ML20137J216

Insp Repts 50-313/85-25 & 50-368/85-26 on 851030-1101.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Deficiencies Noted:Emergency Action Level Inadequately Addressed & DBAs Not Addressed

ML20137J216
Person / Time
Site:	Arkansas Nuclear
Issue date:	12/26/1985
From:	Hackney C, Yandell L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20137J212	List: ML20137J207 ML20137J216
References
50-313-85-25, 50-368-85-26, NUDOCS 8601220320
Download: ML20137J216 (6)

See also: IR 05000313/1985025

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APPENDIX

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATOR 7 COMMISSION

REGION IV

NRC Inspection Report: 50-313/85-25 Licenses: DPR-51

50-368/85-26 NPF-6

Dockets: 50-313

50-368

Licensee: Arkansas Power & Light Company (AP&L)

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Facility Name: Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO), Units 1 and 2

Inspection At: Arkansas Nuclear One, Russellville, Arkansas

Inspection Conducted: October 30 through November 1, 1985

Inspectors: dt.b ,

C. A. Hackney, Emergency Preparedn s Analyst

/J-/9-I5

Date

Emergency Preparedness ard Safegua s Programs

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Accompanying Personnel: D. H. Schultz, Comex Corporation

Approved: , aggtag n o 12-Z4- @f

L. 7 . Yandell, Chief, Emergency Preparedness Date

and Safeguards Programs Section

Inspection Summary

Inspection Conducted October 30 through November 1, 1985 (Report 50-313/85-25;

50-368/85-26)

Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of the license's performance

-and capabilities during a demonstration drill of the emergency plan and *

procedures. The inspection involved 46 inspector-hours onsite by 2 NRC

inspectors.

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Results: Within the emergency response areas inspected, no violations or

deviations were identified. Two deficiencies were identified (NUREG 0654

Emergency Action Levels (EALs) are not adequately addressed in Emergency Plan

Implementing Procedures (EPIPs) and the scheme of classification for Final

Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) design basis accidents is not addressed in EPIPs,

paragraph 2; EPIP 1903.10 only addresses summed offsite dose rates, paragraph 2).

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DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Principal Licensee Personnel

• T. Campbell, Vice President, Nuclear Operations

• J. Levine, ANO General Manager

• D. Boyd, ANO Emergency Planning Coordinator

• F. Van Buskirk, ANO Emergency Planning Coordinator

• M. Tull, Corporate Emergency Coordinator (EC)

• D. Snellings, Little Rock General Of fice (LRGO) Manager, Nuclear Programs

• T. Cogburn, LRGO General Manager, Nuclear Services

• D. Lomax, Plant Licensing Supervisor

• P. Campbell, Plant Licensing Engineer

• Denotes persons attending the exit interivew

The NRC inspectors also held discussions with other station and corporate

personnel in the areas of emergency response organization and training.

2. Emergency Response Exercise

This special inspection was performed to determine the staffing of the

Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) as required in NUREG-0737,

Supplement 1, and committed to in a letter to NRC dated June 14, 1985.

The licensee conducted the drill during the time period from 8:30 a.m. to

2:00 p.m. on October 31, 1985. The drill scenario was written to

demonstrate emergency detection, classification, notification, emergency

response facility staffing, dose assessment, and radiological monitoring.

During the drill, the licensee demonstrated the capability to staff the

Technical Support Center (TSC), Operational Support Centers (OSC), and the

EOF during regular shift hours within the time specified in NUREG-0737,

Supplement 1.

The NRC inspectors had the following observations:

• Personnel were kept informed as to the nature of onsite and offsite

conditions by the TSCEC and EOF Director (EOFD).

• The TSCEC kept the EOFD well informed of plant condition..

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• Excellent coordination was observed between the dose assessment, TSC,

and E0F personnel in the proce>> of down grading the emergency

classification.

• * The TSCEC and the EOFD both demonstrated the change of command

without interfering with the emergency response center's activities.

• The TSC staff routinely projected plant status to assure timely

declarations of changing classifications. For example, time to reach

saturated conditions in the reactor coolant system was projected to

deter.nine time for exceeding the EAL for declaration of Site Area

Emergency (SAE); time to exceed 1 percent fuel damage was projected

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to rdetermine time of reaching EAL for declaration of General Emergency.

