NUREG-0803, Forwards Request for Addl Info to Be Transmitted to Applicant Re Internally Generated Missiles & NUREG-0803

Forwards Request for Addl Info to Be Transmitted to Applicant Re Internally Generated Missiles & NUREG-0803

ML20213E224
Person / Time
Site:	Columbia
Issue date:	08/02/1982
From:	Parr O Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Schwencer A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
CON-WNP-0535, CON-WNP-535, RTR-NUREG-0803, RTR-NUREG-803 NUDOCS 8208180218
Download: ML20213E224 (7)

Text

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Docket File ASB Rdg.

ODParr Docket ?!o. 50-397 NEMORANDUM FOR:

A. Schwencer, Chief, Licensing Branch flo. 2, DL FROM:

Olan D. Parr, Chief, Auxiliary Systems Branch, DSI

SUBJECT:

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERflI!1G INTERflALLY GENERATED HISSILES AtID NUREG-0803 - WASHINGTON NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2 Plant Name:

Washington Nuclear project No. 2 Docket flumber:

50-397 Licensing Stage:

OL Milestone Number:

N/A Responsible Branch:

Licensing Branch No. 2 Project Manager:

R. Auluck ASB Reviewer:

J. Ridgely Requested Completion Date:

N/A l

Review Status:

Awaiting Information The applicant provided a response to the unisolable pipe break in the control rod drive system question in NUREG-0803 in a submittal dated May 12, 1982.

This submittal did not address the areas of environmental conditions due to the break for the equipment or personnel to terminate the LOCA and of the procedures to terminate the LOCA.

The applicant also submitted a revised FSAR Section 3.5.1.2, " Internally Generated Missiles (Inside Containment)."

"e have reviewed this section and find this revised section to be incomplete.

As a result, we have prepared the enclosed request.for additional information.

This represents the first request on these subjects.

Notwithstanding, the applicant should explicitly respond to the questions concerning the old Section 3.5.1.2 as the enclosed questions do not supplant the previous questions.

Until the applicant provides satisfactory responses to these questions, the open item concerning internally generated missiles remains open and Section 4.6,

" Functional Design of Reactivity Control Systems," is a new open item. The total number of open items for which ASB has responsibility is now three.

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AUXILIARY SYSTEMS BRANCH REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WASHINGTON NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2 DOCKET NO. 50-397 10.66 NUREG-0803 states that pipe breaks in the ' control rod drive (4.6) hydraulic system and the resulting environmental effects should be verified on a plant specific basis.

In order to' conform to the guidelines of NUREG-0B03, the applicant should address the following concerns:

I.

Taking no credit for seals and assuming no operator actf rns inside of the control room for 20 minutes (30 minutes for the first operator action outside of the control room plus five minutes for each addi-tional action), provide the following information for a nori isolable break in the CRD piping between the containment penetration and the first isolation valve.

Reactor Coolant - Mass flow rate out of the break as a function of time (= f (t))

- Temperature = f (t)

Compartment

- Temperature = f (t)

- Pressure = f (t)

- Humidity = f (t)

- Airborne Radioactivity level = f (t)

Provide the assumptions used in determining the above information.

If a computer was used, provide the computer printout and the following information:

1.

With respect to the pipe to be broken:

a.

Type of fluid (water or steam);

b.

Temperature; c.

Pressure; d.

Source of the fluid; e.

Flow rate (or assumed flow rate);

f.

Pipe internal diameter; g.

Wetted perimeter of the break (feet);

h.

Total pipe internal volume; i.

Exit flow area, if the break was not in the pipe, just described above; j.

Area of flow restriction, if any; k.

Differential elevation from the source to the pipe break;

1.

Total flow resistance (only if the fluid is Later);

Means to stop fluid flow (none, gate. valve, globe valve, etc.);

m.

and If 1.m is a valve, then the valve's open throat area, full open n.

flow coefficient, valve closure time, and delay time until initiation of valve closure.

2.. With respect to the compartments being analyzed; c.

Number of compartment analyzed; and b.

For each compartment:

1.

initial temperature 11:

initial pressure 111.

initial humidity iv.

free air volume (cubic feet) v.

number of vents and vent areas (square feet).for each vent; and vi.

minimum pressure to initiate flow to the next compartment (psia).

3.

All assumptions used, including but not limited to the:

Orifice coefficient for the "end effects" for the discharge a.

fluid; and b.

Fluid expansion factor.

II.

Verify that all electrical and mechanical equipment needed to mitigate the event is qualified to the environmental conditions determined in Par't I.

Verify that no pump cavitation will occur when pumping 212*F water.

