ML20127L429
| ML20127L429 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 06/24/1985 |
| From: | Baird J, Hackney C, Martin L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20127L412 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-313-85-10, 50-368-85-10, NUDOCS 8506280015 | |
| Download: ML20127L429 (11) | |
See also: IR 05000313/1985010
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' APPENDIX
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, U.-S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV~
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- NRC* Inspection Report: 5'0-313/85-10
Licenses:
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50-368/85-10l
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. Dockets:'50-313-
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'L'icensee:I Arkansas' Power & Light Company
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P.O.' Box 551
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.Little Rock; Arkansas 72203
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' Facility Name:
Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO) Units-1 and 2
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' Inspection At: Arkansas Nuclear One, Russellville, Arkansas
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' Inspection _ Conducted : April 22-26, 1985
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Inspector: E O O.l4Odsh,
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C. A. Hackney, Emergency Prep) redness Analyst
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Other Accompanying Personnel: ;R. Hall, Chief, EP&RPB, RIV (April 25-26, 1985 only)
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D..Matthews, Chief, EPB, OIE
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'C. Wisner, Public Affairs Officer, Region IV -
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M.'Moeller, Battelle
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J. Kenoyer, Battelle
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A. Smith, Battelle
M. Good, Comex Corporation
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Approved:
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J. B. Baird, Chief, Emergency /Preppredness Section
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L. E. Martin, Ch1ef,
Project Section A
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Reactor Project Branch 2
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Inspection Summary
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Inspection Conducted April 22-26, 1985 (Report 50-313/85-10; 50-368/85-10)
~ Areas Inspected:
Routine, announced i'nspection of_the licensee's performance
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s and capabilities during 'an exercise of the emergency plan and procedures. The
inspection involved 232 inspection-hours by 7 NRC and contractor inspectors.
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-Results: 'Within the emergency response areas inspected no violations or
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deviations were identified. ~Three deficiencies were, identified (initiating.and
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paragraph 7; demonstration of downgrading of
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emergency classification
paragraph 7; and demonstration of radiological.
protection
paragraph 12).
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DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted
Principal Licensee Personnel
- Levine, J., ANO General Manager
- Tull, M., Emergency Planning Coordinator
- Enos, T. , Licensing -Manager
- Baker, B., Operations Manager
- Hollis, H., Security Coordinator
- Campbell, G., Vice President Nuclear
- 8oyd, D., Emergency Planning Coordinator
- Van Buskirk, F., Emergency Planning Coordinator
Pool, R., Assistant Radiochemistry Supervisor
Binkley, D., Emergency Planning Trainer
State of Arkansas
Wilson, F., Director, Radiation Control And Emergency Management Programs
Meyers, C., Manager, Nuclear Planning And Response Program
NRC
Johnson, W., Senior Resident Inspector
- Harrell, P., Resident Inspector
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
Lookabaugh, A., Chief, Technological Hazards Branch
Jones, G., Community Planner, Technological Hazards Branch
The NRC inspectors also held discussions with other station and corporate
personnel in the areas of health physics, operations, emergency response
organization, quality assurance, training and records management.
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- Denotes-those present at the exit interview.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings
-(Closed) Open item (313/8211-13; 368/8209-13): The operational support
center was adequately informed of plant status during the exercise.
(0 pen) Open Item (313/8211-49; 368/8209-49): There was not a complete
shift change of personnel in the technical support center (TSC).
(Closed) Open Item (313/8211-84; 368/8209-84): Projected dose and
integrated dose were calculated.
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(0 pen) Open Item (313/8211-89; 368/8209-89): Offsite data from the state
was not used by licensee dose assessment personnel.
(Closed) Open Item (313/8408-01; 368/8408-01): A full compliment of
control personnel was provided for the control room.
(Closed) Open Item (313/8408-02; 368/8408-02): Detection and
classification observed during the exercise were timely and correct.
Additional emergency plan and procedure training had been provided for the
shift operations supervisors (SOSs).
(Closed) Open Item (313/8408-03; 368/8408-03): The shift administrative
assistant (SAA) was available in the control room and additional
assistance was provided during the exercise.
(Closed) Open Item (313/8408-04; 368/8408-04): Personnel in the control
room, T3C, and the emergency operations facility (EOF) were aware of the
change of command and the location of the emergency director.
(Closed) Open Item (313/8408-05; 368/8408-05): Protective action
recommendations, notifications, and dose assessment were transferred from
the control room to the TSC in a timely manner.
(Closed) Open Item (313/8408-06; 368/8408-06): The state was contacted
from the TSC and radiological information was exchanged.
