ML20206U934
| ML20206U934 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 04/14/1999 |
| From: | Cullen S AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20206U878 | List: |
| References | |
| 2.206, NUDOCS 9905260063 | |
| Download: ML20206U934 (20) | |
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'STANo Nc rom TRUTH Asout R ADIATION -
, r April 14,1999 Cenified Mail. 'n
- Return-recel_ot rea_uested ' ' , .
Etecutive Director!or f Operations .
U.S, Nuclear Regulatory Conunission -
Washington, D.C. '20555-0001 .
- ' Re: 10 CFR $ 2.206 Petitions for suspension of the Millstone nuclear power plant operating license
+ -
Fint, STAR, NIRS, Niw York State Senator LaValle and New York Assemblymembers Thiele anp Acampora serve two petitions pursuant to 10 CFR 9 2.206'fo'r the t suspension -
of the operating license at the Millstone Nuclear Power Station. . -
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Second, pethioners request that the NRC conduct a hearing on the issues raised in the two petitions. Petitioners assert that the issues raised are unique to Long Isisnd and that to
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' receive adequate attention, the argtinent must be made with oral presentation and
testimonyassenions.
ofpetitioners coupled with visual aides that petitioners believe are allan essential compon ,
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Third, petitioners request expeditedconsideration of the enclosed petitions due to the- . .
impending effort by Northeast Utilities to restart Millstone Unit #,2. Substantial progres has not been made toward correcting emergency planning deficiencies and the impe restart ofITnit #2 provide compelling reasons'for expedited consideration. Petitioners ' -
{- request imm'ediate notification of an anticipated timeline for consideration of the attached petitions.
', ' Thank you'for your prompt attention to these matters. -
e Sincerely, .
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9905260063 990514' '
' Scott Cullen. ,
. ADOCK 050003 6 For the petitioners
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' 66 NEWTOWN LANE SL'f1 E 2 'e 8 .
'P.O. Boi 4206 E Asi HAMPTON, NY 11937-
. . PHONE: 5163324 0655 fax:. M 6 324 2203', EDO --G19990201
,www.noradiation.org
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April 14,1999 Certified Mail Return-receipt requested Executive Director for Operations U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conunission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 Re: 10 CFR $ 2.206 Petition for suspension of the Minstone nuclear power station operating Heense Pursuant to regulation any interested person.may file a request to institute a proMag pursuant to 10 CFR $ 2.202 to modify, nW or revoke a license.' In the interest of public heakh and safety, STAR (Standing for Truth About Radiation); NIRS (The Nuclear Information Resource Service); New York State Assemblymembers Fred 'Ihiele and Patricia Acampora and New York State Senator Ken 14Valle are pethioning the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to institute a proceeding to suspend the operating license for the Millstone Nuclear Power Station until the facility is in full compliance with the law.
Furthennore, pethioners request that Unit # 2 not be permitted to restart until the facility is in full compliance with the law.
Description of Petitionen STAR (Standing for Truth About Radiation) was organized over concerns about the toxic eff'ects of nuclear radiation. STAR promotes public awareness, medical and scientific investigation, institutional accountability, independent oversight and responsible public heakh and environmental policy. STAR memhars are particularly concerned about the :
lack of emergency planning for Long Island in the event of an accident at the Millstone l power station in Waterford, Connecticut.
The Nuclear Information Resource Service (NIRS) is based in Washington, D.C., and is a national clearinghouse, networking center and advocacy group for grassroots activists concerned about nuclear power and hs radioactive waste.
Assemblymamhars Thiele and Acampora and Senator L.aVaBe are New York State elected officials that are charged with protecting the interesta of their constituents.
' 10 CFR $ 2.206 ,
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SUMMARY
RATIONALE FOR REOUESTED ACTIONS Millstone Nuclear Power Station is in violation of 10 CFR $ 50.54 (q) and subsequently 10 CFR $ 50.47 and in violation of their operating license.
The law requires that a " licensee authorized to possess and operate a nuclear power reactor shall follow and maintain in effect emergency plans which meet the standards in 10 CFR $ 50.47 (b) and the requirements in appandiv E of this part." Moreover, pethioners maintain that there are not " reasonable assurances that ge te protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency.
Pethioners maintain that the operating license for the Millstone power station was unlawfully issued and must be revoked. Furthermore, petitioners assert that prima facie evidence exists to support the conclusion that there are not reasonable assurances that adequate protective measures can and will be taken for Fishers Island, New York, in um event of a radiological emergency at Millstone.
Moreover, pethioners assen that the initial finding of reasonable assurances by the NRC was arbitrary and capricious. Therefore, pethioners maintain that the operating license was issued in direct contravention of the goals of the Atomic Energy Act. Congress has determined that ... " regulation by the United States of the production and utilization of atomic energy and of the facilities used 'a connection therewith is r= y to assure common defense and securey and to protect health and safety ofthepublic."' Moreover, the Commission has an "overMing responsibility for assuring public heahh and safety in the operation ofnuclear power facilities."' Among other things, the Atomic Energy Act charges the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) with the responsibility for regulations to protect the heahh and safety of the public. In response, the NRC promulgated emergency planning regulations that allow operation of a commercial reactor if the NRC finds that "there is reasonable assurance that ade taken in the event of a radiological emergency."'quate protective Pethioners contend that at the present measures can an time there can be no such finding for Fishers Island and that the operating license smal be suspended until such time as a functional evacuation plan can be developed.
