ML20137C631
| ML20137C631 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 11/19/1985 |
| From: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | |
| References | |
| ACRS-T-1469, NUDOCS 8511260550 | |
| Download: ML20137C631 (250) | |
Text
-- - - --- ------ _ - _
OR GWAL
(~~.
UIN11ED STATES U NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION DOCKET NO:
IN THE MATTER OF:
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILLSTONE UNITS 1, 2 AND 3 l
t l
l l
LOCATION: WATERFORD, CONNECTICUT PAGES: 104 - 313 f
DATE: TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 19, 1985 l , w.1 l
.a ogpp pr L .
3w UsenaeU@n6fx L ce Jojogemove from ACRS0h..
. ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
(^ OfficialReporters 444 North CapitolStreet Washington, D.C. 20001 (202) 347-3700 l BS1126OSSO 851119 NATIONWIDE COVERACE f$46 PDR
CR24940.0
'BRT/sjg 104
~
1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
(}
2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3 ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS 4
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILLSTONE UNITS 1, 2 AND 3 5 Northeast Nuclear Energy l Company 6 Training Center Rope Ferry Road 7 Waterford, Connecticut Tuesday, November 19, 1985 The subcommittee meeting reconvened at 8:30 a.m., Paul 9 '
G. Shewmon, chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.
10 11 ACRS MEMBERS PRESENT:
I2 PAUL G. SHEWMON, ACRS Member
() 13 DADE W. MOELLER, ACRS Member 14 DAVID A. WARD, ACRS Member 15 JOHN BENDER, ACRS Consultant 0
JOHN SCHIFFGENS, ACRS Staff Member 17 18 19
'20 21 l
22 23
(')
We FLJ Reporte,s, Inc.
24 25
i PUBLIC NOTICE BY THE UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONERS' ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 19, 1985 The contents of this stenographic transcript.of the proceedings of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS)., as reported herein, is an uncorrected record of the discussions recorded at the meeting held on the above date.
No member of the ACRS Staff and no participant at
) this meeting accepts any responsibility for errors or inaccuracies of statement or data contained in this transcript.
l I
o O
l
E ,
I
\
24940.0 105 BRT rh U 1 P_ R,O,C,E_ E D_ I_ N,G S_
2 MR. SCHEWMAN: Good morning, this is the 3 continuation of our meeting yesterday on the Millstone 1 4 converson hearing. The first thing this morning, we'll 5 hear a summary of pending actions related to SEP, USI, GSI 6 and TMI action plan items.
7 MR. GRIMES: Mr. Boyle is going to make the 8 presentation. We would like to start by going through a 9 status on the SEP activities as they are reflected in the 10 supplement to the SEP integrated assessment report.
11 MR. SCHEWMAN: This is the one that will be 12 issued momentarily that hasn't been out yet?
() 13 ,
MR. GRIMES: That is correct. As soon as we get 14 the reference and the. winds and tornado evaluation we 15 intend to publish the report in final form.
16 MR. MOELLER: Could you mention, as you begin, 17 what is, say, exempted from this list? Like generic 18 issues --
19 MR. BOYLE: I was going to get more into that 20 later on the ISAP.
21 MR. MOELLER: That's good enough.
22 MR. SCHEWMAN: Would you put that projector back 23 a little ways. Thank you.
24 MR. GRIMES: There's a point of clarification 25 for the license conversion. On the two parts of the 7-)
\.)
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336-6646
BRT O 1 conversion evaluation, consisting of the SEP supplement 2 that Mike is going to go through first to describe where we 3 stand with the recommended corrective actions from SEP, and 4 thentheconversionevaluationNURh:G 1143, the report that 5 Mr. Shea prepared; present the status of the unresolved 6 safety issues, the generic issues and the TMI action plan 7 requirements as they have been addressed for this facility, 8 including the formal justifications for continued operation 9 while these issues remain pending, that the licensee 10 submitted at the staff's request. Those are all reflected 11 in here.
12 Mr. Shea is the project manager for Millstone 1, h 13 he was going to address a few of the more significant of 14 those issues before we put on the agenda later this 15 afternoon.
16 MR. MOELLER: Does that -- that 1143 -- okay.
17 That's helpful because when I read it I didn't understand 18 why it was needed.
19 MR. GRIMES: The purpose of this evaluation is 20 to fulfill our legal requirement to explain these things.
21 They are in the form that you'll see them for near term 22 operating licanse; they are presented in the context of:
23 There is no generic resolution for these things, however, 24 it's all right for this plant to operate because -- when we 25 get onto the discussion about the integrated safety ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
24940.0 107 BRT
- (3 A/ l' assessment program we'll try to explain how we hope to 2 achieve at least partial resolution under that program for 3 some of these things while they continue to be generic 4 issues for the industry as a whole.
5 MR. BENDER: Chris, could I ask one more 6 clarifying question -- to clarify. As I understand the 7 ISAP is still a voluntary kind of program?
8 MR. GRIMES: Yes, sir. The Commission policy is 9 to evaluate the effectiveness of this program on a 10 voluntary basis, much the same way that integrated 11 schedules is a voluntary policy. And then once we have 12 developed some experience, then the Commission can decide
() 13 whether or not they want to continue it on a voluntary 14 basis or stop it or make it a mandatory program.
15 MR. BENDER: And the main difference between 16 them is the introduction of the probabilistic technique for 17 evaluating?
18 MR. GRIMES: It's the integrated evaluation 19 process as opposed to the issue-specific evaluation process.
20 I'd hate to say that it's just the probabilistic analysis 21 point of view because over recent years the staff has used 22 probabilistic analysis more, not only to evaluate exemption
. 23 or exceptions from regulatory requirements, but also in the 24 context of licensee initiatives and other plant g- 25 improvements. It forms a fundamental part of the value V
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-3364646
24940.0 108 BRT 1 impact analysis for backfitting requirements, for exa'mple.
2 MR. BENDER: But the concept is really to try to 3 establish the relevant importance of things?
4 MR. GRIMES: That's correct.
5 MR. BENDER: With probabilistic -- probabilistic 6 methods is another approach. Are there others besides that?
7 MR. GRIMES: The fundamental parts of the ISAP 8 concept are, first of all that it's comprehensive and that 9 it addresses all pending issues and potential safety issues 10 for a given f acility using deterministic evaluation 11 techniques, probablistic evaluation techniques, and 12 operating experience.
lll 13 Mike has got a presentation that describes the 14 objectives and evaluation methods --
15 MR. BENDER: I won't go any further, 16 MR. BOYLE: I would just like to thank 17 Mr. Grimes for doing my entire presentation. I have 18 nothing more to say.
19 MR. WARD: We can afford to hear it twice.
20 MR. BOYLE: In a few minutes I want to give a 21 summary of where the SEP items, USIs, GSIs, and TMIs shake 22 out after the integrated assessment was done in SEP.
23 In SEP we did 137 issues or reviews for each of 24 these plants, and out of those I think 86 were directly 25 applicable to Millstone l!
ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
24940.0 109 BRT f'\
V 1 (Slide.)
2 From those 86 we had a number of open issues 3 that were identified in the NUREG 0824, the IPSAR.
4 Since that time, 20 of those items have been 5 complete -- either a hardware modification, a tech spec or 6 procedural change has been done or evaluation completed',
7 and everything that we needed to know has completely been 8 finished on it. 11 issues have been carried over to ISAP, 9 either the evaluation isn't finished yet, the licensee 10 would like to take a look at a new aspect of the issue or 11 for some other reason they would like to carry it on and 12 have it put into the integrated schedule.
() 13 MR. SCHEWMAN: Somebody wanted to know-how those 14 20 wore resolved -- would it all be in the SER?
15 MR. BOYLE: Yes. We'll be getting to it a 16 little later but it is in there.
17 MR. SCHEWMAN: That's enough.
18 MR. BOYLE: 10 other issues are being carried on 19 outside the ISAP process, they just don't lend themselves 20 to being incorporated into it.
21 MR. WARD: Mike, the rest of the 86 have all 22 been previously resolved; is that it?
23 MR. BOYLE: Either in the IPSAR or the 24 cupplement to the IPSAR itself. Yes, they are resolved one
- 25 way or other and an SER is issued for each individual topic.
ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336 6646
24940.0 110 BRT
/ 1 MR. SCHEWMAN: Now, they were completed in the 2 IPSAR, but I just asked you if it was in here and you said 3 yes. So this and the IPSAR do parallel each other, or are 4 redundant; is that right?
5 MR. BOYLE: If there's something completed in 6 the IPSAR then it's no longer in the supplement. What's in 7 the supplement are those things that were carried forward 8 and those are all addressed and dispositioned in there.
9 In ISAP there are approximately 25 topics that 10 are related in one way or another to USI, GSI and TMI 11 action plans, and we have a chart later on that will 12 identify which ones they are. But each one, each USI or
( f 13 GSI or TMI action plan is active right now and not complete.
14 It is addressed in ISAP.
15 There are USIs and GSIs that have not 16 technically been issued by the Commission yet, but the 17 technical resolution is such that we have asked the I
18 licensee to take a look at that issue and see how they 19 might address it in ISAP; if they have procedures or plant 20 hardware or something that might resolve portions of those 21 issues we might, before the staff technically issues the 22 resolution, be able to take care of them for this plan.
23 MR. BENDER: I'm not really clear yet what you 24 are saying. Are you saying if the issue can be resolved cs 25 through ISAP methods, then that's the way it is to be s
ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nation, Coverage 800 336-6646
24940.0 111 BRT G
l 1 ' resolved or what?
2 MR. BOYLE: There are a number of issues that 3 still haven't been -- the technical resolutions haven't 4 been handed out generically to all the plants; however, 5 technically the staff knows what has to be done. We have 6 given those technical resolutions to the licensee and they 7 can take a look and see if they can directly address them 8 right now; and, if so, we would like to address them in 9 ISAP. '
10 MR. BENDER: Okay. I see. And if that were 11 done you'd forget about whether they were ever resolved in 12 the USI or not?
() 13 MR. BOYLE: Right. At the time they would be 14 issued generically we'd say this plant has already -
, 15 addressed it and we'd have a reference for it.
16 MR. MOELLER: And again, none of the 25 items 17 are in the 41?
18 MR. BOYLE: Yes. They are related. We have 19 integrated USI and SEP topics together; they are related.
4 20 Specifically SEP, we did not address individual 21 USIs. They were exempted.
22 MR. MOELLER: And now of the -- you said you 23 originally began with 137.
24 MR. BOYLE: Right.
25 MR. MOELLER: Of the ones, of the 137 that O
ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwife Coverage 800 336 6646
-24940.0 112 BRT
(
\ l aren't in the 41, were any of those USIs or GS --
2 MR. BOYLE: In the beginning way back in phase 1 3 of SEP, we looked through the 1500 or so topics. There 4 were USIs and GSIs and whatever in there. We decided they 5 would be handled generically and we are not going to handle 6 them plant-specifically so no, they are not in the 137.
7 MR. GRIMES: A point of clarification. If you 8 go back to the SEP report, NUREG 0824, it identifies for 9 each of the 137 topics which ones were addressed in the 10 integrated assessment and which ones were exempt because 11 they were being handled under USI, GSI requirements, and 12 there's a table in that report. And at that point we had
() 13_ excluded them but now we are bringing them back, to the 14 extent that we now have some potential resolution.
15 And to expand on a question that was raised 16 earlier, the supplement table, which we've included in this 17 handout, the table of SEP actions, addresses everything 18 that was addressed in the original integrated plant safety 19 report. The text of the supplement, though, only describes 20 those issues for which we originally determined some 21 further evaluation was required. So that the summary table 22 in the supplement does address everything that was 23 considered under SEP.
24 MR. SCHEWMAN: Is that the summary table we are 25 talking about?
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coversee 800 336 6646
24940.0 113 BRT
- 1 MR. BOYLE: No, it is called table 2.1, and it's 2 the fifth page in my supplement. There are no slides. It 3 was just too small for printing.
4 MR. WARD: Wait a minute, Mike. You said USI, 5 for example, may be resolved for Millstone in this part of 6 ISAP. But what if the generic resolution, when it's 7 developed, is different than you assumed satisfactory for 8 Millstone 17 9 MR. BOYLE: Then we'd probably have to go back 10 and look at it but we have taken a look at those USIs, 11 generic issues that the industry feels is basically 12 resolved and work from there. We haven't looked for the m
1 13 one for -- we know what the issue is but we don't know how 14 ; to go about resolving it.
15 MR. WARD: So you are not attempting to do it on 16 I those USIs, just where you think --
17 MR. BOYLE: Just where it's very well defined, 18 and it may be that they don't resolve the entire USI, but 19 they look at aspects of it.
20 MR. GRIMES: Another aspect of that is, even if 21 an unresolved safety issue or generic issue hasn't reached 22 the point where there's a potential resolution being 23 developed, we want to look at it to the extent that if 24 there's anything that can be done, either from operating
,~ 25 experience point of view or from the probabilistic risk
)
ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336 6646
r 24940.0 114 BRT t')
1 perspective point of view, we would want to consider that.
2 That's part and parcel,of the competence of the evaluation.
3 MR. BOYLE: The next slide I have highlights the 4 IPSAR -- what the open items were, what we required or 5 asked the licensee to do.
6 (Slide.)
7 It probably would be easier to follow it on your 8 handout because this is a terrible slide. It gives the 9 title. It also gives the status. This is basically a 10 breakdown of the slide previously; there it has been 11 completed or the staff is still evaluating it if it's going 12 to be done in '85, and also identifies which ones of these
() 13 are being carried forward int,o ISAP.
14 MR. WARD: The last thing there, would you 15 remind me, how has that been resolved?
16 (Slide.)
17 Mike, we asked them to implement the PWR tech 18 spec limit, primary coolant activity. That's one that 19 deals with off-site doses from steam generators -- I 20 mean --
21 MR. GRIMES: If there's a release of primary 22 coolant --
23 MR. WARD: It was an off-site dose calculation 24 that was --
25 MR. MOELLER: As I recall, it was the thyroid ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverase 800 336 6646
24940.0 115 BRT 1 dose recifically. I've often wondered on that. Has the 2 NRC sc?ff given any consideration to going to a risk-based 3 approach in terms of the thyroid dose, the dose limit? If 4 you did, you know, it would be 30 times or so as high.
5 Pick a number -- 10 times. And this wouldn't be as 6 limiting as it currently is.
7 I just wondered if at any time yoa have given 8 consideration to that?
9 MR. GRIMES: I really can't say, Dr. Moeller. I 10 know that work is going on in that area in terms of 11 evaluating the safety goal, ways of implementing the safety 12 goal.
m
, . 13 We look at the dose calculation.more from a 14 siting point of view for the evaluation of operating 15 reactor -- if they miss the siting goal, that doesn't 16 particularly bother us so long as we know we are doing 17 j everything we can to limit off-site doses.
18 MR. SCHEWMAN: Make it short, would you; I would 19 like to get on with this.
20 MR. HERNAN: We have in the past year looked at 21 spiking and coolant limits and consciously decided not to 22 do anything differently as far as the actual limits. We 23 have looked at it.
24 MR. BOYLE: Originally there were 86 topics s 25 evaluated for the plant, 48 met that criteria, 38 -- those
( )
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
24940.0 116 BRT N
> 1 38 topics resulted in items for either further evaluation, 2 tech spec modification or procedure modifications we asked 3 the licensee to do.
4 (Slide.)
5 In the IPSAR the- uroke down in those four 6 categories the way it is right here. The fourth category 7 there were no requirements ultimately asked of them or they 8 completed it before the IPSAR was issued.
9 In the supplement, the numbers are changed.
10 There were 65 items, since 24 were already complete. 17 11 now require hardware modifications; one, procedures or tech 12 specs; 23 are still undergoing further evaluation, things I
13 like the seismic program are still under investigation; and 14 24 of them either resulted in no requirements or have been 15 completed by now. The complete ones you can see from the 16 previous slide.
17 . That's it on the status of SEP and ISAP.
I 18 MR. WARD: Why don't those numbers on the IPSAR 19 supplement add up to the numbers we had on the first chart?
20 MR. BOYLE: The ones on this chart should add up 21 to 65, which means we had 89 original items in the IPSAR, 22 24 of them were complete so that left 65 to be addressed in 23 the IPSAR supplement.
24 MR. WARD: But if I go back to your first --
,s
, 25 let's see -- your first chart --
s -
ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
I 202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336-6646
24940.0 117 BRT 1 MR. SCHEWMAN: Some of it may be that one item, 2 or one topic can lead to several items.
3 MR. BOYLE: Yes. It's a very confused 4 accounting system.
5 MR. WARD: All right.
6 MR. GRIMES: That completes our presentation on 7 the status of the SEP activities and the results that are 8 presented in the supplement.
9 We have enclosed in the handouts the table from 10 the supplement that identifies the actions taken for all of 11 the SEP activities. We hadn't planned on going into a 12 point by point discussion of each of those, but we are 13 prepared to discuss any of those subjects that you may be 14 interested in. Otherwise, we would propose to go onto a 15 discussion of where we are going to go with the integrated 16 safety assessment program.
17 MR. SCHEWMAN: Do you have -- I just wondered 18 about, amongst Carl Michelson's questions or concerns that 19 I gave you yesterday, there was one set there with regard 20 l to reactor water clean up system, breaks, isolation and so 21 on. Does that coincide with anything in this table?
22 MR. GRIMES: There was one issue -- a topic 23 related to high pressure / low pressure isolation capability 24 that we reviewed in SEP, where the licensee had proposed to 25 put an interlock in to prevent exposing the reactor water ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
24940.0 118 BRT O
(/ 1 clean up system to primary system pressure which would 2 possibly rupture the system.
3 The way that Mr. Michelson's questions are 4 presented looks more like a pi.pe break outside containment S evtluation, that we did. But I think that his questions 6 are inspired by the licensee's withdrawal of the commitment 7 to put in the interlock in favor of looking at the relief 8 capacity for the reactor water system. even if it is 9 exporad to the primary pressure it wouldn't break, but even 10 if it did break it was addressed in the pipe break outside 11 containment evaluation that relates to -- some of these !
l 12 cuestions related to what were the consequences of a break,
(), 13 what kind of automatic isolation capability is there on the 14 system, ultimately what would happen if they couldn't 15 isolate the system? That would be uncontrolled break 16 outside containment; the consequences would likely go 17 beyond part 100, using typical licensing analysis.
18 MR. BENDER: Are you inviting us to ask 19 questions about the summary table of IPSAR?
20 MR. BOYLE: I thought rather than go through and 21 have slides in each individual one, since 50 minutes was 22 allocated for this, if you want to take a look and see how 23 it's dispositioned in the SEP and either resolved or 24 further dispositioned in the supplement, feel free to ask 25 questions.
ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Natforwide Coverage 800 33H646
24940.0 119 BRT O
\/ 1 MR. BENDER: If the Chairman will let me I have 2 a couple of questions.
3 MR. SCHEWMAN: Right.
4 MR. BENDER: In part III-5,A, cascading pipe 5 break analysis, the SEP column, you have asked for an 6 analysis of cascading pipe breaks. I guess I'm not very 7 clear on what such an analysis might be.
8 Have you got any examples of what has been done?
9 MR. GRIMES: Cascading pipe breaks involve --
i i
10 are basically a classical pipe break analysis. There were 11 criteria developed under SEP for, when pipes are in close 12 proximity to each other, assuming that a large pipe can
() 13 impact and cause the break of an adjacent, equal diameter 14 or smaller pipe. And the cascading pipe break is simply 15 looking at the consequences of close pipes impinging on 16 each other and causing multiple breaks.
17 MR. BENDER: Is that the definition you are 18 using?
19 MR. GRIMES: That's the definition we are using 20 for cascading breaks; yes.
21 MR. BENDER: There's a campaign under way in 22 some utilities to eliminate a number of pipe whip 23 restraints, if not all of them. Is this plant considering
! 24 doing that? Is there any view as to whether it is valuable 25 or not valuable?
l ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336 6646
24940.0 120 BRT (3
(-) 1 MR. SCHEWMAN: The basis for this would be the 2 so-called leak before brea,,k argument.
3 MR. STET 2: We don't have a great deal of pipe 4 whip restraints on Millstone 1, so that while we are very 5 familiar with what has been going on in the industry and 6 there may be some limited applications that we will be 7 looking into in the future, we have not applied for use of 8 that on Millstone 1, nor have we immediate plans to do so.
9 MR. BENDER: The secondary system has a fair 10 amount of structural restraint in it that implies, at least, i 11 that the loadings are based on pipe whip -- maybe not.
12 MR. GRIMES: I think you'll find the vast I) 13 majority of those -- what appear to be pipe restraints are 14 probably more seismic restraints.
15 MR. BENDER: That's different.
16 MR. GRIMES: In the context of a seismic 17 analysis the loading on a seismic system is different than 18 the pipe whip analysis.
19 MR. BENDER: One third point in this area. A 20 lot of the equipment qualification that has been of concern 21 has to do with exposure to steam conditions. Is the 22 provision of these large closures around a lot of this 23 instrumentation a way of obviating the need to actually get 24 the equipment qualified under the working conditions?
25 MR. GRIMES: Yes.
[v~)
ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 33(H5646
24940.0 121 BRT
,a
~r 6 1 MR. BENDER: Could you guess as to what fraction-2 of the hardware is dealt with by that kind of protective 3 means? 50 percent?
4 MR. KACICH: It's a comparatively small fraction 5 if you look at the total number of components, which is 6 about 700 for Millstone 1, which is under the scope of the 7' EQ rule, maybe a dozen or less environmental enclosures.
8 But the technique, as you indicated, is to make sure that 9 that equipment is kept in a mild environment, even if there 10 is a pipe break in that same room.
11 MR. BENDER: In the absence of the ability to do 12 that, has it required replacement of a lot of the existing 13 hardware?- Or in most cases have you found the hardware l's I could survive without additional qualifications?
15 I noticed motor operators, in particular, are 16 replaced extensively.
17 MR. KACICH: Your question relates to equipment 18 which we didn't enclose but that which we qualified?
19 MR. BENDER: In order to qualify you had to 20 throw away the old hardware --
21 MR. KACICH: A large percentage had to be 22 replaced. That's correct. We were not able to qualify the 23 original equipment.
24 MR. ROMBERG: And even some of that equipment
<~ 25 inside the enclosures we have upgraded to qualified b}
ACE FEDERAL REPOP.TERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Covetge 800 336-6646 l
24940.0 122 B RT. . '
e 3 '
l 1 equipment, as you saw before.
2 MR. BENDER: Thank you.
3 MR. WARD: I have a question. There's an SEEP 4 topic on core spray nozzle effectiveness. Can you tell me, 5 what's at issue there? The requirements from the IPSAR --
6 none.
7 MR. SCHEWMAN: What SEP number is that?
8 MR. WARD: Roman VI .A.4. It's on page 2-26.
9 MR. GRIMES: All three of the BWRs that were 10 evaluated under SEP, there was some information under the 11 Japanese tests concerning core spray effects and the wt.y 12 the core spray water might skip across the top of the core, A
(_) 13 reduce the cooling effectiveness.-
14 That was related to this particular SEP topic, 15 and so we acknowledged that in the original SEP integrated 16 assessment and noted that there was a potential that this 17 new information might cause a concern regarding the 18 effectiveness of core spray. Based on the information that 19 was available to us then, and even today we don't think 20 that is so much of a concern that there's any corrective 21 action that needs to be taken at this time. The 22 experimental studies will continue to go on to improve our 23 understanding of the heat removal processes for core spray 24 system.
25 MR. BOILE: The original issue also is for BWR-5 ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336-6646
- _ _~_
V l
l 24940.0 123 BRT
' (' ' '
1 and this is BWR-3. We figure there's enough of a 2 difference --
3 MR. WARD: That is what I was trying to recall.
4 I thought in this configuration the spray distribution 5 isn't really very important, just so the water gets in 6 there and dribbles down in the top support plate or 7 whatever you call it -- is that right?
8 MR. KACICH: I think compared to other designs 9 that's a true statement. This plant is not as susceptible 10 to that sort of problem.
11 MR. SCHEWMAN: Who is continuing with that work 12 now? I bring it up because one of Michelson's questions, n ~
(_) 13 he asserts that now that GE has stopped work on the 14 analysis of core spray distribution we grow concerned about 15' the potential -- and so on.
16 MR. GRIMES: The division of technology has some 17 purview over it. Before the full committee meeting we'll
'18 check on the status of phase 16 and find out if anybody is 19 actively working on it.
20 MR. WARD: That's A-16 you say?
21 MR. GRIMES: Yes. That's what we reference in i
22 our integrated assessment report.
23 MR. WARD: What is A-167 24 MR. BOYLE: Steam effects on BWR core spray 3 25 distribution.
._)
ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 80 4 336 6646
24940.0 124 BRT
> 1 MR. MOELLER: On page 2-28, Roman IX-5. On the 2 first two items, I gather those are primarily, again, 3 equipment -- verification that the equipment can stand the 4 environment?
5 MR. GRIMES: This was from the perspective that 6 we were reviewing the design of the ventilation systems to 7 keep the areas cool, and we identified a number of 8 ventilation systems that were either susceptible to single 9 failures or had other failure modes that could cause loss 10 of ventilation, and which would affect the operating 11 envelope as opposed to the accident envelope. In some 12 cases they may also have been in the accident envelope.
) 13 But these were the issues that resulted in that review. .
14 MR. MOELLER: On the first one, 4.32.1, have 15 I they demonstrated that the space coolers are not essential?
16 Or is this pending?
17 MR. GRIMES: They submitted an analysis to 18 demonstrate the systems could still operate but we have a 19 note there that it was --
20 MR. MOELLER: It's under review?
21 MR. BAIN: I think I could answer that question 22 for you. Mike Bain.
23 After the IPSAR initially came out we were able 24 to provide some test results of a test that was performed c 25 before start-up of the plant in 1970, where the pumps were v
ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336-6646
24940.0 125 BRT
- 1 run with the coolers shut off and the ambient air 2 conditions were monitored for extended periods of time.
3 So we had a test that we are able to resurrect 4 out of the historical files to resolve that issue.
5 MR. MOELLER: Could you comment on 4.32.2?
6 MR. BAIN: There were two issues there. One was 7 with equipment in the turbine build ^ing because there's a 8 good bit of safety-related equipment that's located there, 9 and the question of whether or not that could function 10 without the turbine building ventilation system operating, 11 and there was also the question of hydrogen generation in 12 the battery rooms.
s 13 The equipment. associated -- the safety related 14 equipment in the turbine building, we were able to resolve 15 that by modifying procedures to restart the turbine 16 building ventilation system within a certain period of time 17 following the loss of off-site power. And we did an 18 analysis of hydrogen generation rates in the battery rooms 19 and showed something like -- it was on the order of several 20 months before you could get to detonation limits.
21 MR. MOELLER: Okay. Thank you.
22 MR. SCHEWMAN: Any other questions on this item?
23 Then we'll go on to the supplement.
24 MR. BOYLE: That's basically it.
y 25 MR. GRIMES: That concludes our presentation on J
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
I 202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336-6646
24940.0 126 BRT J l supplement to the SEP review, and we'll now go on and talk 2 about the scope of the issues to be addressed in the ISAP.
3 MR. SCHEWMAN: We have already run past the 4 break and we are up to 9:50, then?
5 MR. GRIMES: Did we answer the question that you 6 had regarding Michelson's comment on the reactor water 7 clean-up system?
8 MR. SCHEWMAN: The first was core spray. The 9 second was how do they cool the torus water. At least on 10 the drawings we had there was not a figure that showed a 11 loop of the heat exchanger for the torus water. Can you 12 tell me how that gets cooled?
, 13 MR. ROMBERG: Say it again, please?
14 MR. SCHEWMAN: How is the torus water cooled?
15 Is there a heat exchanger in it?
16 MR. ROMBERG: The low pressure coolant heat 17 exchanger cooled by surface water circulates, draws water 18 through it to the ellipsis system, and that heat exchanger 19 takes care of the torus. You could put that on internal 20 recirc or go in a conventional mode, injecting into the 21 changer, but either way -- that's the coolant, there are 22 two trains for that.
23 MR. SCHEWMAN: How do they add makeup water at 24 high pressure during an emergency? Is it obvious whether c-- 25 that's makeup water for the torus or makeup water for the ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336 4 46
_ - ~ _ .
24940.0 127 BRT g
\' 1 primary system? Is the term " adding makeup water to the 2 torus"?
3 MR. STET 2: No. ,
4 MR. SCHEWMAN: Not stuff coming into the torus 5 already --
6 MR. WARD: Not at high pressure.
7 MR. STETZ: If you had high pressure it means 8 you wouldn't have a significant break, and in that case 9 we'd use the feedwater system and anything going out 10 through a small break would be made up to the torus and 11 we'd not be using the torus as a reservoir at that time.
12 MR. SCHEWMAN: All right. Enough.
O(_/ 13 ,
Is the reactor water clean-up system seismically 14 qualified?
15 MR. DE BARBA: It is out to the outermost 16 isolation mouth.
17 MR. SCHEWMAN: Okay. Let's leave the questions 18 on isolation and breaks to the full committee meeting, then.
19 Michelson can ask you himself.
20 MR. GRIMES: All right.
21 MR. BENDER: I wonder if it's useful -- I don't 22 propose it's necessarily a useful idea, I'll ask whether it 23 is desirable or not. Would it be worthwhile to make a 24 comparison between the way in which all these cooling modes 7s 25 are handled in this plant and those in more general use now d
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 33M646
24940.0 128 BRT
(
1 for the later versions -- versions of PWRs? Does something 2 like that exist?
3 MR. KACICH: Part of the presentation'you'll see 4 later today will speak to that. It turns out one of the 5 topics in ISAP of interest requires a discussion of that 6 type in order to explain its significance.
7 MR. BENDER: I think that would be a good way to 8 deal with Michelson's questions because I think most of 9 them have to do with the fact that this plant, which is of 10 fairly old vintage, has some features in it that most of us 11 have forgotten about. And, so, if there were a way to 12 update us on how they were dealt with t' hen as compared to O
N/ 13 now, it would make it a lot easier for us to understand 14 just what was done.
i
- 15. Actually a lot of these methods are better than 16 the ones that are in current use but you forget about what 17 their values were.
18 MR. KACICH: When John Bickel gets here to give
, 19 that part of the presentation I'll see if I can make sure 20 he prefaces the discussion of that with a little synopsis f
21 of the various cooling systems available.
22 MR. SCHEWMAN: Let's go on. We'll lose half an l
! 23 hour some' place else. Someplace in the middle of your talk 24 we may have a break. Go ahaad.
25 MR. BOYLE: Fine.
I ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336 6646
4 - - s - --,ra w g 24940.0 129 BRT s
1 (Slide.)
2 On December 28 of '83, Northeast Utilities 3 originally asked to participate in ISAP. Following the 4 issuance of the SEP, IPSAR, they saw the good things that 5 came out of the integrated assessment there and they wanted 6 to apply that across the board to all the outstanding 7 requirements.
8 Staff responded to their request on April 5th of 9 '84, but they put a caveat on there that since the NRC 10 hadn't yet approved the ISAP program, that things may 11 change in the future.
12 November 15 of that year the ISAP policy 13 statement was published in the Federal Register, which 14 detailed the scope of the program and also the fact that we 15 were looking for a volunteer or two.
16 After that we started meeting with the licensee, 17 in April of '85, to scope out what issues should be in ISAP, 18 what shouldn't be, and then to flesh out the details of the 19 issues in it .
20 on May 17, '85, Northeast Utilities submitted 21 their formal, the last formal request for ISAP, detailing 22 what issues they wanted to put into it and what the issues 23 were all about. The staff issued their approval of this 24 concept for the ISAP for Millstone 1 on July 31 of this r% 25 year and the evaluation of Millstone started shortly after
(>3 1
' ' ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
24940.0 130 BRT
/^i kY l that.
2 (Slide.) .
3 I have a short talk here on the ISAP program and 4 its objectives. The entire scope of this is spelled out in 5 the Commission policy statement issued in the Federal 6 Register.
7 The objective was to provide a stable 8 environment to allow the licensee to evaluate all licensing 9 issues, establish implementation schedules, and provide a 10 basis for updating an integrated schedule, and of course 11 supplying the integrated schedule.
12 Features of it are, deterministic review of
() 13 issues. Most of these issues came out of the SEP process --
14 what we found to be significant from SEP. The 15 probabilistic review of issues, and also the probabilistic 16 review might be able to point out weaknesses in the plant 17 where new issues could be formed.
18 MR. MOELLER: Excuse me. How do you determine 19 whether it's deterministic or probabilistic?
20 MR. BOYLE: Deterministic there's an actual set 21 of issues that have already been written down as a result 22 of SEP. Here, go out and evaluate this. And parallel with.
23 that we asked the licensee to do a probabilistic review of 24 the plant, an entire PSS, from that to also evaluate these gm 25 other issues, PSS-wide, and they may find out other G
\
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 80 4 336-6646
24940.0 131 BRT
/m.
(') I weaknesses in the plant where new issues can be formed.
2 In parallel with those other two we do an 3 operating experience review. In SEP we evaluated the plant 4 from the day it started up until, I think, the end of 1981.
5 ISAP, we have asked our contractor to update that until the 6 end of 1984. In general --
7 MR. SCHEWMAN: Updating means the plant 8 modification changes get in there? Or new things that 9 should be considered get factored in? Or what?
10 MR. BOYLE: Just updating the review of the 11 operating history of the plant. We take a look --
~
12 MR. SCHEWMAN: Okay. I'm sorry. Go ahead.
() 13 MR. MOELLER: Well, now there are sister plants 14 to this one. Do they look at the operating experience 15 there?
16 MR. BOYLE: Not explicitly, no. There is so 17 much information that they took a look at, they just don't 18 have an opportunity. And their basic conclusion from that 19 -- we didn't get into it yesterday -- was it's a fairly 20 well run utility. It's evidenced in the smaller than usual 21 number of LERs that come out.
22 MR. MOELLER: How many LERs do you have, on an 23 average, on Unit l? Do you know? The norm is 50 or so a 24 year.
(~S 25 MR. ROMBERG: Continue and I'll come back to
\-)
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
I 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336-6646
24940.0 132 BRT 1 that.
2 MR. MOELLER: All right.
3 MR. BENDER: Let me explore the methodology for 4 a minute. You can make a judgment that you need a 5 deterministic analysis about something. Would that 6 decision eliminate the need to do a PSA?
7 MR. BOYLE: No. They are done in parallel.
8 MR. BENDER: You might do both in parallel on 9 sequence or some such?
10 MR. BOYLE: Yes. For instance, we might say 11 from experience in SEP, we know that an older plant should 12 do a seismic reanalysis. They may do it at the same time
) 13 they are doing a PSS, and see well, a seismic reanalysis --
14 points out we ought to do these hardware modifications.
15 PSS makes, on a risk basis, but this, in this one place, 16 just doesn't make sense. So they may have the two 17 determinant and probabilistic being used to make a decision 18 about an issue.
19 MR. BENDER: The third aspect has to do with 20 really seeing whether experience influences a judgment, I 21 would assume.
22 MR. BOYLE: Can influence a judgment or it can 23 show a weakness in a plant that something hasn't been seen 24 before by trending out a report --
25 MR. BENDER: Are these done prior to the i
\ s' ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. ,
202-347-3700 Pationwide Coverage 800-33(H5646 l l
24940.0 133 BRT
'd 1 decisions concerning the PSA and the deterministic analyses?
- 2 Is that the idea?
3 MR. BOYLE: They are being done at the same time.
4 MR. GRIMES: All of the evaluations are done 5 before any decisions are made regarding what corrective 6 actions are needed.
7 MR. BOYLE: There are three areas of input.
8 MR. BENDER: I'm digging into the sequence of 9 analysis at the moment. It's kind of a chicken and egg 10 proposition. If you have the operating experience 11 sometimes it can be used as a basis for making a judgment 12 about what the probability is that something will happen.
( 13 As a matter of fact that's why you'd like to'have a lot 14 more experience than just what's in one plant for a basis 15 for judgment. I guess I was trying to get a little bit of 16 a handle as to how these things interrelate to each other.
17 MR. SCHEWMAN: Can we do this later, Mike? I 18 see a table, there's a couple of them here and there's a 19 question -- something called a PSA score, which apparently 20 is a priority issue. Would that be any help or do you want 21 to stay with it here?
22 MR. BENDER: I'll stop. I don't care --
23 MR. GRIMES: I think I can explain it. All of 24 the evaluation --
25 MR. WARD: You have to stop the answer as well i
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. ;
202-347 3'i00 Nanonwide Coverage 800-33M646
.. .=- -. -. -- -
24940.0 134 BRT 1 as the questi'on, Mika, to stop.
2 MR. SCHEWMAN: Go ahead. Briefly.
3 MR. GRIMES: All of the evaluations are 4 conducted essentially in parallel. There's a certain 5 amount of operating experience that goes into the 6 probabilities that are used in the probabilistic safety 7 statement. And by the same token, a deterministic analysis 8 provides some information that la used in laying out events, 9 sequences and probabilistic studies.
10 So they all relate to each other in terms of 11 sharing inf o rmation , but there are three separate kinds of 12 studies that lead to information about the plant design in
() 13 terms of.its strengths and weaknesses, and identification 14 of specific issues to be evaluated in some detail. That's 15 what you have to get at the end of all of these evaluations, 16 is a list of issues that need be addressed.
17 MR. BENDER: Let me try one more time before I 18 stop.
19 In trying to decide whether the probabilistic 20 study is okay. Usually you want to know, well, how much 21 experience base is available to use as a basis of judgment.
22 I'm kind of trying to see whether those sorts of things are l 23- done in testing the usability of the results? The answer 24 must be "yes," that something is done, but I'm not too l 25 specific about it.
(
l ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-33(H5646
24940.0 135 BRT
,~
'/ 1 MR. GRIMES: The answer is "yes." The 2 plant-specific experience goes into the probabilistic 3 safety study in terms of the reliability systems or the 4 frequency of initiating events.
5 MR. BENDER: I'll stop and wait. Thank you.
6 MR. MOELLER: We have, I think, the LER answer.
7- MR. ROMBERG: Wayne Romberg. Yes, the number of 8 LERs-typical here, in 1984 for Millstone 1 the number is 21; 9 1985 to date, as of the first of the month, it was 13. So 10 that's a typical kind of number. That's just on Unit 1 but 11 it's indicative of what we do. Unit 2 is 12 last year and 12 11 year to date. Those are typical of our organization.
. ij
(~) 13 MR. SCHEWMAN:
m It sounds like a factor of two or 14 three.
15 MR. MOELLER: Of course they are hitting years 16 under the new system --
17 MR. ROMBERG: That's right. So that improves 18 the situation.
19 MR. MOELLER: What do you do after you you have 20 an LER, after you've written it up? I guess you go back --
21 I hope you try to get to the root cause.
22 MR. ROMBERG: That's the whole intent. Even if 23 we don't have the LERs, if we have a problem we start with 24 a plant incident report and that forces you to do a root 25 cause, even if it's not required to be reportable. For ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
l24940.0 136 B RT
,x
\
~
l those that are reportable, we meet the 30-year requirement, 2 -whatever, and then we'll do a follow-up for it.
3 Often you can't get the root cause done in 30 4 days, you are only kidding yourself if you think you are.
S We'll go back and make sure we've got it. But you don't 6 get these kind of numbers that low unless you attack the 7 root cause, because if you don't attack the root cause it 8 just keeps coming back.
9 MR. MOELLER: What percent of your LERs are 10 repeats?
i 11 MR. ROMBERG: We are not prepared to answer that.
12 I would have to go back and do some sort of analysis on
('/
s_
13 that. There are people in the company who could probably 14 give you that.
15 MR. MOELLER: But it's not half.
16 MR. ROMBERG: I don't think so. Occasionally 17 lightning will strike twice and you then know you didn't 18 get the right solution the first time, but you hope after 19 twice it doesn't come back again.
20 MR. SCHENMAN: There was this limit switch that 21 came back three times in four days, you got three LERs on 22 it --
23 MR. ROMBERG: Sometimes it keeps striking before 24 you can fix it.
(^T 25 MR. MOELLER: I get tired of the ones where some V
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
- X)2 347-3700 Nadonwide Coverage 800 336 6646
24940.0 137 BRT
,,n w - 1 electr'ical system goes out and they replace the fuse and 2 that's the corrective action.
- 3. MR. SCHEWMAN: Aren't you in favor of replacing 4 fuses?
5 MR. BENDER: That's the story of my life at the 6 moment.
7 MR. WARD: On LERs, this LER rate is about. half, 8 or something, of the industry average. Is that good or bad?
9 How do you know -- a question to the staff -- how do you 10 know they are not underreporting?
11 MR. BOYLE: That's for, I would imagine, our 12- resident inspector.
- () 13 MR. SHEDLOSKY: We do regularly , review the plant 14 logs and plant incident reports, plant reports, and look~
15 for the failures to report.
16_ Along that line there has been fairly good 17 performance. Occasionally -- we are talking about one or 18 two items a year that end up being discussed'with the 19 utility. It's not a large number.
20 MR. SCHEWMAN: I don't know whether it will get 12 1 on, sort _ of two slides hence, but someplace between your 22 part and John Bickel's, I would like to hear a discussio 23' of what you set as a trip point. This gets wrapped up 24 currently in cost / benefit analysis, in the safety goal or 25 backfit rule there's all kinds of wordy and not very ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-33Mi646
'24940.0 138 BRT f~\
\- 1 conclusive discussion about on-site versus off-site costs 2 and things of that sort. But you must have something out 3 of this, you don't call it PRA, but a -- whatever else --
4 PSA -- of when it is a "no, never mind" and when it is 5 important.
6 Will you get to that in your talk?
7 MR. BOYLE: No. I won't. The licensing branch 8 is developing a branch of the system that, ultimately when 9 we do the integrated assessment and there are a number of 10 issues out there, they have developed -- still are 11 developing a system to put these issues in some kind of 12 order.
(~)
( _/ - 13 MR. SCHEWMAN:
. Would you go on?- Well, if I go 14 on two slides in your handout there's something called a PSA 15 score. Is that something they,will discuss?
16 MR. BOYLE: That is one element.
17 MR. SCHEWMAN: Well, go on.
18 MR. BOYLE: After these three types of reviews g 19 are done and the staff has reviewed them, the licensee is 20 asked to do an integrated assessment of all the issues and 21 they will make recommendations to the staf f on corrective 22 actions for the issues, and edn be based on qualitative 23 assessment. That's about as deep as I can get into it 24 because it's rather complex.
^) 25 We take a look at the appropriateness of the J
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
l 24940.0 139 BRT
- i. . ,
I corrective actions. We aren't going to get too detailed a 2 review of their ranking system unless we see that the 3 rankings that they are proposing to us just don't look 4 right, we are going to let them use that black box.
5 The licensee will then provide --
6 MR. WARD: How do you decide whether they look 7 right?
8 MR. BOYLE: You can kind of tell. It's 9 something we have always thought real important down in the 10 "no, no, never mind" area; or something that we think is 11 really trivial and placed up on number 1.
12 MR. SCHEWMAN: It's called engineering judgment.
O
- (_) 13 MR. BOYLE: ,There's no quantitative way to 14 figure it out.
15 MR. GRIMES: The reason we don't get into any ,
16 detail in the way that the licensee prioritizes their 17 issues is parallel to the integrated scheduling process, 18 and that is there are so many dif ferent models and matrix 19 formulations and perceptions about cost / benefit, and 20 importance functions, that we could spend a lot of time 21 trying to improve that state of the art, and it's just not 22 worth the effort because ultimately our judgment tells us 23 whether or not the relative order of things appears to be 24 right. And it won't make a lot of difference in the 7- 25 scheduling.
V)
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336 4646
24940.0 140 BRT
\' 1 MR. SCHEWMAN: I think one thing that comes to 2 mind, though, sometimes I think that nuclear regulation is 3 needed for the bottom -- what I'll call the bottom quartile 4 of the class. How do you impose on them -- it seems to me 5 that a procedure that may work well with somebody who is 6 willingly going on with this, would not work at all with 7 what the lawyers call a hostile witness. Let's leave it at 8 that.
