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Insp Repts 50-324/85-19 & 50-325/85-19 on 850624-28. Violations Noted:Deficiencies in Pipe Support & Anchor Bolt Installation & Insp & Failure to Meet Code Requirements in Pipe Support Weld Design
	ML20133F889
Person / Time
Site:	Brunswick
Issue date:	07/16/1985
From:	Blake J, Liu W; NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20133F846	List: ML20133F842; ML20133F880; ML20133F889;
References
	50-324-85-19, 50-325-85-19, IEB-79-02, IEB-79-14, IEB-79-2, NUDOCS 8508080471
	Download: ML20133F889 (6)
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f UNITED STATES

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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- Report Nos.: 50-325/85-19 and 50-324/85-19

Licensee: Carolina Power and Light Company

P. O. Box 1551

Raleigh, NC 27602

Docket Nos.: 50-325 and 50-324 License Nos.: DPR-71 and DPR-62

Facility Name: Brunswick 1 and 2

Inspection Conducted: June 24-28, 1985

Inspector: b4 '

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W. C. Liu Date Signed

Approved by: , [. f#) MW 7 /4/8'T

J. J. Blake, Section Chieff (/ Uate Signed

Engineering Branch

Division of Reactor Safety

SUMMARY

Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection entailed 33 inspector-hours on site

in the areas of mechanical maintenance associated with modified and newly

installed pipe support and restraint systems; pipe support baseplate designs

using concrete expansion anchor bolts; and inspector followup items.

Results: Two violations were identified - Deficiencies in pipe support and

, anchor bolt installation and inspection; and failure to meet code requirements in

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pipe support weld design - paragraph 6.b.

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REPORT DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

P. Howe, Vice President - Brunswick Nuclear Plant (BNP)

C. Dietz, General Manager - Brunswick Steam Electric Plant (BSEP)

T. Wyllie, Manager, Engineering and Construction

E. Bishop, Assistant to General Manager

J. Holder, Manager, Outages - BNP

L. Jones, Director - Quality Assurance / Quality Control (QA/QC)

C. Blackman, Jr., Superintendent - Operations

K. Enzor, Director, Regulatory Compliance

J. O'Sullivan, Manager, Maintenance

B. Monroe, Principal Engineer

J. McKee, QC Supervisor

W. Dorman, QA Supervisor

R. Poulk, Senior Regulatory Specialist

Other licensee employees contacted included QC inspectors, engineers,

security force members, and office personnel.

NRC Resident Inspectors

W. Ruland, Senior Resident Inspector

L. Garner, Resident Inspector

T. Hicks, Resident Inspector

Attended exit interview

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on June 28, 1985, with

those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspector described the

areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings listed

below. No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.

(0 pen) Violation 325, 324/85-19-01, Deficiencies in pipe support and anchor

bolt installation and inspection, paragraph 6.b.

(0 pen) Violation 324/85-19-02, Failure to meet code requirements in pipe

support weld design, paragraph 6.b.

The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to

or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters

This subject was not addressed in the inspection.

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4. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.

5. Inspector Followup Item (92701)

(Closed) -Inspector Followup Item 324, 325/83-01-02, Plant Unique Analysis

Report - Electric Penetration Box Relocation. The calculations showed that

the maximum stresses at the bottom plate and at the door of the electric

penetration box were unacceptable as compared with the allowable values. As

a result, the licensee decided to eliminate the box and to utilize a splice

approach. The inspector held discussions with licensee representative and

reviewed related documents. It was found that the modification had been

completed for both units. This item is considered closed.

6. Safety-Related Pipe Support and Restaint Systems, and Pipe Support Baseplate

Designs Using Concrete Expansion Anchor Bolts (IE Bulletins 79-14 and 79-02)

a. Documents and Procedures Review

The -inspector reviewed portions of the following documents and

procedures pertaining to safety-related pipe supports and concrete

anchor bolts to determine whether appropriate procedures have been

established and whether they comply with NRC requirements and the

licensee commitments.

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SDG-2 Structural Design Guide for Design of Pipe Supports,

March 20, 1985

- Specification 248-107 Installation of Seismic Pipe Supports and

Miscellaneous Structural Steel, May 11, 1985

- QCP-203, Inspection of Pipe Supports, June 14, 1984

b. Field Inspection of Pipe Supports and Concrete Anchor Bolts, Units 1

and 2

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The inspector conducted a general inspection of pipe supports and

concrete anchor bolts in the Units 1 and 2 Reactor Building areas. The

inspector selected and examined the following pipe supports that had

previously been QC inspected for a verification inspection to determine

the effectiveness of the licensee's program.

Support Number Pipe System BNP Unit No.