Petitioners contend that emergency planning for the Millstone Nuclear Power Station, l
pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47, has been inadequate to minimize the risk to the heahh and ;
safety ofFishers Island, N.Y. residents. Fishers Island, NY is included within the.10 mile ;
EPZ and does not have a functioning emergency plan. !
i l
2 10 CFR $ 50.54 (q).
8 10 CFR $ 50.47 (a)(1).
- Id. at (e).
8 In the Mancr of Consolidated Edison Canpany ofNew York, Inc. (Indian Point Units 1,2, and 3), CLI 75-8, NRCI 7518,173 (1975).
- 10 CFR a 50.47 (a) (1).
II. REOUESTED ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS Petitioners request that the NRC immediately suspend Northeast Utilities' license to operate the Millstone power station until there are reasonable assurances that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency for Fishers Island, NY. Moreover, Petitioners request that the operating license should be suspended until such time as there are "a range of protective actions have been developed for the plume exposure pathway EPZ for emergency workers and the public."'
Finally, pethioners request that these matters be the subject of a public hearing, with full opportunity for public comment.
) III. RATIONALE AND STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
- 1) Fishers Island, Town of Southold, State of New York, is included within the 10 mile plume exposure pathway EPZ for the Millstone Nuclear Station.
- 2) Northeast Utilities, the owner and operator of Millstone, is in violation of 10 CFR $
50.47 hecause there are no " reasonable assurances that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency."' ,
Petitioners maintain that it is indisputable that Fishers Island, NYdoes not have a functioning emergencyplan and that the weight ofthe evidence supports this conclusion.
In fact, the Emergency Manager for the Town of Southold has stated that the Town has:
" Serious concerns with this plan as it relates to Fishers Island. The plan designates New London, Connecticut as the evacuation destination for Fishers Island residents with further transportation to a host community in Windham, CT.
There is an obvious proNem with a plan that calls for movement of a population in a direction closer to the risk and to an area that would have already been affected by the exposure prior to Fishers Island. There is no secondary evacuation route specified in the plan. Our concerns with the plan were reinforced during the last FEMA exercise of the Millstone response plan. As the exercise developed Fishers )'
Island was provided with information indicating eswuation of the population should commence. The New London area had already been affected by the plume .
and could not receive the Fishers Island evacuees."'
Therefore, petitioners contend that the present emergency plan is a serious threat to public heahh and safety and the present state ofplanning and readiness does not proside
]
7
- 5 50.47 (b) (10) 10 CFR $ 50.47 (a)(1).
' Attachment #1:
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reasonable assurances that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event ofa radiological emergency.
- 3) Off-site emergency response plans for nuclear power plants must meet the standard that l
"a range ofprotective actions have been developed for the plume exposure pathway EPZ l for emergency workers and the public." However, there is no secondary evacuation route specified in the present emergency plan.""
There has never been a range ofprotective actions for the public on Fishers Island. The only existing options for Fishers Island in the event of a radiological qency are ;
ahehering and an evacuation plan that has been shov n to be unworkable.2 Therefore, petitioners maintain that there is not a range of protective actions for Fishers Island and the hre:-: is presently in violation of their operating license.
The existing emergency plan for Millstone does not make specific provisions to secure ferry transport for Fishers Island in the event of a radiological emergency. The existing ]
emergency plan designates a ferry district manager to coordinate the use of ferries or the airport. However, this does not provide specific assurances that ferries will be available in the event of a radiological emergency. This problem is further exacerbated by the practical implementation of emergency planning. In fact, in the 1995 exercise of the Millstone emergency plan New London was evacuated by the time that Fishers Island was ordered to evacuate. Indeed, according to John Raynor, "when questioned as to the willingness to board a boat and travel away from their island in a direction closer to the plant while actually seeing the plant grow larger and larger, all said without exception that they wouW not participate in such an evacuation.""
{
Moreover, Fishers Island is within the Town of SouthoM. In the event of an accident at Millstone, the Supervisor of the Town of Soutbold is the emergency manager and can issue a state of emergency in which the evacuation plans are ahered. Presently, the Town of Southold is working to aher the existing evacuation plan for Fishers Island W=a the Town has determined the plan to be unworkable. According to a statement by John Raynor," the Town of Southold, in cooperation with the Suffolk County Fire Rescue t.nd Emergency Services (FRES) and the New York State Emergency Management OfBee (SEMO) are in the process of revising the Fishers Island New York portion of the Millstone Station Radiological Emergency Response Plan. Mr. Raynor has stated that the "present plan has been demonstrated to be incapable ofprotecting the heahh and safety of Fishers Island r&c. While all key components of the revised plan have been cornpleted, actual exercising and regulatory approval still need to be accomplished.
Because ofineressed public awareness resuhing in large scale movement of the population
" $ 50.47 (b)(10)
" Millstone Emergency Plan, Revision 24, December 1997
" Statement of John Raynor, Director of Emergency Management Omos, Town of Southold, May 26th,1998, Jamesport, NY.
"id.
" U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission hearing on plan to restart Millstone Unit #2, March 1,1999.
.. . . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ = - . _ . _ _ _ . _ _ . ._
on eastem Long Island in the event of a Millstone incident, certain key parts of the new plan need to be reevaluated, =~ially in the areas of relocation center & monkoring locations, involvement of volunteer public safety personnel and transportation issues. This planning will need to be incorporated into a larger regional evacuation evaluation to be undertaken by the County of Suffolk. NY SEMO is also conducting a thorough examination of the entire Millstone REP and h's relation to command & control issues betwa Connecticut and New York. Poor inter-state conununication capabilities and procedures between emergency management ofBeials is of grave concern.""