9 Did you have a question?
10 MR. BENDER: I'm a proponent of what you are 11 doing, some kind of overview aside from just looking at the 12 numbers is wise. But who is it? Who does that? Who makes
) ,
13 those judgments? Where are they done?
14 MR. GRIMES: In this program there is an 15 integrated assessment team that provides a variety of 16 perspectives. The operating reactor's project manager and 17 integrated assessment project manager, a probabilistic 18 analyst, a human factors or procedures type --
19 MR. BENDER: You are telling us people that make 20 some sense. But is it a prescribed procedure or is it 21 something that you have devised -- sort of say, well, this 22 ought to go to Joe and this ought to go to Jack kind of 23 thing?
24 MR. GRIMES: It's more the latter. We go to r3 25 people with special expertise to provide us with detailed V
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336-6646
24940.0 141 BRT 7,
V 1 insights on specific issues. But then there's this team 2 that details the broader overview of how those issues need 3 to be addressed.
4 MR. BOYLE: Basically the same approach, the 5 team approach we used in SEP to evaluate the integrated 6 assessment for each plant.
7 MR. BENDER: I'm not sure we know exactly what 8 that is but I assume it's a get-together periodically.
9 MR. WARD: There's a team in your branch formed?
10 I mean for :ch SEP, for each plant there's a team formed?
11 MR. BOYLE: That's correct.
12 MR. WARD': From just your branch or from where?
q
(_/ 13 . MR. GRIMES: Well, in the future it will be just 14 in my branch. In the past it was from a variety of 15 branches, ORD-5 provided the project manager --
16 MR. WARD: Do you have all those people, PRA 17 person and human factors person --
18 MR. GRIMES: In a new organization I have budget 19 management and technical disciplines reporting directly to 20 me.
21 MR. BOYLE: Once the staff has taken a look at 22 the corrective actions suggegted by the utility and okayed 23 them and come back, they'll suggest to us an implementation 24 schedule based on their rarAug system. We will take a 25 look at that and approve it. The approval will be in the ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverase 800 33(H5646
-24940.0 142 BRT O
V 1 form of a license amendment. If so, it will suggest 2 procedures for future updating of that schedule by the 3 licensee.
4 MR. MOELLER: How long does this take, those 5 last three steps? Do you do it for a package of items? Or 6 do you approve them individually?
7 MR. BOYLE: The entire scope of the ISAP is 8 going to be approved at one time.
9 MR. MOELLER: Roughly what length of time are we 10 talking about?
11 MR. GRIMES: The integrated assessment itself 12 will take approximately a month. The time to put all that
'/
'- 13 together in a report for the licensee to develop their 14 schedule, about three to four months, once the issues are 15 well defined. And also, as a point of clarification to 16 Mike's presentation, he took an optimistic view: Once we 17 have okayed the proposed resolutions. If we disagreed with 18 the resolutions we would intend on following a backfitting 19 procedure at least to the point of carrying it forward to 20 the Commission. If we feel we need to resolve the issue 21 and if we feel it's necessary we'll present a cost / benefit 22 rationale for the alternative views.
23 MR. MOELLER: And you have a defined procedure, 24 unambiguous for doing cost / benefit?
25 MR. GRIMES: We have staff guidance in a report
}
i ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646 1
24940.0 143 BRT
. t.
)
I called NUREG BROO58, "How to do a value impact analysis."
2 Right now all I can say is I would tend to use that as at 3 least a guide. I have seen some of the cost / benefit 4 analysis for generic issues, and I don't think in this kind 5 of approach we'd go to that level of detail, but at least 6 we would amass the i #ormation necessary to do that kind of 7 evaluation, even if it's only qualitative.
8 MR. BENDER: What's the report again? How to do 9 a value impact analysis?
11 MR. BENDER: BR0058?
12 MR. GRIMES: That's correct. It's a staff 13 report. I think the BR series are procedures guides.
14 MR. WARD: That has you accounting for averted 15 off-site- or averted on-site costs?
~
16 MR. GRIMES: I don't think that report addresses 17 on-site costs. I think that one was developed on the basis 18 of off-site consequences. I know that the issue related to 19 on-site costs, I think, only came up recently in the 20 context of the safety role.
21 MR. WARD: So your answer, I guess, is that in 22 the cost / benefit, that judgment you make, will not include 23 averted on-site costs as a benefit; is that correct?
24 MR. GRIMES: That's correct.
25 MR. BOYLE: The ranking system being developed
_( }
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
3)2-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
24940.0 144 BRT l3
(/
1 by the licensee, however, does take a look at financial 2 issues, one being the impact on the public, another being 3 impact on the people in the plant. So there is some kind 4 of impact being looked at.
5 MR. WARD: But averted on-site costs are
- 6 domi..ated by, you know, such things as replacement power 7 and so forth. Is that --
8 MR. KACICH: We haven't finalized our plans.
9 Although when we finally get done we probably have some 10 consideration of averted on-site cost. But we haven't 11 come up with a final answer on that yet.
12 MR. SCHEWMAN: On the --
p
's 13 MR. WARD: I should think you would.
14 MR. GRIMES: Depending on the specific issue 15 involved. If it appears that it would be appropriate to 16 consider on-site costs we would, but as I said before I 17 don't think that we'll get to that level of detail in terms 18 of agreeing to disagree that we think that some alternative 19 corrective action may be required.
20 MR. WARD: It's not really a level of detail in 21 the decision to credit or debit those costs easily through 22 the cost / benefit analysis one way or another. So it's not 23 a detail. It's a basic ground, I would think. Well --
24 okay.
25 MR. SCHEWMAN: What he's saying is that they so
)
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
3)2-347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336-6646
24940.0 145 BRT-1 far have been able to run this like a Quaker meeting where 2 a " sense of'the meeting" develops and they march off.
3 Whether or not that means that it won't be applicable in 4 other situations, I think is a fair question. That at 5 least is the way I would perceive it.
6 MR. WARD: I guess my question really comes 7 around, and I can wait for an answer, as to whether the 8 licensee is going to be swayed by estimates of averted 9 on-site cost in -- you said you haven't made up your mind.
10 MR. KACICH: I think if you get down to 11 applications of it you'll find that there are instances 12 where you can make a judgment about do it or not do it O- 13 without-that kind of decision being made.
14 Maybe just to reflect on a previous comment made, 15 and I'll ask the staff to correct me if they see it 16 otherwise, but I think there will be a limited -- on an 17- exception-only basis I think the staff will get into a 18 fairly rigorous review of our black box, and I think the 19- classic case before us right now are these motor operators.
20 There's 11 of them that we don't feel are necessary to do.
21 Now, in that instance, being that it's a 22 -permission requirement and a high visibility item, the 23 level of staff involvement in looking at that will be 24 higher than it would be for an average issue. But in that
.[} 25 instance, you know, there's a lot of information available, a
- ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336 6646
24940.0 146 BRT 1
1 a lot of detail analyses that have been done, that we think
. 2 are very persuasive in terms of the conclusion that we just 3 don't need to do those. And some of that -- some examples 4 we'll get into later, and.perhaps that would be the best S way to tackle your question.
6 MR. BENDER: Just one point. It seems to me all 7 of this, and I guess this is what you are doing, it's 8 necessary to gets the whole picture together and integrate 9 all the issues at one time. You wouldn't individually do 10 one of these impact analyses and decide what expenses were 11 going to be without looking at what other things have to be
, 12 considered in the same light. And I take it that's the r~s 13 approach you are following? When you say " integrate,"
! 14 everything is put together and you look at the package of i
! 15 backfits, not just one by itself.
I 16 MR. GRIMES: That's correct. That's a 17 fundamental premise of ISAP. That was what we did wrong in 18 SEP, or so we were told by the ACRS on a number of 19 occasions.
20 MR. BENDER: That's such an important point I 21 thought I would emphasize it a few times.
22 MR. GRIMES: We'll be sure to do that for the 23 full committee.
24 MR. WARD: You said you did that wrong in the 25 SEP, only because you didn't address the other three kinds
{}
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-33 & 6646
24940.0 147 BRT A) -
1 of topics?
2 MR. GRIMES: In the integrated assessment we t
3 developed corrective actions for the SEP topics, but we '
4 were repeatedly criticized for excluding the TMI action 5 items, the generic issues, and the probabilistic insights.
6 MR. WARD: But as far as the topics you did, the 7 137 or whatever, you really did do a good job of 8 integrating -- sort of a partial integration.
9 MR. BOYLE: As I stated previously last April we 10 started doing a screening review for the licensee issues, 11 (Slide.)
12 We categorized all the work outstanding that the U . 13 licensee had to do in the three areas. One area was it 14 didn't lend itself to ISAP. It's near term, almost 15 complete and should be done outside ISAP. This is a list 16 of those items.
17 This is basically the licensee's workload until 18 ISAP is finished. Other things being routine licensing 19 issues.
20 MR. SCHEWMAN: I'm sorry. Say that again?
21 These are the ones that are short term and outside ISAP?
22 MR. BOYLE: Right. This is their workload until 23 an integrated schedule is developed.
24 MR. SCHEWMAN: I see. When you said " finished,"
-() 25 I misinterpreted. " Developed" is a better word. Thank you.
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
2 2-347-3700 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Nationwide Cop 80 4 336-6646
24940.0 148 BRT
("i
\_.) 1 MR. BOYLE: The next category of issues are 2 those that were NRC requirements.
3 (Slide.)
4 There's quite a number of them here, some of 5 them coming from SEP, some from TMI items. There are 6 generic issues.
7 The ones on the bottom that say NUREG '0933, 8 that's the staff's prioritization of generic issues 9 document. Those are the ones I said before are USIs or 10 generic issues that basically are high priority. We know 11 about what the resolution ought to be, and we asked the 12 licensee to look at those and see how much of that they can (n_) 13 address in the integrated assessment. -
14 The PSA score on the far right column, those 15 were NRC issues which we thought lent themselves to being 16 evaluated by PSA. The licensee has done that. They are 17 going to be discussing their PSA analysis of positions 18 later today.
19 MR. BENDER: These are the licensee's scores as 20 shown?
21 MR. BOYLE: Right. Initial tentative ranking 22 scores where the rank goes from minus 10 to plus 10, plus 23 10 being very important, minus 10 being not too important.
24 MR. SCHEWMAN: I thought maybe it was a net 25 detriment.
ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336-6646
24940.0 149 BRT g
L) 1 MR. BOYLE: Look at it the way you want to.
2 Issue 1.01 had to do with the gas turbine 3 generator. We are also going to be putting in generic 4 issues, like station blackouts, see what portion of station 5 blackout can be addressed by the modifications being done 6 in this issue. There are quite a number of USIs addressed 7 down there,'like systems interaction, hydrogen control, and 8 EQ.
9 MR. SCHEWMAN: Tornado missile protection is 10 off-site -- I'm sorry -- outside the reactor building or 11 outside the primary containment, or what?
12 MR. BOYLE: What we asked the licensee to do is x
\ 13 provide one protected means of shutting down and their 14 proposed resolution of that is to tap into the city water 15 and provide a protected pump to do that so that if a 16 tornado does come and hit one of the buildings that aren't 17 protected, where safety systems are, they'll still be able 18 to supply makeup to the reactor.
19 MR. MOELLER: Excuse me. I notice, of course, 20 radiation protection plans down at 1.39, and I notice in 21 some of the -- in the SALP report that there were lapses in 22 radiation protection. You have a station radiation 23 protection manager and then each unit has -- you said that 24 was a station-wide --
(~N 25 MR. ROMBERG: That's station wide.
b ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336 6646
124940.0 150 BRT
./^%
. (j 1 MR. MOELLER: So you have a station radiation 2 protection man or some title --
3 MR. ROMBERG: Yes. Not the exact title, That's 4 part of the station services organization.
~
5 MR. MOELLER: Is he or she certified by the 6 American Board of Health Physics?
7 MR. ROMBERG: I don't know. I'd have to check.
8 MR. MOELLER: Does anyone work to encourage such 9 certification?
10 MR. ROMBERG: We aave not.
11 MR. MOELLER: I mean if the fellow -- if it's a 12 man or woman -- if that person wanted to take an evening O
\/ 13 course or something by. mail, would the company pay for it 14 to help them become certified?
15 MR. ROMBERG: The company has a policy to 16 support training or not, depending on whether it's 17 job-related or not, we'd pay either 100 percent or 75 18 percent. That was encouraged if we felt it was a need or 19 the individual felt it was a need.
20 MR. MOELLER: Of course I'm biased because, in 21 my own opinion of the fact that certification is a real 22 measure of the qualifications of that person, I mean if 23 they can become certified, all my doubts are removed. You 24 know, I know they are topflight.
25 I guess I would say I'm a little surprised that
}
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS. INC.
s 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-33(Hi646
~
l
'24940.0 151 BRT y~
1 you aren't pushing that, certainly in your radiation 2 protection program. . I would encourage you to do it, to 3 . push it.
4 For example, the American Board of Health 5 Physics has set up a special category for reactor health 6 physicists, and so they have a program specifically 7 directed to, you know, assuring the highest quality among 8 your staff.
9 MR. SCHEWMAN: In a high quality operation he's 10 surprised that that's not part of it.
11 MR. MOELLER: Well, it may be.
12 MR. SCHEWMAN: Let's go on.
e
(_m) 13 MR. BOYLE: The third category issues, we had 14 licensee initiatives, basically plant improvemen ts , things 15 that they want to do for themselves.
16 (Slide.)
17 Some of these also relate to some generic issues.
18 MR. SCHEWMAN: What's the sodium hypochloride o 19 issue?
20 MR. BOYLE: On-site is a big black tank car of 21 chlorine, liquid chlorine. If that were ever to rupture, i
l 22 nuclear safety wouldn't be jeopardized but the local 23 population -- they want to replace that. It's used for, I 24 guess, in-service water for bio -- keep it clean. They rT 25 want to replace it with sodium hypochlorato, which is much V
ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336 4646
24940.0 152 BRT (3, -
O 1 more stable.
2 MR. MOELLER: Is that really involved? I notice 3 it listed it as an item to be addressed or a change to be 4 made.
5 MR. BOYLE: What we are looking at is to make an 6 integrated schedule, take all the work we re~ quire, that 7 they want to do, and put it in a schedule. This is an item 8 they think is very important right now. What we want to do 9 is schedule it --
10 MR. MOELLER: The licensee agrees you want to 11 change?
12 MR. ROMBERG: That's our initiative. '
('h kJ 13 MR. BOYLE: This is not our requirement.- This.
14 is something they want to do by themselves.
15 MR. SCHEWMAN: The page you have is NRC issues 16 is the first line, and then the next page is NU issues.
17 MR. MOELLER: Then I presume if you switched you 18 could eliminate the chlorine monitors on the control room 19 air intake? Or are there other sources of chlorine 20 off-site?
21 MR. ROMBERG: There are potential sources 22 off-site. We have a main railroad track here that runs 23 from Boston to New York and there's always,a potential for 24 chlorine on that.
(^'
b 25 MR. MOELLER: But it would reduce tremendously ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
24940.0 153 BRT
- LJ' -
1 the problem. Right. Thank you.
MR. WARD:
2 Your concern here is not that your 3 control room is not protected but --
4 MR. KACICH: That was an element of our 5 consideration. We can explain that more later this 6 afternoon, if you'd like.
7 MR. WARD: All right.
8 MR. BENDER: At the risk of what I think is 9 introducing a buzz word, is this going to be a new living 10 schedule? The basis for it?
11 MR. GRIMES: Yes. Fundamentally this whole 12 exercise is to develop a more soundly based integrated p/
s- 13 schedule.
Chairman Palladino convinced us that living is 14 not a good word to use.
15 MR. BENDER: He's more literate than a lot of 16 people I know.
17 MR. MOELLER: On the hydrogen water chemistry 18 study, do you have a team that's really looking ahead at 19 the -- all of the ramifications of hydrogen water 20 chemistry?
21 MR. DE BARBA: Yes. We have been looking at 22 that-fairly aggressively. We visited several sites that 23 have already implemented either the test or full program, 24 like Dresden 2. Our plans are to go ahead with a small
{} 25 pilot test program in Millstone in this calendar year, but ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
- 202-347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-334Wi646
24940.0 154 BRT A
k- 1 we understand the concerns and we are concerned, 2 particularly about radiation doses. And we would be doing 3 some extensive monitoring to see what our experience would 4 indicate.
5 MR. MOELLER: When you say " test" you mean you'd 6 actually inject hydrogen and then measure?
7 MR. DE BARBA: That's' correct.
8 MR. MOELLER: Estimate the doses ahead of time 9 and then measure it.
10 MR. SCHEWMAN: I understand the fittings that 11 would allow to you do this injection have gone on in this 12 outage; is that right?
,( ) 13 MR. DE BARBA: That's right.
14 MR. BOYLE: As a follow-up to these-last three
, 15 slides I had some examples of issues that will be evaluated 16 in ISAP, one of them being the one we just talked about.
17 (Slide.)
18 This is an isolation of high- and low-pressure 19 systems. In SEP the staff found the clean up system did 20 not have independent and diverse pressure interlocks. We 21 recommended they either put those interlocks in or evaluate 22 the capacity of the relief systems so that it would be 23 -adequate.
24 The licensee: opted to put in the hardware 25 modification at that point and in SEP that was their ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336 6646
24940.0 155 BRT 1 commitment.
2 Later, shortly after that, when they initially 3 made the first ISAP request, they said we would really like 4 to go back and evaluate our relief capacity. And today 5 that is what the ISAP issue is, we are setting aside the 6 hardware modification now. If it comes out they need it it 7 will be in the integrated schedule.
8 MR. MOELLER: Excuse me. Back on hydrogen. You 9 also have installed mechanisms to inject oxygen at the 10 condenser, the off gas?
11 MT. STETZ: Yes, John Stetz. That goes along 12 with the hydrogen program, injecting oxygen.
/
13 MR. MOELLER: Do you inspect oxygen now? Or you 14 don't have to now but you would with the excess hydrogen?
15 MR..STETZ: With the excess hydrogen we would 16 have to, for re combination.
17 MR. SCHEWMAN: That's injection plus a catalyst?
18 MR. STETZ: Injection plus using the existing 19 off gas combining system taking place of the catalyst.
20 MR. MOELLER: And you are not limited in the 21 capacity of the recombiner or anything like that?
22 MR. STETZ: We don't believe so right now.
23 MR. BOYLE: Another issue that was basically PRA 24 given was ISAP issue 1.17, replacement of motor-operated
(}
s 25 valves, through which we have gone through a rather lengthy ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336 4646
24940.0 156 BRT O 1 evaluation in the past month or so.
2 50.49 requires qualification of equipment report 3 and in the initial ISAP request, we identified 28 motor
] 4 operators which by rule would have to be qualified. But 5 they wanted to evaluat? i.n ISAP and show that maybe it's 6 not that important to qualify these.
7 As time went by --
) 8 MR. SCHEWMAN: This is qualification against 9 pipe break?
10 MR. BOYLE: Harsh environment, any kind of harsh 11 onvironment. Pipe break, radiation, whatever.
12 MR. SCHEWMAN: Fire is not a harsh environment?
13 MR. BOYLE: Not in this instance, no.
14 MR. SCHEWMAN: So when you say any kind --
15 MR. BOYLE: It's rather harsh but it's not in 16 the rule.
17 MR. SCHEWMAN: Any kind, in your parlance, is 18 those two?
19 MR. BOYLE: Basically, yes.
20 Since that time the licensee had done rather 21 extensive PRA or PSS review and they showed that nine of 22 those valves basically misclassified at the beginning and 23 shouldn't have been on the master list for qualification, 24 and so they removed them.
ggg 25 11 of them they found a basis for showing that, ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
24940.0 157 BRT
!~
D) 1 yes, we should be allowed more time to review these and the 2 staff granted them exemption and they are now in ISAP.
3 The rest of the 28 valves were shown to be 4 important, I think during this outage they are having the 5 motor operators replaced.
6 So here is a case where PSS and systems study 7 showed the importance of it.
8 MR. GRIMES: To say the staff granted them an-9 exemption, that is not clear. The Commission voted 3 to 10 22, which is not an overwhelming majority, to allow them an 11 extension to either exempt the valves or fix them at the 12 first opportunity before the next outage.
I
'- 13 So this didn't get as far into ISAP as some of 14 the other issues, but because it was a regulatory schedule 15 requirement that involved a Commission decision, the 16 Commission at least observed the significance and 17 importance of ISAP in this respect for the 11 valves that
'18 the licensee felt might not otherwise need to be qualified.
19 But it should be studied further.
20 MR. BOYLE: Basically they granted them enough 21 time as they requested to do a study in ISAP.
22 The product of ISAP would be the integrated 23 schedule and the priorities is an integrated assessment, 24 which would be the basis for the schedule.
25 (Slide.)
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
l i 24940.0 158 BRT 1 The integrated scheduling and procedure to .
2 update that schedule will be made part of the license for 3 the plant. We fully expect the generic policy for 4 . integrated living schedules to be the same as ISAP.
5 Another product of ISAP will be a good 6 documentation of the plants, so future NRC requirements 7 will have a basis -- the staff won't just blindly say the 8 generic requirement applies to you. They'll have some kind 9 of basis on which to judge the need to implement at this 10 plant.
-11 MR. SCHEWMAN: Does that bring us to the end of 12 ISAP?
O 13 , MR. GRIMES: Yes, sir, it does. For each of the 14 ISAP topics that are currently being reviewed there's an 15 identification and brief discussion in the remainder of the 16 handout. We are prepared to talk about those to the extent 17 that we understand them right now.
18 MR. MOELLER: I would like to ask some questions 19 on some of the specific items.
20 MR. SCHEWMAN: Fire away.
21 MR. MOELLER: I guess it's on the first page, 23.
22 Well, it's page 1 of this part. The 1.05 ventilation 23 system mods.
24 I guess we have already talked about that in IX-5?
f~h 25 MR. BOYLE: That's the same issue.
s_)
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336 4646
-24940.0 159 BRT
('
1 MR. MOELLER: Same issue. Okay.
2 Go to the next page, 1.' 11, in the middle of the 3 page, post-accident hydrogen monitor. Is that what we also 4 previously talked about?
5 MR. BOYLE: This is an issue we have not yet 6 received an analysis from the licensee on, so I'm not 7 exactly sure what the scope of this is going to be yet.
8 MR. GRIMES: This issue relates to compliance 9 with 10 CFR 50.44, and to the extent that an inerted 10 containment with a repressurization system complies with 11 that rule we expect that Northeast's submittal will clarify 12 their position with respect to how they conform to the rule.
O\ . 13 And we already know that there has been a staf f evaluation 14 that has not yet been documented, that will give us a staff 15 perspective on the. extent to which this plant complies with 16 combustible gas control systems. And whatever issues are 17 evolved.from that will be addressed in ISAP.
18 MR. MOELLER: Yesterday, when you were saying 19 that you were worried about the hydrogen-out in the reactor 20 building as contrasted, say, to the dry well -- excuse me?
21 MR. ROMBERG: I think there was a 22 misunderstanding there. We were talking about the dry well.
23 MR. MOELLER: Oh. Okay. Because I -- some --
24 MR. KACICH: The monitor is in the dry well
~T 25 building but it's monitoring the other building.
(O ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 804336-6646
24940.0 160 BRT
'v) f 1 MR. MOELLER: On the ne.xt, control room 2 habitability, what does it mean, " Assessments have shown 3 that original requirements may be overly conservative"?
4 I needed to have that explained.
5 MR. GRIMES: That's the licensee's assertion 6 that they have done a plant-specific evaluation and they 7 think that the generic criteria developed for III.D.3.4, 8 under the TMI action plan, are overly conservative for this 9 plant and that's what they are asking us to evaluate.
10 MR. MOELLER: You are saying temperatures -- the 11 heat load is not as much in the control room as you thought
,- 12 and therefore the temperatures won't rise as rapidly? ,
13 MR. KACICH: The history of this is when the TMI 14 action plan item first came out we did an evaluation of the 15 current plant against the current requirements o,f the 16 action plan and identified the difference. In order to 17 bridge the gap we were talking about modifications, I think, 18 in the range of SS to S7 million. But at that stage we 19 just identified what we needed to do to comply with the 20 action plan item.
21 In keeping with the concept of ISAP, this is an 22 instance where, if we now don't just blindly accept that 23 those requirements are worth doing but rather evaluate the 24 need to do them, we haven't finished the evaluation 25 entirely yet but we believe that we can come up with a much
(~)/
x.-
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 _
Nationwide Coverage 800 336-6646, ___ _
24940.0 161 BRT O
D' 1 more cost-effective way of addressing the intent of the 2 action plan item without a major, major --
3 ,
MR. MOELLER: But in what I read you were 4 talking about using personal protection, you know, air 5 supply for each individual person, versus making the room 6 habitable. And when you review the NRC staff's control 7 room habitability working group's report, which the ACRS, I 8 believe, agreed with -- I'm sure we wrote letters on it --
9 the goal there was to provide a shirt sleeve environment.
10 You know, because the poor operator has enough to do to 11 keep up with the accident and not to be working in an
_ 12 unusual situation. Therefore I would, you know, just as an
\
13 individual, argue a little bit with you in terms of the two 14 approaches. They are not equivalent in any way.
15 MR. BAIN: At this stage we weren't necessarily 16 advocating one approach or the other, we just identified a 17 number of areas where there were a lot of these 18 conservatisms.
19 For example, as far as the dose limits to the 20 operators, for whole body doses we were well below the 21 guidelines even with the existing ventilation systems. If 22 you look at the thyroid doses, that's where we ran into a 23 problem. And on the one hand -- we also had to look at 24 toxic gas releases.
() 25 On the one hand, we have a toxic gas release l
I ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646 j
24940.0 162 BRT
[ )
! ~ %d l where you have to credit the use of respiratory protection 2 in order to avoid the toxic effects of the chlorine gas.
3 And if you can make the same assumptions for the iodine, 4 even using the . source term f rom the action plan item --
5 excuse me -- if you can take the same credit you don't have 6 a dose problem.
7 So there's just a few avenues that we'd like to 8 explore a little further. We don't know where we are going 9 to get to but we don't think we have researched them in as 10 much depth as we would have liked to.
11 MR. MOELLER: Are you allowed -- either you or 12- the stadf can answer this and it may have been answered
) . 13 previously -- are you allowed to give -- have a supply of 14 potassium iodide pills for the operators and take credit 15 for that for protecting the thyroid?
16 MR. CRANDALL: We have in our procedures that we 17 would distribute them but we have never taken credit for 18 them in any of our calculations as far as the habitability.
19 MR. MOELLER: Staff, you wouldn't let them take 20 credit?
21 MR. GRIMES: I don't know whether or not the 22 general requirements or guidelines give credit for them.
23 Certainly in the integrated assessment if that's all that's 24 needed to demonstrate a shirt sleeve environment we would I
(} 25 opt for that approach.
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-33(H5646
24940.0 163 i
.BRT-p) i
'~'
1 MR. MOELLER: Yes, because I agree if it 2 protects the operator what does it matter, then, if he 3 breathes iodine.
4 MR. B IN: I don't believe the NUREG criteria 5 allowed you to take that kind of credit so that's just !
6 another example of what we'd like to look at.
7 MR. MOELLER: Did you ever put the control room 8 on emergency recirculating mode and measure the temperature 9 rise with time -- the rate of rise, where it levels off?
10 Do you know if it can handle the heat load?
11 MR. ROMBERG: That's not a problem even with the 12 existing system. I think we agree that we've got to
,- s
'-) 13 operate with. the existing system -- but the cooling 14 function still continued. We don't rely on makeup air to 15 maintain temperature. Makeup air is just to provide a 16 fresh air exchange to get rid of the normal HBA -- C 17 systems do, we can go on recirculation and maintain the 18 cooling. If you have a cooling failure --
19 MR. MOELLER: You have done this? For how long 20 a period of time? I'm surprised at your answer because 21 everywhere I have talked, you know, to all other plants, 22 the operators will say: You know, if a team comes in to 23 test the control room recirculating system, the operators 24 will say we'll give you 30 minutes, do it and get out of 25 here. We can't stand it after that because it gets so hot
{.}
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 33H646
24940.0 164 BRT
/~S
. )
'~'
1- in here we can't work.
2 Have they ever c1psed off the control room to 3 your knowledge and provided you with data on temperature 4 rise, heat load and all of these things? This is contrary 5 to what I've heard previously.
6 MR. GRIMES: I don't recall having ever seen 7 that kind of data presented for the control room, for any 8 plan.
9 MR. WARD: You say you've got a refrigerated air --
10 MR. ROMBERG: It's a standard air conditioning 11 system, freon and R-12 and provides cooling for both in 12 this particular -- HVHA is the cooling that is involved and
()N.
(_ . 13 it also provides the cooling for the rest of the 14 administration building. It's a large system.
15 MR. MOELLER: You are saying if it can do it 16 under normal periods --
17 MR. ROMBERG: It does it all summer long, 18 year-round. We'll cut off makeup air in the wintertime, 19 like in the wintertime you can cut off or cut it way way 20 down because you don't want the cold coming in because then 21 you have to provide heat. It hasn't been a problem. To 22 cut ventilation off when you go in a nonair-conditioning 23 load, for instance, it would be down due to lack of water i 24 in a maintenance function, and we do that fairly frequently.
L (^s, 25 We just went through it although refueling heat control is
%/
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
m.347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336 6646
24940.0 165 ERT n
r i
'~'
I a little less, it's really not significantly different 2 because you have all the water and it's energized -- it 3 gets warm then.
4 MR. MOELLER: Is the air conditioning system on 5 emergency power in case of an accident? See, if it --
6 MR. ROMBERG: I'd have to get back to you. I'm 7 pretty sure it is and if not it could be powered back up.
8 It's one thing that wouldn't come back automatically, but 9 you power it back up when you get beyond your heat loads --
10 15, 20 minutes.
11 MR. MOELLER: Your system may be different.
I 12 MR. ROMBERG: We have a 13 megawatt gas turbine.
p.,
(_) 13 We can completely power the world just about, too.
14 MR. SCHEWMAN: Are there other questions on 15 those? On 1.06, this is a seismic qualification of piping.
16 Have you looked at the new -- as a result of the pipe study 17 group's recommendations, I understand that there are some 18 new damping values that have been accepted by the code.
19 And some other -- there's a frequency dependence to that 20 and some other things I can't quote.
21 Have you looked at thos'e ? Can you take credit 22 for them? Would they do you any good?
23 MR. DE BARBA: The PVRC damping codes that the 24 SME has proposed allows much higher damping values for
(~ 25 certain classes of piping. We applied for and gained L-};
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336-6646
24940.0 166 BRT O 1 acceptance for use of those on Millstone 3 and are 2 currently using it. We are currently looking at applying 3 for the same in both Connecticut Yankee and Millstone 1 4 because we think it will provide us for potential of 5 minimizing additional supports on piping. That's one 6 reason why this particular issue, you know, we'd like to 7 continue to evaluate -- to gain some of those benefits.
8 MR. SCHEWMAN: Okay. And the second issue down 9 under ATWS 1.18, what's an SLCS, this baron tank injection 10 rate?
11 MR. KACICH: Standby liquid control system.
12 MR. SCHEWMAN: Standby liquid control system.
13 MR. KACICH: Yes. ___
14 MR. WARD: If you are still on this I have a 15 question, 1.07 -- as I understand the agenda, licensee is 16 going to talk about the control room design review. Is 17 that right? This afternoon?
18 MR. KACICH: Yes, that's correct.
19 MR. SCHEWMAN: Why don't we take a 10-minute 20 break, then.
21 (Recess.)
22 MR. SCHEWMAN: Summary and results of 23 probabilistic safety study.
24 MR. BICKEL: Yes. I am John Bickel, supervisor 25 of the probabilistic risk assessment at the Northeast ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6M6
24940.0 167 BRT A
\~'! 1 Utilities service section, and I appreciate the opportunity 2 to give an assessment of our probabilistic safety study 3 which was carried out for Millstone 1 by the personnel at 4 Northeast Utilities.
5 I received a request that -- before I get into 6 this maybe I'll give a few minute brief overview or run 7 down of the -- some of the unique features of Millstone 8 Unit 1, as compared to some of the other boiling water 9 reactors that the ACRS and your consultant staff might be 10 more familiar with, so I would like to shift over to this 11 overhead projector right here.
12 MR. SCHEWMAN: This is on cooling?
,O
\/ 13 MR. BICKEL: This is on the decay heat removal I
14 systems in general; yes.
15 (Slide.)
16 I have the types of decay heat removal systems 17 available on Millstone Unit 1.
18 The primary way the plant would go from a normal 19 operation to shutdown is using the feedwater system, 20 putting water in, boiling it and sending it to the 21 condenser.
22 One of the features that is unique about 23 Millstone Unit 1 relative to, maybe, some other plants that 24 you may be familiar with, is that the condenser is very --
{} 25 has a very large oversizing on it. I believe it's ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336 6646
I 24940.0 168 BRT
(~'T
> \/ 1 something like 105 percent hohdenser. What that means is 2 that the condenser has full bypass capability, can take the 3 entire heat load of the reactor if the turbine is lost.
4 One of the other features about the condenser 5 which is very important in Millstone 1, and is something 6 the plant has worked for for many years to achieve and 7 maintain, is we have the capability of taking the entire 8 reactor to cold shutdown on the main condenser. That is a 9 very -- that is a unique feature. Not all plants have it.
10 That is of course accomplished by -- we have 11 good procedures. We have the ability to use steam and seal 12 the plant once you start to get cold, and in fact draw I) 13 vacuum on the boiler assembly itself.
14 Some of the advantages of this, and I know, you 15 know, the plant has prided themselves on this, is the fact 16 that they have the ability to maintain oxygen, dissolved 17 oxygen levels in the coolant extremely low when they use 18 this, because of course they have the air ejector system.
19 If you were to use the normal, what was 20 originally designed in their shutdown cooling system, you 21 don't have any of that capability to regulate dissolved 22 oxygen, things like that.
23 , This, of course, is a very nice feature. If you 24 can keep the main condenser available and on line, that's 25 all you need to do to take the plant from hot down to
(-}
v ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336-6646
24940.0 169 BRT l
1 essentially cold shutdown conditions.
2 This is, in fact, the way over the last several 3 years that the plant generally shuts down when they decide 4 they want to do that.
5 (Slide.)
6 Now, in the case that the main condenser should 7 become unavailable -- as an example via an event like maybe 8 a main steam isolation valve closure, the loss of condenser 9 vacuum, this plant again has a unique feature in that it 10 utilizes an isolation condenser.
11 What I have shown in here is the flow path.
12 Steam comes up from the upper end of the vessel, comes out, em .
k_) 13 is condensed in an isolation condenser and is returned as 14 condensate on one of the recirc blades.
15 The plant staff has demonstrated a number.of 16 times over recent years that they understand the operation 17 of this. As an example there was a recent MSIV closure 18 i event in which the plant recognized the condition and got 19 on the isolation condenser prior to the point that the 20 safeties actually lifted, so we maintained cooling without 21 any discharge to the torus, which is a benefit.
22 The heat removal capability of the isolat' ion 23 condenser is such that it can match decay heat in a period 24 of three to five minutes, which means it's going to turn 25 the temperature and start to depressurize within a fairly
(^)
v ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336-6646
24940.0 170 BRT (m
\
l short period of time.
2 MR. WARD: What you said is if the MSIVs close 3 this system can handle a cooling without the safeties 4 lifting?
5 MR. BICKEL: This is like an RCIC on some of the 6 more standard ones. Most of the BWRs have a steam driven 7 turbine pump. We utilize what we call a feedwater coolant 8 injection system, which is the safety related mode of 9 feedwater. So, in essence we would just keep the feed --
10 if you had like a small break, rather than tripping this, 11 going on to LPCI, and go on to run.
12 Another mode of decay heat removal, keep the
() 13 feedwater system running, depressurize the vessel, and 14 after a certain period of time enter onto shutdown cooling.
15 This is the flow path of the shutdown cooling system. It 16 takes suction off of one of the legs, two shutdown cooling 17 pumps -- these are located in the reactor building -- feeds 18 two shutdown cooling heat exchangers which are cooled by 19 the reactor building closed cooling system and puts it back 20 into the vessel.
21 This is a non-safety-related safety shutdown 22 cooling system. This is the type of thing that we would 23 use mainly when we would be going down, like for a 24 refueling. We would use this to keep things cool over the g-) 25 long term. Our preference now is to use the condenser.
v ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336-6646
24940.0 171 BRT 1 Based on the sizing of this system, with two 2 heat exchangers in operation, you could actually match 3 decay heat in 10 minutes, but generally you would not cool 4 down to the shutdown cooling entry conditions. I only 5 mention that 10 minutes just to point out the size of it, 6 relative to the decay heat.
7 In other words, by the time you depressurize 8 with a relief valve, cool down enough to enter shutdown 9 cooling, you'd be well capable of matching it with the two 10 heat exchangers.
11 (Slide.)
12 An alternate mode, this is a safety grade mode
'A
(-) 13 of decay heat removal, is to depressurize with a relief 14 valve, or relief valves to the torus, take the water from 15 the torus, reinject it using the LPCI pumps, like your 16 classical RHR mode; heat exchangers here and here are then 17 cooled by safety grade emergency service water pumps whose 18 sole function is cooling these heat exchangers. These are i
19 the LPCI -- this is the LPCI A train, LPCI B train, two 20 pumps, reinject back into the vessel.
21 There are two exchangers. With two trains in l
l 22 service you can match decay heat, about 1-1/2 to two hours, 23 so again on that situation you could be cooling things down.
24 MR. MOELLER: Excuse me, what is cooling -- what l
25 is the heat sink? What is cooling the torus?
l
(-'
l l
l ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336 6646 l
24940.0 172 L
BRT-
[
1 MR. BICKEL: Taking water from the torus, 2 pumping it through a heat exchanger and taking it out to 3 these heat exchangers here and here.
4 MR. MOELLER: Thank you.
5 MR. SCHEWMAN: Those heat exchangers dump to 6 what up there?
7 MR. BICKEL: They are cooled by emergency 8 service water. This is essentially Long Island Sound water. l 9 It's like a once-through cooling.
10 MR. SCHEWMAN: I didn't realize there was just 11 one use of the word " intake" around there.
12 MR. BICKEL: I'm sorry. Yes. *
/^
( ))
.. 13 Now, one of th,e areas that we covered very 14 briefly in our PRA study was the -- this was an area that 15 we identified as an issue, we as a company intend to pursue 16 --
is the decay heat removal capability when you use this 17 RHR as a backup to your normal shutdown cooling system.
18 I'll be discussing that in a little bit further detail but 19 that's one of the areas that we are looking at as an 20 opportunity for improvement in the design of the plant.
21 There are a few other things I would mention, 22 -
just to give you some other trade-off type numbers.
23 If we utilizo -- I mention that I could match 24 the two trains of the safety grade -- I could match decay 25 heat in about 1-1/2 hours. On the other hand, if I had O
ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC, 202-347 37r0 Nationwide Coverage 800 3364646
24940.0 173 BRT V
1 only one shutdown cooling heat exchanger I could match 2 decay heat in about two hours. That's essentially with 3 half the shutdown cooling capability. ,
4 (Slide.)
S If I looked at using only one RHR heat exchanger, 6 and again taking water from the RPV and putting it into the 7 torus using the relief valves, and then cooling that water 8 there, you notice there's -- it takes quite a jump in the 9 period of time it takes to match decay heat. It goes from 10 about two hours, two or three hours, out to a single train 11 will take 14 to 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> to match decay heat. These are 7~s 12 based on best estimate calculations in the 1979 standard
! \
'~'
13 decay heat curve.
14 MR. WARD: Can I ask a question? If it takes 14 15 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br /> -- but in a practical, scenario, can you take 16 advantage of inertia, heat-up and so forth, so that it can 17 be effective much earlier than that? Or isn't it very 18 significant?
19 MR. BICKEL: That's what I was going to get to 20 as the long-term cooling issue on Unit I we found. This 21 mode, I would point out, is ba: .cally now looking only at 22 minimal safeguards being used to cool the plant. In other 23 words, if I take a look at bare minimuma. There are other 24 ways, of course, to cool the torus. ;
() 25 Let me give you some examples of some of the ways ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336-6646
n l ,
-24940.0 174 l BRT
)
' 1 that have been used, and pretty much are used on a routine 2 basis.
~
3 (Slide.)
4 I have in there one of the ways that the plant 5 uses, as a matter of fact it's A!nd of a routine thing, 6 nobody thinks a whole lot of it -- oown over here, this is 7 what I call the reactor water clean up system. This is j 8 like a -- it demineralizes, cleans up the water, takes out l 9 particulate matter, what not. Including in here are a 10 series of non-regenerative heat exchangers which are cooled 11 by the reactor building closed cooling system.
12 Now, these in themselves, if I only used these,
() 13 would not match decay heat for a period of 17 to 19 hours2.199074e-4 days <br />0.00528 hours <br />3.141534e-5 weeks <br />7.2295e-6 months <br />.
14 However, if you start looking at what are my net sources of 15 heat removal, I add this with something else, I can 16 obviously match decay heat a lot earlier. In fact, those 17 are the type of things that are done.
18 Another way that it can be -- it does help the 19 plant -- is you can take -- use your CRD pumps and inject 20 water. If you get water in there that's a lot colder --
21 it's a very small amount but when you integrate it out over 22 the long period of time it's beneficial.
23 These are the basic decay heat removal systems.
24 I guess the differences between the standard BWR-3, I guess 25 maybe to summarize, are that we have a main condenser that O
ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage M3366646
24940.0 175 BRT O 1 we can go all the way to cold shutdown on. Not all BWR-29 2 have that. We have an isolation condenser, which is 3 essentially natural circulation driven. There's no pumping 4 involved in this except for makeup water which we take from 5 our fire water system. Once you turn this thing on you've 6 got about 45 minutes of decay heat removal without doing 7 anything. It involves essentially opening only one valve, 8 located right here; that's the condensate return line valve.
9 All the other valves would normally be open.
10 You change the state of one valve and you have 11 five minutes of decay heat removal. That is much different
- l 12 than an RCIC that has a lot of moving pumps and valves on l 13 ' it you don't have an LPCI system. We use the feedwater 14 coolant injection system which basically is using the same 15 components in the feedwater system. They are just 16 essentially category 1. You have like a category 1 17 feedwater system.
18 We have a non-safety-related shutdown cooling 19 system, which is, you know, essentially it's a control 20 grade system or whatever you might want to call it.
21 That basically summarizes the types of systems 22 in the plant. These are the things that we looked at in 23 the PRA evaluation that was done.
24 We will now commence with the discussion of the 25 probabilistic safety study.
9 ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336-6M6
24940.0 176 BRT
- 1 (Slide.)
2 Why did we carry out a PRA program at Northeast 3 Utilities? The key reason is that the management of our 4" company believes that in-house PRA capability significantly 5 improves our ability to safely manage our plants. That is 6 essentially -- is a statement of official company policy.
7 (Slide.)
8 The objective in developing and maintaining 9 these living PRA models for all of the plants is targeted 10 at three areas, first being the plant design change process.
11 Every time that a modification, either 12 internally generated or externally required, plant design 0) s_ 13 change must be made, there is a required safety evaluation. _
14 In many areas, a PRA is about thebestwaykfnot the only 15 way to evaluate issues such as changae in the margin of 16 safety of equipment, alterations in the frequency of design 17 and beyond designed basis events.
18 A similar area is technical specification 19 changes. We utilize the PRA models in a number of areas to 20 evaluate the impact of changing a critical surveillance or 21 test frequency. Again, they are used in the safety 22 evaluation process.
23 A key area we are talking about today is the use 24 of PRA in the integrated safety assessment program, and 25 I'll be discussing that in the second half of this ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
I 202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 3364646
24940.0 177 BRT l
/'T k 1 presentation.
2 (Slide.)
3 One of the key questions a lot of people ask us 4 at Northeast'was that: Gee, wasn't there an IREP that was 5 done for.you, and why are you going about using your own 6 model, and what's wrong with IREP, and why is it you folks 7 didn't just pick it up and use it as is?
8 The key reason we chose not to follow that path 9 was the ease in using the model. The IREP model was based 10 on the set code which requires a computer which we don't 11 have to operate and we are not a whole lot -- there were 12 not a whole lot of good records of all the scope of the O 13 models used in IREP. So it would make using the IREP
(_/
14 models to evaluate items such as fault transfers and 15 autobus transfer devices and diesel and gas turbine 16 reliability, it would make it very difficult to do.
