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Category:CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS
MONTHYEARML18039A9021999-10-15015 October 1999 Forwards LER 99-010-00 Re Occurrence of Plant Reactor Scram Due to Main Turbine Trip Which Resulted in Main Steam Moisture Separator.All Plant Safety Systems Operated as Designed in Response to Event ML20217E0711999-10-14014 October 1999 Grants Approval for Util to Submit Original,One Signed Paper Copy & Six CD-ROM Copies of Updates to FSAR as Listed,Per 10CFR50.4(c),in Response to ML18039A8961999-10-14014 October 1999 Forwards LER 99-009-00,re Manual Reactor Scram on Unit 2 from 54% Power,Iaw 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv).All Plant Safety Sys Operated as Designed in Response to Event ML20217D3261999-10-0808 October 1999 Responds to Re Event Concerning Spent Fuel Pool Water Temperature Being Undetected for Approx Two Days at Browns Ferry Unit 3 ML20217F7751999-10-0808 October 1999 Confirms 991006 Telcon Between T Abney of Licensee Staff & a Belisle of NRC Re Meeting to Be Conducted on 991109 in Atlanta,Ga to Discuss Various Maintenance Issues ML18039A8931999-10-0808 October 1999 Forwards LER 99-008-00,concerning HPCI Sys Being Declared Inoperable,Iaw 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v).There Are No Commitments Contained in Ltr ML18039A8881999-10-0808 October 1999 Provides Licensee Supplemental Response to NRC 980713 RAI Re GL 87-02,Suppl 1, Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical & Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors. ML20217B5481999-10-0101 October 1999 Requests Exception to 10CFR50.4(c) Requirement to Provide Total of Twelve Paper Copies When Submitting Revs to BFN UFSAR ML20212M1481999-09-28028 September 1999 Refers to Management Meeting Conducted on 990927 at Region II for Presentation of Recent Plant Performance.List of Attendees & Copy of Presentation Handout Encl ML20212F7751999-09-22022 September 1999 Requests Operator & Senior Operator License Renewals for Listed Individuals and Licenses ML20212D3651999-09-20020 September 1999 Forwards SE Accepting Licensee 990430 Proposed Rev to Plant, Unit 3 Matl Surveillance Program ML18039A8721999-09-10010 September 1999 Informs of Licensee Decision to Withdraw Proposed Plant risk-informed Inservice Insp Program,Originally Transmitted in Util 981023 Ltr.Licensee Expects to Resubmit Revised Program within Approx 6 Wks ML20211Q5731999-09-0909 September 1999 Submits Response to Administrative Ltr 99-03 Re Preparation & Scheduling of Operator Licensing Exams.Completed NRC Form 536,operator Licensing Exam Data,Which Provides Plant Current Schedules for Specific Info Requested Encl ML20211G6491999-08-26026 August 1999 Confirms Telcon with T Abney on 990824 Re Mgt Meeting Which Has Been re-scheduled from 990830-0927.Purpose of Meeting to Discuss BFN Status & Performance ML20210Q6931999-08-0909 August 1999 Forwards Updated Changes to Distribution Lists for Browns Ferry & Bellefonte Nuclear Plants ML18039A8371999-08-0606 August 1999 Forwards BFN Unit 2 Cycle 10 ASME Section XI NIS-1 & NIS-2 Data Repts, for NRC Review.Corrected Inservice Insp Summary Rept for Unit 3 Cycle 8 Operation,Included in Rept ML20210Q4421999-08-0505 August 1999 Informs That NRC Plans to Administer Generic Fundamentals Exam Section of Written Operator Licensing Exam on 991006. Authorized Representative of Facility Must Submit Ltr with List of Individuals to Take exam,30 Days Before Exam Date ML20210N1051999-08-0202 August 1999 Forwards SE Accepting Licensee 990326 Request for Relief from ASME B&PV Code,Section XI Requirements.Request for Relief 3-ISI-7,pertains to Second 10-year Interval ISI for Plant,Unit 3 ML20210G8991999-07-28028 July 1999 Discusses 990726 Open Mgt Meeting for Discussion on Plant Engineering Status & Performance.List of Attendees & Presentation Handout Encl ML18039A8181999-07-26026 July 1999 Forwards LER 99-004-00 Re Inoperability of Two Divisions of Plant CSS Due to Personnel Error During Surveillance Testing.Event Reported Per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) ML20210G8051999-07-22022 July 1999 Discusses DOL Case DC Smith Vs TVA Investigation.Oi Concluded That There Was Not Sufficient Evidence Developed During Investigation to Substantiate Discrimination.Nrc Providing Results of OI Investigation to Parties ML20210F3031999-07-22022 July 1999 Submits Rept Re Impact of Changes or Errors in Methodology Used to Demonstrate Compliance with ECCS Requirements of 10CFR50.46.One Reportable non-significant Error Was Found During Time Period of 980601-990630 ML20209J0251999-07-16016 July 1999 Forwards SE Which Constitutes Staff Review & Approval of TVA Ampacity Derating Test & Analyses for Thermo-Lag Fire Barrier Configurations as Required in App K of Draft Temporary Instruction, Fpfi, ML20210B2671999-07-14014 July 1999 Confirms 990702 Telcon Between T Abney of Licensee Staff & Author Re Mgt Meeting Scheduled for 990830 at Licensee Request in Atlanta,Ga to Discuss Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Status & Performance ML20209E3421999-07-0707 July 1999 Confirms Arrangements Made During 990628 Telephone Conversation to Hold Meeting on 990726 in Atlanta,Ga to Discuss Plant Engineering Status & Performance ML20209E5511999-07-0707 July 1999 Informs That as Result of NRC Review of Util Responses to GL 92-01,rev 1 & Suppl 1 & Suppl 1 Rai,Staff Revised Info in Reactor Vessel Integrity Database & Releasing Database as Rvid Version 2.This Closes TACs MA1180,MA1181 & MA1179 ML20196J3531999-06-30030 June 1999 Responds to Re Boeing Rocket Booster Mfg Facility Being Constructed in Decatur,Al.Nrc Has No Unique Emergency Planning Concerns Re Proximity of Boeing Facility to BFN ML20196G9111999-06-28028 June 1999 Discusses Completion of Licensing Action for GL 96-01, Testing of Safety-Related Logic Circuits ML18039A8081999-06-28028 June 1999 Forwards LER 99-004-00 Re Esfas That Occurred When RPS Motor Generator Tripped.Rept Is Submitted IAW Provisions of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) as Event of Condition That Resulted in Automatic Actuation of ESF ML18039A8111999-06-25025 June 1999 Requests Permanent Relief from Inservice Insp Requirements of 10CFR50.55a(g) for Volumetric Exam of Bfn,Unit 3 Circumferential RPV Welds,Per GL 98-05 ML20196F8741999-06-23023 June 1999 Forwards Safety