ML20079G664
| ML20079G664 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 12/31/1990 |
| From: | DUQUESNE LIGHT CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20079G643 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9110090217 | |
| Download: ML20079G664 (75) | |
Text
_ _
i Duquesne Lkpt Company
'A>N BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION UNIT NO.1 .
DOCKET NO. 50-334 LICENSE NO. DPR-66 ATTACHMENT 2 1990 REPORT OF FACILITY CHANGES, TESTS, AND EXPERIMENTS
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Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1 1990 Report _of racility changes, Tests, and Experiments Table of contents Testino Procedures Eagg 1BVT 2.24.10, Chemtrac Flow Tect 1 1BVT 11.26.6, Unit 1 Daselies Test 2 IBVT 1.60.6, HELB Temperature Detection System Cperability Verification 3 Qpiratina Procedures Temporary operating Procedure TOP-1-90-04, Placing Letdown in Service After Haintenance 4-Temporary Operating Procedure TOP 1-90-8, Tanks 1LW-TK-3B and-3A Resin T1ush 5-Temporary operating Procedure TOP 1-90-7, DV-1 Asiatic Clam chemical' Treatment Program 6
- Temporary Operating Procedure TOP 1-90-9, Transfer PAB South Sump to a H2C 7 operating Manual Proc edure OH 1.32.4AG, Tank IWT-TK-26 Fill Through Temporary Domineralizer Train 8 Temporary l Operating Procedure TOP 1-90-16,
' Condenser Hotwell Polishing 9 Temporary operating Procedure Top 1-90-11, Domestic Water Supply to WT-TK-13 and the 6 Way Flow Splitting Box 10 Temporary operating Procedure TOP 1-90-12,
- Temporary Water Supply to CCR Heat Exchanger Cleaning Equipment 11 i
operating Manual. Procedure OH 1.6.4A, RCP Startup 12
- Temporary Modification --Blank riange on Discharge Piping for Pump 1SW-P-4 13 i_
Operational Surveillance Tent OST 3.24.13,-Overspeed Trip Test of Turbine Driven ~ArW Pump IFW-P-2 14 i
Deaver Valloy Power Station Unit 1 1990 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments Table of contente Operatino ProctdRI.gs fcontinuedi fjtqt operating Hanual Procedure OH 1.35.4H, Alarm' Response Procedures A8-40, AB Bulk Hydrogen Storage Tanks Pressure Low / Low-Low 15 Operatit.g Manual Procedure OH 1.7.4, Alarm Response Procedure A3-60,
. Loop Fill lleader Prermure High 16 Operating Hanual Procedure OH 1.7.4, Alarm Response Procedures A3-47, A3 Doric Acid Batching Tank Temperature Hi-Lo, Doric Acid Batching Tank Level Low 17. .
Temporary' operating Procedure TOP 1-90-17, .j l River Water Supply To 6-Way Flow Splitting Box 18 Temporary operating Procedure TOP 1-87-18, Revision 1, Chemical-Scrubbing of Water Treating i
Hixed Dod Remin_ 19 ;
Temporary Hodification - ,
-Provide Temporary Power To i Domestic Water Duotrol Controller 20 Temporary Operating Procedure TOP 1-90-08, Revision 2, Tank ILW-TF,-3B/3A Reain Flush' 21 Operational Surv6111ance Test OST 1.24.4, steam Turbine Driven AFW Pump 1FW-P-2 Test Revision 22 l -Operating Manual Section OM 1.27.3, Valve List Povision 23 remporary operating Procedure ITOP-90-22,
-valve TV-1SS-102A1 Closure, De-energitation and:Energization 24 Temporary operating Procedure ITOP-90-23, Reverse Flush of IC or IA Recirculation Spray lleat Exchanger 25 L ' Temporary operating Procedure 1 TOP-90-27, K641~ Slave Relay Contact Tent 26
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Beaver Valley Power 11tation Unit 1 l
-1990 Report of Facility changes, Tests, and Experinents ,
IAh1Lgfugententm -
preratino Procedurog,fcontinued). Egng Temporary Operating Procedure 1 TOP-90-25, I Steam Line Data For Flow Transmitter Modificatinas 27 i Operational Surveillanco Test OST 3.24.2, 3 and 4, Hotor Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump Test IFW-P-3A, 3rW-P-38 and 1FW-P-2 20 ,
i operating Hanual OH 1.10.3, Safoty Injection !
System Valve List 29 I Temporary Hodification - Fire 6ystem Tank FP-TK-1 To Fire Header Tio Line Dypass 30 ;
Operating Manual Section OH J.26.3, Main Steam Valve List 31 daintenance Procedures e
Installation of Temporary Hourneters on SA-C-1A,.18, and 1C 32 Installation of Temporary contaminated oil and Sludge Removal Filtration Lyatem 33 Jumper and Lifted Lead (J&LL) Tags !
for Steam Dump System 34 i Jumper and Lifted Lead (JCLL) lags for RM-VS-1078 35 i i
i Jumper and Lifted Lead (J&LL) Tags for RM-CW-108A 36 s
Jumper and Lifted Lead (J&LL) Tags for RM-VS-106 37 i Jumper and Lifted Lead (J&LL) Tage for RM-VS-107A 38 f
Jumper and Lifted Lead (JLLL) Tags
-for RM-LW-116 39 Teeporary Hodification of Station Air corpressor
' control Switch Wiring 40 l
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t Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1 !
1690 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments j Table of Cent eni.g i
}{ginte_ nance Proceduren'fContinuedi }'agg i Teniporary Hodification to Acid Distribution finador ;
in Water Treatment 41 Temporary Modification for Running Temporary Cable ,
For Rod Position Indicator (RPI) D-12 42 Helief Valve RV-BD-110 sotpoint change 43 i
Connecting Recording Equipment to Operating Equipment 44 i Addition of a Metal oxido Varister (Hoy) !
to RM-LW-116/ Relay k25 45 j
' Addition of a_Hetal Oxide Varister (HOV) '
to RM-LW-104/ Relay k33 46 Addition of'a Metal Oxide Varister (HOV)-
to RM-CW-10BA/ Relay k4 and RM-CW-10BD/ Relay k9 47 Temporary Rcs Level Indication-(for C Loop)
During Refueling 48 ;
UF$AR Chances Supplementary, teak Collection f. Releaso System FiPar Design Land Leak Teoting 49 Nuclear Group Administrativo Proceduro -3.5 -
Fire Protecticn 51 l Chemistry Procedures Asiatic Clam chemical Treatmant Program 53 j Facility Chanag,g Deoion Chance- I DCP-558j Rev. O, Crane Globe Valves- 54 DCP-655,.Rev. O, CO and ITE Relays Replacement 55 DCP-713,'Rev. O, Containment Instrument Pit l'q Lovel Switches 56 L:
I? DCP-854, Rev. 0, Filtered Water Piping 58 I
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Beaver Valley' Power station Unit 1 1990 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments Table of Content e Facility chances (Continued 1 EAQ2 l
Desion Chka2f DCP-872, Rev. 0, High Mast, liigh Pressure sodium Lighting 59 DCP-895, Rev. O, Roof Vonts ~ ERT Substation 3
011 Transfer Pump Housing 60 DCP-1185, Rev. O, Installation of Air Filter in Diesel Generator Air start Piping 61 DCP-1187, Rev. O, Replacement of Flow Transmitter TT-VS-112 DCP-1270, Rev. O, Permanent-Utility-Tie-Ina for
-the outage Trailer Complex 65 ,
1 Technical Evaluation Report (TEH1, i
TER-4817, Rev. O, LT-RC-459, Pressuriser Level Transmitter Sealed Reference Leg 66 TER-6064, Rev. O,. Change The Normal System Arrangement For Valve 1FO-81 As Shown on Drawing 8700-RM-53A To Be Consistent With The Operating Hanual 68 l i
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Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1 1990 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Emperiments Page-1 of 69 CHANGT.IITLE 1BVT 2.24.10, Chemtrac Flow Test CHANGE DESCRIPTION 1BVT 2.24.10, "Chemtrac Flow Test", is a new procedure that was written to measure the feedwater flow rates supplying each steam generator to verify foodwater flow instrumentation accuracy, and to determine the moisture carryover of the steam exiting each steam generator. This was performed by using a non-radioactive Lithium tracer technique. During the test it was necessary to place each loop's feedwater steam flow / feed flow bistable (one at a time) into the TRIP position .in order to remove from service the non-controlling channel feedwater flow transmitter. This was done to inject the Lithium tracer into the transmitter's root valve (only available access point into the feedwater line).
SAFFTY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
The design basis accident-considered'here would be a reactor trip due to loss
- of feodwater- flow. The test is performed with one out of two reactor trip signals in place. There is no potent ial for creation of a'new type of.
-unanalyzed event because the plant is put into a condition that utilises the design safety- feature (two out of three feed flow / steam flow mismatches to trip the reactor). There is no change to the impact on the margin of safety because- the. use- of the reactor trip setpoints is not changed. Based on the above, the. Safety Evaluation concluded that this test procedure posed no unreviewed safety questions.
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Usaver Valley Power station Unit 1 l 1990 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experi.nents j Page 2 of 59 CHANGE TITLE f
1BVT 11.26.5, Unit 1 Daseline Test l CHANGE DESCRIPTION l 1BVT 11.26.6, " Unit 1 Daseline Testa, is a new procedure that was written to f obtain baseline heat rate performance data for calculations of Unit I heat l rate. To obtain electrical output data for the test it was necessary to ,
install a watthour meter into the nonerator output circuitry . The watthour meter was connected to non-safety related category !! plant equipment.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
The - safety evaluation was written to evaluate the potential for a lose of onsite -power due to a turbine trip. The only accident scenario to consider ;
here would be a ' loss of onsite power due to a turbine trip caused by-the >
installation of.the watthour meter. offsite power is available and unaffected i
by this test. .There is no potential for creation of a new type of unanalyzed event because reliable offJite power is available.
~ There- is no change t1 the impact on the margin of safety because turbine trip availability was unchanged. Based on the ~ above. the Safety Evaluation ;
concluded that this test procedure posed no unreviewed safety questions.
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Beaver Valley Power Station Unit ?
1990 Report of Faellity Changes, Tests, and Experiments Page 3 of 69 j CHANGE TITLE ;
1DVT 1.60.6, High Energy Line Dreak Temperature Detection System operability Verification ,
EHANor DEscRIPTigg i
IBVT 1.00.6, "High Energy Line Break (HELB) Temperature Detection System operability verification", was revised on December 20, 1989 to include test }
changes made during the seventh refueling outage. The test changes included revision of the HELD isolation valves stroke time requirements for Blowdown i
- Trip Valves (TV-1DD-101-A1,A2,B1,D2,C1,C2] from i 5.0 seconds to i 6.0 seconds.
SArrTY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
A safety Evaluation was not required to change the test, but was written to support a UFSAR change to Sections 10.3.2.3 and 10.3.8.3. The UFSAM revision -t changed the time required to close the Blowdown Trip Valves from within 5.0 seconds- of receiving a signal to within 10 seconds after ambient temperatures- >
in the _ Auxiliary and Safeguardo Buildings exceeds 110'F (isolation time includes Jentor response time, signal proceaning time, and. valve stroke. l time). 94 design basis accidents are aunociated with a HELD failure mode. ;
, The revisand to the UFSAD maintained the existing total HELD isolation time of 10 seconds. It only permitted the increase in valve stroke time as long i as the total HELD isoletion time requirements of 10 seconds could be met, f
- There is no potential for creation of a new type of unanalyzed event because the total HELB isolation time requirements within the presently analyzed envelope, were not changed. There is no change to the impact on the margin of safety becauss the total HEL3 isolation time requirements were not changed.
Based on the above, the safety tvaluation concluded that the change in HELD isolation valves- stroke time requirements posed no unreviewed safety questions.
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Dsever Valley Power Station Unit 1 1990 Report of Facility Changes, Tetts, and Experiments Page 4 Of 69 DIANCE TITLI Temporary Operating Procedure TOP-1-90-04, Placing Letdown in Service After Maintenance CH ANGE DE1QRIPTION A now temporary procedure was developed to fill and pressurize the letdown lins following maintenance, to allow letdown to be placed in service.
fMETY EVALUATIQ1LfEMh.P_1 Letdown is not safety related and the manipulations in this procedure will not affect any safety related equipment described in Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Section 9.1. During this procedure an operator will be stationed in close proximity of letdown piping to manitor for water hammer concerne to minimico the possibility of a malfunction. All failures of letdown components will be bound by UrsAR Section 14.2.2 " Accidental Release of Waste Liquid," with any 11guld leakage being accumulated in the cumps. No Technical Specifications are affe ted by this procedure. No unreviewed safety questione exist.