Many o'ther examples of thinking " ahead" were demonstrated that

enhanced the' anticipatory responsa' capability of the TSC.

• ' 'Tfmely, routine; meaningful plant status updates were excellent by

the EC and enhanced the<1SC staff's understanding of current conditions

and expected activities.

• Radiological habitability checks, including issuance of personnel

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dosimetry and recommendations for per,sonnel protection, were timely

and correct.

• Numerous event / activity logs were maintained in the TSC that were

timely and meaningful. Entries from many of the logs were

transcribed by word processing personnel into an information

management system (computer based) that connects site Emergency

Response Facilities and corporate facilities, making accident

< information readily available.

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The following are items for improvement:

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• Reactor technical expertise should'bt available in the EOF to assist

the EOFD and coordinate with the NRC site team.

• Review all emergency response facility communicator personnel to

assure that adequate communicators are available for 10 CFR 50.72 and

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Health Physicis Network (HPN) requirements.

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• State's action on AP&L's offsite protective action recommendations

should be recorded and posted.

• The iclefax number to the State should be readily available at all

times.

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• Blank pages transmitted to offsite agencies should have "NA" or

"Page" crossed out to indicate no information.

• Dose assessment personnel should have a personnel roster board

similar to the TSC and E0F.

• Dose assessment communicator should have a telephone directory, as he

was told to make a call and did not have the number.

• Dose assessment status board should read " PAR" not " PAG."

• Dose assessment status board should be maintained.

• Dose assessment status board should have space for noting the

emergency class.

The inspectors reviewed Revision 1, dated November 1, 1985, (effective date

November 1, 1985), to the ANO Emergency Plan, and Revision 18, dated

September 9, 1985, (effective date November 1, 1985), to EPIP 1903.10,

EAL Response / Notifications.

The following deficiencies were observed:

The ANO EALs listed in the E/P and EPIP (event oriented) were

compared to the NUREG-0654, " Example Initiating Conditions," of

Appendix I, and it was noted that numerous EALs of NUREG-0654 were

not addressed.

Table D-2 of the Emergency Plan lists the correlation of Design Basis ,

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Accidents of the FSAR to various emergency classes. However, no

scheme of classification is provided in the EPIPs that assurances

that all FSAR accidents have applicable EALs listed (313/8525-01;

368/8526-01).

• The EAL (classification criteria) for SAE (paragraph 8.1.1,

EPIP 1903.10) dealing with offsite dose rates, addresses only

" Projected summed offsite dose rates. . . ." rather than in-situ j

results of monitoring (also) as is required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix E,

Paragraph 8, and NUREG-0654 (313/8525-02; 368/8526-02).

The NRC inspectors attended the post-exercise critique by the licensee

staff on November 1, 1985, to evaluate the licensee's identification of

deficiencies and weaknesses as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14) and

Appendix E of Par.t 50, paragraph IV.F.5. The licensee staff identified

the deficiencies listed below. Corrective action for identified

deficiencies and weaknesses will be examined during a future NRC

inspection.

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e Station page system did not function;for initial personnel

notification. ,

o An aperture card was missing from li rary file' system.

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e Only one offsite. mon'itoring.. vehicle was available.

e Radio problems existed in offsite monitoring vehicles.

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e Offsite monitoring personnel need additional training in the use of

radios.

e EC duties were turndd over to.someone not qualified to be an EC.

e dffsite monitoring data was late getting to the State.

e TS'C had problems getting information from E0F.

e Criteria are needed for downgrading the emergency class from a

General Emergency.

3. Exit Interview s , ,

The NRC inspectorsimet with licensee representatives (denoted in

paragraph 1)'at the conclusion..of the inspection on November 1,1985. The

NRC inspectors su'mmarized the purpose and the scope of the' inspection and

the. findings. Additionally, the ?icensee representatives were informed

that additional findings may result-following a briefing of Region IV

Management. The licensee's actirnt during the' drill were found to be

adequate to protect the health ' L safety of,the public. No violations or

deviations were identified- .,

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