Evaluation Accepting Util Response to GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves ML20196F8131999-06-22022 June 1999 Forwards Rev 24 to Security Personnel Training & Qualification Plan,Per 10CFR50.54(p).Rev Withheld ML18039A8051999-06-22022 June 1999 Forwards LER 99-003-00,re Automatic Reactor Scram Due to Turbine Trip.Rept Numbered 99-001 Should Be Deleted & Replaced with Encl Rept as Result of Error Noted in 990614 Rept ML18039A8031999-06-18018 June 1999 Responds to NRC Staff Verbal Request Re TS Change TS-376, Originally Submitted on 970312, & Proposed Changes to TS to Extend Current 7-day AOT for EDGs to 14 Days ML18039A7931999-06-0101 June 1999 Provides Summary of Major Activities Performed at BFN During Scheduled Unit 2 Cycle 10 Refueling Outage ML20195D3321999-06-0101 June 1999 Informs That Cb Fisher,License OP-5525-4,can No Longer Maintain License at Plant Because of Physical Condition That Causes Licensee to Fail to Meet Requirements of 10CFR55.21 ML18039A7911999-05-24024 May 1999 Informs That by Meeting Test Criteria Established by Test Based on Ansi/Ans 3.5-1985 (License Amends 254 & 214) power- Uprate Simulation Acceptable for Operator Training ML18039A7891999-05-24024 May 1999 Informs That Oscillation Power Range Monitor Module Has Been Enabled for Current Cycle of Operation Following Unit 2 Cycle 10 Refueling Outage Which Was Completed on 990509 ML20195B9361999-05-24024 May 1999 Informs That Do Elkins,License SOP-3392-6,no Longer Needs to Maintain License as Position Does Not Require License ML20206U6551999-05-14014 May 1999 Informs That ML Meek & Wd Dawson Will No Longer Need to Maintain SRO Licenses at Plant,Due to Termination of Employment,Effective 990521 ML20206Q8421999-05-10010 May 1999 Forwards Medical Info on DM Olive,License SOP-20540-2,in Response to NRC 990428 Telcon.Encl Withheld from Public Disclosure IAW 10CFR2.790(a)(6) ML18039A7771999-05-0606 May 1999 Forwards LER 99-003-00,providing Details Re Plant HPCI Sys Being Declared Inoperable Due to Loose Electrical Connection.Ltr Contains No Commitments ML20206G6611999-05-0404 May 1999 Forwards SE Accepting GL 88-20,submitted by TVA Re multi-unit Probabilistic Risk Assessement (Mupra) for Plant, Units 1,2 & 3 ML18039A7741999-04-30030 April 1999 Forwards Proposed Rev to BFN Unit 3 RPV Matl Surveillance Program,For NRC Approval ML20206H5901999-04-30030 April 1999 Forwards Notification of Revs to BFN Unit 2 Emergency Response Data Sys Data Point Library.Revs Were Implemented on 990413 DD-99-06, Informs That Time Provided by NRC within Which Commission May Act to Review Director'S Decision (DD-99-06) Has Expired.Decision Became Final Agency Action on 990423.With Certificate of Svc.Served on 9904281999-04-28028 April 1999 Informs That Time Provided by NRC within Which Commission May Act to Review Director'S Decision (DD-99-06) Has Expired.Decision Became Final Agency Action on 990423.With Certificate of Svc.Served on 990428 ML18039A7681999-04-27027 April 1999 Requests Relief from Specified Inservice Insp Requirements in Section XI of ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code,Per 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i).Relief Requests 2-ISI-8 & 3-ISI-8,encl for NRC Review & Approval ML18039A7591999-04-27027 April 1999 Forwards Annual Radiological Environ Operating Rept Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant 1998. Rept Includes Results of Land Use Censuses,Summarized & Tabulated Results of Radiological Environ Samples in Format of Reg Guide 4.8 & NUREG-1302 ML18039A7651999-04-27027 April 1999 Forwards Rev 0 to TVA-COLR-BF2C11, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 2,Cycle 11 Colr. ML18039A7541999-04-23023 April 1999 Requests Approval of Bfnp Unit 3 Risk-Informed ISI (RI-ISI) Program,Per 10CFR50.55(a)(3)(i) & GL 88-01.Encl RI-ISI Program Is Alternative to Current ASME Section XI ISI Requirments for Code Class 1,2 & 3 Piping 1999-09-09
[Table view] Category:INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE
MONTHYEARML18039A9021999-10-15015 October 1999 Forwards LER 99-010-00 Re Occurrence of Plant Reactor Scram Due to Main Turbine Trip Which Resulted in Main Steam Moisture Separator.All Plant Safety Systems Operated as Designed in Response to Event ML18039A8961999-10-14014 October 1999 Forwards LER 99-009-00,re Manual Reactor Scram on Unit 2 from 54% Power,Iaw 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv).All Plant Safety Sys Operated as Designed in Response to Event ML18039A8881999-10-0808 October 1999 Provides Licensee Supplemental Response to NRC 980713 RAI Re GL 87-02,Suppl 1, Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical & Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors. ML18039A8931999-10-0808 October 1999 Forwards LER 99-008-00,concerning HPCI Sys Being Declared Inoperable,Iaw 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v).There Are No Commitments Contained in Ltr ML20217B5481999-10-0101 October 1999 Requests Exception to 10CFR50.4(c) Requirement to Provide Total of Twelve Paper Copies When Submitting Revs to BFN UFSAR ML20212F7751999-09-22022 September 1999 Requests Operator & Senior Operator License Renewals for Listed Individuals and Licenses ML18039A8721999-09-10010 September 1999 Informs of Licensee Decision to Withdraw Proposed Plant risk-informed Inservice Insp Program,Originally Transmitted in Util 981023 Ltr.Licensee Expects to Resubmit Revised Program within Approx 6 Wks ML20211Q5731999-09-0909 September 1999 Submits Response to Administrative Ltr 99-03 Re Preparation & Scheduling of Operator Licensing Exams.Completed NRC Form 536,operator Licensing Exam Data,Which Provides Plant Current Schedules for Specific Info Requested Encl ML20210Q6931999-08-0909 August 1999 Forwards Updated Changes to Distribution Lists for Browns Ferry & Bellefonte Nuclear Plants ML18039A8371999-08-0606 August 1999 Forwards BFN Unit 2 Cycle 10 ASME Section XI NIS-1 & NIS-2 Data Repts, for NRC Review.Corrected Inservice Insp Summary Rept for Unit 3 Cycle 8 Operation,Included in Rept ML18039A8181999-07-26026 July 1999 Forwards LER 99-004-00 Re Inoperability of Two Divisions of Plant CSS Due to Personnel Error During Surveillance Testing.Event Reported Per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) ML20210F3031999-07-22022 July 1999 Submits Rept Re Impact of Changes or Errors in Methodology Used to