(0 pen) Open item (313/8408-11; 368/8408-11): The medical portion of the
exercise was not observed onsite during this inspection.
3.
Exercise Scenario
The scenario was written to test the reactor operations personnel, onsite
and offsite monitoring personnel, first aid, fire team, and other support
functions. The scenario challenged the operations personnel for emergency
classification, notification, and dose assessment. The onsite and offsite
radiological monitoring teams had the opportunity to demonstrate the use
of emergency procedures and radiological monitoring equipment during a
night time exercise.
4.
Control Room
The exercise was initiated at 1758 with the leak rate in the primary
system exceeding a technical specification limit for the Unit 2 reactor.
The initial exercise conditions were given to the SOS and the SOS declared
a Notification Of Unusual Event based upon the emergency action level in
the emergency procedures.
State officials were notified within 10 minutes
after the emergency had been declared. The Duty Emergency Coordinator
(DEC) was notified according to the personnel notification procedure.
He
arrived onsite 22 minutes after having been paged.
The NRC resident
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inspector was notified at his residence and he reported directly to the
control room.- The DEC was briefed by the SOS as to the plant conditions,
notifications, and emergency classification.
An Alert was declared at 1959 due to increased reactor coolant system
leakage. The DEC relieved the SOS of his emergency coordinator function
and assumed command of the emergency coordinator function. The state was
notified of the Alert class at 2009.
The NRC operations center was
notified and given an hourly update over the emergency notification system
(ENS) telephone. Plant augmentation was started at 2012 by the SAA.
The
SOS requested additional assistance for the SAA when he considered the
Unit 2 SAA to be overloaded in performing offsite notifications, dose
assessment, and communicating with offsite agencies. Due to apparent
degradation of the plant, the SOS requested an hourly sample and analysis
of the primary coolant water.
The NRC inspector.noted that the senior reactor operator (SRO) was the
communicator that maintained an open line with the NRC on the ENS. The
reactor operator was without immediate technical assistance since the SOS
and the SRO were performing other emergency functions.
A loss of number 1 diesel generator and loss of offsite power occurred at
2120. The SOS declared a Site Area Emergency and ordered evacuation of
all nonessential personnel. The NRC inspector noted that there was not an
audible or visual indication in the control room that the site evacuation
alarm had sounded or the verbal message had been broadcast over the plant
address system.
The TSC had been activated and declared operational at 2100. The DEC was
relieved by the Emergency Coordinator (EC) in the TSC and all offsite
coordination functions were to be performed by the emergency personnel in
the TSC.
Based on the above findings, improvements in the following areas should be
considered:
(0 pen) Open Item (313/8510-01; 368/8510-01): Assign a communicator for
the ENS, pursuant to 10 CFR Part 50.72(c), that will not reduce the reactor
operators technical support.
(0 pen) Open Item (313/8510-02; 368/8510-02):
Provide a mechanism for the
control room personnel to be assured that the site evacuation alarm is
activated and that the site personnel message is broadcast.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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5.
Technical Support Centy
The NRC inspector noted that the TSC staff appeared to adequately perform
their duties as assigned by the EC.
The EC took command from the DEC at
2100 and assumed all offsite coordination functions.
personnel informed of plant status, and held regular staff briefings.
The
NRC inspector noted that radiological surveys were conducted both inside
and outside the TSC during the exercise.
The NRC inspector noted that the personnel status board had additional
emergency response personnel identified that were not listed in the
emergency plan or procedures.
It was noted that the additional personnel
were an asset to the EC and provided logistical and technical support
during the exercise.
It is recommended that those additional support
personnel be reviewed for need, and incorporated into the Emergency
Response Organization, if justified.
The NRC inspectors noted that the TSC staff supported the control room
operators at the initial stages of the exercise and continued to support
the control room operators throughout the exercise.
Further, the TSC
staff initiated a recovery and reentry plan during the final phase of the
exercise.
The NRC inspector noted that prior to transmitting the General Emergency
notice to the state there was considerable time expended to obtain the
latest radiological information so that the information could be sent with
the General Emergency information being telefaxed to the state.
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information was sent to the state 15 minutes after the General Emergency
was declared.
Following the initial accountability of plant personnel, it was determined
'that accountability was not being performed to maintain account of TSC
personnel during the remainder of the exercise.
Based on the above observation, improvement in the following area should
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be considered:
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'(0 pen) Open Item (313/8510-03; 368/8510-03):
Following the completion of
plant personnel accountability, establish and maintain accountability of
personnel assigned to the TSC.
6.
Dose Assessment
Following the initial portion of the exercise, dose assessment was
conducted in the TSC.