17 In the time between when IREP was done and where 18 we are today, there's obviously been an awful lot of design 19 changes and a number of those were very significant in the 20 overall risk profile of the plant.
21 One example was the increasing of the pipe 22 diameter in the equalizing lines around the MSIVs. One of 23 the things that that change did was it allows people to 24 restore the main condenser, if you have an MSIV closure, 25 and it's a lot easier to do now than it was in the earlier O
ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-33 & 6646
o j 24940.0 178 BRT 1 years of the plant. That was a very significant safety 2 improvement in the plant.
3 Implementation of symptom-oriented emergency 4 procedures. The IREP study basically oriented the old 5 procedures; in other words, where the operator was called 6 upon to say based on what I see in the control room like 7 now it looks to me like I'm seeing a .01 square foot break 8 and I have to go and thumb through the procedure book and 9 carry that procedure out. It obviously placed a great deal-10 of burden on the operator, and in some cases could delay 11 the needed actions of the operator while he's thumbing 12 through an event diagnosis issue.
(m
(_) 13 We have now implemented for a number of years --
14 and they have been part of the training and requalification 15 program -- symptom oriented emergency procedures based on 16 the work of the BWR owners' group. These were essentially 17 customized by the plant organization to equate to the 18 specific features of Millstone Unit 1.
19 Another area that kind of also necessitated 20 reworking what was done in IREP was that we did believe 21 there were significant modeling deficiencies in what was 22 done in IREP.
! 23 They had specific ground rules which contrasted 24 with what the contractors working on that were told to do; r-) 25 however, they did not exactly fall into things that we G
l l
ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
l 202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336-6646 L-
24940.0 179 BRT r~
l wanted to see in a PRA model.
2 As an example, they used a generic data base for 3 initiator frequency. As I just discussed, we don't have a 4 generic BWR. We have a unique one. We also have 15 years 5 of actual experience on it; in some areas the statistics we 6 have on various issues would be significantly different 7 than the generic BWR.
8 As an example, loss of feedwater frequency in 9 our plant is a lot lower than the average BWR.
10 The success criteria: The IREP study utilized 11 more conservative and more licensing-based success criteria 12 in defining their equipment. It didn't always cut that way
(~)
(/ 13 -- one way,-though. I would also point out in some areas .
14 we realize that the success criteria used in IREP were not 15 -- maybe a better word -- they were very optimistic. In 16 the area of how many LPCI heat exchangers did you need to 17 quickly remove decay heat, we did not agree with the model 18 in IREP. We thought we needed two. They thought one.
19 IREP utilized generic reliability data which was l
! 20 basically WASH-1400 data, which, as you look into the 21 history of WASH-1400 was essentially a year and a half's 22 wo'rth data from all different plants, and they say 23 essentially all year and a half data look like from all 24 these plants, which is actually a bigger data base -- looks
- 25 bigger than it is. We have developed a data base that
{~'}
us ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336 6646
24940.0 180 BRT i [
~'
I reflects what we have actually observed at the plant.
2 The impact of that is if there are any squeaky 3 wheels, as you might call it, that are calling out for 4 attention,and oil, our reliability data base,is obviously 5 going to reflect that.
6 Additionally, if there's an area that --
! 7 MR. WARD: Could I ask you.a question about that?
8 Is your plant data base largely -- if this is the right way 9 to ask the question -- at the system level or at the 10 component level? And how do you,use it in the FRA?
11 MR. BICKEL: It's actually at both levels.
12 Certain systems have operated so many times that we can i
]' 13 directly compute the unavailability of it from operating 14 records. As an example, how many times have we gone on the 15 main condenser following a plant trip? H.w many times 16 following a plant trip did the feedwater system remain on 17 line?
18 One could do an. exotic fault tree, and spend six 19 months of an engineer's time trying to use a fault tree to 20 develop that or you can go and extract it out of the actual 21 shift logs and operating records. And that's what we do.
22 That's in the systems area.
23 Obviously we don't -- I guess what I'd call 24 systems data, availability data for things like How many
{} 25 times, given a small LOCA, did we operate the ECCS?
Acn-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
[, m 3 c.3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
24940.0 181
'BRT q'a 1 In that area we utilized actual component 2 reliability experience as gleaned from integrated and 3 periodic system tests.
4 I'll give you some examples of areas where we 5 found some very significant differences over, I guess we 6 would call it generic data.
7 Two other areas very quickly. IREP did not 8 model common cause failure. It was beyond the scope of 9 what they did. We went back in and have addressed that in 10 our study.
11 The state of the art in human factors treatment 12 has advanced dramatically since when the IREP was done. We O
(_) 13 have incorporated what we view to be more state of the art 14 treatment of the bperator.
15 To give some examples --
16 MR. WARD: Could I ask you one question about 17 that? I kind of remember there were some other 18 deficiencies with IREP. I probably -- I get mixed up. The 19 follow-on programs that the NRC sponsors, WASH-1400 -- I 20 guess NREP never amounted to anything.
21 MR. BICKEL: They never started it. And the 22 other program was RSMAP.
l l
23 MR. WARD: It seemed to me one of those didn't l 24 model the containment performance.
(} 25 MR. BICKEL: That's correct. The majority of ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverase 80 4 336-6646
4 24940.0 182 BRT 1 those studies basically looked at generic available data 2 and they said, like, you know, well, there's a containment 3 evaluation for a PWR in WASH-1400 and there's a containment 4 evaluation for a BWR in Peach Bottom out of WASH-1400. I 5 think they pretty much stopped there at that point.
6 MR. WARD: That is was that RSMAP instead of 7 IREP?
8 MR. BICKEL: IREP did not go into containment; 9 no.
10 MR. WARD: You didn't mention that, 11 MR. BICKEL: Okay. Where we stand right now, 12 the probabilistic safety study we did, we did not go into n
k_) 13 containment analysis either, for the key reason that, one,.
14 we have in-core work that we basically were able to use.
15 We did not see a need to develop.something that 16 sophisticated. The reason being that we've had experiences 17 in putting out level 3 PRAs. We did that on Millstone Unit 18 3. There's no way you could gain, I guess what you'd call 19 regulatory acceptance of everything you have done in the 20 containment area.
21 As an example, if we would have done a level 3 22 PRA on Millstone Unit 1, we woul'd be essentially trying to 23 show, well, why are we different than what they've got in 24 WASH-1400.
r- 25 So, in terms of the payback and what we were V) .,
ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 .
Nationwide Coverage 800 336-6646 s :
24940.0 183 BRT s
1 going to get in decisionmaking capability, there was not --
2 it really wasn't justifiable to have gone the length of a 3 level 3 PRA.
4 MR. WARD: So it's really a level 1 PRA?
5 MR. BICKEL: This is a level 1 PRA. We have j
6 left the model, I would point out, in a state such that at 7 our own needs or wants, we can go back and directly backfit 8 the containment and source-term analysis on there. But in 9 terms of meeting the time frame and the program of 10 supporting ISAP, it was not practical to do a level 3 PRA.
11 I would also point out, Mr. Ward, that we -- at 12 the same time we were completing the Millstone 1 PRA, we i 13 had just begun a Connecticut Yankee PRA. So in effect, for 14 a period of about a year and a half with 14 people working 15 on it we had two PRAs being executed simultaneously within
~
I l 16 our own company shop. So it would have been mind-boggling 17 to have gone to a level 3 on either of them.
18 MR. WARD: So you have a 14-person staff?
19 MR. BICKEL: That's correct.
20 MR. WARD: Within -- do you use a consultant?
21 MR. BICKEL: I have three job shoppers that have 22 been -- well, the way to describe that is it is getting 23 around a hiring freeze, to be honest. These are people 24 that have been on board with us for now in excess of a year.
25 For all purposes they are like permanent employees.
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 300-336 4 646
24940.0 184 BRT O 1 The scope of what we executed, as I point out in 2 this slide, was a level 1 PRA.
3 (Slide.) .
4 It differs from IREP in the way the modeling was 5 carried out. We utilize a large event tree process, which 6 was very useful in studying and evaluating recovery actions 7 and the effects of the operator on the accident sequences.
8 To really focus in on any potential areas where l
9 the systems were weak, we additionally used what we called 10 large fault tree modeling. .What that means is we developed 11 the fault tree logic down to the contract wire level.
12 There's a lot of differences of opinion as to how far you 13 have to go to really use PRA.
14 You maybe don't need to do a large fault tree 15 model to use the PRA model, but one of the things that's 16 very interesting about it is that when you do, you find 17 things in the wiring that could use improvement that maybe 18 have been there for 20 years, since the plant was l
L 19 originally built.
20 Another area of the scope of what we've done, c 21 we've relied very heavily on best estimate safety analysis.
I 22 We commissioned with General Electric to develop actual 23 best estimate transient plots of how the plant would behave 24 under a variety of circumstances, when you peel off some of t .
(} 25 the major conservatisms that are used in licensing basis ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-33MM6
24940.0 185 BRT Q,. l. analysis.
2 As an example, we used only 100 percent of ANS 3 decay heat rather than 120 percent, which is -- as is done 4 in appendix K calculations.
5 We utilized assumptions that the transients and l l
6 accidents were initiated at normal water level versus a I 7 reduced water level.
8 We took credit for measured system performance 9 as we utilized the best estimate heat removal of the 10 condenser versus what they assume in the analysis. All 11 these things were followed because we want to intimately
+
12 understand how that plant would perform in a transient. As
( 13 a pay,off, within a few days we are going to utilize all our 14 information with our simulator group in our simulator 15 f acility in the training program for the operator. They 16 are going to check the training simulator in Millstone 1 17 with all these operations done in the PRA. There are a lot 18 of payoffs.
19 Initiators considered. We considered some 20 things beyond the scope of what was done in the IREP. We 21 covered not only anticipated transients, which they covered, 22 but we also went into the area of system interaction and 23 control system-type failures.
24 They basically did not have the scope and time 25 to get into that in any great detail. By that I mean we O.
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336-6646
24940.0 186 BRT
/3 V
1 looked at areas where a support system failing could knock 2 out or create some bizarre event, some cooling water 3 systems. They were beyond the scope of what was looked at 4 in IREP.
5 In the area of control system failures one of 6 the things we focused in on were, like failures of the 7 instrument AC supplies and what they could do to multiple 8 control systems that were being fed by those electrical 9 buses.
10 As an example, the Crystal River 3 event back in 11 February 1980 was caused by a control system interaction 12 because a 24-volt power supply got shorted..
Jx -
13 We looked at design basis events. All the LOCAs.
14 That, again, is consistent with IREP. But we additionally 15 looked a,t a number of types of LOCAs that are clearly 16 beyond the design basis, your interfacing LOCAs. We made 17 maximum use of plant experience, then, in the calculation 18 of event frequencies. In other words, we utilized actual 19 plant data in there.
20 We've utilized component reliability to the 21 maximum extent that that's available. The one area where 22 we did fall back on, I guess what we'll call generic data, 23 is in some of the relays. It's not physically practicable 24 to collect reliability data on 125 volt, you know, relays
{} 25 and coils. There are just thousands of them.
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-33H646
24940.0 187 BRT 1 MR. SCHEWMAN: What sort of evidence could you 2 get on the relay chatter in a seismic event?
3 MR. BICKEL: From operating experience, nothing.
4 MR. SCHEWMAN: That wasn't my question. You 5 said that sometimes you didn't have the data and you went 6 outside to get it. I bring it up because that's one of the 7 things, items of contention in the GSA R-2.
8 MR. BICKEL: Dr. Schewman, the main focus of the I
9 work we did at this point was on internally initiated
. 10 events. We would probably be expanding as needs develop l
11 into the areas of -- more of the externals with passing 12 years.
1 .
13 MR. SCHEWMAN: Let me interrupt with a different 14 question, then. What about internal flooding? Did you 15 treat that?
16 MR. BICKEL: At this point, no. That would be 17 beyond a level 1 PRA. That would be a little bit -- that's 18 a bigger scope. That's pushing towards level 2 or 3.
19 We have on the books right now a request from --
20 internally -- that that be done. But an actual schedule 21 for that has not yet been established. That request to do 22 internal flooding analysis, I point out, exists on all of 23 our units, and we are going to be pursuing it, but the 24 exact schedule is not firmed up right now.
{} 25 We do recognize the -- particularly in older l ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336 6646
24940.0 188 BRT 1 plants -- that that is a very significant area that should 2 be looked at.
3 MR. MOELLER: Level 1 means, of course, too, 4 that you don't carry it to the point of estimating the 5 off-site doses exactly?
6 MR. BICKEL: That's correct.
7 MR. MOELLER: So you believe you gain what you 8 need to know in terms of the plant itself without carrying 9 it that extra step?
10 MR. BICKEL: That's correct. I'll get to that 11 in the ISAP area, how we came up with man-rem estimates, 12 because clearly you do need some information about man-rem, 13 because quite obviously not all core damage scenarios have 14 the same public health impact. Yes, we are deeply aware of 15 that.
16 MR. MOELLER: Right. Right.
17 MR. BICKEL: We utilized actual system 18 reliability, as I started to answer a few minutes ago, 19 based on records. We have the ability to retrieve from 20 multiple -- different data sources, almost any type of 21 number we need on major components. We therefore have 22 developed -- and it's documented in the PRA report that I 23 guess we've tendered with the staff. We have broken down 24 pumps into different sizes, capacities, and duty cycles,
{} 25 all their individual reliabilities to run, start -- various l
- ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
- 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336 6646
24940.0 189 BRT f~)
(/
1 different types of failure modes.
2 We have, additionally, utilized actual records 3 from the plant computing maintenance down times for various 4 systems.
5 Again, this is very important. We are utilizing 6 what's actually going on down there and focusing on what is 7 important and, therefore, what should we be doing in the 8 future. That's very much different than using somebody 9 else's data and trying to glean your own information from 10 it.
11 (Slide.)
12 Some examples of places where we found very,
(.
s 13 very significant differences from, I guess what people call 14 generic data.
- 15 WASH-1400 assumed a typical breaker that might 1
16 be used to start a pump, like an ECCS pump. At a median 17 failure rate at about 1 in 1000.
18 We have actually-gone back to the plant, gone i
! 19 through all.the records, and our records indicate that the 20 big breakers for your large pumps are actually more closely i
21 like about 10 to the minus 4 median failure rate. That's 22 based on the fact that we have cycle counters in some of 23 those big breakers, and we've logged something in excess of 24 about 39,000 cycles, that we actually understand the 25 evolutions that went through those and we've looked at all
('))
u ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336 4 646
24940.0 190 BRT
\l 1 the failures.
2 We find that the 480 volt breakers, a little bit 3 less reliable, but again, much better than was assumed in 4 WASH-1400. What's the implication of this? There's a key 5 implication. WASH-1400, and I think what they call the 6 generic data that people use, basically say that a pump, a 7 breaker and an MOV all have the same failure on demand rate.
8 If I had $1 million and I believed in generic 9 data and I had an ECCS system, I could come to a conclusion 10 that I should allocate the money equally among the three.
11 Our use of internally generated data from our 12 plants says that just really isn' t the way I'd do it. If I s/ 13 had $1 million, the data I have indicates that MOVs is 14 where all the trouble is at. The pumps are maybe the next 15 in the category and way, way down there are the big 16 electrical breakers.
17 So you get the importance of using plant data 18 i really is driven by what you are going to be doing with the 19 PRA study when you are done.
20 In the area where we are looking at resource 21 allocation it's essential that we use the actual data from 22 the plant.
23 (Slide.)
24 Another area where the data from the plant has
% 25 given us a lot of resolution, WASH-1400 assumed a fairly J
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
24940.0 191
.BRT p
V 1 high diesel failure rate. This again is log scales. Look 2 in the range of 2 to 4 percent of the time they assume the 3 diesels would fail to start.
4 We keep very good records on our diesel and we 5 can show that it's much less than 1 in 100; it's in the 6 range of about 6 in 1000. This is based on evaluated 7 starts in which the diesel would actually perform its 8 mission.
9 Again, this has an impact on issues like station 10 blackout. So these are the type of reasons why we use the 11 plant actual data.
12 s MR. SCHEWMAN: Where does your turbine fall on r~)
is_/- 13 that curve?
14 MR. BICKEL: Pardon? The gas turbine? 10ur gas 15 . turbine -- I haven't drawn it here -- actually a little 16 like this. It's clearly not as good as the diesel, but 17 it's definitely better than what they assumed as a 18 WASH-1400 diesel.
19 MR. SCHEWMAN: One characteristic that you 20 haven't defined here is that your pointer.is utterly
'21 invisible. But go ahead.
22 MR. BICKEL: I'd hold a match up, but somebody 23 from the training facility would probably have a heart 24 attack.
rS 25 The actual mean value data is actually published V
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
24940.0 192 BRT
.g U 1 in the PRA report. I'll hold my hand up like this. I 2 believe you all have copies of it at some point.
3 MR. WARD: Do you understand why -- I mean, have 4 you compared your plant-specific experience on equipment, 5 components, with not only WASH-1400 but what other plants 6 are experiencing?
7 MR. BICKEL: Yes.
8 MR. WARD: Do you understand why they are 9 different?
10 MR. BICKEL: We have some experiences, but some, 11 I might point out, might be conjecture on our part. We
.. 12 think that after 15 years the plant maintenance crews 13 pretty much know what they are doing. A lot of the horror 14 stories you get out of some of the other operating plants 15 are the newer units. Some of it is attributable to that.
16 The rest of it, there are some very strong 17 maintenance procedures that groups like INPO and others 18 have come down here and cited -- they are very, very good.
19 They have got people that know how to maintain it. But I'm 20 .not really in a -- I'm really not in a great position to 21 say specifically why scme of the equipment is better and 22 worse.
23 Some of the things we have some insights about, 24 like the MOVs, are -- there's no doubt in our mind that we
(} 25 think the way WASH-1400 calculated MOV reliability may have ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
-24940.0 193 BRT g.
\)
1 been very optimistic and maybe we are just the first people 2 that have seen it. But, in general, you know, it's 3 probably just the experience level of the plant at this 4 point.
5 MR. BENDER: On that point for a minute, is this 6 plant better than the best? As good as or just as good as 7 a certain bracket within the nuclear industry? And how do 8 you characterize it?
9 MR. BICKEL: I --
10 MR. BENDER: Or do you know enough to say?
11 MR. BICKEL: I would be very honest, that there
~
12 are BWR-3s, there's one outstanding PRA. It was far more i,,_T
'# 13 limited in scope than what we have done now. They had a 14 different number.
15 As to how I would define what the differences 16 are, yes, we have looked at that internally, but I can't --
17 you know, I really - "better" is a very relative sense. I 18 wouldn't make decisions based on we are less good than 19 Peach Bottom or something like that.
20 MR. BENDER: I wasn't trying to do that at all, 21 but I would be concerned about your claiming to be an 22 outlier. You know what I mean. So much better than 23 everybody else.
24 MR. BICKEL: I would point out when we get down
() 25 to our bottom lines, I wouldn't consider us to be -- use l
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
E-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
24940.0 194 BRT l
V 1 the word "better" than everybody else. We've got certain 2 areas that are good. There are other things we are working 3 on. .
4 In terms of our own, I guess, corporate 5 perspective, we have a safety goal internally, within the 6 company. And Millstone 1 doesn't meet it. And it's a ways 7 off. We know internally what we want to do to make it meet 8 that goal and we are working on it. But I would not,.you 9 know -- would not be brash enough to say that this plant is 10 better than the rest of the world.
11 MR. BENDER: I wasn't trying to get you to say 12 that. As a matter of fact, I was being -- thinking of it V 13 in selective terms. -
14 If the diesel generator experience here is 15 better than the average I would not be surprised. If the 16 diesel generator experience here is so much better than 17 that of anybody else, then I would have to ask: What is it 18 that makes you so much better? And I think I would want to 19 have more support for the position.
20 It's quite possible that that is also true, but 21 I think you'd need more support.
22 MR. BICKEL: I can give you some examples. We 23 have been a party of an EPRI effort on station blackout 24 which you may be aware of. Harvey Wykoff and others out at 25 EPRI are collecting diesel data because of this pending ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
________ 8i8 % 7-3700 N2ionwide@mqa EBMX"'S
l 24940.0 195 BRT-O 1 station blackout. rule.
I 2 In general, I think that they are finding that 3 one out of 100 failure rates, which is kind of the type of 4
) thing that WASH-1400 was looking at, are -- is actually on 5 the high side. That there is a lot of other industry 6 experiences indicating that diesel failure rates are not as
'7 much out of line with what we are seeing right now.
- 8 The reason comes from the following
- Many of 9 the past studies in which diesel reliability was calculated 10 were based on overcounting the number of failures and 11 undercounting the number of actual demands. The reason 12 being was that the people that had to do the calculations 13 did not have the benefit of all the pldnt records.
14 As an example, if I were assessing reliability 15 data when WASH-1400 was done, what I did was I took LERs, 16 and divided LERs by what I assume was the tech spec 17 surveillance interval, I'm going to end up with high 18 numbers. The reason being that many times these diesels 19 are tested for a lot of other reasons and a lot more times 20 than are indicated as what the minimal requirements of the
, 21 tech specs. And when you factor in a much larger 22 denominator than what other people might have assumed, that 23 makes the numbers tend to go down.
24 It's just better statistical information.
() 25 EPRI, and I think others are working on that and 4
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
,202-347-3700 _ ._ _, Nationwide CoEC3 __, 800 336 6646 _ _ _ , .
24940.0 196 BRT.
LJ l I think there is a general trend that the diesel 2 reliability is a little bit better than has generally been 3 assumed. I don't think that that's a real outlier finding 4 in that area. It's just that -- what I was trying to point 5 out was that we felt very strong, we had to use our own 6 data versus generic WASH-1400 data.
7 MR. BENDER: Let me emphasize, I'm not trying to 8 say you aren't or are. I'm just saying when you make these 9 kinds of presentations, if it's out of line with what 10 people say is the general average, then the justification 11 has to be up front somewhere.
12 MR. BICKEL: Yes. I can see your point. We are k 13 basically trying to do the statistics right. That's maybe 14 the on.ly difference. I think WASH-1400 had one charter of 15 what'they were working on many years ago and it is a whole 16 bunch different than what we are doing here.
17 The end products we want out of our program are 18 listed right here.
19 (Slide.)
20 First of all is an identification of significant 21 safety issues. I would point out if there was no ISAP 22 program, we would still be doing PRAs for the key purpose 23 of identification of significant issues. The fact that 24 ISAP or a program like it exists is very nice because it
() 25 means we have a very strong way of focusing on these i
l ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336 6646
24940.0 197 BRT-
. '(')
~' '
1 results.
2 Another area is engineering insights on safety 3 issues. We think it's very important that the engineering 4 staff knows the potential soft spots in various systems and 5 that our procedures and design changes reflect that type of 6 engineering knowledge.
7 We clearly want a living model, a model that can-8 be exercised and you can essentially utilize it to evaluate 9 various design changes. We want that type of thing 10 available for all future safety evaluations. I would point 11 out since the model has been done we've not only evaluated 12 ISAP items but we've also been utilizing it in a number of 13 areas looking at actual design changes which were leading 14 up to the outage they are currently in.
15 And then the final thing is that we have left 16 the framework with the model as we turned it in in July, so 17 we can extend the thing for future external events modeling.
18 As an example, we are working right now in fire 19 modeling of the plant. We are going to be, within a few 20 years, going back and adding an internal flooding, 21 hurricanes, all sorts of things like that. Because, you
' 22 know, hurricanes are very credible in this region of the 23 country.
24 (Slide.)
r~'s 25 How do we use the overall thing? This slide I V
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
24940.0 198 BRT O 1 would like to walk you through, and I maybe will have to 2 use my hand, essentially outlines what I guess we can call 3- a safety management program here at Northeast Utilities.
4 It centers on the development of a PRA model 5 that is alive and can be readily updated on a computer. It 6 considers event frequency from experience, actual equipment 7 reliability, and success criteria for the equipment. How 8 many trains of gear do you need based on other 9 thermohydraulic-type analysis.
10 We consider the plant procedures in effect,. how 11 they would impact the human -- you know, the human 12 rhliability aspects; we have got the tech specs, which
.%/ 13 establish the type of tests that are done and the 14 surveillance intervals, and we've got the actual hardware 15 design.
16 All these things when combined lead to a living 17 PRA model. How that model is bei.ng done' , it is being 18 focused right now into what we call a public safety impact 19 model, which I'll be talking about in the second half of 20 the thing.
21 This public safety impact model considers design 22 -- all types of changes. Looking at design -- in hardware 23 or in the proposed changes to tech specs, all types of f
24 things like that.
25 Some of these originate from NU areas and some ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
{ .. . - - - - .
24940.0 199 BRT
/'T V
1 originate from requirements or requests from NRC. Then, 2 using the public safety model, essentially establishes a 3 score,-and I think you heard the score this morning from 4 some of the Staff presentations. We are scoring them on a 5 score of plus or minus 10. That is essentially -- it's 6 equatable to a man-rem type thing impact. We essentially 7 have a scale that -- a plus 10 equals 4000 man-rem 8 reduction in public risk and a minus 10 would cause the 9 addition of about 4000 rem.
10 The process of ISAP considers the public safety 11 impact model, but additionally considers other impacts into f- 12 the net benefit.
V 13 The other type of things which are considered ,
14 are things-such as plant personnel exposure, impact on
. 15 productivity of the unit and on the people. Additionally, 16 we have incorporated the capability to add in there the 17 ability to' address hot regulatory issues.
18 As an example, we have, you know -- we are 19 regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. We are 20 also regulated by a state DPUC, that has things they think 21 we should be doing about load management schemes and energy 22 conservation, and we've got a state department of 23 environmental protection that likes us to do certain things 24 about our discharge. All that type of thing from the plant.
() 25 So we have many areas that we are trying to ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
3)2 347 370C Nationwide Coverage 800 336-6646
24940.0 200 BRT O 1 address as a company; putting them all'into ISAP is 2 assuring they all get treated on an equal scale.
3 Dr. Schewman?
4 MR. SCHEWMAN: Is the state environmental group, 5 does it also use man-rem exposure to the public as their 6 criteria? Will they accept that as the things they are 7 concerned about?
8 MR. BICKEL: The types of issues we are dealing 9 with, I understand, on the state DEP level, the key one, I 10 guess, that comes to my mind -- this you may say sounds 11 kind of far-fetched and it's difficult to use PRA, but we 12 have a refuel outage building on-site that has a -- that
. n\"' 13 isn't fully connected to the city sewer system. Not to 14 sound too facetious, we have a waste problem there that is 15 not nuclear-related but is nonetheless controversial in the 16 local area.
17 Wayne, we have some kind of problem with the
-18 town of Waterford? We are having people, outside the NRC, 19 that are saying: You know, you guys have got to get your 20 act together and get in compliance with our health codes 21 and things like that.
22 MR. SCHEWMAN: This is sewage treatment?
23- MR. BICKEL: Sewage treatment. The catch of the 24 thing is, hey, it's going to cost a couple of million
([] 25 dollars. How do we assess the priority of doing that ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336 6646
24940.0 201 BRT V 1 versus control room design reviews or qualifying 2 motor-operated valves.
3 The intent of the ISAP, then, was to take all of 4 these things that were going to require some amount of 5 money, time, and people's resources, put them into a hopper, 6 and then evaluate what should be done.
7 Now, the ISAP process is going to essentially 8 lead to a prioritization, ' asically just a ranking in terms 9 of how important these issues are in terms of the worth to 10 .the company in addressing the problems we face. There are 11 two paths that can occur when you get through this decision 12 process.
l'h
(~/ 13 One is that there is a clear indication of the 14 need to make a change to the plant. This would be either 15 procedures, technical specifications, or actual changes to 16 hardware.
17
~
In some areas you get to a point where you say:
18 It's clear the issue requires fixing.
19 In another area you can look at it and say: Yes, 20 but my model, the recult I got here is colored by the fact 21 I have used a particular assumption in my analysis. At 22 this point if it is ranked a high score, this would then 23 generate the fact that further analysis might be warranted.
24 That then goes back in, and we can then look
{} 25 -- maybe the result of further analysis, is we optimize the ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336 4646
24940.0 202 BRT-(_)
1 design change. In other words, maybe, as an example, we 2 came up with a fix that we identified as being important to 3 safety but the fix we proposed to address in this area was 4 maybe not that great. So we are kind of, still, back to 5 the drawing boards. Look at a different design and 6 evaluate that.
7 Or further analysis could also imply maybe we've 8 got this result because we used a quick, conservative model.
9 Yes?
10 MR. SCHEWMAN: There doesn't seem to be any 11 place for anything to ever escape from that diagram. Is
.x 12 anything likely to be in the public safety impset, or where 13 do the no, never minds g6?
14 MR. BICKEL: To the fact that they essentially 15 just kind of fall off.
16 MR. SCHEWMAN: I was looking for a third arrow 17 out of the bottom --
l 18 MR. BICKEL: Like a trash can or something? We 19 didn't put that on the slide.
20 MR. BENDER: There may be in the plant 21 procedures a couple of elements that are important that I 22 would like to hear something about. One is that a lot of 23 the success /f ailure reporting is based on maintenance 24 errors and that sort of thing. Another is that a certain
() 25 amount of the failure results come from engineering errors.
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336 6646
24940.0 203 BRT q/
x,,
1 MR. BICKEL: Yes.
2 MR. BENDER: Where do they show up in that 3 analysis system that you've got up there?
4 MR. BICKEL: I'm not sure if I fully understand 5 the question. Are you talking about like in a design 6 change or something?
7 MR. BENDER: Let's talk about the favori~te, the 8 motor-operated valve problem. The problems, in many cases, 9 just stem from the fact that the limit switches aren't 10 fastened down properly and so they don't let the valve 11 operate the way it is supposed to.
12 I don't know whetaer that shows up in your model 13 or not anywhere.
14 MR. BICKEL: Maybe what I can try and do is I 15 have this slide in an area where I was going to talk about 16 public safety impact model and I will show you how one can 17 walk some of the issues that we've got in ISAP through this 18 entire chain.
19 Basically to say we have an issue that is 20 identified with NRC, we:have a PRA model, we give it -- it 21 essentially goes through here and comes up with a score.
22 As a result of that score -- and I'll show you 23 examples of two different types of ones -- some of them 24 with: Heck, let's go fix it. And another that says: With
() 2S a little smarter thinking we can probably refine the store.
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
_ _ El& M F- M - NCe NC
24940.0 204 BRT Iv ')
1 We think the high score is artificial or the low score is
- 2. artificial.
3 MR. BENDER: I think maybe you miss the point 4 I'm trying to make here. Really, the data has to have 5 something that reflects the mistakes that people can make 6 and I'm not sure if I understand how that's cranked in.
7 If you base the probabilistic analysis on a 8 certain type of valve relief capacity, for example, and it 9 isn't there, then the answer you are getting has no meaning.
10 MR. BICKEL: Oh. Okay. Okay. I see your point.
11 MR. BENDER: I would like to see how those kind i
73 12 of things get cranked into the analysis.
, V 13 MR. BICKEL: Let me see -- I'm trying to home in ,
14 on the question. What you are saying is when we have like 15 equipment reliability data, does it reflect both operator i
16 and designer-caused problems? Is that what we are leading I 17 to?
18 MR. BENDER: That's what I'm asking.
I 19 MR. BICKEL: The data we would utilize and the l
[ 20 calculations would indicate all of those because they ,
1 l 21 basically reflect: it's an MOV. I put a demand on it, did
! 22 it open? It may not. It may have failed to open because a I
23 maintenance technician improperly set some limit switch and 24 it would be logged in in there. It would also be recorded (n) 25 if there was a design error that caused it. Either one of ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS INC.
F4 PSI-frTi3) NatignT!hCova7n _ _ _800-336 66Mi _ _
24940.0 205 BRT en k .
1 these type things would be factored in.
2 I would point out, though, if there is something 3 that comes up that's identified as a design error, in 4 general they are rare because.you do kind of a burn-in test 5 before you actually turn the system on. Like, say you've 6 made a a)dification. Our reliability data is more geared 7 towards on-line equipment. We would not be looking as much 8 at a starting phase of a new system that we have cut in.
9 MR. BENDER: I'm making you use more' time than 10 probably is allocated, but it works fine as long as you 4
11 have the operating experience to base it on but a lot of it
, 12 you need to have some kind of test data to base it on and
('
13 I'm not sure that I've heard all I'd like to hear about it,
~
14 but it's enough for now.
15 MR. WARD: Any design experience that isn't 16 challenged in experience or test isn't going to be modeled 17 in the PRA.
18 MR. BENDER: Well, that's true. Ihat's why I'm 19 asking the question. Nevertheless, you are trying to make 20 judgments on these things. You have got to have some way 21 of' making the judgment in the absence of that kind of 22 -experience.
23 MR. BICKEL: Yes.
24 MR. WARD: But there isn't any other analytical --
(} 25 MR. SCHEWMAN: You have talked for about an hour ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336 6646
24940.0 206 BRT
(^T
\>
1 now. It has all been very interesting --
2 MR. BICKEL: You want to get to the bottom line.
3 MR. SCHEWMAN: Roughly -- I see an awful lot of 4 slides here. I hope some of these are Casey's instead of 5 yours. If they aren't we aren't going to get through them 6 all.
7 MR. BICKEL: I'm going to try to speed it up, I 8 guess.
9 (Slide.)
10 I have here the result of our recently completed 11 reevaluation of everything. There are differences. I 12 would like to give you some kind of yardstick of comparison.
/^')
\--
13 We have Peach Bottom, which was a 1975. version 14 PRA. We have the IREP study that was done on Millstone and 15 we have our recently completea work.
16 The differences that occur in these numbers, the 17 majority of them are due to methodology, differences in 18 data, some difference in the way various issues were 19 treated.
20 We think we've got a larger scope of items that 21 were considered in the model we've developed than in the 22 others. I point out that we've utilized a mean value in 23 all of our quantifications. Everybody else has used medians.
24 We find that means are easier for us to use.
,/~% 25 In terms of what caused all of this --
V ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
3)2-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336 6646 f
'24940.0 207 BRT
.O v 1 (Slide.)
2 I have shown nere a breakdown of what issues 3 contribute to that overall core melt frequency that we 4 derived.
5 The breakdown of these issues -- I won't spend 6 too much time unless there's specific questions -- is very 7 heavily tied-to the -- you know, there are a lot of 8 differences between what IREP had -- in other words, the 9 relative dominance of LNP from what we obtained was much 10 different than what they had when IREP was done.
11 MR. WARD: Are you going to explain that?
12 MR. BICKEL: Yes.
13 (Slide.)
14 The key reason that loss of normal power as an l-15 initiating event leading to core melt decreased -- on IREP 16 it was about 85 percent -- was due to the fact that they
- l. 17 assumed about a times higher loss of normal power frequency.
18 They assumed in IREP that we lost off-site power once every 19 three years. We have lost it, I think, twice in 15 years.
20 Two outs of 15 -- we weren't losingikevery 21 three years. They assumed a higher diesel failure rate.
22- MR. WARD: The one last month -- is that one of 23 them?
24 MR. BICKEL: That's one of the two in 15 years.
25 It's curious they were both due to hurricanes.
ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. .
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336 6646
1
)
24940.0 208 ~
BRT
~t 1 They assumed completely different reliability 2 for the diesel'and gas turbine.
When we combine all of 3 those things together it's not too surprising that they 4 came up with a much higher contribution to station LNP and 5 blackout issues.
6 MR. SCHEWMAN: Do you get any additional credit
. 7 if you sort of know you are going to lose power a day in 8 advance?
9 MR. BICKEL: Like we did last time? We, we'd 10 get'a' bene. fit but it would be difficult to come into the 11 PRA model. 'You could match decay heat in systems --
12 MR. WARD: There has to be some benefit or else 13 the plant people wouldn't have done it; isn't that right?
14 If the PRA doesn't show it --
15 MR. BICKEL: The PRA would be very difficult to 16 show it because the PRA is generally executed from full 17 power. The assumptions of the initial conditions are full 18 power. If you start the~' analysis like, say, 20 percent 19 power, your decay heat removal requirements are 20 significantly lower. There is a benefit --
21 MR. SCHEWMAN: Maybe you should say you haven't 22 had any power losses in 15 years, then.
23 MR. BICKEL: Pardon?
24 MR. SCHEWMAN: Maybe you should say you haven't 25 had any power losses in 15 years.
[}
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3?)0 Nationwide Coverage 800-336 6646
24940.0 209
~BRT
(
l MR. BICKEL: That would be optimistic, I guess.
2 MR. WARD: Well, no. That's a good point. If 3 the only thing that's given them to you is hurricanes and 4 you have a way of reacting in advance to hurricanes --
5 MR. SCHEWMAN: You sure as hell know when they 6 are coming.
7 MR. BICKEL: For about three days, I guess.
8 Some of the areas we looked at were, again, a 9 whole bunch different and beyond what was considered in 10 IREP.
11 (Slide.)
12 We did look at things as exotic as tube ruptures
'f'l )
13 in the isolation condenser, LOCAs in the reactor water 14 clean-up system of the, interfacing LOCAs in LPCI and core 15 spray. That essentially makes it a lot easier for us to 16 use the model.
17 (51ide.)
18 MR. SCHEWMAN: John, why don't you go on ahead 19 since you are going to go over this again on December 4, 20 and get down to actions taken by NU based on -- ,
21 MR. WARD: Could I ask him a couple of questions?
22 You don't have to go'back to the chart, but on the earlier 23 chart you showed the mean core melt versus the median core 24 melt frequencies for the other two analyses.
() 25 MR. BICKEL: Yes.
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
24940.0 ' '
210 BRT ,
,m.
- 1 MR. WARD: I guess I'm glad to see you are 2 expressing it as mean. But in one of the write-ups they 3 had -- one of the letters, you make some comment about: If
- 4. I divide my mean by -- number by, like two or three, I get 5 the median. ,
6 Gee, don't say that when you come to Washington.
7 There's a couple of guys there that will draw you and t 8 quarter you.
)
9 '
MR. BICKEL: That's a particularly interesting 1,0 issue being that we had some differences when, I guess some
.li of the Staf f's contractors tried to do the same thing and
) 12 they promptly recounted to us: Gee, in your letter of July
'- 13
. something or other you made that statement. You are 14 obviously referring to the July 10 letter, I think.
15 MR. WARD: That's one place it got expressed, 16 but I'm almost. tired of hearing about it at our meeting.
l 17 So I'll blame it on you --
i h 18 MR. BICKEL: I can see'the point completely. No l
I 13 argument out of me. Two key areas-came out of the study --
20 yes?
21 MR. WARD: Let me ask you one more question 22 about that. You also mention in the write up that you've 23 got sort of a corporate safety goal; 8 times 10 to the 24 minus fourth doesn't quite meet that. What is that? What 25
-(} is your goal?
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
[' .
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336 6646
~24940.0 211 BRT 1 MR. BICKEL: Our safety goal is very similar to 2 the AIF and NRC' safety goal. In other words, we are 3 sh6oting for a total core melt frequency of less than 10 to l 4 .the minus 4 per year at 50 percent confidence level.
5 We also have a secondary level that basically 6 says.we would like to go better than that. In other words, 7 we'd like to be able to show that we can beat that with 8 some margin. The problem is, obviously, we are a bunch of 9 ways away from that,'and that leads into, I guess, my slide
- 10. right now.
11 (Slide.)
12 What's causing and what can we do about it and fh .
~U 13 what have we done.
14 Right now from our analysis it indicates that 64 15 percent of the calculated core melt frequency is coming .
16 from long-term decay heat removal-related issues. 'That 17 basically means that we are saying the majority of the 18 trouble, from what we can see, stems from chains of events
!. 19 where we lose the ability to cool the core in about the 20 four-hour time frame. I'll get into the actions we've 21 identified.to try and address that.
22 The next biggest piece that, you know, sticks 23 out as maybe'an outlier is the area of station blackout.
24 One of the unique findings, again, which differs
(' .
25 -- a majority of the people out there view the whole issue ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
- 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
24940.0 212 BRT (O
_/
1 of station blackout is the reliability of your big 2 emergency generator sources. What we are finding is that 3 the biggest piece of it is actually due to the coupling of 4 the gas turbine and the service water systems.
5 In essence, the service water system is some of 6 the pumps in it are powered by the gas turbine. The
! 7 failure of the gas turbine means that you've got -less l 8 service water pumps available, and that basically puts
! 9 reliance on the remaining service water pump to cool the 10 diesel. Hence, a failure of the gas turbine, a single 11 failure of the service water system, basically means that i
12 the diesel
- is not going to get cooling water so it's not bs/ 13 going to run for too long. We found that is the dominant 14 way of.getting the station blackout.
p 15 Like I say, that's different than -- we get this,
[ 16 again, because of plant-specific data.
17 MR. KACICH: If I could interject at this point.
18 The question arose earlier about our ootential ability to 19 resolve some of the USIs before a final generic resolution
! 20 is out; this is an example of the kind of plant specific 21 data that we'll have at our disposal to try to resolve, in 22 this case, USIA 44.
23 (Slide.)
24 MR. WARD: What I was going to show you here 25 briefly -- you have a copy of the slide -- as I plotted
{~}
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
24940.0 213 BRT
()
1 along here, the decay heat curve normalized to the core 2 power level. And the times at which various systems, we
-3 would predict using best estimate calculations, would match 4 the D Day heat.
5 Main condensing field waters available 6 immediately, IC; 2, shutdown cooling trains; using two of 7 the LPCI heat exchangers in the emergency cooling water --
l 8 right in here, in this period right out here is where we '
9 found an area that we think needs improvement. I guess 10 we'll have the ability to discuss this in greater detail --
11 the key thing is that if you utilize the torus as a heat 12 sink, by blowing down with the relief valves you do not
) 13 pressurize the -- essentially don't pressurize the 14 containment very much at all.
15 As the water heats up in the torus in a period 16 of about four hours we currently predict you are going to l
17
( lose pump suction on all your injection pumps. That's 18 because you don't have the pressure -- you don't have a 19 pressurized containment, which is what is normally assumed 20 in your LOCA analysis, the way they sized the original 21 system.
22 So we have concluded that you have to have a 23 success criteria of two of the LPCI heat exchangers. We 24 are talking about a 2 out of 2 reliability configuration, 25 and it doesn't take a whole lot of imagination to say that l
I ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336 6646
i +
24940.0 214 BRT:
M
' kf:~
l any single failure will knock out your long-term decay heat 2 removal' if you are on that mode.
3 The problem we are trying to address'both with i
14 hardware and analytical work right now is what do you do to 5 get you by this, this kind of gap-that occurs right in here.
6 That's one of the ISAP items that we have given a high 7 priority to, we'll discuss later.
8 (Slide.) -
9 These are the actions taken by NU based on the 10
~
implications of our study, and I'll try to summarize them 11 very quickly.
12 When we found the long-term decay heat removal b
s_/ 13- thing it took us several months to completely get detail as 6
14 to what was actually going on there, what was the original 15 design basis, what was it licensed as? It was an immediate 16 evaluation of all our legal requirements and that was 17 completed under the conclusion that -- we have come to the 18 conclusion that basically the plant has moved beyond, with 19 the new emergency operating procedures -- in essence, has 20 moved beyond what it was originally designed for many years 21 ago.
22 -
We have concluded that the long-term cooling 23 issue is not a -- was not like a LER item. It has been 24 fully reported to the Staff when we submitted the PRA. It 25 was a very -- in our opinion, it was a great surprise when ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
l 202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336-6646
~ - . - _ - - _
24940.0 215 BRT ,
'- 1 we found this. Recognizing that we currently believe we 2 need 2 out of 2 trains, we_then began to look very quickly 3 at what are the areas that are the biggest problem in that 4 2 out of 2 reliability situation. The key one that k'ind of 5 cropped up was the lube oil cooling and do we actually I 6 determine in our LPCI pumps surveillance, if you run those 7 pumps over the long term they are going to run?
8 We found the surveillance that was being done 9 essentially did not run the pumps long enough to heat up 10 the lube oil to see that the lube oil coolant -- it should l 11 be a "b" there -- the lube oil coolant was actually cutting 12 in.