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Deaver Valley Power Station Unit 1 l 1990 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments 'l Page $ of 69 i
pHANGE TITLE !
Temporary Operating Procedure TOP 1-90-0, (1LW-TK-3B/3A) itesin Flush q cMANGE DFSCRIPTION h new temporary- procedure was written to provide instructions to flush resin from the Low- Level Waste Drain Tanks (ILW-TK-3A/3D), to the Liquid Wasti) ;
Dominera11:er (1LW-I-2). Water fevm the High Level Waste Drain Tank i (1LW-TK-2A/28), used to flush the resin will be collected in an Evaporator ,
' Test Tank (1LW-TK-5A/58). 7 gAFETY EVALUATigli
SUMMARY
.The new procedure operates the Liquid Waste System as described in Ltpdated }
Final- Safety Analysis Report-(UFSAR) Section 11.2.4. The consequences of an i accident have been previously analyzed in UFSAR Stations 11.2.4 and 14.2.2. j This- new- procedure is based on prov' asly existing procedures.- llo Technical Specifications are affected by t ..a Temporary operating Procedure. Ilo -
unreviewed cafety questions exist. ,
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Beaver Valloy Power Station Unit 1 1990 Report of Facility Changos, Teotn, and 1:xporhv it s Page 6 Of 69 CijANGE TIT 11 Temporary Operating Procedure TOP 1-90-7, BV-1 Asiatic Clam Chemical Treatment Program
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CilANGE DFSCRIPTIQM A new temporary procedure wa; cenorated to provide a means of extermination of Asiatic clame in the DV-1 Ri wr cater and Circulating kator Systems, in order to main'ain design heat transfer and flow path conditions of those oystems.
Two temporary homes are to be used for injoction o.t clamicido into the Reactor Plant River Water (RPRW) and Turbino Plant River Water (TPRW) chlorination '
headoro.
SAFETY EVALUATION S M 1@l The clamicide food process is similar to the chlorination proccos of the RPRW and TPRW Systema described in Updated Final Safety Analysin Report (UFSAR)
Section 9.11.2. The RPR'1 flow requi oments of UFSAR Tablo 9.9-3 will be met q in the svent of a Containment Isolatior. Phaso B (CID) signal. The Turbine ,
Plant Component cooling Water System described in UFSAR Section 20.3.9 will not be affected by this procedure. In the event of a Safwty injection Signal -,
(SIS), containment Isolation Phase A (CIA) or CID, the RPRW S): 'em and Hoactor Plant component Cooling Water (CCR) System will perform its safety related
/,k' g9 function as described in UFSAR Sections 9.9 ond 9.4. If wither temporary hose k used to transport clamicido to the chlorination headers would fail, the spill 1 would be collected in the Turbine Du'.1 ding floor drains which are clamicide .' }
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monitored. The n.argin of e fety as defined in the basis of the Technical Specification is not reduced. No unroviewed cafety quantione exist.
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l BeaverfValley Power Station Unit 1 l 1990 Report of.racility Changes, Tests, and Experiments l Page 7 Of 69 CHANGE TITLE 7 Temporary-operating Procedure To." 1-90-9, Transfer PAD South Sump to a hic
. gBANGE DEECBIPTION
- A new temporary procedure was developed to transfer the contents of the Primary . Auxiliary Building (PAD) South Sump to a High Integrity Container (HIC) located in the. Solid Waste Area using an air operated diaphragm pump and ,
temporary 1 hoses. This procedure.also provides instructions to dowater the HIC during transfer. ,
SAFETY EVALUATION SUMM M ;
i The Service Water System (SWS) and Primary Vents and Drain System are not safety. related. No safety related equipment is located in South East PAD elevation 722'- or in the east trench or Solid Waste Duilding. In the event a .
temporary component would- leak or fail, the failure would be similar to installed. component failure and would be bound by Updated Final Safety An: lysis Report Section 14.2.2 and 14.2.3 analysis. No Technical Specifications are.affected by this procedure. No unreviewed safety questions -)
exist.
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Deaver Valley Power Station Unit 1 1990 Report of Facility changes, Tests, and'Experimente Page 8 Of 69 l ,
CHANGE TITLE Operating Manual Procedure OM 1.32.4AG,
[lWT-TK-26) Fill Through Tempo ary Domineralizer Train CHANGE DESCRLPilpli An existing procoduro was modified to change the monitoring point for the sample panel from the installed mixed bed domineralizer effluent to the temporary demineralleer ef fluer t through the use of temporary tubing. This will improve chemistry monitoting of the temporary demineralizer and provide alarms when the dominerslizer is depleted.
SAFETV EVALUATION SUMMaR{
No Systems important to safety as described in Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Sections 9.6 and 9.11 are affected by this procedure change. No radiclogical systems are involved. There are no design basis accidente related to this system. Technical Specifications are not affected. No unreviewed safety questions exist.
- 600,000 gallon Domineralized Water Storage Tank.
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l Deaver Valley Power Station Unit 1 1990 Report of Facility Changes, Te6ts, and Experiments Page 9 of 69 CHANGE TITLE Temporary Operating Procedure TOP 1-90-16, Condenser Hotwell Polishing CHANGE DESfRIPTION A new temporary procedure was developed to recirculate hotwell condensate throvgh the steam generator blowdown high output capacity demineralizers to obtain water chemistry specifications as determined by the Chemistry Department. Condensate is to be transferred to the suction of the blowdown transfer pumps [lBD-P-1A/lB) through temporary piping. The blowdown transfer pumps normally take suction on the steam generator blowdown flash tank (lFW-TK-3) and discharge to the blowdown drain heat exchanger [1FW-E-9).
SAFETY EVALUATION SUMghEl During the performance of this Temporary Operating Procedure, the plant is shutdown. If the temporary modification would fail, the loss of condensato would not affect the plant response to an accident. No safety systems or systems important to safety are affected by this procedure as described in Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Sections 10.3.5.2, 10.3.6 and 10.3.8.3.
Radiological systems are not affected by this procedure. No Technical Specification are involved with this new procedure. No unreviewed safety questions exist.
-Beaver Valley power Station Unit 1
- 1990 Report of Facility Changes,-Tests, and Experiments Page 10sof 69-
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Temporary Operating Procedure TOP l-90-11, Domestic Water Supply to WT-TK-13 and the 6 Way Flow Splitting Box .
CHANGE DESCRIPTION A new temporary procedure was developed to install temporary hoses from the TLD l Building Domestic Water System to the Domestic _ Water Storage Tank
[1WT-TK-13). in--the Unit 1 Turbine Building and the 6 way flow splitting box in the Water Treatment Room.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
The domostic- water. system serves no safety related equipment as described by-Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (VFSAR) Section 9.11. If the temporary modification should_ fail, the amount.of water which would leak would be very small compared to .the. flood analysis in UFSAR Section 2.3.- No Technical 4
Specifications -are involved in this procedure. No unreviewed safety questions exist.
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Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1--
'1990; Report of Facility Changes, Tests,:and Experiments Page 11 Of 69.
CHANGE' TITLE
- Temporary Operating Procedure TOP 1-90-12,
-Temporary: Water Supply to.CCR lleat Exchanger Cleaning Equipment CHANGE DESCRIPTION ;
A new temporary procedure was developed to install and remove a temporary hose l and spool pieces.-for . tube cleaning of reactor plant component cooling water
.(CCR) heat exchangers [1CC-E-1A/1B/1C).
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
The- temporary modification does not affect any safety.related system. The (441gn basis accident ' described -by Updated Final Safety Analysis Report-Section 14.1.14 is not affected by this change. No radioactive or potentially radioactive systems are involved.. The amount of water resulting from a hoce-rupture _ would- be very small and boundad by the flood analysis.. Technical Specifications are not affected by this new procedure. No unreviewed safety .l questions exist.
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Beaver. Valley Power Station Unit 1 1990 Report of Facility Changes,' Tests, and Experiments Page 12 of.69 ;
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Operating Manual' Procedure OH 1.6.4A, RCP Startup ggANGC DESCRIPTION-An existing procedure, OM-1.6.4A RCP Startup, was modified to allo',t a Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) to_be started while the Number 1 seal differential pressure indication is out of service. Two temporary pressure gauges will-be installed '
to determine differential pressure. J SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
Accidents identified by Updated Final. Safety Analysis Report Sections 14.1.6, 14.2.7, 14.2.9 .and 14.3.1 assume the reactor is operating, however the pump will be started while the reactor is shutdown. Although the Number 1 seal may fail and. cause a locked rotor or small Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA), the
' reactor is shutdown and- the probability of- failure is low due to reduced .
reactor coolant system pressure and temperature. If the Number 1 seal would fall, the Number 2 seal would become the pressure boundary. In the event the ;
temporary _ pressure gauge would' fail, leakage would be enveloped by the small break. LOCA accident. The margin of safety as defined in basis of the
-Technical Specifications is not reduced. No unreviewed safety questions exist.
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Beaver _ valley Power Station Unit 1 1990 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments Page 13 of 69 CHANGE TITLE Temporary Hodification - Blank Flange on Discharge Piping for.[1SW-P-4)
CHANGE DESCRIPTION.
A-- blank #1.ange'- is to be installed-in the discharge piping of Decontamination Pump (1sW-P-4) in order for the pump to be-removed for repairs. The pump does not have'a discharge isolation valve. This pump (1SW-P-4) is currently'out of i service.
i SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
. If the flange' would- fail, the contents of Decontamination Tanh (1SW-TK-4) would drain to the Solid haste Area Sump. The maximum volume of the tank-(1,400 gallons)- would be contained in -the Solid Waste Sump. The pump is located; in the solid Waste Area and no safety related equipment is located in this area. Technical Specifications are not affected by this temporary modification. No unreviewed safety questions exist.
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t Daaver Valley Power Station: Unit 1 fl990 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments' Page 14 Of 69 i
_ CHANGE TITLK'
_ operational surveillance. Test OST 1.24.13, Overspeed: Trip. Test of Turbine Driven AFW Pump (1FW-P-2) ;
CHANGE DESCRIPTION .
'A new~ surveillance -test was developed to demonstrate the operability of the overspeed trip mechanism of the turbine ~ driven Auxiliary; Feed Water (AFW) pump
[lFW-P-2). This test' Tis similar to the previously approved overspeed ,
operational _ Surveillance Test (OST). 2.24.9, Overspeed Trip Test of Turbina Driven AFW Pump [2FWE*P22), developed for Unit 2. l
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SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
In order- tol avoid overpressurizing of safety related AFW piping and components, the test is_ performed while the pump isiuncoupled from the turbine drive,- thus the AFW System will function as described in Updated Final Safety-Analysis Report (UFSAR)_ Sections 10.3.5.1.2' -and'10.3.5.2.2._ The accidents described in UFSAR Sections 14.1.8, 14.1.11, 14.2.5,- 14.2.4, 14.3.1 and
.14 . 2 . 5 . 2 . will- not be adversely affected by the temporary loss of_the turbine driven AFW_ pump since the other two trains of AFW pumps are required to be operable during the test (if performed in Modes 1-3). Placing this pump in an inoperable- stato is. allowed by DV-2 UFSAR probability risk assessment and the-AFW system la _similar in design and: function to the Unit 2 AFW system.. The margin- of. safety .as defined in the basis for.the Technical Specification is not reduced. No unreviewed safety questions exist.
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Deaver = Valley Power Station Unit 1 ;
1990 Report of Facility Changoo,-Tests / and Experiments Page 15 of -
CHANGE TITLE .
' operating Manual 1 Procedure CM 1.35.4H, Alarm Response Procedures h8-40, A8-48.- Bulk Hydrogen Storage Tanks pressure Low / Low-Low
. CHANGE DESCRIPTIOR-
'In accordance with the darkboard concept cf NURCG-0700, Annuncl3 tors AB-40 and A8-48 .(which are. nocmallyf lit ' graon) are to.be' disabled'by maintaining the knife -switch open. Thel original- intention of the alarma assumed that a Hydrogen bottle 'was continuously . lined up to supply the Volume _ Control Tank l; (VcT) and Main Generator.: .The current operating practice, started about 10
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- years ago, is'to lineup Hydrogen or,an as needed basis.
'abFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
Hydrog2n oupply. to the VCT and the Main Generator la not important to safety,
-or used to mitigate the consequeneca of ar.y accident. Disabling of the bulk
-Hydrogen pressure ' low' and low-low alarme does not af f ect the performance of the bulk- Hydrogen system. No Technical Specifications are affected. No
- unreviewed safety questions exist.-
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Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1 1990 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments
-Page 16 of 69 CHANGE TITLE operating Manual Procedure OM 1.7.4, Alarm Response Procedure A3-60, Loop Fill Header Press High CHANGE' DESCRIPTION In accordance with- the darkboard concept of NUREG-0700,-Annunciator A3-60 (which- is normally lit green) is to -be disabled by maintaining the knife switch open. The alarm is normally lit due to leakage through loop fill
-header. flow control valve (FCV-lCH-160), and/or Reactor . Coolant System leaking through the loop till-valves [MOV-lRC-556A,B,C].
LAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
- The; affected portion of the Chemical and Volume Control-System (CVCS)'is not safety-.related. Disabling of; the alarm will not change tho performance of this . portion of CVCS. No accident analysis described in Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Chapter 14'is affected by this. change. The fill header is not a Technical Specification related item. No unroviewed safoty questions exist.
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s i Deaver Valley Power Station Unit 1 1990 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments-Page 17-Of 69 CHANGE TITLE l
Operating Manual Procedure OM 1.7.4, Alarm Responae Procedures A3-47, A3 Boric Acid Batching. Tank Temp Hi-Lo, Boric Acid Batching Tank Level Low CHANGE DESCRIPTION .
In accordance with the darkboard concept of NUREG-0700, Annunciators A3-47, A3-48 (which are~ normally lit green) are to be disabled rf maintaining the knife switches open. . The level alarm is normally lit because the batching _
procedure- completely drains the batching tank after flushing. The temperature
. alarm can be' lit depending- on ambient. temperature in the Primary Auxiliary ,
Building'(PAB).
- SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
The boric.. acid batching procedure does not refer to these alarms. Acid batching is used only on an intermittent basis with a local operator present.
Local- indication is used in__the batching procedure. The boric acid batching
-tank is not a safety related- piece .of equipment.- No accident analysis described in Updated; Final . Safety Analysis Report chapter 14_Lis affected by thia change. . Boric acid batching: tank level and temperature are not Technical specification related.-- No unreviewed safetf questions exist.
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Deaver Valley Power Jtation Unit 1
'1990 Report of Facility Changes, Teetc, and Experiments.
Page 18 Of 69 4 - F CilANGE TIILE-
-Temporary Operating Procedure TOP 1-90-17, l
--River Water supply To 6-Way Flow Splittint Dcx QHhEGE DESCPIPTION
.A newL temporary. procedure was developed to install a temporary hose from the discharge' of the Chilled Water.condensec Booster Pumps (IVS-P-2A/2B) to the 6-way flow splitting. box in Water Treatment.- This is required bccause the water treatment clarifier is out of service.
SAFEtt EVALUATION
SUMMARY
'No' safety. systems or systems.important to safety are affected by this change as -described 'in Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Section-2.3. . Any flow directad out of - the flow splitting box is very-cmall compared to the flood analysis. Technical specifications. are not affected by this new procedure. i No unre? towed safety questions exist.
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{. Beaver Valley-Power Station Unit l' 1990. Report of Fae.111ty changes, Teets, and-Experiments
+ -
Page 19 of 69 ,
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EUANGE TITLE ,
- - Temporary operating Procedare TOP.1-87-18, Revision 1, Chemical Scrubbing of Water Treating Mixed Bed Rosin'
~ CHANGE DESCRIPTION An.; existing:_ temporary procedure was revised to treat the mixed bed resin with a brine. solution. The- brine solution removes excess regeneration products from- the resin so that a normal rinse of the resin will be effective and the demineraliter can be' returned to service.
T-S AFETY EVALUATIOff-
SUMMARY
No safety systems or systems important to safety _are-affected by this change 1 as' described by Updated Final Safety Analysis. Report Section 9.11. The amount )
of. water --released by a temporary hose rupture would be very small compared to J the- flood analysis.- _ Technical Specifications -are Enot affected by this '
procedure change. No unreviewed safety questions exist.
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Beaver Valley' Power Station-Unit 1
-1990
- Report of Facility Changes,. Tests, end. Experiments Page 20 of 69 CHANGE TITLE.
Provide Temporary; Power To Domestic Water Duotrol Controller
- CHAh0E DESCRIPTION
- The- normal power. supply '(provided by MCC-12 via 120 VAC (PNL-AC-4})_to the domestic water' duotrol controller le currently out of service. The temporary-
. modification 1 provides power to the controller from a normal wall socket outlet.
~
SAFETY EVALUATION SUMMAR1
. No.. safety systems or systems .important to safety are affected by this e temporary = modification, overcurrent protection is still available from the=
- outlet -breaker.; Technical Specifications are'not affected by this temporary. ,
modification.- No unreviewed safety questions exist.
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Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1 1990_ Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments Page 21 Of 69 CHANGE TITLE Temporary Operating Procedure TOP 1-90-08, Revision 2,
[1LW-TK-3B/3A) Resin Flush CHANGE DESCRIPTION An existing ten.pora ry procedure was revised to allow the bypassing of high level waste drain tank low level trip so that the tank level can be lowered for cleaning. Also the procedure allows the removal of the tank manway and the use of a water lance.
JAFETY EVT.LUATION
SUMMARY
The high and low level waste drain tanks are not safety related and they are not located adjacent to safety related equipment. In the event the tank overflowed, the water would be collected in cumps and the radiological consequences of the accident would be enveloped by the analysis of Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Section 14.2.2. The margin of shfety defined in the basis of Technical Specifications is not reduced by thiy procedure change. No unreviewed safety questions exist.
Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1 1990 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments Page 22 Of 69 LtihNCE_ TITLE Operational Surveillance Test OST 1.24.4, Steam Turbino Driven AFW Pump Test (lFW-P-2) Revision GSMSP,LIIFCRIPTION A revicion to OST 1.24.4 was made to install a temporary pressure test gaugo on drain valve 1FW-360 to measure Auxiliary Feed Water (AFW) header discharge pressure for poet maintenance testing of AFW pump discharge valve 1PW-36. The enange also lifted a lead to remove train A auto-open signal to AFW motor-operatud throttle valves MOV-lFW-151B, D and F from Main Steam System trip valve TV-lMS-105A.
SAFETY EVALUATLON SUMMMX The performance of the AFW system, as described in Updated Final Safety Analysis Roport (UFSAR) Section 10.3.5.2.2, is unchanged since the other two AFW pumps are operable per Technical Specification 3.7.1.2. The Engineered Safety Feature system is unchanged since throttle valves MOV-lFW-151B, D and F will open if AFW pump 1rW-P-3A starts as described in UFSAR Sections 7.3.1.1.2, 7.4.1.2.2, 7.4.1.3 and 10.3.5.2.2. The AFW flow path is not alteredt if the temporary gauge would fail, it is to be isolated by a locally ctationed operator, and the lifted lead has no affect on operable pumps IFW-P-3A and JR. The ratgin of safety as defined in the basis for the Technical Specifications is not reducod. No unreviewed safety questions exist.
Deaver Valley Power Station Unit I 1990 Report of Facility Changue, Testo, and Experiments Pago 23 of 69 CHnNGE TITLE i
operating Manual Procedure OM 1.27.3, Valve List Revision CHANGE DESCRIPTION The normal system arrangement position of Air Ejector Suction Linos Cross Connect valve [1AS-260) was changed from shut to open. This valve position change supports a change to Temporary operating Procedure (TCP) 1-86-36 for measuring dischargo flowrate (prevents daily stroking of valvo).
FAFETY EVALVATION SUMMARl No safety systems or systems important to safety as described by Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Section 10.3.6 are affected by this position change.
The change does not affect air f3.ow from the air ojoctoro and the ability of radiation monitor (RM-lSV-100) to detect increased radioactivity in the main condenser. Technical Specifications are not af fected by this valve ponition change. No unreviewed safety questions exist.
Beaver Valley Powee Station Unit 1 1990 Roport of Facility Changen, Te6:s, and Experiments Page 24 Of 69 f.llhHQX IlILE Temporary Operating Procedure ITOP-90-22, Valvo
! (TV-1SS-102All closure, De-energitation and Energitation CHANGE DESCRIPTIDH A now temporary procedure was developod to time stroke and verify clooed reactor coolant loop cold leg sample line inside containment isolation valve (TV-lSS-102Al], with remote valve position indication unavailablo. The procedure will remove the fuse for loolation valve (TV-lSS-102A1) to ensore the valve remains in the closed position. Procedure steps are added to re-energiro the vcive should an accident occur which would require the use of the Post Accident Sample System (PASS).
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
With the fuse to the valve removed, the valve remains in the safe (CLOSED) position should a Cor ta inment Isolation Phase A (CIA) signal occur. If valve l
(TV-1SS-102All is required to be opened, (for a PASS sample), steps are given to re-install the fuses. The PASS in not required for safe plant shutdown as described in Updated Final Safety Analysie Peport Section 14.1. Technical Specificationo are not Lffected by this new procedure. No unreviewed safety questions exist.
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Deaver Valley Power Station Unit _1_ l 1990 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments l
Page 25 of 69 ,
CHANGE TITLE Temporary operating Procedure ITOP-90-23, Reverse Flush of IC'or 1A Recirculation Spray Heat Exchanger CHANGE DESCRIPTIOM A' new temporary procedure _ was generated to_backflush the recirculation spray '
. heat _exchangers _[1RS-E-1C(IA)) while the plant is in Mode 1,2,3 or 4. The flushing will be accomplished while the affected recirculation spray heat exchanger is on clearance.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
Both headers of the River ' Water System will be capable of supplying their respective loads during performance of the Temporary Operating Procedure (TOP), except for recirculation spray heut exchanger IC. -At'least I train of recirculation -spray will- remain operable during the TOP to assure minimum containment- depressurization requirements,. '
Recirculation spray capacity does- .;
not affect- the amount of safety injection-flow and therefore does not impact !
peak' clad-_ temperature. The co-tainment analysis' in Updated Final Safety Analysis -Report (UFSAR) Section 14,3,4 only-assumes 2 of the 4 Recirculation Spray" subsystems are available. There are no UFSAR Chapter 14 design-basis-accidents ufor which failure modes associated with this TOP can be an initiating event.- The _ margin Eof safety as defined in the basis for Technical .
-Specifications is not reduced. -No unreviewed safety questions exist.
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Beaver Valley Power. Station Unit 1 1990 Report of. Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments Page 26 Of 69 CHANGE TITLE-TemporaryTOperating-procedure iTOP-90-27, K641 Slave Relay Contact Test CHANGE DESCRIPTION A- new' Temporary Operating Procedure- (TOP). was generated to perform post-maintenance testing for the replacement'of contacts on Slave Relay K641 -
TrainfB. The procedure will-install a jumper to complete the circuit so-that Low. Head Safety Injection (LHST) pump discharge recircalation valve J MOV-lSI-885B actuation can be verified.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
- In + 1 event 'the jumper would fail (open), the Safety Injection System / Solid
- Stato Protection System circuit would be unaffected, and the system would function if accuated -by accident conditions' During the test, recirculation .
valve- MOV-lSI-805B will cloce; if_ the LHSI pump started, the pump would not i have- a. minimum recirculation flowpsth available.. The TOP has a precaution to
- stop:-all testing if conditions develop where the Solid State Protection System-(SSPS)- or Safety Injection is needed or actuated. The TOP uses normally installed -tert sveitches to test the circuit af ter the jumper is installed. No other part- of .SSPS vill be altered by the performance of the TOP. The margin 1 of safety- es- defined in the -basis of the Technical Specifications is not reduced. No unreviewed safety questions exist.
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Beavor Valley' Power _ Station Unit 1 1990_ Report of Facility Changes,--Tests, and Experiments Page_27 Of 69-n- CHANGE TITLE-Temporary operating Procedure 1 TOP-90-25,
' Steam-Line Data For Flow Transmitter Modifications.
pjbyGE DESCRIPTION A ;new temporary procedure wasl developed to obtain steam line data for several l flow; transmitter; modifications. Tne test consista of installing pressure _-
gauges on existing test connections and drain valves. Pressure and temperature data-- will -be recorded from the test instrumentation and installed plant instrumentation.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
The heater drains system is the only system affected. In accordance with Updated FintT. -Safety Analysis Report Chapters 10 and 14, no' safety systems or systems important- to safety- are affected by this procedure. Technical Specifications are not affected by this jascudure. No unreviewed-safety questions exist.
