ML20137J216
| ML20137J216 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 12/26/1985 |
| From: | Hackney C, Yandell L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20137J212 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-313-85-25, 50-368-85-26, NUDOCS 8601220320 | |
| Download: ML20137J216 (6) | |
See also: IR 05000313/1985025
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APPENDIX
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATOR 7 COMMISSION
REGION IV
NRC Inspection Report:
50-313/85-25
Licenses: DPR-51
50-368/85-26
Dockets: 50-313
50-368
Licensee:
Arkansas Power & Light Company (AP&L)
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Facility Name: Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO), Units 1 and 2
Inspection At: Arkansas Nuclear One, Russellville, Arkansas
Inspection Conducted: October 30 through November 1, 1985
Inspectors:
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C. A. Hackney, Emergency Preparedn s Analyst
Date
Emergency Preparedness ard Safegua s Programs
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Accompanying Personnel:
D. H. Schultz, Comex Corporation
Approved:
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L. 7 . Yandell, Chief, Emergency Preparedness
Date
and Safeguards Programs Section
Inspection Summary
Inspection Conducted October 30 through November 1, 1985 (Report 50-313/85-25;
50-368/85-26)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, announced inspection of the license's performance
-and capabilities during a demonstration drill of the emergency plan and
procedures. The inspection involved 46 inspector-hours onsite by 2 NRC
inspectors.
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Results: Within the emergency response areas inspected, no violations or
deviations were identified. Two deficiencies were identified (NUREG 0654
Emergency Action Levels (EALs) are not adequately addressed in Emergency Plan
Implementing Procedures (EPIPs) and the scheme of classification for Final
Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) design basis accidents is not addressed in EPIPs,
paragraph 2; EPIP 1903.10 only addresses summed offsite dose rates, paragraph 2).
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Principal Licensee Personnel
- T. Campbell, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
- J. Levine, ANO General Manager
- D. Boyd, ANO Emergency Planning Coordinator
- F. Van Buskirk, ANO Emergency Planning Coordinator
- M. Tull, Corporate Emergency Coordinator (EC)
- D. Snellings, Little Rock General Of fice (LRGO) Manager, Nuclear Programs
- T. Cogburn, LRGO General Manager, Nuclear Services
- D. Lomax, Plant Licensing Supervisor
- P. Campbell, Plant Licensing Engineer
- Denotes persons attending the exit interivew
The NRC inspectors also held discussions with other station and corporate
personnel in the areas of emergency response organization and training.
2.
Emergency Response Exercise
This special inspection was performed to determine the staffing of the
Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) as required in NUREG-0737,
Supplement 1, and committed to in a letter to NRC dated June 14, 1985.
The licensee conducted the drill during the time period from 8:30 a.m. to
2:00 p.m. on October 31, 1985.
The drill scenario was written to
demonstrate emergency detection, classification, notification, emergency
response facility staffing, dose assessment, and radiological monitoring.
During the drill, the licensee demonstrated the capability to staff the
Technical Support Center (TSC), Operational Support Centers (OSC), and the
EOF during regular shift hours within the time specified in NUREG-0737,
Supplement 1.
The NRC inspectors had the following observations:
Personnel were kept informed as to the nature of onsite and offsite
conditions by the TSCEC and EOF Director (EOFD).
The TSCEC kept the EOFD well informed of plant condition..
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Excellent coordination was observed between the dose assessment, TSC,
and E0F personnel in the proce>> of down grading the emergency
classification.
The TSCEC and the EOFD both demonstrated the change of command
without interfering with the emergency response center's activities.
The TSC staff routinely projected plant status to assure timely
declarations of changing classifications.
For example, time to reach
saturated conditions in the reactor coolant system was projected to
deter.nine time for exceeding the EAL for declaration of Site Area
Emergency (SAE); time to exceed 1 percent fuel damage was projected
to determine time of reaching EAL for declaration of General Emergency.