Demonstrate Compliance with ECCS Requirements of 10CFR50.46.One Reportable non-significant Error Was Found During Time Period of 980601-990630 ML18039A8081999-06-28028 June 1999 Forwards LER 99-004-00 Re Esfas That Occurred When RPS Motor Generator Tripped.Rept Is Submitted IAW Provisions of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) as Event of Condition That Resulted in Automatic Actuation of ESF ML18039A8111999-06-25025 June 1999 Requests Permanent Relief from Inservice Insp Requirements of 10CFR50.55a(g) for Volumetric Exam of Bfn,Unit 3 Circumferential RPV Welds,Per GL 98-05 ML20196F8131999-06-22022 June 1999 Forwards Rev 24 to Security Personnel Training & Qualification Plan,Per 10CFR50.54(p).Rev Withheld ML18039A8051999-06-22022 June 1999 Forwards LER 99-003-00,re Automatic Reactor Scram Due to Turbine Trip.Rept Numbered 99-001 Should Be Deleted & Replaced with Encl Rept as Result of Error Noted in 990614 Rept ML18039A8031999-06-18018 June 1999 Responds to NRC Staff Verbal Request Re TS Change TS-376, Originally Submitted on 970312, & Proposed Changes to TS to Extend Current 7-day AOT for EDGs to 14 Days ML18039A7931999-06-0101 June 1999 Provides Summary of Major Activities Performed at BFN During Scheduled Unit 2 Cycle 10 Refueling Outage ML20195D3321999-06-0101 June 1999 Informs That Cb Fisher,License OP-5525-4,can No Longer Maintain License at Plant Because of Physical Condition That Causes Licensee to Fail to Meet Requirements of 10CFR55.21 ML20195B9361999-05-24024 May 1999 Informs That Do Elkins,License SOP-3392-6,no Longer Needs to Maintain License as Position Does Not Require License ML18039A7911999-05-24024 May 1999 Informs That by Meeting Test Criteria Established by Test Based on Ansi/Ans 3.5-1985 (License Amends 254 & 214) power- Uprate Simulation Acceptable for Operator Training ML18039A7891999-05-24024 May 1999 Informs That Oscillation Power Range Monitor Module Has Been Enabled for Current Cycle of Operation Following Unit 2 Cycle 10 Refueling Outage Which Was Completed on 990509 ML20206U6551999-05-14014 May 1999 Informs That ML Meek & Wd Dawson Will No Longer Need to Maintain SRO Licenses at Plant,Due to Termination of Employment,Effective 990521 ML20206Q8421999-05-10010 May 1999 Forwards Medical Info on DM Olive,License SOP-20540-2,in Response to NRC 990428 Telcon.Encl Withheld from Public Disclosure IAW 10CFR2.790(a)(6) ML18039A7771999-05-0606 May 1999 Forwards LER 99-003-00,providing Details Re Plant HPCI Sys Being Declared Inoperable Due to Loose Electrical Connection.Ltr Contains No Commitments ML20206H5901999-04-30030 April 1999 Forwards Notification of Revs to BFN Unit 2 Emergency Response Data Sys Data Point Library.Revs Were Implemented on 990413 ML18039A7741999-04-30030 April 1999 Forwards Proposed Rev to BFN Unit 3 RPV Matl Surveillance Program,For NRC Approval ML18039A7681999-04-27027 April 1999 Requests Relief from Specified Inservice Insp Requirements in Section XI of ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code,Per 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i).Relief Requests 2-ISI-8 & 3-ISI-8,encl for NRC Review & Approval ML18039A7591999-04-27027 April 1999 Forwards Annual Radiological Environ Operating Rept Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant 1998. Rept Includes Results of Land Use Censuses,Summarized & Tabulated Results of Radiological Environ Samples in Format of Reg Guide 4.8 & NUREG-1302 ML18039A7651999-04-27027 April 1999 Forwards Rev 0 to TVA-COLR-BF2C11, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 2,Cycle 11 Colr. ML20206C8591999-04-23023 April 1999 Informs That Util Has Determined,Dr Bateman No Longer Needs to Maintain His License,Effective 990331,per Requirement of 10CFR55.55(a) ML18039A7541999-04-23023 April 1999 Requests Approval of Bfnp Unit 3 Risk-Informed ISI (RI-ISI) Program,Per 10CFR50.55(a)(3)(i) & GL 88-01.Encl RI-ISI Program Is Alternative to Current ASME Section XI ISI Requirments for Code Class 1,2 & 3 Piping ML18039A7581999-04-23023 April 1999 Responds to Item 4 of 981117 RAI Re TS Change Request 376 Re Extended EDG Allowed Outage Time,In Manner Consistent with Rgs 1.174 & 1.177 ML20206C1241999-04-21021 April 1999 Forwards Annual Occupational Radiation Exposure Rept for 1998, IAW TS Section 5.6.1.Rept Reflects Radiation Exposure Data as Tracked by Electronic Dosimeters on Radiation Work Permits ML20205T0971999-04-15015 April 1999 Submits Change in Medical Status for DM Olive in Accordance with 10CFR55.25,effective 990315.Encl Medical Info & Certification of Medical Exam,Considered by Util to Be of Personal Nature & to Be Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6) ML18039A7441999-04-0707 April 1999 Forwards LER 99-001-00,providing Details Re Inoperability of Two Trains of Standby Gas Treatment Due to Breaker Trip on One Train in Conjunction with Planned Maint Activities on Other.Ltr Contains No New Commitments ML18039A7431999-03-30030 March 1999 Responds to NRC 990112 RAI Re BFN Program,Per GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety- Related Movs. ML18039A7421999-03-30030 March 1999 Provides Results of Analysis of Design Basis Loca,As Required by License Condition Re Plants Power Uprate Operating License Amends 254 & 214 ML18039A7411999-03-30030 March 1999 Provides Partial Response to NRC 981117 RAI Re TS Change Request 376,proposing to Extend Current 7 Day AOT for EDG to 14 Days ML18039A7371999-03-26026 March 1999 Requests Relief from Specified ISI Requirements in Section XI of ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code,1989 Edition.Encl Contains Request for Relief 3-ISI-7,for NRC Review & Approval ML18039A7331999-03-26026 March 1999 Forwards Rev 4 to TVA-COLR-BF2C10, Bnfp,Unit 2,Cycle 10 COLR, IAW Requirements of TS 5.6.5.d.COLR Was Revised to Extend Max Allowable Nodal Exposure for GE GE7B Fuel Bundles ML18039A7291999-03-22022 March 1999 Forwards Revised Epips,Including Index,Rev 26A to EPIP-1, Emergency Classification Procedure & Rev 26A to EPIP-5, General Emergency. Rev 26A Includes All Changes Made in Rev 26 as Well as Identified Errors ML20204G8471999-03-19019 March 1999 Reports Change in Medical Status for Ma Morrow,In Accordance with 10CFR55.25.Encl Medical Info & Certification of Medical Exam,Considered by Util to Be of Personal Nature & to Be Withheld from Pdr,Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6).Without