ML20058C126

Expresses Strong Objection to NRC Response to OIG Rept on Region I Review of off-site Emergency Preparedness

ML20058C126
Person / Time
Site:	Pilgrim
Issue date:	09/06/1990
From:	Muirhead D CITIZENS URGING RESPONSIBLE ENERGY
To:	Carr K NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
Shared Package
ML20058B453	List: ML20058B450 ML20058C123 ML20058C126
References
NUDOCS 9010310291
Download: ML20058C126 (6)

Text

1 1

l CITIZENS URGING RESPONSIllLE ENERGY j

P. O. Box 2621 l

Duxbury, MA 02331 1

September 6,1990 l

Mr. Kenneth M. Carr, Chairman Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1717 H Street, NW Washington, DC 20555 l

Dear Chairman Carr:

i We are writing on behalf of the approximately 1,700 members of CURE to express our strong objection to the Nuclear-Regulatory Commission's (NRC) response to the Office of the Inspector General's:

(IG) report on the-NRC Region 1 Staffs review of off-site emergency.

preparedness for the Pilgrim Nuclear. Power ' Station in Plymouth, Massachusetts (Case No. 90N-02).

Specifically, 'we refer to the.

memorandum to you from James M. Taylor, Executive _ Director for Operations, dated August 3,1990.

At best, Mr. Taylor's i

memorandum is a whitewash of the IG report. JAt worst, the memorandum ' represents a dereliction of. duty 'on the part of federal officials.

In any event, the report further erodes the already minimal level of confidence which the public has in the NRC's, ability and willingness to provide for the -public. health and safety.

As you know, the IG concluded that:

1) "The NRC staffs assessment of off-site emergency preparedness. was neither balanced i{

nor thorough"; 2) " portions of the NRC staffs presentations

• during the October 14 and December 9,1988 ~ Commission meetings were inaccurate"; 3) "NRC staff relied 'on information obtained from the Boston Edison. Company (BECo)...and in light of the Company's vested interest in restarting Pilgrim, BECo was not the best source for the NRC staff to rely on..."; and 4) "TheyLdid not contact responsible' emergency planning-officials in a timely manner..'.they - did not 3

reconcile differences -in credible information they received from-various sources, and in some cases they did not validate information they accepted.".

9010310291 9o1018 DR ADOCK O$oOt 'y3

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Page 2 l

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Mr. Taylor's response to these findings is four-fold.

First, he states that there is "not evidence sufficient to substantiate that any staff member intentionally - provided inaccurate -information to the Commission."

Second, he claims that there have been " steady l

improvements"' with regard to emergency planning.

. Third, he l'

defends the Staff by stating that "the 1988 situation at Pilgrim put l

the staff in a unique role."

Fourth, he promises to conduct a " lessons-learned" review.

CURE _ will address each of these points, l

1.

Lack of sufficient evidence.

Mr. Taylor's statement that there is insufficient evidence that the NRC staff intentionally lied to the Commission _both misses the point and ignores the NRC's own regulations.

Mr. Taylor's comment is based upon a false premise:. That the public safety is adequately protected as long as no one can prove-that the NRC staff's misrepresentation of the facts was l

intentional.

This _ premise totally ignores the fact that the public safety can be and has ;been equally compromised-by misrepresentations which are the ~ result of Staff actions which were "neither balanced nor thorough," to use the.

Inspector General's word::.

Moreover, Mr. Taylor has completely overlooked the I

standard of conduct for NRC employees. which appears -in 10 C.F.R. Part O Section 0.735-1(b) of those regulations mandates as follows:

The maintenance of unusually high standards of

' honesty, integrity, impartiality, and. conduct by Government-employees and-special Government I

employees is-essential to assure the proper -

performance of the Government business. and the maintenance of confidence by citizens-in their Government.

Both the Staff activities.which led to the Inspector General's investigation and Mr. -Taylor's memorandum to you fall far short of this standard. The NRC has totally H

i i

Page 3 failed to inspire public confidence in its ability to ensure the public safety.

2.

Emereency olanning improvements.

Duxbury CURE vehemently objects to Mr. Taylor's implication that the subject of the Inspector General's report is of no consequence.because the status of off-site emergency planning has improved.

While CURE disputes the rosy picture painted by. Mr. Taylor, the status of planning is-irrelevant to the conclusions of. the Inspector General.

Improved planning' simply does not mitigate the Staff actions discussed in the Inspector General's' report.

3.

Uniqueness of the 1988 situation. Nor does the alleged uniqueness of the situation in 1988 provide a rationalization for the performance of the NRC Staff.