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Many o'ther examples of thinking " ahead" were demonstrated that
enhanced the' anticipatory responsa' capability of the TSC.
- ' 'Tfmely, routine; meaningful plant status updates were excellent by
the EC and enhanced the<1SC staff's understanding of current conditions
and expected activities.
Radiological habitability checks, including issuance of personnel
dosimetry and recommendations for per,sonnel protection, were timely
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and correct.
Numerous event / activity logs were maintained in the TSC that were
timely and meaningful.
Entries from many of the logs were
transcribed by word processing personnel into an information
management system (computer based) that connects site Emergency
Response Facilities and corporate facilities, making accident
information readily available.
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The following are items for improvement:
Reactor technical expertise should'bt available in the EOF to assist
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the EOFD and coordinate with the NRC site team.
Review all emergency response facility communicator personnel to
assure that adequate communicators are available for 10 CFR 50.72 and
Health Physicis Network (HPN) requirements.
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State's action on AP&L's offsite protective action recommendations
should be recorded and posted.
The iclefax number to the State should be readily available at all
times.
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Blank pages transmitted to offsite agencies should have "NA" or
"Page" crossed out to indicate no information.
Dose assessment personnel should have a personnel roster board
similar to the TSC and E0F.
Dose assessment communicator should have a telephone directory, as he
was told to make a call and did not have the number.
Dose assessment status board should read " PAR" not " PAG."
Dose assessment status board should be maintained.
Dose assessment status board should have space for noting the
emergency class.
The inspectors reviewed Revision 1, dated November 1, 1985, (effective date
November 1, 1985), to the ANO Emergency Plan, and Revision 18, dated
September 9, 1985, (effective date November 1, 1985), to EPIP 1903.10,
EAL Response / Notifications.
The following deficiencies were observed:
The ANO EALs listed in the E/P and EPIP (event oriented) were
compared to the NUREG-0654, " Example Initiating Conditions," of
Appendix I, and it was noted that numerous EALs of NUREG-0654 were
not addressed.
Table D-2 of the Emergency Plan lists the correlation of Design Basis
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Accidents of the FSAR to various emergency classes.
However, no
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scheme of classification is provided in the EPIPs that assurances
that all FSAR accidents have applicable EALs listed (313/8525-01;
368/8526-01).
The EAL (classification criteria) for SAE (paragraph 8.1.1,
EPIP 1903.10) dealing with offsite dose rates, addresses only
" Projected summed offsite dose rates. . . ." rather than in-situ
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results of monitoring (also) as is required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix E,
Paragraph 8, and NUREG-0654 (313/8525-02; 368/8526-02).
The NRC inspectors attended the post-exercise critique by the licensee
staff on November 1, 1985, to evaluate the licensee's identification of
deficiencies and weaknesses as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14) and
Appendix E of Par.t 50, paragraph IV.F.5.
The licensee staff identified
the deficiencies listed below.
Corrective action for identified
deficiencies and weaknesses will be examined during a future NRC
inspection.
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Station page system did not function;for initial personnel
notification.
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An aperture card was missing from li rary file' system.
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Only one offsite. mon'itoring.. vehicle was available.
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Radio problems existed in offsite monitoring vehicles.
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Offsite monitoring personnel need additional training in the use of
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radios.
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EC duties were turndd over to.someone not qualified to be an EC.
dffsite monitoring data was late getting to the State.
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TS'C had problems getting information from E0F.
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Criteria are needed for downgrading the emergency class from a
General Emergency.
3.
Exit Interview
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The NRC inspectorsimet with licensee representatives (denoted in
paragraph 1)'at the conclusion..of the inspection on November 1,1985.
The
NRC inspectors su'mmarized the purpose and the scope of the' inspection and
the. findings. Additionally, the ?icensee representatives were informed
that additional findings may result-following a briefing of Region IV
Management. The licensee's actirnt during the' drill were found to be
adequate to protect the health ' L safety of,the public.
No violations or
deviations were identified-
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