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) oversees the conduct of the exercise of an emergency plan and reports the resuhs to the NRC. It has been held that, ahhough FEMA's report constitutes a rebuttable presumption of validity, the NRC has the uhimate responsibility for determining the adequacy of a utility's RERP when either issuing a license or allowing a license to remain in effect. Therefore, pethioners maintain that allowing the Millstone license to remain in effect and allowing the restart of Unit #1 requires the NRC to make a determination that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency for Fishers Island, NY and that there are "a qe ofprotective actions" that have been developed fer the plume exposure pathway EPZ." '
- 4) The NRC is charged under the AEA and ERA with primary responsibility to ensure, through its licensing and regulatory functions, that the generation and transmission of nuclear power does not unreasonably threaten the public welfare. NRC regulations provide that if the Commission determines that a finding of" reasonable assurance" cannot be made, then it must decide whether enforcement action abould be taken." In reaching hs decision, the Commission is guided by, among other factors, the relative signi6cance of the de6ciencies, whether adequate interim compensating measures have been or will be ,
taken promply and whether there are additional compelling reasons for continued l operation.'
In deliberating the efBelency of the emergency plan at Indian Point, "the Commission j considered, among other factors, that substantial progress had been made to correct j deficiencies at Indian Point, that the remaining problems would likely be corrected wkhin a short period of time and that the likelihood of a severe nuclear accident in the intervening " correction period" was extremely remote."" :
In the instant case, there are not adequate interim compensating measures have been or '
will be taken and there has not been substantial progress to correct the de6ciencies with the Millstone emergency plan. The statements and experiences of Southold Town ofBeial
" id.
" 10 C.F.R. @ 50.47(aX1985), see 628 F. Supp. 654,658.
'7
" $70950.47 (b)(10)
F.2d 766,773; 1983
- 10 C.F.R. @ 50.54(sX2Xti)(1982) id.
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.. j John Raynor would support the assertion that the de6ciencies have not been corrected and will not be corrected in the near future. Mr. Raynor claims that the Town registered a complaint about the range ofprotective measures and the failure of the plan to provide j adequate protective measures in the event of a radiological emergency.
Moreover, petitioners assert that the likelihood of a severe nuclear accident in the intervening " correction period" would not be extremely remote. Due to the extended blackout period with Unit #2 the correction period for the emergency plan would come at the time when the probability of a severe accident was most pronounced. Petitioners I believe that the NRC is negligent in its primary responsibility to ensure, through its licensing and regulatory functions, that the generation and transmission of nuclear power j does not unreasonably threaten the public welfare. ;
W. CONCLUSION In sum, the abovementioned provides sufBeient evidence that there are not reasonable l
assurances that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency for Fishers Island, NY. Therefore, the NRC must suspend the operating license for the Millstone power station until there can be reasonable assurances.
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April 14,1999 J CertiSed Mail l Return-receint reauested Executive Director for Operations U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conunission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 Re: 10 CFR $ 2.206 Petition for suspension of the Millstone nuclear power plant operating license Pursuant to regulation any interested person may file a request to institute a proceeding pursuant to 10 CFR $ 2.202 to modify, suspend or revoke a license.' In the interest of public heakh and safety, STAR (Standing for Truth About Radiation); NIRS (The Nuclear Information Resource Service); New York State Assemblywatss Fred Thiele end Patricia Acampora and New York State Senator Ken LaValle are pethioning the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to insthute a proceeding to mepend the operating license for the Millstone Nuclear Power Station until the facility is in full compliance with the law.
Petitioners maintain that all ofthe regulatory listedfactors; " demo land characteristics, access routes, andjurisdictional boundaries"' graphy, t are ignoredin emergencyplanningfor the Millstone Nuclear Power Station.
Description of Petitionen STAR (Standing for Truth About Radiation) was organi=A over concerns about the toxic effects ofnuclear radiation. STAR promotes public awareness, Meal and scientific investigation, institutional accountability, independent oversight and responsible public heahh and environmental policy. STAR mamlers are particularly concerned about the lack of emergency planning for I.ong Island in the event of an accident at the Millstone power station in Waterford, Connecticut.
The Nuclear Information Resource Service (NIRS) is based in Washington, D.C., cod is a national c's' ghouse,
. networking center and advocacy group for grassroots activists a::eemed about nuclear power and hs radioactive waste.
Assemblyn=mhars Thiele and Acampora and Senator LaValle are New York State elected ofBeials that are charged with protecting the interests of their constituents.
' 10 CFR $ 2.206 8 ad.
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SUMMARY
RATIONALE FOR REOUESTED ACTIONS Millstone Nuclear Power Station is in violation of 10 CFR $ 50.54 (q) and subsequently 10 CFR $ 50.47 and in violation of their operating license. The law requires that a
" licensee authorized to possess and operate a nuclear power reactor shall follow and maintain in effect emergency plans which meet the standards in 10 CFR $ 50.47 (b) and the requirements in appendix E of this part."3 The present NRC regulation for emergency planning states clearly that the " plume exposure pathway EPZ for nuclear power plants shall consist of an area Ahmg 10 miles in radius."' In fact,"the exact size and configuration of the EPZs surrounding a particular nuclear power reactor shall be determined in relation to local emergency response needs and capabilities as they are affected by such conditions as demography, topography, land characteristics, access routes, and jurisdictional boundaries."s However,ptitioners maintain that there are no mechanisms by which these conditional factors and their relationship to local emergency response needs can be evaluated and the result has been a complete lack ofreasonable assurances that adequate protective measures can and will be taken on Long Island in the event of an accident at Millstone. 1 Longhiand The shores of Long Island are just outside the existing ten mile planning zone. This presents a problem based upon the unique geography of Long Island, which is aptly named because ofits length. Petitioners maintain that all of the listed factors in the present regulation (" demography, topography, land characteristics, access routes, and jurisdictional boundaries") are relevant to EPZ planning and the entire risk picture for the Millstone Nuclear Power Station.