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Beavor.Valloy Powsr Station Unit 1 1990 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments Page 28 of 69 pHANGE TITLE-Operational Surveillance Test OST 1.24.2, 3 and 4,.
Motor Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump Test IFW-P-3A, IFW-P-3B and 1FW-P-2 CHANGE DESCRIPTION Existing Operational Surveillance Toots 1.24.2, _ 3 and 4 (Motor Driven ,
Auxiliary Feed Pump Test IFW-P-3A, IFP-P-3D and 'lFW-P-2) have been revised )
.to change tho' acceptance criteria for the pressure drop requirements on 1 recirculation ' flow to incorporate the Minimum Operating Point (MOP). The flow i l
control valve is also being failed open to ensure full flow. The new MOP is taken from an Engineering Calculation Package (#8700.24.46).
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
The pump is -inoperable during the -test due to the closure of the manual 1:clation valve. With the flow control' valve f ailed open, the operator would have to zopen the manual isolation valve if the pump was' required. The other two' pumps- remain operable.. The new MOP curve will verify that the pump in running- acceptably. The new HOP limits will verify that the basis of the Technical Specificatione are met. No unreviewed safety questions exist.
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B'eaver-ValleyLPower Station Unit 1 1990 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments Page 29 of 69
- CHANGE TITLE.
-. Operating. Manual OM 1.10.3, Safety Injection System Valve List CHANGE DESCRIPTION
- The normai system arrangement -position of Nitrogen Supply Header Isolation-Valve' (ING-325) in the supply lino to Unit 2 was changed from shut to open.
This is the normal position of the valve during. operation.
SMETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
. There is no change to the probability of failure; Unit'2 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report T(UFSAR) Section 9.5,9 states that Unit-1 can supply Nit.rogen through the ernse connect piping-and isolation valve ING-325.- In the event of a Nitrogen supply failure, the safety injection accumulators are protected by redundant .normally- closed valves on the supply -lines. No accidento are
-identified. in: Unit 1 UFSAR Chapter _14 or Unit 2 UFSAR Chapter 15. Technical Specifications -are- not affected by this change. No unreviewed safety-questions, exist.
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- Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1 1990 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experimento Page 30 of 69 CHANGE TITLE
- Temporary.Hodification - Fire System 7ank FP-TK-1 To Fire Header. Tie Line Bypass CHANGE DESCRIPTION The line from the fire system hydropneumatic tank FP-TK-1 to the distilbution system is plugged, which degrades system presoure inventory control and causes fire system pump FP-P-1 to run cont' ;uously. A temporary hose will be run from valve FP-40 to valve FP-338 to bypass the flow restriction.
EhFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
The tesporary modifications will enhance reliability since it -mimics permanantly. installed equipment which has degraded. Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Chapter 14 contains no accident relevant to implementation or failure of this modification. The worst case failure vould be Eequivalent to a 1 inch brehk in the fire system which is enveloped by UFSAR Section- 9.10.1. This . temporary modification does not affect the Technical Specifications. No unreviewed safety questions exist.
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' Beaver Valley Power Station Ur.at 1
.1990' Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments Page 31-Of 69 ?
CHANGE TITLE
- Operating Manual OM 1.2' #. Main Steam Valve List CHANGE DESCRIPTION 0 change the normal system arrangement position of auxiliary steam to gland steam isolation valve IMS-42 fron closed to open, and change main turbine gland steam control valve Mov-1MS-201 .from open to closed. The auxiliary steam-~ header will oupply the gland steam system,-with the main steam supply available as a backup.-
EAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
No.. safety systems or . systems important to safety are ' involved or af fected by this change as: described in Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR)
Sections. 10.3.2.1, 10.3.2.3=and 10.3.3.1. The accident analysis described by; )
UFSAR Section 14.1.7 is unaffected since the failure modo.of' auxiliary etoam supply is no' more likely' than failure of nain steam supply and main steam supply _ status -- i s - readily_ available in the control Room. Technical Specifications are not affected -by this change. No unreviewed safety questions exist..
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1990 Report of Facility Chat.ges, Tests, and Experiments .
H Page 32 of 69 l
,- i CHANGE TITLE Installation of Temporary Hourmaters on SA-C-1A, 1B, and IC QHANGE DESCRIPTION This temporary -modification was needed to determine run times on the Statioh Air Compresecca so that a predictive maintenance-schedule could be estabitahwd for_ . compressor overhauls. This change was initiated to increaes the reliability of- the Station Air Compressors. This modification did not-alter the performance of the compressors and/or.their associated control circuitry.
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SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
The probability ~ or consequences of an accider.t described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis. Report (UFSAR) will not ce increased because the Station Air compressors -do not provide a safety function and their failure will'not-affect l the safety l; functions of other equipment' -(Reference UFSAR Section 9.8.)).
Failure of -the Station Air Compressors will not increase the-radiological consequences - of an accident because they .are not used. to mitigate an l accident. All air operated ; valves fail' closed (Reference UFSAR.Section L 9.8.1).
Thec possibility of- an accident or malfunction of a different. type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created since the modificatian
--utilizes- existing circuitry of .the Sto !on Air Compressors. The only malfunction would be failure of the Station air compressors.
No Technical Specification bases. are affected by this modification nince L -safety related air operated valves do not require air to close.
No unreviewed safety question is involved.
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Deaver Valley Power' station Unit 1
,(
1990 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments 6 Page 33 of 69-JgHANGE TITLE 4
I Installation of Temporary Contaminated Oil and Sludge
' Removal. Filtration System CHANGE DESCRIPTION- 5
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l =This = temporary modification was in affect for one week on each chiller. The
- filtrationf system removed sludge which was detrimental to the operation of the
- c hil le r .~. While- one chiller was being cleaned the other was carrying the-3
. station load. !
- SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
The ' probability 1 Safety Analysio- _ or consequences of not an accident described in the Updated failureFinal
- - Report (UFSAR) will be increased because chiller
' does not' contribute to any analyzed accidents (Reference UFSAR Section 9.4.3.2).
il Failure of the Chiller will not increase the radiological consequencen of an accident since river water can be used ar an alternative cooling mechanism.
2 (Reference-UFSAR Section 9.4.3).
I
-The possibility' of an accident or malfunction of a different type-than any j; previously evaluated in the UFSAR 10 not created since the modification is in
~
l the: secondary side of the plant and will not affect the function of any safety
. related equipment in= the . vicinity of the chillers. If the backup aupply of river water does not- maintain ambient air temperature in containment, Unit
, operation can-be curtailed (Reference UFSAR Section 9.4.4)
} No.. Technical Specification bases are affected by this modification since the
}; backup supply of river water is. adequate to cool station loads if_the chillers i : fail. No margin of safety will be reduced.
-No unroviewed cafety question is involved.
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tieover Volley power Stotion Unit 1 1990 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experisuunt s page 34 nf. 69 g)MEGE Ting l i
Jt vnper and Lif Led Lead (JCLL) Tags for Steam Dutnp System .
i pjaRQE DESCRIPTION This temporary modification was made to disable valve PCV-MS-106A and to recalibrate 1/p for PCV-Mt 106D1 to act as the first. valve to open. With one steam dump valvs disabled there is still a suf ficient stoa.n dump espacity with the remaining condwnser steam dump valves and atmospheric valves.
SAFETY-E MLUAT10!LSUdKhh1 Thv. probability or consequences af an accident doserfbed in the Updated Final
-safety Analysis Deport (UF8AR) will not ce increased because the recalibration i of a condenser steam dump and isolation of another $oes not increase the
-prwbability of .an accidental depressurization (Hoference UFSAR Section ;
14.1.13).
Even with valve PCV-MS-106A disabled, sufficient steam dump capacity. exists with the remainii.g condenser dump valvom and the atmospheric.oump valves. Two 4 I
conoonsor dump- valves will stati be available for cooldown capabilitius. The cransequences of -an .necidental .depressurigation or a steam line break remain 1 unchanged and are covered in UFSAH Sections 14.1.13 and 14.2.fi. j
- The possibility of an ace) dent or malfunction of a differen' type tnan any previously eval utted .. in the UFSAR is et created since the r dification is in l the secondary side of the plant and even if one condenser s' eam dump is out of 3 survice sufficient steam dump :apacity exists with the remainityg condenser _ {
dump valves and the atmospherir dump valves. t IJo Technical Specification bases are af fected by this modification since the condenser steam dump valves arc not mentioned in the Technical Specifications.
.tio unroviewed safety question is involved. j
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Deaver Valley Pover station Unit 1 ,
1990 Report of racility Changes, Teste, and Experiments i Page 35 of 69 '
CHANGE TITLE Jumper and Lifted Lead (Jr,LL) Tags for RH-VS-107D- l CrlANGE DESCRIPTION This radiation monitor design - was upgraded to allow neceasary adjustment l capabilitlos. This inodtfication-af foctri indication only. ;
I jiAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
l The probability or consequences of an accident described in the Updated Final Satety- Analyste Report (UFSAH)- will not be increased.since the modification i affects indication only and has no effect on any malety function of this conitor. The electronic -components added are in the circuit which provides !
-indication. The alarm and/or trip functions f.r e unaffected by .this !
modification.
r Failure of the -monitor will not increase the radiological consequences of an
-accident since equipment reliability is unaffected by this modification. >
The_ possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different typo than any previously evaluated in the UFsAR is not ' created sinces the modification af f acts 'indicat1:>n only. -
No Technical Specifleation bases are affacted by this modification since the monitor still performs its safety function as before.
No unreviewed safety question is involved.
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heavor Valley power Station Unit 1 1990 Report of racility Changer, Toots, and 1:xperin ont o Page 30 of 69 CithELllT1I Juroper and Lif ted Lead (J&t1} Tago for hM-GW-10BA CllhNOT hl'UCElfilfH This radiation anonitor design van upgraded to allow nacers ary adjustn ent capabilities. This nodification af f ected indication only.
EhfflLJYhWAT10lLELTJihPX Tho probability or consequencon of an accident doperibed in the Updated Final safoty Analysis Report (UF5AR) will not be incronood sinco the nodification affects indication only and has no offect on any cafety function of thia snon it o r. The electronic componentn added are in the circuit which providen indication. The alarm and/or trip f unc t. ions are unaffuetod by this nodification.
Failure of the toonitor will not incronen the radiological conooquences of an accident since equipment re11at'111ty la unaf f ected by this rnedification.
The potisibility of an accident or malf unct ion of a dif f urent type than any previounty evaluated in the UrSAR is not created uince the modification affects indication only, llo Technical Specification bauen are affuctod by this modification pinee the monitor still performa its enfoty function au befoto.
14o unroviewed omfoty questton is involved.
Doaver Valley Power Station Unit 1 1990 Report of racility changes, Tosts, and Experiments Page 37 of 09 CL%1LQE 111LC Jumper and Lifted Lead (J&LL) Tage for P.M-VS-106 flL$iqr d DESCPIPTION This radiation monitor design was upgraded to allow necessary adjustn.ent capabilities. This tuodification affected indication only.
ShFFTY EVALUATION SMtydt The probability or consequences of an accident described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UrsAR) will not be increased since the modification affects indication only and has no effect on any safety function of this monitor. The electronic components added are in the circuit which provides indication. The e.larm and/or trip functions are unaffected by this modification.
Failure of ths monitor will not increase the radiological conuequences of an accident since equipment reliability is unaffected by this modification.
The possibility of an accident or malfunction of a differont type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created since the modification affects indication only.
11 o Technical Specification bases cre affecteG by thin modification since the monitor st '.11 perf orms its safety function as before.
11o unreviewed safety question is involved.
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Deaver Valley Power station Unit 1 '
1990 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments Page 38 of 69 CHANGE TITH l Jumper and Lifted Lead (JELL) Tags for RM-VS-107A g11Ml0E DESCRIPTION This radiation monitor design was upgraded to allow necessary adjustment capabilities. This modification affected indication only. .
).gETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
The probability or consequences of an accident described in the Updated Final !
Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) will not be increased since the modification ,
affects indication only and has no effect on any safety function of this monitor. The electronic componente added are in the circuit which providas indication. The alarm and/or trip functions are unaffected by this ;
modification. ,
4 Failure - of. the- monitor will not increase the radiological consequences of an- '
- accident since equipment reliability is-unaffected by this modification.
The possibilit'y' of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any i previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created- since the modification ;
affects indication only.
Ho Technical Specification bases 'are af fected by this modificatir.n since the monitor still performs its safety function as before. j Ho-unreviewed oafety question is involved.
