ML20151R286
| ML20151R286 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 01/29/1986 |
| From: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| REF-10CFR9.7 NUDOCS 8602060006 | |
| Download: ML20151R286 (100) | |
Text
-
QNIJDQTATES OF AMER P
lNAL
(
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the matter of:
COMMISSION MEETING Discussion /Possible Vote on Full Power Operating License for Millstone-3 (Public Meeting)
Docket No.
Location: Washington, D. C.
Date: Wednesday, January 29, 1986 Pages:
1-R2 9602060006 060129 PDR 10CFR pgg PT9.7 ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES Court Reporters
('
1625 I St., N.W.
Suite 921 Washington, D.C.
20006 (202)- 293-3950
1 D I SC L 4 1 M ER 2
3 4
5 6
This is an uncfficial transcript of a meeting of the 7
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission held on 3
1/29/R6 in the Commission's office at 171'7H Street, 9
N.W.,
Washington, D.C.
The meeting was open to public 10 attendance and observation.
'This transcript has not been 11 reviewed, corrected, or edited, and it may contain 12 inaccuracies.
13 The transcript is intended solely for general 14 informational purposes.
As provided by 10 CFR 9.103, it is 15 not part of the formal or informal record of decision of the 16 matters discussed.
Expressions of cpinion in this transcript 17 do not necessarily reflect final determination or beliefs.
No 18 pleading or other paper may be filed with the Commission in 19 any proceeding as the result of or addressed to any s t a femen t 20 or argument contained herein, except as the Ccmmission may 21 authorire.
22 23 24 25
1 1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3
4 DISCUSSION /POSSIBLE VOTE ON FULL-POWER OPERATING-
{
-5 LICENSE FOR MILLSTONE-3 6
7 PUBLIC MEETING 8
9 Nuclear Regulatory Commission 10 Room 1130 j-11 1717 H Street, Northwest 12 Washington, D.C.
13 l
14 Wednesday, January 29, 1986 15 16 The Commission met in open session, pursuant to 17 notice, at 10:10 o' clock 4 a.m., the Honorable NUNZIO a
a 18 J. PALLADINO, Chairman of the Commission' presiding.
19 COMMISSIONERS PRESENT:
20 NUNZIO J.
PALLADINO, Chairman of the Commission 21
. THOMAS M. ROBERTS, Member of the Commission 22 JAMES K. ASSELSTINE, Member of the Commission i
FREDERIfKM. BERNTHAL, Member of the Commission 23 r
9 34 LANDO W, ZECH, JR., Member of the Commission 25
I 2
1 STAFF AND PRESENTERS SEATED AT THE COMMISSION TABLE:
2 3
S.
CHILK, Secretary to the Commission 4
V.
STELLO 5
H. DENTON 6
T. NOVAK l
7 E.'DOOLITTLE i
8 T. MURLEY 9
R. STAROSTECKI 10 L. McCABE 11 J. SHEDLOSKY 12.
E. ROSSI L
13 T.
SPIESS 1
J 14 M. MALSCH 4
15 P. CRANE 16 17 ALSO PRESENT:
i 18
.i 19 J.
FERLAND, NUSCO 20 J. OPEKA, NUSCO i
21 22 23 I
-24 2S i
, _,. - - = -...,,.,. _. _, - _
3 1
PROCEEDINGS 2
(10:10 a.m.]
3 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Good morning, ladies and 4
gentlemen.
5 Today is the first public meeting and get together 6
since yesterday's space shuttle tragedy.
We, NASA and NRC, 7
have the same objectives of safety; therefore, yesterday's 8
events were especially keenly felt by all of us.
We 9
sympathize with our sister agency and the families of the men 10 and women on the spacecraft.
We share th'eir anguish as NASA 11 struggles with analyzing yesterday's tragic event.
12 With respect to our business today, the purpose of 13 this. meeting is for the Commission to discuss and, if ready, 14 decide on whether or not a full-power license shall be granted 15.
for the-Millstone Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No.
3.
16 November 25, 1985, the Commission issued a low-pSter 17 license for the Millstone Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 3, 18 authorizing fuel load, precriticality testing, and low-power 19 operation for power levels up to five percent of full power.
20 The NRC Staff has prepared a presentation, and I 21 understand also that members of the NRC Staff, other than the 22 presenters, as well as representatives of Northe'ast Nuclear 23 Energy Company are available to answer any questions we may 24 have.
25 I also understand that Rick Starostecki, Director of
4 1
Projects, Region I, is here today, and he is likewise 2
available to answer any questions which may arise.
And we 3
also have the Regional Administrator here.
4 Do any of my fellow Commissioners have any 5
additional opening remarks?
6
[ Chorus of.no's.]
7 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
All right.
I will turn the 8
meeting over to Mr. Stello.
9 MR. STELLO:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We will jump 10 right into the briefing.
11 We are prepared to tell you what we think we have 12 done that allows us to conclude that we are satisfied that the,
13 plant is now ready, and I understand it may be ready as'soon 14 as Friday to go above fi6e percent power.
15 I will keep my introduction short, and I will turn 16 the meeting over to Harold to make a few preliminary 17 introductory remarks and get on with it.
18 MR. DENTON:
The presentation this morning will be 19 done by Tom Novak and Elizabeth Doolittle, who are on my left, 20 and as we already mentioned, Tom and Rich.
21 This plant is owned by a utility that has had almost 22 twenty years experience running connecticut Yankee, and I 23 think Millstone-1 at the same site went into operation in 24 1970; Millstone-2 went into operation in 1975.
This utility 25 has had a lot of operating experience.
I might note that it
5 1
1 is the only site in the U.S. where there are three different I
2 vendor plants represented.
There is a GE plant, a CE plant, 3
and this will be a Westinghouse plant.
So they have not been 4
able to use the same crews of operators, the same simulators, 5
and it does present some unusual challenges.
i 6
CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Do they plan any attempt at 7
interchangeability of operators or personnel?
8 MR. DENTON:
This utility objected to the INPO 9
approach to what was required for NSRos in terms of equivalent 10 experience.
They wanted to use their Millstone-1 operators 11 and count their BWR experience toward Millstone-3.
The 12 Commission and INPO decided that it had to be experience in 13 the same type of plant.
This caused them to alter their 14 operator training program.
One area that we want to change is 15 the status of the operator situation and the fact that they 16 need, even though they are a very experienced utility, they 17 need to use STAS, and we plan to cover them.
18 Another area I want to mention that is somewhat 19 unique is that it is a high population site.
We identified I
20' this several years ago.
After TMI, we looked at all of the 21 sites in the U.S. and required a PRA to be done on those high 22 population sites.
23 You remember the Commission's involvement in the 24 Indian Point case.
We had a PRA at Limerick, Zion, and a 25 number of other high' population sites.
4
)
j 6
1 I do want to cover -- maybe at the end of the 2
meeting would be the appropriate time to cover some of the 3
conclusions we came to from reviewing the PRA and what is 4
being done about correcting the dominant. sequences there.
But 5
perhaps in order to not divert off to that topic, off that 6
topic from the normal type presentation, we should go through 7
the normal presentation and the Regional views of the 8
operation and then cover this PRA issue at the end, since it 9
is not the typical kind of thing that we bring to your 10 attention.
l 11 With that introduction, Tom?
12 MR. NOVAK:
Okay, let's move on then.
13
[ Slide.]
14 As was mentioned, this is a Westinghouse pressurized 15 water reactor, probably the plant's most recently brought to 16 the Commission, which are of the same pcwer level and basic 17 design'as the Callaway and Wolf Creek plants.
This 18 containment is a subatmospheric, but it is, more than anything 19 else, a large dry containment, and basically it reacts as 20 that.
21 As was noted, this will currently operate the three 22 units.
It originally had the space for five to six units, but 23 as we understand, because of a rather narrow transmission 24 corridor, probably the generating capability is limited to 25 about three units.
r --
,.e-
-.n- -.
1 7
1 As Harold mentioned, it is located i.n a high 2
population site factor.
4 3
The issue I would like to talk about now and then 4
move over to the Region's discussion is the staffing and 5
operatingexperience.
1 i
6 May I have Slide 6?
7
[ Slide.]
8 I would like to bring you up to date.
We have had i
9 some very recent discussions with the Licensee regarding the 10 shift complement.
There are some changes that they have made, 11 and I would like to reflect them here.
l 12 They have added an additional Senior Reactor i
13 Operator to the' plant staff, so that the number now is 16 14 Senior Reactor Operators available for shift operation.
4 15 He is currently operating on four shifts.
He went i
I 16 into that just about last week, as he went critical.
And 17 today he will be operating with graduate engineers on each --
18 graduate degreed persons on each shift.
19 As I show here under " Shift Technical Advisors," the 20 dual role, we are understanding it to be four; that will now 21 be five with the addition of this SRO, who is a degreed 22 individual.
He will be on shift.
And that will bring the a
23 dual _ role operation with a degreed engineer to five, and this 4
)
24 will be the operation that they intend to operate until after 25 some exams in March.
There will be five shift operations 4
8 1
starting about the middle of February.
On each shift will be 2
a degreed individual.
3 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Does that mean they meet the 4
expertise on shift policy regarding educational requirements?
5 MR. NOVAK:
That's correct.
6 Now as I ncte on the slide, they will be required to 7
have Shift Advisors.
As Harold mentioned, a number of their 8
Shift Supervisors came from Millstone Unit 1.
They have 9
several years of operating experience.
But as the 10 Commissioners decided, this is not the kind of previous 11 reactor operating experience that we think is most applicable 12 to a pressurized water reactor, and so they have taken other 13
' Northeast Utility employees -- which is very important in my'
~
14 mind, because they are people who are part of the same 15 company, that come from the Haddam Neck Station, from the 16 Millstone-2 Station, and they are acting as the Shift.
17 Advisors.
18 Now we have observed these crews in simulator 19 training.
We see good harmony between the crews and the 20 advisors.
So we are pleased that this arrangement will work 21 out, and it is probably going to run through June until the 22 crew itself has all of the operating experience it needs.
23 As we note here, they have been using a simulator.
24 The simulator for Millstone-3 has been used since February of 25
'85.
In fact, each of the operating stations at Millstone has
9 1
its own plant-specific simulator.
There is a simulator 2
specific for Millstone Unit 1 that will be going into 3
operation in March of
'86, of this year, and Unit-2 has its 4
own simulator, and it went into operation in August of
'85.
5 So we are satisfied that the staffing is 6
acceptable.
Mr. Starostecki may have some additional views 7
from direct observation of'the shifts' performance during 8
low-power testing.
9 I would like to now set aside the discussion on the 10 PRA study.
11-CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Can I ask a question on the 12 Shift Advisors?
Is that consistent with our current policy?
13 I thought we had decided not to go forward anymore with Shift 14 Advisors.
15 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
We had a cutoff date.
16 MR. NOVAK:
Yes.
It was March, in fact, March of 17
'85, is my recollection of the cutoff date.
18 We did write the Commission and informed the 19 Commission of our views regarding the continued use of Shift 20 Advisors for this application.
The Shift Advisors here in our 21 mind can perform the function.
We believe that the experience 22 that these individuals have, coming from Haddam Neck and 23 coming from Millstone-2, going through the training that they 24 have gone through and the exams and the simulator drills, 25 gives us the confidence that this can be a workable crew.
= _. =, - -. - _. _ _. _.-
10 i
1 But, in fact, yes, there is a requirement here to 2
provide that experience through about the summer of this year.
1 3
CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Then this is not consistent 4
with our cutoff date really.
It is an exception.
5 MR. NOVAK:
That's right.
This is an exception.
6 And, in fact, we know of at least one other plant where we 7
probably will be running it.
That is the Comanche Peak 1
8 station.
9 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
I seem to recall -- I'm not 10 sure who asked the question or even when it was asked, but I 11 remember that that question arose last summer and last fall, a 12 fairly long time ago.
13 I, and maybe some others, wondered why we were 14 letting these people in under the' wire, and I don't even 15 remember what the ultimate resolution of the issue was.
16 But from what you are saying.today, I gather that it i
17 was sort of a good-faith compromise, in your judgment, since l
18 they had gone ahead and trained these people and had made the 19 assumption that they would utilized in that role.
Is that 20 what you're saying?
21 I recall being surprised at the fact that that was 22 allowed to happen.
h i
23 MR. NOVAK:
The people who came off the Millstone-1 1
24 plant, for example, are Shift Supervisors, so they are holding 25 responsible positions.
11 1
I think the company believes these are certainly the 2
right people that they want on shift, and it is a question of 3
familiarity with the performance of the pressurized water 4
reactor versus the boiling water reactor.
5 The Commission's decision is, it should be closer.
6 Now clearly the people we are bringing in will do the job.
I 7
am reinforced by the fact that these are utility individuals 8
as opposed to contract people brought in where there may be 9
some differences between crews.
Our observations of their 10 performance is that they work well together, and that is 11 probably one of the keys that we were looking for, that they 12 are Northeast Utility employees.
13 We have seen this, for example, even the Duke 14 Company, I recall, on the Catawba station, utilized some Shift 15 Advisors, but again, they were Duke employees coming from 16 McGuire or Oconee, and in that case again there is harmony.
