ML20127L429

Insp Repts 50-313/85-10 & 50-368/85-10 on 850422-26.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Deficiency Noted:Initiating & Maintaining Communications & Demonstration of Downgrading Emergency Classification

ML20127L429
Person / Time
Site:	Arkansas Nuclear
Issue date:	06/24/1985
From:	Baird J, Hackney C, Martin L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20127L412	List: ML20127L407 ML20127L429
References
50-313-85-10, 50-368-85-10, NUDOCS 8506280015
Download: ML20127L429 (11)

See also: IR 05000313/1985010

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' APPENDIX

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, U.-S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV~

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NRC* Inspection Report: 5'0-313/85-10 Licenses: DPR-51

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50-368/85-10l NPF-6

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. Dockets:'50-313- 4

50-368'

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'L'icensee:I Arkansas' Power & Light Company

,;' r. P.O.' Box 551

.Little Rock; Arkansas 72203

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. ' Facility Name: Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO) Units-1 and 2 H

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' Inspection At: Arkansas Nuclear One, Russellville, Arkansas

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' Inspection _ Conducted : April 22-26, 1985

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Inspector: E O O.l4Odsh, 9 19-8 [

C. A. Hackney, Emergency Prep) redness Analyst Date

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Other Accompanying Personnel: ;R. Hall, Chief, EP&RPB, RIV (April 25-26, 1985 only)

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D..Matthews, Chief, EPB, OIE -

i, 'C. Wisner, Public Affairs Officer, Region IV -

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M.'Moeller, Battelle

J. Kenoyer, Battelle

, A. Smith, Battelle

M. Good, Comex Corporation

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Approved: *b 7 P Lf -/T

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J. B. Baird, Chief, Emergency /Preppredness Section Date

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L. E. Martin, Ch1ef,

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Inspection Summary

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Inspection Conducted April 22-26, 1985 (Report 50-313/85-10; 50-368/85-10)

~ Areas Inspected: Routine, announced i'nspection of_the licensee's performance

..' s and capabilities during 'an exercise of the emergency plan and procedures. The

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inspection involved 232 inspection-hours by 7 NRC and contractor inspectors.

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, -Results: 'Within the emergency response areas inspected no violations or 'f

deviations were identified. ~Three deficiencies were, identified (initiating.and

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maintaining communications paragraph 7; demonstration of downgrading of

.' emergency classification paragraph 7; and demonstration of radiological.

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protection paragraph 12).

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DETAILS

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1. Persons Contacted

Principal Licensee Personnel

• Levine, J., ANO General Manager

• Tull, M., Emergency Planning Coordinator

• Enos, T. , Licensing -Manager

• Baker, B., Operations Manager

• Hollis, H., Security Coordinator

• Campbell, G., Vice President Nuclear

• 8oyd, D., Emergency Planning Coordinator

• Van Buskirk, F., Emergency Planning Coordinator

Pool, R., Assistant Radiochemistry Supervisor

Binkley, D., Emergency Planning Trainer

State of Arkansas

Wilson, F., Director, Radiation Control And Emergency Management Programs

Meyers, C., Manager, Nuclear Planning And Response Program

NRC

Johnson, W., Senior Resident Inspector

• Harrell, P., Resident Inspector

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

Lookabaugh, A., Chief, Technological Hazards Branch

Jones, G., Community Planner, Technological Hazards Branch

The NRC inspectors also held discussions with other station and corporate

personnel in the areas of health physics, operations, emergency response

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organization, quality assurance, training and records management.

• Denotes-those present at the exit interview.

2. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

-(Closed) Open item (313/8211-13; 368/8209-13): The operational support

center was adequately informed of plant status during the exercise.

(0 pen) Open Item (313/8211-49; 368/8209-49): There was not a complete

shift change of personnel in the technical support center (TSC).

(Closed) Open Item (313/8211-84; 368/8209-84): Projected dose and

integrated dose were calculated.

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(0 pen) Open Item (313/8211-89; 368/8209-89): Offsite data from the state

was not used by licensee dose assessment personnel.

(Closed) Open Item (313/8408-01; 368/8408-01): A full compliment of

control personnel was provided for the control room.

(Closed) Open Item (313/8408-02; 368/8408-02): Detection and

classification observed during the exercise were timely and correct.

Additional emergency plan and procedure training had been provided for the

shift operations supervisors (SOSs).

(Closed) Open Item (313/8408-03; 368/8408-03): The shift administrative

assistant (SAA) was available in the control room and additional

assistance was provided during the exercise.

(Closed) Open Item (313/8408-04; 368/8408-04): Personnel in the control

room, T3C, and the emergency operations facility (EOF) were aware of the

change of command and the location of the emergency director.