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Beavor Valley Power Station Unit 1 1990 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments Page 39 of 69 s
CHANGE TITLE-9
- Juroper and Lif ted Lead (J&LL) Tags for RM-LW-116. i l
C_ HANCE DESCRIPTION l
This radiation -monitor design was . upgraded to allow necessary. adjustment I capabilities. This modification affected indication only.
shtrT( EVALUA?IoH s0MMARi l The probabiU t,' or consequences of an accident described in.the Updated Final l Safety.-AtalyS16 Report (UFSAR) will not be increased since the modification l attects. Jndscat pu . c.J y and has no offact on any safety function of this l motiltor. The. elee+ronie components added are in the circuit which provides l ir.dication. T/,. Alarm and/or trip functions are unaffected by this r,odification. ;
-. }
Failure of ' no monitor'will not increase the radiological consequences-of an- !
accident since equipment reliability is unaffected by this modification. ;
i The possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created since the modification affacts indication only, s
No Technical Specification bases are affected by this modification since the monitor still performs its. safety function as before. .
=t No unreviewed safety question is involved.
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beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1
- 1990 lieport of racility changue, Tests, and Expoximents l
Pago 40 of 69 cHAnor TIILI Temporary Modification of Station Air conpronsor control switch Wiring CHANGE DEIGIUlpli This modification permitted a rapid restart of the air compressors in the oyent of a low pressure condition. It did not altor the performanco of the station air compressor just enhanced their operability, fdFETY EVALUATION EyyEhEl The probability or consequences of an accident described in the Updated Tinal Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) will not bo increased becauco thu Station Air comprensors do not provido a safety function and their failure will not affect the safety functions of other equipment (Reference UFSAR Section 9.8.1).
Failure of the Station Air compressors will not increano the radiological consequences of an accident because they are not unod to mitigato an accident (Reserence UFSAR Section 9.8.1). No safety rolated equipmont requires the supply of compressed air for ohutdown.
The ponnibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created since the modification does not introduce any now failure modes. Loss of station air is bound by the turbine trip analysis (Poterence UFSAR section 14.1.7), and spurious omfotv injection analysis (Referenco UFSAR Section 14.1.10). This modification wil4 enhance the rollability of the Station Air System.
No Technical Specification baces are affected by this modification since safety related air operated valves do not require air to closo.
No unroviewed saf ety quection le involved.
Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1 1990 Report of Facility Changes. Tests, and Experimonte r Page 41 of 69 CHANGE TITLI l Temporary Hodift:ation to Aeld Distribution Hender in Water Treatment CHAM 0E.DrscRIPT103- !
The acid header was replaced as a maintenance repair. The Operations ,
Department requested elimination of unused valves from this train to simplify ;
operation and reduce subsequent maintenance. This system la not addressed in ;
the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) or Technical Specificatinns.
7ae ful.ction of the header remainod the same. This change eliminated parallel !
tacw paths which were not used. ;
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
L
- TI.e probability or consequences of an accident described in the UFSAR will not ce increased since this change is limited to the water treating area which does not directly or indirectly contribute to any design basis accider,t ,
- scenarios.-- - There is no safety -related equipment in the vicinity of the change.
The only credible failure modo is an acid line leak. The likelihood of an acid line.-leak would be less, since there will be fewer components in the line.
There are no radiological consequences associated with acid header failures.
The possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the-UFSAR is not created since the only failure mode !
! is external leakage and this would not affect any safety systems. There_are no safety systems in the area of water treating. ,
No Technical Specif'i cation bases are affected by this modification since this system is not 1 Lated in the Technical Specifications.
No unreviewed safety question is involved.
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Deaver Valley Power Station Unit 1
- 1990 Renort of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments Page 42 of 69
}
L C11 ANOE I,11LE Temporary Hodification for Running Tomporary cable
- For Rod Position Indicator (RPI) D-12 ;
CHANGE DESCRIPTION 4
i A cable was run from the operating dock to the coil stack of rod position i
indicator D-12. This was to eliminate excess noise in the circuit and erratic
- indicttor operation. Thiw modification affected indication only and had no-
- j. affect on reactor protection-or centrol.
1 '
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
i l- .The probability or consequences of an accident described in the Updated Final l
- safety Analysis Report (UTCAR) will not be increased since the RPI System >
l provides indication -only, is not a safety related-system, and there is no safety related equipment in the immediate area of the temporary cabl6. [
)'
. Failure of the temporary cable will not increase the radiological consequences-of an _ accident because the system provide 1 indication only, and there are no design basis accidents which would be initiated by the system. !
i
- . . The possibility of an -accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created since the temporary cable i jl does not . create. or change any failure modo baned on the fact that it is an ;
j identical cable to the one presently installed.
i -
- No Technical- specification bases are affected by.this modification since the <
l temporary cable will enable the i 12 step acceptaneo criteria to be met for
! the D-12 position. .
I No unreviewed safety question is involved. ;
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Deaver Valley Power. Station Unit 1 1990 Report of racility changes, Tests, and Experinients Page 43 of 69 1 C11ANG.I TITLE Rollef' Valve RV-BD-110 Setpoint change CilANGF DESCRIPTION The setpoint of relief valve RV-DD-118 was changed from 80 poig to a maximum of 120 paig to obtain the proper flow for radiation monitor PJi-DD-101 and make it more reliable.
(AFETY EXAtt'ATION StfMMARY
.The . probability or consequences of an accident described in the Updated finai Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) will not be increased because the system piping is pressure rated higher than the~new relief valve setting. -
Failure of RH-DD-101 will not increase the. radiological consequences of an accident because this radiation monitor has no automatic finctions to mitigate any consequences of an accident. The radiation monitor provides indication and alarms only (as strted in UFSAR Section 11.3.3.3.30).
The possibilAty of an. accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR in not created since the relief valve will still open before the blowdown systnm piping or radiation monitor RM-BD-101 is over-pressurized.
The . relief valve and radiation moniter are not Technical Spe<*1rication ,
related.
Ho unroviewed safety question is involved. ;
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Denver Valley Power Station Unit 1 1990 Report of Facility changes, Tects, and Experiments Page 44 of 69 l
ElihFff TITLE Connecting Recording Equ1}eont t o Operating Equipment CHANG 2 DESCRIPTIQ3 This cafety evaluation was for a new proceduro to install, control, ovaluate, and remove recording equipment to monitor plant parameters while equipment is in service. The preceduto is generic.
EAIITY_EVA1MTION SUHMMX The probability or consequences of an accident described in the Updated Final Safcty Analysis Report (UFSAR) will not be increased because the procedure requires a failure analysis for each applicat ion to ensure safety system performance will not be degraded. In addition, the failure modes applicable to this proceduro have been previously analyzed or accumed in accident analyses. Proceduro controls minimiro the offect of malfunctions which may occur.
The radiological consequences of an accident will not increase because the procedure requires a failure analysis for cach application to ensure safety system performance will not be degraded.
The possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created since the failure modos applicable ta this procedure have been previously analyzed or aumumed in accident analyses. Procedure controle minimize the effect of malfunctions which may occur.
This procedure is generic in nature but contains cufficient controls to preclude exceeding acceptance limits for the liconoing basis. The chango will have no affect on the acceptance limits which form the basis for the Technical Specifications due to proper proceduro controlo.
No unroviewed safety question is involved.
lieaver Valley Power Station Unit 1 1990 Report of racility changes, Tests, and Experiments Page 45 of 69 CHMiGE TITLE Addition of a Metal exido Varister (MOV) to lui-LW-110/helay k25 DiMgr DEE.cr1PT1?ll A metal oxide varister was installed across the coil of relay k2$ in order to eliminate voltage spikes en the A.C. supply to radiation monitor hM-LW-116.
This change reduced the time required to close trip valve TV-LW-116 in the event of a detector or power supply failure, and will reduce potential off-site releases. The change did not affect the respon a ora a hi-hi alarm.
ERETY rVALUATIQ1(_EV11MMM The probability or consequences of an accident described in the Updated Final safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) will not be increased because the change reduced the time required to close trip valve TV-LW-116 in the event of a detector or power supply failure, and terminate the off-site liquid wasto discharge.
Short circuit of the MOV removes the voltage across k25 woich causes trip valve TV-LW-116 to close and terminates the liquid waste discharge. Open circuit of the MOV returns the unit to ite' original design. Thus, failure of the MOV will not increase the radiological consequences of an accident.
The possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created since no operating or design parameters are affccted by addition of the MOV.
The proposed change will reduce the amount of time required to close trip valve TV-LW-116 on a detector or power supply failure, and thereby reduce potential off-site releaces. Therefore, the change will not reduce the margin of afety as defined in the baolo for any Technical Specification.
tio unreviewod safety question is involved.
i Deaver Volley Power station Unit 1 i
- -1990 Report of Facility changes, Tests, and Experiments !
Page 46 of 69 j i- . j
-CHANGE TITLE. (
Addition of a Metal Oxide Varister (MOV) to RM-LW-104/ Relay k23 l CHANGE DESCRIPTION t
A metal oxide varister was installed across the coil of relay k23 in order to ,
4 eliminate voltags spikes on the A.C. supply to radiation monitor RM-LW-104. l' This change reduced the time required to close trip valve TV-LW-105 on a detector or power supply failure and reduced potential off-site releases. The ;
change did not affect the response on a hi-hi alu,m.
l SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
l t
The -probability or consequences of an accident described in the Updated Final !
Safety Analysis Report (UrsAR) will not be increased because the change ,
reduced the time required to close trip valve TV-LW-105 in the event of a detector._or power supply failure, and terminate the off-otte liquid waste e discharge.
1 short circuit of the -HOV removes the voltage across k23 which causes trip valve TV-LW-105 to close and terminates the liquid waste discharge. Open ,
circuit of the HOV returns the unit to its' origir.a1 dcsign. Thus, failure f of the HOV will not increase the radiological consequences of an accident. l The possibility of an accidgnt or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created since no operating or design parameters are affected by addition of the MOV.
The proposed change will reduce the- amount of time required to close trip j
valve TV-LW-105 aon a detector or power. supply failure, and thereby' reduce potential off-site releases. Therefore, the change will not reduce the ;
margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical specification.-
-l No unreviewed safety question is involved.
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Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1 1990 Report of rac'.11ty Changes, Teatu, and Experimento Page 47 of 09 (11ANGE TIT 11 Addition of a Metal Oxide Varister (MOV) to kH-GW-10BA/Rolay k4 and hM-GW-10BD/ Relay k9 GhliGI_.EEpFIPTION A metal oxido varister was installs.J across the coil of relay k4 and relay k9 in order to eliminate volt ago spikes on the A.C. pupply to RM-GW-10BA and RM-GW-10BB respectively. Thio change reduced tho time required to cloop valves TV-cW-ID3 and TV-GW-103A2-C2 on a dotettor or power supply failure and reduced potential off-site releases. The chango did not affect the response to a hi-hi alarm.
EAf1lIY EVALUATION SUMtBEX The probability or consequences of an accident described in the Updated Final Satoty Analysis Report (UFSAR) will not be increased becauco the changes reduce the tirno required ts close trip valves TV-GW-103 and TV-GW-103A2-C2 in the event of a detector or power supply failure, and terminate the off-site discharge.
Short circuit of the MOV removes the voltage acrons k4 and k9 which causes trip valves TV-GW-103 and TV-GW-103A2-C2, respectivuly, to close and terminates tho dischargo. Open circuit of the MOV returns the unit to ito' original design. Thus, failuru of the MOV will not increase the radiological consequences of an accident.
The possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type t han any previously evaluated in the UFSAR is not created since no operating or design parameters are affected by the addition of the MOV.
The proposed change will reduce the amount of timo required to cloco trip valven TV-GW-103 and TV-GW-103A2-C2 on a detector or power oupply iallure, and thereby reduce potential off-site releases. Therefore, the change *
not reduce the margin of safety au defined in the basis for any Techn.
Specification.
Ilo unroviewod safety question is involved.
B00Ver Valley power Station Unit 1 1990 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments l Page 48 of 69 !