Encl ML20207M0611999-03-11011 March 1999 Forwards Goals & Objectives for May 1999 for Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant,Units 1,2 & 3,radiological Emergency Plan Exercise.Plant Exercise Is Currently Scheduled for Wk of 990524 ML18039A6971999-02-22022 February 1999 Forwards Typed TS Pages,Reflecting NRC Approved TS Change 354 Requiring Oscillation PRM to Be Integrated Into Approved Power uprate,24-month Operating Cycle & Single Recirculation Loop Operation ML18039A6961999-02-19019 February 1999 Provides Util Response to GL 95-07 Re RCIC Sys Injection Valves (2/3-FCV-71-39) for BFN Units 2 & 3.Previous Responses,Dtd 951215,1016 & 960730,0315 & 0213,supplemented ML18039A6911999-02-19019 February 1999 Forwards Rev 3 to Unit 2 Cycle 10 & Rev 1 to Unit 3 Cycle 9, Colr.Colrs for Each Unit Were Revised to Include OLs Consistent with Single Recirculation Loop Operation ML20203B6031999-02-0404 February 1999 Requests Temporary Partial Exemption from Requirements of 10CFR50.65,maint Rule for Unit 1.Util Requesting Exemption to Resolve Issue Initially Raised in NRC Insp Repts 50-259/97-04,50-260/97-04 & 50-296/97-04,dtd 970521 ML18039A6741999-01-21021 January 1999 Responds to NRC 981209 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-259/98-07,50-260/98-07 & 50-296/98-07,respectively. Corrective Actions:Will Revise Procedure NEPD-8 Re Vendor Nonconformance Documentation Submission to TVA ML20199F6951999-01-0808 January 1999 Submits Request for Relief from ASME Section XI Inservice Testing Valve Program to Extend Interval Between Disassembly of Check Valve,Within Group of Four Similar Check Valves for EECW Dgs,From 18 to 24 Months 1999-09-09
[Table view] Category:UTILITY TO NRC
MONTHYEARML20059L5741990-09-19019 September 1990 Forwards Rev 2 to Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Cable Issues Supplemental Rept Corrective Actions,Sept 1990. Rept Revised to Clarify Cable Bend Radius & Support of Vertical Cable & Document Resolution of Jamming Issues ML20064A6871990-09-18018 September 1990 Requests Closure of Confirmatory Order EA-84-054 Re Regulatory Performance Improvement Program ML20059L4931990-09-17017 September 1990 Provides Addl Info Re 900713 Tech Spec Change 290 Concerning Hpci/Rcic Steam Line Space Temp Isolations,Per Request ML18033B5171990-09-17017 September 1990 Forwards Addl Info Re 900524 Tech Spec Change 287 on Reactor Pressure Instrument Channel.Schematic Diagrams Provided in Encl 2 ML20064A6851990-09-17017 September 1990 Responds to NRC Recommendations Re Primary Containment Isolation at Facility.Background Info & Responses to Each Recommendation Listed in Encl 1 ML20059K2971990-09-14014 September 1990 Responds to NRC 900208 SER Re Conformance to Reg Guide 1.97, Rev 3, Neutron Flux Monitoring Instrumentation. TVA Endorses BWR Owners Group Appealing NRC Position Directing Installation of Upgraded Neutron Flux Sys ML20059H3861990-09-10010 September 1990 Forwards Corrective Actions Re Radiological Emergency Plan, Per Insp Repts 50-259/89-41,50-260/89-41 & 50-296/89-41. Corrective Action:Plant Manager Instruction 12.12,Section 4.11.3.1 Revised ML18033B5031990-08-31031 August 1990 Forwards Financial Info Required to Assure Retrospective Premiums,Per 10CFR140 & 771209 Ltr ML20059E1741990-08-31031 August 1990 Informs That Plant Restart Review Board & Related Functions Will Be Phased Out on Date Fuel Load Commences ML20059D7061990-08-28028 August 1990 Requests That Sims Be Updated to Reflect Implementation of Program to Satisfy Requirements of 10CFR50,App J.Changes & Improvements Will Continue to Be Made to Reflect Plant Mods, Tech Spec Amends & Recommendations from NRC ML18033B4931990-08-20020 August 1990 Suppls Response to Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-259/90-14,50-260/90-14 & 50-296/90-14.Corrective Actions: TVA Developed Corporate Level std,STD-10.1.15 Re Independent Verification ML20063Q2431990-08-20020 August 1990 Responds to 900807 Telcon Re Rev to Commitment Due Date Per Insp Rept 50-260/89-59 Re Electrical Issues Program ML20063Q2451990-08-17017 August 1990 Provides Revised Response to Generic Ltr 89-19 Re Request for Action Concerning Resolution of USI A-47, Safety Implication of Control Sys in LWR Nuclear Power Plants & Notification of Commitment Completion ML20063Q2441990-08-17017 August 1990 Advises That IE Bulletin 80-11 Re Masonry Wall Design Implemented at Facilities.Design Finalized,Mods Completed, Procedures Issued & Necessary Training Completed.Sims Data Base Should Be Updated to Show Item Being Implemented ML20059A4861990-08-16016 August 1990 Responds to Verbal Commitment Made During 900801 Meeting W/Nrc Re Control Room Habitability.Calculations Performed to Support Util 900531 Submittal Listed in Encls 1 & 2 ML20059A5141990-08-16016 August 1990 Provides Response to NRC Bulletin 88-008,Suppl 3 Re Thermal Stresses in Piping Connected to Rcs.Util Does Not Anticipate Thermal Cyclic Fatique Induced Piping,Per Suppl 3 to Occur in Plant.Ltr Contains No Commitment ML18033B4821990-08-14014 August 1990 Submits Revised Response to Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-259/89-16,50-260/89-16 & 50-296/89-16.Extends Completion Dates for Commitments to 901203 ML18033B4831990-08-13013 August 1990 Responds to NRC 900713 Ltr Re Violations & Deviations Noted in Insp Repts 50-259/90-18,50-260/90-18 & 50-296/90-18. Corrective Actions:Craft Foreman Suspended for Three Days & Relieved of Duties as Foreman ML18033B4811990-08-10010 August 1990 Responds to NRC 900710 Ltr Re Power Ascension Testing Program.Four Hold Points Selected by NRC Added to Unit 2 Restart Schedule ML18033B4801990-08-0808 August 1990 Forwards Response to SALP Repts 50-259/90-07,50-260/90-07 & 50-296/90-07 for Jul 1989 - Mar 1990 ML20044B2121990-07-13013 July 1990 Clarifies Util Position on Two Items from NRC 891221 Safety Evaluation Re TVA Supplemental Response to Generic Ltr 88-01 Concerning IGSCC in BWR Stainless Steel Piping.Insp Category for Nine Welds Will Be Changed from Category a to D ML18033B4371990-07-13013 July 1990 Forwards Corrected Tech Spec Page 3.2/4.2-45 to Util 900706 Application for Amend to License DPR-52 Re ADS ML18033B4331990-07-13013 July 1990 Requests Temporary Exemption from Simulator Certification Requirements of 10CFR55.45(b)(2)(iii) ML20055F6091990-07-12012 July 1990 Provides Response to NRC Bulletin 88-003 