17 We see a good working relationship.
18 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
For the people on shift 19 where advisors are not to be used, where did they get their 20 experience, their hot operating experience?
21 MR. NOVAK:
Either Haddam Neck -- probably Haddam 22 Neck, is my recollection.
23 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Okay.
I guess I have two 24 questions on the advisor and how that fits in with the 25 operating crews.
12 1
I know you have a slide later on on the operator 2
licensing experience.
One of the questions I have is why the i
3 high failure rate or what appeared to be a high failure rate 4
on these crews, particularly if they were experience people, 5
like the SRO candidates.
If they were the experienced people, i
I 6
the right people for the job, why, when they went through the l
7 training program and faced the operator licensing exam, didn't 8
they do so well?
You may want to deal with that later on.
9' MR. NOVAK:
I think Rich plans on answering that.
10 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
The other question has to 11 do with the package you sent down yesterday, the SER 12 discussion of the Shift Advisor program.
It seemed as if you 13 had identified a fair number of problems with the Shift 14 Advisor training program itself, not covering what appeared to 15 be some fairly key systems of the plant, questions about the 1
16 training on the plant tech specs and operating procedures, 17 training on the simulator.
18 Are you satisfied that all of those questions have 19 now been satisfactorily resolved?
And to what extent did you 20 review the examinations that I assume the Licensee gave to the 21 Shift Advisors to make sure that these people have not only a i
22 detailed understanding of what it takes to be an operator at t
],
an operating plant, but also a knowledge, a working knowledge 23 i
24 and familiarity with this particular plant, given the fact i
25 that they came from another somewhat dissimilar plant?
. _. ~
1 13 i
1 MR. DENION:
We had a team of three people, I think, 2
up there last week looking into these answers, and maybe we 3
can hear from one of them.
4 MR. NOVAK:
I would like Larry Crocker to respond to j
5 those statements, and I think Rick Starostecki can speak to 6
the Staff's review and testing of the performance.
i 7
COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
And I realize that the 8
bottomline conclusion is that you think it is acceptable, and 9
I am interested a little bit in why.
I 10 MR. CROCKER:
I am Larry Crocker with the Staff.
I 11 was a party to this review on the Shift Advisor training 12 program.
13 Basically, what you see in the SER is almost a recap 14 of what we have gone through on most of the units, other 15 utilities as well, setting up the training program, something 16 that is acceptable to the Staff that the utility can do, and 17 it was recounted in the SER basically.
18 We were happy that the utility did, in fact, 19 incorporate the recommendations that the Staff had.
We 20 reviewed the program at the end, both the examination that was l
21 given to the operators -- they all passed it; we were happy 22 with that.
And I was a member of the team last week that went 23 up to watch one of the shifts in operation on a simulator.
We 24 think they did very well there with the advisor participating 25 with the shift personnel.
There was good interaction between
-.. -. _.-_.. ~ _ _ _ -, _ _..
.. - -, -, _. _. -,. = - -, -
,.. _.,,, _ ~. _.
14 1
the advisor and the other shift members.
2 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Okay.
3 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Wasn't it a bit unusual to 4
have three F.tifts up to five percent power, and now as they go 5
up to full power, phasing into six?
That is pretty lean, 6
isn't it?
7 MR. NOVAK:
Well, my understanding, sir, is that 8
Northeast Utilities looked at-the fueling of Millstone-3 as 9
they would do a refueling operation on Unit 2.
In other 10 words, they doubled up on the number of people and went to a 11 three shift operation.
They feel that they want more people 12 on shift.
So through most of the refueling of Millstone Unit 13 3,
they had a conplement in numbers of five or six shifts; 14 however, they were operating on three shifts, so there were a 15 lot of people in the control room.
16 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
That is for fueling.
What 17 about when they begin operation?
18 MR. NOVAK:
Just about the time they went critical 19 or shortly thereafter, they had completed the necessary 20 training for the Shift Advisor and could configure a fourth 21 shift.
And then they put that shift into operation, and now 22 currently they are on four shifts.
And as the training, the 23 simulator training, and that proceeds on the fifth shift, and 24 that is scheduled for middle or late February.
They will got 25 to a five shift operation.
They will stay there until some
15 1
additional exams are done.
2 MR. DENTON:
I think the answer is, yes, it is thin, 3
compared to some other utilities you have seen.
Some other 4
utilities have greatly exceeded our minimum requirements and 5
have come in with a lot of SRos, a lot of Ros, and no need for 6
STAS.
7 Millstone is not there, but they meet the minimum, a
we think.
9 COMMISSIONER ZECH:
When do they expect to get the 10 six shifts?
11 MR. NOVAK:
It is basically based on some exams.
12 There were some exams scheduled for late last year, and now 13 they have slipped month-to-month, and now it is my 14 understanding they are scheduled for March.
There will be a 15 number of people, something on the order of thirteen 16 individuals, going up for both SRO licenses and RO.
And with 17 that, depending on the passing rate, they would be ready, 18 then, to go into six shift operation.
19 All of the other units are six shift operations 20 across the board, so clearly that is their intention, to 21 operate Millstone-3 as a six shift unit.
22 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
When did you say they would 23 have these additional people if they pass the exams?
24 MR. NOVAK:
As I understand it, the exams are 25 scheduled for March of this year.
16 1
CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
So they will be running thin 2
until that time.
3 MR. NOVAK:
They will be running five shifts about 4
the middle of February until they have -- depending on the 5
passing rates of those individuals taking the exams.
6 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
They still would be running --
7 MR. NOVAK:
If you look at the configuration of the 8
plant today, there is an excess number of licensed operators 9
on shift.
They are taking these people who are waiting to 10 form this sixth shift and putting them on the other four 11 shifts.
They are performing activities on shift right now.
12 It is thin in one sense, but yet I think it's,a 13 point that perhaps the Region --
14 MR. DENTON:
We have assumed 40 or 50.
Here you 15 have an experienced utility.
They solve things their own 16 way.
They did have some unique distinctions, I think.
They 17 hold the record for running the longest number of days without 18 a scram.
They have their own views about how to go about 19 running their operator training program.
They have argued 20 with INPO about the criteria that we are proposing, and then 21 they found themselves short and are still catching up from 22 that decision several years ago to go their own route.
23 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
I am surprised such a 24 seasoned utility such as this could not have anticipated its 25 needs better, at least for this stage of the game.
J 17
]
1 MR. DENTON:
I don't want to defend their actions, i
)
2 They meet the minimums.
We certainly have seen a lot of 1
]
3 utilities who have done better.
They have convinced us that
}
4 they do satisfy the minimum requirements.
l 5
COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
How long had the shift i
6 advisors been working on shift?
l I
7 MR. NOVAK:
It was only recently.
I would say about 8
the Fall of this year, they went into training.
They do not t
9 go on shift until they have passed all of the prerequisites.
1 l
10 There is a training period.
There are some exams.
There are 11 some simulator training.
12 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
It is not like some e
i 13 utilities where the people have been working a year or two i
14 years on shift with the crews?
l 15 MR. NOVAK:
That is right.
They have not been doing i
j 16 that.
i l
17 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Why didn't they anticipate l
18 they would need advisors?
3 j
19 MR. NOVAK:
They argued the boiling water reactor l
20 experience was applicable.
21 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
They thought they would 22 get by on the hot operating experience.
23 MR. NOVAK:
That is correct.
l i
l 24 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Are we ready to go on?
Go i
j 25 ahead.
1 I
i
m 18 i
1 MR. NOVAK:
I would like to turn the next portion of i
2 the presentation over to Region I.
i 3
[ Slide.)
e i
4 MR. MURLEY:
We have slide nine.
We talk about i
I 5
construction.
Over the period when Millstone 3 was under
)
6 construction, we did 18,000 inspection hours from the Region.
i 7
This included two construction team inspections by the Region i
8 and a CAT Team managed out of I&E Headquarters that was done 1
l 9
in February, 1985.
In addition, we sent out our own i
4 10 non-destructive evaluation van, which allows us to -- we did t
j 11 that twice -- that allows us to do our own independent i
i 12 measurements of quality of welds and other construction 13 activities there.
i 14 I guess in summary, we believe that the program at j
15 Millstone 3 was characterized by very strong management 16 control over the contractors.
Whenever we sat down with them 17 and asked questions at any level of detail, we could get j
18 answers from the Licensee themselves.
They did not have to i
19 bring in their contractors to know what was going on.
/
l 20 I think overall we kind of judge it to be probably 21 if not the strongest, at least one of the strongest 22 construction management programs we have seen in the Region;
)
23 very good quality assurance program.
]
24 (Slide.]
25 MR. MURLEY:
Let's move to slide ten and talk i
t
i 19 1
briefly about preops and the SALP history.
2 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
A couple of questions on 3
the construction.
You mentioned the NBE reviews.
I an l
4 looking at your November 25th memo to Harold on low power l
l 5
license recommendation.
I had a couple of questions about 6
some of the construction items that were in there.
7 You talked about the NBE results and the radiography J
8 comparisons that were done.
Your conclusion was "no l
9 significant re-work has been required to meet functional I,
10 design requirements."
Is there any significance to the i
11 terminology " functional design requirements?"
12 MR. MURLEY:
No.
13 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
They met essentially i) 14 everything that was needed, all of their license commitments, 15 whatever they committed to, to start with?
i 16 MR. MURLEY:
All the codes and standards and that 17 sort of thing; yes.
3 j
18 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Construction deficiencies; 19 you talk about two in particular, the containment liner 20 buckling and the crimping of lugs on the main control board.
21 Have both of those items been resolved?
4 22 MR. MURLEY:
Yes.
i 23 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
What was the nature of the 24 crimping problem?
l 25 MR. MURLEY:
Rich, do you recall the details on t
r.--c.,.v.--
m--.-
y---
--.--.7
-,.,,-r------,m._.g-r-
py.
--m----w-,
20 1
that?
2 MR. STAROSTECKI:
I would like Ebie McCabe, the 3
Section Chief for me, to see if he can address that.
4 MR. McCABE:
The crimps for the connectors on the 5
main control board were found by Licensee inspection not to 6
meet the continuity and tightness requirements they had.
They 7
then re-worked or re-examined 150,000.
I believe they 8
re-worked around 7,000 to make them meet the requirements.
We 9
did observe that by field inspection in the progress and at 10 the end in their records.
We were satisfied that they did 11 resolve the issue.
12 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Was the method of 13 connection okay, it is just they didn't squeeze them tight 14 enough?
15 MR. McCABE:
I don't know if it was the method of 16 connection or the tool that was used.
The net result was 17 there wasn't proper continuity and they corrected it.
18 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Are you going to talk 19 about fire protection later or is now a good time?
20 MR. MURLEY:
We can take it up now.
21 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
It sounds like from page 22 ten of your memo, that you resolved all of the outstanding 23 fire protection issues.
I just wanted to understand what 24 criteria you had applied in resolving those, specifically, did 25 you use the generic letter, 83-33, and the Branch Technical
21 1
Position, or did you use the interpretation document that has 2
now undergoing Commission review?
3 MR. NOVAK:
Tom, maybe we can help you.
We used the 4
Branch Technical Position.
This is a review that is the same +
5 as those most recently brought to the Commission.
6 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Good.
7 MR. DENTON:
Commissioner, there is a question, and 8
maybe now is a good time to bring it up, on the tech specs on 9
fire protection.
We have pend.ng before the Commission a 10 proposed change in the treatment of fire protection in the 11 tech specs.
I think we briefed you about the general need to 12 reduce the bulk of the tech specs.
I think at the moment we 13 have the old style fire protection tech specs in this license.
14 If you were to decide this orher uatter within the 15 next few days, we might be able to revamp this one, but I just 16 wanted to call that to your attention.
17 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Okay.
The last question 18 on construction deficiencies, have all of the construction 19 deficiencies now been resolved?
Are there any holding over 20 that are pend. - full power operation?
21 MR. MURLEY:
There were some conditions put into the 22 license.
1 23 MR. STAROSTECKI:
The construction deficiencies 24 themselves have all been resolved.
We have some TMI action 25 items that are dependent on the full power operation or have
22 1
schedule delays.
The only point I would like to clarify, the 2
Appendix R inspections, we have done inspections in accordance 3
with the Branch Technical Position plus also the additional 4
guidance IE has developed to do Appendix R type inspections.
5 We have not restricted the inspections'to just the Branch 6
Technical Position.
We have gone out and tried to anticipat5 wh'at the policy might be and seeing are there major problems 7
8 in the definitions of fire areas and things that have been 9
controversial.
10 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
That's all I have on 11 construction.
12 MR. MURLEY:
Let's talk about preop testing.
13 Again, the results of the testing have been quite good.
I 14 will talk about some scheduling problems in a minute.
In 15 terms of comparing with other reactors, we looked at the 16 number of LER's for the first two months of preop and start-up 17 testing, compared it with Calloway and with Byron I.
For 18 example, the number of LER's for Millstone 3 was less than 19 Calloway and much less than for Byron.
20 We have seen fewer operator errors than we saw at 21 Limerick, which of course is a boiling water reactor, but just 22 to calibrate ourselves, they seemed to be making fewer errors 23 and tech spec interpretations, that sort of thing.