Petitioners are unaware of any other commercial reactor in the United States that is situated so close to an island, such as Long Island, with such a dense population base with such little infrastructure. Furthennore, in the event of an accident at Millstone, the emergency preparedness on eastern Long Island would be inadequate to protect the
. health and safety of the people of eastem Long Island. Petitioners contend that application of10 CFR 50.47 has been inadequate to address real world site-specific characteristics for Long Island and that approval of the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) for the Millstone Nuclear Power Station has been arbitrary and capricious.
- 10 CFR $ 50.54 (q).
- 8 10 CFR $ 50.47(c)(2)
Id.
' demography, topography, land characteristics, access routes, and jurisdictional boundaries
' id.
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L EASTERN LONG ISLAND COULD BE ADVERSELY IMPACTED BY A SIGNIFICANT RELEASE OF RADIATION FROM MILLSTONE AND RESIDENTS WOULD TRY TO EVACUATE THE AREA IF THEY FELT THEY WERE IN DANGER REGARDLESS OF THE ACTUAL THREAT An accident at Millstone could have a direct impact on the people ofLong Island. It is indisputable that a signW-si release ofradiation, at a time when the wind was blowing towards Long Island, could pose a risk to the heahh and safety of the people in the area.
This assenion is premised on several facts:-
First, the five towns ofeastern Long Island; Southold, East Hampton, Sheher Island, Riverhead and Southampton are the areas on Long Island (L.I.) most likely to be ImpmM in case of an accident at Millstone. Furthermore, these areas have the least developed transportation infrastructure in the region. Indeed, ahhough the mainland ofLong Island is outside the concentric 10 mile EPZ circle, it is only slightly outside that circle and a ponion of the region, the Town of Southold is within the existing 10 mile EPZ for Millstone. The mainland is as close as 11-12 miles from the facility. This distance is
==anad by the Long Island Sound and Millstone is clearly visible from eastern Long Island.
Second, in a report to a Congressional subcommittee concluded that a mehdown at Millstone Unit 3 would devastate communities in at least a 20 mile radius, causing at least 23,000 deaths from radiation exposure,38,000 eventual cancer deaths and hundreds of billions in economic losses.? Furthennore, the subcommittee determined that Millstone Unit #3 was among the list ofsites with the highest scaled consequences based on NRC CRAC2 accident consequence analysis. Therefore, Eastern Long Island is within a 20 mile radius with grave potential impact in the event of an accident. This direct impact may resuh from exposure to radiation in the event of an accident and the consequences depend on vast and complex circumstantial factors and variables. However, petitioners maintain that the impact experienced on eastem Long Island could also resuk from a perceived threat of exposure to radiation in the event of an accident at Millstone.
Third, recently a chemW fire near Millstone at the Dow Chemical factory in Gale's Ferry, Connecticut resuhed in "a large cloud of black smoke from a fire in a Styrofoam storage building."' According to local observers, "a prevailing north wind quickly carried the smoke across Block Island Sound to the eastern tip ofLong island, where it hung ominously for hours before dissipating into the darkmss and Montauk residents, unaware ofits source began to suspect a disaster at Millstone.' "
' United States House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Oversight and investigations,1982.
Calculation of Reactor Accident Consequences (CRAC2).
' East Hampton Star, April 8,1999 "id.
e ,emr. e. * *-
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A. CONSIDERATION OF THE ENTIRE RISK PICTURE In a January 1981 Order clarifying the scope of the proceeding that serious accidents at Indian Point Unit 2 or Unit 3 were to be considered with " equal attention" to both probabilities and consequences the Commission stated that the entire risk picture should be considered in hs decision-making." In the Matter of Consolidated Edison Company of New York, the Commission determined that at Indian Point, where the population density is high, the estimated societal risk is more sensitive to uncenainties in the accident r probability estimates than at other less densely populated sites. Indeed, h was determined that " focusing exclusively on overall numerical risk est'unates is not appropriate in general and, in the case ofIndian Point, is particularly inappropriate." Therefore, it is clear that the Comminainn has determined that population density and estimated societal risk are more sensitive to uncertainties in the accident probability estimates than at less densely ,
populated shes." However, this analysis must be coupled with a view of the " entire risk l picture."
In evaluating the societal risk around Indian Point the Commission looked at whether proposed measures would provide substantial risk reductions to protect the public heahh and safety. Petitioners maintain that the " entire risk picture" and the impact of any accident at Millstone on eastem long Island could resuh from a perceived threat of exposure to radiation. Petitioners maintain that an accident could be minimal and that the threat may be "insign*=" and nonetheless the reaction on eastern Long Island may be severe.
Indeed, the concern ofresidents and visitors alike would resuh from several factors. First, residents would primarily be concerned because the facility is visible across the sound.