() 13 We then believe, I think -- John, in June? --
14 surveillance on the LPCI surveillance on lube oil took a 15 hefty chunk out of our problems in the area; it was a 20 16 percent reduction in that 8 times 10 to the minus 4 number.
17 Additionally, in the process we identified in 18 there a glitch in the EOPs with regard to the pump 19 throttling instructions. Again, actions have been 20 initiated to correct those. One of the areas of doing the 21 very detailed fault tree was that it picked up a wiring 22 error in the LPCI loop selection logic, in which the timers 23 to the individual reactor recirc valves were, in effect, 24 crossed. It was found by an analyst performing the' f ault 25 tree.
O ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336 6646
24940.0 216 BRT O
'~#
1 We identified that. Again, it was a 2 reportability evaluation under an SSH; and again, based on ,
3 our review of that, it was not reportable. We have 4 documented this again. We found this. .It is being looked 5 after.
6 We found a very critical dependency within the 7 service water 9 -- SW-9 valve. It's a nonessential service 8 water cutoff MOV. You can't test it under normal operation 9 .without tripping the plant. We concluded that the best 10 spot for that thing to be powered -- I should also mention 11 it had'an ABT breaker; it can be flipping back and forth 12 between the diesel and gas turbine.
C')
k- 13 As a result of that it has now been permanently 14 aligned to the diesel, so, in other words, when the diesel 15 comes on it is going to be aligning that valve. Yes?
16 MR. SCHEWMAN: Why don't we just stop these
[ 17 items here. You have given us examples, and if somebody 18 wants to bring up a question they can, but I think we ought i 19 to move on to the next topic.
I 20 MR. BENDER: Let me just make a point, I think 21 this is illustrative of the question I was raising earlier 22 and it shows what you can do if you know what to look for.
23 There are a lot of pieces of hardware you are taking a lot 24 of credit for being highly reliable and I don't know 25 whether we have the same kind of analysis of those things.
{
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-33(H5646
24940.0 217 BRT I
1 So somewhere along the way someone will have to think about 2 how much of this type of analysis has to go crediting the 3 design and maintenance functions as being properly 4 performed. End of my statement.
5 MR. BICKEL: I guess with'that, the next 6 question is -- we'll proceed with lunch? Continue on? -
7 MR. SCHEWMAN: Well, I don't care. I would like 8 to have -- since I have got lunch here in box form I would 9 like to do it for half an hour, get it done in half an hour.
10 I don't care whether we do it now or after the next item, 11 MR. BICKEL: The second part of the presentation 12- is on some of the applications made of the PRA, evaluating 13 the ISAP issues that Chris attempted to summarize, Chris 14 and Mike were talking about earlier this morning.
15 (Slide.)
16 The objectives of what we are doing in this 17 prioritization is obvious. We want to prioritize all the 18 safety issues.
l 19 An additional thing we are hoping to get out of 20 ISAP is the formal NRC acceptance of NU identified specific
! 21 safety issues that may not have gotten on the books because 22 of TMI action plans and what not.
l 23 The final thing is the ability to, having 24 blended this type of thing in, to properly allocate how we 25 spend our time and money.
(~)
V l
ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
I 202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336 6646 L-
24940.0 218
_BRT J
l (Slide.)
2 I have talked people through this point. It's 3 my intent to give some examples of how, essentially, we 4 carry out the modeling.
5 (Slide.)
6 The key aspects of what we are doing is called 7 -- we are utilizing what we call a matrix quantification 8 process in the model, in which we have a vector which 9 contains the frequency of all the initiating events that we 10 are studying. Again, these are tied to our past experience.
11 It would contain like the frequency of loss of feedwater,
-s 12 turbine trip, loss of normal power, et cetera.
13 We essentially have a matrix stored in the 14 , computer that essentially contains transition probabilities, 15 where given that you have this initiating event, what's the 16 likelihood of ending up, like, say in an early core melt 17 with a failed containment or an early core melt with an 18 intact containment or late core melt or very, very 19 long-term core melt?
20 We can essentially, on a computer, very rapidly 21 update the elements of this matrix, and show shifts in the 22 frequencies of these individual plant damage states.
23 Dr. Moeller had asked me earlier about, are we 24 getting man-rem and public risk into that? The way we are em
(_ ) 25 treating it is we have broken up the type of core melts ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
201349-F00 R8ation-ide Coverage NM)N
24940.0 219 BRT 1 into different scenarios that led to=them so we can 2 ' segregate out which caused earlier releases of more and 3 that--type of impact in there.
'4 We, essentially, then, compute changes in risk 5' using the following formulation. We essentially say that a 6L change in_ risk -- first of all is the exposure period. How 7 much time in the remaining operating years of Millstone 1.
8 We are using 25.
9- (Slide.)
10 We are looking at the change in the original 11 plant damage state frequencies. If we expect a transient 12 ' induced core melt with a transient early core melt with an O
\/ 13 intact containment, and I see a change in the frequency of 14 that from like 10 to the minus 5 to 10 to the minus 6, 15 there's a delta in that individual plant damage state 16- frequency.
17 I then multiply it by a man-rem consequence for 18 the individual plant damage state.
19 You immediately question where did we get this?
20 We didn't do a level 3 PRA.
21 What we did is we took several studies available 12 2 for the site. Millstone 3 PRA has a detailed plant 23 consequence model that reflects the weather, the 24 surrounding, you know, area of the plant, populations and 25 all that sort of stuff.
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336 4646
24940.0 220 BRT
! /N L'-) 1 We essentially ratioed Millstone 1 to Millstone 2 3 evacuation, that type of thing. We scaled down the, you 3 know, the number of curies that would be released out of 4 the core. We took credit for the work of the ID COR group 5 as to which classes of core melt sequences would lead to 6 what fraction of the release categories coming out.
7 That's not going the full way of a level 3 PRA, 8 but it gives us at least a reasonable perspective on which 9 type of core melts have worse impacts.
10 This is if -- we utilize this approach, then, if 11 we have something that's directly modelable with the system 12 modelings in the PRA. That is not possible in all cases.
O(_/ 13 Examples include -- there are other areas where 14 you would have to do a risk evaluation.
15 Some areas deal with nonnuclear hazards. An 16 example is the chlorine. There are other toxic gases that 17 we might have to evaluate in the future.
18 What we have done in that area is we've utilized 19 information to develop what we might call an equivalent 20 man-rem from chlorine.
21 In other words, you can take a model for the 22 release of chlorine out of a tank, make it somewhat 23 analogous to a containment breach event, and then use the 24 same nuclear-type assumptions, and come up with, you know, 25 doses to various people in the population area.
O(~s ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 33(H5646
24940.0 221 BRT
/'5 f 1 _,We actually had such a calculation of thdt 2 several years ago when people were looking at chlorine.
3 In essence, we can come up with an equivalent 4
man-rem. We can then compare chlorine impacts against I
5 radiological ones.
6 l A third area that you have to also -- 1 l
7 MR. WARD: I don't know how you did that. That 8 sounds like a real ground-breaking effort, to compare the 9 chemical and radiological risk. You probably found 10 chlorine is the riskiest thing on the site, isn't it?
11_ MR. BICKEL: The way they got that, actually, i
12 just to put it in a nutshell, was they have data from the
() 13 chemical industry and OSHA that says that if you receive 14 such and such a dose your likelihood of survival beyond X 15 days is such. If you look back to your dose impact curves 16 -from radiological, you can find the same thing.
17 In essence, we just put the two scales together 18 and forced them to converge on what level of concentration p 19 of chlorine was the equivalent of so many rems. That's 20 essentially all we did on that. That's the only way to do 21 it. You have to be able to put them on an equivalent scale 22 to be able to rank them. .
23 The third area deals with areas where you are 24 forced to use engineering judgments because you cannot put n 25 it into the model. What is done in cases like that would U
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
~
\ __. Y ^ ? _________ ~ " " "
24940.0. 222
.BRT O 1 :be something like-evaluating certain procedures or things 2 that : impact the environment of the operator. The only way 3 that they can be evaluated is to, number one, use the PRA 4 -to identify the sensitive issues for consideration and then
-5 look at the potential of the thing in light of the rankings 6' that have been given to other projects. I am going to give 7 some examples of that because I understand there are 8 specific requests.
9 This is an example of an evaluation that was 10 done to address ventilation around the feedwater system on 11 Millstone Unit 1. ,
12 What we looked at in hera, we made a modeling 13 assumption that the issue that's involved is fol-lowing the 14 loss of normal power the ventilation used around the 15 F.W.C.I. gets shed in the process of stripping and they are 16 not automatically reloaded.
17 What we looked at was a design change that went 18 back and automatically put the ventilation back on the gas 19 turbine -- automatic -- so you' assure full cooling.
20 What we did is we looked at the calculated 21 unavailability of the F.W.C.I., given the loss of normal 22 power again. It's about 16 percent. And then what we said 23 was we are going to assume that without this fix being made 24 it is guaranteed to fail, the F.W.C.I. system. We are
() 25 making a conservative bounding assumption that we are going ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336 6646
24940.0 223 BRT
(")
I to knock out the F.W.C.I..
, 2 All of this alphabet soup is " plant damage 3 states," " transient"; "early core" meant with intact versus 4 nonintact containments. " Sus" is your small LOCAs.
5 You notice there are small shifts in certain of 6 them. "A" is large LOCAs. Notice both here and here, 7 these two go up a bit.
8 The increase in core melt frequency we 9 calculated as 35 percent. We put through what the various 10 weightings on each of these plant damage states -- this has 11 a risk impact if nothing is done of about 10,000 man-rem.
12 That's attributable to the weightings that would be applied
!~}-
s 13 to these particular plant damage states. That's an example 14 of where we took the model, made a simple modeling 15 assumption and recomputed the entire P array on the
- 16 computer.
17 Another example, addressing long-term cooling.
18 We know the total fraction that long-term cooling 19 contributes to risk on the plant. We believe it's about 64 20 percent of the core melt. We basically went back in and 21 asked the question: If we were able to develop one out of 22 two success criteria for the LPCI heat exchangers, what 23 would be the impact? Again we come up with about a 38,000 24 man-rem impact. This is basically in your longer-term core 25 melt scenarios.
{j ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336 6646
124940.0 224
- BRT 1 (Slide.)
2 This was an example of an issue that was brought 3 about not because of safety but because of reliabilit'y 4 concerns,.but in which you can also find-a safety impact in 5 keeping the plant running.
6 The issue was should we retube the-Millstone 7 Unit 1 condenser?
8- We looked at the base case, where we determined 9 this thing would impact is the following:' If you have a 10 crudding up, if the condenser tubes are degrading and they 11 begin to leak significantly, you are going to have to shut 12 -the plant down; and in some cases you could have a very
-0 13 severe in-leakage which is going to necessitate isolating 14 the feedwater. system to keep the chlorides from getting 15- into the reactor.
16 We know that the frequency of getting into that 17 scenario where you have to essentially cut off the main 18 condenser, which looks like a main steam isolation valve L 19 closure -- we are going to say, let's assume that the l '20 condenser continues to degrade. We would project that this I
i 21' f requency is going to shif t upwards with passing time.
l 22 Such a calculation was done to gauge, you know, t
! 23 is this going to increase? We then obviously looked at th3 24 shift in these plant damage statest didn't come up with l
() 25 very large of an increase in core melt frequency. It had a L
I I
ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
. _ _ _ _ . _.. ? 3479 L ._ . ]
- H ! w covasse__ 800 336 6646
24940.0 225
.BRT C 1 risk impact of about 506 man-rems.
2 What we would imply from this is the following:
3 If we go in and fix the main condenser this doesn't 4 increase, that remains the same. That is the equivalent of 5 saving a future 506 man-rems.
6 MR.-MOELLER: Excuse me, when you have a delta 7 core melt frequency and you get the percent, the delta risk 8 depends upon the particular event? What I'm driving at, 9 like 35 percent change in core melt frequency was 10 equivalent to 10,600 person-rem, and a 1 percent is 600.
11 So it's not linear.
12 MR. BICKEL: That's correct. It depends on the
() ___13 plant damage state that's being looked at. ,They've all.got 14 slightly different weights. Some of them are about half, 15 others of them are 1/10th, thi -
that. So they are
/
16 unique to the type of plpnt damage state you were looking 17 at that was af'fected.
18 (Slide.)
19 This particular change was one that was 20 initiated with the idea of reducing spurious trips on the 21 plant. This is a very interesting one.
22 The old way it was required that every month got 23 to go in and close the M.S.I.V.s up to the 10 percent limit 24 switch and check the reactor protective system contact 25 switches close, register that the M.S.I.V.s were beginning
.O ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
. 202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336 6646
__ -, - - - . - - . - _ . ._~ -. ,,- - - - ,--.----.--
I 24940.0 226 BRT
(:) 1 to close. In addition, to stroke close those valves; if it 2 misstrokes and goes all the way on an individual M.S.I.V.,
3 it's going to cause a redistribution of all the steam flow, 4 which is going to look at a steam line break according to 5 the way the logic is set up. So all four of them are going 6- to close so you have a main steam line closure event.
7 We went back and looked at the initiating event 8 frequency for M.S.I.V. closure, which, again, is tied 9 directly to plant data. And we determined that 40 percent 10 of the M.S.I.V. closure events had occurred due to that 11 particular test.
12 We then looked at the fact that a test proposal 13 was being made, then, to eliminate this 10 percent closure 14 test and put the thing into the quarterly testing of the 15 full closure of the valves, which is.done at reduced power.
16 So the impact, then, is that we are going to'get 17 ; a direct reduction in the number of challenges that you 18 could get into this. So we essentially adjusted the 19 frequency downwards, reflecting a 40 percent reduction as a 20 result of eliminating that type of a threat.
21 When we calculated the entire change, the core 22 melt frequency took a very small drop, but nonetheless, it 23 was measurable. The change in risk was about 600 man-rems.
24 Again, this thing is being proposed as a way of
/~ 25 reducing spurious trips; so the PRA model, we find, is
(_T/
ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
-24940.0 227 BRT
~#
1 usable in looking at small changes that impact reliability 2 more than safety. !
3 (Slide.)
4 One of the areas in which there's an engineering 5 judgment-type evaluation being done -- control room design 6 review. There were basically three issues that affect risk 7 involved in the CRDR process, the first being avoiding 8 human caused initiating events. In other words, if the 9 control board is laid out in some sort of a problem 10 configuration maybe it causes a lot of trips of the plant.
11 The second area is that maybe given a transient has 12 occurred, is the layout of the control board and the O
x- 13 instruments that are available, are they such that they 14 -cause a lot of system unavailabilities because the operator 15 has thrown switches the wrong way in the heat of some event?
16 Finally, is there instrumentation in there that, 17 you know, 13 deficient f rom a human enactors point of view 18 that could lead to major cognitive errors in the 19 decisionmaking process of the operators in some event?
20 How did we use the PRA in this? Obviously you 21 can't quantify this in a matrix type model.
22 (Slide.)
23 What we did use was, we utilized the insights 24 from the PRA. First of all, in the area of human caused r"T 25 initiating event, you basically go back in and look and say V
ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646 j
24940.0 228 BRT u) 1 how many of the initiating events that were caused by 2 operators were caused by things within the scope of the 3 control room design review?
4 When we did that we were lead to a conclusion 5 that the events that are human caused tend to be dominated 6 by events which are outside the scope of the CRDR; like 7 maintenance and other activities would not be considered in 8 the control room design review.
9 Because of this we were able to conclude that 10 the CRDR would have no significant effect on these types of 11 human caused events and hence would not be very much of a
-12 risk impact.
13 We then looked at issue of critical operator 14 actions, where the operator might make an error in a short 15 period of time and thereby disable some equipment.
16 To get a handle on that, our human factors 17 people tell us that what we should be looking for is some 18 kind of a very hurried decision that the operator has to 19 make. In other words, where he's in a stress situation, 20 he's got to make a go/no go decision in a very short period 21 of time, and, you know, he has to do something quick. We 22 then tried to ' identify in the PRA where are the high risk 23 sequences that involve very, very quick operator actions 24 that if the control board was well laid out, as a result of
() 25 the control room design review, we would have some ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336 6646
'24940.0 229 BRT
/Q' xj .
1 improvement from.
2 We were able to identify these four events right 3 here. You had a reactor trip with a failure of the fast 4 transfer logic, it switches you from the generator to the 5 off-site switch yard given a trip. We concluded that the 6 benefits of a CRDR would be minimal because this type of a 7 sequence of reactor trip with fast transfer failure is very 8 low probability. That isn't too surprising when you look 9 at that type of a sequence.
10 Small LOCA in which there's a failure of-the 11 automatic ECCS actuation. Again, good instruments could 12 -lead to a very good decision by the operator in a v,ery 13 short time period, but the probability, again, is low, 14 mainly because the operator has a lot better procedures 15 right now than he did before. .
16 The loss of feedwater in conjunction with a 17 failure of the isolation condenser, th i's is going to lead 18 to a non-LOCA situation in which you can get a fairly quick.
19 core uncovering. In this area we looked at what type of H2O evaluation has already been done, and one thing we should 21 point out is the validation of the new emergency operating 22 procedures for Millstone Unit 1 there was a detailed review 23 of.the control board layout already done. So the 24 additional benefits of going back and doing the control
() 25 room design review on top of what has already been done is ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Com 800 336 6646
24940.0 230 BRT D
T.J l going to be a very small delta over it. In other words, we 2 doubt you are- going to find anything new of great 3 ~ significance.
4 The fourth area, MSIV closure-type ATWSs. The 5 operator has to make a very quick decision to reduce water 6 level to mitigate the event.
7 One of the critical areas that our human factors 8 person would point out is the ability of the operator to 9 use the existing GEMAC-type controller to regulate the 10 water level. He's going to have to go over and play around 11 with the knobs. The specific issue there is more dominated 12 by the GEMAC controller performance and all that than it is O 13 by the control room design review scope.
14 In other words, if he's going to get into this 15 action the trouble would more come from this controller 16 than in the operator's ability to go find it and know that 17 he's got to start to operate it.
18 There were some areas of cognitive error that 19 were pinpointed from the PSS as being important. One of 20 those happened to be the reference leg flashing issue. In 21 other words, under certain scenarios the reference legs 22 will flash and you can get some erroneous level indications.
23 It could lead to an incorrect operator decision on the need 24 to put more water in the core. An additional area was the
() 25 f ailure to recognize the need for level control. Both of ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. I 202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverase 800-336 4646 j
24940.0 231 BRT
(
V) 1 these areas, if you look at them, though, are either 2 addressed elsewhere or have been considered in the scope of 3 other items, so'the additional -- the benefit of the 4 control room design review, you are not going to be able to 5 get a clear reading from the PRA of the significant numbers.
6 What was done, then, was in view of the insights 7 we had, we essentially looked at all the other projects, 8 put in a scale that essentially was purely judgmental, but 9 based on reflecting, you know, the merit of this versus 10 some of.the other projects that had some actual hardware.
11 payoff.
7 12 (Slide.)
- 13 Control room habitability. This issue addresses 14 'three areas.
15 MR. WARD: Wait a minute, John. On'the design 16 review now, is the bottom line from that that there is 17 nothing that needs to be fixed in the control room? Is 18 that what you are saying?
19 MR. BICKEL: No. That's not the conclusion of 20 that. What we are saying is on a relative scale of the 21 worth of the CRDR in terms of the new improvements that 22 have not already been obtained from other programs -- in 23 other words, we are looking at what is going to be the 24 delta in improvement. We are saying it's fairly low.
() 25 However, there are other items that are lower and higher.
ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
E 347_-3_700__ ______ __ Nationwide Cm 800 336 6646
24940.0 232 BRT p.
v 1 We will essentially put a rank. We had to put it somewhere 2 into -- into a ladder. That does not imply that it 3 wouldn't get done. All we are assessing in here, mind you, 4 is . the benefit.
5 If somebody comes out and says we can do it for 6 $1000, you know, you'd be looking at, again, your 7 cost / benefit criteria and you make the decision from there.
8 But it is important to stack up what's the maximum type of 9 benefit you could get from it. That's what we are doing in 10 this exercise.
11 In the area of the control room habitability, 12 , this is another one I understand there was interest in
(' " '
13 getting some discussion on. Chlorine gas release is one ,
14 area that impacts habitability. Another is the potential 15 of a radiological release from an accident in Millstone 2.
16 I point out this analysis was done last summer.
17 Operability of Millstone 3 was not considered in this --
18 when this evaluation was done. The additional thing was 19 ventilation, HVAC, impact on the operator and their 20 environmental stress. These are the key considerations t
21 that went into it.
22 (Slide.)
23 The PRA did allow a calculation of the chlorine 24 gas-induced core melt frequency. In essence what we did is
.( )
25 we have an estimate of the frequency of the tank car i
l i
ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide CsGC~J 2 33 M
24940.0 233 BRT
-i \
U 1 failing for various modes; that necessitating a routine --
2 what would hope to be a nonroutine shutdown of the plant 3 because of the event. We made the assumption that we would 4 -be shutting the plant down and then we had to assume 5 additional failures.
6 As a result of coupling the chlorine gas release 7 accident on top of additional failures on automatic and 8 manually initiated equipment as you again begin a shutdown, 9 you end up with a fairly small core melt frequency relative 10 to other things. The risk impact from that is -- can be 11 directly calculated.
3 12 In terms of a radiological release from
\_) 13 Millstone 2, we took a guess at what the core melt 14 frequency on Millstone Unit 2 might be and, again, 15 projected the man-rems from that. In terms of a core melt 16 on Millstone 2 resulting in a need to shut down Unit 1 and 17 failing in that regard as pell -- and, again, you know, 18 these are convoluted sequences; this is an accident from an 19 accident. So again the risk impact of the habitability 20 improvements would be, again, small, being that this risk 21 is small.
22 The third area which we viewed as probably more 23 important -- again, I'd label this as an engineering 24 judgment call -- right now is in the area of the
() 25 ventilation system and its impacts on operator stress. In ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
FiM47-3700 Nationwide Coverr] 800 336 6646 _ . . _ . _ _
24940.0 234 BRT 1 other words, the room might heat up over long periods of 2 time. This again was purely judgmental-related. It was 3 done, again, like I say, by weighing this thing up against 4 some of the other issues that were being looked at.
5 MR. WARD: John, the chlorine gas, 34.5 man-rems, 6 that's real man-rems, I guess. Did you make an estimate --
7 what about this equivalency? Was there an estimate of the 8 off-site consequence or risk?
9 MR. BICKEL: What this is related to, the 10 sequence, this delta CMF involves -- first we have a 11 release from the chlorine car. That is going to result in 12 some alarms going off in various control rooms and 13 communications that we have got a chlorine release. We 14 assume that the decision would be made to execute a very 15 rapid shutdown of the other units. On Millstone 1, then, 16 they begin the shutdown -- in other words, maybe they've 17 ,
got the rods in or something, they run back the recirc, 18 they initiate a shutdown. And additional failures occur on 19 top of that that eventually result in a core melt. That's 20 j a very low number, but it is because you have got like 10 21 to the minus 4 or minus 3 chlorine car accident followed by 22 additional failures on Millstone 1.
23 MR. WARD: That chlorine release is, in itself, 24 without being -- you know, going through the plant scenario, 25 causes that.
ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
?n?. m m m Narinnwidermerare m w 6646
24940.0 235 BRT ~
l v
1 MR. BICKEL: Oh, I see your point. The risk 2 impact of the chlorine was evaluated separately under 3 another issue. Is that what you are leading to?
4 MR. WARD: I was wondering what that number is.
5 MR. BICKEL: This is related to radiological 6 release coming from Unit 1 because of a chlorine release.
7 MR. WARD: You said a few minutes ago you had 8 developed some equivalency.
9 MR. BICKEL: That's correct. For evaluating the 10 sodium hypochloride system all we did was we evaluated an 11 equivalent man-rem. The equivalent man-rem, my 3 12 recollection was like in the order of about -- it's on a i
~
13 subsequent slide -- about l~0~,~000.
14 MR. KACICH: About 10,000 man ~ rems.
15 MR. BICKEL: It's humongous. This is solely 16 related to radiological because of the chlorine release.
17 It's a little bit different.
18 MR. MOELLER: On the third item you say 19 engineering judgment is how you evaluated the impact of 20 environmental stress?
21 MR. BICKEL: Yes. The way that was done is we 22 compared this issue, which is basically people performance, 23 against known hardware issues that we are very readily able 24 to quantify. I would grant there are fairly large n
!s ,) 25 uncertainties, but all we are dealing with, really, we are ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202,347e3700__M@rc~1 _ - - - - - _ . _ EEN
i 24940.0 236 BRT 1 getting an order of magnitude-type assessment.
2 If we can prioritize these things in terms of 3 orders of magnitude we are doing far better than we havo 4 been able to in the past. And the thing we are finding as 5 a result of this net process is that order of magnitude ,is
)
6 a pretty good way right now. This thing could -- maybe ,
7 this thing if it goes up from 45 to 100 man-rems we'd still 8 end up with the same decision. What we are comparing this 9 to is a judgment call to this environmental related stress 10 to some hardware, maybe an issue or deficiency we want to i
11 resolve. , . l es 12 MR. MOELLER: But your bottom line, as I'see '
O 13 that, is that control room habitability is not all that 14 important? Is that what you are saying? ,
15 MR. BICKEL: We would rate it as being somewhat 16 more important than the control room design review, which 17 is a similar issue. There are a number of these which a'ta ,
18 similar in nature. They involve the human areas, not that 19 readily quantifiable.
20 MR. BENDER: You have to have some kind of 21 actual threshold, and I'm not sure that 45 man-rems or 100 22 man-rems is large enough for anybody to care yet unless 23 it's concentrated on one individual. I wonder how we. deal 24 with the question of threshold in these kinds of analyses?
() 25 How big does a number have to be to cause action.
ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
Fi45cM@) N::CIfD W _---_CGi'6C1_ - - -- --- - - - - - - _ - -
24940.0 237 BRT o
? -
1 MR. BICKEL: Bear in mind, this is not an action 2 threshold. What this is being used for is, this is the 3 benefit side of a cost / benefit evaluation. You don't get 4 to the point of making any type of decisions until you
- 5 evaluate all potential benefits and really weight the total
(
6 cost.
7 MR. BENDER: If it were $1000 per man-rem, I l
8 would say $45,000 would be spent; I would want to know more m 9 than that in order to'make a judgment.
V ,
l 10 MR. KACICH: One comment in the sense of
\ 11 perspective, we have been focusing on one of the factors in
\y
\ 12 the decisionmaking process, clearly an important one
, (,)
13 because the PSS model is the dominant part of our ISAP .
14 process. There are four others we haven't talked about and 5 19 all five need to be combined as the benefit side of the 3
16' equation, then look at cost, and only'then can we get
\
l
,17 specific about what to do and not to do.
w.t 18 MR. SCHEWMAN: When do we talk about the other I '\ 119 four?
20 MR. KACICH: That's not on the agenda as of now.
<n ,
21 MR. SCHEWMAN: It's interesting but takes a lot 22 of time as well.
I 23 (Slide.)
l i
34 MR. BICKEL: I would like to mention what has as l
i
() 2S yet been mentioned as a hot potato. The MOVEEQ. You heard t
l' ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
, _ _ 202 347 3700 __
Nationwide Coverage, ._ 800 33(H5646 . _ _ _ . ___ _ _ _ _
24940.0 238 BRT fs N
1 some of the history about it.
2 There were a whole series of valves that wore 3 individually evaluated, directly using the PRA model, and 4 this was an interesting place because we were able to take
.5 the model and look at individual valve changes and weight 6 their effectiveness.
7 There were a couple down here, you see some zeros 3 in terms of impact of core melt on. As an example, there 9 are a couple of particular valves here that we were able --
10 you can show don't do anything. Some of them are very 11 startling, and I think it is important maybe to take a look 12 at them for a second.
O ,
13 This is a makeup valve that provides water to 14 the condenser hot well that is pat: of the feedwater 15 coolant injection system.
16 In other words, if you turn the FWCI on, you are 17 eventually going to delete the hot well because the water 18 is spilling into the dry well and torus.
19 This valve is located near the reactor building 20 equipment drain tank and it is -- its problem right now is 21 that it doesn't meet the radiation qualification in a very 22 narrow sense of the term.
23 When you look at the situation of this valve, a 24 you come to some very interesting circular logic. If the
(') 25 feedwater coolant injection system runs and operates, you ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
K m.srs sn B Nationwide cogn 800-33m
n
. . 4 e 24940.0 239 BRT
/~s
~(_)
1 obviously keep the core covered at all times, there's no .
~2 major radiation source term, therefore you don't have an 3 environmental qualification problem.
4 If, however, the feedwater coolant injection
-5' system isn't running and a whole lot of other pumps aren't ,
6 running, you are going to have a radiological source term 7' problem, which may make this valve difficult to move.
8 1 However, if you can't run the feedwater coolant 9 injection system you are not going to delete the hot well 10 and the issue of this valve -- it becomes kind of a moot 11_ . point.
- 12. There are a couple of others that are of the
() ' 13 same, almost identical category. I'll just show you one on 14 a PNID.
15 These two valves up here-are related to the dry
! 16 well spray portion of the LPCI.
17 (Slide.)
18 .These two valves here have been identified as, l 19 again, having a qualification problem in a harsh l 20 environment. Let's take a look at where you might have to i
21 use it.
- 22 If you had a break somewhere here in the reactor 23 building to give you the steam, yes, this valve -- you 24 might have a problem. However, if you've got a pipe break 25
-( ) out here outside the boundaries of the dry well, it is very
! ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347-3700 ,__ _; Nationwide Coverage _ _._ 800-336-6646 _ , _ _ , , _ _
24940.0 240 BRT p
Y l difficult to envision how you would need to turn on this 2 spray valve. You haven't got any pressure on there.
3 If the break is inside h,ere where all your steam 4 is, obviously you don't have the steam temperature 5 environment up near here. The next question is radiation 6- qualification of these valves.
7 Again you get back to the same argument I 8 discussed a minute ago about the makeup valve for the hot 9 well. These valves would receive a high radiation dose if 10 there was damage in the core. How do you get damage in the 11 core? Well the answer is you lose inventory and you don't 12 put the water back in.
T 13 , One of the key areas that you are putting water 14 back in is with these LPCI pumps. So if the LPCI pumps 15 have failed to put water in here you have a radiation 16 source term that may make these valves not work. But if 17 you don't have these pumps working you can't put any water 18 through these valves anyway.
19 There are a whole bunch of valves like this, 20 essentially the tail end of the EEQ program have been 21 evaluated individually in the ISAP program.
22 '
think I can probably just wind it up here.
23 MR. KACICH: Why don't you just go to the last 24 log slide here.
(} 25 MR. SCHEWMAN: While he's going, what does it ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
24940.0 241 BRT q
v-1 cost to replace one of these valves?
2 MR. KACICH: The cost to do all 11 remaining 3 would be approximately $1 million. That's additional cost.
4 The money to get them has already been spent.
5 MR. SCHEWMAN: Thank you.
6 (Slide.)
7 MR. GRIMES: While he's finding the last slide, 8 I would like for the purpose of the record, to clarify, 9 since this will form substantial part of a basis of an 10 exemption if these valves are not clarified, that we don't 11 consider this circular logic.
12 MR. BENDER: What was that term? Maybe we O 13 shouldn't get it clarified, but circular logic says we are 14 back where we started.
15 MR. SCHEWMAN: I'm sure the logicians have a 16 more sophisticated term you can find.
17 MR. BICKEL: One of the things of I have done on 18 this slide is put in a log scale.
19 (Slide.)
20 One of'the nost important facets of the ISAP i 21 process is the ability to put all things together.
2'2 Incredibly our graphics people have put the scale a little
! 23 bit backwards, but I think we can still see the' intent.
24 What we've got here is essentially man-rem 25 impact of all of the things we've looked at with the ISAP
(}
I ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
' 800-336-66Mi
_ 202-347-3700_ _ _ Nati,onwi_de Coverage _. .
24940.0 242 BRT o 1 model, on .the scale of where they kind of line up.
2 I have over here the original NRC-initiated 3 items that were put into the program and the on,es over on 4 this side were the ones that we kind of put in.
5 Here, down here you see our issue related to the 6 long-term cooling and some work we want to do to upgrade 7 ' capability to remove decay heat in the long term.
8 Here's the chlorine near it. Changes we put 9 into the surveillance program obviously have some big 10 ' weights, so it -- because it addresses a key problem down 11 here.
12 The highest ranking NRC-related item is the area 0 13 of the ventilation, the feedwater coolant injection system 14 area of the plant following a LNP.
l 15 Somebody could say well', we could do some 16 further analysis and firm this one up, but again, this is a t
17 candidate right now. This one here is high in our l
18 visibility list.
19 There are other ones in here related to back 20 feeding AC power from Millstone to Millstone 1 to address 21 appendix R fire issues.
22 We have a makeup pump for tornado missiles. All 23 these are along in here.
24 We could point out that we may have some
-( ) 25 judgment calls in certain areas where there were human ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 2ES-27-WED Rt1Efb@EGID @M
7 24940.0 243
(
1 factors related. It could be off by factors of 2 or 3.
2 Even if they were, the tremendous span of this log scale -
3 indicates that we could still make some very really 4 fine-tuned decisions, despite the uncertainties that exist.
5 MR. SCHEWMAN: We don't have a copy of that in 6 our handout.
7 MR. BICKEL: You don't?
8 MR. KACICH: You should have one in there.
9 MR. BICKEL: They put it on two pages, I believe.
10 MR. SCHEWMAN: You mean these two things.
11 MR. GRIMES: These are that handout --
12 MR. SCHEWMAN: I see. Okay.
O 13 MR. WARD: What's the bottom one, the l
14 NRC-initiated HVAC for LNP?
15 MR. BICKEL: The ventilation system that cools 16 the area around some of the big pumps and motors related to 17 the feedwater coolant injection system. This was a 18 holdover item, I guess it was identified in SEP.
19 MR. WARD: We don't know what LNP stands for.
20 MR. BICKEL: Loss of normal power. Pollowing a l
21 loss of normal power the motor with that HVAC gets shed 22 while you are reloading.
23 MR. WARD: So that's not station blackout --
g 24 MR. BICKEL: No.
() 25 MR. SCHEWMAN: Okay. I would like to start, ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347-3700 Nationwide Coveray 800 336 6646
24940.0 / 244 BRT O 1 again, then, at 10 minutes to 1:00.
2 (Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., the meeting was 3 recessed, to reconvene at 12:50 p.m., this same day.)
4 5
6 7
8 9
10 11 12 O 13 14 15 16 17 18 l 19 20 21 22 j 23 24 O 25 ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
24940.0 245 BRT
(~'a 1 AFTERNOON SESSION (12:50 p.m.)
2 MR. SCHEWMAN: The next item on the agenda, we 3 start off with the integrated response capabilities. Who 4 is doing the presentation on that?
5~ MR. KACICH: Paul Blasioli is going to take care 6 of that.
7 MR. BLASIOLI: I work in generation facilities 8 licensing, and 'we'll be talking about integrated emergency 9 response capabilities, and I'll follow it up with an 10 overview of the emergency preparedness program for 11 Millstone 1.
12 (Slido.)
) 13 Supplement 1 to NUREG 0737 is the document the 14 NRC issued providing criteria for five items, safety 15 parameter display system, emergency operating procedures, 16 control room design review and regulatory guide 1.97 on 17 emergency response facilities.
18 The document came out in December of '82 and 19 most of these are self-explanatory. Three of these are 20 going to be addressed in a little more detail.
21 (Slide.)
22 We responded on April 15, 1983, as well a's every 23 other licensee, and we had a fairly unique integration 24 scheme. Not only did we integrate the five issues in 25 supplement 1 but we also integrated all four plants l-ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Cove age 800-336 6646
L 24940.0' 246 BRT.
L D 1 together as well as our plant process computer replacement L 2 projects. The integration of the five items.was fairly 3 -straightforward, and again similar to what other utilities 4- had.to do. We have input to SPDS, regulatory guide is
.5' inputted to SPDS as well as some of the debt acquisition
'6 systems in the EOF.
7 Integration efforts for all four plants, the 8 most. unique part -- this isn't all that unique -- but what 9 we did choose to to do is integrate the SPDS into the plant 10 process computer. We had programs already in place to 11~- initiate replacement of the computers at the three-12 operating plants, and those schedules dictated the schedule 13 ~ for.the SPDS.
.14 We tried to do them in somewhat series as much 15- ~ as possible, as opposed to parallel path. It turned out-16 Millstone 3 was first, then Millstone 2, then Connecticut-17 Yankee, then Millstone 1. In a similar fashion we~will.be 18 doing th'e CRDRs, in a series, with the same. set of plants,
-19 Millstone 3, Millstone 2, CY, and Millstone 1.
' 20. Regulatory guide 1-97 and the EOPs were fairly 21 plant-specific and are just done on a schedule dictated by 22 the plants. Emergency facilities are basically-23 site-specific so all are doing EOFs at the same time.-
L 24 MR. SCHEWMAN: What does the last . item mean? It
[
- 25. helps your purchasing agent but what else does it do? How --
t ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 33MM6
24940.0 247 BRf O I what is being integrated in the process computer?
2 MR. BLASIOLI: Our SPDS will be an integral part 3 of our plant process computer, we will not have a stand 4 alone SPDS system, and this schedule for doing SPDSs were 5 then dictated by the schedule for the replacement of the 6 process computers.
7 Did I answer your question?
8 MR. SCHEWMAN: Does the parallel projects mean 9 the three on this site or the integration of everything'on 10 the multiple sites? Replacement projects means there are 11 several projects.
12 MR. BLASIOLI: There's a replacement computer 13 project for Connecticut Yankee, for Millstone 1, for 14 Millstone 2. There were three separate projects.
15 MR. SCHEWMAN: And they are being integrated?
! 16 MR. BLASIOLI: Not necessarily integrated 17 together except to the degree we tried to come up with an 18 overall schedule that allowed us to use the same resources 19 in-hou'se to do all four projects, including Millstone 3 20 which was under construction at the time.
21 MR. SCHEWMAN: Thank you.
22 (Slide.)
4 23 MR. BLASIOLI: Based on our response and phone i
j 24 call; and additional responses after the initial response, 4
(]) 25 the NRC Staff issued confirmatory orders, confirmatory i
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
[ 202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
24940.0 248 BRT O 1 order for Millstone 1 modifying our license, and there were -
2 some legally binding requirements that came out of that.
3 Most are schedule-type requirements.
4 Very quickly, in the case of SPDS, we were 5 required, will be required to submit a safety analysis
~
6 report April of '87, and at the same time we have to affirm 7 completion date for the completion of SPDS and the 8 operators trained. That will roughly be the first half of 9 1988, based on our current schedule.
10 EOPs at Unit 1 are already implemented. They 11 were implemented in June of 1983. We also had to provide a l
12 procedures generation package to the NRC which was provided 13 in May-of '83, t
14 Control room design review. We owe the NRC a l
15 program plan in March of '87, at the same time we owe them 16 a schedule for the summary report which will probably I 17 follow about 12 to 18 months thereafter.
18 Regulatory guide 1.97. We owed the NRC and gave 19 the NRC in February of '84 our regulatory guide 1.97 report l
20 with essentially -- all the items except.those that are in 21 ISAP are completed at this time.
l 22 Emergency response facilities are essentially 23 completed. The only thing that is left to be done is some 24 additional data acquisition systems that are being
(} 25 evaluated right now.
l ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
cN 9700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
24940.0 249 BRT O
1 MR. WARD: The SPDSs are not in place. Will the 2 SPDS have to be modified --
3 MR. BLASIOLI: I'll try and correct that. A lot ,
4 of information -- the way the EOPs are written now is to 5 tell the operator to obtain a certain amount of information, 6 right now he does it off the board. With the SPDS in place 7 he could rely on the SPDS or the boards to get the 8 information. I don't know if he'd have to modify the EOPs 9 to tell him to go to the SPDS or the boards. He'd have the 10 option.
11 MR. SCHEWMAN: Does the PSA have any impact or 12 input on what goes up on the SPDS? Did the AIF set up 13 guidelines for this? Did the NRQ? Or what?
14 MR. BLASIOLI: In terms of the specific 15 parameters and information on the SPDS? I'm going to get 16 into that in just a little bit.
17 MR. SCHEWMAN: Fine.
18 (Slide.)
19 MR. BLASIOLI : Emergency operating procedures.
l 20 As I just said, they implemented on June 29, 1983 and it 21 was either one of the first -- it was the first or one of 22 the first BWRs to have implemented the upgraded 23 symptom-oriented EOPs. Obviously they are based upon the i
24 owners' group efforts, their emergency procedure guidelines; i
() 25 they are symptom-oriented. We don't care about the event ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
__ __________ 202-367-3709 __ _ _ NaicawMs Coverts 800 336 6 %
24940.0 250 BRT U
1 too much. It's basically the symptom that's trying to be 2 corrected.
3 There are two major guidelines that come out of 4 the generic technical guidelines: the reactor pressure 5 vessel control, you are interested in controlling the water 6 level in the vessel; the pressure, the RPV, shutting the 7 reactor down and cooling it down.
8 Containment control guideline primarily deals 9 with the control of the temperature inside the dry well, 10 the pressure in the dry well, as well as the suppression 11 pool water level and the temperature of the water.
12 MR. MOELLER: When you say it was implemented in
(,_)
13 June of '83, you mean all the operators were up to speed at 14 that time?
15 MR. BLASIOLI: That includes training of 16 operators, that's true. Validation, verification, 17 everything.
18 MR. WARD: Let's see. Do you have a copy of the 19 EOP --
20 MR. BLASIOLI: I think John has some examples.
21 MR. WARD: Okay. That was passed out.
22 MR. BLASIOLI: Quickly going through the 23 procedure generation package, I'm not sure how familiar you 24 are with the process the NRC is going through reviewing the f3
%J 25 EOPs. They are looking not at the EOPs themselves, what ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
. . _ . _ - . - - . - - . = _- -. .-_ _ _ - - - - _ - --- _.
I r ,
124940.0 251 1 BRT
- . 0 l' they are looking for is a procedure generation package.
2 We submitted our procedure generation package on
, 3 May 13, 1983. It has five basic parts to it. The i 4 plant-specific technical guidelines are where each' utility 5 takes the generic guidelines, modifies them as necessary to 6 have -- to come up with a plant-specific guideline, which 7 deals basically with modifying the guidelines if in fact we '
8 have different equipment. We have -- I think John.Bickel
- 9. went through that this mor'ing. n We have isolation 10 condenser and FWCI, as. opposed to HCCIA plant-specific 11 writer's guides. It tells the operating staff how to write 12 the procedures verification program, verifying that all the
,O' _
13 actual steps in the procedures 'are technically correct.
14 Validation program -- to make sure that you in 15 fact can implement the EOPs, the operators can use them, 16 -and you can perform the safety function or emergency 17 functions that you need to perform.
18 A training program basically trains the 19 operators. It consists primarily of a classroom training 20 phase and a simulator that's on the GE simulator.-
21 MR. SCHEWMAN: The writers guide is something so -
22 there's uniformity for the reader?
23 MR. BLASIOLI: Yes, it gets down to the details 24 of formats, the way to actually number the pages, figures,
() 25 tables, cross-referencing, all that stuff.
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
_.. gfgs-sn Ne@mro CI M M""3 _ _ _ . . . . _ . .
24940.0 252 BRT
,m U
1 (Slide.)
2 Just a real quick rundown of the NRC status of 3 our review, NRd ceview. ,
4 After we made our submittal in May of '83, the 5 NRC requested some additional information. The primary 6 . area there was, in fact, that when we submitted our 7 plant-specific technical guidelines, we did not provide 8 information justifying the differences between those 4
9 guidelines and the technical guidelines of the owners' 10 group. The NRC asked us to give them more information on 11 the differences and justification for the differences,
-~ 12 which we then provided on March 9 of '84.
u 13 . ,They then, based on chat ecbmittal, gave us a
~
14 safety evaluation in September of '84 with a couple'of
- 15 remaining items on the validation and verification program, 16 as well as the writers guide. We then responded again in 17 January of '85, provided that information and as NUREG 1143 18 indicates, the NRC staff is going on based on that last 19 submittal. That's fairly straightforward stuff.
20 Any questions?
21 (Slide.)