. i pHANGE TITLE f Temporary RCs Level Indication (for C Loop) During Refueling
't i
CHANCE DESCRIPTION A new procedure, ICMP 06RC-LT-TEMP-1C-31, was written-to provide temporary 1
- indication of Reactor Coolant system (RCS) level in the Control Room for '
mid-loop operation during refueling outages. Steam Generator level channel
- L-rW-496 will be used as a reactor vessel level system. ;
i SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
Level indicator- LI-FW-496 and recorder TR-RC-408 will indicate reactor vessel [
1evel, inst $ad of' their normal steam generator level indications. Narrow renge stnam generator level -channels are not required in refueling mode (or i modes 4 & $). No actuations will result from alarms unless a redundant steam i generator level- channel trips, _and safety systems are aligned for automatic actuation. These systems must be controlled by operations. }
- The probability or consequences of an accident described in the Updated Final ['
Safety Analysis Report will not be increased because the affected safety system (Steam Generator Harrow Range Level Channel) will be out of service .!
for the modes in which the procedure is used. ,
Reactor trip and auxiliary feed pump start actuations (also turbine trip ,
actuations) may result from failure of the temporary configuration. However, i in the applicable' modes, these systems are normally disabled. These'are not accidents, just safety system actuations. The probability of occurrence of l inadvertent actuations will not change.provided safety systems are properly ;
controlled.
i Failure of - the temporary- RCS level indication will not increase -the radiological consequences of an accident because there are no pertinent
, accidents.-
l ll No new type -of accident can occur. Inadvertent palety system actuations are possible but will not occur if redundant systems and safety systems are properly controlled.
No Technical specification bases are-affected by this modification-since the affected safety related system (Narrow range steam generator level channels)- l are'not required-for operation during Modos 4, 5, or 6. ,
- No unreviewed safety question is involved.
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Deaver Valley Power Station Unit 1 I
- 1990 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiment s Page 49 of 69 plW[gE TITLE supplementary Leak Collection & Rolease System Filter Design and Leak Testing CHANOE DI1CJ11tIlpli Two changes to the Updated Final Safety Analysis Boport (UFSAR) were ovaluated. The first chango was related to the Supplementary Leak Collection and Release System (SLCRS) carbon adoorber donign efficiency. The cocond chango revised the SLCRS carbon adsorbor leak test critoria. Both changes are described below.
/
Carbon Adsorber Design Efficiency Safety System runctional Evaluation (SsrE) observation SLC-ME-033 identiflod an incompleto design basis for the Supplementary Leak Collection and Release System (sLCRs) lodine filter ef ficioney. The SSFE evaluation concluded that the UFSAR should be updated to specify the minimum design officiency for radioiodine rumoval.
This pro oced r change adds a nontence to UFSAR Section 6.6.2 that reilects the purchase specification requirements, and thus the design requirements, for SLCRS filter v.ficiency.
Carbon Adeorber Leak Teett.ng carbon adoorber leak testing criteria referenced in the UFSAR (i.e. DP-1082) is different from that provided in the Technical Specifications (i.e. ANSI N510-1975). This proposed change revices the UFSAR to reference Technical Specifications instead of DP-1082. The following paragraphe describe documents reviewod as part of this evaluation.
[lf-1012 is a United States Atomic Energy Commienion Report entitled
" Standardized Hondestructivo Test of Carbon Dods for keactor Confinement Application." The report was prepared by the Savannah Rivt' oratory and is dated July, 1967.
Et2R1atory Guide 1.52, dated Juno 1973, references DP-1082 as providing an acceptable in-place leak test criteria for the carbon adsorbor section of atmosphere cleanup eystems.
Requlatory Guido_ l t12, Rev. 2, dated March 1970, references ANSI N510-1975 as providing an acceptable in-placo leak tout criteria for the carbon adsorber section of atmosphere cleanup systems.
t Deaver Valley Power Station Unit 1 l
- 1990 Report of' Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments ,
Page 50 of 69 ;
SLCRs Filter Design & Leak Testing (Continued)
Technical Sr.ecificalign surveillance requirement 4.7.8.1.b.1 references ,
ANSI H510-1975 for in-place tasting of the charcoal adsorber section of the SLCRs flitard.
I UPSAR Section 6.6.2 states that: " Charcoal cells are leak tested using l' procedures outlined in DP-1082.*
charcoal celle _are currently tested in accordance with ANSI H510-1975 as i required by: Technical specifications. As indicated above, Aus! H510-1975 l provides the most recent criteria found acceptable to the NRC. Therefore, to i resolve the conflict between the UFSAR and Technical Specifications, this ,
change _ proposes to delete the reference to DP-1082 in the UFSAR, and add in ,
its place a reference to Technical Specifications (for leak test criteria).
EhEETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
The changes will not- affect the probability of failure of the SLCRS or Ato components. _ Therefore, the changes will not increase the probability of +
occurrence of a malfunction of equ;pment important to safety. ,
The performance of the safety system (i.e. the SLCRS) is not affected by the changes. Thus, the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety will not= increase.
The chsnges will have no impact on the assumptions and radiological consequences of- the Loss of Coolant' Accident (LOCA) and ruv1 Handling - -j Accident. Therefore, the consequences of a previously evaluated accident will not be increased. ,
Since there are no failure modes associated with the changes, the probability of occurrence of the design basis accidents (i.e. Loss of Coolant Accident, and Fuel Handling Accident) will be unaffected. ,
The proposed changes will not affect the plant response. Therefore, the possibility of a new type of' accident is not created.
There are no failure modes associated with the changes. Thus, a malfunction of equipment important to safoty or a different type is not created.
l l The changes will have no affect on _the operability or. surveillance requirements for the SLCRS and thus, will have no effect on the Technical
-- Specification Basis or.the margin of safety as defined therein.
- No unreviewed safety question is involved.
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Doaver Valley Powur Station 'Juit 1 -
1990 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments Page 51 of 69 CllANGE TIILE Nuclear Group Administrative Procedurs 3.5 - rire Protection j CHANor'DEQfBIPTION This change involved the conversion of Site Administrative Procedure (SAP) 9D
- to Nuclear Group Administrative Procedure (NGAP) 3.5. The following list identifies specific changes.-
1 l
- 1. SAP 9D was reformatted to the new Nuclear Group Administrative Manuti format.
- 2. . Organisational changes were incorporated in Figure 1 of NOAP 3.5.
- 3. Definitions provided in SAP 9D were relocated to NCAP 10.1 kgfinitiens.
- 4. A requirement was added to inspect temporary fire penetration seals-on a weekly basis until permanent seals are installed (References Quality Assurance Audit 09-14). I
- 5. A new form, "llot - Work / Fire Barrier Permit Form," to be used by all j station- groups instead of individual department procedures / forms was I included in NOAP 3.5 - The form will require Control Room notification prior to start of hot work,
- 6. A form, ~ " Fire Protection Impairment /Systora out of Service Form," was }
relocated to. Attachment 16 of NGAP 3.5. This form requists a work party supervisor to obtain authorization from the Nuclear shift Supervisor or Nuclear Station Operating Foreman.
- 7. A requirement- was added' to indicate that. temporary site facilities >
(fabrication shops, trailers, etc.) which have fire protection provided, shall be evaluated by the Fire Protection Engineer.
- 8. A requirement was added to indicate that brigade members must dress-out ,
in full gear to receive drill credit.
- 9. Tables 1 and 3 of SAP 90 (Operability Requirements for the Fire Protection Systems NRC required and ANI required) were incorporated.into Attachment 2 of NCAP 3.5.
- 10. -Taoles 2 and 4 of SAP-9D (Surveillance Requirements for Fire Protection ,
Systemi NRC- required and ANI required) were incorporated into Attachment 5 of NCAP 3.5.
- 11. The smoke detector testing frequency was changed from Semi-annual to
. Annual per the revised NFPA code 72E.
- 12. References to -SAP 9D in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) were revised to reference NGAP 3.5.
-e ,,~,-.mrew,. < . , - , - , . , * - -._ _,,..,.~_m,.',,,----,,.m m-- ,,,.m ..m.-_ _.w---ye,m -e. e,,--,,--mw-wc.--.-+.%%,..r-
Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1 1990 Report of Facility changes, Tests, and Experimento a Page $2 of 69 HCAP 3.f - Fire Pro 6ection (Continued)
EAFETY EVALUATION St'HMARY i
The design and operation of fire protection equipment and ecmponents renains the same. There are no credible failure modes associated with the change. In addition, the performance cf safety systems will be unchanged.
Since no changes to the Fire Protection System are being made, the assumptions -and radiological consequences of accidents identified in the UFSAR ,
3 or Fire Hazards Analysis are unchanged.
Since- there are no credible failure modes a.sociated with the change, the probability of occurrence for design basis accidonts will be unchanged.
Administrative changes will not dffect equipment or components of the Fire
- Protection System or systems important to safety. The administrative changes
! will not change the probability of failure.
The accident analyses in Section 14 and section 15 of the_UFSAR's for Unit 1 and Unit 2, respectively, are not affected. The Appendix R fire hazards ;
analyses _ for Unit 1 and Unit 2 (Updated Fire Protection Appendix R Heport and 9 Fire Protection safe Shutdown Report) are not affected by this change.
9 No unreviewed safety question is involved.
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Baavor valley-Power' station Unit 1 1990 Report of Facility Changas, Tests, and Experiments page 53 of 69' p ANGE TITLE Asiatic Clam Chemical Treatment program CHANGE DFSCRIPTION Temporary modification to support alternate biocido additions to Unit 1 River Water Systems. This modification provides fors- ,
i l
1)' injection of biocide through an existing fitting at the suction of the chlorination pumps, and
- 2) routing a . service water sample (taken from a low point drain downstream of a radmonitor) through a container of clams used for monitoring biocido effects.
This modification is to be performed after the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources gives approval for use of the Clam-Tcol CT-1 used in the treatment _ program. New blocide is added'to better kill Asiatic clams to prevent river water heat exchanger fouling and potentially improve heat exchang6r perfarmanew.
sATETY EV Ef L p p yR g Tho - tmplementat ior- of this temporary modification is-considered to be safe.
No etange to the Technical Specifications is required. No changes to the <
bpdated. Final iafety Analysis Repoct (UFSAR) are required.
The probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident will not ;
bv increased. All temporary modifications are- outside safety related -
component and safety actuation boundaries.
The probability of an. occurrence or the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety _w ill not be increased. All equipment will be l
~
run as routine cycling or performance of Temporary Operating-Procedures (TOP's).
.. i
. The: possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previotely . evaluated in the UrSAR will not be created. -No new failure modes or . pecential hazards will be created by- the implementation of thia
- modification.-
- This temporary modification does not involve an unreviewed safety question.
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Deaver Valley Power Station Unit 1 1990 Report of racility changes, Tests, and Experiments j Page 54 of 69 CHkNGE Tifl&
DCP-568, Rev. O, Crane Globe Valves CHANGE DESCRIPTION This modification entails the repair or replacement of crane globe valves e-!ninally purchased via p.o. Hunbers DV-154 and DV-355.
'stlrgt;,gVALUATicil
SUMMARY
.T hr / been. determined that this modification will not increase the
, ' pry',rjl i t y of occurroneo, or consequences of an accident or malfunction of
- -g,p r eq' important to safety as previously evaluated in the UrsAR. The nodi f .catioi. will not create _an accident different than any previously evaluated in the Updated-Final Safety Analysis Report.
This~ modification will not adversely affect the margin of safety es dvziued in the basis for any Technical specification.
f The- probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident wil: r#s be increased. For each valve repair or replacement a technical evaluation will ensure that the new valve meets or exceeds the original dostgn reqJiremonts.
t
- The margin of safety defined in the basis for any Technical specifleation is not ~ reduced since the replacement valves will ensure that original design requirements are met or exceeded.
No unreviewed safety question is involved.
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I Deaver Valley power' station Unit 1 ;
1990 Report of racility Changes, Tests, and Experiments i Page 55 of 69 i CHANGE TITLE DCP-655, Rev. O, Co and ITE Relays Replacement l CHANGE UFSCRIPT10ti The purpose of this modification is to replace relays51-106, 51-107,51-108, !
and $1-109 .on the 4KV station service system. The existing Co-6 and ITE-521 type relays will be changed to CO-11 and ITE-51E type relays. Dy performing ,
this modification the new variable range relays should permit the starting of L the feedwater pumps at rated load condition and prevent subsequent tripping of ,
the system station and unit station service transformer feeds to buses 1A, 10, l IC, and ID. (The plant experienced this type of trip on October 18, 1982).
SAFETY EVALQh110N.
SUMMARY
Th*a desigts change- is considered tt be safe and does not constitute an unreviewed safety question nor does it offect the bases of Technical ~ ,
specifications 3/4.8.1 and 3/5.8.2.