Second, residents are aware that in at least a 20 mile radius there could be at least ' 3,000 deaths from radiation exposure and 38,000 eventual cancer deaths. Third, h must be considered that residents are sensitive to the environmental and heahh problems and may j overreact in the event of any accident and threat, real or perceived, to avoid harm.
Moreover, a human response study was actually conducted on Long Island. The study,
" Evacuation behavior in response to nuclearpowerplant accidents "" concludes that
" knowledge ofevacuation behavior, whether in response to natural or technological )
threats is crucial for the successful design and implementation of community emergency plans."" The Long Island evacuation behavior response study is the only extensive study of human behavior in the event of a radiological emergency of which petitioners are aware '
and it has been ofpanicular interest because the study was conducted on Long Island.
l
" In the Matter of CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK, Inc, 21 N.R.C.1043 (a1985),
21 N.R.C.1043 '
" id.
" " Evacuation behavior in respome to nuclearpowrplant accidents, " Professional Geographer 36(2).
1984.207 215. I
" Id. at 207.
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We believe that this gives the study enh-ad relevance to the issues raised by the pethioners and that this study validates and confirms many of the issues raised by petitioners.
B. THE ENTIRE RISK PICTURE AT MILLSTONE MUST INCLUDE EASTERN ,
LONG ISLAND in the event of a radiological emergency the public will overreact to a radiological threat, whether the threat is real or perceived. The modem reality of the media and technology makes communication almost immediate. Upon leaming of a threat at Millstone, petitioners assert that residents of eastem Long Island would quickly react and there is basis for this assertion. Indeed, based upon experience gleaned from the Three Mile Island accident "even though the Governor's evacuation advisory was geographically limited and issued with a the proviso that an excess ofcaution is best, an extensive evacuation shadow was cast over a six-county area.""
Therefore, we believe h reasonable to assume that an accident at Millstone would resuh in a widespread evacuation response on eastem Long Island particularly, and possibly well beyond. Indeed, the study concluded that a "high degree of spontaneous evacuation is likely to occur on Long Island,just as it did around Three Mile Island, during a radiological emergency."" " Spontaneous evacuation and its geographic manifestation, the evacuation shadow phenomenon, seem to place nuclear power plant accidents in a class by themselves."" We'strongly concur with the conclusion that " evacuations in response to nuclearpowerplant accidents are likely"to be characterised by an extreme over-response to limitedprotective action advisories. " Therefore, the proximity of the plant, and its visibility across an open body of water, coupled with existing conctrns about the operations at Millstone would likely resuh in a widespread evacuation of the region.
The Long Island study suggested several implications for evacuation planning on Long Island and determined that "the extent of the evacuation shadow suggests that limiting f'
evacuation planning to the 10-mile plume exposure EPZ would be under-planning for a nuclear accident Waa so few of the evacuees would actually originate in that zone.""
Pethioners agree and believe that this finding has particular relevance to the instant case.
Indeed, petitioners submit that the shadow phenomenon is even more relevant now than at the time of the study as a resuh of the heightened public concem and attention to heahh and environmental problems. Indeed, the attention to breast and prostate cancer and causes of environmental degradation are far more informed in public discussion in the media, non-profit and professional sectors and the general public is aware of the problem.
" Petitioners submit the study as Attachment # !
" Id. at '
" Id. at 211.
" id. at 213.
"id.
8' id. at 214.
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i-Moreover, the media has recent pronouncably brought the problems at Millstone into the minds ofthe Long Island public This prevalence ofmedia coverage is coupled with the fact that the chizens of the region are aware that they are not specifically provided for in the event of an accident and that there is no specific evacuation plan for eastern Long island in the event of an accident at Millstone. Petitioners contend that this fact will enhance the probability of a serious
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shadow phenomenon in the event of a problem at Millstone. Therefore, the threat, whether real or perceived, of a potential nuclear contamination will invariably cause residents ofeastern Long Island to take action and possibly to overreact.
C. THE PRESENT TEN MILE EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE FOR THE MILLSTONE NUCIP AR POWER STATION IS INADEOUATE BECAUSE LOCAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE NEEDS HAVE NOT BEEN ADDRESSED AND THE UNIOUE CIRCUMSTANCES ON LONG ISLAND HAVE NOT BEEN INCORPORATED INTO RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLANNING AND THE PRESENT STATUS OF EMERGENCY PLANNING DOES NOT. AND CANNOT.
PROTECT THE HEALTH AND SAFETY OF LONG ISLANDERS The present NRC regulation acknowledges the need for consideration of" local emergency response needs and capabilities as they are effected by such conditions as demo topography, land characteristics, access routes, and jurisdictional boundaries Indeed, the New York State Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plan states that "each county has the prime responsibility for responding to a radiological emergency with their resources and..these resources are contained in each county plan.""
Ahhough the New York plan allows the State to assert control and " declare a State of Disaster Emergency,"28 petitioners maintain that this system does not minimize risk to public heahh and safety and therefore the NRC has failed to implement the directive received from Congress by statute. The stated objective of the " Millstone Nuclear Power Station emergency plan is to delineate assessment and protective actions to be taken to minimize the consequences of an incident to the heakh and safety of the public."
The concept behind the existing emergency plan for Millstone is for " separate plans to exist for the licensee, state and local communities within the plume exposure pathway
" Within the last six months the issue has been featured on local news stations consistently and the local papers have all covered the issue prominently. In support of this ossertion enclosed find (" Selected examples of media coverage") attachment #
" id. at i 50.47 (c) 2.
" New York State Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plan for Commercial Nuclear Power .