24 We brought in Resident Inspectors from Calvert 25 Cliffs, Haddam Neck as well as Tom Shedlosky from Millstone 1 e
23 1
and 2, to look over the operations.
2 I think we have taken a' pretty careful look.
What 3
we have seen in the preop program was a slow fuel loading
~
4 process.
5 Let's move on to SALP, because there are some points 6
I would like to make.
That is slide 12.
7 (Slide.]
8 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Are you going to talk 9
about the reasons why the procedures were late?
10 MR. MURLEY:
Yes.
11 Slide 12 shows the results of the SALP that ended 12 last Fall, August 31st.
I guess I would characterize ~it as 13 kind of an average SALP.
During the two previous periods, 14 1984 and 1983, they had quite good SALP reports, mostly 15 Category I's with a few Category II's.
This I think was 16 caused for a couple of reasons.
17 one, they had a self imposed tight construction 18 schedule.
I don't know the reason for that.
It is just good 19 management.
-I suspect it also had to do with the PUC, putting 20 a cost cap on some of the costs of the plant.
In any case, 21
.they had very, very tight schedules.
They were always 22 conscience of schedule.
They met their construction 23 schedules, but their long range planning for operations didn't 24 keep up with construction.
25 I think as you noted, they got caught.in planning
24 1
for a number of operations when kind of the rules changed.
2 Also, their strategy of doing hot functional testing at the 3
very end of. construction, they didn't start their hot 4
functional testing program until late October, and they were 5
licensed in late November, as you will recall.
Just'for 6
comparison, Seabrook has already done its hot functional 7
testing, nine months or more ahead of fuel load.
8 I can't tell which way is the best way to do it.
9 There are pro's and con's'of each.
Doing hot functional lo testing at the last minute means you are adjusting -- you 11 learn from hot functional testing and you are adjusting set 12 points in your procedures.
There was the combination of a 13 very tight construction schedule which was met, planning, long 14 range planning, which I think would have been better, and then 15 everything piling up at the end led to a very, very tight 16 large amount of work at the very end.
i 17 I think this average SALP rating reflects the hurry 18 and rush that was done at the end of construction and 19 beginning of preop testing ~.
20 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
What was the rating of one 21 for preop testing based on for the period ending August 22 31st?
23 MR. STAROSTECKI:
When you have a preep program, we 24 do look at the program and the preparations for the preep 25 testing.
We obviously did not have a chance to evaluate the
rrw 25 1
conduct ~of the testing or the detailed procedures.
The 2
guidance document that laid out the program and scheduling 3
looked very good up front, that they'were planning it well.
4 That's what was stated very clearly in the SALP.
We only 5
restricted curselves to rating that.
6 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Why the three in 7
surveillance?
8 MR. STAROSTECKI:
The three in surveillance, when 9
you read the SALP, the biggest frustration we had was the 10 procedures for conducting surveillances, when we sent 11 inspectors to review them, weren't ready.
They were written 12 but there were blanks, there was missing information, and w'e 13 had to go back several times to get them.
We were saying we 14 should have seen them in advance two to three months, they
-15 weren't there, and as a result, we knew the program was there 16 to get those in shape but we think three is still acceptable, 17 but we didn't think they were ready for the inspections when 18 they should have been.
19 MR. MURLEY:
We told them it was tineliness.
We 20 were under quite a bit of pressure to finish our review, the 21 Region's review, of the procedures, so they could have fuel
- 22 load.
I think they had a date of November 19th.
Finally, I 23 called-up Mr. Ferland, the President, and said, stop, we need 24 at least a week to satisfy ourselves that these procedures are 25 in good enough shape.
We had ten people on site doing this
26 1
review, including some contractors.
We did satisfy ourselves 2
that the procedures for fuel loading were adequate, and we 3
held them up for a week or so, I guess.
4 Nonetheless, I think, to conclude, this average SALP 5
rating reflects this crush of work at the end and the results 6
of the hurry up that had to be done as a result.
I should i
7 point out that this rush has not continued into the 8
post-licensing operations.
That is very important.
They have 9
slowed down now.
Their original schedule for criticality was r
10 late December.
They just went critical last week.
This 11 reflects the fact that they had to take the time to get these 12 procedures in order and do it right.
13 Our evaluation that since licensing, low power 14 licensing, it has been slow and deliberate, cautious, and no 15 shortcuts.
16 I guess I would like a Senior Resident Inspector to 17 give some views.
Tom Shedlosky has some of his own thoughts.
18 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Can I ask you a question on 19 procedures in general?
It is my understanding there are a 20 number of procedures not yet finalized.
Would you comment on 21 whether or not thcy are finalized?
22 MR. MURLEY:
That was the case at the time.
23 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
I mean right now.
24 MR. MURLEY:
My understanding now is they are pretty 25 much finalized.
27 1
CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
You are satisfied with them and 2
this includes procedures for all of the important operations?
3 MR. MURLEY:
Yes.
This is Tom Shedlosky, Senior 4
Resident Inspector.
5 MR. SHEDLOSKY:
Good morning.
My name is John 6
T.
Shedlosky.
I am the Senior Resident at Millstone 1 and 2.
7 Since the initial fuel loading in December, I have 8
been observing the conduct of operations, particularly the 9
conduct of operations in the control room at Unit 3.
10 Basically, I have observed that the operators are acting 11 professionally in the~ conduct of their duties.
Specifically, 12 they are paying a good deal of attention, a high degree of 13 attention, to the indications on the main control board.
They 14 are also acting to control the testing which is in progress at 15 present at the plant.
16 There is good interaction between the shift people 17 and the reactor engineers who are directing the testing.
We 18 have observed that the operators have taken a very cautious 19 approach to watch relief.
There are good turnovers.' They are 20 good briefings before evolutions, both by the shift supervisor 21 and by the reactor engineers.
22 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Tom, you are satisfied 23 that they have all of the procedures in place, they understand 24 them, and they are properly applying them as they go about 25 their duties?
28 1
NR. SHEDLOSKY:
To my knowledge, they have all of 2
the procedures in place.
3 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: 'On the tech spec part of 4
that, the November 25th memo seemed to indicate that had not 5
quite been finalized yet.
Have you completed your review of 6
tech specs and done the usual assurance that the tech specs 7
matched the as-built plant and both of those match the FSAR 8
commitments?
9 MR. NOVAK:
Yes, we did go through that process.
10 They did, however, pick up one area where the tech specs and 11 the FSAR were consistent but the as-built plant differed.
12 Several years ago there was a design to include,certain 13 switches on the remote shut-down panel.
It was subsequently 14 decided through design that those were not necessary, but it 15 was never recovered, so the FSAR reflected that fact.
The 16 tech _ specs reflected that fact.
17 Late in the development of the technical 18 specifications, a table was entered into the technical 19 specifications which included those switches, which kind of 20 came after the QA of this check we asked the Licensee to do.
21 It was only through their surveillance testing, as they got 22 into operation, where they were to check this table and they 23 noted these switches were called for.
They in fact were not 24 part of the design and we reviewed'it and found it acceptable.
25 The essence was that originally they thought they
29 i
1 would need more than the steam turbine auxillary feedwater i
2 pump to hold the plant in hot shut-down.
It was subsequently 3
decided that pump alone could do it.
These other switches 4
were to provide some flexibility for operating a motor driven a
i 5
auxillary feedwater pump.
6 It was a legitimate error that was made several 7
years ago, that was not caught.. We have talked about it to 4
8 the Northeast Utilities management, to get a feeling that this 9
was a singularity, so to speak, and not reflective of a
]
10 breakdown in their process.
11 MR. MURLEY:
Rich Starostecki is going to talk about i
12 some of the questions on operators and licensing.
l 13 MR. STAROSTECKI:
If I could have slide 11, please.
14
[ Slide.]
15 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
I am not sure if I am i
16 agreeing with the characterization that this is an average 17 SALP, the 12 categories, six are 2, five are 1, and one is 3.
18 MR. MURLEY:
I am talking in terms of what Millstone 19 can do.
I am confident they can do better.
They are a better organization than this.
Every other SALP we have done for 20 21 Haddam Neck and Millstone 1 and 2, I think they are going to 22 do better and they can.
4 l
23 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Have they received a three 24 for any of the other plants in any category?
25 MR. STAROSTECKI:
Not in the recent past.
The three
)
--. - - _. _, _ _ _.. _. _.. _. ~. _, _., _,.. _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _. _ _. _....,.,
~
30 1
is somewhat unique.
I also think it represents a challenge to 2
them in the transition from construction to preops.
This 3
particular problem with the switches, if the surveillance 4
procedure were written sufficiently far in advance, they would 5
have caught it prior to fuel load.
It was the individual 6
having procedure generated late in the game, so to speak, that 7
identified the problem.
Again, it is another example that if 8
things were done sooner, they would have caught it sooner.
9 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Yes.
10 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
What is the role of Yankee 11 Atomic, if any, in this organization today?
12 MR. MURLEY:
NUSCO has their own engineering 13 organization.
It.is very strong in construction Sanagement.
14 They do not rely on Yankee Atomic Group in Framingham for much 15 of substance if anything.
I am sure they have members of 16 Yankee on their Board of Directors.
17 MR. STAROSTECKI:
I know of no daily working 18 relationships where there is a contractual arrangement between 19 NUSCO and the Yankee Atomic, similar to that, Maine Yankee, 20 Vermont Yankee, Yankee Rowe, that Seaboard has.
21 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
That has not always been 22 true, has it?
My understanding is -- I had a vague 23 recollection when I was there nearly two and a half years ago 24 that there was a weaning process where Yankee Atomic was 25 involved in the earlier years.
31 MR. MURLEY:
I think that is right, in the earlier 1
2 days of Connecticut Yankee, Haddam Neck.
I think there was a 3
much closer relationship.
We do see in the other Yankee 4
organizations, people who have worked at Connecticut Yemkee, 5
so there has been an exchange of personnel over the years.
6 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
That has been some years j
7 ago.
It is an important point, in general, which the Staff
)
8 knows about more than I do, or at least have known about 1
i l
9 longer than I have, that the Yankee Atomic organization has 10 provided that kind of broad umbrella of leadership to the 1
11 northeast, that is generally contributed to the excellence of 12 operations there over the years.
Would that we would have had 13 that sort of thing in some other parts of the country.
14 MR. MURLEY:
I think that is correct.
15 MR. STAROSTECKI:
They have been getting good 16 grades.
As noted in the SALPs for the others in the past, j
17 for Haddam Neck, Millstone 1 and 2, there is area for
]
18 improvement, critical self-evaluation being one of them.
That i
19 has been pointed out to them in the last SALP, and once a I
i 20 problem is identified, they do pursue it quite well.
1 21 I would like to focus on the insights that we have i
22 gained from the examination of failures that we have had at i
j 23 Millstone 3.
We had three sets of examinations.
Most of the 24 exams were given in May of 1985, and then we had examinations j
25 in September and subsequently in October.
There are 33 people
32 1
at Millstone 3 holding licenses: 27 hold SRO licenses, six 2
hold reactor operator licenses.
Of those, obviously, one is 3
the operations manager, and two are his assistants, so that 4
really leaves 30 people available to stand shift.
5 The numbers you saw previously of 23 indicate the 6
actual number that were standing shift, so there are enough 7
licensed people to stand five shifts.
They have, in fact, had 8
people, shift advisers, through the training, and they have 9
been qualified and we have seen them on shift with the normal 10 people and the normal complements, 11 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Will these people be used for 12 the five shifts?
13 MR. STAROSTECKI:
Some of them are staff positions 14 that are intended to remain staff positions but they can be 15 used on shifts.
It is really up to'the utility to decide 16 whether a staff engineer stands shift duty or not.
17 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Will they have enough people 18 then to stand the five shifts, and will they do it?
19 MR. STAROSTECKI:
My understanding is they will.
20 Now, whether they do it, I think we have to ask UUSCO whether 21 they intend to do that or not.
22 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
All right.
23 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Can you give us the number 24 of candidates and the number of candidates who passed for each 25 of the exams, for SRO and also for Ros?
33 1
MR. STAROSTECKI:
In the May exam, we had -- May 2
1985 -- we should have a backup Vugraph, backup slide 2A.
If 3
we could have slide 2A, please.
4
[ Slide.]
5 In the May 1985 exam, we had 16 SRO candidates, of 6
which nine passed.
We had two of five reactor operators.
In 7
September we had 11 of 14 senior reactor operators, three of 8
five res tor operators.
In the October re-exam, all seven of 9
seven senior reactor operators passed, and one of one reactor 10 operator passed.
11 Now, the insight I get from that is that when you 12 look back at where the problems were, they occurred in the 13 simulator portion of the exam, the written examinations. For 14 example, in May, all 16 of the senior reactor operators passed 15 the written, and what happened is that the failures occurred 16 on the simulator.
There were no failures on the oral 17 walk-through.
18 When we give a simulator exam, we also do a third 19 part, and that is to take the people through the plant and 20 walk them through.
21 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
But this is rather 22 significant. At least the simulator exam is as significant as 23 any other part of the exam.
24 MR. STAROSTECKI:
Yes, it is.
And it begs the next 25 question, why do we have the problem on the simulator exam?
34 1
CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Yes.