Re Insp Results. No Relays Found to Have Inadequate Latch Engagements. Therefore,No Corrective Repairs or Replacement of Relays Required ML18033B4251990-07-10010 July 1990 Forwards Cable Installation Supplemental Rept,In Response to NRC Request During 900506 Telcon.Rept Contains Results of Walkdowns & Testing Except Work on Ongoing Cable Pullby Issue ML18033B4241990-07-0606 July 1990 Advises That Util Expects to Complete Implementation of Rev 4 to Emergency Procedure Guidelines by Mar 1991.Response to NRC Comments on Draft Emergency Operating Instructions Encl ML18033B4201990-07-0505 July 1990 Provides Basis for Closure of Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 4.5.3. Util Has Concluded That Analyses Presented in BWR Owners Group Repts Acceptable for Resolving Issue,Subj to Listed Conditions ML18033B4091990-07-0202 July 1990 Responds to NRC 900601 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-259/89-53,50-260/89-53 & 50-296/89-53.Corrective Actions: Condition Adverse to Quality Rept Initiated & Issued to Track Disposition of Deficiency in Chilled Water Flow Rates ML20043G4901990-06-14014 June 1990 Forwards Tabs for Apps a & B to Be Inserted Into Util Consolidated Nuclear Power Radiological Emergency Plan ML20043H3511990-06-14014 June 1990 Forwards Corrected Pages to Rev 15 to Physical Security Contingency Plan,As Discussed During 900606 Telcon.Encl Withheld (Ref 10CFR73.21) ML20043F4951990-06-11011 June 1990 Advises That Facilities Ready for NRC Environ Qualification Audit.Only Remaining Required Binder in Review Process & Will Be Completed by 900615 ML18033B3651990-06-0808 June 1990 Forwards Revised Page 3.2/4.2-13 & Overleaf Page 3.2/4.2-12 to Tech Spec 289, RWCU Sys Temp Loops. ML18033B3391990-06-0404 June 1990 Responds to NRC 900504 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-259/90-08,50-260/90-08 & 50-296/90-08.Corrective Actions: Individual Involved Counseled on Importance of Complying W/Approved Plant Procedures When Performing Assigned Tasks ML20043D3251990-06-0101 June 1990 Responds to NRC 900502 Ltr Re Notice of Violation & Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty.Corrective Actions:Snm Program Action Plan Being Developed & Implemented,Consisting of Improved Training for Control Personnel & Accountability ML18033B3551990-05-31031 May 1990 Forwards Response to 891219 Request for Addl Info on Hazardous Chemicals Re Control Room Habitability ML20043C1951990-05-30030 May 1990 Forwards Response to Generic Ltr 90-04 Re Status of Implementation of Generic Safety Issues ML20043C0601990-05-29029 May 1990 Forwards Response to Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-259/90-12,50-260/90-12 & 50-296/90-12.Util Admits Violation Re Access Control to Vital Areas,But Denies Violation Re Backup Ammunicition for Responders ML18033B3351990-05-25025 May 1990 Provides Basis for Closure of Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 4.5.3, Reactor Trip Sys Reliability. Analyses Presented in BWR Owners Group Repts Acceptable for Resolving Issues Subj to Listed Conditions ML18033B3221990-05-21021 May 1990 Forwards Rev 1 to ED-Q2000-870135, Cable Ampacity Calculation - V4 & V5 Safety-Related Trays for Unit 2 Operation, as Followup to Electrical Insp Rept 50-260/90-13 Re Ampacity Program ML18033B3101990-05-18018 May 1990 Responds to NRC 900417 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-259/90-05,50-260/90-05 & 50-296/90-05.Corrective Action: Senior Reactor Operator Assigned to Fire Protection Staff for day-to-day Supervision of Fire Protection Program ML20043A6101990-05-15015 May 1990 Forwards Rev 16 to Security Personnel Training & Qualification Plan.Rev Withheld (Ref 10CFR2.790) ML20043A4091990-05-14014 May 1990 Forwards Rev 14 to Physical Security/Contingency Plan.Rev Withheld (Ref 10CFR73.21) ML20043A4081990-05-14014 May 1990 Forwards Rev 15 to Physical Security/Contingency Plan, Consisting of Changes for Provision of Positive Access Control During Major Maint & Refueling Operations to One of Two Boundaries.Rev Withheld (Ref 10CFR73.21) ML18033B2921990-05-0909 May 1990 Provides Info for NRC Consideration Re Plant Performance for Current SALP Rept Period of Jan 1989 - Mar 1990.Util Believes Corrective Actions Resulted in Positive Individual Changes & Programmatic Upgrades ML20042F7401990-05-0404 May 1990 Responds to Generic Ltr 89-19, Request for Action Re Resolution of USI A-47, 'Safety Implication of Control Sys in LWR Nuclear Power Plants.' TVA Will Finalize Calculations for Switch Setpoints Prior to Units Restart ML20042F7701990-05-0404 May 1990 Provides Results of Review of Util 890418 Submittal Re Supplemental Implementation of NUMARC 87-00 on Station Blackout.Implementation of 10CFR50.63 Consistent W/Guidance Provided by NUMARC 87-00 ML20042F3721990-05-0202 May 1990 Forwards Corrected Monthly Operating Repts for Jan-June 1989 & Aug 1989 - Jan 1990.Discrepancies Involve Cumulative Unit Svc Factors & Unit Availability Capacity Factors ML18033B2631990-04-12012 April 1990 Forwards Response to NRC 900212 Request for Info Re Power Ascension & Restart Test Program at Unit 2.Util Has Refined Power Ascension Program to Be More Integrated & Comprehensive ML18033B2551990-04-0909 April 1990 Responds to NRC 900309 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-259/89-16,50-260/89-16 & 50-296/89-16.Corrective Actions: Contractor Will Perform Another Check Function Review for Mechanical Calculations & Area Walkdowns Will Be Conducted ML18033B2431990-04-0202 April 1990 Responds to NRC 900302 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-259/89-43,50-260/89-43 & 50-296/89-43.Corrective Action: Surveillance Insp Revised to Prevent Removal of All Eight Emergency Equipment Cooling Water Pumps from Water 1990-09-19
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M' TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY CH ATTANOOGA. TENNESSEE 374o1 400 Chestnut Street Tower II August 28, 1985 Mr. James M. Taylor, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555
Dear Mr. Taylor:
This is in response to J. Nelson Grace's July 22, 1985 letter to H. G. Parris which transmitted the Proposed Civil Penalty Action: EA 85-51 (IE Inspection Report Nos. 50-259/85-13, 50-260/85-13, and 50-296/85-13) for Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant. Our response to the violation is provided in the enclosure.