By- performing this modification, tripping of the system and unit station service. transformer feeds to buses-1A, 10, ic, or 1D should be eliminated when the feedwater pumps are started .at rated conditions. However, even in the F event that all a-C power is lost, no adverse conditions would occur in the 1
reactor core ~ as stated in UPSAR Section 14.1.11 " Loss of off-site Power to the station Auxiliarios (station Blackout)". Therefore, the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in Updated Final Safety Analysia Report (UFSAR) Section B.4.2 and 14.1.11. will not be increased.
This modification is limited to the replacement of co-6 and ITE-511 type relays with CO-11 and 1TE*51E type relays and will not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in UFSAR ,
Sections 14.1.8 and 14.1.11. !
The margin of safety as defined in Technical Specification Dasis 3/4.8.1 and !
3/4.8.2 will not be reduced since the replacement relayo should make the operability of the system ctation and unit ' station service system more ,
reliable.
A No unreviewed safety question to involved.
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Denver Valley Power Station Unit 1
'1990 Report of Facility changes, Tests, and Experiments Page 56 of 69 gilAtm TITLE j l
DCP-713, Rev. O, containment Instrument Pit Level Switches ,
l CHAtlGE SISCRIPTION
, At the present ' time, the level switches (LS-DA-121 and 122) for the containment instrument pits cause grounds on the annunciator system. While ,
this switch is partially protected from the weather, it is still subjected to !
significant amounts of moisture. The inside of the pit has heavy condensation all the time. Also, rain water is running down the containment *s exterior ,
wall into the instrument pits due to an inadequate seal between pit covers and ;
the containment wall, j This design change is to replace the present electrical contact switches, LSDA-121 and 122, in their general purpose enclosures with segled mercury _,
contact switches housed in water tight enclosures. Replacement switches under 7 consideration- are Mercoid level control NEMA 3 or 4 with new otainless steel j cable. and floats. Rain gutters or flashing will be installed on the ,
containment wr.11 directly over the pit's concrete covers to divert rain from running down- the. containment wall into_ the instrument pits. It may be !
necessary to form and pour new concrete pit covers with proper-horizontal- <
slope and-proper cover to containment radium fit.
EATETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
The probability of an occurrence of an accident previously. evaluated in the safety analysis report will'not be increased because the new equipment will be better than the existing ones due to the fact that they are moisture-proof.
There is no impact - on. the function of :the safety-related portion of the annunciator system- and containment system in Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Section 7.8.1 and Section 6.4.
The consequence of an accident previously evaluated in the safety analysis report will not be increased because this design change is in the non-safety portion .of the' annunciator system that has no ef fect on the consequeneen of an accident previously. evaluated in UFSAR chapter 14.
The probability _ of a malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report will not be increased because the modification of this portion is non-safety-related and does not I
create a situation'which would increase the-probability of malfunction. l The' containment instrument- level switches are lightweight. A failure, resulting .in the switches falling .into the pit, is inconsequential.
Therefore, there is'no seismic hazard.
l The consequence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report will not be increased because the portion of this design change in_ the annunciator system and
- l. containment system is not used to prevent or mitigate the consequences of an accident.- There should be- no effect on the-consequences of malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the UFSAR.
Deaver Valley Power Station Unit 1 1990 Report of Facility Changen, Tests, and Experiments Page 57 of 69 DCP-713, containment Instrument Pit Level Switches (Continued)
There are no UFSAR Chapter 14 accidents affected by this non-safety portion of annunciator system and cor.tainment system.
There are no rafety syntems affected by the proposed design change.
The possibility for an accident of a different type than previously evaluated in the safety analysis report will not be created because there is rio configuration change such that an accident of a different type is created.
With the proposed modifications, the containment instrument pits will not cause grounds on the annunciator system.
The possibility for a malfunction of equipment important to safety of a different type than previously evaluated in the safety analysis report will not be created becauce the failure of this equipment has no effect on safe plant operation and shutdown of the plant.
Failure modes of the proposed design change which were reviewed included equipment failure in the annunciator system and containment system. This portion of the design change is non-safety-related.
The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification will not be reduced because the containment inotrument pit level switches are not addressed in the Technical Specifications.
No changes in parameters that affect the course of any accident analysis, or supporting Technical Specification basis, or could result in exceeding the acceptance criteria for fuel cladding, RCS boundary, or containment boundary are being made by this modification.
No unreviewed safety question is involved.
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Doaver Valley Power Station Unit 1 1990 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experimente l Page 58 of 69 CHANCE IIILE !
I DCP-854, Rev. O, Filtered Water Piping i l
CHANGE DESCRIPTION j The existing filtered water lines in the Turbine Building have corroded to the l point where -these lines must be replaced due to excessive leakage and wall ;
loss. This design change proposes to replace the existing carbon steel piping ;
with new fibergises piping. The purpose of thio design change is to avoid equipment damage or personnel injury which may result from a filtered water line break.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
l This design change is safe and does not involve an unreviewed safety question or change- to the Technical Specifications. The change in piping material and -
1 additional supports to this_ non-safety; system will not increase the
- probability of failure of'~this system or any equifeent important to safety. I No chenges to the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) are required. !
The filtered water system is not discussed in the DVPS-1 UFSAR. The system is designed to supply seal water to various pumps and cooling water to other '
components in both Unit I and Unit 2. In general, all equipment supplied which .
is - safety. related has a backup source of seal or coolin; water. The filtered water system is- not required to be operable during any design basis .F accidents. The filtered water system is required to be operable to supply cooling water to the Unit- 2 station air compressors during plant shutdown and/or with. a loss of olfaite power per BVPS-2 Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Report.. This requirement vill be .taken. into consideratica during installation.
This change -involves only a change in piping material and addition of pipe supporto. . The pipe is still subject. to .a failure due to overpressure;
- however, the-design specifications reduce the probability to an acceptably low ,
level. The current source of pipe failure (corrosion).has been reduced or ;
eliminated by .the use of corrosion resistant materials. The fiberglass pipe has less resistance to damage caused by. external loadet however, problems will -
be prevented by maintaining adequate installation clearances from existing equipment which has the potential to impact the system. +
There are no Technical Specifications or bases which assume operability or integrity of-the filtered water system.
No unreviewed safety question is involved.
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Deavec Valley Power station Unit 1 1990 Report _of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experiments ,
Page 69 of 69 CliANCE TITLE i i
DCP-872, Rev. O, liigh Mast, High Pressure Sodium Lighting !
I i
- CHANGE DESCRIPTIDH t
This modification will upgrade the present coeurity Lighting system by the !
addition of high mast, .high pressure sodium ILghting and the replacement of i the existing mercury vapor or sodium vapor lampo with high preosure sodium j lamps of greater wattege. ;
SAFETY. EVALUATION BUKHARX The implementatio of this modification 10 considerud to be safe. No changee i to the Technical specifications or the Vpdated Final safety Analyste Report i (UFSAR) are required as a result of this taodification. )
This modification will not increase the probability or the consequence of an
- accident previously evaluated in the UFSAR. This modification will- corap2y ;
with the requirements of 10CFR13.46 ond ANSI /ANS-3.3-1982., The Lightir.g systorn !
description and Industrial Security description (UFSAR 8.4.4 and 12.7 '
respectively) will remain valid.-
The possibility for the occurrence of an unanalyzed accident will not be !
- created by-_the implementation of this modification. Tho Security Lighting System and its power supplies are non-safety-related, and there are no tailure ,
modes of the security lamps which would create accidents of a different type ,
than previously evaluated. ;
- No. Technical specitication basis is affected by this modification.
- No unreviewed safety question is involved.
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Deaver Valley PowGr station Unit 1 1990 Report of Facility changes, Tests, and Euperiments ,
Page 60 of 69 CHAllge TITLE ;
DCP-895, Rev. O, Roof Vents - ERF Substation 011 Transfer Pump Housing l
-CHANGE DEf>CRIPTION The Emergency Responso Pacility (EPF) Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Transfer Pump l (ERFS-P-1A) cubicle is a subgrado concrete structure at the west end of the ERP Diesel Fuel Oil Storago Tank (ERFS-TK-1). This structure has become an ;
ac.umulation point for moisture, which has disrupted the operability of the fuel oil transfer pumps. A ventilation system consisting of one 5 inch diameter plastic vent pipe and a wind driven rotating turbine exhaust fan will ,
be installed to improve circulation of dryer air through the cubicle to remove !
excess moisture. 4 EMMY EVALUATION SUMMAM
- This modification is considered safe. No unroviewed safety questions exist t
- nor' are any changes to the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) or the .
Technical Specifications -required. This modification will reduce the amount !
of condensation in the ERF Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Cubicle, ,
-awi thus improve the reliability of.the Fuel Oil Transfer Pumps; -
This . modification does- not- affect - the evaluation in S ttion 12.3 of the i Updated P'nal Safety Analysis Report. This modification will .erve to improve the reliability of- the -ERF Diesel Fuel Oil Transfer Pump by reducing the '
b amount of moisture .in its cubicle. This modification does not affect any safety-related equipment either directly or indirectly.
Failure of the Fuel 011 Transfer Pumps (ERFS-P-1A, 10) does not affect any equipment that is needed to safely shut down the station.or mitigate the consequences of an accident or malfuncticn. No failure of_this modification
~
can create an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously i evaluated in Section 12.3 of the Updated Final SafrL/ An tysis Report. ,.
This modification does not affect the basis for any Technical specifications.
i No unrev1ewed safety question is involved. ,
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Boav r Valley Power Station Unit 1 1990 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, and Experinients Page 01 of 69 CithtXJ111LL DCP-1185, Rev. O, Installatica of Air Filter in diesel Generator Air Start piping gEhHgE DrscRIPTION The diesel generator air starting nystems will start the engine upon receiving a start signal, the solenoid valve (Sov) is energiced, allowing air from the tanks to pass through the SOV to the pinion gear and engage with the engine ring gear. Once both pinion gears are engaged, the air is parend through the air starting valve and the air line lubricator, releasing an oil-air mist into the starting motors. The multi-vano motors drive the pinion gears, rotating the ring gear and cranking the engine. ,
Recently, the air start motors have failed to disengage on several occasions.
An investigation by the Instruuent and Controls Section revesled that rust particles lodged on the seat of the SOV are proventing proper shut-off.
The purpose of this modification is to install an air filter on the inlet of the air start SOVs so as to prevent future problems with dirt particles g lodging under the seat.
EbfLTLEVALUAT10N
SUMMARY
The probability of occurrence for an accident previously evaluated in the safety analysis report will not he increased because the existing air start motors that failed to disengage were cauced by runt particles lodged on the seat of the SOV, preventing proper shut-off. This design change will aneuro the air starting system design capabilities are maintained. Therefore, the probability of occurrence for an accident described in the safety analysis f will not be increased.
The consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the safety analysin report will not be increased because the diesel generator air starting systemu were already evaluatec in UFSAR Sectione 8.5.2.3 and 8.5.2.6. The redundant air starting system dr.tign has already been analyzed such that the failure of i one air start system wili not prevent the diesel generator from starting.
Installation of the air filters was reviewed and recommended by the vendor, Engineoring has also determined that the filter installation will not cause a o large pressure drop and the air starting capabilities will not be affected.
Periodic filter inspection, or replacement if determined necessary, will further assure the air starting system operateu an designed.
The conocquence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety au previously evaluated in the safety analysis report will not bo increased because the proposed changes will not affect the consequenceo of any malfunction of safety-related equipment. Halfunction of the air starting system, and Jiesel generator failuro have been evaluated in the safety analysis.
D- ,
Beaver Valley-Power Station Unit 1
.1990-Report of Facility. Changes,-Tests, and Experiments Page 62 of 69-DCP-llB5, Install ation of Air Filter in Diesel Generator Air Start Piping (Continuel) ,
- The design basis accident reviewed for potential impact by the ptaposed design
- change was-the loss of emergeticy AC-power.
The safety system affected by the proposed ' design change is the Diesel Generator Emergency Power System.
The possibility for an accident of a different type than previously evaluated in the . safety analysit report will not be created because the changes will' assure the air starting design capabilities are maintained,.and the filter installations will ensure the air start motors disengaged from the engine when the diesel start . Therefore, the possibility for an accident of a different
+/pe will not be cteated.
The. possibility 'for -a malfunction of equipment important to safety of a different- type than previously evaluated in the safety analy:is report will .
not- be created because the materials and the size of the new air filters to be installed meetsi the original design analysis and is recommended by the diesel generatot vendor. QA Category I and seismic installation will minimize-the possibility of equipment malfunction.