2 MR. STAROSTECKI:
In hindsight, I think there are 3
three things we have to address. One is the lack of 4
familiarity by the candidates with the simulator exam process 5
itself.
They were not aware of what our techniques and 6
practices were.
7 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
What do you mean by that?
8 MR. STAROSTECKI:
In a simulator exam, our examiners 9
go in and actually ask people questions during the simulator 10 portion, and they expect to see also at the same time 11 cooperation and a working spirit of the shift as a shift, not 12 as individuals.
The minute an examiner would start asking a 13 question, people would stop and let that one individual answer 14 the question.
It was a very artificial environment.
15 We subsequently had a meeting with the other 16 candidates for subsequent follow-on exams and we got that 17 clarified.
We also had a meeting with the candidates after 18 the first exam, and this is where the issue came out.
People 19 were not aware of what was expected of them during the 20 simulator exam portion.
21 The solution to that is we ought to be going out and 22 telling the candidates before the exam what it is we really 23 expect of them, and not to be artificial about how they behave 24 when confronted by an examiner during the simulator portion of 25 the exam.
35 1
COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
You are saying it is our 2
fault, not theirs.
3 MR. STAROSTECKI:
I say it was a mixup in 4
communication.
We did not tell them up front that we wanted 5
them to behave as a shift and not to artificially stop.
6 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
I must say if I were taking 7
an exam and it was on a simulator, and I knew that there was 8
an operating reactor and an NRC examiner walked up to me and 9
started asking me questions, if I were one of the other 10 operators, unless I was told that I was supposed to pretend 11 that this was an operating plant, I would probably stop and 12 watch, too.
I think that is our fault, not'theirs.
We learn 13 some things from that.
14 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Didn't we allow them to operate 15 as a team?
It seems to'me that if we allow them to operate as 16 a team, we don't interrupt with questions.
17 MR. STAROSTECKI:
That is a difficulty for the 18 examiners in coming up with standards for the examiners 19 uniformly applied across the country in how they deal with the 20 candidates.
Yes, partially it is our problem, I will agree to 21 that.
The second part of the problem is the definition 22 of the roles.
There are two SRO licenses on each shift at 23 Millstone 3.
They have defined those roles as one is a shift 24 supervisor, one is senior control room operator.
They have 25 different duties.
- = _ _
36 1
One of the things that became apparent during our 2
examination process is both assumed that their duties were 3
only restricted to those positions, yet, in fact, we expect 4
the examiners to test the SRO for all duties of an SRO, not 5
just only a portion of it.
So there was a problem, I think, 6
with the training program, and I explained to the people that 7
they have to be ready to fulfill the other individual's duties 8
as a senior reactor operator.
We are not there solely to l
9 license somebody as a senior control room operator. Both have 10 a senior reactor operator license and we expect both to have i
11 the knowledge and skills of the senior reactor operator.
12 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
But on the simulator, you are 13 testing the team.
14 MR. STAROCTECKI:
Correct.
15 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
So the tendency is to 16 concentrate on the team.
I'm not saying you shouldn't test 17 them on the other things as well, but the simulator, if the 18 objective is to see how they work as a team --
19 MR. STAROSTECKI:
Are they working well as a team?
20 Are they keeping the plant under safe condition?
Are they 21 using the procedures properly and do they have a proper 22 delineation of what the reactor operator does, what it is the 23 senior reactor operator does, and are they working together?
24 Is the communication and information flow present?
25 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
But I question whether that is
37 1
the. time to look at the other aspects.
I'm not saying you 2
should not look at the other aspects; the question is when.
3 MR. STAROSTECKI:
The difficulty is you have a 4
dynamic machine, a simulator that is running real time, but 5
you want to be able to freeze the machine and ask them static 6
questions: what are you doing, do you appreciate the problem 7
you have?
We introduce casualties into the scenario, and you 8
want to see how people react and whether they recognize the 9
casualty or not.
That is where people are making judgments 10 about the operator's knowledge of the procedures and are they 11 properly following them.
12 I think the third problem that we saw is the 13 emergency operating procedures, the symptom-oriented 14 guidelines that were developed for Millstone 3 were not fully 15 developed on the simulator. Again, the simulator was not in 16 full operational status until fairly late.
We saw that the 17 operators themselves really never had enough simulator time 18 and they did not have the simulator available for their 19 training sufficiently in advance of the exam.
That is 20 partially our problem, too, because we wanted to use that 21 simulator.
It is a tool and we wanted to see how it would 22 Work.
23 They did not have it for the last two years for 24 practice, nor did they have the simulator available to check 25 out all the symptom-oriented guidelines.
It happened that one
A 38
+
1 of the casualties we ran identified a problem with one of the 2
symptom-oriented procedures, and it took both NRR and i
3 ourselves in the Region quite a few months to resolve that one
(
4 open item.
It happened to be an open item that was open with
)
5 Westinghouse when the Human Factors staff had done the review 6
of the Westinghouse guidelines.
1 7
So the third point, the practice on the simulator, I 8
think, extends to both the operators and the testing out of 9
the symptom-oriented procedures on the simulator.
Once the j
10 symptom-oriented guidelines were resolved, and once we had 11 told the operators what we were expecting from them, the 12 j
re-exams and future exams did not have that problem.
j 13 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Is this kind of problem just 14 something that happened at Millstone?
Do we have troubles 15 communicating with licensees generally when we are running I
16 simulator examinations?
Have you observed other regions, i
17 other groups running a test?
Is this failure to communicate a f,
18 widespread problem?
i j
19 MR. STAROSTECKI:
I do not think it is a problem.
i 20 We did not have the problem at seabrook.
Seabrook also had a 21 simulator in operation for quite a while before Millstone 3 l
1 22 did. Seabrook does not have a low power license either.
It is 23 where there is a simulator in use, where the people have had 4
1 24 the practice with it, that maybe we in the NRC have gotten too l
{
25 used to asking some of these people simulator-type questions, i
m -
-,,,--,---n,---,-.,,--,-,-__--_v
-n--,-,.,-,-,,--,,,,,,_n
f 39 1
I j
1 and here is a plant with a simulator where it was made 2
operational fairly late in the training program.
They i
3 themselves were not used to it, and we were not appreciative 4
enough of the fact that they were not used to it.
5 We do not have that problem.
We have not had that 6
kind of a problem at other plants where there are simulators.
I 7
Now, there are obviously some plants where there are no 8
simulators where we do not know-how things would go.
9 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
I am worried not so much f
10 about the details of this case but I am just concerned about i
11 our walking in,.giving an examination, they do not know what 12 they are supposed to be doing, we do not seem to know what we t
13 are doing.
That does not contribute to the credibility of our
)
i 14 examining process.
I hope this is an isolated incident.
If j
15 it isn't, we ought to figure out what we are doing.
i 16 MR. MURLEY:
Just a second.
I think there was an i
17 element of shakedown here in the sense of how we used the i
i l
18 simulator in our exams.
Now we try to communicate ahead of J
i 19 time how we are going to come about and do the exams, so I 20 think that should resolve this particular kind of problem.
21 But there was an element of a shakedown in this involved, yes.
)
22 MR. DENTON:
I think this area has been changing 23 rapidly.
Many utilities have gotten ahead in the use of the
{
24 simulator and having it for use.
Take Palo Verde.
You recall i
25 they had a simulator five years ago.
The level that is 1
40 1
expected tends to be set by the best performer, and I think in 2
this particular area the utility was slower than some, such as 3
Susquehanna or other plants in the region which had had a 4
simulator for some time and everything was well set, and I 5
don't think the examination posed any problem.
6 I think this is more of an isolated case.
i 7
COMMISSIONER ZECH:
But I assume the regional people 8
and the NRR is now satisfied that the state of training of 9
these people is satisfactory; is that right?
10 MR. STAROSTECKI:
Yes, sir.
It has been 11 demonstrated in the control room, as well.
We are quite 12 pleasantly surprised, and that is why we,did bring in some 13 resident inspectors from other operational plants, to get a 14 third view as to the adequacy of the operators, and we are 15 very satisfied.
16 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
It.looks like the 17 examination results at the latter end of the year were much, 18 much better, indicating there is now an understanding of what 19 is' expected in the examination.
20 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
It is difficult to pass the 4
21 exam if you don't know what the rules of the exam are.
22 MR. STAROSTECKI:
The Millstone exams in May were an 23 isolated case.
I attribute it primarily to the fact that the 24 simulator was not available to them for a period of two years, i
25 and it was fairly late in'the game.
At the point in time, we
,___.,._ - -,~.___,,.._ _. _ -._..,_._.
41 3
]
1 had an option: use the simulator or not use it and ignore it.
j 2
Maybe it was our mistake for trying to use the simulator too i
3 soon.
j 4
COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
I have a problem with l
5 that, though, because the simulator really is the ideal test.
6 It allows you to test the way people will perform under actual l
i 7
conditions.
It is much better than just asking people what 8
things are on the control board of the plant.
I think it is 9
the ideal way to conduct a test..
I am not sure I fault you 10 for using it.
I understand this is a transitional kind of l
11 thing.
I 12 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
I gather in response to 4
13 Commissioner Zech you are satisfied with the state of training i
{
14 of these people, both with regard --
15 MR. STAROSTECKI:
Yes, we are, very much.
i j
16 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
-- with respect to the
~
j 17 simulator and other aspects.
i 18 MR. MURLEY:
Yes, and it is borne out by the I,
i 19 experience we have seen in their operations.
j 20 That concludes the regional presentation.
l 21 MR. NOVAK:
May we have Slide 7 back on the screen, J
22 please?
4 I
f 23 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
May I ask a question so far as j
24 the regional work is concerned?
One of the attachments we 25 normally look for is a list of open items that the region
,i l
42 1
still has. Are you satisfied that all of them have been 2
corrected?
I do not have that with me.
3 MR. MURLEY:
We looked for the list, and I did not 4
have it either, a list of open items.
5 MR. McCABE:
We still have some items that are 6
open.
We have no items that are open that are critical to 7
them going on.
These are minor items of inspector follow-up, 8
some in the nature of outstanding items, but I will go back 9
and check on this the next time I come. I do not have a 10 problem with meeting the NRC requirements.
11 MR. STAROSTECKI:
As far as license condition, I'm 12 not aware of any license conditions that have not been 13 satisfied. What Mr. McCabe is referring to is inspector 14 follow-on items that do not reach the threshold of becoming 15 license conditions.
16 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
My question really was related 17 to are we ready to license the plant, and it was related to 18 are the license condition items completed by the region?
19 MR. MURLEY:
The answer to that is yes.
20 MR. DENTON:
We do not actually issue the license 21 until we check with the region to make sure that all of the 22 things that are needed to comply with the low power license 23 have been fulfilled, and it is usually a day or two after the 24 Commission meeting, in any event.
25 MR. MURLEY:
We do one final check, and then I will
63 1
provide a letter to Harold to that ef fect.
2 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Okay, good.
3 MR. NOVAK:
There were some human engineering --
4 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
What was that?
5 MR. NOVAK:
To be as complete as we can, we were 6
informed last night from the Licensee that there were some 7
human engineering deficiencies that he had committed to 8
correct prior to fuel load, and they ended up on what is 9
usually called a checklist, and they are not complete.
They lo are in the process of doing it now.
There are a few that will 11 go beyond tomorrow, and we are going to condition the license 12 to include these few human engineering deficiencies.
13 These are things like changing labels on meters, or 14 even changing the face of the meter.
We have reviewed 15 them. We are satisfied that they do not represent a risk to 16 continued operation of the startup program, and they are going 17 to do them.
So there are a list of things yet to be done, but 18 we do not view those as anything that would preclude going 19 forward in the startup test program.
20 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Just before we leave the 21 region, could you say a few words about the two operating 22 events on January 16th, one involving the diesel generators 23 and the second the condensate storage tank 24 overpressurization?
And in particular, have both of those 25 items been corrected?
44 1
MR. STAROSTECKI:
I would like to defer to the 2
onsite staff if the condensate storage tank problem has been 3
corrected.
I would attribute the condensate storage tank 4
problem as a personnel problem with the valve lineup.
I think 5
the kinds of problems they have had, those two things, the 6
diesel generator one does not hit me right off the bat, but 7
there were a number of design changes to that diesel generator 8
prior to fuel load.
9 Let me see if the senior resident can talk on the 10 diesel generator.
11 MR. SHEDLOSKI:
The condensate storage tank problem 12 occurred due to freezing of a pressure relief vacuum breaker 13 which is located at the top of the tank.
The tank was in a 14 filling operation and became overpressuri cd..
That tank does 15 not have remote pressure indication.
16 The utility has taken the tank out of service.
It 17 is a nonsafety-related tank.
It is used for balance of plant 18 makeup water to support the startup ovolution.
They havo 19 constructed two additional storage tanks adjacont to the 20 failed tank.
They are in the process of repairing the failed 21 tank and will restoro it to permanent operation.
22 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
The diesels?
23 MR. SHEDLOSKI:
That was a diesel soquencor problem, 24 I believo, that same day or the day after.
That was simply an 25 electronic failure duo to the failure of a diodo in an
= _ _ _ _ _
45 1
electronic circuit which was repaired that day.