On August 21, 1985, I discussed with Dave Verrelli of your staff an extension to August 28 for submitting this response.
Fees in response to the proposed civil penalty of $112,500 are being wired to the NRC, Attention: Office of Inspection and Enforcement. This fee is being sent in accordance with your letter to H. G. Parris dated August 5, 1985 regarding EA 84-136 which recommended we reduce the fees from $150,000 to
$112,500 If you have any questions, please call R. E. Alsup at FTS 858-2725.
To the best of my knowledge, I declare the statements contained herein are complete and true.
Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY WnL{.
J. A. Domer, Chief Nuclear Licensing Branch Enclosure cc (Enclosure):
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II ATTN: Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Mr. R. J. Clark Browns Ferry Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 7920 Norfolk Avenue Bethesda, Maryland 20814 gr 288!M8%!r I'd-l'f An Equal Opportunity Employer 8-L
l J
! ENCLOSURE l
) RESPONSE i j NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION
- OF CIVIL PENALTIES
- EA 85-51 (INSFECTION REPORT NOS.
j 50-259/85-13, 50-260/85-13, AND 50-296/85-13)
J i
J. NELSON GRACE'S LETTER TO H. G. PARRIS DATED JULY 22, 1985 i
Item 1 l Technical Specification 3.1 requires that for the reactor protection system there be two operable or tripped trip systems.for each function (Table
', 3.1.A). If two instrument channels for the reactor low water level trip ,
i system are not operable for both trip systems, the appropriate actions
- shall be taken, including the initiation of insertion and completion of insertion of all operable control rods within four hours.
Contrary to the above, this requirement was not met on Unit 3 for the :
l reactor low water level trip system in that two reactor water level 4
instruments (LIS-3-203 A, B) were inoperable on February 13, 1985. At this time, sufficient redundant water level indication existed which should have f alerted the licensee that it was in an action statement condition. The licensee did not initiate and complete insertion of operable control rods
),
within four hours as required by the Technical Specification.
4 This is a Severity Level II violation (Supplement I).
(Civil Penalty -$100,000)
- 1. Admission or Denial of the Alleged Violation
{ TVA admits the violation.
{ 2. Reasons For the Violation
' On February 13, 1985, at 2130, unit 3 was returning to service from a cold shutdown. The unit had been critical since 2058, and reactor
! pressure was approximately 35 psig. At this time, the unit operator I noticed the "B" GEMAC water level indicator, LI-3-60, was indicating '
! approximately 17. inches less than "A" and "C" GEMACs, LI-3-53 and i LI-3-206. At 2136, a half scram was initiated by LIS-3-203D. The unit
! operator immediately raised the water level which cleared the half i
scram. The operator had five water level indicating instruments to I show the water level in the reactor vessel (see Figure). Level &
indicators LI-3-53 and LI-3-206 are GENAC instruments in channel "A."
and they share a common reference leg. Level indicator LI-3-60 is a .
I GENAC inst ~rument and is in channel "B." Yarway instruments LI-3-46A l and LI-3-46B are in channel "A" and "B" respectively, and they have
! separate reference legs from the GENAC instruments. When viewing the five level indicators, the operator initially concluded that LI-3-60 i
f
! was in error since there were four other instruments indicating levels
[ very close to each other at 37 inches and 40 inches. This conclusion caused subsequent problems because it was a misinterpretation of the information provided by the control room indicators. The technical specification requirement for this condition specifies that all
! operable rods are to be inserted within four hours. Due to the
} misinterpretation, rod movements were continued. By 2230, all three control room indicators were indicating the same level. Operability
{ checks on LIS-3-203C and LIS-3-203D verified operability of redundant i low water level scram switches. The event was red phoned to NRC on i February 15, 1985, following review of the circumstances by management '
- and engineering.
4 Although sufficient redundant water level indication existed at the
, time to diagnose a nonconservative error in water level instruments l LIS-3-203 A and B, operator training was not sufficient to ensure correct diagnosis within the timeframe that the condition existed.
j previous operator training had emphasized diagnosis at rated conditions
! and operator actions for the significant water level errors which occur i
under accident and degraded conditions and which affect adequate core
{ cooling. The complexity introduced by the calibration of the various instruments at off-rated conditions impeded diagnosis until af ter the
- condition had returned to normal.
l j 3. Corrective Steps Which Have Been Taken and Results Achieved i
i Browns Ferry unit 3 operated until March 9, 1985, at which time TVA I
removed the unit from service to conduct further investigations.
f Following shutdown, special test number ST-8502 was conducted in an :
I effort to duplicate the operating conditions and level mismatch that j
had occurred. The large mismatch observed on February 13 was not j '
reproduced during the performance of the test, although during the unit cooldown, a saml1 level mismatch was observed. The level mismatch '
increased from one to four inches with reactor pressure approximately t
60 psig, then level indication converged. On subsequent i
I repressurization and depressurization, the mismatch was not dupilcated.
j Visual inspections of level sensing lines, welds, valves, and l instruments were made both inside the drywell (BD) and outside the
- drywell. No leaking lines were intially discovered. Minute leakage at
! valve packings was noted but this leakage was not sufficient to have caused the mismatch experienced, and it is believed that this leakage existed only at operating pressure.
4 t
i i
- .: s -, ~ , , - . . _. _- . ,y_, , , _, , ..., .--.c. ,-,cm_m.. . . . _ - . . . . , . . . , . , , -
. _ _ _ . _ ._ _ _ - _ _ ~ _
j Liquid penetrant non-destructive testing was conducted on selected sensing lines and welds. During preparatory cleaning of the "A"
, channel reference les line (X-28a) at penetration X-28 outside the 4
drywell, a leak was discovered. No leak had been observed at this location during two previous visual inspections. The leak resulted 1 from a crack in the 304 stainless steel sensing piping. From initial l inspection of the crack, metallurgical personnel thought to be j approximately one~ drop every 2 minutes and 17 seconds with the reactor i at atmospheric pressure (measured 13.5 milliliters in 3.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />). This l leakage would have drained some water from the "A" channel reference j leg which would not have been automatically made up via the condensing i -pot when the reactor was at low temperature. Such leakage could have 4
caused or contributed to the level mismatch. The liquid penetrant 1 examinations of the welds and sensing lines adjacent to the X-28 and f I-29 penetrations revealed no other cracks or leaks.