Plants, Disaster Prepardness Commission of the State of New York, June 1997, ill-1
" id. at lll 4
" Millstone Nuclear Power Station. Unit Nos.1,2, and 3, Emeroency Plan Revision 24. January 1998,1 1.
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EPZ."" In fact, "these plans are linked together by a broad overall concept ofoptions through mutual planning and common notification and assessment procedures. The Millstone plan also states that " state and local emergency preparedness programs include training programs and periodic drills and exercises."" However, no such drills or periodic training occurs on eastem Long Island. .
Indeed, the Deputy Commissioner of the Department of Fire, Rescue and Emergency Services for the County of Suffolk County stated that "we were totally unaware of any ingestion path or any other danger outside what we consider the ten mile zone. Our concentration has always been within that ten mile circumference and the evacuation plan as we had gradually evolving deah with getting the people of Fishers Island...back to the north fork."" Indeed, Suffolk County maintains that "all our analysis has deah with the evacuation of the people at Fishers Island."'8 Therefore, petitioners maintain that the complete lack of site-specific emergency planning for eastern Long Island is abundant.
"The entire federal bureaucracy is vested whh a discretionary power, against the abuse of which the public needs prctection. "[A]dssse tors must strive to do as much as they reasonably can do to develop and to make known the needed confinements of discretionary power through standards, principles, and rules."'2 However,in the instant case emergency response needs are greatly affected by site-specific characteristics and the conditions enumerated by regulation have been ignored on eastern Long Island. There has not been consideration of demography, topography, land characteristics, access routes, and jurisdictional boundaries as they relate to emergency planning on eastem Long Island in the event of an accident at Millstone.
Pethioners are unaware of any other area that has the same significant emergency planning issues as those on eastem Long Island. Furthermore, besides Millstone, petitioners are unaware of any other commercial reactor in the United States that is situated so closely to an island with such a dense population base like that of eastem L.I. Petitioners maintain
. that the proximhy of an island, with such a dense and varying population base like that of eastem L.I., to a commercial nuclear reactor, such as Millstone, gives rise to the need for detailed site-specific emergency planning.
Indeed, the region has serious and signikant emergency planning issues that relate to the established condhions; demography, topography, land characteristics, access routes, and jurisdictional boundaries all present serious obstacles to emergency planning on eastem Long Island. Emergency planning for the area immediately beyond the existing 10 mile EPZ involves a largely populated island and the coordination of efforts with another state.
" id. -
" id.at 12.
" id.
" Statement of Fred Daniels, Deputy Commissioncr of the Department of Fire, Rescue and Emergency Services for the County of Suffolk County, May 26,1998.
id.
" K. Davis, Discretionary Justice 59 (1969).
- o. .
Millstone station is in close proximity to a densely populated area which has complex emergency planning variables. Thus, pethioners believe that the regulatory criteria established to determiae the " exact size and configuration of an EPZ surrounding a particular nuclear power reactor," All have extremely significant implications for emergency planning on Long Island and that the present emergency plan is inadequate.
- 1) The demography of Eastern Long Island is substantially different fmm other areas in the nation with nuclear facilities Demography is defined as the " study of vital and social statistics in their application to ethnology, anthropology and public heahh."" Demographic statistics relate to the population of an area and typically refer to a populations size, sex, age, composhion, household characteristics, and geographical distribution. The demographics of Eastem Long Island are different than most other areas. Eastern Long Island is a unique area because it is relatively close to a major metropolitan area, yet remains somewhat rural in nature. The economy ofeastern Long Island is primarily agricuhural, seafood and tourism.
However, Eastem Long Island has a signiAmt population boom during the spring, summer and fall. The demography of eastern L.I. is extremely varied based upon the time ofyear or even the day of the week and this particular situation is extremely unique to eastern L.I. This fluxuation of vishors and part time residents presents an extremely signi6 cant variation in population. A conservative estimate would indicate that the number of people on eastern L.I. during the busy season could triple."
The census population numbers for the five towns do not represent the amount ofpeople that may be in the area. Indeed, The Peconic County Financial Feasibility Study determined that 36.0% of the homes in the region were second homes. Second home owners are not considered in the census because the second homes are not residences.
Therefore, population numbers for the east end ofLong Island can be grossly understated at certain times of the year. The Peconic County Financial Feasibility Study acknowledges that the " attractiveness of the area's open space, ocean, beaches, forests, wood shingled houses and 350 year history coupled with it's unique location near New York Chy (NYC) provides the foundation for the viability of the area."" Thus, the characteristics that make the region so unique also make them so unpredictable. The proximity ofeastem L.I. to NYC makes h possible for second home owners to frequently travel between homes. At certain times of the year, eastem L.I. becomes so overwhelmed with outsiders, that many residents choose not to drive at certain times, due to the severe road congestion.
8' Funk and Wagnatts New Comprehensive intomational Dictionary of the English Language, J.G. Ferguson Publishing Co.
[ Statement by New York state Assemblymen Fred Thiele, March 1,1999
. . . ~ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ . . _ . ._ .
e .
In sum, the population and composition ofeastem L.I. is extremely varied at certain times of the year. Indeed, the household characteristics are diverse and extremely varied at various times of the years. The potential volume ofpeople to consider in emergency planning is widely varied on eastem L.I. due to significant influx ofnon-resident visitors and second home owners on weekends, summers and holidays. This large variance in population is an extremely relevant factor that must be considered in a she-specific examination of emergency particulars.