22 That's all I have on EOPs. I was going to go 23 into the SPDS now. The SPDS objective -is that the SPDS 24 will be an aid to the operator to give him information on
() 25 the critical parameters necessary for keeping the plant in ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
F4237-E@ NtM@wa 3 @DRM?l3 >
24940.0 253 BRT I
1 a safe status, as well as helping him to implement the EOPs.
2 Again, the SPDS will be a integral part of the 3 plant process computer, computer-driven obviously, with 4 four CRTs in the control room. The SPDS will be supplied 5 by GE -- not safety grade, not class 1-E, not seismic. It 6 is obviously going to be -- well, not obviously, but we are 7 going to make it consistent with the EOPs. The basic 8 thrust of the SPDS will be to help the operators implement 9 the EOP, and to know when there are certain entry 10 conditions that go into the OPPs. Location, they are going 11 to be located in the control room as required. We are also
,c- 12 going to have it in the TSC, although that's not required 13 from an NRC perspective.
14 MR. WARD: What you just said about the entry 15 conditions for EOPs and so forth with the SPDS seems to 16 conflict a little bit with what you said earlier, that the 17 EOPs don't -- aren't dependent on having SPDS. It seems to 18 me they conflict. Maybe you can explain it.
19 MR. BLASIOLI: Okay. The EOPs certainly can be 20 implemented with or without an SPDS. If there's an SPDS in 21 the control room, some of the pre-conditions for the 22 reactor pressure vessel control -- if water drops below a 23 certain part or water pressure goes below 2 PSIG, or 24 whatever -- there will be certain indications off the SPDS:
(/ 25 either lights will go on and off or the colors of the ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-3 6 -3700 Mat %m?'bfavrage 800-31WF^3 l
24940.0 254 BRT O parameters will change colors on the SPDS stream.
1 Those 2 indicators will let the operator know automatically if he 3 hasn't already gone to go into certain of his EOPs. That's 4 what I meant by that comment.
5 MR. SCHEWMAN: The SPDS will be placed in the 6 control room and where else?
7 MR. BLASIOLI: The technical support center.
8 MR. SCHEWMAN: Is this the technical support 9 center? Next-door?
10 MR. BLASIOLI: No. Emergency operations 11 facility is next-door. The technical support center right 12 now is located adjacent to the control building for O 13 Millstone 3. It's a site TSE.
I'm going to get into that 14 a little bit later as well.
15 MR. MOELLER: Why have the SPDSs taken so long 16 to be installed?
17 MR. BLASIOLI: That gets back to this 18 integration of all four plants at Northeast Utilities. We 19 did Millstone 3 first because we wanted to get an operating 20 license and that was the first in the bin, and any day now 21 in fact we are hoping to get that license.
22 Millstone 2 was next and that was dictated by 23 the schedule already in place for the Millstone 2 24 replacement projects of the computer. CY was next and we 25
(]) happened to follow up last.
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-M00 Nationwide Coverage 800 336-6646
I 24940.0 255 BRT r x,
()
1 MR. MOELLER: Okay. Thank you.
2 MR. BLASIOLI: Availability, it's going to have 3 a designed availability of greater than 99 percent.
4 Reactor modes, essentially everything but refueling and 5 shutdown at this moment.
6 (Slide.)
7 Data storage, typical SPDS data storage, 8 anywhere from two to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> pre-event and with a 12-hour 9 post-event storage.
10 Data validation, all the censor signals that 11 will be going in for the SPDS parameters will go through a gw. 12 certain validation algorithm inside the SPDS and they will i d 13 then be assigned a certain quality tag: validated, 14 invalidated or invalid data.
15 MR. SCHEWMAN: Comment on your availability, 99 16 is a nice target. Is it in the tech specs that this thing 17 has to be up or down?
18 MR. BLASIOLI: As of right now it certainly 19 wouldn't be, because we don't have it.
20 MR. SCHEWMAN: Do you expect it to be a year 21 from now or two years from now?
22 MR. BLASIOLI: There's no efforts underway to 23 put that into our tech specs at this time. It would 24 certainly have to be something we'd address with the NRC
() 25 once we implemented it.
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
E-347-3700 Fationwide Coverase 800-336 6646
24940.0 256 BRT g
~
l MR. SCHEWMAN: I probably have the story wrong,
- 2 so I shouldn't mention names anyway, but one event that 3 came up, A, the system worked and B the system didn't work, 4 didn't thrust it, and so it was a "no, never mind." I hope 5 your system works a lot better.
6 MR. BLASIOLI: So do we.
7 (Slide.)
8 One thing I really didn't get into too much 9 before and I meant to, we are just in the initial phase of 10 designing the SPDS. We have just signed a letter of intent 11 with GE about two months ago. We are hopefully going to 12 issue a purchase order this week as a matter of fact, and n'
N- 13 the designed functional spec will be completed by roughly 14 the May time frame of 1986. So we are in the very early 15 design phases. We don't have a lot of details on what the 16 places are going to look like.
17 In general we are going to have something that 18 deals with the two primary EOPs, which are the reactor 19 vessel control line and the containment control line, some 20 sort of schematic, some sort of display with factual 21 information, parameter information.
22 We will also have a radioactivity release 23 control. That will be geared fairly nicely to our 24 emergency plan and there are different levels: Unusual
{} 25 event, general alert, emergency. Those different ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-33(H5646
24940.0 257 BRT
+
)
a 1 conditions will in fact key different colors on our SPDS 2 screen, and then we'll have some information on the 3 critical plant variables.
4 (Slide.)
5 MR. MOELLER: I presume that's other critical 6 plant variables.
7 MR. BLASIOLI: As opposed to the ones already 8 included in the first?
9 MR. MOELLER: Right.
10 MR. BLASIOLI: Yes. Okay. There will be human 11 factors in engineering that will be an integral part of our
,3 12 SPDS design. It was in the case of Millstone 3, is being 13 in the unit of Unit 2 and obviously will be for Millstone 1~.
14 We will use the appropriate human factors guidelines.
15 There's some NRC guidance, industry guidance. There's a 16 fair amount of guidance on that.
17 Verification and validation, a lot of that will 18 be done by General Electric, but in general, what we'll 19 have is a system -- a means of verifying that each step in 20 the design process was done accurately and completely, and 21 that you take the information from each step and you use it 22 appropriately in the following steps.
23 You take the design and functional spec 24 requirements, make sure they are carried through the entire
( ,) 25 design process.
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
WA-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336-6646
.24940.0 258 BRT L) 1 The SPDS validation process is really a process 2 .to confirm that the overall system works the way it's 3 supposed to and meets the intent of the design and 4 functional spec. The three prime means of doing validation 5 are going to be a factory test before the computer is 6 delivered to the site, the integrated acceptance test on 7 site, and then man the loop testing, which will use 8 operators to actually run them through some scenarios, some 9 preCAM scenarios to see how they respond and if they are 10 able to use it. It's more used from a human engineering 11 point of view to be sure the man / machine interface 12 practices been properly designed.
i' 13 (Slide.)
14 That's it for the emergency response 15 capabilities, and I was going to go into the emergency 16 preparedness program unless you have any questions.
17 MR. SCHEWMAN: Fine.
18 MR. BLASIOLI: Okay. Just really quickly, we 19 did in fact have a plan in place before TMI. Most 20 utilities obviously had to do that.
21 A post-TMI plan was implemented in July 1981.
22 That met the 0654. NRC did an appraisal in 1982 that t
l 23 consisted of a two-week process whereby they came and 24 looked at the procedures, plans, training, equipment,
() 25 facilities, whatever, and they issued an appraisal report I
ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336 4646
24940.0 259 BRT O .
1 and we -- took us, you know, about a year to respond to all 2 the different comments, but that was finally closed out.
3 Prompt alerting and notification system was 4 implemented in May of '82. That consisted primarily of 5 about 150 sirens.
6 NRC ap? roved our overall plan in May of '83.
7 They found it acceptable and found that we had revised the 8 plan to meet the revised regulations.
9 The station plan over the last two or three 10 years has been revised to include Millstone 3. I want to 11 emphasize the plan is a station plan; it's the same plan 12 for all three plants.
O 13 MR. SCHEWMAN: How far is Long Island at its
~
14 nearest point?
15 MR. BLASIOLI: Greater than 10 miles because 16 it's outside the plume exposure.
17 Anyway, the station plan is for all three units.
18 We had to revise it to include Millstone 3 <ver the last 19 two or three years, and because of that, the plan got 20 totally re-reviewed by the NRC staff. All items have been 21 currently resolved and we even went through a Millstone 3 22 appraisal.
23 There are a few items remaining in the appraisal 24 that are hardware-related and all related to Millstone 3.
() 25 There's nothing related to Millstone 1.
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - . _ _ _ - -202-347-3700 NaionwW9 Covemcp 8G-3366d5
24940.0 260 BRT
(/
1 (Slide.)
2 Off-site emergency response plans. They also 3 had a pre-TMI plan, in fact they had NRC concurrence in 4 December of '77. They did a tri-town full-scale exercise 5 in June of '78, prior to any of the regulations that exist 6 today. The plan was revised to meet NUREG 0654 in October l 7 of '81. We obtained the FEMA approval in October of '84 --
8 that's the 44 CFR 350 approval process. The only condition 9 at that time was that they had not reviewed and blessed off 10 on the alerting and notification system. We did obtain 11 that just recently, in August of '85. So, bottom line from
- 12 the last two slides is: We are in pretty good shape from 13 an_NRC/ FEMA review of our emergency plans. .
14 (Slide.)
15 Overall concept of operations. As most 16 utilities, we do have approximately a 10-mile plume 17 exposure pathway EPZ. I have a couple of slides I'm going 18 to show you in a second.
19 Likewise, we have a 50-mile ingestion exposure 20 pathway. The states within 10 miles are Connecticut and 21 New York. The states within 50 are Connecticut, New York, 22 and Rhode Island as well. There are 12 local communities 23 within the 10-mile plume exposure pathway.
24 We have both a station emergency organization
() 25 and a corporate emergency organization. The station is ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
24940.0 261
.BRT
~
0 1 obviously on-site, located in SOE/ LEO control room. They 2 are the primary organization to respond to an emergency.
3 They have the responsibility for classifying the event, 4 initial notifications, taking corrective actions on-site, 5 recommending protective action off-site, 6 The corporate emergency organization is somewhat 7 a parallel organization. They support the plant, they 8 provide more time-consuming and more detailed analyses of 9 the -- whatever is happening at the site at that particular 10 time.
11 State and local communities, information is
. 12 provide to them from either the SEO or CEO, and then local 13 communities are basically the decisionmaking individuals 14 until they are -- if a state of emergency is declared by 15 the governor, he has authority over the local communities.
16 (Slide.)
17 MR. SCHEWMAN: Have you talked to them about the 18 relative options of evacuation versus shelter? What have 19 you done with regard to that sort of public education?
20 MR. BLASIOLI: Okay. As a matter of fact, we 21 have our emergency classification scheme. That has been 22 adopted by us and the NRC and the state of Connecticut. It 23 has a dual purpose. It has an initial classification, 24 which is unusual event alert, site area, general emergency,
.() 25 and along with that there's a posture code, alpha, bravo, ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
l 202-347-3700 _ _ _ _ Nationwide CmRD _
800-336-6646
- -- . . . . - _ _ . - - . _ _ ~..- . - . . . - . . . _. . .
24940.0 262 BRT 1 et cetera, which is geared specifically to the way the .
2 state of Connecticut has been doing business for quite some 3 time. ,
4 Based on that posture code there are 5 automatically preplanned sheltering and evacuation 6 recommendations, automatically made. Based on whatever the 7 initiating event is, they know there are certain 8 recommendations for them to take. .
9' They have a procedure to assess those to make 10 sure there is no other constraints, weather, whatever..
11 MR. SCHEWMAN: "They" is the local mayor now?
12 MR. BLASIOLI: Local communities unless the 13 governor declares a state of emergengy.
14 (Slide.)
15 This is just a little map of the various EPZs.
16 -You can see the 10-mile impacts. The parts of New York 17 that it impacts --
18 MR. SCHEWMAN: Let me stay with that question if
!- 19 you are through with it.
20 MR. BLASIOLI: Sure.
l 21 MR. SCHEWMAN: You are telling me it's all by _
i 22 the: book and they have read the book enough so that you 23 trust them to follow it or at least you hope they will.
j 24 This book, then, is aimed at using observed source terms f()- 25 before anybody would start clogging the roads to get out of ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
.... .. _ _ m 347-3700 . . _ . - . Nationwide Coq ,,
800 336 6646 _ , _ _ , _ , ,
24940.0 263 BRT j- 1 kJ l 1 the locality?
2 MR. BLASIOLI: In the case of a very fast-moving 3 event, which is a very low probability event, the posture 4 codes allow them to make decisions without being -- if you l l
5 don't have the time to go out and actually take an actual 6 dose assessment.
7 There are posture codes that allow them to take 8 some protective action prior to having that data. The more 9 typical scenario would be those organizations would be 10 fully in place; he'd have an EEOF staff, Berlin staff, 11 local EOCs would all be staffed, and there's sufficient 12 information coming in from the emergency monitoring teams
'- 13 , to provide the information to the communities to allow them 14 to make decisions on a real time off-site dose assessment, 15 but initially, the posture codes allow them to take 16 protective action without the benefit of that information.
17 MR. SCHENMAN: Okay. Thank you.
18 MR. MOELLER: Hase your emergency drills been l
19 successful enough to where you are now on an every other l 20 year basis?
l
( 21 MR. BLASIOLI: Yes. This past year we went on 22 that.
23 MR. MOELLER: Thank you.
24 MR. BLASIOLI: The only part of New York that's f')
xs 25 in the two-mile are two islands , Fishers Island and Plum ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
24940.0 .- 264 BRT
<~s k_)
1 Island. Plum is basically a federally controlled island 2 that we really don't do too much with other than gotify 3 them. They h 9 ve their own emergency plan and evacuation 4 plan and' what have you. There's not much more that needs 5 to be said for that.
6 ._. (Slide.) .
y , l 7 That's just a list of the 12 local communities 8 within 10 miles.
9 (Slide.)
10 One thing that's probably a little. unique about 11 Millstone and Northeast Utilities, we activate both the <*
12 station emergency organization and the off-site corporate
.('y
'~'
13 emergency organization as well as the state and local n \
14 communities at the alert level. Most utilities do have to 15 activate at the alert, but that's only usually the TSC and ,
16 the control room. We activate the SOF, TSC, OFC, Berlin --
17 everything at the alert level. -
The on-shift staff is augmented b'y-about 44 18
, 19 .on-call individuals within 60 minutes. The SS, shift
~
20 supervisor, is the, director of 'tke SEO until relieved by 21 the on-call director, and then the SS goes and fulfills the 22 . manager of control room operations.
23 Other typical managers are managers of the TSC, t 24 manager of radiological doso assessment, manager of
() 25 radiological consequences, public information, . engineering s
A Acn-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 33(HM46
. - _ . - -_ . . - _ . - ~ _ . - - . . .--
.g _ _ _ .. . _ . - . _ . _ _ _
- (.4 - C- >
p
?OJ 3 L l
. FC
! .. %~
v . ' ; =.
, 'ga4940.~0 265 BRT~
ifi Y 'd
- 1. support, communications, et cetera.
h R 2 CEO staff is essentially nobody on shift,
' t^
3 obviously., But they are on a 90-minute on-call. They have 4 staff, Berlin and in fact there are 16 people on call.
'S They have essentially the same kind of managers:
6, Technical support, public information, communication, 7 s similar type of setup.
8 Recovery phase, once the plant is put in a cs 9< stable conditien we go into recovery phase, which may be 4
10 nothing more than just a normal station and corporate 11 ' facilities. We have the resources to respond to wherever 11 2 . we are, and if not, we actually implement a recovery t.'
--h ,
.13 organization if it's going to take us quite a while to
, s
- Crecover or if it's going to take extensive resources.
14 b 15! MR. WARD: 'To see if I understood what you said,
~'
- *16 in every alert the shift supervisor has to leave the 17 control room and go to the tech support center?
18- MR. BLASIOLI: New York, the shift supervisor 19 \ stays in the control rodm at all times. For the first 60 l
20 minutes before the director of the SEO goes on-site, which l 21 goes to the EOF, he would remain in the control room.
22 MR. WAIU): He has different responsibilities but l-Vs 23 never leaves the control room?
T\ 24 MR. BLASIOLI: That's correct.
'h .
25 (Slide.)
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
L: KiMm4Ei) N4ndb@wGan 800 336 6646 _ _ _ _ _ _ _
24940.0 266 BRT
~
l Just a rundown of the various emergency response 2 facilities. I actually have less slides than you' have in 3 the handouts. In the handouts there's some pretty good 4 pictures of various facilities.
5 Control room, just as we were talking, as a 6 matter of fact, is the facility by which emergency response 7 is handled for the first 60 minutes of any accident. If 8 it's'an unusual event, then we don't activate, so therefore 9 they are the only facility.
10 Operational support center is the Millstone 1 11 library, about 75 feet from the Unit 1 and. Unit 2 control 12 rooms, and it is basically where all the overflow people, p>-
13, the INC techs, chem techs, HPs, mechanics, electricians --
14 where they would go to support the control room. We keep 15 them out of the control room but they are fairly close to 16 it.
17 Technical support center, we were talking 18 briefly before, is a site technical support center. We 19 used to have a different technical support center. We 20 built a new one as part of Millstone 3 and we just made it 21 operational in about roughly May of '85, just this past 22 year. It is now the technical support center for all three 23 units.
24 It is a habitable facility. It's about -- has e
25 one-foot thick concrete walls. It is about 2000 square ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-33M646
-24940.0 267
.BRT rs (w/
1 feet. It holds about 15 people, five -- we have five 2 people designated to go there af ter an emergency. We can 3 handle five NRC people and then we have enough room for 4 five additional people as we see fit.
5 MR. MOELLER: That is, I assume its own air 6 cleaning system and own emergency --
7 MR. BLASIOLI: It is tied in with emergency 8 power. It has its own HVAC system. It's underground, as a 9 matter of fact.
10 Okay. EOP -- I understand you saw that 11 yesterday. I think you took a tour of the EOF, did you not?
12 MR. KACICH: It ended up being canceled from the
(
13 tour. But let me. throw in on the fly, yesterday 14 Dr. Moeller raised the question of protective features for 15 the EOF. Perhaps you could address that now.
! 16 MR. BLASIOLI: The protection factor on the EOF,
-17 greater a 500 protection factor for noble gases and 130 or 18 even greater than 130 for Jodine 131. It's a substantial 19 structure, has about two-foot thick concrete walls and 20 ceilings, its own HVAC system, charcoal absorbers, 21 emergency diesel, airtight doors you can close manually and 22 they are airtight.
23 Let's see, what else? Decontamination 24 facilities in the EOF. It's a pretty nice building.
25 MR. MOELLER: How frequently do you have to test
( })
l ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. l 202-3/7-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336 4646
24940.0 268 BRT
.n 1 the diesel generator for that? Or how frequently -- do you 2 do it like -- .
t 3 MR. BLASIOLI: I don't know.
4 MR. ROMBERG: We have frequency for all the 5 equipment out there and it's tested by Unit 2 operators.
- 6 That closes the doors, the diesels, ventilation systems, i
7 lights, batteries for the emergency lights; and the whole 8 physics department has surveillance on the pack, rad 9 monitors, batteries -- all in a program, surveillance, just 10 like anything else in the plant.
11 MR. MOELLER: Very good.
()
'~'
12 13 MR. BLASIOLI:
old conference room.
The corporate EOC is basically an It's still used once in a while as a 14 conference room. It has been redone and has all the 15 appropriate communication and data links that we need for 16 the corporate emergency organization to do their function.
17 Again, they have -- I guess I already said that.
18 And then as far as supplement 1 to NUREG-0737 goes, these 19 facilities are essentially complete. The only thing that's 20 really missing from the EOF and TFC would be additional 21 data acquisition systems that may need to be put in place.
22 If they are, they are going to be tied into the plant 23 process computer system upgrades.
24 (Slide.)
() QS That's just a little map of the various ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
ST&D37_-NED RttmIfb@naco OMSC"3
24940.0 269
,BRT 1 facilities.
2 We are in the training facility. EOF -- the TSC 3 is located here. TSC is here. OSC is right next to Unit 1 4 control room.
5 MR. SCHEWMAN: What channels of communication 6 would be open with the NRC? I take it there would be a 7 dedicated line. Any of this SPDS information scheduled to 8 go off-site or is that dead now?
9 MR. BLASIOLI: The so-called nuclear data link 10 is temporarily dead. There is an emergency -- if I got the 11 acronym right -- emergency response data system, I believe
. g-] 12 -- that's being discussed now within the NRC. It's a u
13 volunteer program at the moment whereby you would tap --
l 14 the NRC would tap into our system, our data acquisition 15 system. That is not required at the moment.
I 16 MR. SCHEWMAN: But answer my question, then:
17 What lines of communication would be open?
18 MR. BLASIOLI: Right now basically -- there 19 would be a significant number of NRC people on-site. They 20 would arrive on-site. That would be our primary contact.
21 In lieu of that or in the interim period before 22 we arrive on-site, we have the emergency notification 23 system, the HP network that are dedicated phone lines to 24 both region 1 and Bethesda. We have other just normal
-s
(_) 25 phone lines as well as that, telecopy. If we have to get ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
N Nanonwide Coverase 800 336-6646
24940.0 270
~BRT g)
G 1 information and data it would quickly be telecopied or 2 verbalized over the phones.
3 MR. SCHEWMAN: Regular lines weren't too useful 4 at THI too, as I recall.
5 MR. BLASIOLI: The dedicated lines are HP 6 network and ENS. It's just the health physics line -- l 7 MR. GRIMES: There's one line that's dedicated 8 for transmitting health physics data from their computer 9 system to the computer system in Bethesda so we get 10 information about releases around the plant. There's 11 another telephone line that goes right to the duty officer 12 in the incident response center and that s where oral 13 communication during an event -- or t6-provide st.atus.
14 MR. SCHEWMAN: Those are the two dedicated lines?
15 They both go to Bethesda?
16 MR. BLASIOLI: The HP goes to region 1.
17 MR. GRIMES: I think to the region on the HP 18 network.
19 MR. SHEDLOSKY: There are two basic circuits.
20 The ENS is a dedicated four-wire circuit with no switching.
21 When the receiver is picked up it will ring at the NRC 22 operations center in Bethesda.
23 The health physics network is a dial telephone 24 system. Dialing two digits, a two-digit number, you will
() 25 get the duty officer in Washington or other reactor ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347=3700_ Mh _ UMU24"3
24940.0 271 BRT e 1 facilities or region 1.
2 MR. SCHEWMAN: Thank you.
3 MR. MOELLER: Have you had to respond -- I don't 4 know whether it is yet required, but the NRC was 5 considering each utility had to demonstrate the ability to 6 supplement the crew on-site in case of an extreme natural 7 phenomenon occurring, earthquake, et cetera.
8 MR. BLASIOLI: Yes. Have we been asked to 9 demonstrate that yet? No. We have not. I believe that's 10 still in the review process between the NRC staff and 11 Commission. The NRC staff is trying to get -- has 12 presented some positions to the NRC Commissioners for their 13 decision.
14 MR. MOELLER: You mentioned helicopters, didn't 15 you?
16 MR. BLASIOLI: No, I did not. That's not part 17 of our emergency response.
18 MR. MOELLER: We came across the steel narrow 19 bridge driving here on 156. What happens if that bridge 20 falls in? Are there other --
21 MR. ROMBERG: Wayne Romberg. If that bridge 22 falls down there are other routes to come to the plant. In 23 fact that's not the primary. I never go across that bridge.
24 MR. MOELLER: You just send visitors across.
llh 25 (Laughter.)
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
_. 202 347 1700 Nanontade Conrane WAl%#dL_ -
24940.0 272 BRT 1 MR. ROMBERG: They have been threatening to 2 condemn it for a year. We have demonstrated in a number of 3 cases that we can in fact bring alternate people in in a 4 hurricane. We were not sure the parking lot would be 5 accessible because the roads might not be accessible. We 6 brought in extra people with food and sleeping bags to be 7 sure we can ride it out. We had a big summer storm here t
8 last summer and we had people in the plant here in sleeping 9 bags and cots, and were able to demonstrate, not because 10 someone asked us to, but because the real situation came up.
11 And it's really no problem. Most of our staff lives 12 relatively close and when duty calls they -- we camp out.
O 13 MR. BLASIOLI: As part of the normal exercises 14 we go through every year, shift turnovere and people coming 15 in on various alternate routes. But specifically for a 16 seismic event I don't think that has been specifically done 17 for a seismic event.
18 (Slide.)
19 That's just -- you have a better slide of that, 20 actually, in your handouts of the technical support center.
21 This is where the manager of the FSC would be. This is all 22 working area with a bunch the tables.
23 Unit 1 area, Unit 2 area, Unit 3 areas. This is 24 where a lot of printers and computer systems -- not the (gg 25 systems but the printers would be. That's just -- we have ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
- Nationwide Coverage
_ _ _202
_-347-3J00_
800-336-6646
- l l
124940.0 273 BRT
')
v 1 a bunch of storage facilities over here.
2 MR. MOELLER: This is underground?
3 MR. BLASIOLI: Yes. One floor underground.
4 There's part of a building on top of it but the TSC portion 5 is underground.
6 MR. MOELLER: On the sewer system, does it 7 require pumps at that elevation to pump it up to go into 8 the line? And are those on emergency power?
9 MR. BLASIOLI: I don't know that.
10 MR. ROMBERG: The sewer system for that, in fact, 11' doesn't need to be pumped up from that elevation. We have 12 a sewer line running from the whole plant -- actually, Unit
' 0)
' ' '- 13 1 side runs right by that. It's sufficiently deep that it 14 picks that up. But those pumps on the sewer system are, in 15 fact, powered such that we dcn't lose sewage facilities at 16 the site just because of we have a loss of off-site power.
17 In fact, that was recently demonstrated when we lost 18 off-site power for about a day and all those facilities 19 continued operating.
20 MR. MOELLER: Thank you.
21 MR. BLASIOLI: I had planned to go through this 22 fairly quickly because I thought you were going to be the're.
23 (Slide.)
24 If you are interested, I can go through that in j
-() 25 a little more detail, but we actually have the Waterford --
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverase 800 336-6646
24940.0 274 BRT
.(
\.)
1 state of Connecticut -- we have state police that come to 2 the EOF during emergencies, and there are spaces for NRC, 3 for FEMA, and all the various managers have their own 4 little work area. We have an assembly area where the 5 director can call people together for meetings to provide 6 information, to obtain information.
7 MR. SCHEWMAN: This tech support center is where 8 at this point?
9 MR. BLASIOLI: It would be here.
10 (Slide.)
11 We are a little over a mile away from the unit.
12 Within the protected area itself next to Unit 3 is the
' '(~#)
13 technical support center on the west side of the plant.
14 MR. SCHEWMAN: And the emergency operations 15 facility is just out the back door, front door, whichever
[ 16 you call it back there?
l 17 MR. BLASIOLI: Yes. Right next to us here.
18 (Slide.)
19 We have a kitchen facility. Whatever. I guess
, 20 that's enough.
21 MR. MOELLER: Is there food stored there?
22 MR. BLASIOLI: I believe there's some canned 23 goods and nonperishable goods stored there; yes.
24' MR. WARD: This includes the plant drawings?
() 25 MR. BLASIOLI: Yes. FSARs, tech specs, all ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nt snwide Coverage 800-336 6646
24940.0 275
/
,BRT 1 emergency plans, emergency plan implementing procedures --
2 there's a fair amount of documentation that's there.
3 (Slide.) ,
4 Getting to the exercises, we basically have 5 performed four successful exercises since the revised 6 regulations post-TMI. Three of those were full-scale; all 7 the states and local communities participated. The most 8 recent one, which we have just done two weeks ago, was 9 on-site only. We did not have off-site participation. It 10 was scheduled to have of f-site participation, but it was 11 going to be the week following Hurricane Gloria. We 12 postponed it. The state basically felt they had exercised
'~
13 their emergency response during Hurricane Gloria adequately, 14 so they requested that we not participate with them.
15 MR. MOELLER: And the fact that the Long Island 16 communities won't cooperate with Shoreham, and they being 17 within your 50-mile radius, that doesn't affect you?
18 MR. ROMBERG: No. Long Island is within -- well, 19 maybe you can address that better. Within the 10 miles we 20 don't have a problem. Within the 50, I think we -- the 21 level of cooperation required is a lot less.
22 MR. MOELLER: It's minimal. -
23 MR. ROMBERG: Beyond the 10-mile you aren't 24 really required to do very much, and as a result, what we rm
() 25 are asking them to do is nothing like what they are asking ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
20g.349 3700_ N~#TrShfoverage ENEM"?>
24940.0 276 BRT O 1 us to do. There's a different whole agenda there that we 2 won't get into, but that doesn't exist relative to them.
3 MR. BLASIOLI: That hasn't been a problem.
4 In 1984 the NRC actually participated. They 5 arrived on-site, arrived up in Berlin, they participated in 6 the exercise with us.
7 We will continue -- we are required to do 8 exercises annually with or without the state, and we are 9 required to do exercises biennially with the state of 10 Connecticut and the local communities.
11 (Slide.)
12 Very quickly, maintenance -- emerge 6cy O 13 preparedness program, there is annual training that goes on; 14 it's general overview training as well as specialized 15 training for the function that that person is supposed to 16 do, perform in a given emergency. That's done annually.
17 We have various tests, drills and exercises we 18 already talked about. Test -- all the communications 19 systems are tested periodically, monthly, quarterly, 20 whatever the case may be. We have fire drills in 21 accordance with tech specs and some other drills that we 22 hav'e as far as review and updating of the plan and 23 procedures. Once a year we review the plan and all the 24 letters of agreement we have. We update them as necessary, 25 revise the plan as necessary, and there's an independent ggg ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
- '## ~*"#***'
24940.0 277 BRT 1 review of the entire program that's done once a year, 2 separate from the people who are actually responsible for 3 the emergency plan itself. And the rasiOts of that are 5
4 given to both station and corporate management, and we take 5 corrective action based on that.
6 I think that's all I had planned on the 7 emergency preparedness program.
8 MR. SCHEWMAN: Thank you.
9 MR. HAYNE3: My name is Harry Haynes and I'm the 10 man _ger for operator training for Northeast Utilities.
11 This afternoon I would like to provide a brief presentation 12 of the training activities in the operator training area,
- 13. starting with an overview of the organization, going on to 14 a review of the existing programs, and then bringing you up 15 to date on some of the new initia.tives that we are involved 16 with in the area of operator training.
17 . First I would like to start with the issue of 18 organization. And the operator training or nuclear 19 training issue is under the purview of the vice-president 20 of nuclear and environment engineering, rec. Sears.
21 (Slide . )
22 Reporting to Dr. Sears is the director of 23 nuclear training, Malcom Black. Reporting to Malcom Black 24 would be the manager of technical training, manager of hll 25 operating training and the manager of Berlin, or ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
___ __202-367-37CD __ __._ _.___.. __ Nationeide Covers 800 336 4165
24940.0 278 BRT O 1 engineering-type training in our corporate office, as well 2 as the manager of simulator computer systems engineering.
3 Reporting to the manager of operator training 4 will be the supervisor for operator training for each unit; 5 in this case I've illustrated the supervisor of operator 6 traiaing for Millstone Unit 1.
7 This is a relatively new organization that has 8 undergone some recent changes, specifically to bring the 9 simulator project into the nuclear training department. As l
10 the simulator issue was begun and developed, there was a l
]
11 project organization which has now been incorporated 12 entirely into the nuclear training department.
13 operator' training' consists essentially of four 14 basic programs: First, the nonlicensed operator program, 15 sometimes called the PEO program; reactor operator initial 16 training program; senior reactor operator initial program; 17 '
and continuing training, or sometimes -- frequentl'y called 18 requalification training.
19 (Slide.)
20 The nonlicensed operator training program 21 essentially has input from ex-Navy nuclear pcwer plant 22 operators.
23 (Slide.)
24 It consists of classroom training, and takes a 25 new employee in the operation and acquaints him with the ggg ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
,t
,; 24940.0.
279 ,
BRT U -
1 various aspects of doing business with Northeast in the i
2 area _of health physics, QE, QA, and organization and
'3 general employee training.
4 Beyond that there is an OJT program which is by 5 and large administered and implemented by the operations 6 department itself, principally a qualified program at this 7 time.
7 8 MR. MOELLER: Could you say that again. For the l
9 on-the-job training, someone else does it? I assume they 10 have to do it'on-site -- not here.
11 MR. HAYNES: Correct. It relies strongly on 12 operator department and qualified operator involvement on O. 13 the qualifications of any hires into the PEO program.
14 MR. MOELLER: Okay. q 15 MR. HAYNES: The reactor qualified program takes 16 a qualified operator and trains that individual such-that 17 The's qualified and becomes licensed as a reactor operator 18 -qualified to manipulate the controls of the plant.
19 (Slide.)
20 This program and Millstone Unit 1 is essentially.
21 a _four-week program consisting of classroom, on-the-job 22 training, and simulator training.
- 23 This illustration and the time line shown here 24 are illustrated for our existing program. As you are well 25 aware from our tour yesterday, we are making some very
(
l i- ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
, __,_ , . ._ 202
_-347_3700_._
Nationwide Coverage, _ _ _._ 800
_ _ 336
_ _-6646_
i 24940.0 280 BRT
{
p d 1 strong commitments to simulators, and the Millstone Unit 1 !
2 simulator isn't here at this time, but when factored in, I 3 would look to see some changes in these numbers and try to 4 gain the maximum use out of the simulator in this program.
5 (Slide.)
6 The senior reactor operator program --
7 MR. WARD: I guess I didn't quite understand.
8 Is the simulator -- having an on-site simulator going to 9 make the training longer than 44 weeks or shorter?
10 MR. RAYNES: I expect it will in fact make it 11 longer, but it won't be a one for one increase in the 12 course length.
- O k/ 13 For instance, right now our simulator training, 14 which is done at a generic simulator, is approxibately two 15 weeks in duration. The simulator training we are 16 anticipating for operations department personnel in the RO 17 program could be as long as eight to 10 weeks long. But I 18 wouldn't expect that to result in this program increasing 19 in length by six weeks, because we expect to capitalize on 20 the use of the simulator and take into account some of the 21 things that are taught in the classroom and increase their 22 emphasis during the simulator training portion. So I 23 wouldn't expect this to go up by six weeks but it could 24 become lengthened by some degree.
25 MR. WARD: I guess I'd almost expect the
( }-
ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336-6646
24940.0 281 BRT
-~
(b 1 argument that it might decrease. If a simulator is a more 2 efficient tool than a classroom, at least some of the 3 teaching --
4 MR. HAYNES: That's a possibility. We'll have 5 to see when we get our program together. One of the other 6 variables that would come to bear on that question, of 7 course, is the current activity associated with 8 accreditation, and a redefinition and increased definition 9 of the operator training requirements. What impact that 10 will have on the course length is yet undetermined as well.
11 MR. MOELLER: Where do you stand on INPO
,- 12 accreditation?
G 13 MR. HAYNES: I am going to address that as part 14 of the program a little later on.
15 (Slide.)
16 The senior reactor operator program takes 17 qualified reactor operators and qualifies them or licenses 18 them to the senior reactor level operator level. This is 19 20 weeks long consisting of classroom training, on-the-job 20 training and also simulator training.
21 (Slide.)
22 In the area of requalification training or l 23 continuing training, as it is sometimes called, I think it 24 would be interesting to point out that very recently the
, () 25 vice-president of nuclear and environmental engineering and ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
RiR#374f/00 Nationwide com 800-336-6646
24940.0 282 BRT O 1 the vice-president o'f nuclear operativns have clearly 2 signified their commitment and support in this area by 3 publishing guidelines regarding the policies to be adhered 4 to relative to continuing training.
5 Essentially, it is policy guidance that there 6 will be 12 weeks per year, or 12 weeks per requalification 7 cycle applied to licensed operator training, with no less 8 than five weeks in any given year for operator training in 9 the licensed area. -
10 Such training will be founded on formal learning 11 objectives. Formal evaluations will be undertaken of all 12 the participants in this program, and to the extant O 13 possible, it is encouraged that plant management, such as 14 John Stetz and the operations supervisor for Millstone 1, 15 involve themselves in these evaluations, particularly where 16 they are going to take place in the dynamic setting of the 17 simulator. So training in the operations department and --
I 18 the line management will be involving themselves in the 19 collective evaluation of operator performance in this area.
20 MR. MOELLER: Ed, how do you make sure that the 21 training includes the feedback of operating experience?
22 MR. HAYNES: Operating experience -- in the 23 design of our programs as we are entering into this 24 accreditation effort, which has some very discrete and ggg 25 prescriptive measures for the evaluation and feedback, will ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336 4646
v, , _ ,u . . . .
24940.0 283 BRT A_m) 1 result in our creating procedures spec'.ically designed to 2 ensure that all of the inputs that should be incorporated 3 into the training will be formalized and formally accounted 4 for in our design of our programs.
5 We have a design module in our procedural 6 process for the accreditation of training programs and the 7 building of training programs that ensures that all of the 8 plant and industry events are accounted for in the design 9 of our programs.
10 (Slide.)
11 Exceptions to the policy statement regarding 12 continuing training must be approved or authorized by the 13 vice-president NE&E_and the vice-president of nuclear 14 operations.
15 MR. WARD: Have you had any requalification 16 examinations conducted by the NRC yet?
17 MR. HAYNES: Not as yet on Millstone Unit 1, and 18 to my knowledge, we have not had that experience on any of 19 our other units.
20 I am corrected by Mike Jensen, the assistant 21 training supervisor of Millstone 1. We have had that 22 experience on Millstone Unit 2.
23 (Slide.)
24 MR. WARD: What's been the experience with that?
25 MR. HAYNES: I really couldn't address thap ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverase 800 33M646
24940.0 284 BRT O
C 1 issue. Wayne, perhaps you could?
2 MR. ROMBERG: Talking to the Unit 2 operators 3 who were involved in this, and it was a random selection 4 that they took, again, it wasn't a whole exam. What they 5 did was the NRC came in and put in just specific sections 6 of -- the operators who took part in it didn't think the 7 sections the NRC provided were any significantly different 8 than the ones we provided and the scores were similar.
9 Turned out not to be the big traumatic experience that we 10 had feared.
11 MR. HAYNES: I would like to give you an update 12 on status report,-if you will, on some new initiatives in 13 the training area in general and the Millstone Unit 1 14 operator training area specifically.
15 (Slide.)
16 I think there are two major things that are 17 happening in the training area that make this particular 18 time particularly exciting. One, of course, is the 19 prominence of simulators in the operator training area.
20 (Slide.)
21 Certainly simulators are an NU commitment.
22 (Slide.)
23 This, of course, is the facility we are 24 currently meeting in and this will house the four plant
{} 25 reference simulators that we have purchased through the l
ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347 3700 Nationwide Coverage M33MM6
24940.0 . 285 BRT tO V
1 link simulation system, with Millstone 2 and 3 currently 2 being on-site and Millstone 1 and CY simulators currently 3 under factory acceptance testing at the Silver Spring 4 facility.
5 This is an artist's rendition of the Millstone 6 Unit.1 simulator and I show it basically to identify the 7 level of detail that we have gone to in building the 8 Millstone Unit 1 simulator.
9 I'm sure as you were in the Millstone Unit 1 10 control roota yesterday you identified that there was a 11 substantial amount of back panel controls and 12 instrume'ntation.
A 13 Nearly all of that has been included in,the 14 scope of simulation far Millstone Unit 1, as the operations 15 department clearly interfaces with this equipment and 16 information on a regular basis, both in normal and 17 emergency plan operations.
18 All indications, dials, switches that would 19 normally be manipulated by the operations department in the 20 execution of their activities will be simulated and 21 functional. These are just some snapshots of the Millstone 22 Unit 1 simulator as it sits in the Silver Spring facility.
23 (Slide.)
24 I'm nure you recognize panel 903, 904 and the
/~N 25 beginning of 905. And then 906, -7 and -8, as the front G
ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 ' Nationwide Coverage 800 336 6646
24940.0 286
-BRT n
\'^) l panel are currently lighted up. This is probably an 2 earlier representation of that simulator. You see a lot of 3 single link software engineer people sitting at terminals 4 and working out the bugs in their program.
5 We would expect this simulator would be 6 delivered to our facility very close to the end of the year 7 and incorporated fully- into Millstone Unit 1 operator 8 training in 1986.
9 (Slide.)
10 The other major activity that is ongoing in 11 training today certainly is the accreditation of training 12 programs. In particular, in my area, the accreditation of f
k }-
- 13 operator training programs, and Millstone Unit 1 is well on .
14 its way to entering the s: creditation process in that it 15 has a completed job and task analysis .for the nonlicensed 16 reactor operator and senior reactor operator positions.
17 (Slide.)
18 The learning objectives, based upon the skills l 19 and knowledge identified in the task analysis, have been j 20 written for those programs and are currently under review 1
21 and approval, in concert with the operations department for 22 Millstone Unit 1. -
23 The development of the training material or the 24 reviews of the training material based upon the formal r~ 25 learning objectives that have been written is underway and
( s}
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336 4646
24940.0 287 PRT O
1 we would expect that activity to be completed in early 1986.
2 We are anticipating an INPO accreditation team visit in the 3 first quarter of '86, more specifically, in March. And we B 4 would expect, based upon that visit and based upon the 5 readiness of our programs, to be accredited on Millstone 6 Unit 1 operator training programs by mid-1986.
7 (Slide.)
8 Of course, that's somewhat of a variable, 9 depending on INPO's ability to support the accrediting 10 activity. But this would be our anticipated schedule.
11 MR. WARD: What's the schedule for the other 12 training classes? Mechanics and -- other --
O 13 MR. HAYNES: As I indicated earlier, we are into 14 a bit of a reorganization. We are currently assessing the 15 readiness of those programs. There will be a report 16 published internally that will assess the readiness of 17 those programs and establish the date by which we could 18 submit our self-evaluation report for those programs.
19 Unfortunately, that report won't be out until 20 December 20, so I can't really respond to that.
21 MR. WARD: That is also under the director of 22 nuclear training?
23 MR. HAYNES: That's correct. He has facilities 24 in Berlin under his cognizance, at Connecticut Yankee under lll 25 his cognizance, here -- and next-door, there's a ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. I
_________q347.J700_ _ _ _ _ _
__ _ Nationwide Coverage 800 336 4 646
24940.0 288 BRT
!O -
1 significant building next-door. It would be my 2 expectations that the majority of the technical training 3 would take place in the building right across the brid'ge 4 from this building; this building being primarily 5 concentrated in the area of operator training.
6 MR. WARD: But it sounds like there is not a 7 formal training program at the present time. Is that right?
8 MR. HAYNES: I don't think it would be accurate 9 to say there is not a formal training program. It is not, 10 at this point in time, in my opinion, accreditable. And 11- there's a significant amount of activity going to be 12 undertaken to update those programs to accreditable status.
/~
(T / 13 Exactly when that will occur I couldn't say.
14 There is formal training being given currently 15 to INC, mechanics and electricians, and various other 16 disciplines within the utility. It is not as well advanced 17 in the issue of accreditation.
18 MR. WARD: Thank you. ,
19 (Slido.)
20 MR. BLASIOLI: That basically provides the 21 overview of the area of operator training. I'd be glad to 22 answer any questions that you have. We are pretty excited 23 about some of the new initiatives that are taking place and 24 we think they are going to be a very big benefit to us.
25 Thank you.
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336-6646
24940.0 289 BRT
/~)
(_/
1 MR. SCHEWMAN: What do we have on maintenance?
2 MR. KACICH: We have a short presentation on the 3 maintenance which we could go through right now if you 4 would like.
5 MR. SCHEWMAN: I would like to have it done by 6 2:00.
7 MR. KACICH: I think we can handle that. John?
8 MR. STETZ: Thank you very much.
9 MR. SCHEWMAN: You could say our operating 10 record speaks for itself, John.
11 MR. STETZ: You are right, it does.
12 (Slide.)