1 i Prior to any line repairs, the inservice inspection group performed j ultrasonic testing of the CEMAC associated sensing lines both inside i and outside the drywell. No bubbles were found in the sensing lines outside of the drywell. A bubble about 8-inches long and approximately
- 1/8 tol/4 inche thick was found near penetration X-28 inside the i
drywell. No other bubbles were found.
i During a time span between March 11 and March 12, 1985, with the l reactor in cold shutdown, reactor water level (JB) indicators LIS-3-53 '
j and LIS-3-206 developed a 19.5-inch indicated level variance compared
] with LIS-3-60 in a period of approximately 17 hours1.967593e-4 days <br />0.00472 hours <br />2.810847e-5 weeks <br />6.4685e-6 months <br />. Repair of the
- leak on the "A" channel reference leg had not been performed at this time. Ultrasonic testing in the drywell revealed that level in "A" reference leg was low by an amount appropriate to the indicated j mismatch. The leakage rate from the cracked line was measured and
! calculations were made to determine if the crack leakage was the cause i of the indicated level variance. It was concluded that the leak was i the cause of the level variance.
d The cracked portion of the line was retaoved along with an attached line (X-28a-1) which was no longer in use. The instruments which had been connected by the X-23a-1 line were associated with low pressure cooling injection (BO) loop selection logic which had previously been removed. Two pipe couplings and a short section of pipe taken from the removed line adjacent to the crack were welded in place.
Subsequent liquid penetrant testing revealed that the short section of replacement pipe was also cracked. This cracked pipe was removed and replaced with another piece of piping taken from the removed line further away from the leaking cracked portion. This section of pipe tested satisfactorily. -
l r
The section of line containing the crack was polished and microscopically inspected onsite by metallurgical personnel. The inspection results revealed the crack to be transgranular stress corrosion instead of fatigue cracking as previously thought. The crack failure mode indicated halogen contamination was likely to exist, thus contaminant swipe checks were made at penetration X-28 and X-29 and associated piping outside the drywell. These tests showed chloride to be the major contaminant present.
Swipe checks wdre also taken inside the drywell from the X-28 and X-29 penetrations to the constant head pot for both "A" and "B" channel water level sesnsing lines. The chloride levels found inside and outside the drywell were only slightly above the expected background levels except adjacent to the X-28 penetration outside the drywell. .
The outside portion of penetration X-28 is located in the reactor water cleanup (RWCU) (CE) heat exchanger room. Significaht levels of chloride contamination were found in this room. During inspection of unit I lines, pitting of the line just below the condensing chamber was observed. These lines were then inspected on unit 3 and swipo checks were taken. Results of checks for both units revealed acceptable levels of chlorides. It is believed the source of chlorides at the X-28 penetration was due to paint on the instsrument lines from the painting of the drywell penetration. The fire retardant in the paint is the actual source of the chlorides. Additionally, a steam leak from the RWCU heat exchanger was observed spraying in the vicinity of the instrument lines during the inspection at power. It is believed the temperature and humidity resulted in leaching of chlorides from the paint chips and resulted in conditions highly favorable for transgranular stress corrosion cracking. The chloride levels at the other locations are believed to be due to non-specific sources (e.g.,
perspiration, concrete dusts, etc.).
Cleaning of the instrument lines, both inside and outside containment, was performed using stainless steel brushes, demineralized water, and Lethanol. Following cleaning, swipe tests were again performed to determine if decontamination efforts were effective. All areas were'at satisfactory levels except the X-28 penetration transition piece and sensing lines located in the immediate area of penetration external to the drywell. The lines and transition piece were again cleaned and 3'
swipe tests made. The results after additional cleaning revealed acceptable chloride levels. After chloride concentrations were reduced, quality control inspectors performed liquid penetrant dye testing of all sensing lines from X-28 penetration to the wall of the RWCU heat exchanger room. This area was selected because this was the 1socation of the leak, and was also the only area where levels of chloride contamination significantly above background IcVels were ,
detected. The examination revealed all lines were satisfactory. An attempt to assess the potential for undetected leakage in the area of the sensing lines was made by taking swipes and measuring the contamination levels on the wall and floor area below the sensing lines. No contamination gradient indicative of preexisting leakage was detected.
Special Test ST-85-3 was prepared and initiated to determine if there was any evidence of post-repair leakage or communication betwoon the reference and variable legs (via equalizing valves, differential pressure transmitter diaphragms, etc.). Leakage at these locations may be proven or discounted by observing a level discrepancy trend and sequentially isolating the instruments at the panel and monitoring the discrepancy trend for change. Following the sensing line repair, all associated instrumentation was returned to service and was monitored for Icakage until March 27, 1985, when the special test was discontinued. No discrepancies were noted during the test or since return to service of the instruments to date.
The observed level mismatch was most likely caused by a loss of water in the "A" instrument reference leg. This investigation has revealed two probabic causes of the loss of water in the "A" reference leg.
One possible cause of the level mismatch was reference Icg leakage via the transgranular stress corrosion cracking that existed adjacent to the X-28 penetration in the reactor water cicanup heat exchanger room.
Leakage from the crack may be varied in quantity due to external f orces applied to the line from thermal expansion, film coating over the interior surface of crack passage, pressure changes, or unknown reasons. The transgranular cracking was caused by chloride contamination.
The more probabic cause, as indicated by supporting calculations which may have been enhanced by the above listed cause, is the potential for the presence of air bubbles in the "A" reference leg. During the refueling outage preceding this event, the "A" reference leg was drained when the vessel icvel was lowered to accomplish jet pump instrument nozzle repairs. In this maintenance process, water icvel was lowered to a point below the range of control room level indicators, and temporary level instrumentation was connected to the "below core plate" sensing line and the drained "A" reference column.
When vessel level was returned to normal, the "A" reference leg was backfilled through an instrument drain line at panel 25-51 using a hose and demineralized water pressure. Due to the number and character of restrictions to flow when backfilling, in conjunction with high points which have been determined to exist in horizontal runs, a bubble may have been trapped in the sensing line. Additionally, it was established that the reactor was maintained at negative pressures (via the main condenser) for several days prior to the November 20, 1984 (discussed below) and February 13, 1985 startups. This, in conjunction with the previously listed cause, could poentially contribute to the introduction of air in the horizontal runs of the reference leg. Upon startup, the bubble could have been compressed in a horizontal run or escaped, thus causing a decrease in water level in the reference leg.
~
The inability to reproduce the level mismatch during shutdown, and the post shutdown ultrasonic examination of the sensing line lend more credibility to escape, rather than compression, of a bubble in the sensing line.
1 I
An experience review survey was conducted for related Browns Ferry )
events and available BWR data. An Licensee Event Report (LER) review indicated two similar occurrences at Browns Ferry:
- In August 1977, during startup of unit 2, "B" reference column instruments read high by 20 inches. Sensing lines and valves checked g for leakage. The reference leg was backfilled.
- In May 1981, during startup of unit 3 LI-3-53 and LI-3-206 failed upscale, and a shutdown commenced. The reference leg was backfilled, and the instruments were brought back into agreement.