2 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Have there been any other i
3 significant operating events as part of the startup program 4
since these two events?
i 5
MR. SHEDLOSKI:
The condensate storage tank failure 6
was the most significant.
There had been two safety 7
injections caused by a high rate of change, actually a small l
8 change in main steamlino pressure, but because of the rate of 9
change, in which a relief valvo or an atmospheric relief valve 10 in secondary steam generators have bqen 100 pound differential 11 change, rapid chango in main steamlina pressure, caused a 12 safety injection, which was verified to be an invalid safety 1
13 injection and secured.
14 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
May I ask the Region another 15 question?
I gather Millstone 3 only went critical rather 16 recently?
17 MR. MURLEY:
Yes.
18 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
And I was wondoring whether you 19 feel that there has been enough experience with the plant i
20 after criticality to allow them to go above 5 porcent.
It 21 ocems like a rather short period of tino from criticality to 22 full power.
23 MR. MURLEY:
That is a good question. With the l
24 pressurized water reactors -- for a boiling wator roactor, wo i
25 have got a month or two after criticality whoro we can observo
46 1
their cperations.
And I asked my staff that very question.
2 The answer that I have gotten, and I was satisfied with it, is 3
yes, we are satisfied; that we have observed them during the 4
period from fuel loading while they are doing precriticalityp 5
tests and during this past week of criticality.
6 CHAIRMA!! PALLADINO:
How does the timo period 7
compare with other similar types of reactors?
8 MR. MURLEY:
I will have to defer to NRR, but my 9
guess is that with other pressurized water reactors, it in 10 short between the criticality -- it in similarly short, only a 11 week or two.
12 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
I,had a mini =pression it 13 was tne other way around, that the BWRs had short and the PWRs 14 had longer ones.
15 MR. STAROSTECKI At Millstone there is only one 16 they will do between criticality and power sessions; that is 17 the low power physics testing and natural circulation 18 testing. All of the other testing of components they can do by 19 generating enough heat in the primary system without the 20 reactor critical to generato steam and tout out an awful lot al of systema.
That in what you cannot do on a boiling water 22 reactor.
You have to be critical on a boiling water roactor 23 to carry out a lot of your tests of your safoty systomo. Tnone 84 tosto were already dono at M111stono.
85 MR. MURLEY:
It was on the basis of observing during
47 1
that testing, of the pre-op testing, the startup testing, that 2
plus the week that we have had of observation.
3 MR. DENTON:
We face this question every time we 4
schedule a Commission meeting.
In this case the utility has 5
had a lot of experience.
They are running a lot of plants.
6 Their own schedule calls for going above 5 percent by Friday, 7
and we do not want to be in a position of unduly delaying them 8
by scheduling it lato.
What we do in this case is we take the 9
Commission approval as being contingent on satisfactory 10 completion of all of the 5 percent required.
We wait until 11 that happens.
12 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
We are particularly interested 13 in this point because it seems a lot of motion to novo 14 promptly.
I don't say it is wrong to move promptly, but I 15 want to make sure we are moving promptly prudently.
16 MR. MURLEY:
I would not hositate to advise Harold 17 if I thought that we were not ready, as I did before the fuel 18 load.
I just stopped things until we were satisfied.
19 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Excuse me, Harold.
I should 20 not have interrupted.
21 MR. DENTON:
That was the only point I was going to 22 make.
In any caso, we always await that the pogion is 23 satisfied that ovarything is proper beforo going ahead, and we 34 would como back to you if thoro is any real major occurrenco.
25 CHAIRMAN pALLADINO:
One moro question for the
l i
L 48 l
1 Region.
The recent hurricane Gloria, I gather it had some l
l 2
impact on Millstone Units 1 and 2.
Were there any changes 3
made in Unit 1 and 2 as a result of that, and do those l
4 indicate for any changes in Unit 3?
l l
5 MR. MURLEY:
There you are talking about the L
1 l
6 electrical power system.
They did lose some electrical power 7
at the site.
8 MR. STAROSTECKI:
I am not aware of any changes they l
l 9
made since then.
They had some changes for the onsite t
l 1
10 emergency power systems, but that related to other ongoing 11 studies.
l 12 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
The Licensee has a l
13 representative here. We can give him a few minutes at the i
14 and of the meeting to make any comments, and then maybe they l
15 could address this question if it seems appropriate.
i 16 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Particularly in light of 17 the last item on this chart.
I 18 MR. MURLEY:
That concludes our presentation.
19 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
What slide are we on?
(
20 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Slide 7.
21 MR. DENTON:
That is a good lead-in to the PRA 32 review, and I want Mr. Spiess to summarize what we did, but 23 just to set the stage, we did request a number of PRAs to be 24 done.
Our policy has been to get those PRAs in house, such as 25 at Limerick, get them reviewed, and consider the results of l
l
[
49 1
the PRA prior to licensing because it does not seem that we 2
should license a plant and then review the PRAs.
So for 3
several years we have been doing that.
4 In this case our review was completed very~1 ate, 5
about the time the plant was being licensed, but we did just 6
that same sort of thing to make sure we thoroughly understand 7
the implications of the PRA prior to licensing.
I would like 8
to have Spiess walk you through what we learned from the PRA.
9 I should mention also, by the way, Millstone 10 completed a PRA on Unit 1 last summer that turned up some 11 rather high results.
This was their own PRA, and they 12 notified us about it, and we have met on it and they have 13 taken appropriate actions on that.
14 We do follow PRAs around the country, and when PRAs 15 get done, if they show something that is unexpected or 16 unusual, it does call for us to look into it.
17 MR. SPIESS:
The PRA was reviewed by our staff.
Our 18 staff was assisted by personnel from Lawrence Livermore 19 liational Laboratory as well as Brookhaven Laboratory.
When we 20 put together our conclusions, we sent the draft report to the 21 utility by October -- I don't know if it is listed there.
22 Basically what we found is that the most important 23 vulnerability to core melt was involving station blackout.
24 Basically, based on our analyses -- and of course, you have to 25 be very careful when you look at the PRAs because of the
50 1
uncertainties in the range of parameters, but in any event, we 2
found that the contribution of the station blackout to the 3
core melt was something like 40 percent of the total core 4
melt.
5 Now, as was mentioned earlier, at the same time we 6
were sensitized by the recent loss of station blackout --
7 excuse me, the recent loss of offsite power to the Millstone 8
site, the Hurricane Gloria that you mentioned earlier, 9
Mr. Chairman.
10 So between those two facts, we decided to pursue the 11 issue on a plant-specific basis, even though the issue has 12 also been pursued on a generic basis; but not knowing exactly 13 the fate of the generic resolution, we thought that it was 14 prudent to ask the utility to make sure that our conclusions 15 and our assumptions were correct.
16 So we sent a 50-54 letter to start dialogue. So the 17 utility was looking into this, looking into our assumptions, 18 what contributed to our understanding of this sequence being 19 so important.
They were looking into it, analyzing it, and it 20 will be discussed sometime the end of February.
21 So again, we were sensitized by the loss of offsite 22 power.
As you may know, they also had loss of offsite power 23 back in 1975, so this site has an average loss of offsite 24 power of.2 per reactor site, which is twice as much as the 25 average loss of offsite power for all sites in the United
51 1
States.
It meets the regulations.
It has two diesel 2
generators, but that is the minimum.
It meets the minimum 3
requirements as far as onsite power is concerned.
4 Harold said that we have reviewed other reactors 5
located in high density sites. Those plants have different 6
power configurations. For example, Indian Point has three 7
diesel generators as well as additional power sources from gas 8
turbines.
Similarly with Limerick.
9 Again, even though we have identified this issue, we 10 are pursuing it with the Licensee, and of course, we are also 11 pursuing it on a generic basis.
It does meet our minimum 12 requirements,.and we see no reason why this issue should hold 13 up power for this plant.
14 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
What about the fact that you 15 do have three plants here on one site and each of them 16 individually, of course, meet our requirements, but whenever I 17 see a situation like that, I am always inclined to ask what 18 opportunities there are to provide for human intervention 19 quickly should the need arise, and at very little extra effort 20 or expense.
21 Has there been some effort to make it possible to 22 tap other power sources from the other reactors into each of 23 the reactors if the circumstance should arise where that is 24 needed?
25 MR. SPIESS:
To the best of my understanding,
52 1
everything is independent.
Millstone 3 has tuo diesels, 2
Millstone 2 has two diesels, Millstone 1 has one and a gas 3
turbine.
So, if they were to add a swing diesel, you could 4
connect that to both plants, but our minimum requirements, you 5
cannot interconnect from one to the other.
6 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Isn't that a cheap fix when 7
you have three plants on site to provide extra backup and 8
flexibility?
9 MR. STELLO:
Let me speak to that issue.
That is 10 one of the issues that concerned me, was whether some of the 11 results we see on the PRA are results of the artificiality of 12 our requirements that prohibit the kind of interconnections 13 that could enhance the ability of the plant to respond.
That 14 is clearly one of the issues we want to look at, and cur 15 regulations do prohibit certain kinds of interconnections.
16 And if it is a result of what we are doing, then clearly we 17 ought to know that and understand that perhaps we are causing 18 a change in safety that we really do not want because of some 19 of these requirements.
20 So it is-a good question and it is a question we 21 want to look at.
22 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
You want to examine common 23 sources of failures that might arise?
24 MR. STELLO:
In this case the power supplies are 25 required to be independent, and here is the ability with I
_. _. _ _. _ _ _ _ =, _. _.
53 1
regard to station blackout to enhance the ability of each of 2
the stations to respond to blackout by some of the 3
interconnections that Mr. Bernthal has talked about.
4 CHAIRMAN'PALLADINO:
The only point I am making is 5
when you look at that possibility, the connections, the common 6
mode failure --
7 MR. STELLO:
Sure, that is the reason for the 8
isolation, is the fear that when you interconnect them, you 9
introduce failure modes which will cause them all to be 10 disrupted.
11 MR. DENTON:
A number of people have gone to three 12 buses rather than two, and perhaps a third one might be a 13 swing, and that would satisfy the common mode.
We wanted to 14 flag this for you.
We think the plant is not unsafe without 15 16 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
The station blackout issue, 17 whether we are going to issue a full power license today, are 18 two different issues.
Do you disagree?
19 MR. DENTON:
I do not disagree.
The station 20 blackout issue is a generic issue for all plants. We want to 21 bring it to your attention that we are working on a particular 22 case reflecting their loss of offsite power in their two 23 diesels.
We think we can go forward and continue to work with 24 them.
I think they have got some innovative thoughts that 25 they maybe want to tell you about today that they are
,m..
,_. --.y-
,,,,cm--
r-
54 1
considering.
They have not responded to the letter.- I see no 2
difficulty in issuing a lower power license at the same time 3
that we continue to work with them on this particular issue.
4 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
I think it is a loose use of 5
statistics to -- how many cases do we now have of loss of 6
offsite power there?
7 MR. SPIESS:
Three.
8 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Saying it is double what S
other sites are statistically is not much of a statement based 10 on three events.
There is this emerging picture'that these 11 are pretty common events, and you can tell me whether they are 12 more common than we had projected a few years ago.
13 MR. SPIESS:
I should say, Mr. Chairman, we are 14 satisfied that they have procedure's in place to recover from a 15 station blackout, very detailed procedures.
The operators 16 have been trained in those procedures, and in addition, of 17 course, they have procedures that they shut the plants down 18 as a hurricane or some other catastrophe approaches, which 19 they did during Hurricane Gloria. They did shut the two plants 20 down.
21 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Most of what you have said 22 has been verbal rather than numbers.
What kind of numbers?
23 Either that or I was not paying close enough attention.
24 MR. SPIESS:
Base'd on our analysis and with help 25 from our consultants, we find out that the station blackout
55
.1 contribution to core melt is 8 x 10 to the minus 5.
2 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
8 x 10 to the minus 5.
So 3
it's about 10 to the minus 4.
Can you give other numbers 4
quickly?
5 MR. SPIESS:
Our total core melt is 2 x 10 to the 6
minus 4, and I should quote the Licensee's numbers.
They have 7
their numbers when it comes to PRA and depending on what 8
assumptions they use, what assumptions we use. Their number 9
for total core melt is 5 x 10 to the minus 5, and contribution 10.
is 1 x 10 to the minus 5.
11 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
But our number is 2 x 10 12 to the minus 4?
13 MR. SPIESS:
For total core melt.
14 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Is there a dominant --
15 MR. SPIESS:
Yes, there are two factors that 16 contribute to the difference.
It is the seal leakage. Once 17 you have loss of power, you degrade the seal and you can get 18 leakage, and depending on what assumption you make --
i 19 COMMISSIONER ZECH:
That is the reactor coolant 20 pump seal.
21 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
This has been an issue that 22 we have been trying to resolve with Westinghouse owners for a 23 number of years. We are doing our own research.
They have 24 been doing research and there is still controversy about how
'25 good the seals would be for a continuous lo'ss of coolant.
56 1
MR. SPIESS:
One of the things that has been 2
identified is the 0-ring as being the Achill'es Heel as far 3
as the seal being able to withstand a station blackout.
4 Westinghouse has redesigned the seal and selected the. proper 5
material, and they would be recommending to the owners the 6
next year or so to change.
