ML20090C442

Advises That Confirmatory Item 12, Main Steam Line Break, Reviewed W/Respect to Pending Request to Load Fuel & Perform Precritical Testing.Consequences Less Severe than FSAR Section 15.1.5 Analysis

ML20090C442
Person / Time
Site:	Catawba
Issue date:	07/11/1984
From:	Tucker H DUKE POWER CO.
To:	Adensam E, Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
TAC-59005, TAC-59006, NUDOCS 8407130300
Download: ML20090C442 (2)

Text

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DUKE POWER GOMPANY P.O. nox 03180 CHARLOTTE, N.C. 28242 IIAL H. TUCKER retrenoxe

.J".I.""'"." o- July 11, 1984 Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Attention: Ms. E. G. Adensam, Chief Licensing Branch No. 4 Re: Catawba Nuclear Station Docket No. 50-413

Dear Mr. Denton:

On March 19, 1984 representatives from Duke Power, Westinghouse, and the NRC met to discuss Confinnatory Item 12, Main Steamline Break using a revised Heat Transfer Model, which is discussed in Section 6.2.1.1 of the Catawba FSAR. Duke subsequently provided the staff with additional information concerning this subject in a letter dated March 28, 1984, and Westinghouse submitted for NRC review WCAP 8354 that documents Ice Condenser Containment analysis techniques. In that this issue involves the temperatures used for environmental qualification of equipment inside containment, and since the staff has not completed their review of this item, Duke submits the following analysis in accordance with 10 CFR 50.49 to support fuel loading and pre-critical testing activities.

Duke Power has reviewed this situation with respect to the pending request to load fuel and perform pre-critical testing for Catawba Unit 1.

It was concluded that the consequences would be less severe than analyzed in FSAR Section 15.1.5 for the following reasons:

1) Prior to initial criticality, there would be no fission product inventory in the core.

2) The moderator temperature coefficient at beginning-of-life (B0L) is slightly positive. Therefore, the core would not go critical as a result of a MSLB accident.

Very truly yours,

$A.A d~Ag, Hal B. Tucker NAR/slb cc: Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission O Region II 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Ip Atlanta, Georgia 30323 l, 8407130300 840711 PDR ADOCK 05000413 A PDR

'~ Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director July 11, 1984 Page 2 cc: NRC Resident Inspector Catawba Nuclear Station Robert Guild, Esq.

- Attorney-at-Law P. O. Box 12097 Charleston, South Carolina 29412 l Palmetto Alliance <

21351 Devine Street Columbia, South Carolina 29205 Mr. Jesse L. Riley Carolina Environmental Study Group '

854 Henley Place Charlotte, North Carolina 28207 3

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