The gaseous effluent radiological monitoring system
(GERMS) was activated for performing dose assessment.
The GERMS was
preprogrammed with meteorological, radiological, and other variables to
follow the accident scenario.
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The NRC inspector noted that the dose assessment team did not evaluate the
dose rates and summation doses in the affected sectors versus the source
term, plume centerline results or offsite radiological monitoring team
measurements.
It was noted-that the TSC dose assessment team did not
attempt to obtain or use the state offsite radiological monitoring
information.
Based on the above findings, improvement in the following area should be
considered:
(0 pen) Open Item (313/8510-04; 368/8510-04):
Include radiological data
from offsite monitoring or other sources in the evaluation of GERMS dose
assessment reports.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
The EOF W3s prepared for operation in a timely manner. The NRC inspectors
noted an unusual number of personnel utilized for setting up the EOF prior
to the arrival of the emergency response organization (ER0) personnel from
Little Rock, Arkansas.
The EOF was staffed with an adequate number of
personnel.
The NRC inspector noted that personnel were listed on the
status boards that were not indicated in the emergency plan or procedures.
It is recommended that those additional personnel be identified and included
in the emergency response plan, if justified.
The E0F Director (EOFD) arrived at the EOF and promptly assigned personnel
to their emergency tasks.
It was noted that the EOF was not activated
within the time recommended in NUREG-0737, Supplement 1.
This had been
identified as an unresolved item (313/8502-03; 368/8502-03) prior to
the exercise and action on this item was not completed at the time of this
inspection.
Furthermore, the EOFD delayed relieving the TSC EC for
approximately 80 minutes after arriving at the E0F. During the delay the
plant conditions degraded and a General Emergency was declared.
The NRC inspector noted that the EOFD kept the staff appraised of plant
status and events. However, the EOFD briefings did not include
onsite/offsite radiological conditions or state and local events. The
plant status boards were maintained and kept up to date during the
exercise.
The NRC incident response center experienced difficulty in establishing
and maintaining contact with the EOF during the exercise.
In addition,
communicators were not designated to communicate with the NRC at the EOF.
The exercise was terminated during a General Emergency class at
approximately 0300 hours0.00347 days <br />0.0833 hours <br />4.960317e-4 weeks <br />1.1415e-4 months <br />. The status boards indicated that a release was
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ongoing and the reactor:was not in a stable condition.
The licensee did
not demonstrate termination of the release, placing of the reactor in a
stable condition and downgrading of the emergency class.
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Based on observations by the NRC inspector in the E0F, the following items
are considered to be_ emergency preparedness deficiencies:
The capability to downgrade and reclassify the accident following
mitigation of the accident was not demonstrated.
(313/8510-05;
368/8510-05).'
The E0F communication system procedures did not adequately support
communication with offsite agencies.
(313/8510-06; 368/8510-06).
Based on the above findings, improvement in the following area should be
considered:
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(0 pen) Open Item (313/8510-07; 368/8510-07):
Assign an individual (s) in
the EOF responsibility for communicating with the NRC.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Operational Support Centers
The radiation protection operational support center (OSC) was activated in
a timely manner. The team leader took charge of the area and made team
assignments.
Members of the team appeared to be adequately trained in the
proper use of their instruments and proccdures.
Team members were briefed
prior to being dispatched to monitor / radiological conditions in the plant.
The NRC noted that a status board was maintain'ed for radiological
conditions and personnel accountability, however, there was not a procedure
to maintain personnel accountability in the OSC.
The NRC inspector noted
that several key procedures were mot in the onsite equipment cabinet.
In
particular, "EPIP 1903.43 Duties'of Emergency Radiation Team" and the
equipment / operational checklist were not in the cabinet.
Based on the above observations, improvement in the following areas should
be considered:
(0 pen) Open Item (313/8510-08; 368/8510-08):
Ensure appropriate copies of
checklist and procedures are in the emergency cabinet.
(0 pen) Open Item (313/8510-09; 368/85-09):
Develop and implement an
accountability procedure for the OSC..
No violations or deviations were identified.
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99. ~ [ Fire Team
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~The fire team members responded to the fire in a timely manner.
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team leader established communications with the control room. .Necessary^
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fire _ team members'had to be prompted to take an active role in the
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scenario; .The NRC. inspector noted that team members were not familiar
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with the.use' of their communication equipment that may be used with the
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, self-contained breathing apparatus.
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Based on the above observations, improvement in the following area.should
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(0 pen) Open' Item (313/8510-10; 368-8510-10):
Provide training for all
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-fire team members in the use of communications equipment.