12I.

Provide a discussion of the procedural steps to be taken to isolate the break in the CRD pipe at the outside surface penetration of centainment to terminate the small pipe LOCA accident.

Identify all equipment and materials required to isolate the break.

Pro-vide a commitment to maintain on site these items as dedicated equipment and materials.

Discuss your procedure to verify periodically the existence and conditi'on of these dedicated items.

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IV:

Assuming that the sumps are inoperative for the event in sPart I (since they are not seismic Category I, Class lE), provide

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maximum water level in the compartment., Verify that no equipment required to bring the plant to a safe condition will fail as the result of internal flooding.

Verify that no personnel radiation hazard will exist due to wading through reactor coolant.

V:

Verify that all analysis performed in " Parts I and IV includes time for the items listed below.

The first action outside of the control room should be assumed to be at least 30 minutes after annunciation in the control room plus five minutes for each personnel action in accordance with ANS 58.8.

Installing scaffolding requires multiple actions just like donning protective garb.

1.

HP survey of the area and documentation; 2.

Establishment of protective garb requirements; 3.

Establishment of change areas, clean areas, check-in and check-out lists, waste disposal facilities and transportation of necessary garb to the area for the workers; 4.

Following all HP procedures; 5.

Review of repair procedures.

l Assume that the event occurs with the minimum plant personnel l

available on any shift.

f 10.67 The FSAR infers that compartment walls will stop internally generated (3. 5.1 )

missiles.

Verify that all compartment walls will 1) prevent missiles from penetrating the walls and 2) not form any secondary missiles, either by spalling or scabbing.

1 10.68 The FSAR states that " secondary missiles are not considered credible l

(3. 5.1 )

due to their low probability of occurrence and their low kinetic-(RSP) energy levels.

In addition, no reliable method to predict secondary missile characteristics is known."

Regarding your statement that no reliable method to predict secondary missile characteristics, the staff requests you use the empirical formula generated by CEA-EDF and Bechtel Topical Report BC-TOP-9A as appropriate to calculate the spalling and scabbing with the missile striking perpendicular to the barrier surface.

Provide example calculations using each method.

For each occurrence of scabbing, verify that all redundant equipment is completely protected from debris of all l

sizes.

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10.69 With respect to bolted valve bonnets, the FSAR Loes not address the (3.5.1) simultaneous failure of the bolts due to chemical attack followed by a pressure transient.

Verify that no valves with bolted bonnets are located under or near any pipe or ve'ssel containing any chemically corrosive material.

For any valve for which this cannot be shown, specify the valve and provide a description of the design provisions which will be provided to ensure that no chemicals will be able to come in contact with the bolts.

As an alternative, consider.the bonnet to be a missile and verify that redundant safety related equipment needed for safe reactor shutdown will not be damaged, in-cluding damage due to secondary missiles.

10.70 The FSAR states that thermowells and detectors "are evaluated as (3.5.1 )

potential missiles if a single circumferential weld would cause their ejection." Within the same paragraph the FSAR states that "because of their highly conservative design thermowells and sample probes are not considered credible missiles.'

These two statements are contradictory. Verify

1) that thermowells and sample probes were evaluated as missiles and 2) that no safety related equipment needed for safe reactor shutdown would be damaged by thermowell or sample probe missiles including damage by secondary missiles.

I 1 0.71

' Compressed. gas bottles are potential missiles.

Consider all

( 3. 5.1 )

compressed gas bottles and accumul: tors as potential missiWs~

(RSP) and verify that redundant safety related equipment needed for safe reactor shutdown will not be damaged, including damage by secondary missiles.

If damage will result, describe the design provisions which will be used to protect the redundant equipment.

10.72 The FSAR states that "when the separation and redundancy of the (3. 5.1 )

essential systems is not adequate...It is shown that the essen-tial components will not be damaged by the credible missile.."

Provide a discussion of, and figures as appropriate to illustrate, I

how "it is shown" that no damage would be incurred.

Provide sample calculations, if appropriate.

10.73 Provide the results of an analysis which verifies for each rotating (3. 5.1 )

piece of machinery that no failures can occur due to metal fatique (RSP) or chemical attack (such as chloride stress corrosion) such that any piece can become separated and, therefore, a missile.

As an alternative, verify for each piece of. rotating machinery that the casing will contain any missile generated at its maximum kinetic energy or that no safety related equipment will be damaged by the generation of the missile taking no credit for any casing or enclosure.

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l Provide sample calculations and reference any support' documentation l

10.74 used to assure that HVAC fan casinos will retain any and all internally

( 3.5.1 )

generated missiles.

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