7 The other difference is the diesel generator would 8
have the ability.
Millstone has used information from 9
preoperational testing, and we think that is too liberal.-
It 10 is too optimistic. It is not actual demands.
In the past we 11 have compared this with data for the preoperational testing 12 versus real demands.
There is a substantial difference.
It 13 is those two factors.
14 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Station blackout and pump 15 seals.a:.e the dominant factors in the staff's testing, power 16 related events?
17 MR. SPIESS:
Yes.
The other things that were 18 identified, the utility has used the insights from the PRA to 19 tune up and change the procedures, and I think that is a good 20 thing.
21 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Thanks.
22 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Mr. Zech?
23 COMMISSIONER ZECH:
No.
24 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
How long were the three 25 loss of offsite power events?
4 57 1
MR. SPIESS:
The recent one, Gloria, was something 2
like 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br />,-but they could have gone forward much 3
earlier. They could have recovered in 3-1/2 hours for one, and 4
maybe 5-1/2 hours in the other.
Back in the 1975 timeframe, 5
it was about four hours. The earlier one was a few minutes 6
only.
(
7 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Okay.
I 8
CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
If they could have recovered 9
sooner, why didn't they?
10 MR. SPIESS:
There was no need for it.
11 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
How do you know?
12 MR. NOVAK:
Their argument was they had a very 13 stable situation and they wanted to take the time -- what they 14 were doing was washing down a lot of the switch gears.
They 15' had had a lot of salt deposition.
We talked to them 15 specifically about that.
You may want to ask them their 17 philosophy.
It was a decision to hold the plants in that la mode.
19 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Had they needed the offsite 20 power, they would have been able to restore it shortly after 21 they knew there was a need?
22 MR. STELLO:
The plant was already shut down.
23 MR. DENTON:
They had the diesels running.
24 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
If the diesel for some reason 25 had stopped, then they could have gone --
58 1
MR. STELLO:
You might ask the Licensee.
As I 2
remember, the real concern was to make sure that they had 3
washed down to get the salt spray.
4 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
On diesel generator 5
reliability, I take it what you are saying is that, given the 6
fact that the plant has not gone into operation yet, it.is 7
hard to get a feel for where they stack up in terms of the 8
reliability of the diesels.
You just cannot rely on 9
preoperation?
10 MR. SPIESS:
Based on our experience, we cannot.
11 Therefore, we use generic.
12 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
What kind of reliability 13 have they had for the other plants in terms of diesels?
14 MR. SPIESS:
I do not recall the numbers.
15 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
I was thinking'of the 16 qualitative -- historically, has this utility had good diesel 17 reliability at its other plants?
18 MR. SPIESS:
Yes, because of their concern.
19 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
One more question you can 20 answer very quickly. I want.to learn a bit more about the 21 PRA.
What uncertainties do you attach to our estimates and at 22 what confidence level?-
23 MR. SPIESS:
The numbers that I quoted were due to 24 internal events, both our numbers and their numbers.
The 25 contribution of external events, somehow we do not lump them
59 1
together because the uncertainties do not fall in the same 2
ballpark. numbers, plus or minus 10, plus or minus 15.
3 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Plus or minus a factor of 4
10, with what confidence level?
Engineering judgment, right?
5 MR. SPIESS:
Engineering judgment.
The importance 6
is what insights it gives you on what sequences. You look at 7
the assumptions, pay more attention to that than to the botton 8
line numbers.
9 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Why the differences in 10 terms of our bottom line number and thei'r bottom line number, 11 to the extent that you can?
12 MR. SPIESS:
Their assunption of low leakage 13 following station blackout.
Our assumption was a few hundred 14 gpm.
That contributed to maybe 80 percent of the difference.
15 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
And those numbers are only 16 internal contributors, not external at all?
17 MR. SPIESS:
No.
18 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Is that because they do 19 not look at external contributors?
20 MR. SPIESS:
We both looked at external, and our 21 numbers are not that much different if we use the same 22 fragility assumptions.
23 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Is it true for this plant 24 as it has been others I recall, like Indian Point, the 25 external contributors are dominant or not?
Are you saying
60 1
station blackout is dominant?
2 MR. SPIESS:
No.
3 COMMISSIONER ZECH:
Are you also saying that the 4
pump seal leak prediction is being reviewed and perhaps you 5
will come up with a different number and that may have a 6
significant bearing on the PRA calculation?
Is that what you 7
are saying?
8 MR. SPIESS:
That is true, Commissioner Zech, and 9
also, when we sent the 50.54 letter, we identified a number 10 of uncertainties, and that was one of them.
11 CCMMISSIONER ZECH:
That would be a significant 12 uncertainty, a significant impact on this particular 13 calculation, as I understand it; is that correct?
14 MR. SPIESS:
It will. It will decrease.
It is not 15 going to eliminate the station blackout as an important 16 consideration, for example.
17 COMMISSIONER ZECH:
No, of course not, but if I 18 understand it correctly, if it is the dominant or a dominant 19 factor, then it may change your PRA calculation, possibly.
20 MR. SPIESS:
It would possibly change.
21 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Are you ready'to go on with 22 more of-the presentation?
23 MR. NOVAK:
Just a summary.
24 There are no outstanding investigations.
We have a 25 slide which shows that the number of allegations received
~
61 1
during.the construction are small by number.
They have been 2
resolved. 'So all other activities relating to the licensing 3
of the plant have been satisfied.
4 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Those that relate to safety, I 5
presume, the staff has looked into?
6 MR. NOVAK:
Yes.
I 7
' CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Number of investigations, zero; 8
and status of investigations complete is eight.
And you are 9
saying that all of the eight are completed.
10 MR. NOVAK:
They are complete, sir.
There are no 11 outstanding investigations.
12 MR. DENTON:
In conclusion, we recommend that you l
13 recommend the license for the full power requirements, 14 contingent on the 5 percent power requirements.
15 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Are there any special 16 insights that the project manager would want to offer?
17 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
I have one more question, at 18 least, before we go too far, but go ahead.
P 19 MR. DOOLITTLE:
No, nothing additional to what has 20 been said.
21 MR. MURLEY:
The enforcement aspect has been good on 22 Millstone-3 itself, but there is an enforcement order that 23 covers the company.
It stems from a couple of events.
24 One was Haddam Neck, where they had a refueling seal 25 failure.
-,w,
,--v
.-y,,_--,,
,,.,vw.,-,--
,y.-n.--
un.,-..nq,
,n, a,,.-,
62 1
CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
A what?
2 MR. MURLEY:
A seal failure at Haddam Neck, where 3
200,000 gallons was lost during refueling.
That, coupled with 4
another event, we felt they did not do an adequate job of S
reviewing design changes.
6 We have kind of seen that in other places around the 7
country, as a matter of fact, so we issued them an order.
The 8
Director of Inspection and Enforcement did that, to cF) back 9
and look through their procedures across the board as a 10 company.
11 They have done that.
They have got an independent
~
12
. group within the company to go back and review all design 13 changes of safety significance.
They have an outside group 14 that oversees that, a senior management group composed of 15 people outside of the company.
16 They are still under that order, and as I understand 17 it, they're kind of wrapping up the results.
And we have seen 18 a substantial improvement in the attitude in terms of more
'19 self-criticism and more looking at design changes.
20 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
I remember the seal 21 failure incident.
What was the second one that led to the 22 design control question?
23 MR. STAROSTECKI:
The problem with the post-accident 24 sampling system at Haddam Neck and also at Millstone, there 25 was also a device for high-range radiation monitoring inside
63 1
of containment at Haddam Neck and also some other wiring 2
problems.
3 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
One other question I would like 4
to ask:
Recently the Commission was advised that their check 5
valve testing is a significant problem.
I wanted to ask, does 6
the Millstone-3 program cover feedwater system check valve 7
testing, and to what extent is this a problem in this plant?
8 MR. STELLO:
The specific testing we can get into on 9
Millstone, but I believe that the information that we got from 10 San'Onofre has generic implications, and we will be coming to 11 the Commission and informing you of how we intend to start to 12 go about. dealing with that issue.
Clearly, it will be an 13 issue that we will want to look at in all plants.
14 CHAIRMAN-PALLADINO:
Including the testing program 15 that would be used.
16.
MR. STELLO:
We will include that for sure.
There 17 is at least some strong indication that it is a design issue 18 of hydrodynamic proble~ms associated with where the check valve 19 is in the system and its ability to move in response to 20 hydrodynamic loading.
21 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Is this plant one.where the 22 check valve alignment would be such that a failure of the 23 check valves would have a different consequence from that of 24 the other plants like San Onofre?
At some plants, it may 25 bring about a more severe consequence?
64 1
MR. ROSSI:
This would have main steamline isolation 2
valves, so that would help the problen and would have more 3
design features in the feedwater system to address the kind of 4
problem that occurred at San Onofre.
5 MR. STELLO:
We have not done that comparison.
We 6
need to do what we said, to try to give you what I consider to 7
be a thoughtful answer, and we are not prepared to do that 8
today.
9 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Have any of the utilities been 4
10 alerted to the check valve problems, so they can look at it?
11 MR. STELLO:
Oh, yes.
12 CHAIRMAN PALLADIN,0:
Are they looking at it here?
13 MR. STELLO:
You can ask the Licensee what their 14 plans are.
We have not imposed any additional requirements 15 yet, because we are not sure that we understand it well enough 16 to conclude what to do to assure ourselves that.we are clearly i
17 going to improve it, rather than aggravate it.
We are simply 18 not ready to do that yet.
19 CHAIRMAN-PALLADINO:
I will ask them to comment on 20 that when they come up here.
21 MR. MURLEY:
We did find, just to close this up, 22 Mr. Chairman -- we found a similar problem before the San i
23 Onofre report came out of a failure at Shoreham of some anchor 24 check valves.
We did a quick look across the Region of all 25 plants, and, in fact, there has been some specific actions 4
65 1
taken at Millstone-3 to improve it, and you can get the 2
details from the Licensee.
3 MR. DENTON:
The scope of our review in the past has 4
been limited to PORVs.
We learned that in WASH-1400, and we j
5 sent out orders, but then increasingly as we move into the 1
6 balance-of-plant, it is not clear how the tests are being l
7 done.
8
-CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Let me see if there are other i
9 questions before we ask the Licensee for any comments they e
p.
10 might have.
l 11 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
I had a couple of questions 12 on license conditions.
One of the things that you mentioned 13 was an environmental qualification.
It sounds like you said t
14 that the qualification of some of the electrical equipment 15 inside containment was done for a certain temperature, and it J
16 has got to be redone for a higher temperature?
What is going i
f 17 on?
l 18 Does that mean the higher temperature is shown to be l-19 necessary?
Does that mean that they have got to requalify a 20 bunch of the equipment?
l 21 MS. DOOLITTLE:
The temperature that the utility 1
22 used to qualify their equipment is somewhat lower than what we I
23 have seen in the past.
We found acceptable the analysis they 24 provided to us; however, we asked them to go back and actually l
25 measure the average containment temperature over the next fuel a
i
..-_.m,_..,__
66 1
cycle, see what that is, and then recalculate equipment 2
qualified life if the temperature is much different.
3 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
One other question:
On page l
4 7,
I guess it was, of the license, there is another condition 5
that deals with the question of ATWS.
i 6
.MR.
STELLO:
I'm not sure I understood your first l
7 question, as to whether we answered it.
You are looking at 8
the license condition with maximum temperature, 350 degrees?
l 9
COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
I don't know what the i
10 maximum temperature is.
11 MR. STELLO:
There are two different ones.
12 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Containment average 13 temperature is the one that I was inquiring about, f
14 MS. DOOLITTLE:
Yes.
15 MR. NOVAK:
To summarize again, the Licensee 16 believes that that containment will run cooler than what we 17 had previously seen.
We were going to give them the benefit 1
\\
18 of the doubt for a year, and then we're going to go back and i
i 19 make them look at it again.
l 20 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
The other one was on ATWS, 21 and it looked like, in response to the Generic Letter that we 22 issued after the Salem event, it looks like there has been 23 pretty slow progress here.
24 Why hasn't Millstone-3 met those requirements, and 25 where are we now on that issue there?
l
67 1
MR. NOVAK:
I generally agree with you.
In fact, o
2 the event is going on two years, and what we have done is 3
looked at the -- at those immediate procedures.
They have all 4
of what I would call the post-trip review procedures.
We have 5
seen that happen right after the event.
6 The other things that are envisioned in this thing, 7-I cannot speak' offhand, but we clearly had a near-term 8
solution to the ATWS problem, and then there are some 9
longer-term requirements.
And perhaps the Licensee can speak 10 to the schedule, 11 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Any questions?
12 COMMISSIONER ZECH:
No.
13 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Then I am going to invite 14 representatives from Northeast Nuclear Energy Company to join 15 us at the table.
.16
[ Pause.]
17 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
I am going to ask you to 18 introduce yourselves, so that we can get it on the record.
We 19 welcome you here.
20 You have heard a couple of questions along the way, 21 and we want to give you an opportunity to make any statements 22 that you would like to make and then respond to any of the 23 questions that we've raised.
24 MR. FERLAND:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have only 25 a very brief statement to make.
68 1
My name is Jim Ferland.