)
13 . Plant maintenance programs. We have a new 14 computerized system, and I'll run you through that a little
. 15 bit. We have had a system since the plant started up.
16 (Slide.) ,
17 It is based pretty much on history, learning 18 about the equipment. In 1982, the company looked at all 19 the different programs that existed throughout Northeast 20 Utilities, looked at their fossil plants, looked at their 21 nuclear units, and they found a wide discrepancy in the 22 programs that we had. So they decided that they should 23 pull these all together and try and come up with some 24 overall system that could be used throughout the Northeast
() 25 Utilities system, both on facile units, hydro units, and ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336 6646
24940.0 290 BRT O 1 nuclear units. And that's where this PMMS system 2 originated.
3 (Slide.)
4 Part of the PMMS system 's developing a critical i
5 equipment list, and again, the nuclear units were f ar along 6 in this before 1982 came along. Just because they had 7 technical specifications, we knew what was critical just 8 based on history. So that was a good start for us.
9 We also went down and -- there are a few 10 criteria that also come into this a little bit later. I'll 11 show you that.
[
12 We also went through a PM sheet for each
( 13 critical component. We developed folders that essentially 14 told us what we needed to do and how to do it. We 15 developed procedures and we've incorporated that all into 16 the PMMS system.
17 (Slide.)
18 That's from our original procedures.
19 Our systems cover corrective maintenance and 20 they cover PMs, predictive maintenance.
21 (Slide.)
22 Critical criteria, some of the things we 23 consider: Effect on power generation, naturally; standby 24 equipment may not be available -- there may not be an 25 alternate system available; capital investment, high --
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347-3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6666
-24940.0 '
291 BRT
~
l . turbine. We might look at that and come up with a whole PM 2 program for that, which we do -- we do with all,the major 3 equipment.
4 Health and safety of the public. Normal PM 5 programs for motor-operated valves. Anything like that.
6 Yes?
7 MR. SCHEWMAN: Let me read that and shift to a 8 different topic. You people are justifiably proud of the 9 number of days you go without scram and can remain on line.
10 What do you think -- what would you say are the largest 11 factors that have allowed you to do that? Or what things 12 have you aimed at in your maintenance program that have Os- 13 contributed to this? Or did that come later?
14 MR. STETZ: None of this. Okay? Let me just 15 run through this quickly and then I'll get to the meat of 16 what I would like to say.
17 (Slide.)
18 More effective utilization of personnel. We are 19 able to track things better because it's a computerized 20 system. We can put how many man-hours it takes to do a 21 typical rebuild on a piece of equipment. We can determine 22 peaks, valleys throughout the year; factor in vacations, 23 things like that. We can better utilize the company's 24 resources.
.%j('] 25 Automatic scheduling and tracking of PM programs.
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 80 4 336-6646
24940.0 292 BRT
/~ ,
NT) 1 A natural outgrowth of a computerized system.
2 (Slide.)
3 Stock levels; this will be in the future, a 4 couple of years down the road. What we hope to do there is 5 we'll be able to look into a computer, determine whether we 6 have the parts necessary to do a particular job. When we 7 pull the equipment out of the warehouse this part will be 8 automatically ordered. With the thousands and thousands of 9 spare parts required for a nuclear plant, that gets to be a 10 very large task.
11 This other item here, trend failure analysis, 12 that's an important item also. We were doing that long bms 13 before this computerized system came into effect. What it 14 means is determining root cause of problems. And that's 15 the only way you get 374-day run.
16 (Slide.)
17 What I would like to say now is what I believe 18 is the key to a good maintenance program, and that's first 19 of all making sure that the technicians and maintenance 20 mechanics know how to do their job. And I believe they do.
21 We, as management, give them certain tools; actual tdols 22 and training; whatever we feel is necessary we ensure that 23 they get it.
24 As the plant gets older and older, we lose
{} 25 expertise out in the industry. We have a lot of equipment ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 33(H%4
24940.0 293 BRT
)-
1 that, when it was designed it was close to state of the art 2 and people were trained. Now that the equipment gets older, 3 those people have moved on to management positions and are 4 no longer available, so it becomes more and more critical 5 to us to learn more things about our equipment and to 6 become more independent. And that means training all the 7 technicians.
8 The second major factor in a good maintenance 9 program is the role of management, and that's determining 10 how best to utilize our own resources. We look at our 11 history on equipment. We look at failures. We look at 12 what comes back after the technician goes out and does a PM
\/ 13 on a piece of equipment. --
14 This is a continuing type of thing. We 15 initially set up the PM program to hit most items once a 16 year. We thought that was a good place to start.
17 We h.ve since learned that some items can go two 18 years, three years -- and that's exactly what we do with 19 this program. We custom tune it to the information that's 20 coming back from the field. So it's essentially a living 21 type of schedule, if you will.
22 PM program, the PMMS program helps us do that 23 because it helps us schedule things a little easier just 24 because it's computerized. That's all.
( })
25 We look at the application of the equipment and, ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336-6646
24940.0 294 BRT 1 determine wha't.happens if the component fails. Naturally, 2 we would like to PM everything we could during an outage.
3- We physically can't. So what that means is we have to 4 closely scrutinize which components we must perform 5 maintenance on. We do that in several ways, and one of the 6 most important ways is with good communication. We have 7 meetings with operations, with the maintenance department, 8 with INC department, and we look at the work lists and we 9 put priorities on things. We can't do everything, so we 10 have to put these things in a priority and determine the 11 best frequencies in doing these programs.
12 We don't want to over-PM something. We don't 13 want to under-PM something.
14 The program works. In the last three years we 15 have been able to perform our outages in the INC area 16 without any outside vendor support. The previous 15 years 17 we haven't been able to do that. That comes about by using 18 this computerized system and by taking a sense of pride in 19 being able to handle things ourselves. That's a very 20 important factor for the technicians. They were given the 21 chance --
22 MR. WARD: You said that was in the INC area?
23 Is that what you said?
24 MR. STET 2: Yes. It's a challenge that was 25 given to the technicians and they readily accepted it.
ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 33 4 646
24940.0 295 BRT V(3 1 kith our help in gaining more and more knowledge of the 2 plant, we can custom tune the work that must be done during 3 an out ge and possibly take some things that typically were 4 done during outage times and move them off to non-outage 5 times.
6 We have moved over 50 percent of the work that 7 we used to do during outage periods to non-outage periods, 8 just because we've gotten smarter. We have looked at 9 things a lot harder. We'll be doing that in the '
10 maintenance area in the future.
11 Another important area is having licensed people 12 involved in the different maintenance departments, because
( 13 by having that there, it is essentially having operations 14 close to the unit maintenance departments ACRS and they -can 15 help on a daily basis to determine what critical items need 16 to be gone over as far as PMs go.
17 Yes?
18 MR. SCHEWMAN: We have come to 2. Why don't you 19 open it for questions now.
20 MR. STETZ: I'm finished.
21 MR. WARD: I noticed in something I read that 22 the -- early in the history of the plant, there were quite 23 a number of MSIV failures of one sort or another. But if I 24 understood what I read, there haven't been any in five
{' 25 years or so. Is that attributed to something specifically ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coversee 800 33 4 646
l l
! 24940.0 296 BRT 1 in the maintenance program or what?
2 MR. STET 2: Again, getting back to root causes.
l 3 We have had problems with limit switches and it is a 4 concerted effort on management's part over the last few 5 years to look at these failures a lot closer than we have 4 6 in the past. That's what our job is. And that's why you 7 don't see those failures any longer. -
8 MR. BENDER: Did you say something about the 9 interaction between PRA and program maintenance? Do they 10 interact?
11 MR. STETZ: Yes, they do. PRA, if they identify l 12 a particular item that we might not look at too often, or
! () 13__ __ they feel that we could improve probabilities ,by performing 14 a different type of maintenance or maintenance activity 15 more frequently, they come to us, they discuss it, and we 16 wind up revising our procedures to incorporate those 17 recommendations. We have done that in the past.
18 MR. SCHEWMAN: Very good. Thank you.
19 MR. GRIMES: Mr. Shea will provide a very brief j 20 summary of the conversion SER. We'll focus on what we l 21 believe is the most significant aspect of it.
22 MR. SHEA: You can read the slide presentations 23 of what we are going to present later, if you want to. I 24 think it's probably more profitable for the Subcommittee 25 members to get up to date on where the plant is. It's in O
ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
! 202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverase 8003 M 6646 L
v.
24940.0 297 BRT.
O 1 an outage right now,.and they are nearing the period when 2 they plan to start up. And one of the items that NRC has 3 overseen rather extensively is the inspection -- pipe 4 inspection, welding inspection particularly, during the 5 outages. And, as a matter of fact, it was required after 6 the 1984 outage that they submit their plans for this next 7 inspection during this outage, the welding inspection 8 program, which they did, which we reviewed and accepted.
9 (Slide.)
10 There's a slide up here that indicates the type 11 of activity that took place during the last outage. They 12 inspected -- I'll give you the bottom line -- 215 welds.
13 There were 21 reported indications, which means some sort 14 of repair or correction was going to have to be made. And 15 over to the right, under that heavy line, you can see that 16 there were -- the correction was for seven weld overlays, 17 and 13 welds were actually replaced, that is, new piping 18 was installed.
19 There was one weld on the 28-inch that was not 20 repaired. It was analyzed. And also, during the 1984 21 outage there was a large amount of intergranule -- well, 22- induction heating stress improvement, and they used new 23 techniques or relatively new or state of the art techniques 24 on the ultrasonic testing.
25 Now, since this is ancient history, that's the ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 147 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 316 (M6
-24940.0 298 BRT 1 way it was in 1984, we thought it probably would be wise at 2 this time to take a look and see what the results of this 3 inspection were, because we still have to clear it with our 4 own people in-house. So you are hearing it probably before 5 our own reviewers will go over the material. I don't know --
6 do you have any?
7 MR. KACICH: We are prepared to discuss the 8 results of the inspection for this outage. We can do it
- 9 now if you want to.
10 MR. ELY I have some documents -- I have from
-11 generation engineering --
12 MR. SCHEWMAN That's a part of a company?
13 MR. ELYt Part of Northeast Utilities. Excuse 14 me.
15 This is the -- let's say, the ground rules for 16 this year.
17 We did qualify or requalify all of our people 18 and procedures at the NU center in Charlotte prior to this 19 outage. This was as a result of a letter that we received 20 in late August of this year.
21 We also at that time qualified procedure and 22 personnel to do the weld overlay inspection.
23 (Slide.)
24 Wo did, as Jim said, meet with them in May to 25 discuss what welds we would inspect this year. We were ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 NationwWe Coverage 800 33646d6
24940.0 299 BRT
/~3 k'"J 1 working to NUREG 1061 criteria: 5 percent pipe of immune 2 or nonsensitive systems; 10 percent by pipe size --
3 sensitive lines which had at least one mitigating technique; 4 the last pass heat sink welding and 25 percent by pipe size 5 of the non -- of the sensitized lines without any 6 mitigating technique.
7 MR. SCHEWMAN: The overlays were put in in '84?
8 MR. ELY: We put in seven overlays in 1984.
9 MR. SCHEWMAN: What fraction of those are 10 inspected?
11 MR. ELY: All of them.
12 MR. SCHEWMAN: Would you tell me where I could l3
(/ , 13 find the procedures and how long there's bean qualification 14 procedures for personnel on overlay?
15 MR. ELY: The procadures are our own procedures --
16 MR. SCHEWMAN: I'm not interested in procedures 17 so much as I'm inherently dubious of people's ability to do 18 this, though the track record is improving. I'm even less 19 dubious about their ability to do it on overlays. And I 20 wonder what you could --
21 MR. WARD: More dubious.
22 MR. SCHEWMAN: -- give me for comfort.
23 MR. ELY: The procedures are the ones the EPRI 24 center developed over the past year. Our own people were 25 qualified in October, early October of this year, just ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nattonwide Coverage 800 336 6M6
24940.0 300 BRT
/~N i
() 1 prior to the outage.
2 It is at present the best available technique.
3 MR. SCHEWMAN: That's certainly true I'm sure.
4 Whether it's good enough or not is the question. Or 5 whether, indeed -- what it will show up is.
6 The first year after the stuff goes in you are 7 probably okay. But the question certainly is going to 8 arises How many years are you going to stand still for 9 this? Or is the NRC? And the other is when -- what 10 evidence do we have that indeed they could find a crack 11 halfway through it if it was there?
~
12 MR. ELY: We have at this moment only those rx
(_) 13 samples available in Charlotte which one can demonstrate.
14 MR. SCHEWMAN: This is something P&L made for 15 them or what?
16 MR. ELY: Charlotte made up quite a few cracked 17 samples, some were them small f atigue cracks, some were 18 spiked, and then overlaid and then were used as inspection 19 test samples.
20 MR. SCHEWMAN: Well, I assume you don't think 21 you can measure the crack before it gets into the overlay, 22 so the question is: ' when it's in the overlay, what 23 evidence have you that you can see it?
24 MR. ELY: The samples in Charlotte contain (G
') 25 cracks in parent metal, cracks to the interface with the ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS. INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 33M546
o .
l 24940.0 301
- BRT O
, 1 overlay, cracks from the parent level into the overlay, l
2 cracks solely within the overlay, a weld defect, hot shorts, 3 lack of bond between the overlay and the pipe -- parent 4 metal. And they also contain porosity.
5 MR. SCHEWMAN: If I could get the right report 6 out of Charlotte, it would tell me what they found, at 7 least in one set of tests on each of those kinds of samples?
l 8 MR. ELY: Yes. In fact, the qualification test 9 the personnel had, had the four major criteria -- four 10 major flaws: those solely in the parent metal; parent l 11 metal with interface; solely in the weld; and a lack of 12 bond. They have to find some or all of those in the test to 13 samples that they take.
l 14 MR. SCHEWMAN: At least in the one we saw 15 yesterday, you had apparently used a flapper, sort of a j
16 smoothing technique rather than machining or a heavy 17 grinding. Is that what was used down there at Charlotte?
18 MR. ELY: Charlotte's ability to make weld 19 overlays, I think, lies somewhat behind our own. My 20 surf ace finishes, as you saw -- you were up on the 21 isocondenser,. fourth floor. That's one we did the other l
l 22 day. We have a much finer surface than they do after 23 grinding. Their as-welded surf ace is virtually impossible 24 to inspect. That surface there is fine for coupling. You 25, can get sound in and get sound back, so I have no real i
ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336 6646
24940.0 302 BRT
~(
'~
1 hardship with the surface that we have. It is lightly 2 flappered, but that's all.
3 MR. BENDER: Could I ask another question?
4 MR. ELY: Sure.
5 MR. BENDER: What is the date of the specimens l
6 that you are making reference to that Charlotte has? Are 7 they recent?
8 MR. ELY: Yes.
9 MR. BENDER: Like this past six months?
10 MR. ELY: Yes. I think all of them were made 11 within the last six months.
12 MR. BENDER: And your inspection program, using
, 13 your people, I take it, are qualified on those specimens?
14 .
MR. ELY: Yes.
15 MR. BENDER: And where would they have fit --
l 16 when you described their qualifications, how do you 17 characterize their abilitits?
18 MR. ELY: At the moment, we only have one person 19 for weld overlay, very good. He's passed every 20 qualification they had in all -- he's seen everything that 21 Charlotte has ever given and passed all of them.
22 MR. BENDER: None of hose guys are perfect.
l l
23 He's within the upper 10 percent -- is that what you are '
l 24 saying? -- of those who have been able to detect the things
(~S 25 they think are there?
%-)
ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336-6646
[
l l
24940.0 303
- BRT l
1 MR. ELY: We have some interesting comments on 2 this requalification. He did have 100/100 last time. On l 3 the requalification, we took it prior to information being 4 given out on whdt frequency should be used or how many flaws 5 were there.
6 Mr. Peterson passed it the firsr. time with the l
7 caveat on which side of the weld -- which they later 8 decided to throw that sample out. The samples that l
9 Charlotte is using in some cases are extremely difficult.
10 MR. BENDER: I know enough. Thank you.
11 MR. ELY: We did decide to complete final l 12 inspection with these procedures in personnel, which had l 13 started back in '82. We accelerate the six years. This is l
l 14 basically the way we go through it.
l l 15 Prior to the outage, we pull all the radiographs, 16 examine all the radiographs so we have them on hand. We do l 17 a manual or what we call a " master slave," which is just a 18 remote manual. Then once we find or detect a flaw, we go j 19 through a long list of other options to relook at it. We 20 use the automated equipment. We use radiography. If we 21 don't have a decent radiograph to look for geometry, we 22 would use liquid penetrant. We generally ask them to 23 remove a valve so we can do it -- dismembering the pipe.
24 I think we have been relatively successful 25 showing some things that appear to be flawed are not.
ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverase 800 336 4646
24940.0 304
'BRT 1
(Slide.)
2 This is our results of this year.
3 (Slide.)
4 We have only one today that we have called 5 flawed, and that's in the isocondenser, the one you saw the 6 other day which has the weld overlay on it.
7 We did some number that we had last year. I 8 don't have a good record at the moment of each one we did 9 last year. We did do all welds in the isocondenser last 10 year, so this is simply a reexamination.
11 MR. SCHEWMAN: " Acceptable." This means there 12 were no detectable flaws, that the flaws were much smaller
() 13 than analysis said you need to worry about -- what?
14 MR. ELY: We did not use the WB-13 table, per se.
15 Indications which are characterized as flaws are treated as 16 flaws -- unless we did it differently. If they are 17 acceptable we did it under 3640. If it's 3640 it would be 18 on here as evaluation is acceptable per IWB3640. So we 19 have no other known flaws that we left in service this year.
20 (slide.)
21 This shows only part of it. This is the 22 remainder. We are still in progress on the -- in process 23 on the jet pump instrumentation nozzles today. We have 24 some indications on nozzles which were evaluated today. To 25 date we have only one known flaw.
ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverase 800 3 % 6646
24940.0 305 BRT 1 MR. SCHEWMAN: You have', in this plant, gone 2 through a history of a rather sorry time with your initial 3 condenser up to water chemistry -- that you are more state 4 of the art.
5 Could you tell me sort of, if you plotted 6 something versus time, whether it's conductivity, chloride, 7 or whatever -- when the shoulder came? Has this been a 8 steady trend upwards? Or is it sort of -- I guess what I'm 9 trying to look for is what your basis for your 10 extrapolation -- do you have some basis to say: Yes, you 11 think this good behavior is likely to continue? O r --
12 MR. ELY: With the exception of one system, 13 which is our friend the isolation condenser, which seems to 14 have a flaw every cycle regardless of how many times we ,
15 look -- the other systems, I think, there are some 16 explanations for.
17 Reactor water clean-up, where we had most of the 18 flaws last time, had not been well done in the past. It is 19 a small, thin-walled pipe. Under scme codes it was not 20 required to be inspected. So it was missed at times. That 21 was probably the first year when 'we had done 100 percent of 22 that system, which is a good reason why we found a lot of 23 flaws.
24 I would expect that we will be much less in the
{} 25 future than we were. I would expect this type of ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336-6646
.. i, j .c 24940.0 306 BRT le performance, one or two flaws. We are replacing systems.
2 Some systems where we have had problems in the past have 3 been replaced with immune material now, with 316 Ls and Ks, 4 hopefully immune.
5 MR. SCHEWMAN: " Rots of ruck," as they say.
6 MR. ELY: We have not fou6d flaws in that yet.
7 When we do, it's from fitting to fitting.
8 MR. SCHEWMAN: Does the isocondenser have static 9 water in it?
10 MR. DE BARBA The part that has been cracking 11 has been in the seam face, the supply size. But just to 12 emphasize the point, we have had quite a bit of cracking
! 13 over the years and we have taken-mitigating actions, either 14 replacing a lot of pipe.cr hav, igg done things like 15 IHSI-treated pipe, so the amount of pipe that is
> -16 essentially unmitigated at this point is a fairly small 17 percentage.
18 MR. ELY: And we have completed all -- we only 19 added 26 welds this time to bring our base line up to 100 20 percent of welds inspected 'y o new techniques.
21 Last time we did nearly 100 percent. We were 22 almost 100 percent la'st time.
23 Questions?
24 MR. ROMBERG: Specifically, the question you 25 asked relative to the chloride intrusion in the early '70s
[}
ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336 6646
24940.0 307 BRT O
v 1 and when chemistry got better, essentially we stopped the 2 chloride intrusion. It's been very good since. We no 3 longer take those to exhaustion. In fact, we don't even 4 take them close to exhaustion. We are tech spec, I think --
5 maybe in -- maybe the sister plants are not, but we are 6 tech spec to have 30 pounds of salt dissolving capability 7 left when we trash.them.
- 8 MR. SCHEWMAN: These are deep bed?
9 MR. ROMBERG: These are deep bed at the time we 10 get rid of them, so conductivit is very, very low.
11 MR. SCHEWMAN: After 10 or 15 years, how many 12 times have you had intrusion, gone over stuff or carried r
13 over?
14 MR. ROMBERG:
- One time. We have not had an 15 instance since.
16 MR. SHEWMON: No, no, I mean the powder from the 17 demineralizer.
18 MR. ROMBERG: We don't have powder. Deep bed, 19 resins, resin traps. And as far as we know, watching the 20 chemistry and looking at the indicators, you'd see if you 21 had a resin intrusion. We have not had one. Our 22 maintenance in that whole system as a result of our 23 heightened awareness of the early '70s has been very high.
24 The chemists and operator are aware of it.
f')
s-25 MR. SCHEWMAN: Do you run that continuously?
ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC, 202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6646
24940.0 308
~BRT D
'O 1 MR. ROMBERG: We have six beds in service, 100 2 percent hour. Continuously.
3 MR. SCHEWMAN: How do you determine the capacity?
4 MR. ROMBERG: I'm not a chemist, but what they 5 do is look at the conductivity and look at chloride and 6 when they get a computed 30 pounds left --
7 MR. BENDER: They do it stoichometrically.
8 MR. ROMBERG: We don't approach the limit. And 9 we know they are good then, because we send them down to 10 rad waste; we finish expending them down in rad waste. In 11 fact, we know we are good because they wouldn't last long 12 at rad waste.
O 13 Another thing unique at Millstone, our clean-up ,
14 system is one of the old high flow systems. We run things 15 designed for 7 percent recirc flow, which is much larger 16 than the newer plants. And we typically run clean-up flows 17 in the 250, 300 gallons a minute. I think the new plants 18 are much smaller than that. We can run 1200 a minute on 19 our cleanup roads, so we can maintain our water puri'ty 20 better with a better capability of doing that. We have 21 been able to maintain water chemistry, probably better than 22 the sister plants ever since the intrusion.
23 MR. SCHEWMAN: When you get over to Unit 2, 24 there's problems of oxygen in the makeup water. Is that
(} 25 not a problem with the inherent design of the DW-l?
ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
. 202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336 6646
24940.0 309 BRT O
1 MR. ROMBERG: I'm not real familiar with their 2 oxygen problems.
3 MR. SCHEWMAN: I'm not sure they have one. But 4 for a while, people kept aiming at salt and then they 5 discovered that hey, if you've got an air leaking system, 6 it will find something to corrode whether it's salt 7 intrusions or other things.
8 MR. ROMBERG: Okay. I understand.
9 In earlier days, we had more of a leaky 10 condenser. And we had air intrusions there and we worked 11 with that pretty hard, so that's really not a problem. Air 12 leak is a very, very low number there. What we see is the 13 condensate polishing facil'ity not adequately designed for 14 the water standards and that's causing us some problems 15 there.
16 Another thing, we use a very large steam 17 generator blowdown, which means we have a tremendous water 18 makeup which we buy from the city, and we treat it through 19 various water treatment packages, but there's a lot of 20 organics. It comes from a reservoir, green bugs, algae --
21 when the system breaks down, you end up with organisms that 22 break down. You get high conductivity, not necessarily 23 related to chloride, but it's there. It gives us some 24 grief relative to the steam generator water chemistry.
i
() 25 MR. SCHEWMAN: Mr. Shea, is that the end of your ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
__ ._______Xtle7 37CD __ Nuioneida Covenwe acD 3%4SM
24940.0 310 BRT
. ()>
1 demonstration?
2 MR. SHEA: If you look at the last page, I sum 3 it up there.
4 MR. SCHEWMAN: Did you and Mr. Boyle get 5 together and vote whether the best people who work for the 6 NRC are both Irish or all Irish?
7 MR. SHEA: No. You'll have to ask Janet.
8 MR. GRIMES: Unfortunately, Grimes is also an 9 Irish derivative, so you have four of them.
J 10 MR. SCHEWMAN: Is that the end here or do you 11 have some concluding remarks?
12 MR. GRIMES: No. I think Mr. Shea has summed up
(' 13 the concluding remarks. We came here to des.cribe to you 14 why we think the plant should be granted a full term 15 operating license, and we presented a staff evaluation to 16 support the license conversion. We focused on that one 17 particular aspect of this plant operation regarding IGSCC, 18 but there are a number of other details of what has 19 happened since the POL was originally issued. Unless you 20 have any specific desires, I propose to take the question 21 lists that you presented to us and select some of those 22 questions as they relate to the conclusions in NUREG 1143, 23 and put together a brief presentation for the full 24 committee with respect to the conversion SER.
() 25 MR. SCHEWMAN: Does anybody have any questions?
ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
_ , 202 347-)700 _ __ _ NationwideCoverc;3 __ _ _ _ 800 336-6646_ _ _ _ _
24940.0 311 BRT O 1 Dade? On these items that were on, at least the list -- if 2 you look at the agenda for the meeting, I think at this 3 point in time we have closed the presentation. We are into 4 the closing remarks, which I will not make to you people, 5 but I will make to the people at this end of the table.
6 Those of you who want to stay to hear it because 7 it will influence some of what will come up on the 5th, are 8 welcome.to stay. Those of you who want to leave will at 9 least know what you are missing. Please do it quietly.
10 I think on the whole it has been a good 11 presentation and a good meeting, and we thank you for your 12 hospitality.
O 13 .Let's go on, then.
14 MR. KACICH: Dr. Schewman, just one 15 clarification. The question that arose during Tom's 16 presentation yesterday about the origin of the 1.5 millirem 17 limit. In 30 seconds I think Ray Crandall can address that.
18 MR. CRANDALL: That's half of the 3 millirem
+
19 limit from 10 CFR i. During ' any quarter they allow you to 20 go to one half of the annual.
21 MR. MOELLER: Title 10, 150, i, I had never 22 heard it broken down further.
23 MR. SCHEWMAN: I find I have something here, 24 utility performance monitor report. It came in my mail
() 25 this morning.
ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
>TVJ7.E7i) Newide Cm 800 3364646
24940.0 312 BRT
(~
\
l MR. ROMBERG: Yes. We provided you with a 2 number of things as a result of some of the discussions we 3 had yesterday. You asked about performance indicators and 4 other relevant type of information.
5 Corporate nuclear operations department puts 6 those out quarterly and they are goals internal to the 7 company we have set that provide some illumination of where 8 we are going, what's important to us, and where we stand on 9 certain things that apparently are also important to you.
10 It tracks -- trends LERs -- it trends a number of scrams 11 per year reported -- whatever. It is really very much in 12 line with where INPO is going. It's stuff we already do, 13 though also in your pachage you saw a little sheet that i 14 shows where lost generation comes from. It's in a memo 15 form, has a little pie-shaped graph and shows for each of 16 the plants in the system where the lost generation came 17 from.
18 If you look at Millstone -- I think you have the 19 third one there -- it shows Hurricane Gloria was a bad deal 20 and Unit i lost a lot percentage-wise. Look under item B.
21 Gloria was 23 percent of the lost generation for the period 22 - in question, January 1 to September 30. So the motto for 23 that is, don't have any hurricanes.
24 It points up, we do trend that stuff very l
l 25 closely, we do look at it, and that's again part of the i (~)T
\~
i ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336-6646
24940.0 313 BRT 1 reason we are probably as effective as we are. We look at 2 those things and use that information to manage our 3 resources, better attack what the true problems are. The 4 other thing you got in your package I think is a typical --
5 yours isn't pink like the operators copy -- emergency 6 operating procedure. That's not the whole thing. The 7 whole stack would take you days to go through, but it's at 8 least typical of what they look like and what the operator 9 has at his disposal.
10 MR. SCHEWMAN: I assume that if Dave Ward has 11 any other questions on that he'll bring it up.
- 12 You can go off of this.
13 (Whereupon, at 2:30 p.m., the meeting was 14 l adjourned.)
l 15 !
I 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 o
I 25 ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 147 1700 Nat%TrMh@ overage A00 336 6646
l l
CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL REPORTER 0
[ This is to certify that the attached proceedings before -
the UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION in~ the
- matter of
NAME OF PROCEEDING: ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILLSTONE UNITS 1, 2 AND 3 l
1
(
DOCKET NO.:
i .
PLACE: WATERFORD, CONNECTICUT 1
l DATE: TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 19, 1985 i
j= were held as herein appears, and that this ir the original transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear
- Regulatory Commission.
i (sigt) # A ;
(TYPED l JOEY BREITNER i Official Reporter ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
! Reporter's Affiliation I
i i
!O i i i
_ . . . . . . - _ _ _ . , _ . . . . , _ _ . - . . . . . . _ , , , . _ ~ - . - - ,
3 . s. A NRR STAFF PRESENTATION TO THE :
~
0 ACRS _
l
. e
SUBJECT:
CONVERSION OF THE PROVISIONAL OPERATING LICENSE TO A FULL TERM OPERATING LICENSE DATE: November 1;9, 1985 PRESENTER: James J. Shea Q .
' PRESENTER'S TITLE / BRANCH /DIV: Project Manager MP-1 Operating Reactors Branch #5 Division of Licensing e.
, y PRESENTER'S NRC TEL. NO.: (301) 492-7231 SUBCOMMITTEE: Dr. Paul Schewman * - Chairman Dr. Dade Moeller Mr. David Ward M. Bender - Consultant J. Schiffgens Staff
~
O .-
J s
1 2 -
O - '
O '
~
NUREG-1143 ITEMS OF. INTEREST . ,
A. OPERATING PROBLEMS ,
5 B. ACCIDENT ANALYSIS i
C. RHR REQUIREMENTS D. RESULTS OF IGSCC INSPECTIONS, AND INSPECTION PLANS -
4 i
O E. STAFF CONCLUSIONS
(].:
t.
S e
s 9
SLIDE 1 11/19/85 O
~
. .)-
4
1 O
(A) OPERATING PROBLEMS D
(1) CHLORIDE INTRUSION f (2) FEEDWATER SPARGER CRACKING (3) INVERTED POISON TUBES ,
m (4) HYDRAULIC SNUBBERS O (5) FEEDWATER N0ZZLE INTERNAL CLADDING DEFECTS . ';.) -
(6) GAS TURBINE GENERATOR PERFORMANCE (7) OTHER OPERATING PROBLEMS SLIDE 2 11/19/85 O -
, 1 a
'. , i 2 l m
O -
(B) ACCIDENT ANALYSIS ~'.
..vd
- 1. NRC REQUIREMENTS r
10 CFR 50 APPENDIX A
^
GDC-10 REACTOR DESIGN a-GDC-15 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM DESIGN GDC-21 PROTECTION' SYSTEM RELIABILITY AND TESTABILITY GDC-27 COMBINED REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM CAPABI.LITY GDC-28 REACTIVITY LIMITS O .
3 t- REGULATORY GUIDES .
~
1,53 APPLICATION OF SINGLE FAILURE CRITERION TO NUCLEAR POWER PLANT PROTECTION SYSTEMS i
1.105 INSTRUMENT SET POINTS i
I o
SblDE'3 11/19/85 O
~
J,
. l 1
- 2. TRANSLATION m 0 *
.)
NO TRANSITION BOILING DURING THE WORST ANTICIPATED TRANSIENT -- I.E. FOR MP-1 " LOSS OF LOAD WITHOUT TURBINE STEAM BY-PASS TO'THE CONDENSER". THE MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR) MUST BE GREATER THAN 1.07 THROUGHOUT THE TRANSIENT OR 1.42 - 1.48 DURING NORMAL OPERATION FOR OPTION B OR A. ,
PEAK LOCAL ZIRCALOY CLAD TEMPERATURE MUST NOT EXCEED 2200*F DURING THE DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT (DOUBLE ENDED RUPTURE OF THE LARGEST PRIMARY COOLANT PIPE)
-- 3. ANTICIPATED TRANSIENTS WITHOUT SCRAM (ATWS) .
~.
ATWS RULE 10 CFR 50.62 - JUNE 4, 1984 O GENERIC LETTER 85-06 QUALITY ASSURANCE GUIDANCE FOR ATWS .)
EQUIPMENT THAT IS NOT SAFETY RELATED - APRIL 16, 1985 NNEC0 RESPONSE SEPTEMBER 9, 1985 ALTERNATE ROD INSERTION RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM EVALUATION IN ISAP TOPIC 1,18 SLIDE 4
'O -11/19/85 o
v
e .
O Q n. i (C) RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL REQUIREMENTS. '
NORMAL . l r'
MAIN CONDENSER WHEN AVAILABLE (HOT)
. ISOLATION CONDENSER (HOT)
P.
SDCS (C00LDOWN) e
_ ABNORMAL ISOLATION CONDENSER
, O
- ADS -
9 F %- . -
.T S IDE 5
.11/19/85 O -
? ,
+
- s t
$~
1 O ..
x..)
(D) RESULTS OF IGSCC INSPECTIONS AND INSPECTION PLANS (NUREG SECTION 5.3.2) r SYSTEM APRIL 1984 OUTAGE INSPECTED REPORTABLE REPAIR INDICATIONS
' 1-28" RECIRC. 98 6-12" WELD OVERLAY
- SHUTDOWN COOLING 2 LPCI 11 RWCU 41 7-8" REPLACED O CS 15 2-10" REPLACED
.] .
IC 48 4-12" REPLACED 2 ,
1-16" WELD OVERLAY TOTAL 215 21 7 WELD OVERLAY 13 REPLACED 4
DURING 1984 OUTAGE A TOTAL OF 26 IGSCC WELDS INCLUDING THE 13 IDENTIFIED AB0VE WERE REPLACED. 83 RECIRC. WELDS RECEIVED INDUCTION HEATING STRESS IMPROVEMENT SLIDE 6 11/19/85 s
g ,4
O SYSTEn N0vensEa 198s OUTAce i INSPECTED REPORTABLE REPAIR l INDICATIONS 1 -
e w i i I
l RECIRC.
LPCI l' RWCU CS IC TOTAL k O -
O
~4.
6 l
l t
Sk.IDE7 11/19/8s
~
O a
....,.s. -
1 1 i O (E) STAFF CONCLUSIONS
~
l THE 40 YEAR FTOL REQUESTED BY NNECO TO EXPIRE 1
OCTOBER 20, 2010 SHOULD BE GRANTED I
e m
M 9
l O -
U-
~
I SLIDE 8 11/19/85
~
O g s
e 9%' e 44 6W q m. . g.e 9-
- 4 whh 6 ee - gee % w =h
? * .
, NRR STAFF PRESENTATION TO THE O ACRS
SUBJECT:
Millstone Unit 1 - SEP and ISAP Presentation DATE: November 18 and 19,1985 PRESENTER: Michael L. Boyle O
PRESENTER'S TITLE / BRANCH /DIV: Integrated Assessment Project t'anager Systematic Evaluation Program Rranch Division of Licensing PRESENTER'S NRC TEL. NO.: 492-8935 s
SUBCOMMITTEE: Millstone units 1-3'
?
O
\
O MILLSTONE UNIT 1 I. OUTSTANDING SEP ITEMS COMPLETE 20 ISAP 11 OTHER 10 II. USI, GSI AND TMI ACTION ITEMS APPROXIMATELY 25 ISAP TOPICS ARE RELATED TO USI, GSI OR TMI ACTION ITEMS.
F THESE, 10 ARE USIs OR GSIs THAT HAVE BEEN O TECHNICALLY RESOLVED, BUT NOT YET ISSUED, O
f\
Millstene Unit 1 SEP Status IPSAR IPSAR SECTION TYPE SAFETY IMPROVEMENT STATUS COMMENTS 4.1.6 2 FLOOD EMERGER6ENCY PROCEDURES COMPLETE 4.1.7 3 EVALUATE STRUCTURES FOR PMP AND PMH CCMPLETE 4 INSTALL ROOF SCUPPERS 1995 6 EVALUATE BLOCK WALLS AND GROUNDWATER LOADS INTEGRATED ISAP 1.19 4.2.1 3 TURBINE AND ST6 BLD6 PILES AND PEAT UNDEALAY SUBMITTED ISAP 1.19 4.3.1 3 QUALITY 6R0"P CLAS$!FICATION 1987 ISAP 1.15 4.4.1 3 WIND AND TORNA00 LCADS INTESRATED ISAP 1.19 4.6.2 2 IS! WATER CONTROL STRUCTURES COMPLETE 4.7 1 TCRNADO MISSILE PROTECT!DN ISAP !.02 4.9 2 TURBINE INSPECTION COMPLETE
.4.8 3 FULL CLOSURE TEST OF TURBINE CONTROL VALVES SUBMITTED 4.9 3 P!FE BREAK OPEN ITEMS COMPLETE 4.10 3 P!PE BREAK OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT COMPLETE 4.11.2 3 SE!SMIC SMALL LINE VALVES. RV INTERNALS, ETC. SUBMITTED ISAP 1.06 4.12 3 INTEGRATED STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS SUBMITTED ISAP 1.!?
4.14 3 THERMAL OVERLCADS COMPLETE ISAP 1.20 4.16.1 - 3 LEAK LETECTION: SEISMIC COMPLETE 4.17 2 PROCURES FOR COLD SHUTDOWN OUTS!DE CONTROL ROCM CCMPLETE 4.19 1 INTERLOCK RWCU SUCTION LINE ISAP 1.04 4.19.1 2 TS LIMITS ON CHLORIDES COMPLETE 4.20 i LOCK DEVICES, INSTALL VALVE, ADMIN CONTROLS COMPLETE 4.20.3 2 PROCEDURES TO ISOLATE PEMOTE VALVES COMPLETE 4.20.7 3 BRANCH LINE ISOLATION ISAP 1.03 4.21.1 3 SPACE COOLERS: NON-ESSENTIAL COMPLETE 4.23.! 3 AUTO AND MANUAL 3"S TRANSFERS ISAP 1.21 4.24.1 3 SURVE! LANCE FREGUENCY FOR CHANNELS COMPLETE 4.25.1 3 ISOLATICN BETWEEN CONTR01. AND SAFETY SYSTEMS SUBMITTED ISAP 1.22 4.25.2 1 !!0 LATE RPS AND PCWER SUFFLY SYSTEMS CCMPLETE ISAP 1.22 4.27 2 CEGRADED GRID PROCEDURES COMPLETE !!AP 1.23 4.28 1 BYFASS ST6 PROTECTIVE TRIPS ISAP 1.01 4.28.3 3 PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE PROSRAM: STS COMPLETE 4.29 2 TS SATTERY SERVICE TEST COMPLETE 4.30.1 3 BATTERY STATUS ALARMS SUBMITTED 4.30.2 2 TS SATTERY OUTAGE LIMITS 1985 4.32.2 3 BATTERY R00M HYDROSEN COMBINATION C0t?LETE 4.32.3 3 EVALATE NEED FOR FWC!/D6 AND INTAKE VENTILATION CCP?LETE ISAP 1.05 4 PCWER SUPPLY MO:S FOR VENTILATION SYSTEM ISAF 1.05 4.35 2 TS FR! MARY COOLANT ACTIVITY CDP.PLETE TYPE: 1 Eguissent modification :
2 TS cr pr:cedure sodification 1 SEP 3 Additional evaluation :
U 4 Eauipsent sodification l 5 TS or procedure sodification } Su:plement 6 Additi:nal evaluatien :
IPSAR
SUMMARY
AND CONCLUSIONS O .
SEP TOPICS REVIEWED 86 TOPICS THAT MET CRITERIA 48 TOPICS CONSIDERED IN IA 38 (89 ITEMS)
CATEGORY 1 CATEGORY 2 CATEGORY 3 CATEGORY 4 ITEMS REVIEWED 14 10 41 24 IN IPSAR
-~
IPSAR 17 1 23 24 SUPPLEMENT CATEGORY 1: RESOLUTION REQURES HARDWARE MODIFICATIONS OR TESTS 2: RESOLUTION REQUIRES TS OR PROCEDURE CHANGES 3: RESOLUTION REQUIRES FURTHER EVALUATION 4: NO REQUIREMENTS OR CATEGORY 1, 2, OR-3 REQUIREMENT
. COMPLETE.
I f
- O
Tabla 2.1 Summery cf IPSAR and Suppiht Evaluatiens SEP Topl- h!PSAR Section p -
Supplement- Requirements O
Requirements No. No. Title Free IP5AR section' From i
No. Supplement 11-3.3, 4.1.1 Flooding Elevation .
II-3.8.1, Determine the effects of 2.1.1 II-3.C probable manteue hurricane Assure structural adequacy of (Pmt) wave inleakage and masonry walls in fire pumphouse.
Identify any necessary (15AP Issue 1.19) corrective actions.
Provide analysis of Pfel Mone wave structural effects.
(See Sections 4.6 and 4.12.)
4.1.2 Intake Structure None ---
4.1.3 Local Flooding Mone ---
4.1.4 Cas Turbine Building Mone ---
4:. 4.1.5 Diesel Fuel Oil None (See Section 4.1.6.) ---
4.1.6 Emergency Procedures l Revise the flood emergency 4.0 procedures to address the Procedural change complete.
topic concerns and laplement the revised procedures.
4.1.7 Roots to Determine the adequacy of 2.1.2 Install scuppers on selected f roofs subjected to ponding roofs. (1985 Refueling Outage) cn resulting from the local '
probable nextous precip!tation (PNP). (See Section 4.12.)
II-4.F 4.2.1 Turbine Building Evaluate structural capability 2.2.1 of the plies steporting the Under staff review. .(ISAP issue building. (See Section 4.12.) 1.19) 4.2.2 Cas Turbine Generator Building Evaluate structural capability 2.2.2 of the plies supporting the Under staff review. (ISAP !ssue building. (See Section 4.12.) 1.19) 0 i
o o
o tab 13 2.1 Seemary cf IPSAR andjeplement E:aluations SEP
- IPSAR ,
Supplement Requirements Topic Section Requirements section~
From No. No. iltle , Free IPSAR No. Supplement 4.2.3 Buried Pipelines . Conduct soll Investigation in 2.2.3 Awalting information free area of the safety-related licensee. (ISAP Issue 1.19) j water pipelines tehere they say be underlain by peat. (See Section 4.12.)
i III-1 4.3.1 Radiography Requirements Perform a volumetric inspection 2.3 Same (ISAP Issue 1.15) l of all Class 1 and 2 piping, and valves and Class 2 vessels not volumetrically inspected previously. Document in FSAR update.
4.3.2 Fracture Toughness Identify and replace, if 2.3 Same (ISAP Issue 1.15) necessary, the components that do not meet fracture toughness requirements.
g Document in F5AR update.
4.3.3 Valves Evaluate design of Class 1, 2.3 Same (ISAP Issue 1.15) 2, and 3 valves on a sampling basts; upgrade if necessary, y Document in FSAR update.
a to 4.3.4 Pumps Analyze the design safety 2.3 Same (ISAP issue 1.15) margins of the specified pumps. Document in FSAR update.
4.3.5 Storage Tanks Evaluate design of specifled 2.3 Same (ISAP Issue 1.15) tanks. Document in FSAR !
update.
4 I e t
l 1
fabla 2.1 Suet 4ry cf IPSAR nd 5 l'eent e E: luations SEP - IP5AA Topic Section .
Supplement No. Requirements Requirements No. Title , Froe IPSAA section From No. Supplement 111-2 4.4.1 Reactor Building Steel . Analyze the specified Structures Above the structures capabilities to 2.4 Provide protected safe shutdown OberatingFloor '
train and assure adequacy of CST resist tornado loads and propose corrective actions, and firewater tank anchor bolts.
if necessary. (See Section (15AP issue 1.02) 4.12.)
4.4.2 Ventilation Stack Submit analyses demonstrating 2.4 capability to achieve and Same as 4.4.1 maintain safe shutdoun of Units 1 and 2 case of a tornado-induced failure of the stack. (Analysis subeltted--
under staff review.)