A review of unit 3 was made for startups since the refueling outage end in November 1984. There had been six startups on unit 3, with four from cold conditions. Review of logs and recordings indicated an essesntially identical but less pronounced event occurred during i startup on November 20, 1984. This was attributed to a bubble in the reference column. It is noted this was the first startup to pressure 4 after a lengthy refueling outage.
Industry data search yielded 22 other BWR events related to water level instrument problems. Several of the events appears to be directly analogous in that mismatches were observed during shutdown or startup
- situations. For those events for which a cause could be ascertained, leaking fittings or valves were implicated. During power operation, level events involving mismatches appear abruptly and involve of fscale I
- readings. At low pressures or shutdown, mismatches occur gradually as observed at Browns Ferry. Details of these events are included in the engineering report on this matter.
Concerning safety ramifications of the event, the following observations may be made.
- Shif t personnel promptly restored and maintained water level throughout the situation.
- Redundant reactor protection system instrumentation was operable.
- The mismatch introduced about a 30-inch error in sensed level in the affected leg. Assuming a single failure in an unaffected leg, this error in actuation setpoint would be of low consequence considering
- the reactor power and pressure.
Selected primary containment isolation system logic is also on these i instrument columns and the same conclusions as above are pertinent.
- High pressure cooling injection (BC) and reactor core isolation cooling .
(BF) trip logic (high water level) were also affected. These systems are, however, inoperable at low reactor pressure. Experience review indicates that the same scenario is unlikely at rated pressure since failures are abrupt and automatic functions will occur prior to operator intervention.
l l
l l
As explained earlier, the root cause of the event has not been explicitly determined. Reference leg leakage or bubble formation is strongly suggested. The not effect was introduction of a temporary nonconservatism in the instrumentation setpoints. Analysis of the operator action also points out the need for additional training in diagnosing water level instrumentation problems at off-rated condition Operators, plant management, and shift technical advisors received training to enable them to more rapdily diagnose water Icvel indication problems with emphasis on calibration of the various instruments at off-rated conditions and its effect on comparison between instruments.
The need for conservative action on discovery of off-normal situations was also stressed.
- 4. Corrective Steps Which Will Be Taken to Avoid Further Violations The reactor water level instruments are calibrated to be most accurate for certain conditions of pressure and temperatured. The calibration conditions used for level instruments are those corresponding to rated pressure (1000 psig) and rated temperature (546 0F). The method for compensating for off-rated conditions varies from instrument to instrument. For the two of concern here, the compensation for the Yarways is a temperature compensation using heat clamps and the compensation for the GEMACs is an electronic pressure compensation.
These methods of compensation result in water level indications at off-cated conditions which are not exactly indicative of actual Icvel but the variances are predictabic. The operator training progran traditionally has stressed level instrumentrosponse and malfunctions under emergency conditions. Simulator exercises for the diagnosis of level indicator problems will be reviewed and expanded to embrace a general set of postulated malfunctions. This action will be completed in time for the next training rotation (January 1986). This additional training is particularly appropriate in that the experience search indicates this type event is not particularly unusual and is also consistent with the importance placed on water level instrumentation.
Further, this training should preclude the confusion which led to the miscommunication and lack of aggressive action on the part of the c :re;rts in their resolution of the reactor water level indication d: (<.re ancies. The reported events at low power have relatively minor sa.e y consequences; however, this additional training may assist operators in avoiding more serious conditions under more unfavorable circumstances.
The classroom training described in item 3 will also be repeated before the next unit startup.
- 5. Date When Full Compliance Will Be Achieved Full compliance will be achieved on completion of the described training. This should be accomplished by April 15, 1986.
Item 2 10 CFR part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI requires that measures be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality be promptly identified and corrected. These measures must assure that the cause of the condition is determined and corrective action is taken to preclude repetition.
Contrary to the above, on November 20, 1984 reactor vessel water level instrument problems were identified in that the Shif t Engineer and Assistant Shifi Engineer logs indicated that the GENAC B narrow range instrument (LI-3-60) was reading approximately 11 inches lower than CEMACs A and C (LI-3-53 and LI-3-206 respectively). The cause of this discrepant condition was not determined and corrective actions were not taken to preclude repetition in that on February 13, 1985, the same instruments were similarly providing inconsistent readings.
This is a Severity Level III violation (Supplement I).
(Civil penalty - $50,000)
- l. Admission or Denial of the Alleged Violation TVA admits this violation.
- 2. Reasons For the Violation Due to the training deficiency outlined in response to violation 1, plant personnel and management did not correctly diagnose that the earlier event affected the vessel level instruments in a nonconservative manner and that a degraded condition existed. Failure to fully recognize the degraded condition led directly to failure to investigate and take appropriate corrective action.
- 3. Corrective Steps Which Have Been Taken and Results Achieved Af ter the similar event of February 13, 1985, operators, management, and shift technical advisors received training as outlined in our response to Violation 1. This training has resulted in improving the plant staff's ability to correctly diagnose water level instrument anomalies which will cause appropriate identification of degraded conditions and initiation of corrective actions.
- 4. Corrective Steps Which Will Be Taken to Avoid Further violations Refer to Violation 1. .
- 5. Date When Full Compliance Will Be Achieved Refer to Violation 1.
Item 3 10 CFR 50.72 requires each nuclear power reactor licensee to notify the NRC as soon as practical and in all cases within one hour of the occurrence of any event during operation that results in the condition of the nuclear power plant being seriously degraded.
Contrary to the above, two low water level instrument channels, one in each Reactor Protection System trip system, were inoperable during a reactor startup on February 13, 1985. This seriously degraded condition was not reported to the NRC until approximately forty-three hours af ter the event occurred when a one-hour report was filed.
This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I).
- 1. Admission or Denial of the Alleged Violation TVA admits this violation.
- 2. Reasons For the Violation The event occurred between approximately 2100 and 2230 on February 13, 1985. The entire naturo of the instrumentation problem was not recognized at that time. Investigation and reportability was referred to plant management and engineering. An investigation was begun early on February 14, and it was determined during that day that instruments LIS 3-203 A and B were nonconservative. The NRC resident inspector was i
briefed on the progress of the investigation at 0700 and again at 1200 on that same day. However, due to the attention focused on the investigation, reporting pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 was overlooked until the following day.
- 3. Corrective Steps Which Have Been Taken and Results Achieved J
On discovery that an Emergency Notification System (ENS) report for the event had been unintentionally neglected; an immediate report was initiated to the Commission in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 requirements. In addition, responsibility has been placed with the Shif t Technical Advisor unit supervisor to review each potentially reportable event, as documented by a Licensee Reportable Event Determination (LRED). Further, the supervisor will ensure cach LRED is completed and dispositioned for ENS reportability in a timely manner and in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 requirements.
- 4. Corrective Steps Which Will Be Taken to Avoid Further Violations .
No further corrective action is required.
- 5. Date When Full Compilance Will Be Achieved Full compliance has been achieved.
- ._ _ _ _ _ -