The demographic parteulars ofeastern Long Island appear to have a unique relationship with public heahh probieres. Recent studies conclude that easternIan suffering from extremely ekvated levels of breast andFurthermore, prostate cancers.g Island Long Island has a federally .iesignated sole source aquifer. Therefore, heahh factors and concerns in the region relating to groundwater quality and seemingly elevated cancer rates make the study of the vital and social statistics even more complex. Residents are sensitive to the environmental and heahh problems and may overreact in the event of any accident to avoid harm. 'Iherefore, the shadow phenomenon is possibly more relevant ,
than at the time of the study due to heightened public concem and attention to heahh and environmental problems.
- 2) Topography and land ebarneteristics on Long Island are unique.
Topography is defined as "the description of particular places, or the physical features collectively of a region."" It is petitioners contention that collectively, the physical features ofeastem Long Island are unique and warrant special consideration.
Geographically, Long Island is very unique; aptly named because of hs length the eastem end ofLong Island is geographically isolated. Unique circumstances and complex emergency planning variables have existed on Long Island since the NRC licensing of Millstone. The NRC has allowed Millstone to operate without adequately addressing the '
unique topographical circumstances on eastern Long Island.
The elongated configuration of Long Island is accented by the two distinctive forks that distinguish eastem Long Island and which contribute to the geographical isolation of the region. Eastem Long Island has extremely unique land characteristics. In the event of an accident at Millstone, h is inevitable that people on the eastem end of Long Island would try to escape harm. This escape wouki nessitate that people on eastem Long Island would have to travel to the West. Whether the harm is real or perceived, petitioners maintain that h is indisputable that people will try to escape eastem L.I. The reasons for this assertion are clear. In the words of the Mayor of the Village of Greenport," "on any clear night, Millstone is the prominent land mark on the horizon off Long Island Sound from virtually any point of Long island and...the towers on the Millstone side are a land mark
" suffolk County Task Force, Committee on....
" Funk and Wagnalls
" Greenport is one of the Long Island towns closest to Millstone.
.....--+=.==. mans.-- w. -. . , .- * -
b ..- -
e that most mariners rely on."" Therefore, the petitioners contend that the visibility of the plant across the sound, make Millstone seem closer to eastern Long Island, and make the residents more aware ofits presence.
If an accident occurred in the summertime, as mentioned, the area would be crowded with second home owners and tourists. Petitioners maintain that evacuation and emergency planning presents the most problems in the area that is most likely to be impacted by an i accident at Millstone. For example, Greenport, " located on the east end of the north fork of Long Island, our only means of evacuation in the event of a disaster is to the west over a very limited system ofroads. We fear that if there were a major nuclear accident were to occur at Millstone, especially during the peak summer season, that the ensuing confusion and/or panic might render evacuation from Greenport impossible."
- 3) The land characteristics of the region strongly dictate the available access routes The land characteristics and access routes on Eastem Long Island must be considered as a whole because the land characteristics have strongly dictated the available access routes.
There are no major highways on eastern Long Island and the infrastructure is mostly rural in nature. Indeed, it is most likely the rural nature ofeastem Long Island that has resuhed in the lack of transportation infra:tructure.
)
l The road system on eastem L.I. has very few main arteries and the eastem most pints of Long Island, Montauk and Orient Point are some of areas closest to Millstone.'
Essentially, Eastem Long Island juts out into a fork, commonly known as the North and South Forks. Access from the two forks, in a westerly direction is extremely limited.
Moreover, the two long forks have limited road systems. For example, and indicative of the rest of the region, is the fact that almost all of the roads in East Hampton are "one through lane in each direction."" Furthermore, these limited road systems are subject to traffic congestion and do not lend themselves to easy and efficient travel in normal circumstances. In emergency situations, such as a problem at Millstone, the road system may very well be dangerous.
Indeed, the five towns of Southold, Riverhead, Easthampton, Shcher Island and Southampton are the mon likely areas to be impacted by an accident at Millstone and the land characteristics present unique planning problems. The Town ofEast Hampton is indicative of the situation on the entire east end ofLong Island. For example, the East Hampton Transportation Plan states that " traffic volumes on highways such as Route 27
- Statement of David Kapell, Mayor of Greenport, June 25, NRC hearing, Jamesport, NY d' id.
4:
Indeed, the " overwhelming majority of automobile traffic traveling into the town does so on one of two state roadumys *
- See Attachment #1, a map of eastem Long Island, with particular reference to the North and South Forks and the available access routes from east to west. '
- Town of East Hampton Transportation Plan, L.K. McLean Associates, P.C. June 6,1997, 8-1.
-m- }
I are at, or near, capacity, often for many hours of the day."" " Average summer trafEc growth increases on the Town's roadways exceed 8 percent per year, which causes -
congestion levels to tnerease on more roadway segments each year."" Petitioners believe that this problem is significant and not indicative of the remainder of the region. Indeed, {
" typical average annual trafBc growth elsewhere on Long Island is in the order of I-2 j percent per year."" 4 It is indisputable that the road system is subject to severe crowding at various times of the year. However, regional traffic plans indicate that special events "often exacerbate trafBc conditions in the Town."" The traf5c control"in the immediate vicinity ofthese events often becomes challenging."" Therefore, petitioners cornend that a special event, such as an emergency situation created by an accident at Millstone, would lead to greatly exacerbated traffic conditions due to the limited road system.
However, the roads are not the only transportation complexity on eastern Long Island.