4.4.3 Effects of Fallure of p Monquallfled Structures Provide an analysis of the 2.4 effects and any corrective Same as 4.4.1 actions that may be recessary.
m 4.4.4 Components Not Enclosed in quellfled Structures Determine the adequacy of the 2.4 b
o components and identify any Same as 4.4.1 correctJve actions that may be necessary.
4.4.5 Roofs Determine the adequacy of roofs 2.4 of Category I structures. (See Same as 4.4.1 Section 4.12.)
4.4.6 Load Coshinations Demonstrate that wind loads 2.4 were properly cochined with See Section 2.10 other specified loads or identify (15AP Issue 1.19) any r. cessary corrective action.
(See Section 4.12.)
i e
G
. U ,, .
Tabla 2.1 Summary ct IP5AR W Supplement E=luations SEP IPSAR Topic Section , sepplement Requirements Requirements No. No. Title section From
, From IP5AR he. 5"pplement Ill-3.A 4.5.1 Flood Elevation Provide analysis of Pfel wave 2.5 See section 2.1.1
- ' structural effects and identify any necessary corrective actions. (See Sections 4.1.1 and 4.12.)
4.5.2 Groundwater Demonstrate appropriate 2.5 consideration of hydrostatic Provide additional justification forces on a sampling basis. of margin. (15AP issue 1.19)
(See Section 4.12.)
Ill-3.C 4.6.1 Deficiencies Noted Determine the adequacy of roofs 2.1.2 subjected to ponding resulting Install sc gpers on selected roofs.
(lo be installed during Fall 1985 from the local PMP. (See Section refueling outage) 4.12 and 4.1.7.)
4.6.2 Structures and Components Revise procedure to include Requiring Inspection 4.0 Procedural change complete.
a inspection of floodwalls, (See Section 4.6.3.)
- 4. 6. 3 Inspection Program m Develop and s delt an leproved 4.0 inspection progree for water Inspection program complete.
control structures.
III-4.A 4.7 Tornado Missiles Evaluate protection of systems 2.4 and components to ensure the Provide safe shutdown train.
capability to safely shutdown the plant via a tornado elssile-protected path.
Modify as necessary to provide 2.4 a tornado elssile protected Provide safe shutdown train.
shutdown path. See Section 2.4 (15AP issue 1.02)
~
111-4.8 4. 8 Turbine Missiles inspect tuttine and propose 2. 6 None frequency based on results.
e 6
m o
. , .4 -
^
Tab b 2.1 5-ry cf IP5AR an_d SeepleasIn't E:',1uations '
SEp - IPSAR *
, Supp1'ement Requirements Topic Section Requirements No. No.
Section Free Title Free IP5AR leo. Supplement i
III-4.3 4.8 Turbine Missiles Evaluate the leprovement in 2.6 l
Awaiting further information control valve availablitty free turbine manufacturer.
l associated with full closure i
testing and feasibility of conducting such tests.
III-5.A 4. 9.1 Cascading Pipe Breaks Subalt an analysis of cascoding 2.7.1 None pipe breaks.
4.9.2 Jet Impingement Provide information specified. 2.7.2 18one I 4.9.3 Pipe Whip Provide an analysis of the 2.7.3 leone potential for and consequences of pipes whipping into the dryuell liner.
III-5.8 4.10.1 Moderate-Energy Piping None ---
9 4.10.2 Jet lapingement Subelt a review of affected jet 2.8 None lapingement analysis.
eu 4.10.3 Unisolable Breaks None ---
U III-5 4.11.1 Pile Foundations Evaluate structural capability 2.9.1 of plies supporting the turbine None (See Section 2.2.1 and 2.2.2)
(ISAP Issue 1.19) and gas tortine buildings.
(See Sections 4.2.1, 4.2.2, and 4.12.)
4.11.2 Motor-0perated Valves
~
Demonstrate valve structural 2.9.2 Under staff review.
Integrity. (ISAp Issue 1.06) 4.11.3 tow-Pressure Coolant leone ---
Injection / Containment Spray Neat Exchangers I e .
9
. , .v -
Tabla 2.1 Summary of IP5AR an,d $ipplomitat Ev 1uations SEP IP5AR il Suppionent Requirements e
Topl: Section Requirements Section From No. No. Title , Froe IPSAR No. Supplement III-6 4.11.4 Transformer and Control . samme (staff is reviewing). 2.9.3 under staff review.
Roon Panels . (ISAP !ssue 1.06) 4.11.5 Ability of Safety-Related None ---
Electrical Equipment to .
Function.
4.11.6 Qualification of Cable Provide plan to implement 2.9.4 Mone Trays results of SEP Owners Group Program.
4.11.7 Recirculation Pump Supports None ---
4.11.8 Reactor Vessel Internals Provide a setselc analysis of 2.9.5 Under staff review.
the reactor vessel internals. (ISAP Issue 1.06)
III-7.8 4.12 Design Codes. Design Evaluate adequacy of original 2.10 under staf f review.
Criteria, Load Combinations design criteria on a saapilng 4 (15AP issue 1.19) and Reactor Cavity Design basis for specified structural Criteria elements; provide Information requested in Topics 11-3.8, N
II-4.F. III-2, III-3.A. and b
w III-6 that has been deferred to ,
this tcpic.
III-8.A 4.13 Loose-Parts Monitoring and None ---
Core Barrel Vibration Monitoring III-10.A 4.14 Thereal-Overload Protection Demonstrate proper setting 2.11 Mone for Motors of Motor-Operated of thereal-overload trip Valves setpoints and discuss operating emperience of specified valves.
Implement modifications found to be necessary, s .
t i e l
I
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -~- ~ - ~ ~ -~
~ ~ 1C)Do 8.B WoD TCED and supp1"ement Erslu:tions
^
=
SEP IPSAR p -
Topic , Supplement R quirements Sectlen R quiremezts No. No. Title Section From
. Froe IPSAR No. Supplement IV-2 4.15 Reactivity Control Systees., None ---
Including Functional Design ahd Protection Against Single Failures V-5 4.16.1 Systems Currently Available Provide at least one leakage 3.1 Technical Specification change at Mllistone Unit 1 detection method that is complete (Amendment 97).
quellfled to a safe shutdown j
i earthquake or provide procedures that specify actions to be taken for a setsele event and failure of the leakage detection equip-ment (e.g.,pjantshutdown).
The leakage detection method should be testable during operation.
)
Evaluate sensitivity in conjunc- 3.1 None tion with Topic III-5.A. (See ,
Section 4.9.1.) l g 4.16.2 Intersystes Leakage Mone ---
e
$ V-10.8 4.17 Residual Heat Removal Review and leiplement emergency 4.0 Procedural change complete.
System Reliability procedures, including steps to prnceed to a cold shutdown condition from outside the control room.
V-11.A 4.18 Requirements for Isolation Install an independent pressure 4.0 Region I outstanding lies No.
of High- and Low-Pressure interlock for the reactor water Systems cleanup (RWCU) systee inboard 245/84-27-05. (ISAP Issue 1.04) suction isolation valve.
s t
- I e
l mmmi
I , 0., '
fab 13 2.1 Summary cf IPSAR a upplement E r fustions SEP - IPSAR Topic Section , Supple'eent Requirements Requirements 16 o . No. Title Section From
, Free IPSAR llo. 5 = lement V-12.A 4.19.1 Water Cheefstry Lleits . Revise Technical Specifications 3.2 to incorporate AG 1.56 Italts Technical Specification change for chlorides and conductivity complete (Amendment 99).
ifelts, or provide justification for not doing so.
4.19.2 Lietting Conditions for leone Operation ---
VI-4 4.20.1 Locked-Closed Valves Install adelnistratively , 4.1 Casplete including revisions controlled mechanical locking to IPSAR requirements noted in devices in the specified valves.
Section 4.0.
4.20.2 Lines Requiring a Second Valve and Both Locked Install a second valve and 4.2 Complete except for Region i Closed administratively controlled locking devices on both, on outstandlag Ites No. 245/84-27-08.
< the spectfIed Ilnes.
4.20.3 Remote Manual Valves Demonstrate leakage detection, 2.12.1 None y locate operating stations in e accessible areas, and develop
$ procedures for isolation of the specified valves.
4.20.4 Valve tocation None ---
4.20.5 Instrument Lines None ---
4.20.6 Valve tocation and Type None ---
4.20.7 Lack of Information Review Isolation capablitty of 2.12.2 two Ifnes and laplement Relocate branch line connection modifications, if necesary. points. (15AP issue 1.03) t e
I
____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ - - - - - ~ - - - - ~ ~ --
r------ - - - - - - - -
.1 -
.__---__-----------------r- .
SEP IPSAR n .
O Topic Section .
Supplement Raquirements No. R2quirements No. Title , From IP5AR Sect No. ,lon From 5mplement VI-7.A.3 4.21.1 Testing or Space Coolers . Demonstrate that the space 2.13 Nons
' coolers are not essential.
(Analysts subeltted--under staff review.)
4.21.2 Testing of the E5W5 None ---
VI-7.A.4 4.22 Core Spray Nozzle None ---
Effectiveness .
VI-7.C.1 4.23.1 Automatic Bus Transfers Evaluate the existing automatic 2.14.1 bus transfers and Identify Perfore circuit breaker corrective actions to ensure coordination analysis including need for faulted loads would not be transferred. instrument ac bus (15AP 4.23.2 Issues 1.21 and 2.17)
Manual Bus Transfers Install appropriate interlocks 2.14.2 same as above.
or provide justification for not
) doing so. (15AP !ssue 2.19)
VI-10.A 4.24.1 Survel11ance Frequency Evaluate the surveillance 4.0 None N frequency of the specified N channels.
m 4.24.2 Channel Functional Test None ---
Frequency 4.24.3 Response-Tlee Testing Mone ---
Vill-1.A 4.25.1 Isolation Devices Between Reactor Protection Systes Conduct test to determine if 2.15 existing isolation is adequate. (15AP issue 1.22)
(RPS) and Monitoring Propose corrective actions if Systems necessary.
4.25.2 Isolation Devices Between Provide adequate isolation. 4.0 None the RP5 and its Power Supply t
-GC(
, .u -
O O -
O Table 2.1 Sussmany of IPSAR and Suppleeent Evaluations SEP IPSAR Topic Supplement Requirements Section Requirements No. No.
.Section Free Title From IPSAR No.
Supplement Vil-3 4.26 Systems Required for Safe None ---
Shutdown h VIII-1.A 4.27 l'otential Equipment Failures Develop and implement procedures 4.0 None Associated with Degraded to protect Class 1E systems of a Grid Voltage degraded grid voltage condition.
VIII-2 4.28.1 Startup Trips typass Ifght-off speed and 4.3 Region I outstanding Ites No.
generator excitation speed 245/84-27-07. (15AP issue 1.01) trips under accident conditions.
4.28.2 Operational Trips Bypass high lube oil temperature 4.3 Region I outstanding Ites No.
trip under accident conditions.
245/84-27-07. (ISAP Issue 1.01) 4.28.3 Gas Turbine Preventive Implement a preventive mainten- 2.16 Mone Maintenance Program ance program, leprove existing one, or provide justification for not doing so.
4.28.4 Generator Trips typass specified trips under 4.3
? Region I outstanding Ites No.
accident conditions. 245/84-27-08. (!$AP Issue 1.01) t' 4.28.5 Annunciators None ---
VIII-3.A 4.29 Station Battery Test Revise Technical Specifications 3.3 Requirements Technical Spectfication change i
to require battery service and complete (Amendment 99).
discharge tests. ~
VIII-3.8 4.30.1 Battery Status Alares and Install the s'pecified battery 2.17 l Indications Under staff review.
status alares or provide justification for not doing so.-
'O tabla 2.1 Summary cf IPSAR and Suppleme,ht Evaluations SEP . IP5AR "
Topic Section ,
Supplement Requirements Requirements No. No. Title Sectlen From
, Free IPSAR No. Supplement Vill-3.5 4.30.2 Battery Outage Lielts Revise Technical Specifications 3.4 Proposed Technical Specifications to reduce battery outage fielts or provide justification for not received from itcensee.
present 11elts.
IX-3 4.31 Station Service and Cooling Water Systems Mone (pending results of Topic ---
II-4.F review).
IX-5 4.32.1 Core Spray and LPCI Systees Demonstrate that the space coolers 2.18.1 Ventilation are not essential. (See Section See Section 2.15.
4.21.1.) (Analysis submitted--
under staff review.)
4.32.2 Reinttlation of Ventilation Demonstrate that the equipment 2.18.2 Modify operating procedures After a Loss-of-Offsite- serviced is unaffected by the Power Event lack of ventilation and that the to start exhaust fans.
4 hydrogen combustion llelt in the battery rooms will not be reached.
to 4.32.3 Leck of Information ly Provide information on the space 2.18.3 coolers for the feedhvater (15AP Issue 1.05) co coolant injection and diesel generator areas.
4.32.4 Intake Structure Ventilation .
System Demonstrate that sufficient 2.18.4 (ISAP Issue 1.05) ventilatign can be provided in a Lleely manner.
XV-1 4.33 Decrease in Feednvater Mone currently; survelliance of ---
Temperature, increase in turbine bypass valves and llelts Flow, increase in steam for reactor power if the turbine Flow, and Inadvertent bypass is inoperable will be Opening of a 5tese Generator required if credit is taken for Rollef or Safety Valve the turbine bypass in the reload analysis.
l l
l k
9
, v, s o
Tabla 2.1 Summary cf IPSAR and Supplene'nt Enluations
^ ,
SEP - IPSAR " '
gi Supplement Requirements Topic Section Requiremelts sea. No.
Section From Title Free IPSAR No.
Supplement XV-3 4.34 Loss of External Load . 16one ---
Turbine Trip, Loss of Condenser vacuum, Closure '
of Main Steae Isolation Valve (BWR), and Steae Pressure Regulator Failure (Closed)
XV-16 4.35 Radiological Cansequences Implement OWR Standard 3.5 Technical Specification change of Failure of Small Lines Technical Specification iloit complete (Amendment 99).
Carrying Primary Coolant for primary coolant activity Outside Containment and propose, for staff review, associated action statements if these limits are exceeded.
XV-18 4.36 Radiological Consequences See Section 4.35. 3.6 See section 3.5 of a Main Steam Line
~h Fallure outside containment.
to i .
ISAP FOR MILLSTONE 1 (2) .
ORIGINAL REQUEST TO PARTICIPATE IN ISAP WAS BY LETT'ER DATED DECEMBER 28, 1983 STAFF RESPONDED TO THE REQUEST ON APRIL 5, 1984 NRC ISSUES ISAP POLICY STATEMENT ON NOVEMBER 15, 1984
. STAFF AND LICENSEE MET FOR INITIAL TOPIC SCREENING REVIEW ON APRIL 2, 1985 LICENSEE SUBMITTED FINAL ISAP SCOPE AND DESCRIPTION ON MAY 17, 1985 STAFF ISSUES SCOPE APPROVAL ON JULY 31, 1985
. ~
O .
6 O
w
ISAP PROGRAM AND OBJECTIVES i O !
~
DESCRIPTION OF THE ISAP PROGRAM FOUND IN COMMISSION POLICY STATEMENT ON SSER (49 FR 45112, NOVEMBER 15, 1984).
OBJECTIVE - TO PROVIDE A STABLE ENVIRONMENT TO EVALUATE ALL LICENSING ISSUES, ESTABLISH IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULES, PROVIDE A BASIS FOR UPDATING THE SCHEDULE AND PROVIDE A BASIS FOR FUTURE REGULATORY ACTIONS, FEATURES DETERMINISTIC REVIEW OF ISSUES PROBABILISTIC REVIEW 0F ISSUES AND PROVIDE A
SUMMARY
OF PLANT STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES.
i -
OPERATING EXPERIENCE REVIEW LICENSEE PERFORMS INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF ISSUES O FOUND IN DETERMINISTIC /PSA/0PERATING EXPERIENCE REVIEWS, DECISIONS ON CORRECTIVE ACTIONS BASED ON QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENT OF VALUE/ IMPACT APPROPRIATENES OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS REVIEWED BY STAFF LICENSEE WILL PROVIDE IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULES LICENSE AMENDMENT CONTAINING IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULES AND PROCEDURES TO UPDATE SCHEDULES ISSUED O
n
Millstone 1 !!AP laplementation ! tees
/~m
.C ISAP i Itea
,. + +. _ . . ..__,
1 Seisaic Qualification of Safety Related Piping 2 Primary Containsent Leak Rata Monitoring 3 Undervoltage Protection Esergency Bus 4 Replacement of Mater Operated Valves
- Flcedgate Mods. and Installation of Scuppers 6 Refueling Cavity Seal Evaluation 7 Records Vault Temperature and Huaidity Control 8 Process Computer UPS Installation 9 MS Relief Valve Vacuus Breaker Load Qualification 10 Station Battery 'A' Replacesent
!! Rev. and Eval. for Diesel Air Start Systen 12 Sas Turbine Generater Elec. Equipment Protection 13 Auxiliary Equipment Systes Ocillograph 14 Superviscry and Events Recorder Systees 15 Replate Main Senerator Neutral Srcunding Trans.
16 Lisitorque Mctor Operated Valves: Lubrication 17 460V Motor Soft Start Capability 18 ISSCC Counterseasures 19 Circulating ' dater Piping Thrust Block Repairs 20 Sas Turbine Generator Battery Replacesent 21 Sclid Radmaste Building Ventilatica and Roof Mods.
22 Spent Fuel Pool Cleanup 23 Voltage Regulator, Instrusent Trans Replacements 24 House Heating Boiler Stack 25 Precuring Nucl. Grade Mat./ Service Sensitive Lines 266 Plant Training Sisulater 279 Frchabilistic Safety Study 26 Unit Availability M: del 299 Re:fReplateseEt 30 Eser. 6as Turbine Generator Vibration Switches
+-+ + __ _ _ __. +
4 Cngeing activities that represent a level cf effort that sust be saintained, l
t O
1 l
t i
Millstone 1 ISAP Tcpics FSA
) ISAP i Title - NRC issues to be included in ISAP Topic Source Score
+. .+ + . .. . .- . _+ + ... ++_+.
1.01 Sas Turbine Seneratcr Start Logic Mcdificatiens SEP VI!!-2 1.00 1.02 Tornada Missile Protection SEP III-4.A 3.75 1.0; Containsent Isclation-Appendix A Mcdtfications SEP VI-4 1.04 RWCU Systes Pressure Interlock SEP V-11.A 0.01 1.05 Ventilation Systes Modificaticas SEP II-5 0.00
!.06 Seissic Qualificatica of Safety Related Piping IEB 79-021-14 0.10 1.07 Contrcl Rocs Design Review 0737:Supp! 1 0.10 1.0S Safety Paraseter Disclay Systes 0737:Supp! 1 1.09 RS 1.97 Instrusentation 0737: Suppl 1 1.10 Esergency Response Facilities Instrusentation 0737:Suop! !
1.11 Post Accident Hydrogen Mcniter 0737:Supel 1 1.12 Centrol Roca Habitability 0737:III.D.3.4 0.50 1.!! BWR Vessel Water Level Instrumentation 0737:II.F.2 1.50 1.14 Appendix J Mcdificaticns 10CFR50 1.15 FSAR Update 50.71 1.16 Appendix R 50.48 5.00 1.17 Peplacesent of Motor Operated Valves 50.49 1.50 1.13 ATWS 50.62 1.00 1.19 Integrated Structural Ananysis SEP 1.20 MCV Interlecks SEP!!I-10.A 1.21 Fault Transfers SEP VI-7.C.1 .25 1.22 Electrical Isolation SEP VII-1.A 1.23 Srid Separatien Procedures SEP V!!!-1.A
-/, 1.24 Esergency Power SEP VIII-2 1.00 1.25 Degraded Srid Valtage Precedures MPA B-23 1.24 - Ites 2.1-Equipsent Classification / Vender Inter. Sales ATWS 1.27 Itess 3.1.11.2-Pest Maintenance Testing Sales ATWS 1.29 Ites 3.1.3-Fost Maintenance Testing TS Changes Sales ATWS 1.29 Respcase to SL S1-34 MPA B-65 1.;0 !tes 1.2-Pest Trip Review Data and Inf5rsation Sales ATWS 1.;l ites 2.2-Equipsent Classification / Vender Inter. Sales ATWS 1.32 !tess 3.2.11.2-Pest Maint. Testing Procedures Sales ATWS
!.;3 Ites 3.2.3-Post Maintenance Testing TS Changes Sales ATWS 1.34 !tess 4.5.21.3-Reactor Tris Systes Testing Sales ATWS 1.;5 Ites 4.5.1-Reacter System Functional Testing Sales ATWS 1.36 TS Covered by SL 33-36 MPA B-93 1.37 TS Affected by 50.72 and .73 (SL 33-431 MPA A-13 1.33 Expand GA List NURES-0933 1.;9 Radiation Protection Plans NURES-0933 1.40 Bolting Cegradatica or Failure NURES-0933 1.41 Flcoding cf Ccapartaents by Backflcw NURES-0933 1.42 MSL Leakage Control Systess NURES-0933 1.43 Water Hasser NURES-0933 1.44 Asyssetric B1cudawn loads en Reacter Systess NURES-0?!3 1.45 Systess Interaction NURES-0933 1.46 Detersination of SRV Peal Dynasic Leads NURES-09:3 1.47 Containsent Esergency Susp Perforsance NURES-0933 J 1.49 Safety Facter for Penetration I-10A Ocer. Exp.
O, !.49 Reactor Vessel Surveillance Progras Cancelled
, _ .+ + -
. -+ + -+ + . +
ti
. s y, < ., .
Millstone ! ISAP Topics FSA ISAP i Title - NU !ssues to be included in ISAP Topic Source Secre
(')
\d
++ + _ .
2.01 LPCI Resotely Operated Valve 1-LP-50A&B
. + +.
NU
. , +. ,
0.10 2.02 Drymell Husidity Instrusentation NU 2.03 Precess Ccaputer Replacesant . NU 2.04 Hi;h Stras Flou Setpoint increase .NU .05 42.05 Hydrogen Water Chesistry Study NU 2.06 Condenser Retube ,
NU l.25 2.07 Sedius Hypochlorite Systes -
NU 10.00
- 2.0! Extraction Steas Piping NU !.75 2.09 Upgrading of Piping and Instrusentatica Diagrass NU 2.10 , Drywell Ventilatica Systes NU 2.11 Stud Tensicners NU ,
2.12 Reactcr Vessel Head Stand Relecation NU
. 2.13 Turbine Water Induction Modifications cancelled
- 2.14 Evaluation and laplesentation of NUR15-0577 NU s
2.15 TcrqueSwitchEvaluationforMOVs i NU 2.16 Reactcr Protection Trip Systes NU ^
2.17 4.161V, 480V & 125Vcc Plant Distribution Prot. NU 2.19 Spent fuel Pool Storage Racks /Transacration Cask NU 2.19 DC Systes Review Cancelled 2.20 RWCU Systes Isolaticn Setpoint Reduction Ny 2.21 480V Lead Center Repl. of 011 Filled Breaker
' NU ,. L 2.22 Control Rod Drive Systes Water Haaser Analysis NU 2.23 !astrusent, Service and Breathly Air leprva NU .
p 2.24 Cffsite Pcuer Systess _
NU tj
- 2.25 tryne!! Tesperature Mcnitoring iystes Upgrade NU 2.26 Reliability Equipsent NU
~
2.27 Spare Recirculation Pusp Mater -- NU 2.29 Lcng Ters Cooling Study NU 10.00 2.29 FWCI Assesssent Study NU 2.30 MSIV Closure Test Frequency NU l.50 '
, 2.31 LPCI Lube 011 Cooler Test Frapuency NU 10.00 4
+ . + + . . . .. , + . .
+ +g A
6 s>~
i m o
N D
+%
\
V -
o
'l 4 4
SEP TOPIC V-11.A, REQUIREMENTS FOR ISOLATION OF HIGH-() AND LOW-PRESSURE SYSTEMS SEP REVIEW FOUND THAT RWCU SYSTEM DOES NOT HAVE INDEPENDENT AND DIVERSE PRESSURE INTERLOCKS 4
SEP IA RECOMMENDED EITHER A DEMONSTRATION OF ADEQUATE RELIEF CAPACITY OR INSTALLATION OF INDEPENDENT PRESSURE INTERLOCK LICENSEE PROPOSED TO MAKE THE HARDWARE MODIFICATION i IPSAR SUPPLEMENT, SECTION 4.0 1
INSPECTION REPORT 50-245/84-27 IDENTIFIED THAT THIS ITEM WAS NOT COMPLETE ISAP LICENSEE REQUESTS IN DECEMBER 1983 TO INCLUDE RESOLUTION OF THIS TOPIC IN ISAP, PROPOSES TO DEMONSTRATE ADEQUACY OF RELIEF CAPACITY, t
- .~
O
4 s
i.
O.
INTEGRATED SCHEDULES PRIORITIES ESTABLISHED IN IA WILL BE THE BASIS OF AN INTEGRATED SCHEDULE j
. INTEGRATED SCHEDULE AND PROCEDURE TO UPDATE SCHEDULE TO BE MADE PART OF LICENSE -s i
- GENERIC POLICY TO DEVELOP INTEGRATED LIVING SCHEDULES TO BE THE SAME AS IN ISAP p
O -
k e
i i
. O i
13
1
..- TOPIC: 1.01 Gas Turbine Generator Start Logic Mods.
SOURCE: SEP Topic VIII-2 DISCUSSION: Result of SEP review indicated that 9 trips associated with start-up and steady-state ,
operation of the GTG do not use coincident '
logic or are not bypassed in emergency conditionsi.
ISAP: Evaluate the safety impact and need to implement mods.
TOPIC: 1.02 Tornado Missile Protection 2 SOURCE: SEP Topic III-4.A (
DISCUSSION: A protected source of makeup water to the IE and RPV should be provided to ensure tornado missiles to not inhibit safe shutdown. ;
ISAP: Integrate with Topic 1.16 Appendix R TOPIC: 1.03 Containment Isolation SOURCE: SEP Topic VI-4 DISCUSSION: Make sure identified valves comply with provisions i of GDC 54-57.
ISAP: Evaluate potential modifications to penetration X-204, cooling water return Ifne TOPIC: 1.04 RWCU System Pressure Interlock SEP Topic V-II.A O ' SOURCE:
DISCUSSION: Failure of the pressure control valve and a single failure
~
of one pressure interlock could result in a LOCA outside containment.
ISAP: Evaluate capacity of relief valve and need for independent interlock.
TOPIC: 1.05 Ventilation Systems Mods SOURCE: SEP Topic IX-5 DISCUSSION:- SEP recommended mods to emergency power for FWCI coolers and for intake structure exhaust fans.
ISAP: Evaluate conservations in design limits and risk insights.
TOPIC: 1.06 Seismic Qualification of Piping SOURCE: IEB 79-02 and 79-14 DISCUSSION: Licensee required to verify that seismic analyses perfonned on safety-related piping systems apply to actual configurations ISAP: Since priority mods are complete, evaluate schedule for remaining mods (270/1100)
TOPIC: 1.07 Control Room Design Review .
SOURCE: NUREG-0737, Supplement 1 DISCUSSION: In response to requirements, program plan and schedule O ISAP:
will be submitted by March 2, 1987 Schedule should be based on ISAP IA S _ _ _ _ _ . .
TOPIC: 1.08 Safety Parameter Display System p SOURCE: NUREG-0737, Supplement 1 V DISCUSSION: In response to requirements, program plan and schedule will be submitted by April 9, 1987 ISAP: Schedule should be based on ISAP IA TOPIC: 1.09 Reg. Guide 1.97 Instrumentation SOURCE: NUREG-0737, Supplement 1 DISCUSSION: Infonnation related to Reg. Guide 1.97 has been provided to NRC for review.
ISAP: Provide results of review; additional information still necessary; ISAP to schedule ongoing evaluation.
TOPIC: 1.10 Emergency Response Facilities Instrumentation SOURCE: NUREG-0737, Supplement 1 DISCUSSION: Preliminary response by licensee documented in Topic 1.09 ISAP: Determine schedule for remainder of Topic 1.10 response and implementation.
TOPIC: 1.11 Post accident Hydrogen monitar SOURCE: NUREG-0737, Supplement 1 DISCUSSION:
ISAP:
o TOPIC:
1.12 Control Room Habitability :
SOURCE: NUREG-0737, III.D.3.4 DISCUSSION: Certain accidents crate potential for hazardous control room environment. Assessment have shown that original requirements may be overly conservative ISAP: Evaluate alternative method of providing control room protection.
TOPIC: 1.13 BWR Vessel Level Instrumentation SOURCE: NUREG-0737, II.F.2 DISCUSSION: NNECO is currently investigating several approaches to resolve reference leg flashing ISAP: The need for additional instrumentation should be evaluated.
TOPIC: 1.14 Appendix J Mods SOURCE: 10 CFR 50 DISCUSSION: Licensee requested to identify any design features that do not permit conformance with requirements.
ISAP: Provide additional information on schedule determined in ISAP IA.
O
TOPIC: 1.15 FSAR Update SOURCE: 10 CFR 50.71 d DISCUSSION: Licensee required to submit FSAR update according to recent schedule exemption ISAP: Integrate this required date with other schedules.
TOPIC: 1.16 Appendix R SOURCE: 10 CFR 50.48 DISCUSSION: Topic is the result of exemption requests and proposed modifications.
ISAP: Schedule should be based on ISAP IA.
TOPIC: 1.17 Replacement of Motor Operated Valves SOURCE: 10 CFR 50.49 DISCUSSION: New implementation schedule established by Commission outside ISAP ISAP: Integrate this required date with other schedules.
TOPIC: 1.18 ATWS SOURCE: 10 CFR 50.62 DISCUSSION: Licensee is currently in compliance except for SLCS ISAP: The significance of SLCS capacity should be evaluated.
TOPIC: 1.19 Integrated Structural Analysis SOURCE: SEP II-3.B. II-4.F III-2, III-3.A. III-6, III-7.B DISCUSSION: Information on structural analyses have been provided ISAP: Evaluate submittals TOPIC: 1.20 MOV Interlocks SOURCE: SEP III-10.A DISCUSSION: Licensee has submitted and staff reviewed information on thermal overload devices for 12 MOVs ISAP: Staff SER closed out this topic. Resolved.
TOPIC: 1.21 Fault Transfers SOURCE: SEP Topic VI-7.C.1 DISCUSSION: For six remaining ABTs, NNECO studies have shown no risk impact in not replacing. Issue of reliability and acceptability should be further evaluated.
ISAP: Extend and schedule evaluation.
TOPIC: 1.22 Electrical ' solation SOURCE: SEP VII-1.A DISCUSSION: SEP review concluded that independence of RPS channels was not except for neutron flux, ARPM, RPS power supplies, U MSL radiation monitors.
ISAP: Evaluate licensee response.
. TOPIC: 1.23 Grid Separation Procedures SOURCE: SEP Topic VIII-1.A g DISCUSSION: See ISAP Topic 1.25 ,
TOPIC: 1.24 Emergency Power SOURCE: GL 84-15 and SEP VIII-2 DISCUSSION: See ISAP Topic 1.01, GTG preventive maintenance program ISAP: Completa TOPIC: 1.25 Degraded Grid Voltage Procedures SOURCE: MPS B-23 DISCUSSION: Licensee must provide operator procedures for degraded grid voltage conditions.
ISAP: Complete 4.16 RV bus, LNP, bus load-shed Mods this outage, then schedule final procedures and implementation.
TOPICS: 1.26, 1.27, 1.28, 1.20, 1.31, 1.32, 1.33, 1.34 and 1.35 ATWS SOURCE: GL 83-28, Salem ATWS DISCUSSION: Review plant design as well as utility programs against GL 83-28.
ISAP: Complete evaluation of MPAs TOPIC: 1.29 Response to GL 81-34 G SOURCE: GL 81-34 BWR Scram System Pipe Breaks, MPA B-65 DISCUSSION: Evaluate Millstone 1 against guidelines in NUREG-0803 ISAP: Complete review.
TOPIC: 1.30 TS covered by GL 83-36 SOURCE: NUREG-0737 DISCUSSION: TS for each item of the action plan were to be provided.
ISAP: Schedule and develop remaining TS.
TOPIC: 1.37 TS affected by 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73 SOURCE: 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73; GL 83-43 DISCUSSION: GL 83-43 required changes to TS reouired as a result in change in reporting requirements.
ISAP: Staff to issue proposed TS.
TOPIC: 1.38 Expand QA List SOURCE: NUREG-0933 (NUREG-0660)
DISCUSSION: When generic guidance is developed, QA lists are to be revised according to revised safety importance lists.
ISAP: See how much of the proposed resolution of this topic can be incorporated and IA.
O
-_ - .- -. __. __ .=- - _ - - - - - - - -_ - . - - - _ - .
l TOPIC: 1,39 Radiation Protection Plans l SOURCE:' NUREG-0933 (TMI III.D.3.1) l DISCUSSION: Improve worker protection plans by better defining i
criteria and responsibility .
ISAP: See how much of the proposed resolution of this topic-can be incorporated into IA.
I i
TOPIC: 1.40 Bolting Degradation or Failure !
SOURCE: NUREG-0933 (GI-29) i j DISCUSSION: Evaluate bolting failure history to see if safe
- operation may be jeopardized if similar bolts fail.
ISAP: See how much of the proposed resolution of this j topic can be incorporated into IA.
! TOPIC: 1.41 Flooding of Compartments by Backflow SOURCE: NUREG-0933; IE 78-06, 83-44 DISCUSSION: Evaluate the consequences of drain backflow into safety-related compartments
- ISAP: See how much of the proposed resolution of this topic
,' can be incorporated into IA.
TOPIC: 1.42 MSL Leakage Control Systems 4
SOURCE:- NUREG-0933
]k DISCUSSION: Evaluate containment penetrations to see if sufficient leakage detection systems.
occurred generically.
Excessive-MSIV leakage has ISAP: See how much of the proposed resolution of this topic !
- , can be incorporated into IA.
TOPIC: 1.43 Water Hammer SOURCE: NUREG-0933, USI A-1 1 DISCUSSION: Evaluate plant against effects of water hamer. Develop corrective actions.
ISAP: See how much of the proposed resolution of this topic j can be incorporated into IA.
j .
, TOPIC: 1.44 Asy m etric Blowdown Loads SOURCE: NUREG-0933, USI A-2 DISCUSSION: Confirm applicability of generic positions to Millstone 1.
ISAP: Evaluate licensees response.
i l TOPIC: 1.45 Systems Interaction j SOURCE: NUREG-0933, USI A-17 d'
DISCUSSION: Development of systematic process to review plant systems to determine impact on other plant systems.
n V
ISAP: See how much of the proposed resolution this topic can be incorporated into IA.
4 i
- i. _ .. __. _ _ . _ . _ - _ . _ . _
TOPIC: 1.46 Determination of SRV pool dynamic loads O S0uRCE: NuREa-0933; sark I reassessment; USI A-39 DISCUSSION: Determine additional loads that result from SRV operation.
ISAP: See how much of the proposed resolution of this topic can be incorporated into IA.
TOPIC: 1.47 Containment Emergency Sump Performance SOURCE: NUREG-0933; USI A-43 '
DISCUSSION: Evaluate safety concerns dealing with post-accident conditions which could degrade long term recirculation capability.
ISAP: See how much of the proposed resolution of this topic can be incorporated into IA.
TOPIC: 1.48 Safety Factor for Penetration X-10A SOURCE: Operating Experience DISCUSSION: Following water hammer in 1979, the licensee was to evaluate the assumed degradation of penetration X-10A (IC supply line)
ISAP: Complete evaluation.
TOPIC: 1.49 RV Surveillance Program '
p ISAP: Deleted V
TOPIC: 2.01 LPCI Remotely Operated Valves 1-LP-50A and B SOURCE: NU DISCUSSION: Propose remote operation capability for torus drain valves to ensure drain capability even in high radiation fields ISAP: Schedule implementation TOPIC: 2.02 Drywell Humidity Instrumentation SOURCE: NU DISCUSSION: Provide capability for continuous leak detection monitoring.
ISAP: Schedule implementation TOPIC: 2.03 Process Computer Replacement SOURCE: NU (NRC SPDS)
DISCUSSION: Replace present hardware with a new unit that will be able to interact with SPDS ISAP: Schedule implementation TOPIC: 2.04 High Steam Flow Setpoint Increase SOURCE: NU DISCUSSION: Reset MSIV closure setpoint to 140% steam flow to
, i allow full power testing of turbine stop valves.
ISAP: Schedule Implementation
\
TOPIC: 2.05 Hydro SOURCE: NU (IGSCC) gen Water Chemistry Study O DISCUSSION: Study feasibility of altering primary water chemistry by injecting hydrogen ,
ISAP: Schedule Study TOPIC: 2.06 Condenser Retube SOURCE: NU DISCUSSION: Increase plant availability by reducing condenser leakage by retubing with titanium.
ISAP: Schedule implementation TOPIC: 2.07 Sodium Hypochlorite System SOURCE: NU DISCUSSION: Reduce Public risk by replacing chlorine by sodium hypochlorite in seawater biofouling control system.
ISAP: Schedule implementation ,
TOPIC: 2.08 Extraction Steam riping Replacement SOURCE: NU DISCUSSION: Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Stage Extraction Piping is susceptible to steam erosion. Propose replacement of degraded piping.
ISAP: Schedule implementation.
TOPIC: 2.09 Upgrading of PSIDs ~
SOURCE: NU DISCUSSION: UpgradeexistingP& ids (PartofFSARupdate) l ISAP: Integrate the July 1,1986 required date with other schedules, l
TOPIC: 2.10 Drywell Ventilation System SOURCE: NU DISCUSSION: Perform evaluation to determine most cost effective method of reducing drywell air temperature.
ISAP: Schedule Study TOPIC: 2.11 Stud Tensioners SOURCE: NU DISCUSSION: Replace manual stud tensioners with automatic system to reduce exposure and outage time ISAP: Schedule implementation.
TOPIC: 2.12 RV Head Stand Relocation SOURCE: NU DISCUSSION: Because of crane modification putting RV head on stand O~ manual assistance. Propose stand relocation to line up crane with stand.
ISAP: Schedule implementation
l TOPIC: 2.13 Turbine Water Induction Mods.
SOURCE: NU O DISCUSSION: Caaceiied ISAP:
TOPIC: 2.14 Evaluation and Implementation of NUREG-0577 SOURCE: NU; USI A-12 DISCUSSION: Evaluate potential for low fracture toughness of supports ISAP: Complete, NA.
TOPIC: 2.15 Torque switch modifications for MOVs SOURCE: NU; IE 84-10, 85-50 DISCUSSION: Determine if MOV torque switches are set below manufacturers recommendation. Evaluate limitorque MOs as in IE 85-50.
ISAP: Schedule study.
TOPIC: 2.16 Reactor Protection Trip System SOURCE: NU DISCUSSION: Evaluate setpoint drift concerns in ADS and ECCS ISAP: Schedule study q TOPIC: 2.17 4.16RV, 480V and 125Vdc Plant Distribution Protection V SOURCE: NU .
DISCUSSION: Perform breaker coordination study in excess of Appendix R requirements.
ISAP: Schedule study TOPIC: 2.18 Spent Fuel Storage Racks / Transportation Cask SOURCE: NU; NWPACT DISCUSSION: Evaluate means to increase spent fuel storage capacity (lose full core capability in 1987, reload discharge capability in 1991)
ISAP: Schedule study TOPIC: 2.19 DC System Review SOURCE: NU DISCUSSION: Cancelled TOPIC: 2.20 RWCU System Isolation Setpoint Reduction SOURCE: NU DISCUSSION: Evaluate lower isolation setpoint to have RWCU available for decay heat removal and clean-up followup scram.
ISAP: Schedule study G
V TOPIC: 2.21 480V Load Center Replacement SOURCE: NU
(]; DISCUSSION: Replace of-filled breaker trip devices with solid state breakers ISAP: Schedule implementation TOPIC: 2.22 CRD System Water Hammer SOURCE: NU DISCUSSION: Evaluate the potential for water hammer loads in CRD scram piping ISAP: Schedule study TOPIC: 2.23 Inst., Service and Breathing Air System Improvements SOURCE: NU DISCUSSION: Engineering review of air systems to improve reliability and integrity ISAP: Schedule study TOPIC: 2.24 Offsite Power Systems SOURCE: NU DISCUSSION: Installation of 345RV breaker, slow speed bus transfer systems, main generator disconnect device, full capacity station RSS transformer, modification of flander 23 kv line, ISAP: Schedule implementation p),
L.
TOPIC: 2.25 Drywell Temperature Monitoring System Upgrade SOURCE: NU DISCUSSION: Upgrade air temperature monit'oring system to facilitate verification of compliance with 10 CFR 50.49 and possibly eliminate some conservatism in agins calculations.
ISAP: Schedule implementation TOPIC: 2.26 Reliability Equipment SOURCE: NU DISCUSSION: Procurement of computerized UT equipment, vibration monitoring and diagnostic equipment, etc. for performing NDT.
ISAP: Schedule purchase TOPIC: 2.27 Spare Recirculation Pump Motor SOURCE: NU DISCUSSION: Expedite replacement of worn pump motors ISAP: Schedule implementation O
. TOPIC: 2.28 Long-term cooling study
. SOURCE: NU DISCUSSION: PSS determined that 64% of core melt frequency is due to i - O. failure to maintain long-term decay heat removal. Proposed i project is a study of long-term cooling capability for system improvement.
ISAP: Schedule study i
TOPIC: 2.29 FWCI Assessment Study SOURCE: NU DISCUSSION: Examine drawings and design against as-built system, compare
- system description against verified design, identify limits of operation, review assumptions of FW control system against design basis transients.
. ISAP: Schedule study TOPIC: 2.30 MSIV Closure Test Frequency SOURCE: NU DISCUSSION: Change test procedures to require test for 10% MSIV closure to be conducted in conjunction with quarterly MSIV closure stroke test.
ISAP: Schedule revision a TOPIC: 2.31 LPCI Lube Oil Cooler Test Frequency F SOURCE: NU i
DISCUSSION: Change testing procedure of LPCI system to confirm that 4
solenoid v'alve controlling LPCI pump motor bearing lube oil is open ISAP: Schedule revision i
1 9
ll I
1 t
i
(.. .
O MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT NO, 1 O ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING ONFULL-TERMOPCRATINGLICENSE NOVEMBER 18 - 19, 1985 O
9 a
4 0 .
6 i
h 1
l r
i i
MILLSTONE UNIT 1
- O PROBABILISTIC SAFETY STUDY
! l a s J
r 1
. 1 i
i a
t l I
1 1
i i i !
i l'
4 O -
i i
i
.. ._ _ . ~ _ _ _ _ _ _ - . . - - - _ _ . . .. - _ . . - -- -
1 t- ,,
.- i
>. i O
.WHY NU IS PURSUING A LIVING PRA PROGRAM:
NU BELIEVES IN-HOUSE PRA CAPABILITY SIGNIFICANTLY IMPROVES O OUR ABILITY TO SAFELY MANAGE OUR PLANTS O
- a. .,.
O NU CORPORATE OBJECTIVE:
DEVELOP AND MAINTAIN LIVING PRA MODELS FOR USE .IN
. o PLANT DESIGN CHANGE - SAFETY EVALUATIONS o TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION - SAFETY EVALUATIONS -
0 INTEGRATED SAFETY ASSESSMENT PROGRAM l
i i
I j ,
i i O t
i
}
l
O MILLSTONE UNIT 1 [ REP NOT USED BECAUSE: .
o EASE OF MODEL USE o DESIGN CHANGES (1980-1985) o IMPLEMENTATION OF SYMPTOM ORIENTED EMERGENCY PROCEDURES Oo M00etiNG Deficiencies iN iRee INITIATORS :
SUCCESS CRITERIA
" GENERIC" VS, ACTUAL PLANT RELIABILITY NO COMMON CAUSE FAILURE ANALYSIS UNCOUPLED HUMAN ERRORS O 1 1
,., l O
1 5
SCOPE:
o LEVEL I PRA o LARGE EVENT TREE /LARGE FAULT TREE MODELING o BEST ESTIMATE SAFETY ANALYSIS 2 o INITIATORS CONSIDERED:
O -
ANTICIPATED TRANSIENTS SYSTEM INTERACTIONS / CONTROL SYSTEM FAILURES DESIGN BASIS EVENTS BEYOND DESIGN BASIS EVENTS o MAXIMUM USE OF PLANT EXPERIENCE EVENT FREQUENCIES COMPONENT RELIABILITY SYSTEM RELIABILITY SYSTEM MAINTENANCE DOWNTIME O
l .