Initially, however, it should be noted that the situation in 1988 was not unique. -Staff's comments on the ' Ins'pector General's report state expressly that "50.54(s). cases-are not unusual."

See the Inspector General's report at Page 19.

Section 50.54(s) is the section of the -NRC's regulations which allows the Commission to, determine that off-site emergency preparedness is not adequate.

Moreover,-

Staff's response notes' that. the situation involving Pilgrim was only "slightly 'different" from the usual. 50.54(s) t situation.

However, even if the Pilgrim situation was somehow i

L

" unique," that does not justify.the malfeasance - and nonfeasance on the part of. Staff, If:anything, the

" uniqueness" of the Pilgrim. situation - should havel inspired Staff to take. extra steps and.to err 'on the side of caution and thoroughness.'

If Staff is competent only -toi deal with the familiar, then Mr. Taylor has.' revealed yet another serious'(veakness on the part of your agency.

4.

Lesson-learned review.

Mr. Taylor's commitment to conducting a " lessons-learned" review is an apparent exercise in damage control intended to bury the issues i

i

Page 4 raised by the Inspector General beneath a trail of, paper-without public involvement.

As a final point, CURE brings to your attention the fact that the o

Inspecter General's report demonstrates ' that Boston Edison l

persont.el' provided inaccurate information to NRC Staff in violation of 10 C.F.R. 50.9. The facts demonstrating.a violation of 50.9 appear at pages 3-4 of the report.- At page 3, the report states:

y l

t l

The NRC staff learned from BECO that all emergency implementing procedures for the EPZ' communities-had been submitted to the State' for technical review with the exception of five procedures for the Towns of Plymouth and Duxbury.

The inaccuracy of this information' is confirmed at page 4:

i Had NRC staff discussed the status of the emergency.

implementing procedures with local officials, they would have l

learned the information was not correct.

According - to Plymouth and Duxbury officials, none of. the implementing procedures (about 130 procedures) for these communities had even been approved for submission to the State.

In fact, many of these procedures were still being developed.

At page 20 of.the IG's report, Staff defends.its reliance on information provided by Boston Edison noting that '" licensees are fully cognizant of the criminal-nature of 'providing false 'information to NRC." If, as the IG has documented, Boston Edison did provide false information to NRC Staff, then the Commission:must pursue this matter.

If Boston Edison's actions go unpunished, then the NRC will-have. demonstrated only --that its reliance on 50.9Lis entirely i

misplaced.

It should be noted that in.1982 BECo was cited by-.the-NRC with the highest. civil penalty in regulatory history,. in part, for

.i having provided false information to the NRC. (NUREG-0090, Vol. 5, No.1, January-March 1982, appended)

For these reasons, Boston Edison's role in. Staff's review of emergency' preparedness must be subject of a separate action.

In light of the IG's findings on emergency preparedness, it is imperative that the Inspector General move immediately to complete

(

the investigation into the balance of our charges that 'the resolution e

lo Page 5 i

of management and equipment issues was 'also misrepresented for restart consideration.

In conclusion the IG's report confirms what CURE and others have suspected all.along -- that the NRC is blatently violating its mandate to protect the public health and safety in its blind ambition to promote the nuclear power industry.

Only firm corrective action in response to the IG's report can restore the agency's credibility.

We join Congressman Gerry Studds in asking your Commission to take a more responsible approach to:

this important matter.

We look forward to your reply.

Sincerely yours, f"

M.h4% Wh.u Donald M. Muirhead, Jr., M.D.

Mary C. Ott Co-Chairmen, Duxbury CURE i

Diane Buckbee, President i

Plymouth CURE I

i

'[

Page 5 of management-and equipment issues was also misrepresented for restart consideration.

In conclusion the IG's report confirms what CURE and others have suspected all along -- that the NRC is blatently violating its mandate to protect the public health and. safety in its blind ambition to promote the nuclear power industry.

Only firm corrective action in response to the IG's report can restore the agency's credibility.

We join Congressman Gerry Studds in asking your Commission to take a more responsible approach to this important matter.

We look forward to your reply.

Sincerely yours, t

Donald M. Muirhead, Jr., M.D.

M ry C. Ott Co-Chairmen, Duxbury CURE Diane Packbee, President-Plymouth CURE l

cc:

President George Bush Peter Agnes l

Chairman Kenneth Carr

. Senator William Golden Inspector General David Williams' Senator Edward Kirby Inspector George Mulley Rep. Charles. Mann Senator John Kerry Rep. Peter Forman Senator John Glenn, Jr.

