vill be monitored c.
by Operations and RadCon to ensure positive radiological levels.
- 4. -
All applicable RadCon admini.strative requirements are to be followed during performance of this procedure.
5.
All temporary hoses and piping is removed at the end of the TOP and the blevdown system is restored to normal arrangement.
6.
The TOP requires sampling of the condensate system to verify T.S.
3.7.1.4 ?" 'ts are not exceeded.
If these limits are exceeded and isolating blowdown from the leaking SG does not reduce activity levels, then the TOP requires plant shutdown.
i 7.
Any leaks from the SG Blowdown Demineralizers are normally directed to the Chemical Vaste sump.
Corrective Maintenance Procedure CHP 1-30VR-REJ-26-1H, Revision 0, Temporary Repair of REJ-26 in Safeguards NERU provided instructions (refer to EH 61699) that were incorporated into a CHP to perform temporary repair of REJ-26 in 30"-VR 151-03 (i.e., a River Vater line located at elevation 722'-6" in Safeguards Area). The installation of the temporary sleeve does not compromise the integrity of the River Vaste System.
The design concept of the temporary modification limited pocsible leakage from the rubber expansion joint if it failed.
Internal flooding due to River Vater line failure is not considered as an accident initiating event in the FSAR. No unreviewed safety question was involved with this new procedure.
Corrective Maintenance Procedure CHP 1-75-331, Revision 0, Testing of Motor Operated Valves using H0 VATS This is a new procedure to determine the overall operating conditions of various motor operated valves using Motor Operated Valve Analysis and Test System 2100 Signature Analysis System. This provides additional H0V preventive maintenance in accordance with vendor (H0 VATS) recommendations. No unreviewed safety question was involved with this new procedure.
Safety Evaluation Report (SER), Steam Generator Tube Expansion This evaluation addressed the safety impact of the expansion of a J
limited number of tubes at the first and second support plates on the cold
)
leg side of the A steam generator.
This expansion was intended to demonstrate the effectiveness of the expansion process in minimizing the occurrence and the rate of peripheral tube cold leg thinning.
Favorable results of this demonstration vill verify the expansion process for use on Page 51 i
i l
DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY Besvar Valley' Power Station I':
50-334-
, License No.
- L Docket No.
other tubes-in accordance with 10CFR50.59 criteria.
Eddy current testing results were interpreted to reveal the occurrence of cold leg tube vall l :;
I thinning of the. steam generator tubes at lower tube support -plate L
elevations. Whilethe exact mechanism that'causes this thinning is unknown, i
it.was believed that expansion of the tube into the tube support plate interface.. This technique had been shown to retard potential corrosion in model boiler tests and_vas expected to reduce the vibration amplitude of the j.-
1.
tube.-
The modification consisted of the expansion of approximately fifty (50) tubes at the two of the lover tube support plate elevations on the. cold
' leg side of the A steam. generator.
The tubes expanded were selected to
' provide.a valid monitoring of the effect of the expansion on various size i:
L eddy current indications.
The. expansion was done using a hydraulic l
expansion process to provide an expansion zone longer than the thickness of w
the tube support plate and nominal outside diameter slightly smaller than
..the diameter of the tube support plate.. The expansion process minimized the crevice between the tube and the tube support plate.
A post process eddy current inspection verified successful' modification implementation.
No unreviewed safety question was involved with this SER.
Page 52
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Docket No'.-
.50-334 '
License No'.
DPR-66 w'
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. TOP No.J86-42, Pressurizer PORVs [PCV-1RC-455C,-445]
Stroke Time Determination-m, m
. TheLTOPTvas prepared to measure-the PORV's stroke time verify thej j
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. stroke.:timerf were -less than 2.5-seconds, as. assumed ~in SER.
-'" Overpressure Protection System" l(OPPS) Lfor.BVPS Unit 1, 4/4/83..
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!. Performing'theLTOP.in'Hodes:1,
'2, 3,.or 4 would provide additional
< time 1to correct;the P.ORV" stroke times: if needed prior to when-0PPS I
Lis required to bei operable..
No. credit vasi taken for PORVs to 3".
Lprotect the RCS during a complete Loss-of Heat. Sink'(UFSAR 4.3.4),
10ne PORV as tested'whil' the other POV provided Overpressure Relief
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(T;S. 3.4.9.3).
The TOPfLrequired.- the associated block' valve to be.