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No violations'or deviations were identified.
10. -PostJAccident Sampiing
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Personnel were familiar with the required procedures and appropriate
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equipment.
Interaction between the radiochemist and the radiation
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protection personnel appeared to be excellent.
Pre-sampling briefings
were thorough. -However, the post accident sample building had water
covering most of the. floor, this was considered a safety concern due to
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the~ electronic equipment being used in the facility.
The NRC inspector
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also noted that the automatic liquid nitrogen fill system was inoperable.
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During an accident personnel may have to go into a high radiological area
to obtain liquid nitrogen ,for. the multi-channel analyzer.
Based on the above observation, improvement in the following area should-
be considered:
(0 pen) Open Item (313/8510-11; 368/8510-11):
Provide an alternate method
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for-~ obtaining liquid nitrogen outside a potentially high. radiation-area if
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the automatic fill system should fail.
No violations or deviations were identified.
11.
Security / Accountability
The nonessential personnel evacuation alarm was activated at a Site Area
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Emergency at 2128." LThe accountability of station personnel was completed
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at 2236; a total time'of 68 minutes to complete the accountability.
process. This exceeds the 30 minutes guidance of NUREG-0654 by a'
significant amount.
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Based on this observation, improvement in the following area should be
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(0 pen) Open Item (313/8510-12; 368/8510-12):
Review the accountability
process and provide procedures to accomplish accountability according to
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the NUREG-0654 guidance criterion of 30 minutes.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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12. Offsite Radiological Monitoring
The NRC inspector observed the formation and dispatch of the offsite
radiological monitoring team. The teams were notified to report to the
plant at the Alert class. Onsite team members began arriving at the OSC
in approximately 10 minutes.
The offsite team members began arriving in
approximately 45 minutes.
Team members were briefed as to their duties and requested to'get their
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equipment, inventory the kits, and go to their designated area.
The team
members used the procedures provided in the kits, and performed activities
as they were requested from the TSC and the EOF.
Team members did not
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use, or simulate, the use of the respiratory protective equipment and
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anti-contamination clothing.
Further, the team was on the edge of the
plume and when the wind shifted the team was notified that the
radiological readings were increasing and the team remained in the plume.
Upon returaing to the EOF the team did not survey the vehicle or
themselves for radiological contamination.
Based on observations by the NRC inspectors, the following item is
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considered to be an emergency preparedness deficiency:
Offsite radiological monitoring team members did rjot demonstrate adequate
radiological protection procedures during the exercise.
(313/8510-13;
368/8510-13)
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Public Relations / Media
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The NRC inspector observed that the. joint information center =(JIC) was
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staffed in timely manner considerhg the JIC's distance from the AP&L
office in Little Rock,, Arkansas.
The licensee staff assig'ned to the JIC
staff for the exercise was sufficient to carry out their assigned duties,
and it was noted that there were additional personnel available in Little
Rock. News releases were coordinated with the appropriate representatives
and released in a timely manner.
The news conferences were held in a time
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frame which was commensurate with the events as they were happening in the
scenario without any indication of anticipatory action. The information
available during the news conference was adequate. However, consideration
should be given to providing media training to those individuals
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responsible for conducting news conferences and prioritizing information
to be disseminated to the public.
The performance of all personnel in the JIC was adequate during the
exercise, also, coordination of information with the state was adequate.
No violations or deviations were identified.
14.
Exercise Critique
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The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to
determine that deficiencies identified as a result of the exercise and
weaknesses noted in the licensee's emergency response program were
identified for corrective actions as required by 10 CFR 50.47 (b)(14),
10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.E, and the guidance criteria in
The licensee critique of the emergency exercise was held with exercise
controllers, key exercise participants, licensee management, and NRC
personnel attending. The deficiencies and weaknesses identified as a
result of this exercise were, in most cases, similar to the NRC
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inspectors' findings.
Corrective action taken by the licensee for
identified deficiencies and weakness will be reviewed during subsequent
NRC inspections.
No violations or deviations were identified.
15.
Exit Meeting
The exit interview was conducted on April 26, 1985, with licensee
representatives.
Mr. P. Harrell, NRC resident inspector, was in
attendance.
Mr. C. A. Hackney, the NRC team leader, Mr. R. E. Hall,
Chief, Emergency Preparedness and Radiological Protection Branch,
Region IV, Mr. D. Matthews, Chief, Emergency Preparedness Branch, I&E,
and other staff members represented the NRC.
Mr. C. A. Hackney summarized
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the team comments and observations in the subject areas of the exercise
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scenario, control room, TSC, OSC, fire team, offsite monitoring and
public affairs.
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