Rep. Joseph Kennedy' Congressman Gerry Studds Selectmen, EPZ Communities Congressman Edward Markey Edward' F. : Lawson Governor Michael Dukakis Ellen Cargill.

1 Attorney General James Shannon Diane Buckbee Commissioner David Mulligan David ' Quaid Secretary Charles Barry Robert Pollard Bernice McIntyre Michael Ernst Robert Boulay E

"Y CITIZENS URGING RESPONSIBLE ENERGY-P. O. Box 2621 Duxbury, MA 02331 I

September 6, 1990; l!

Mr. Kenneth M. Carr, Chairman Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1717 H Street, NW Washington, DC 20555

Dear Chairman Carr:

We are writing on behalf of the approximately 1,700 members of CURE to express our strong objection to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) response to the Office of the Inspector General's (IG) report on the NRC-Region I Staffs review of off-site emergency preparedness for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station in Plymouth, Massachusetts (Case No. 90N-02).- Specifically, we refer to the memorandum to you from. James M. Taylor, Executive Director for Operations, dated August 3,1990.

'At best, Mr. Taylor's memorandum is a whitewash of the.IG report. 'At worst,' the memorandum represents a dereliction of duty on' the part of federal officials.

In any event, the report further erodes-the already l

miaimal kvd of confidence which the public has in the NRC's ability and willingness to provide for the public health and safety.

As you know, the IG concluded that:

1) "The NRC staffs assessment of off-site emergency preparedness was neither balanced nor thorough"; 2) " portions of the NRC staffs presentations 'during :the October 14 and December 9,1988 Commission meetings were 1

inaccurate"; -3) "NRC staff relied on information obtained from the Boston Edison Company-(BECo)...and in light of the Company's vested interest in restarting Pilgrim, BECo was not the best source for the NRC 'ctaff to rely on...";. and 4) "They -did not contact responsible emergency planning officials in a timely manner...they did not reconcile differences in credible information they received.from various sources, and in some cases. they did not validate information they accepted."

f ax>,,

-n i

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• 1 4

Page 2 g

Mr. Taylor's response to these' findings is four-fold.

First, 'he states that there is "not evidence sufficient to substantiate that any staff. member intentionally provided inaccurate information to the Commission."

Second, he claims that there have been " steady l

l improvements" with regard to Lemergency planning. - Third, he defends 'the Staff by stating that "the 1988 situation at Pilgrim put the staff in a unique-role."

Fourth, he promises-to. conduct a " lessons-learned review.. CURE-will address each of these points.

i 1.

Lack of sufficient evidence.

Mr. Taylor's statement that there is insufficient evidence that the NRC staff 7

intentionally lied' to the Commission both misses' the point:

and ignores the NRC's own regulations.

Mr. Taylor's comment is based -upon a. false-premise:. That the public safety is adequately-protected as long as no one can prove that the-NRC staff's misrepresentation of the facts was intentional..This premise totally ignores the fact that the public safety can be 'and has been equally compromised,by misrepresentations which are the result of Staff actions which were "neither balanced nor thorough," to use the Inspector General's words.

Moreover, Mr. Taylor has completely overlooked the standard of conduct for-NRC employees which appears in

'10 C.F.R. Part O Section 0.735-1(b) of those regulations mandates as follows:

The maintenance of unusually high standards of honesty, integrity, ' impartiality, and. conduct by Government employees and special Government employees is essential to assure the proper performance of the Government business and the maintenance of confidence ~ by citizens in their

' Government.

Both the Staff activities which led to the Inspector General's' investigation-and Mr. Taylor's, memorandum to you fall far short of this standard.

The NRC has ' totally

I Page 3 failed to inspire public confidence in its ability to ensure the public safety.

2.

Emercency olanning imorovements.

Duxbury CURE vehemently objects to Mr. Taylor's implication that the subject of the Inspector General's report is of no J

consequence because the status of off-site emergency planning has improved.

While CURE disputes the rosy picture painted by Mr. Taylor, the status of planning is irrelevant to the conclusions of the Inspector General.

Improved planning simply does not mitigate the Staff actions discussed in the Inspector General's report.

3.

1.IMaueness of the 1988 situatin Nor does the alleged uniqueness of the situation in 1988 provide a rationalization for the performance of the NT,C Staff.

Initially, however, it should be noted that the situation in 1988 was not unique.

Staffs comments on the Inspector General's report state expressly that "50.54(s) cases are not unusual."

See the Inspector General's report at Page 19.