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- Closing the ~ block valve does not render l l
!the. block-' valve, inoperable' '(T.S.
! 3. 4~.11)..
No unreviewed safety l
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qsestions exists.,
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- V DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY j
LB: aver' Valley Power Station j
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, Docket No.
50-334'
', License No.
DPR-66 s
l RADIATION MONITOR STUDY - NRC AUDIT ITEM 50-334/83-30-05 j
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-A' radiation monitor.1 study " Particle Distribution Evaluation" vas performed for the purpose of closing NRC unresolved item 50-334/83-30-05,' vhich expressed a concern - that time effluent radiation monitors were not collecting representative samples.
The.st'yly'vas performed under. normal operating conditions in two phases.;
.In 1984,- weekly charcoal ~and glass ' fiber. filter samples were analyzed for, radioactivity for a period of 6 months. The results were evaluated and submitted to the NRC.
Radioiodine effluents.
showed good' data correlation. The error band consistently converged towards zero as activity increased above Minimum Detectable Activity (MDA). Traces of Co-60 and Cs-137 vere detected but the quantities were not sufficient to' draw conclusions.about particulate plateout.
The NRC accepted the radiolodine portion of the study.
In 1985 and 1986, the study was continued to statistically evaluate plateout of particulate.
Nuclepore membrane filter samples were collected.from the SA 9/10 and SPING-4 monitors simultaneously with control samples from a specially designed in-house designed test system. This sampling was done for all effluent exhaust systems.
The Mellon Institute of Carnegie Mellon University performed an electron microscope analysis of the filter samples. A majority of particles collected were determined to consist of sulphates, and a few iron (or rust). particles.
Particle plateout was most evident for the'submicron particles and a few particles greater than 1 micron. While evaluation of the degree of particle plateout was the purpose of the study, other particle behavior characteristics were evident and equally important.
It was found that particle travel through long sample lines can also lead to particle agglomeration, particle splitting, and re-suspension of large particles in the sample lines.
i Correction factors were calculated based on particle number, surface area, and volume (mass) distributions.
The effluent radiation monitors were found to have collection efficiencies both higher and lower than the test system.
All of -the calculated correction factors were within the i
conservative correction factors used, both past and present in our
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effluent release calculations.
Therefore, the conclusions of the j
study are that Duquesne Light Company vill continue to use the i
, existing conservative correction factors in our reports of effluent l
release data and previously reported data does not require revision.
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O DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY Beaver Valley Power Station Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 Technical Evaluation Report No. 102 Reactor Coolant Pump Technical Manual Revision This TER updated the RCP Technical manual to the latest.information provided'by the vendor.
There were no unreviewed safety questions identified.
Basis for Safety Evaluation 1.
Vill the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) be increased?
NO REASON:
The changes recommended by TER 102 vill not adversely affect the reliability or safety of the Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCPs).
The pressure retaining capability and the flow coastdown characteristics will not be altered.
The changes were recommended to be consistent with the values in the new RCP technical manual, but were only made in a conservative direction.
The UFSAR was reviewed to determine if any accidents vould be affected by the recommended changes.
It was determined that the following sections vould not be affected:
section 14.1.5; 14.1.6; 14.2.7; 14.2.9; 14.3.
Also, no other part of the UFSAR will be affected, except for sections 4.2 and 4.3.
The vibration limits of section 4.2 are consistent with the vendor's values from the technical manual and are considered adequate to protect the mechanical integrity of the pump.
In section 4.3, the description has been changed to be consistent with the technical manual.
Therefore, the probability of an l
occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR vill not be increased.
2.
Vill the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR be created?
NO REASON:
The changes are so minor, they neither change the failure modes of the equipment involved nor introduce any new potential hazard which could cause an accident.
Therefore, it vill not I
create the possibility for any new, different types of accidents.
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Isithe. margin. of: ' safety : as' defined in the basis ~~for any Technical NO Specification reduced?-,
' REASON:
.The Technical Specification.index 'and. sections 3.2.5 and 3.4.6.2 vere; reviewed' to-determine if their bases might be
.affected. It was ~ determined that no Technical Specifications n: bases vould be affected by these changes. These changes will
-not affect the total RCS' flovrate (3.2.5) or the RCS' leakage.
limits'(3.4.6'.2).' Therefore, these changes vill not affect.the.
margin of safety aslLdefined in the-basis-for any: Technical
' Specifications.
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