Failure modes'_of the proposed design change which were reviewed included the failure of- air starting system. However, the redundant air start syntom's d2 sign- will ensure the diesel generator reliability is maintained in the event of an' accident.
l . The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification will not- be reduced because the proposed changes do not degrade any Technical Specification requiremer.t s. No changes to Technical Specification 3/4.8.1 is needed.
This_ design change to the diesel generator air starting system is considered to be safe and does not involve ans unreviewed safety questions. The filters were reviewed sand recommenced ' by ;he manufacturer. This modification will
- ensure the original. air starting system designs are maintained; therefore, ,
UFSAR' sections f8.5.2.2 and. 8.5.2.4 and Technical Spacification .3/4.8.1 requirements will.not be affected.
L
- No'unreviewed safety question is involved.
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Beaver Valley Power Station' Unit 1
-1990 Report of Facility Changes, Tests, .and Experiments Page 63 of 69 CHANGE TITLE' DCP-1187, Rev. O, Replacement of Flow Transrictir FT-VS-ll2
- CHANGE DESCRIPTIQH Flow . transmitter FT-VS-112 cannot bo calibrated within its tolerance, has been declared. inoperable,- and removed from service. Th'.s. instrument has a history of- being difficult .to celibrate and normally the as-found values are out of tolerance when the . mainter.snee surveillance procedure is performed. The existing flow transmitter (FT-VS-ll2) Model #1913 (Leeds &- Northrup);is obsolete and no longer available. This DCP replaces flow transmitter FT-VS-112 Model #1913 with a reliable transmitter. .
Flow t'ransmitter-~ FT-VS-112 _does not input to RM-VS-110, but only passes through the -moniton (similar to a junction box), and does not affect the '
operabilityfof the Radiation Monitor,
- Eh?ETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
The probabil'ty i of an' occurrence of an accident previously. evaluated in the safety -analysis . report will not be increased because this change is to be a one-for-one replacement with equipment qualified to meet the requirements of the previous transmitter.-
The consequence of arr accident previously evaluated in the safety _ analysis report will not be increased because'neithir the function nor any protective features -are being modified by this change. The design change will only involve a: direct. replacement with qualified materials.
The- probability of a- malfunction of equipment in. port ant to safety as
-previously. evaluated' in the safety analysis report will not be increased because this- transmitter _does not impact _ safety nor will -the degree of reliability ~be reduced by the installation of the new transmitter.
~
The -consequence of a1-malfunction of equipment important to safety as
.previously evaluated in the' safety analysis report will not be increased' because the-consequence of.a malfunction of this transmitter will be identical to the one it replaces. The equipment is not important to safety because the effluent flow ..may be estimatad, if the flow transmitter fails to maintain the recorder operable. Also, there are no automatic-functions or manual actions based on the operability of-this component.
- The design- basis' accident reviewed for potential impact is the accidental release of waste gas.
The safety systems'affected by the proposed design change is the Supplementary Leak Collection =and Release System.
, .The poss bility for an accident of a different type than previously evaluated i
in the: safety analysis report will not be created because the system configuration and response will be identical to that which existed prior to the replacement of the transmitter, i
- ... .-_ _ - . . ~ - - _ - , _ _ ,
Deaver Valley Power Station Unit 1 1990 Report of Facility changes, Toots, and Experiments Page 64 of 69 DCP-- 118 7, Replacement of Flow Transmitter FT-VS-112 (Continued)
The possibility for a malfunction of equipment important to safety of a difforent type than previously evaluated in the safety analyuis report will not be created because the possible malfunctions of the new transmitter will be the same as the replaced transmitter. If the transmitter malfunctions, and consequently the flow recorder malfunctions, Technical specifications require that
-
- low be estimated overy 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> during releases in this pathway.
Failure modes of the proposed design change which were reviewed include failure or the transmitter and recorder.
The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification will not be reduced because the system effluent flow rate measuring device FR-VS-112 will still perform as designed, with n;> compromises being made in the system safety and reliability.
No unreviewed safety question is involved.
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Beavor Valley Power Station Unit 1 1990 Report of Facility Changes, Tects, and Experiments Page 65 of 69 CHANGE TITLE DCP-1270, Rev. 1, Pormanent Utility Tio-Ins for the Outage Trailer Complex CHANGE DESCRIP1LQ1{
Presently, a temporary outage trailer complex is situated east of the paved roadway adjoining the Guard House and the Unit 2 Control Room.
The purpose of this decign change is to provide a permanent utility tie-in to the outage trailer complex. Domestic water supply, sewage connection, fire protection (sprinkler), water and telecommunication connection will be provided on a permanent basis. The installation will eliminate all the temporary utility connections that have laid on the walkway which cause a personnel safety hatard.
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
The probability of an occurrenco of an accident previously evaluated in the safety analysis report will not be increased because the proposed modification is not safety-related, and in no way would its inoperability affect plant operation.
The consequence of an accident previously evaluated in the safety analysis report will not be increased. Because the design change is located outside, the failure of this trailer complex and its associated utilities do not impact safety-related equipment and therefore affect no accident consequenceu.
The probability of a malfunction of equipment important to safoty as previously evaluated an the safety analysis report will not bo increased because the proposed changes will not affect any nuclear safety-related equipment.
The consequence of a malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the safety analysis report will Lot be increased because the proposed changes will not affect the consequence = of any malfunction of safety-related equipment. >
There are no design baais accidents impacted by the proposed design change.
No safety systems are affected by the proposod design chango.
The poenibility for an accident of a different type than previously evaluated in the safety analysis report will not be created because these changes do not "
impact the operability of any equipment required for plant safety.
The possibility for a malfunction of equipment important to safety of a 3 different type than previously evaluated in the safety analysis report will not be created because the proposod modification is not safety-related, and it is located outside of safety areas. Therefore, the change will have no impact on safety related equipment.
The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification will not be reduced because the installation of this outage trailor utility tie-in will not affect any Technical Specification.
No unroviewed safety question is involved.
4 Beaver Valley Power Stasion Unit 1
. 1990 Report of Facility. Changes, Tests, and Experiments l Page 66 of 69 CHANGE TJTLE E . - .
.TER-4817, Rev. O, LT-RC-459,-Pressuriter Level Transmitter
. Sealed Reference Leg CHANGE DESCRIPTION-
'- This:--Technical Evaluation Report -(TER) supports an Updated Final Safety
-Analysis Report (UFSAR) change to reflect the actual plant' configuration of
- the. Pressuriter Lesel gauges. All three level transmitters LT-RC-459, 460 and 461, _have sealed reference legn.
Sometime around the second refueling outage the sealed reference leg for level. ,
transmitter LT-RC-459 was. changed to an'open reference leg-(with Westinghouse. -
concurrence) after -finding its bel)~4s damaged. . The UFSAR was updated to 4
. reflect this change. During the 7t. ,afueling the bellows for LT-RC-460 and 461 were found to be damaged and a request was made to replace them with open
[ referenceJ legs similar- to LT-RC-459. Based upon Westinghouse letter j -DLW-89-536, which. identified a concern related to Hydrogen dissolution in the open reference legs, the sealed reference lege were restored. -
s SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
I .The. dissolution -of Hydrogen :in the open reference legs was found to cause a L 20% error in level readings, .the sealed reference legs provide only a 2%
) ' error.
i This- change- restores the pressurizer level to the original plant design and j- does not Lintroduce any new failure modea. The most common failure modes is i 1 cracking of the bellows in the sealed leg. Since these are esed for normal
- level ~ control of the pressurizer and produce no safety-related signals (which are- provided :by pressure instruments) andisince a failure in any one leaves etwo other- level transmitters for -redundancy, no safety significance is attributed.to the fsilure of any one level 1 transmitter.
This changeLto the UFSAR will reflect-the: current condition of the pressurizer level' control- tranomitters, .which is the original design of the system.' -The probability;of failure is net increased..
Restoration of Level ' transmitters .LT-RC-459,-460, and 461 to their origical designt (sealed reference leg) will reduce the ' error (20% to 21) of the
-indicated = level by eliminating Hydrogen dissolution concerns in the open reference leg.
This : change has no.effect on radiological assumptions and consequences for any fdesign basis accidents.
This change to the UFSAR will document that the pressurizer level transmitters have been restored to their original plant deuign and tnerefore create no now types of accidents.
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Beaver Valloy Power-Station Unit'l .
1990 Report of Facility.. Changes, Tests,.-and Experiments Page~67 of 69' 4
-TER-4817, Pressurizer-Level Transmitter Sealed Reference Leg (Continued) 0
- This- change doos ;not introduce any 'new types of malfunctions because the j' pressuriter- level: transmitters- have been restored .to their original plant ;
4 design.
Ho changes-in the Prosaurizer Level High Reactor trip setpoint are being made. ,
e-This change will have-no impact on the' basis for any Technical specificatic:.u.
No unreviewed safety question is involved. .
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Deaver Valley Power Station Unit 1 1990 Report of Pacility Changes, Tests, and Experiments Page 68 of 69 i CHANGE TITLE l
TER-6064, Rev. O, Change the Normal System Arrangement for Valve IFO-81 as shown on Drawing 8600-RM-53A to be consistent with the Operating Manual.
CHANGE DESCRIPTION The proposed change involves valve 1FO-81, which is uued to isolate the cross-conneci line between the fuel holding tank transfer pump (EE-P-4A & B) discharge piping and the holding tank fill line. The proposed change will revise Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Figure 9.14-1 to show the valve (lFO-81) unut. This valve is normally shut to accommodate fuel oil transfer from the fuel holding tank to the fuel ctorage tanks, and fuel oil hold tank fill operations, j{
Operations personnel identified a discrepancy between the Operating Manual j)i Chapter 36 Section 3 Valve List and UFSAR Figure 9.14-1. The valve list showed the valve as normally shut and the UFSAR Figure showed the valve as normally open. It should be noted that Design Change Package (DCP) 390 final As-Duilt drawing 2700-RM-53A-10B-6 and later revisions (thru RM-53A-19 revised October 1990) also show the valve as normally open.
The proposed change would resolve this discrepancy by revising the UFSAR Figure to show the valve shut.
This change involves piping associated with the emergency diesel generatot fuel oil holding tank (EE-TK-6). This 9,000 gallon fuel tank is used for receiving new fuel oil, and as a holding reservoir while tests of new fuel oil are performed. After the fuel oil is tested and accepted, it can be transferred to the 20,000 gallon fuel oil storage tanks.
SAFETY EVALUATTON SUMMAE1 There are no operating or design parameters affected by this change. With valve 1FO-81 normally closed, the system will be aligned to allow fuel oil transfer from the fuel oil hold tank to the fuel oil storage tanks, and to allow hold tank fill operations.
There are no credible failure modes associated with the change. Valve 1FO-81 '
should be shut during hold tank fill operations to prevent untested oil from being inadvertently transferred to the fuel oil storage tanks. This valve should also be shut when transferring fuel oil from the hold tank to the storage tanks to prevent recirculation of the fuel oil back to the hold tank.
Reter to UFSAR Figure 9.1-1-1, Fuel Oil System For Emergency Dieuel Generators.
The change involves a valve in the Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil System. However, this change does not affect operation of the Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil System or any other safety systems or systems important to safety.
l
. Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1 1990 Report of Facility changes, - Test s, and Experiments Page 69 of 69 TER-6064, Change the NSA for Valve 1FO-81 in UFSAR
--to be Consistent with the operating Manual (Continued).
Technical Specifications require that the fuel storage tanks ~(EE-TK-1A & B) contain 17,500_ gallons of fuel and that the level be verified periodically.
Changing- the alignment of valve 1FO-81 to normally shut will have no effect on the fuel storage tanks, or the capability of the fuel storage tanks and
~ downstream components to provide the quantity cf fuel oil required by Technical Specifications. Therefore, the change will have no effect on the ability of the system to perform its function or the probability of failure of the emergency diesel generator fuel oil system.
The performance of the emergency diesel generator. fuel oil system will remain unchanged. Since the change will not affect the performance of the emergency diesel- generators and their associated fuel oil systems, the change will have no impact- on the assumptions- and radiological consequences of design basis accidents.
There are no ~ failure modes associated with the change. Since there are no failure modes. associated - with this change, the probability of occurrence of the design basis accidents identified will be unaffected.
Since no equipment described in the Technical Specifications or accident i analysis are'affected, no acceptance-limit will be affected.
The change will have no effect on the operability or surveillance requirements for the emergency diesel generators or associated fuel oil systems, and thus will have no-effect on the Technical Specification Basis.
-No unroviewed safety question is_ involved, i
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