The Town of Sheher Island is an island that lies between the Nonh and South forks. The island is only accessible by one of two ferries on either side of the island. The nonh ferry services the nonh side of sheher Island and unloads passengers and cars in Greenpon. ,
Greenport is approximately 13 miles from the Millstone plant and evacuation from Sheher l
Island to Greenpon would likely bring people closer to the path of any plume heading towards the area. However, to funher complicate the matter the ferries are all small.
Indeed, the nonh ferries are larger than the south ferries and they can only carry "13 cars ,
per depanure."" Thus, the situation at the ferry docks may very well resuh in confusion ;
and inefBelency.
- 4) Millstone emergency planning involves logistical issues related to jurisdictional boundaries l l
The close proximity of Long Island to the Millstone plant has serious interstate l implications in emergency planning. The present emergency plans already involve '
planning areas in two states, Connecticut and New York. The existing evacuation plan calls for residents ofFishers Island, NY to be evacuated to New Lordon, Connecticut.
Currently, evacuation planning for the Millstone plant is plagued by problems presented by interstate jurisdictional boundaries.
Petitioners believe that a coordinated effon by the federal govemment would be the most efBeient and effective solution. Moreover, the Atomic Energy Act and the federal licensing procedures already give the federal government a vinually exclusive role in regulating matters related to nuclear power. Indeed, the Supreme Court has indicated
" Id. at S-1.
" Id.
" id.
" Id. at 3-5.
"Id.
" Statement of I. Bemard Jacobson, General Manager, North Ferry Co. Inc.
J that.... Therefore, we believe it to be incumbent upon the NRC to plan for emergency planning in instances that would have interstate implications.
The unique geography ofLong Island and the close proximity to Millstone provide circumstances that must be considered on the federal level. Typically, the role of the federal govemment is to coordinate effens that reach beyond state boundaries and this is one such example of an area where such an effort would be more efficient. An accident at Millstone would substantially affect interstate commerce and is a situation that requires oversight and planning by the federal government. Therefore, in this unique situation we believe that the federal government must play a larger role in emergency planning for Millstone based upon the interstate idrions and the potential affect upon interstate commerce.
Pursuant to New York State law, the disaster preparedness commission is charged with studying all " aspects ofman-made or natural disaster prevention.'d Furthermore, the I commission shall develop plans that " identify potential disasters and disaster sites...and such other measures as reasonably can be take to prevent disasters or mitigate impact.'d' The commission is directed to develop disaster emergency plans "for coordinated ,
evacuation procedures, including the establishment of temporary housing and other necessary facilities."" However, the state does not maintain an evacuation plan, or emergency plan, in the event of an accident at Millstone. The New York State plan .
acknowledges the existence ofMillstone but makes no site-specific plans in the event of an accident at Millstone. Petitioners maintain that the New York law, as it applies to nuclear facilities, is preempted and therefore, New York should not be implementing such a plan because uhimately it would have to be preempted. However, petitioners maintain that this illustrates the confusion and inefficiency that abounds in the present state of emergency planning at facilities across the country and in particular, at Millstone. Indeed, jurisdictional boundaries involved in emergency planning for Millstone make independent state planning efforts, difficult, at best, and dangerous as they exist at the present time.
I) Connecticut school children: The school on Fishers Island plays host to children from Connecticut who make the daily trip by ferry to attend the school Once on Fishers Island the children are subject to evacuation by the State ofNew York and the Town of !
Southold. Therefore, coordination on the federal level would be important to provide for i the safety of these children. ;
ii) Fishers Island: Fishers Island is within the Town of Southold. In the event of an accident at Millstone, the Supervisor of the Town of Southold is the emergency manager and can issue a state ofemergency in which the evacuation plans are ahered.
Presently, the Town of Southold is working to aher the existing evacuation plan for Fishers Island because the plan is unworkable in their view, Indeed, the Emergency Manager for the Town of Soutbold has stated that the Town has:
" NY CLS Exec @21 (1997)).
id. at 21 (3) (a) 1-5.
- Id. at b.
c
" Serious concerns with this plan as it relates to Fishers Island. The plan 1 designates New London, Connecticut as the evacuation destination for Fishers i Island residents with further transponation to a host conununity in Windham, CT.
There is an obvious problem with a plan that calls for movement of a population in a direction closer to the risk and to an area that would have already been affected by the exposure prior to Fishers Island. There is no secondary evacuation route specified in the plan. Our concerns with the plan were reinforced during the last FEMA exercise of the Millstone response plan. As the exercise developed Fishers Island was provided with information indicating evacuation of the population should commence. The New London area had already been affected by the plume
{
and could not receive the Fishers Island evacuees.""
Therefore, h is likely that in the event of an accident at Millstone, Connecticut school children would be evacuated to Long Island by emergency personnel from the Town of Southold. This would create enormous logistical problems for the emergency planners as well as the affected families. Therefore, jurisdictional boundaries would hamper any coordinated effort and would create logistical problems.
1 iii) Plum I=lami: Plum Island is a United States Department of Agricuhure research facility which is located on a small island directly off Orient Point, Long Island.
Plum Island conducts sensitive research and the entire island is offlimits to the public.
Petitioners maintain that the existence of the federal facility add one more layer of planning that lacks coordination. Plum Island maintains its own emergency plan and would not be beholden to State or local emergency officials. Therefore, the existence of this facility is one more example of a site-specific variable that has not been given l
adequate consideration in the present planning. Indeed, the facilities plan and the actual cooperation by the facility should be coordinated by one central responsible agency. l Petitioners again maintain that the agency should be the NRC.
9
" Attachment #1:
._ . . . . ..