(Closed) Open Item (313/8408-05; 368/8408-05): Protective action

recommendations, notifications, and dose assessment were transferred from

the control room to the TSC in a timely manner.

(Closed) Open Item (313/8408-06; 368/8408-06): The state was contacted

from the TSC and radiological information was exchanged.

(0 pen) Open item (313/8408-11; 368/8408-11): The medical portion of the

exercise was not observed onsite during this inspection.

3. Exercise Scenario

The scenario was written to test the reactor operations personnel, onsite

and offsite monitoring personnel, first aid, fire team, and other support

functions. The scenario challenged the operations personnel for emergency

classification, notification, and dose assessment. The onsite and offsite

radiological monitoring teams had the opportunity to demonstrate the use

of emergency procedures and radiological monitoring equipment during a

night time exercise.

4. Control Room

The exercise was initiated at 1758 with the leak rate in the primary

system exceeding a technical specification limit for the Unit 2 reactor.

The initial exercise conditions were given to the SOS and the SOS declared

a Notification Of Unusual Event based upon the emergency action level in

the emergency procedures. State officials were notified within 10 minutes

after the emergency had been declared. The Duty Emergency Coordinator

(DEC) was notified according to the personnel notification procedure. He

arrived onsite 22 minutes after having been paged. The NRC resident

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inspector was notified at his residence and he reported directly to the

control room.- The DEC was briefed by the SOS as to the plant conditions,

notifications, and emergency classification.

An Alert was declared at 1959 due to increased reactor coolant system

leakage. The DEC relieved the SOS of his emergency coordinator function

and assumed command of the emergency coordinator function. The state was

notified of the Alert class at 2009. The NRC operations center was

notified and given an hourly update over the emergency notification system

(ENS) telephone. Plant augmentation was started at 2012 by the SAA. The

SOS requested additional assistance for the SAA when he considered the

Unit 2 SAA to be overloaded in performing offsite notifications, dose

assessment, and communicating with offsite agencies. Due to apparent

degradation of the plant, the SOS requested an hourly sample and analysis

of the primary coolant water.

The NRC inspector.noted that the senior reactor operator (SRO) was the

communicator that maintained an open line with the NRC on the ENS. The

reactor operator was without immediate technical assistance since the SOS

and the SRO were performing other emergency functions.

A loss of number 1 diesel generator and loss of offsite power occurred at

2120. The SOS declared a Site Area Emergency and ordered evacuation of

all nonessential personnel. The NRC inspector noted that there was not an

audible or visual indication in the control room that the site evacuation

alarm had sounded or the verbal message had been broadcast over the plant

address system.

The TSC had been activated and declared operational at 2100. The DEC was

relieved by the Emergency Coordinator (EC) in the TSC and all offsite

coordination functions were to be performed by the emergency personnel in

the TSC.

Based on the above findings, improvements in the following areas should be

considered:

(0 pen) Open Item (313/8510-01; 368/8510-01): Assign a communicator for

the ENS, pursuant to 10 CFR Part 50.72(c), that will not reduce the reactor

operators technical support.

(0 pen) Open Item (313/8510-02; 368/8510-02): Provide a mechanism for the

control room personnel to be assured that the site evacuation alarm is

activated and that the site personnel message is broadcast.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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5. Technical Support Centy

The NRC inspector noted that the TSC staff appeared to adequately perform

their duties as assigned by the EC. The EC took command from the DEC at

2100 and assumed all offsite coordination functions. The DEC kept the TSC

personnel informed of plant status, and held regular staff briefings. The

NRC inspector noted that radiological surveys were conducted both inside

and outside the TSC during the exercise.

The NRC inspector noted that the personnel status board had additional

emergency response personnel identified that were not listed in the

emergency plan or procedures. It was noted that the additional personnel

were an asset to the EC and provided logistical and technical support

during the exercise. It is recommended that those additional support

personnel be reviewed for need, and incorporated into the Emergency

Response Organization, if justified.

The NRC inspectors noted that the TSC staff supported the control room

operators at the initial stages of the exercise and continued to support

the control room operators throughout the exercise. Further, the TSC

staff initiated a recovery and reentry plan during the final phase of the

exercise.

The NRC inspector noted that prior to transmitting the General Emergency

notice to the state there was considerable time expended to obtain the

latest radiological information so that the information could be sent with

the General Emergency information being telefaxed to the state. The

information was sent to the state 15 minutes after the General Emergency

was declared.

Following the initial accountability of plant personnel, it was determined

'that accountability was not being performed to maintain account of TSC

personnel during the remainder of the exercise.