I am the President of 2
Northeast Utilities, and with me today is John Opeka, Senior
-3 Vice President of Nuclear Engineering and Operations.
4 This is a special pleasure for John and me this 5-morning, in that both of us have an extended work history at 6
the Millstone site itself, both on Millstone-3 and the entire 7
Millstone complex.
Both of us, at one time or another in our 8
working careers, have been Station Superintendents at 9
Millstone.
10
~I appreciate this opportunity to comment, however 11 briefly, on the readiness of Millstone-3 to proceed to full 12 power operation, and I can assure the Commission that we are-13 ready in every respect to receive the full power license that 14 we need to move into our power ascension program.
The power 15 ascension test program, which we intend to carry out in 16 nothing other than the same characterization, I think, that 17 was used a little earlier today by some'of the Staff with 18 regard to their comments on our conduct of the reviewing 19 operation, will be conducted in a deliberate, in a cautious, 20 in a very thorough manner.
21 When we have done that and we've completed our test 22 program in just that way, that unit will be ready for 23 commercial operation and ready to serve our customers for the 24 next several decades.
25 We are acutely aware of the_ responsibility and the
69 1
obligations that go along with managing the nuclear 2
technology, and I can comment to you that this organization 3
will bring every bit of the capability we have to operate this 4
facility in exactly the same kind of fashion that we have been 5
operating Connecticut Yankee and Millstone-1 and Millstone-2 6
for many years.
7 And that is the end of my prepared comments.
Myself 8
and Mr. Opeka will be glad to respond to any questions you may 9
have.
10 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Thank you.
11 Well, I was interested in what changes were made as 12 a result of Gloria that might impact on Unit 3, for example.
13 MR. OPEKA:
As a result of Gloria -- before Gloria 14 occurred, we were aware of the vulnerability of the site to 15 incidents where a hurricane would come up the coast, and with 16 the wind direction coming from the water and with no rain, the 17 probability of salting up the insulators and creating a loss-18 of the switchgear situation.
19 As a result of that, we made the decision early on 20 Friday, the day of the hurricane, to shut down.
That was our 21 decision, and we shut down all plants, and as a result, I 22 believe, minimized the exposure of that loss of power at the 23 site.
24 The question was asked as to why we waited 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> 25 to restore power.
The main reasons was that we shut down
i 70 1
1 early, got our emergency power sources all operating on the l
l 2
three units, and that included five-diesels and a gas 3
turbine.
There was no need to transfer fron emergency power 4
to offsite power.
In fact, we had our emergency -- corporate 5
emergency organization intact until outside power was 6
restored, and the question was:
Why are we waiting?
And the t
7 answer from the plant was:
Everything is stable.
Take your 8
time.
Make sure that the salt is off all the insulators.
9 When you're ready, we can take it, but there's no rush.
10 And I did clarify this, I believe, in a letter to 11 you, indicating that if we had to, we would be able to restore 12 power to Millstone-1 within three and a half hours and 13 Millstone-2 within five and a half hours.
14 As a result of Gloria, we did have one large roll-up l
15 door on Millstone-l's turbine building that did collapse, and 16 we did take action to reinforce that and also to prevent that 17 from recurring.
18 There were a number of procedural changes that we 19 make, and this is a process that we go through any time we 20 have an emergency drill, and this was an emergency drill.
In 21 fact, we were into an alert condition.
22 Any time we have incident like this, we have a 23 critique, and if we find any problems, we revise the l
24 procedures.
And we have a program still in effect to make 25 those corrections.
So they're mainly procedural as a result
71 1
of that incident, except for that one roll-up door.
2 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
If you hadn't decided to wait, 3
how long would it have taken you to bring on power from 4
offsite, if you found you needed it?
5 MR. OPEKA:
Well, I said three and a half hours for 6
7 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Three and a half hours.
8 MR. OPEKA:
For Millstone-1 and five and a half 9
hours for Millstone-2.
That's our estimate.
If we needed 10 power, that's how long we'd have --
11 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
I can see at the beginning, it 12 might be three and a half or five and a half.
But are you 13 saying that carries along almost all the way?
14 MR. FERLAND:
If I understand your question, 15 Mr.. Chairman, when the storm initially struck, it caused 16 damage which would have taken five and a half or three and a 17 half hours to restore.- However, fifteen hours into the event, 18 it's likely we could have restored the power in a much shorter 19 time period than that.
But I don't know if we've ever done 20 any estimating to know how much less.
21 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
That's what I was trying to get 22 at.
23 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Have you given any thought 24 to the question that was brought up earlier with three plants, 25 whether there would be some cheap and advantageous steps that l
72 1
could be taken as backup?
2 MR. OPEKA:
Yes, we have.
In fact, as was 3
discussed, there are certain requirements that prevent you 4
from tying the plants because of the single failure and common 5
mode failure problems associated with that.
6 On Millstone-1 and 2, we do have a design change in 7
to tie 1 and 2 through a bus, so that if we lose power in any 8
of those two units, we can transfer power from the other.
9 And also, as part of our corporate emergency and 10 site emergency organizations, when we have an incident like i
11 this -- in fact, during Gloria, one of the first things we did
\\
12 was evaluate, if we lost the emergency power to either of our 13 plants, how could we get power from one plant to the next?
14 Where can we get an outside power source to get in so we can 15 connect?
What's the layout of the lines?
Where do you make 16 the connections?
17 That's all part of the planning process that we 18 undertake during such emergencies.
We don't have any 19 permanent fixes, other than the Millstone-1 and 2 fix at this 20 point.
21 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
You don't plan to tie 3 into 22 some --
23 MR. OPEKA:
At this point, there isn't.
We are in 24 the process of evaluating the station blackout results.
We'll 25 be meeting with the' Staff later in February to discuss this,
73 1
and also the generic station blackout issue, and we will 2
obviously use those issues as a mechanism for determining 3
whether we need something like that and what it is.
And what 4
we don't want to do is be premature on putting in a power 5
source until we complete those evaluations.
6 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Sure.
7 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Let me ask a question in a 8
different area that had to do with check valves.
Do you have 9
any special plans or test program with regard to check valves, 10 in light of the information that the Staff has sent out?
11 MR. OPEKA:
Well, I don't have too much information 12 on that, except that I understand we did get information on 13 the problem, and it's part of our in-service inspection test 14 program.
But I don't have the details on what, if any, fixes 15 we have to make.
16 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Well, I know the Staff, as they 17 indicated, wants to study the problem.
But I think it's also 18 helpful when a utility also studies it, because we may gain 19 insights that the Staff could benefit from.
20 MR. OPEKA:
What we like to do in those type of 21 events is wait until at least INPO does their evaluation 22 through their SER process, where they come out with 23 recommendations.
We like to wait for that process to occur 24 before we make any modifications, and that takes about two or 25 three months.
=
f j
74 2
1 So that might be one of the reasons that we haven't 3
2 done anything that'I'm aware of at this point.
i 3
CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Any other questions?
i 4
COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Just a couple.
I wondered 5
if you all had any comments that you wanted to add on your i
6 operator licensing experience, your experience in developing 3
7 your operating procedures for Millstone-3, and also maybe if 8
you could just give us your perspective on the status of your design control program that's come out of the operating plants 9
j 10 experience.
i 11 MR. OPEKA:
Okay.
On the operating experience, I'm I
j going to start all the way with TMI.
When Three Mile Island 12 13 occurred, it was one of the TMI action items that came.out 14 that indicated that we should have a shift Technical Advisor l
15 on shift.
But eventually the long-term program and the i
j 16 recommendation at that time was to take your two top people, i
17 your Shift Supervisor and your second person in command, and
-18 send them to some outside school, so they can get 60 credit i
19 hours2.199074e-4 days <br />0.00528 hours <br />3.141534e-5 weeks <br />7.2295e-6 months <br /> of technical, college-level training, and in addition, l
20 take your Shift Supervisor and give him several course in interpersonal relationships, communications, and management.
i 21 i
22 And once that occurred, then you can get rid of the Shift 23 Technical Advisor.
1'
}
24 In 1980 when I came out -- and obviously it wasn't 25 approved at that time, but what we didn't want to do was -- we 1
i i
.., - ~ - -.,. - - - -. - -... _, - -.. -..,
75 1
wanted to take timely action, so we, as a company, made a 2
commitment back in late 1980 to hire Memphis State University 3
and to send one -- send one person out of every two from each 4
shift, from each of our three operating plants, to this MSU 5
school, which is basically a commitment like taking a person 6
off shift for two years full-time to get this education.
And 7
then after that was done, we'd take the second person and put S
them through the school.
9 The whole purpose of that training was to eliminate 10 having an extra person in a trailer that would be available 11 within ten minutes to come to the control room.
We thought 12 the better fix was to train existing people with that actual 13 training, technical training, so that we have a better overall 14 shift.
That decision was made in 1980, and we're proceeding.
15 Now on Millstone-3, we realized there was a lot of 16 discussion about having degrees on shift, and what we didn't 17 want to do was jeopardize our license, so we decided to, in 18 staffing Millstone-3 -- and this program that I'm talking 19 about applies to Millstone-3--- but in staffing Millstone-3, 20 which is an additional requirement, that we would hire 21 degreed, nuclear trained officers to act as our Shift 22 Supervisors, but realizing that these people didn't have 23 commercial operating experience, we want to have each shift to 24 have a person that had commercial operating experience on one 25 of our power plants.
76 1
And we didn't distinguish whether that should be a 2
FWR or a BWR.
We felt that having -- the importance of having 3
commercial operating experience is, how do you manage that 4
shift?
How do you handle technical specifications?
How do 5
you do work orders?
How do you do maintenance?
What's the 6
-relationship?
And a lot of that is independent of whether you 7
are operating a BWR or a FWR.
In fact, a number of the 8
licenses that were used in operating Millstone-2 came from 9
Millstone-l.
They are Millstone-1 licensed people that were 10 relicensed on Millstone-2.
11 So we used that philosophy, and this was prior to 12 the industry initiat,ive that came out and said that, well, 13 every shift should have hot operating experience and at least 14 have one person that had six months of experience.
15 Well, when that came out, we were well within our 16 program, and we moved people around within our plants and 17 basically had our shift staffing set up.
We still felt 18 strongly about our position.
In fact, in working -- we are 19 the only utility that basically disagreed with the final 20 statement, and what we were trying to have the policy 21 statement indicate was that if you have an experienced SRO 22 person, who had at least one year of experience at a 23 dissimilar commercial operating plant, that would be 24 equivalent to half a year at a similar one.
That obviously 25 did not go through.
a 77 1
We had a choice at that time, in order to meet the 2
hot operating experience, to take our shift supervisors and 3
send them to Millstone 2 or Connecticut Yankee for a six month 4
program in observing a plant at power or leave the person on j
shift to gain the experience of starting up the plant.
We 5
6 felt that the person would get much more experience staying 7
where he was and starting up the plant.
We had our people on 8
shift for about three years, through the whole start-up 9
program.
I think that is what contributen to the fact that we 10 had very few LER's, since we got the low power license.
11 It is not as simple as it might be.
We made some 12 decisions back in 1980.
We tried to keep the staff informed 13 of what we were doing and through circumstances got into a 14 situation where we had to use shift advisors to meet the hot 15 operating experience.
16 I think we were trying to come up with the best j
17 overall shift program, to provide the best results.
It was 4
18 not a fact where we just ignored what the policy was and went 19 on our own way.
20 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Do you have any 21 perspectives yourselves on the initial experience in licensing 22 those folks, the high failure rate of that first test?
Was it 23 basically a glitch, moving into the simulator and then 24 understanding what it was our people were looking for?
25 MR. OPEKA:
I agree with what Rich Starostecki
78 1
indicated.
There were three reasons for the high failure 2
rates.
We believe that the problem has been resolved.
At one 3
time, we did not have the simulator in our licensee programs.
4 We elected to put it in because again, we were looking for 5
well trained people and using the simulator is obviously one 6
way of doing that.
7 Because that first class large portion -- I think a 8
majority of people failed because of the simulator test and it 9
was because of our unfamiliarity with the machine and also the 10 testing process.
I think that problem has been resolved.
11 CHAIPRAN PALLADINO:
Any more?
12 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
I would add a comment 13
.along the line of your discussion earlier with the Chairman 14 and our discussion with the Staff on the station black-out 15 question.
I think we all should recognize it is a high 16 population density site.
I think I would urge you all on your 17 own to take a look at contributors to risk and measures that 18 you can take to reduce those risks, and in particular, station 19 black-outs.
Take a look at what your options are, what 20 alternatives are available, indeed, what some other countries 21 are doing to focus on that problem, the pump seal failure 22 problem.
I would urge you to take a look at some options and 23 alternatives there, as you begin to look at that issue, and 24 decide for yourselves what might be done to help reduce that 25 risk distributor.
79.
1 MR. OpEKA:
We are doing that.
2 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Any other questions?
3 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
A couple of quick ones.
I 4
probably asked this in 1983, but I have forgotten the answer, 5
if I did.
6 How did you manage to come up with a GE BWR or 7
combustion BWR and a Westinghouse BWR?
8 MR. FERLAND:
I wish, Commissioner, I could tell you 9
it was foresight and we were trying to diversify our risks.