Section 50.54(s) is the section of the NRC's regulations which allows the Commission to determine that off site emergency preparedness is not adequate.

Moreover, l

Staff's response notes that the situation involving Pilgrim was only "slightly different" from the usual 50.54(s) situation.

However, even if the Pilgrim situation was somehow

" unique," that does not justify the malfeasance and nonfeasance on the part of Staff.

If anything, the

" uniqueness" of the Pilgrim situation should have inspired Staff to take extra steps and to err on the side of caution and thoroughness.

If Staff is competent only to deal with I

the familiar, then Mr. Taylor has revealed _ yet another l

sericus weakness on the prt of your agency.

4 Lc; son learned review.

Mr. Taylor's commitment to conducting a " lessons-learned" review is an apparent exercise in damage control intended to bury the issues m.,.

Page 4 raised by the Inspector General beneath a trail of paper without public involvement.

As a final point, CURE brings to your attention the fact that the Inspector General's report demonstrates that Boston Edison personnel provided inaccurate informatiori to NRC Staff in violation of 10 C.F R. 50.9. The facts demonstrating a violation of 50.9 appear at pages 3 4 of the report.

At page 3, the report states:

j The NRC staff learned from BECO that all emergency implementing procedures for the EPZ communities had been submitted to the State for technical review with the exception of five procedures for the Towns of Plymouth and Duxbury.

The inaccuracy of this information is confirmed at page 4:

Had NRC staff uiscussed the status of the emergency implementing procedures with local officials, they would have learned the informahrm was not correct.

According to Plymouth and Duxbury officials, none of the implementing procedures (abat 130 procedures) for these communities had even been approved for submission to the State.

In fact, many of these procedures were still being developed.

At page 20 of the IG's report, Staff defends its reliance on information provided by Boston Edison noting that " licensees are fully cognizant of the criminal nature of providing false information to NRC." If, as the IG has documented, Boston Edison did provide false information to NRC Staff, then the Commission must pursue this

matter, if Boston Edison's actions go unpunished, then the NRC will have demonstrated only that its reliance on 50.9 is entirely misplaced.

It should be noted that in 1982 BECo was cited by the NRC with the highest civil penalty in regulatory history, in part, for having provided false information to the NRC. (NUREG-0090, Vol. 5, No.1, January-March 1982, appended)

For these reasons, Boston Edison's role in Staff's review of emergency preparedness must be subject of a separate action, in light of the IG's findings on emergency preparedness, it is l

imperative that the Inspector General move immediately to complete j

g.

the investigation into the balance of our charges that the resolution V..

J' I

.(+

i Page 5 9

I of management and equipment issues was a!so misrepresented for restart consideration.

In conclusion the IG's report confirms what CURE and others have suspected all along -- that the NRC is blatently violating its mandate to protect the public health-and safety in its blind ambition to promote the nuclear power industry.

Only firm corrective action in response to the IG's report can restore the agency's credibility.

We join Congressman Gerry Studds in asking your Commission to take a more responsible approach to this important matter.

We look forward to your reply.

Sincerely yours,

.M M 7.Q

^

i Donald M. Muirhead, Jr., M.D.

Mary C. Ott Co Chairmen, Duxbury CURE p

Diane Buckbee, President Plymouth CURE 1

ll

Page 5 of management and equipment issues was also misrepresented for i

restart consideration.

In conclusion the IG's report confirms what CURE and others have suspected all along -- that the NRC is blatently violating its i

mandate to protect the public health and s*,fety in its blind ambition to promote the nuclear power industry.

Only firm corrective action in respoase to the IG's report can restore the agency's credibility.

We join Congressman Gerry Studds in asking your Commission to take a more responsibic approach to this important matter.

We look forward to your reply.

r Sincerely yours, Donald M. Muirhead, Jr., M.D.

Mary C. Ott Co-Chairmen, Duxbury CURE Diane Buckbee, President Plymouth CUP.E cc:

President George Bush Peter Agnes Chairman Kenneth Carr Senator William Golden Inspector General David Williams Senator Edward _ Kirby Inspector George Mulley Rep. Charles Mann Senator John Kerry Rep. Peter Forman Senator John Glenn, Jr.

Rep. Joseph Kennedy Congressman Gerry Studds Selectmen, EPZ Communities Congressman Edward Markey Edward F. Lawson Governor Michael Dukakis Ellen Cargill Attorney General James Shannon Diane Buckbee Commissioner David Mulligan David - Quaid l

Secretary Charles Barry Robert Pollard Bernice McIntyre Michael Ernst Robert Boulay

!