, Based on the above observation, improvement in the following area should

be considered:

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'(0 pen) Open Item (313/8510-03; 368/8510-03): Following the completion of

plant personnel accountability, establish and maintain accountability of

personnel assigned to the TSC.

6. Dose Assessment

Following the initial portion of the exercise, dose assessment was

conducted in the TSC. The gaseous effluent radiological monitoring system

(GERMS) was activated for performing dose assessment. The GERMS was

preprogrammed with meteorological, radiological, and other variables to

follow the accident scenario.

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The NRC inspector noted that the dose assessment team did not evaluate the

dose rates and summation doses in the affected sectors versus the source

term, plume centerline results or offsite radiological monitoring team

measurements. It was noted-that the TSC dose assessment team did not

attempt to obtain or use the state offsite radiological monitoring

information.

Based on the above findings, improvement in the following area should be

considered:

(0 pen) Open Item (313/8510-04; 368/8510-04): Include radiological data

from offsite monitoring or other sources in the evaluation of GERMS dose

assessment reports.

No violations or deviations were identified.

7. Emergency Operations Facility

The EOF W3s prepared for operation in a timely manner. The NRC inspectors

noted an unusual number of personnel utilized for setting up the EOF prior

to the arrival of the emergency response organization (ER0) personnel from

Little Rock, Arkansas. The EOF was staffed with an adequate number of

personnel. The NRC inspector noted that personnel were listed on the

status boards that were not indicated in the emergency plan or procedures.

It is recommended that those additional personnel be identified and included

in the emergency response plan, if justified.

The E0F Director (EOFD) arrived at the EOF and promptly assigned personnel

to their emergency tasks. It was noted that the EOF was not activated

within the time recommended in NUREG-0737, Supplement 1. This had been

identified as an unresolved item (313/8502-03; 368/8502-03) prior to

the exercise and action on this item was not completed at the time of this

inspection. Furthermore, the EOFD delayed relieving the TSC EC for

approximately 80 minutes after arriving at the E0F. During the delay the

plant conditions degraded and a General Emergency was declared.

The NRC inspector noted that the EOFD kept the staff appraised of plant

status and events. However, the EOFD briefings did not include

onsite/offsite radiological conditions or state and local events. The

plant status boards were maintained and kept up to date during the

exercise.

The NRC incident response center experienced difficulty in establishing

and maintaining contact with the EOF during the exercise. In addition,

communicators were not designated to communicate with the NRC at the EOF.

The exercise was terminated during a General Emergency class at

approximately 0300 hours0.00347 days <br />0.0833 hours <br />4.960317e-4 weeks <br />1.1415e-4 months <br />. The status boards indicated that a release was

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ongoing and the reactor:was not in a stable condition. The licensee did

not demonstrate termination of the release, placing of the reactor in a

stable condition and downgrading of the emergency class. ,

Based on observations by the NRC inspector in the E0F, the following items

are considered to be_ emergency preparedness deficiencies:

The capability to downgrade and reclassify the accident following

mitigation of the accident was not demonstrated. (313/8510-05;

368/8510-05).'

The E0F communication system procedures did not adequately support

communication with offsite agencies. (313/8510-06; 368/8510-06).

Based on the above findings, improvement in the following area should be

considered: ,

(0 pen) Open Item (313/8510-07; 368/8510-07): Assign an individual (s) in

the EOF responsibility for communicating with the NRC.

No violations or deviations were identified.

8. Operational Support Centers

The radiation protection operational support center (OSC) was activated in

a timely manner. The team leader took charge of the area and made team

assignments. Members of the team appeared to be adequately trained in the

proper use of their instruments and proccdures. Team members were briefed

prior to being dispatched to monitor / radiological conditions in the plant.

The NRC noted that a status board was maintain'ed for radiological

conditions and personnel accountability, however, there was not a procedure

to maintain personnel accountability in the OSC. The NRC inspector noted

that several key procedures were mot in the onsite equipment cabinet. In

particular, "EPIP 1903.43 Duties'of Emergency Radiation Team" and the

equipment / operational checklist were not in the cabinet.

Based on the above observations, improvement in the following areas should

be considered:

(0 pen) Open Item (313/8510-08; 368/8510-08): Ensure appropriate copies of

checklist and procedures are in the emergency cabinet.

(0 pen) Open Item (313/8510-09; 368/85-09): Develop and implement an

accountability procedure for the OSC..

No violations or deviations were identified.

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~The fire team members responded to the fire in a timely manner. The fire * ' !

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1 equipment was.available to' meet the teams initial response needs. The

' fire _ team members'had to be prompted to take an active role in the

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with the.use' of their communication equipment that may be used with the .

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(0 pen) Open' Item (313/8510-10; 368-8510-10): Provide training for all

-fire team members in the use of communications equipment.