COMPARISON OF MILLSTONE UNIT I DATA WITH WASH-1400
< .95 -
i -
Millstotle Uriit I -
Bt'ea ker's .
f T
'30 _ 4.16 kVi -Wash-1400 j 48'UV Breaker i
j .-
j .os - '
l t t 4
l 26 , , ,
io- .
,g2 Failure Rate Per Demand
~
l
- 1 m-L L J
1lllllj!!ll)i; Il) j 11 P
1 0
0 4
1 H
S A
i g -
W 0 0
i H 4l e T
I 1
- s he W si aD A d T W n A a
'D m I e I
t D
T i n
r e
I
'N U f P e
l E
e n
l e
,e .
N t o se t a
O l s i
,R T l D e i
S ' ' * ' -
2 L M i gr
,u L i l
I
' a M
F F
O ,
N O ,
S I
R A
P M .
O .
C .
3 v
s 0 s i 9 3,
- o. _
l
e *.
O-DESIRED END PRODUCTS:
o IDENTIFICATION OF SIGNIFICANT SAFETY ISSUES o ENGINEERING INSIGHTS ON SAFETY ISSUES o LIVING MODEL FOR FUTURE SAFETY EVALUATIONS o FRAMEWORK FOR FUTURE EXTERNAL EVENTS MODELING O .
O _ ~
o 1 6
_ ~ _
5 c
E P
S i
. 7S w E 'T c N E
T
^O A
" t k f O
T S
E G
N l
A lC E
K 4
1
- A T
I H
Y r L V S O L E
A N. L .ra o cE p T S E
C J
6 E Sm O t
D R Ol l O c. T f Ti I c SWM oP L A P
d L 1 L uA I A i P I S t i I A
m'
- 4 r S c E iG s N ot A t i
C s
' ' s t
- y
)
V A L
T , ds i
' - , i t
s S b S C R A E R
/ E P. t:
s E t R Q
gt f
l l
R 4
l E( (s t
f O
~ - -
~ - -
~ -
j J
?
O i
2 CORE MELT FREQUENCY RESULTS:
PEACH BOTTOM MILLSTONE 1 MILLSTONE 1 (WASH-1400) (IREP) (PSS) 2,13 x 10-5/yR, 3,3 x 10-4/YR. 8.07 x 10-4/YR.
(MEDIAN) (MEDIAN) (MEAN)
O
-(])
I i
i CORE MELT CONTRIBUTION BY INITIATORS:
o LOSS OF NORMAL POWER 30.13%
l 0 REACTOR TRANSIENTS -
i WITH MAIN CONDENSER 11.28%
WITHOUT MAIN CONDENSER 2,44%
'(]) -
REACTOR TRIP 6,19%
l 0 LOSS OF FEEDWATER 12,94%
l 0 LOSS OF SERVICE WATER 4.91%
o LOSS OF R.B.C.C W. 0.01%
o LOSS OF T.B.S.C.C.W. 0.26%
l l
O .
CORE MELT CONTRIBUTION BY INITIATORS o SMALL-SMALL LOCA 5,14%
( < 0.01 FT2 )
Oo SMALL LOCA (0.01 FT2 <. AREA < 0,2 FT2 ) 20,84% .
o LARGE LOCA - 2.15%
a . INADVERTENT S/R VALVE OPERATION 3,71%
O
i
.O -
l l
l l-l .
CORE MELT BY INITIATORS
! o IC TUBE RUPTURE 0.02%
(UNIS0 LATED) 0 R.'d.C.U. LOCA 40,01%
<O l
(UNIS0 LATED) - _ .
o INTERFACING SYSTEM LOCA L.P.C.I t 0.01%
CORE SPRAY 0.014%
O 4
O i
l CORE MELT FREQUENCY BY SAFETY ISSUE o LONG TERM DECAY HEAT REMOVAL 64% i o STATION AC BLACK 0UT 12.01%
GAS TURBINE / SERVICE WATER O GAS TURBINE / DIESEL 6.66%
5,35g l
r O ,
D
) _. -
art-NOTE: FEEDMTER/ CONDENSER MILABLE IMMEDIATELY ac z
O
, a soc inames .
I U
4 E
an.
g t BLEED Aaso FEEo inAsess 4
y I
--__- _________ ________._ ... ___f_
_. -1 Soc TAAsse foi .
}
4 e u 3 4 +<h #j ka *
O #
y t #
us A g
0 ---------------------------------------------------------------
ft St.EEo Asso FEED T R As80 U
i _______________________.____.. _________________________________ _____ sROCU ,
l #
t t
, . r- ,1
.i
- 1 /
, , t.,
, ~ s
,o-5
- Oe o2 - o'4 374,. o.e e50 t's 4Io s'o eIo lo. io. 4'o. 'elo. s'.
o ebo f ..'r ,
, 1
, TIME IN. HOURS TO MATCH DECAY DEAT
-s' a
f p f e % g &
/
e' $ ,
[
4 o
h n
,_ f
, \.. ,- . ,
e 4 $. #
- [.
V #
I1 8 e
-.a .
J
.s J
g dm * $
7"
(_)
ACTIONS TAKEN BY NU BASED ON PSS IMPLICATIONS; o LONG TERM DECAY HEAT REMOVAL EVALUATED IN TERMS OF 10CFR50,72, 10CFR50,73 REPORTABILITY o UPGRADED LPCI PUMP SURVEILLANCE (LUBE OIL COOLING) RESULTING IN ~ 20% REDUCTION IN CORE MELT FREQUENCY o CONTAINMENT CONTROL E0P UPGRADE INITIATED TO CORRECT ERROR IN PUMP THROTTLING INSTRUCTIONS o WIRING ERROR IN LPCI LOOP SELECTION LOGIC CORRECTED (1985 FALL OUTAGE) o SW-9 (NON-ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER CUT 0FF) A,B,T. BREAKER
') PERMANENTLY ALLIGNED TO DIESEL BUS o PROCEDURES IMPLEMENTED TO ADDRESS DRYWELL H,V.A.C. LOCK 0UT LOGIC o IC-3 REPLACED WITH SMALLER VALVE TO PROVIDE BETTER FLOW CONTROL o PROJECT INITIATED TO RESOLVE LONG TERM DECAY HEAT REMOVAL ISSUE VIA ANALYSIS AND MAJOR HARDWARE MODIFICATIONS o INITIATION OF SEVERAL FORMAL TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES TO REDUCE FRE0VENCY OF REACTOR SCRAMS FROM HIGH RISK
. SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES l
LJ
0 9 a 8 o
4 O
l l
l MILLSTONE UNIT 1 O
ISAP PUBLIC SAFETY IMPACT MODEL APPLICATIONS O
o OBJECTIVES OF ISAP INCLUDE:
o PRIORITIZATION OF SAFETY ISSUES Oo FORMAL NRC ACCEPTANCE OF NU IDENTIFIED PLANT-SPECIFIC SAFETY ISSUES ,
o RESOURCE ALLOCATION nt 1
O 0
+ !l 'I
( iIll l,l1
~
O ~ - ~
^ h
~ _ ~
~ - ~
~
t g
5.
C
[
E
- u P o
g S t 6
_ c .
S g
o u E r p c D
- E
- [T( -
e r
4 e_
T I
H Y
T t T S c>
L E
A M P
NG D L
E Ee F p A o S ni I S E
C O .
Ol R TI V OA t ' cr
{
P SI L c L L G P^
C P
L I P u^ t A -
i I S M I 1t s e
ci cn s
t o in.
c s
" s i
x Q
)/ T o
T E ~
t i,
1 M t s S o S C ,
T n E R
/
- p. tI ,e N iE i
E qR c .
Y q t t n m, E c 5 -
_ '~ _ _
o_ _
~
t t
O .
Matrix Quanti ication o rocess Ej x Mjk = Pk th Nj : frequency of thej initiating event (i.e. loss of feedwater, turbine trip, etc.)
M = naiti n i pr bability of ending up O ik in k th lant damage state, given jthinitiating event.
I Pk : frequency of kthplant damage state (i.e. early core melt / intact containment, late core melt / failed containment, etc.)
i l
O
e O
Evaluation 0 Risk Impact:
ARisk= T h APk. Ek ARisk : change in Man-Rem due to implimentation of change T : Exposure period O (i.e. remaining operating years >
APk : change in thek th PI nt Damage State frequency due to implementation of change l
Ek : Man-Rem consequences given k th Plant Damage State O
O POTENTIAL IMPACT OF FEEDWATER SYSTEM VENTILATION ISSUE AT MILLSTONE UNIT 1 BASE CASE ASSUMING VENTILATION (AS-IS) FAILURE RESULTS IN FEEDWATER FAILURE F.W.C.I. UNAVAILABILITY GIVEN LNP 1.625 x 10-1 1.0 x 100 PLANT DAMAGE STATE FREQUENCIES (YR.l)
TEl 2.57 x 10-4 3.30 x 10-4 O TE2 1,41 x 10-5 1,41 x 10-5 l Tf_1 2.26 x 10-4 4.46 x 10-4 TL2 8.25 x 10-5 7.78 x 10-5 SE1 1,54 x 10-5 1.54 x 10-5 SE2 2.54 x 10-7 2.54 x 10-7 SL1 1.85 x 10-4 1.85 x 10-4
! SL2 8.59 x 10-6 8.59 x 10-6 AEl 1.37 x 10-6 1.37 x 10-6 AE2 2.30 x 10-9 2.30 x 10-9 All 1.60 x 10-5 1.60 x 10-5 ACMF = 35.0%
ARISK = 10,610 MAN-REM O
)-
4
- a i 1 ,
POTENTIAL IMPACT '0F RESOLVING LONG-TERM DECAY HEAT REMOVAL ISSUE AT MILLSTONE UNIT 1 l
i.
A CMF = 64.0% '
i O ARiSx - is,000 MAN-aEM ~
i f
f 6
O
(a,
IMPACT OF NOT RETUBING THE MILLSTONE U. NIT 1 CONDENSER BASE CASE WITHOUT RETUBING (AS-IS)
M.S.I.V. CLOSURE FREQUENCY 0.435/YR. 0.568/YR.
PLANT DAMAGE STATE FREQUENCIES TEl 2.57 x 10-4 2.59 x 10-4 TE2 1,41 x 10-5 1,44 x 10-5 Til 2.26 x 10-4 2.27 x 10-4 8.25 x 10-5 8.58 x 10-5 O TL2 SE1 1.54 x 10-5 1.54 x 10-5 SE2 2.54 x 10-7 2.54 x 10-7 SIl 1.85 x 10-4 1.85 x 10-4 SL2 8.59 x 10-6 8.59 x 10-6 AE1 1.37 x 10-6 1.37 x 10-6 AE2 2.30 x 10-9 2.30 x 10-9 All 1.60 x 10-5 1.60 x 10-5 ACMF = 0.74%
A RISK = 506 MAN-REM O
l O .
IMPACT OF REDUCING 10% MSIV CLOSURE TEST FREQUENCY BASE CASE. ASSUMING ELIMINATION OF (AS-IS) MONTHLY TEST M.S.I.V. CLOSURE FREQUENCY
.4 s/va. .27/va.
O CORE MELT FREQUENCY 8.07 x 10-4/YR. 7.99 x 10-4/ya, ACMF = 1%
A RISK = 600 MAN-REM O .
.b -
O e
P0TENTIAL IMPACT OF-CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW ISSUES ASSESSED:
Qo AVOID HUMAN CAUSED INITIATING EVENTS o AVOID HUMAN CA SED SYSTEM UNAVAILABILITIES o AVOID COGNITIVE ERRORS DUE TO INSTRUMENT DEFICIENCIES I
I O
I -
LQ INSIGHTS FROM PSS:
o HUMAN CAUSED INITIATING EVENTS:
DOMINATED BY EVENTS FROM OUTSIDE CONTROL ROOM CRDR HAS NO SIGNIFICANT EFFECT o SCREENING OF CRITICAL OPERATOR ACTIONS IN ( 10 MINUTES Rx TRIP /4,160V FAST TRANSFER FAILURE (LOW PROBABILITY)
SMALL LOCA/ECCS ACTUATION FAILURE (LOW PROBABILITY)
O -
LOSS OF FEEDWATER/IC FAILURE (CONTROL BOARD LAYOUT CONSIDERED IN E0P VALIDATION)
MSIV CLOSURE /ATWS - REDUCING WATER LEVEL l (GEMAC CONTROLLER OPERATION-0UTSIDE CRDR SCOPE) l 0 COGNITIVE ERROR INSIGHTS FROM PSS l
REFERENCE LEG FLASHING FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE NEED FOR LEVEL CONTROL (0UTSIDE CRDR SCOPE)
A RISK = 40.0 MAN-REM O
1 O
t POTENTIAL IMPACT OF CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY MODIFICATIONS ISSUES ASSESSED:
o CHLORINE GAS RELEASE o MILLSTONE 2 CORE MELT / RADIATION RELEASE o HVAC IMPACT ON OPERATOR ENVIRONMENTAL STRESS O
O i
?*
i J
! INSIGHTS FROM PSS 1
.o CHLORINE GAS RELEASE 3 2LCMF = 9.2 x 10-7/YR.
j ZiRISK = 34.5 MAN-REMS i
o MILLSTONE 2 CORE MELT i.(2)
I JiCMF = 2.5 x 10-7/YR. ,
1 21 RISK = 10.0 MAN-REMS i
) o ENVIRONMENTAL STRESS (ENGINEERING JUDGEMENT) i 2iRISK = 45 MAN-REMS c
l.
4 (2)
\
O IMPACT OF MOV E.E.O.
VALVE DECREASE IN CORE MELT DECREASE IN FREQUENCY PUBLIC RISK 1-LP-7A, B 9.0 x 10-7/yR. 100 MAN-REM l-LP-10A, B l-LP-15A, B 0.0 0.0 MAN-REM 1-LP-LEA, B l-CS-5A, B 5.0 x 10-E/yR. 375 MAN-REM l-IC-2 2.0 x 10-9/yR. 0.1 MAN-REM O 1-IC-4 0.0 0.0 MAN-REM l-CU-2 0.0 0.0 MAN-REM l-CU-3 2.5 x 10-7 /yR. 18 MAN-REM l-RR-2A, B 1.5 x 10-6/yR. E0 MAN-REM l-MW-9EA 0.0 0.0 MAN-REM 7.65 x 10-E/yR. (~1. 0D 553 MAN-REM O
l ,
, O O O .
n 16 8 85 4
ISA 16A CONTAINMENT SPR Af L INE% /-CON T A 6NM EN T SPRAY LINE i _ g g
- "aolf =^o$ p._ ..q 30..
- lo aa i . Aojt iOAo8 .A' V . 30.. ,
. , g3 2 :04=
j 7, > ,,.
[ ** ^ ol[: [osa > .
. .o)[: to A..
I P RIM ARY CON 1 AINMEN T TORUS TORUS SPRAY LINE w p-SPRAY LINE l
TORUS TEST LINE '
""g ' TORUS TEST LINE .
a.A IA is ,
' 502C ._
4502D I, 2C 2D f ll 6A [ 3A 68 C)<1 h Q tSO2A _ _
85028gM{48 ><}- N l CONI AINMEN T COOLING } A, 2A - 28 38 SS CONTAINMENT COOLING pf AT ERCHANGER W ' ' C<}- HEAT EXCHANGER
( [ [ ]( -
EME peGENCY I l E ME RGENCY SERvsCE SE RVeCE WATER WATER
. FROM CST -N-NOT E:
ALL VALVE NUMBERS LPCl SYSTEM DI AGR AM ARE PRECEEDED BY LP
[
i
_ _ _ ._ _~ ._ .
i . .
a, ,, ,
8-cu-5 Raccw E WATER [ j(
1
%r NON-REGE NE RAl8VE
>' 1 itE A T E XCH A N GENS
+, g
,, g, g wwwww -.- -
\ REGE NER AlsVE saEAT E XCHANGE R S
- t-co.. j *d
^"'"%',www-wvwv -NwwmAw-et."#./tt at PRES $UNE y . .. REGUL ATING VALVE u
N-e-M2
&n 4 - 0U -28
~ww . uww.. uwu , ,
vs ,I _ _ .. .i G ? .
r TO H SE DT
==
- AY ftLTERS '
1' p . c. w s) ;[
- g. '
T O MAsN l I
. CONDENSLR ,
- [M}~-
l-l REACTOR WATER CLEANUP SYSTEM E X i-c"-*oa b ii b i .4i .
4-CO 2CO .
b
+1 Bx-X ::
,3 A
p3 r o , , ,, o , , ,, i o, ,,,,,
u L
g^x_ c-
) NJ v) w- a
!j :-cu-3s :-cu-as ,r ,
r I TO MAIN CONDENSCH I-CU 32'
' y'j" li b
.. - .S.. - a
~
l
. \
I 1
O MOV ~-Cv-2
- Physically located in Drywell
- Functional Requirements:
(1) Normally open (2) Closes on high flow signalin RWCU, RWCU line break O
- Line Break in Drywell
- Closure cannot isolate RWCU break, .
thus no benefit
- Line Break in Reactor Building
- No exposure to harsh steam environment O
. - - - .. - - _ _ .__-----~-m-- - - , _ , _
l O
MOV ~-C -3 a
+ Physically located in Reactor Building
- Functional Requirements:
(1) Normally open (2) Closes on high flow signal in RWCU, O RWCU line break
- Line Break in Drywell
- No exposure to harsh steam environment Line Break in Reactor Building CU-2 will not see harsh environment
- Benefit of Qualification lies in redundancy to cope with 1-CU-2 failure.
t
O 3ene li":
+
ACMF=XwexQcu-zo Q co-3 A LOCA frequency of RWCU LOCA in RX Bldg.
(2.4 x 10 Pyr WASH-1400 data)
Qcu-a unavailability of MOV l-CU-2 to close (0.11 Millstone Unit 1 data)
O ac cu -3 difference in unavailability due to environmental qualification AQcu-3 = Qcu-3,i - O cu-3,r.
= 1.0 - 0.066
=0.934 o ACMF: (2.4 x 10 Pyr)(0.11X0.934)
- 2.5 x 10 Pyr O
C H ARDENED RX MAKEUP PUMP FOR --
TORNADO MISSILES AC BACKFEED FROM MP-2 --
FOR APPENDIX R t
--lMPROVE LPCI LUBE OIL COOLER TESTING m
g- UPGRADE FWCl/HVAC FOR LNP -- -
-- REMOVE LIQ. CHLORINE -lNSTALL SODIUM HYPOCHLORITE FOR CHLORINATION I
2 ITl E
Om _
=
UPGRADE LPCI HEAT EXCHANGERS FOR LONG TERM COOLING C
8'
$l'- .
NRC NUSCO INITI ATE D INITI ATED O
- . e
]..
NRC NUSCO O INITI ATED INITI ATE D REDUNDANT RWCU PRESSURE INTERLOCK--
l L
I c
g- -
l E
> RWCU ISOLATION MOV EEO -- l 7
l l x
Omg CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY - * - -
[ U) CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW --
ADD MORE SEISMIC PIPE HANGERS RECIRC PUMP MOV EEO --
GAS TURPINE START LOGIC MODIFICATIONS *-'
I C o-- LPCI MOV EEO FOR BLEED AND FEEO -
O COOLING GAS TUR81NE RM. PROCRAM -
CORE SPRAY BLOCK MOV EEO --
RETUBE MAIN CONDENSER MODIFY BWR LEVEL INSTiG
--REDUCE MSIV CLOSURE TEST FREOUENCY
-- REPLACE EXTRACTION STEAM PtPING C
iT
- O .
J f
MILLSTONE UNIT 1 INTEGRATED EMERGENCY RESPONSE CAPABILITIES EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM O .
p 4
J G
lO i
l
O INTEGRATED EMERGENCY RESPONSE CAPABILITIES SUPPLEMENT 1 TO NUREG-0737 o SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY SYSTEM (SPDS) o EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES (EOPs) o CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW (CRDP.)
(]) o REGULATORY GUIDE 1.97
. o EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITIES (ERFs)
O .
- 6
L O
INTEGRATED EMERGENCY RESPONSE CAPABILITIES INTEGRATED NU APPROACH a INTEGRATION OF FIVE (5) ITEMS o INTEGRATION OF' EFFORTS FOR ALL FOUR (4) NUCLEAR PLANTS o INTEGRATION OF PLANT PROCESS COMPUTER (PPC) REPLACEMENT O PROJECTS I
O
O l
INTEGRATED EMERGENCY RESPONSE CAPABILITIES CONFIRMATORY ORDER o SPDS l 0 E0Ps o CRDR O o REGULATORY GUIDE 1.97 o ERFs I
i O
I l0 INTEGRATED EMERGENCY RESPONSE CAPABILITIES EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES (EOPs) o IMPLEMENTED ON JUNE 29, 1983 o
BASED UPON BWROG EMERGENCY PROCEDURE GUIDELINES (EPGs) o SYMPT 0M-0RIENTED Q o REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL CONTROL ,
o CONTAINMENT CONTROL O
s W~
O. '
- x;;
/
' 6 , $
, , :r*
4 INTEGRATED EMERGENCY RESPONSE CAPABILITIES s
-\
PROCEDURE GENERATION PACKAGE (PGP) o SUBMITTED ON MAY 13, 1983 o PLANT-SPECIFIC TECHNICAL GUIDELINES o PLANT-SPECIFIC WRITER's GUIDE O o VERIFICATION PROGRAM o VAllDATION PROGRAM o TRAINING PROGRAM
~ .
i M
,s b5 t
4 O '
l 9
- ....,,..--_.-.,-n. , + _ . , . - --._-.-.._,,._,,,,-,-...-.,-,--.,,_---n._,_n. -
, , , . ,.n.-- , - _ - . , , r ,
) ikA O :. .- . .
h a
g'
n:,
s
'- INTEGRATED EMERGENCY RESPONSE CAPABILITIES
.. .. y
, j' .
N[
' ^
STATUS OF NRC STAFF REVIEW o' NRC REQUESTED ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON NOVEMBER 30, 1 -
1983
~'
,s - .
o RESPONSE SUBMITTED ON MARCH 9, 1984 g
O' e,o o SAFETY EVALUATION (SE) ISSUED ON SEPTEMBER 24, 1984 RESPONSE TO SE SUBMITTED ON JANUARY 31, 1985 P' s- :' o NUREG-1143 q"
3 1
4
_~9 3:
~ , - - - - - - - - . - - - ,
, . - - - , - - ~ . - - . . . . , _ , . , . _ , - . . , . .
+ ..
INTEGRATED EMERGENCY RESPONSE CAPABILITIES SAFETY PARAMETER. DISPLAY SYSTEM (SPDS)
- o. SPDS OBJECTIVE GENERAL DESCRIPTION -
O o INTERRALPARTOFPPC s,
o PPC/SPDS WILL BE SUPPLIED BY GE o NOT SAFETY GRADE o CONSISTENT WITH E0Ps o SPDS USE AND LOCATION o AVAILABILITY o REACTOR MODES o DATA STORAGE o DATA VALIDATION i
1, J.
5 e
1
t~
O f e 4
- i. INTEGRATED EMERGENCY RESPONSE CAPABILITIES DISPLAY DESCRIPTIONS o REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL CONTROL o CONTAINMENT CONTROL o RADI0 ACTIVITY RELEASE CONTROL !
O o CRITICAL PLANT' VARIABLES t
b 3
O l
O I
INTEGRATED EMERGENCY RESPONSE CAPABILITIES HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING o HUMAN FACTORS CONSIDERATIONS INTEGRAL PART OF SPDS DESIGN o HUMAN FACTORS GUIDELINES VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION o OVERVIEW
- o. DESIGN VERIFICATION o SPDS VALIDATION O
.~.
O EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM
~
MILLSTONE STATION EMERGENCY PLAN o PRE-TMI PLAN o POST-TMI PLAN IMPLEMENTED IN JULY, 1981 o NRC APPRAISAL IN JANUARY, 1982 o
PROMPT ALERTING AND NOTIFICATION SYSTEM IMPLEMENTED IN MAY, 1982 O- o NRC APPROVED PLAN IN MAY, 1983 o STATION PLAN HAS BEEN REVISED TO INCLUDE MILLSTONE UNIT 3 o PLAN RE-REVIEWED BY NRC o ALL ITEMS CURRENTLY RESOLVED o MILLSTONE UNIT 3 APPRAISAL O
0 -
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM 0FFSITE EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANS o PRE-TMI P.LAN o POST-TMI PLAN IMPLEMENTED IN OCTOBER,1981 o FEMA APPROVAL RECEIVED IN OCTOBER, 1984 o PROMPT ALERTING AND
.O.
FEMA IN AUGUST, 1985 NOTIFICATION SYSTEM APPROVED BY O
0 9
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM OVERALL CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS o
APPROXIMATELY 10-MILE PLUME EXPOSURE PATHWAY EPZ o
APPR0XIMATELY 50-MILE INGESTION EXPOSURE PATHWAY EPZ o
STATION EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION (SE0) o CORPORATE EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION (CEO)
STATES O o LOCAL COMMUNITIES
O i
4 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM ACTIVATION OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATIONS o ACTIVATED AT ALERT LEVEL o SE0 STAFFING o CEO STAFFING
- o REC 0VERY PHASE O
'I 9
0 .
l
,' a
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITIES o CONTROL ROOM o OPERATIONAL SUPPORT CENTER '
o TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER o EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY o
CORPORATE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER o SUPPLEMENT 1 TO NUREG-0737 0
4 9
O
~
O EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISES o PERFORMED FOUR (4) SUCCESSFUL EXERCISES SINCE REVISED REGULATIONS ISSUED POST-TMI o NRC PARTICIPATION IN 1984 EXERCISE o EXERCISES WILL CONTINUE TO BE CONDUCTED ANNUALLY
_g o 0FFSITE PARTICIPATION REQUIRED BIENNIALLY O
s .
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM MAINTAINING EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM o TRAINING l 0 TESTS, DRILLS AND EXERCISES
, o REVIEW AND UPDATE OF PLAN AND PROCEDURES 3
O 4
)
i
.f i
O i
i
j lil ll
~.d .
e O S
. \
R .
\
E T
- l
_ v d, i
v N E A, l
C T - 0 u .
R r. =
O P
O P u U =
S L .
A n
C I N -
H e
C -l E L i T AlJ7' N l i
~
e
- m O
ll1lllIl
o o
O e .
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY 5' c== ' '
. ..o,,,,,,
D .55. S$ DSE O
. 478 0
.M ,
t } . . oo c <\ o.nt cio. or f a^a a55' 55= a ' . ..c. c, on..no .
r ri AA n Aa_
d.
' \ \
I 5 .-y
- E a c.. a 2".'f.o A i5 2l;- A A y u ^u < 7
=:. . . . . u %_ -
M O 5.
~
"~
1 V V . , , . .....
j
_._ N
- A J^ e,, . W. llit, DH.,
!.g a
4 1 i 1"sT!?.' i 4
I I I L___J J L__
w ---,
e o
~
O
. O .
w CORPORAT.E EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER
~;. _
aars 4
DCE O J MIS
- ISO 9eRC 1
e
~
O O .
O .
OPERATIONAL SUPPORT CENTER UNIT 1 & 2' 3 I y z; _
=-. ..
E G .C.astaases
- 'T
- - 1 -
L
_7 O
e m
- p. .
4 .
O MILLSTONE UNIT 1 l
REACTOR OPERATOR TRAINING OPERATOR REQUALIFICATION PROGRAM lO I
l 1
0
O
'g OPERATOR TRAINING O
l
O
~
VICE PRESIDENT NUCLEAR & ENVIRONMENTAL ENGINEERING v
! DIRECTOR l NUCLEAR TRAINING l
MANA ER OPERATOR TRAINING i
MP1 OPERATOR TRAINING SUPERVISOR O
P lO .
FOUR BASIC PROGRAMS o NON-LICENSED OPERATOR TRAINING o REACTOR OPERATOR INITIAL TRAINING o SENIOR REACTOR OPERATOR INITIAL TRAINING o CONTINUING TRAINING O
n .
i i
O NON-LICENSED OPERATOR o ENTRY LEVEL /EX-NAVY NUCLEAR OPERATOR o CLASSROOM TRAINING o ON-THE-JOB TRAINING O . . _ - -
o: HEAVY INVOLVEMENT OF OPERATIONS' O
O l
REACTOR OPERATOR o PLANT EQUIPMENT OPERATOR / REACTOR OPERATOR o FORTY-FOUR WEEKS l
O -
CLASSROOM TRAINING ON SHIFT SIMULATOR TRAINING l
l l
l O
O SENIOR REACTOR OPERATOR o REACTOR OPERATOR / SENIOR REACTOR OPERATOR O
l TWENTY WEEKS CLASSROOM TRAINING -
ON SHIFT SIMULATOR TRAINING O
[ ..
O I
CONTINUING TRAINING o POLICY STATEMENT TWELVE WEEKS EVERY 2 YEARS FORMAL OBJECTIVES O
FORMAL EVALUATION ,
ANNUAL EXAMINATION O
e '
o O
9 NEW INITIATIVES IN
$ OPERATOR TRAINING o
O
e
- 4 ,
e i
O
- SIMULATORS -
O ,
A NORTHEAST UTILITIES COMMITMENT O
'*
- e o
O .
MILLSTONE UNIT 1 0 , ACCREDITATION O
i
,.c D#
o PROCEDURES BASED ON A JOB / TASK ANALYSIS - COMPLETED o OBJECTIVES FOR NON-LICENSED, REACTOR AND SENIOR REACTOR OPERATORS DEVELOPED - COMPLETED
,_ o MATERIAL DEVELOPMENT ,UNDER WAY U
o INP0 TEAM VISIT - FIRST QUARTER OF 1986 o INP0 ACCREDITATION BOARD - BY MID-1986 0
f 1
O e
J e
1 o
4 1
1
- . j I MILLSTONE UNIT 1 .
)
I
.I I
PLANT MAINTENANCE PROGRAMS O
~+
1
+
6 4
I I
t i
O 4
J O .
PRODUCTION MAINTENANCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 0 DEVELOP A CRITICAL EQUIPMENT LIST (SEE ATTACHED FOR CRITERIA) (SCHEDULED FOR COMPLETION SEPTEMBER 1984) 0 ESTABLSH PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE PM GUIDELINES FOR EACH TYPE
,' 0F EQUIPMENT I 0 PREPARE A PM SHEET FOR EACH CRITICAL COMPONENT USING THE APPROPRIATE GUIDELINE Ih0 DEVELOP AN OVERALL PM PROGRAM AND SCHEDULE USING THE I b' COMPONENT PM SHEETS
- j. '0 ' REVISE PM PROGRAM AS CRITICAL EQUIPMENT IS ADDED, DELETED OR l MODIFIED AND IF CORPORATE PM GUIDELINES ARE CHANGED l
l I
e 4
?
s.
4
I O
1 PRODUCTION MAINTENANCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 0 INITIA_TED IN 1982 (5 YEAR PROGRAM) 0 ENCOMPASS ALL NU GENERATING STATIONS (NUCLEAR, FOSSIL, HYDRO) AND INCLUDES PREVENTIVE, CORRECTIVE AND PREDICTIVE MAINTENANCE.
O PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE O -
h 1
0
\
, j I
Lo I
J
! PRODUCTION MAINTENANCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
.i i-
- O CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE 0 PREDICTIVE MAINTENANCE
( t O
e 4
, ~-. .-,..-,.,,,=,,.,....._--------...--.,,-.------,m- . . _ . - _ _ - , - _ - . - . - - - , _ - . - . - , - , - - - - - _ _ _ _ _ _
PMMS (S) .
CRITICAL EQUIPMENT CRITERIA 0 FAILURE WOULD, AFFECT POWER GENERATION 0 STANDBY EQUIPMENT NOT AVAILABLE 0: CAPITAL INVESTMENT IS HIGH 0 FAILURE WOULD ENDANGER HEALTH OR SAFETY OF PERSONNEL, EMPLOYEES AND/0R PUBLIC ,
0 REPAIR COSTS OR REPLACEMENT EXCEEDS THE COST OF PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE SERVICE FUTURE COST OF REPAIRING PRESENT FACILITIES WILL BE O INCREASED BY A LACK OF PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE O
PMMS MAJOR BENEFITS 0 MORE EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT MANAGEMENT OF MAINTENANCE THROUGH THE ABILITY TO MONITOR, ANALYZE AND ADDRESS THE RESULTS OF THE MAINTENANCE EFFORTS.
O PREDICT AND FORECAST REQUIRED RESOURCES FOR MAINTENANCE.
O MAINTENANCE RELATED INFORMATION DATA BASE.
O AUTOMATIC SCHEDULING AND TRACKING OF THE PM PROGRAM.
O -
l O
PMMS MAJOR BENEFITS (CONTD)
- Q 0 ALLOW EFFECTIVE / EFFICIENT USE OF MAINTENANCE RESOURCES THROUGH BETTER PLANNING AND SCHEDULING.
O ASSIST IN DETERMINING STOCKAGE LEVELS FOR SPARE PARTS AND MATERIALS.
O IDENTIFY THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATIONS (STAFFING / SKILLS / TRAINING / SUPPORT /ETC.)
0 DISIMINATION OF INFORMATION IN THE LOCAL ORGANIZATION AND IO SYSTEM WIDE.
~
i 0 TREND FAILURE ANALYSIS OF EQUIPMENT / SYSTEMS.
O
. - - m- , _ , . , , --y - - - ,
1985 INSPECTION RESULTS O WELDS INSPECTED INSPECTED 1985 1984 EVALUATION RECIRC. 28" 4 4 ACCEPTABLE 22" 1 1 -
- 12" 4' 4 4" 5 "
SAFE ENDS 4 WELD OVERLAYS 6 24 9 l l
~
ljCI 18" 46 ACCEPTABLE 16" 5 51 CSOLATION CONDENSOR 14" 1 -
ACCEPTABLE
~12" 7 1-CRACKED ICAC-F-13 10" 4 '
ACCEPTABLE WELD OVERLAYS 2 14 SHUTDOWN COOLING 16" 1 ACCEPTABLE 14" 1 12" 2 4
O
! 1985' INSPECTION RESULTS CONT.
m
>v
- CORE SPRAY 10" I4 ACCEPTABLE r
REACTORWATER CLEAN-UP 8" 8 ACCEPTABLE JET PUMP INSTRU-MENTATION ASSEM-BLIES 10 ? IN PROCESS i
h LO.
't s
e O
l i !
,e- .-. -- , , - ., , -, , ...,e,..,.,-.e,,e --.,,w--- .-.,--,w--. . . . , ,, , , , , .-- .m. ,,-, _w, ,,.-n-r-----,e , rr--n---., w,y-n~
i y y, u U M .
l C
P L .
i i
s
. W ,
.LY T g E p 5 x T. S. T
..AID 4 E R
01 S
- ; m.-, EMM s T N - /
AE _
T W
R C , 3 ' C E .
{ ' C S " M - B E
N
" p .l R
D N
r N
x O s C 'm= _- '
O M
. T S2 I
/j 3
. m '
- i 1
w .
a ,1 -
l Dm x i_ ,-
- g -
,,3 l
O_Q r I x
n Q- ws ss i
%G m-n
~
x o-
,A -
_, ) x
. 'A S
, 'n g t _
T -
A M -
, )
w ,
. o r
s I F
k n% - s( S R
x .X _
4
.T
.H - __
1 -
,3 7 g r
/
n 3 x
'U L
L L, ~~ - -
__k}( ~
l
- A FF .
'J i
l C S E P (
- L .RX -
T g ,. - _ ~
- e s, 3 ,
,t
, u .-
92 4R C D
C
i
=U
,0 8
P.
E E
. 'O T _
A _
'8 E C H _
w' d
T A
C E
K N
I T D S A
-. E I . S T H C E A P H E T L C H AC T
} A S E M A DS E R T EE % SL S S T nT iA 1 EE VT CT EU HN rW LA A I
As C
T M s n 0 ~ VO S A t
- E U M 8 s E o5 RM R C-e T a r I -
3 Lo - - -
Oa :
S I
o c n E
tt 'a t
uc b ) s s
n E
e-a t _
" o t ur X n M o
c -
s n o M .
s T
'c
! N1 - .
- l II
'w , , .
e S .
M ! !
E M
K ;
C
- P c S I
o 3
~
p, E
- ~ -
K - '
, v :
r A -
T
^ f .
i c
gN g )) ,s l f g O
~
D
'A . A -
'w 'A s A E R E
T A P 7 / s
)
W __
D _
E E
F
(/ s / '( .s
~
~ _
, Na Ex G .
x Ef Rn ~
a '
y sA I s a -
f s ,
4 s
IL CU s L.L L U
F
'A L I
A PF 'S i '8 C E.~
G S E
_ (
LPE CPE P Anx OE oE L -I TN TW N s - N .
, NH N -
T pO A C
e
~
S C
g
,l.I
l \lIlll1, I! ljl I )Iljil I l
's ,
.j
. i;
' '0 a
C
{ S D)( Y L NI K E T
U S
'a E HIN
'a T A T A TCM l
C P DE A 0 L E H M1 M
)
EE RT R
- A
_ WT, MS T
A AS S AA T RE N a-IT iA E C TH
. rW H A Y S CY t R
~
) E O T N ) D T 20 AE LD oM c
o ~ -- W S o LT -
8 C
R t8 u p \ C r C \ C E '
f 8 s s a
/
N Po R E E -)'
o En .
N Nr o '\ J!
C o M
'a T
W ,
'w -
C
)
6.
s w e . M .
s E
S f(. i C c I D- P 4 0 C N,- 1 4 4 x P 3 T 0 ~ 5 7
4 S
r O '
"l M U -
d
' r )
} T e
d
'w A
x N, .
X s
E R A E
T A
W P /
s y D E
L F
,/ , ) [
, t t
8 2 ~ _
E 2 G .
M ET RH
~ _
a ,
i
- T1
_ r
, i
/% <
SL CU L
,k t
4 ' L 8
J PF I E S .~ _
8 LP C E E P E S .
oE E ' R R TN W , 3 -
N .
M
_ 1 c i OT
' NH
_ .A s
C Q p~
0 R
C N
\ 7' '
- 1\1 llf fIl l
,i! ('
{
g
'u 3'
= .
C C _
G S
M _
d
. M T A
C E
N8 8
R U
O D H
'S T i 'I A H2 C
P
. HY CLHETAC-5 _
L TE _
s, _ *. AT S M1 _
MAI A .
" R D
SES XA TE T
EE fT . - >
% EM VMCT H /H tA i L AI A s Pw V S PA CY M - R T
' 8 E 0 5 5HT 2D -
8 T N s, s / l~
AE - - -
0 D 0N .
x 5 O tT tS 8
C uC s' P
s s, n s
Po '
, s t R X
~
uP *Q _ -
i#
O y I
6
'W 8
3 m g f sI 6
x
$ X ! 0 6 E
f$ E m \2*
C
- P
_W m s m ,
( xs s
p
["
w m
N
s, n C 3
g~ ~
e x n>
'A '
'W 'A e
S R
E E
T A %
/ / s
)
W D
. ' E E _ r P -
(, T s e sr .S
/ NR M E
x G ET l AH 3 - -
y
\
i, '
x /
m, L L
L e
'A n sL 'Su CU PP '8 LPE CPE P , 't C
P E .M_
G S E R R
oE 0E L -
M Ts 1W t
- n % 3
[
T< s s
oT a 1 NH C
O
- 0 R
C
-[ (
\ k* [
i l![\lll ,-liI i i])l' 0 Il; ll l
~ I)
- , . 1J ) jl i I
a' .. S E
., H C
C T w'
f.
C X n N RYS E L T E N
I SR S
S ATT E U l
C s WAA I E HCH O DD E E HT o
P A 2 L Ed FMS M=
- T, #et A *
) NT S T S A EAT AI A E r8 VE C R H aTA rW
[ LH A
A T C Y VY S 4y _ A U DCA f n -
g' ACR
/EO SED f E SDT I O S s
T u A t
) %/ . --
Lo c s O n . o w S8 Co LT c LS U )
A F C c
E s - s e S
N Pc e n E E ~
D Ea - v N
Kr O
C u' J!
,a C
0 ~. _
E S
7
~ x f
M y K f C t c P S
. o -
9 fr 5 9 i p i t
c o - M <x gP g
f g
g 4 M e
- C 0- -
D
+
'4 a
g M -
- r a N )
s M /
.i g-g r
~
,/ g )
f
%f =S .- -
^ NA N E
' E .~
%' IT j AH ~ -
a f
4 T, g
-'~
/
x ,s f L
L L ,
- U *A L CU 4 F
- 8 E .
PF 'S LPE CPE n a C
P 8
E S
~ -
L
~
E'T .
W
{
- f "H s.
S C
- e e a
)C C ~
o T S
C
\
l ll l
7
- - 'e
's C
N, 3 Y A
MY NA t C C S EI E DR
'0 ' O 1 A SLO I
'I E E C ' H H
- P CY L H H TA ES TCO L 2 r
MA T A AM *'
P ,
I 4 1
a SDs tg8
. EE c i wM A HT
' 3 ,
T - L / A A Ae M 8 V E CT
, 4 0 E SHT oH E 4
T N A E S
_ L D 0 N O
Lf La 01 C /
FUC R '
E S s '
N Po E
s
- C E E R - )
_ D N C N ' '
O C
O FME4 0
S xI _
- T
b
/\ 1 9 -
1 E
C e3 1 ,
8 W
]
5~ i
~
K a.- / ,
D- -
Q I o
- - c E
M Q r C
A
~
T N
l 4 l O._[ . - -.
(
)
W hj
) %
f M'
4~
A
%, 'A 4
0
'A E R E
T ,' '
(
[
A.
D -
E E
F -
4 s/ %( .S L/ / NR M E
g i
Fi
~
? e f s
}'
- {
g -
.,g
/
m I
/ .
x L
- A
-- N
- ~
w c F * - E h i a C G g ~
Lp P P E g E R K g
mg Og L -
I N OT
=NH
_ j
- 3 g
Q%
- p. .
C
[ T S
C
- f .
i! ;,
- l l
+g43e6&
g r' !! .
I m _
$- !a so i
g!!
6 A m f 5 i t
- i 2 5 a !:=
!] - q 9 :e g5
. --oo-- !
I5 . f."
's / s _.
E ag"g't ._ e x ,i i o s. / % l U /
w z A!
05 X
~ lu w s. .s o a
'\Y S b
,$ L T Ts
[ 1 $_
< W3 .
1, -
5 -CP- _
y; .
z
=
{ Y ~, I x).
i n
^
l
' l N N g
..., R .-
s en E i
>g ? n g- , > s a
W I i w -u cn 50 N .'
sr x 3g.} d
- -co-
- r. ,. ,.<
-4 }- -
- y v C -CO-
_d, { rI 22 "g' _
- < =
l so v6 s
.: a: = -
r=*s-- , r 6
a
==ll
=x E ,.,
l N
r:
j h, O
L u . .
I,
/> 1
+
9
,- s
.h ~~-
. =
3
, I e$ ;i .
l n
A
.-4 s-Oi
-: II '
,e w
l
? -
\r h -
/
4*
,, i 8 .Y
!O ,
l T. .:
P ! \. T '
s '
-fD s .
u_ _s
} _x
- ) s
,- =- -
- i M ' '
.' r 4 , ,
$ e
- s. .
v 1 .
3 J y
- 'a Q
g - V f iA z
i z a l
( ,
.4 -
H-
- 27 r
s
- , a e'
3 I
o 3 e
- ~
G * ** st
- 3 6 St .a. .s 3 -
SI A r
.i y.
, l
~
h II 5 .-
). . .,
as ~
'e
O 44 3 .
U
_ _ _ _ _ _ . _