1SW-142-PG409, Rev. A Service Water 1

1E11-128-PG600, Rev. A Service Water 1

1E11-128-PG249, Rev. A Service Water 1

PS-4349, Rev. A Service Water 1

1RCC-10PG246, Rev. D Closed Cooling Water 1

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1PS-9, Rev. O Residual Heat

Removal (RHR) 1

(inside torus)-

1PS-13, Rev. 0 .RHR inside torus 1

IPS-14 Rev. O RHR inside torus 1

IPS-18, Rev. O RHR inside torus 1

PS-3695, Rev. B Radwaste Drain 2

PS-7384, Rev. C Radwaste Drain 2

2E11-127-PG1002, Rev. A RHR 2

2E11-128-PG251 Rev. B RHR 2

2E11-126-PG1001, Rev. A RHR 2

.The above fourteen supports were partially inspected against their

detail drawings for configuration, identification, location, fastener

installation, welds, and damage / protection. These supports were either

modified or newly installed as a result of the torus modifications, IE

Bulletin 79-14 requirements, and the new pipe additions. In general,

the appearance of the supports was good and the supports were installed

in accordance with design documents with the exception of four supports

identified below:

(1) Support No. ISW-142-PG409, Rev. A, in the Unit 1 Service Water

System was inspected. It was noted that portions of the support

were not installed in accordance with the design drawing and the

manufacturer's instructions. Both the design drawing and the

manufacturer's instruction showed a bolt connection for the two

strut assemblies. Studs were actually used in the installation.

Furthermore, the studs were installed with double nuts on one side

and a single nut on the other. No locking device was found on the

single nut side.

(2) Support No. PS-7384, Rev. C, in the Unit 2 radwaste drain s,, tem

was examined. It was noted on sheet 5 that the l'-3 1/2" and

l' - 1 1/2" measured dimensions were incorrectly marked down on the

as-built drawing in that these two dimensions should have been

interchanged.

(3)_ Support No. PS-3695, Rev. B, in the Unit 2 radwaste drain system

was inspected. It was found that a 1/8"' fillet weld was specified

by the design drawing for connecting the end attachment to the

baseplate. Since the end attachment is 3/8" thick and the base

plate is 3/4" thick, in accordance with the American Welding

Society (AWS D1.1) code requirements, the minimum size of fillet

weld should be 1/4".

(4) Support No. 2E11-127-PG1002, Rev. A, in the Unit 2 RHR system was

examined. It was noted that a 1/4" fillet weld was specified by

the design drawing. The column and the baseplate had a thickness

of 1/2" and 1", respectively. In accordance with the American

Institute of Steel Construction (AISC) code requirements, the

minimum size of fillet weld should be 5/16".

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Paragraph 7.1 of Brunswick Structural Design Guide, SDG-2, for

design of pipe supports, requires that welds shown on design

drawings be in accordance with AISC and AWS D1.1 unless otherwise

noter.. In addition, the paragraph requires that welds which are to

be 'n accordance with AISC and ANSI B31.1 conform to the weld deta*1

and joint preparation requirements of AWS D1.1 code. Paragraph

II.4 of Brunswick specification No. 248-107 Installation of

Seismic Pipe Supports, requires that QC verifications shall be

made to insure that catalogue components identified and called for

on the design drawings have been used in the support and that

construction shall be responsible for insuring that erection

activities are in compliance with the design drawings. Paragraph

XII.1 of the specification requires that all welding shall comply

with AWS D1.1 unless the design drawing specifies particular welds

to be made in accordance with ASME or ANSI B31.1. Procedure

QCP-203, Inspection of Pipe Supports, requires that QA/QC verify

that all hardware, such as bolts, nuts, clamps, etc., is installed

as shown on the design drawings. Missing hardware will be

documented per procedure QCP-401.

Discrepancies identified from the aforementioned (1) and (2)

supports indicate that portions of the supports were not installed

and verified in accordance with the design drawings and the above

procedural requirements. This is a violation of 10 CFR 50,

Appendix B, Criterion V, and is identified as an example of

Violation 325, 324/85-19-01, Deficiencies in pipe support and

anchor bolt installation and inspection.

Discrepancies identified from the aforementioned (3) and (4)

supports reveal that portions of the supports were improperly

designed in that the weld sizes specified by the design drawings

did not meet the applicable code requirements. As a result, these

supports may not be able to perform their intended function as

required by the applicable codes. This is a violation of 10 CFR

50, Appendix B, Criterion III, and is identified as Violation

324/85-19-02, Failure to meet code requirements in pipe support

weld design.

During the inspection, the inspector noted that the safety-related

steel frame in the Unit 2 reactor building at elevation 50 foot

was found in an unacceptable condition in that one anchor bolt in

each of the two baseplates was improperly installed. There was no

bearing contact between the nuts and the baseplates. As a result,

these two anchor bolts may not be able to perform their intended

function as required by the design. The inspector held discussions

with licensee representatives with regard to the above anchor bolt

status. The licensee subsequently took immediate action by inspecting

76 anchor bolts in the Unit 1 and 76 anchor bolts in the Unit 2 reactor

building area. The licensee further identified seven anchor bolts in

the Unit 1 area and 12 anchor bolts in the Unit 2 area that were

improperly installed

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in terms of no bearing contact between the nuts and the

baseplates. The deficiencies identified above are a violation of

10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, and are identified as another

example of Violation 325, 324/85-19-01, Deficiencies in pipe

support and anchor bolt installation and inspection.

In addition to the above findings, the inspector noted that no

acceptance criteria were found in the licensee's inspection

, procedures relative to bolts versus studs installation, tightening

of locknut installation, and torque requirements for strut and

rigid rod installation. The inspector held discussions with the

licensee representatives with respect to the above concern. It

was found that the licensee was very responsive in resolving the

above concern in that the related document was revised immediately

to include the aforementioned acceptance criteria.

Within the areas inspected, two violations were identified.

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ML20133F889

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