10
[ Laughter.]
11 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
I thought you liked the 12 challenge or something.
13 MR. FERLAND:
In fact, it turned out each of those 14 assessments were made separately and individually based on 15 what we thought the best product for a given cost was
.16 available at that particular time.
As a practical matter, we
.17 actually operate them as pretty much a separate and 18 independent facility, although they are located on a common 19 site.
20 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
First of all, on your education 21 requirements for your people on shift, I think you did make a 22 commendable effort to perhaps step out in front on this 23 several years ago.
You are to be commended for that.
24 Enhanced education, in my view, is important for people in our 25 control rooms.
We should seek more rrofessionalism in our own
, - -, _. -. - _ - - -. _.-~-..
80 1
control room atmosphere.
You are to be commended for that.
2 On the other hand, I understand the problem that you 3
have had.
I would just say certainly you have to comply with 4
our regulations, and I know you intend to do that, but I would 5
say also I would encourage you to keep your education program 6
going so that you can eventually have those operators in your 7
control room with degrees and with your company.
I would 8
encourage you to keep going, in spite of the fact that you may 9
be on a little bit of a different track than you originally 10 started on.
11 I think your management reputation, of course, in 12 your utility, is very strong. You have had a good working 13 relationship with the NRC..
Your schedule is very tight, in my 14 view.
You know that.
I discussed it during my plant visit.
15 You met your schedule.
In my view, you do not have, on this 16 particular plant, which is different from the other two, an 17 awful lot of experience.
You are going in from construction 18 operation, and I don't have to tell you, I'm sure you know, 19 both of you are experienced enough and your people, that is a 20 lot different operating a plant than it is building it.
21 In spite of your experience, in spite of your strong 22 management oversight, which I know is there, I would just 23 encourage you to be cautious, prudent, especially alert during 24 your operational testing and building up and so forth that you 25 are in right now and coming into, that you watch that very
81 11 carefully.
Be very' vigilant.
I think.you will have to be.
I 2
hope you are not going to be over confident that just because 3
of your experience, because you are in a different plant, a
4 new plant -- I think it is smart to be very careful.
5 I think frankly our Staff did a very good job, the 6
. regional people, when they did tell you to hold up for a week 7
during that prior to fuel load.
It was important to them.
4 8
You did tax us, as far as I understand, with all the 9
inspections and reviews that were very important for us to do 10 thoroughly and competently, too.
11.
Your schedule, although tight, 7 think it still 12 should give you reason to be careful as you proceed from now.
13 on.
I would just say that is the message I would like to give 14 you.
You have done a good jcb with this plant it looks like, 4
15 but you are in a different phase now.
We will be watching to 16
'make sure you operate it carefully and prudently.
17 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Let me ask the Commission now 18 if it is ready to vote.
We had indicated a possible vote.
I 19 for one have_had my questions satisfactorily answered.
It 20
. concerned primarily the fact that I did not understand the 21 procedures were finalized, and I did have concerns about the 22 adequacy of the operating crew.
I think you are giving 23 attention to that.
4 24 I recognize that you are a well seasoned utility in 25 this business.
I concur and I think the Commission concurs in
82 1
the admonition that Commissioner Zech has provided.
2
-Let me ask the Commission, does it authorize the 3
Staff to allow Millstone 3 to proceed above five percent 4
power, up to and including full power, when the Staff feels it 5
is ready to so authorize the utility?
6 All those in favor, that are in favor of authorizing 7
the Staff in that way, say aye.
8 (Chorus of ayes.]
9 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Opposed.
10
[No response.]
11 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
They.are all ayes.
Any other 12 comments by the C,cmmission?
13
[No response.]
14 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Thank you very much.
We stand 15 adjourned.
16
[Whereupon, at 12:05 p.m.,
the meeting was 17 adjourned.]
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
1 CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL REPORTER 2
3 4
5 This is to certify that the attached proceedings 6
before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the
.7 matter of COMMISSION MEETING e
9 Name of Proceeding:
Discussion /Possible Vote on Full Power Operating License for Millstone-3 lo (Public Meeting) 11 Docket No.
12 place:
Washington, D. C.
19 Date:
Wednesdav, January 29, 1986 14 15 were held as herein appears and that this is the original 16 transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear 17 Regulatory Commission.
13 (Signature) g (Typed Name of Reporter) Barbara Whitlock 20 21 22 23 Ann Riley & Associates, Ltd.
24 25
~
l i
l C0Yk SS"0X 33]I:XG MILSTONE NUCmEAR POW 3R STATION, UNIT 3 l
JANUARY 29,1986 i
i i
FU__ POWER OPERATING
_ CENSE I
I EL!ZABETH L. DOOLITTLE x 24911 i
l SLIDE 1
4 M11S"0XB 3 FU:~.a 70Tf3R :l:C3NS3 i
a i
C7NR2'?S
.L.
.a v.
s.
a i
- ?:AN" 3ACIG30'JNJ
- SLIC"3] :'SS'J3S j
i 1
I
- ?03A3:::L::S"::C SAF3"Y ST))Y 33V3W 4
l t
I INS?3C" ION ?ROG3AM SA2 SA7 ?]3S?3C"IVIS l
/
1 i
- AELIGAZ:0NS
- COXC:1US::0KS i
1 O. lI,0
- u: w s l
l
""n-
. A V;p " 6 JJJ qpp J.,
l l
- MIIISTONE 3 IS OWNED BY 15 U'TIUTIES OF WiiICH CONNECTICUT UGHT AND POWER COMPANY AND WESTERN MASSACHUSETT5 ELECTRIC COMPANY OWN 655
- UCENSEES-15 UTIUTIES
- NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY (WHOIff OWNED SUBSIDIARY OF NORTHEAST UTElTIES) ACTS AS AGENT AND REPRESENTATIVE
- OPERATOR: NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY
-MIIISTONE 1-OPERATING SINCE 1970
-MILLSTONE 2-OPERATING SINCE 1975 CONNECTICUT YANIIE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY
-HADDAM NECK-OPERATING SINCE 1967 SUDE 3
?MST BACKG30"JND
' PLANT I
WESTINGHOUSE 4-LOOP / 3411 MWt /1156 MWe CONTAINMENT: LARGE DRY, SUBATSIOSPHERIC AE and CONSTRUCTOR: STONE & WEBSTER, BOSTON
- SITE SITE ORIGINALLY CONSIDERED FOR 5 REACTORS ON THE NORTH SHORE OF LONG ISLAND SOUND NEAR WATERFORD, CONNECTICUT LARGEST NEARBY COMMUNITIES:
- WATERFORD: POPULATION APPROXISLATELY 18,000
- NEW LONDON: POPULATION APPROXIMATELY 29,000 40 MILES SOUTHEAST OF HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT ABOVE AERAGE SITE POPULATION FACTOR su:t 4
SEL3CT3D ::SSGS I
i
- S"A7?IG/ :?:EA:?:XG 3X?I33XC3 0
- :?303A3:::1::S". ::C SA?3:?Y S"UJY SLIDE 5
i cr n
i Sr,A.,3.3..y..Ja v
n v.y7,Acr r n..
a
...va
.s X.y,1 3 s.y.u p m
l STAFFING
- PLOT STAFF: 23 LICENSES 15 SP.0s 8 RCs
- PROPOSES TO USE ADVISORS SHIFT STAFFING
- 3 SHJTS UP TO 55 POWER
+ 6 SHETS PROPOSED BEYOND 51 POWER SHIFT TECHNICAL ADVISORS
- DUAL ROLE ON 4 SETTS
- SEPARATE STA ON 2 SEIFTS HOT OPERATING EXPERIENCE
- SSET ADVISOR WE1 BE REQUIRED ON 3 0F' 6 5HIFT5 SIMULATOR
- PLANT SPECEC I
- IN USE SINCE FEBRUARY 1985 SUDE 6
i P303A3:::l:S":C SAKY S"OY REV3W 1
i SEPTEMBEP.1981 -NRC REQUESTED NNECO PERFORM l
MILLSTONE 3 SPECIFIC RISE STUDY BECAUSE OF SITE HAVING AN AB0VE AVERAGE POPULATION DENSITY NEARBY AUGUST 1983 -NNECO SUBMITTED MILLSTONE 3 PROBAFJILISTIC SAFETY STUDY (PSS)
-PERFORMED BY UTILITY, WESTINGHOUSE AND STONE & WEBSTER i
-DESIGN CHANGES AND INSIGHTS FROM PSS OCTOBER 1985 -P.ESULTS OF STAFF REVIEW:
RECO.\\BfENDATIONS CONCERNING
- DESIGN AND PROCEDURE CHANGES
- STATION BLACK 0UT SUDE 7 I
i i
i
. INS:?3C"::0N :?30G3AM l
I l
- C0XS"3 ~C"':0X t
i i'
- :?330:?S and. S"A3"I':?
- 0?33A":0XS i
l i'
i
nn}'10...)vv..7y) i TorryIarr Ivu
,u..
- INSPECTION HISTORY FAVORABLE
- QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM
- ENGINEERING ASSURANCE PROGRAM
- TEAM INSPECTIONS
- REGION I FUEL LOAD READINESS ASSESSMENT i
Suut s
I
- ?RE:?S and. S"A3T
?
- PREOP TESTING RESULTS ACCEPTABLE
- FUEL LOADING WAS SLOW, DELIBERATE, CONTROLLED. CAREFUL AND WITHOUT INCIDENT
- STARTUP TEST PROCEDURES LATE, BUT OF GOOD QUALITY
- NO SIGNIFICANT HARDWARE PROBLEMS l
i
$UDE 10
e i
i t
i
~
OPERA 7:0XS l
CONTROL ROOM DISCIPUNE AND PROFESS 10NAUSM ARE GOOD j
UCENSED OPERATOR TRAINING:
-EOP LAPSES i
-SIMUU. TOR USE OPERATOR UCENSING RESULTS e
SUDE 11 I
i SA1P PERIOD PERIOD ENDING ENDING PRESENT FUNCTIONAL AREA (8/31 84)
(8e3185)
TREND A. OPERATIONS N 'A 2
CONSISTENT f
B. TRAINING NA
')
IMPROVING
/
C. RADIOLOGICAL N, A 2
CONSISTENT CONTR0l3 D. MAINTENANCE N <A 2
CONSISTENT E. SURVEILLANCE N;'A 3
CONSISTENT I
F. PREOPERATIONAL 1
1 CONSISTENT TESTING i
G. FIRE PROTECTION NA 1
CONSISTENT f
H. EMERGENCY N,/A 2
CONSISTENT PREPAREDNESS I. SECURITY N/A 1
CONSISTENT J. CONSTRUCTION 1
1 CONSISTENT K. QUAllTY N /A 1
CONSISTENT ASSURANCE L. I.ICENSING 2
2 CONSISTENT l
i SLIDE 12 i
l l
i i
(
SA2 ?33S:?3CT::VES l
l l
- CAPABLE UCENSEE; STRONG NUCLEAR BACKGROUND
- MANAGEhfENT INVOINED IN ONSITE ACTIVITIES l.
- CORRECTIVE ACTIONS STRONG AND EFFECTIVE I
- STRONG CONTRACTOR CONTROL t
SUDE t3
~
i A " ' 7 G.A..'.'..r0.No 22a 1
6 i
NDIBEP. RECEMD 26 I
3 I
i I
NUMBER RESOD'ED f.'6 i
I l
.s.
7 a vatBr., BpBb,1 mTI. Aa3 a.
m,,,
a i
(ALL QC RELo.TED) l i.
I u s. ol v a t. I I.... u b,....I a 2 1 a.- l a.n i li I v. u i L L 0
\\
k p
i i
I l
I l
i I
i e
l i
I l
i l
I I
i t
i f
b eo m 9e.m Jt 14 i
i
kkk f (
k k k f h G k t t G h t h Q h k k g0 k{hghth{090(hqhq(g(gQq(qQ9QqQ 9/35 TRMeil' ITAL 'IO:
Q/
Document Control Desk, 016 Phillips A
ADVANCED CDPY 'IO: /
/
'Ihe Public [bcument Ibm 1 DATE:
[" 3[' b cc: C&R
!a tac FI O 1:
SECY OPS BPRJCII M
papers)
Attached are copies of a Omnission nceting transcript (s) and related neeting document (s). They are being forwarded for entry on the Daily Accession List and placannt in the Public Docunent Ibcm. tb other distribution is requestal or required. Existing DCS identification numbers are listed on the individual docununts wherever known.
Vceting
Title:
b, w w f To s ls\\o(c
\\)Oc.
& Twd oe Ad_
LAL A lu s w e_.- s t
\\
Meeting Date: l - A 9 - R (o Open X Closed N
DCS Copies (1 of each checked)
Iten
Description:
(bpies Advanced Original R3y Duplicate
'Ib PDR Document be Dup
- Copy
- l.
TRA 6, 1
1 hhen checked, DCS should send a copy of this transcript to the LPDR for:
O I U M0: coo 5 J
\\
2.
5 E2 E
5 c
0*
B$
=-
(PDR is advanced one copy of each document,
- Verify if in DCS, and 3
two of each SEIN paper.)
Clunge to "PDR Available."
~