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No violations'or deviations were identified.

10. -PostJAccident Sampiing '

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Personnel were familiar with the required procedures and appropriate

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equipment. Interaction between the radiochemist and the radiation

protection personnel appeared to be excellent. Pre-sampling briefings

were thorough. -However, the post accident sample building had water

, covering most of the. floor, this was considered a safety concern due to

the~ electronic equipment being used in the facility. The NRC inspector ,

also noted that the automatic liquid nitrogen fill system was inoperable.

During an accident personnel may have to go into a high radiological area

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to obtain liquid nitrogen ,for. the multi-channel analyzer.

Based on the above observation, improvement in the following area should-

be considered:

(0 pen) Open Item (313/8510-11; 368/8510-11): Provide an alternate method i

for-~ obtaining liquid nitrogen outside a potentially high. radiation-area if ,,

the automatic fill system should fail.

No violations or deviations were identified.

11. Security / Accountability  :

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The nonessential personnel evacuation alarm was activated at a Site Area

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Emergency at 2128." LThe accountability of station personnel was completed

at 2236; a total time'of 68 minutes to complete the accountability.

process. This exceeds the 30 minutes guidance of NUREG-0654 by a'

significant amount.

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Based on this observation, improvement in the following area should be -

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considered: '

(0 pen) Open Item (313/8510-12; 368/8510-12): Review the accountability

process and provide procedures to accomplish accountability according to

the NUREG-0654 guidance criterion of 30 minutes. '

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No violations or deviations were identified.

12. Offsite Radiological Monitoring

The NRC inspector observed the formation and dispatch of the offsite

radiological monitoring team. The teams were notified to report to the

plant at the Alert class. Onsite team members began arriving at the OSC

in approximately 10 minutes. The offsite team members began arriving in

approximately 45 minutes.

Team members were briefed as to their duties and requested to'get their

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equipment, inventory the kits, and go to their designated area. The team

members used the procedures provided in the kits, and performed activities

as they were requested from the TSC and the EOF. Team members did not ,

use, or simulate, the use of the respiratory protective equipment and *

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anti-contamination clothing. Further, the team was on the edge of the

plume and when the wind shifted the team was notified that the

radiological readings were increasing and the team remained in the plume.

Upon returaing to the EOF the team did not survey the vehicle or

themselves for radiological contamination.

Based on observations by the NRC inspectors, the following item is _

considered to be an emergency preparedness deficiency:

Offsite radiological monitoring team members did rjot demonstrate adequate

radiological protection procedures during the exercise. (313/8510-13;

368/8510-13)

No violations or deviations were identified. -

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13. Public Relations / Media --

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i The NRC inspector observed that the. joint information center =(JIC) was

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staffed in timely manner considerhg the JIC's distance from the AP&L

office in Little Rock,, Arkansas. The licensee staff assig'ned to the JIC

staff for the exercise was sufficient to carry out their assigned duties,

and it was noted that there were additional personnel available in Little

Rock. News releases were coordinated with the appropriate representatives

and released in a timely manner. The news conferences were held in a time ,

frame which was commensurate with the events as they were happening in the

scenario without any indication of anticipatory action. The information

available during the news conference was adequate. However, consideration

should be given to providing media training to those individuals

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to be disseminated to the public.

The performance of all personnel in the JIC was adequate during the

exercise, also, coordination of information with the state was adequate.

No violations or deviations were identified.

14. Exercise Critique ,

The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to

determine that deficiencies identified as a result of the exercise and

weaknesses noted in the licensee's emergency response program were

identified for corrective actions as required by 10 CFR 50.47 (b)(14),

10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.E, and the guidance criteria in

NUREG 0654,Section II.N.

The licensee critique of the emergency exercise was held with exercise

controllers, key exercise participants, licensee management, and NRC

personnel attending. The deficiencies and weaknesses identified as a

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result of this exercise were, in most cases, similar to the NRC

inspectors' findings. Corrective action taken by the licensee for

identified deficiencies and weakness will be reviewed during subsequent

NRC inspections.

No violations or deviations were identified.

15. Exit Meeting

The exit interview was conducted on April 26, 1985, with licensee

representatives. Mr. P. Harrell, NRC resident inspector, was in

attendance. Mr. C. A. Hackney, the NRC team leader, Mr. R. E. Hall,

Chief, Emergency Preparedness and Radiological Protection Branch,

Region IV, Mr. D. Matthews, Chief, Emergency Preparedness Branch, I&E,

and other staff members represented the NRC. Mr. C. A. Hackney summarized

.. the team comments and observations in the subject areas of the exercise

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scenario, control room, TSC, OSC, fire team, offsite monitoring and

public affairs.

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