ML20204J557

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Expresses Opposition to Reopening of Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant Under Any Circumstances
ML20204J557
Person / Time
Site: Pilgrim
Issue date: 10/23/1987
From: Worrall B, Worrall W
AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED
To:
NRC
Shared Package
ML20204J386 List:
References
FOIA-88-198 NUDOCS 8810250178
Download: ML20204J557 (31)
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Text

.

62 Indian trail Duxbury, Ma 02332 October 23, 1987 i

Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

h RE:

PILGRIM NUCLEAR PLANT IN PLYM0'JTH, MASSACHUSETTS Dear Sir; i

i I do not believe that there should be any manufacturing or nuclear l

whose operation endangers the lives plants within this country of the citizens.

Any plant that must submit an evacuation plan in case of accident, is j

too dangerous to tolerate.

PERIOD.

i We are opposed to the re-opening of Pilgrim Nuclear Plant under any circumstances, j

Sincerely, i

&c r a h.].t.n Oh^ " A.-[

t William H.

and Beverly L. Worrall l

8810250178 880914 PDR FOIA JOHNSON 68-198 PDR Z/17

e BOSTON EDISON Eie:uhe Offices 800 Sc9ston Street Scsten. Yassachusetts 02199 October 26, 1987 Ralph G. Bird Semer 'v ce Pres'deat - Nuc' ear Mr. Peter Agnes, Jr.

Commonwealth of Massachusetts Assistant Secretary of Public Safety One Ashburton Place - Room 2133 Boston, MA 02108

Dear Mr. Agnes:

As you and I recently discussed, periodic submittal of the information developed in response to the issues identified in the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) August 4,1987, "Self-Initiated Review and Interim Finding for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station" (SIR) should facilitate FEMA's review of the resolution of those issues.

Accordingly, we are forwarding a copy of a report entitled "Pilgrim EPZ Public Beach Population Analysis,"

dated October 14, 1987, which addresses subissues C.1 and C.2, as identified in the "Boston Edison Company Action Plan and Schedule for Providing Assistance in Addressing FEHA Issues," dated September 17, 1987 (Boston Edison Action Plan).

He are also enclosing for your consideration a draft letter of transmittal to FEHA and a suggested distribution list.

In subissue C.1, FEMA recuested, "(1) an updated geographical description of the beaches (within the Pilgrim EPZ) and their capacity."

(Page 26 of SIR) l The Boston Edison Action Plan (Page 14) stated that preliminary estimates of the expected maximum number of people on the public beaches within the EPZ had i

been developed and were being verified.

It also stated that updated geographical descriptions of the beaches were being developed.

The results of those efforts in response to FEHA's request are contained in the enclosed report.

In subissue C.2, FEPA requested, "(2) a detailed analysis of the beach population, including the number of permanent and temporary residents and the number of day visitors, togethe with their geographical dispersion."

(Page 26 of SIR)

The Action Plan (Page 15) stated that the geographical dispersion of the population of each of the public beaches was being developed.

It also indicated that a breakdown between permanent and temporary residents and day visitors did not need to be developed since the current planning process is based on the conservative assumption that sufficient sheltering capacity will be identified for the entire beach population.

Thus, the enclosed report provides the information requested by FEMA as to geographical dispersion of the population on the public beaches within the EPZ.

rM

Mr. Peter Agnes, Jr.

Assistant Secretary of Public Safety October 26, 1987 Page Two Please do not hesitate to contact either myself or Ron Varley at (617) 747-8544 if you have any questions.

't 'l- -

R. G.' Bird Enclosure cc:

Mr. John Lovering Deputy Director MCDA 400 Worcester Road Framingham, MA 01701 Mr. Jeffrey B.

Hausner MCDA 400 Worcester Road Framingham, MA 01701 i

Mr. Steven A. Varga, Director Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Pegulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

20555 w/o draft letter attachment Mr. R.H. Wessman, Project Manager Division of Reactor Projects - I/II i

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 7920 Norfolk Avenue Bethesda, MD 20814 Wessman - NRC w/o draft letter attachment U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region 1 - 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406 w/o draft letter attachment Senior NRC Resident Inspector Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station I

Rocky Hill Road Plymou'th, MA 02360 w/o draft letter attachment 1

l

(

PILGRIM EPZ PUBLIC BEACH POPULATION ANALYSIS KLD Associates, Inc.

October 14, 1987 The purpose of this report is to respond to certain issues raised in the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) August 4,1987 "Self-Initiated Review and Interim Finding for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (SIR)."

In particular, the report addresses SIR subissues C.1 and C.2 as identifled in the "Boston Edison Company Action Plan and Schedule for Providing Assistance in Addressing FEMA Issues" dated September 17, 1987 (Boston Edison Action Plan).

Subissue C.1 stated:

FEHA and the RAC... must receive the following additional information:

(1) an updated geographical description of the beaches and their capacity.

Attachments A-G are relevant portions of United States Geological Survey quad sheets (modified as described under Subissue C.2 below) which identify each of the major public beaches in the EPZ as follows:

f Attachment A - Brant Rock Beach and Green Harbor Beach

' - Ouxbury Beach Attachment C

'Saquish Neck a

Page 2 - Grays Beach Attachment E - Plymouth Beach Attachment F - Priscilla Beach and White Horse Beach Attachment G - Manomet Beach l

l l

In addition, estimates of the expected maximum number of people on each of these beaches are contained on Attachments A-G and summarized below:

Location Estimated Canacity Brant Rock 1,211 l

Green Harbor Beach 2,609 Ouxbury Beach 4,583 l

Saquish Neck 654 l

Grays Beach 103 Plymouth Beach 1,960 i

l Priscilla Beach 430 White Horse Beach 2,387 Hanomet Beach 655 14.592 l

l l

l

Page 3 These estimates were developed by counting the number of persons visible on aerial photographs of the beaches and adjacent off-beach areas (L g, paths, homes, parking areas) taken between about IPM and 3PM on Sunday, July 5, 1987.

At least two independent counts were made for each beach and the highest count selected in each case.

The photographs cover virtually all of the area of the major public beaches and each of the areas of high beach population density.

On July 5

.- was clear and sunny and the temperature was approximately 85 degrees with low humidity.

Since July 5 was part of a three-day holiday weekend during which Massachusetts beaches likely reach capacity and the weather conditions were highly conducive to maximum beach usage, these numbers are considered to represent reasonable estimates of the maximum number of persons expected on these beaches at any one time.

Although those numbers could, of course, be exceeded on a given day, the excess would be expected to be small and not significant for emergency planning purposes.

Subissue C.2 states:

(2) a detailed analysis of the beach population, including the number of permanent and temporary residents and the number of day visitors, together with their geographical dispersion.

Attachments A-G contain histograms which 'dentify the distributi,on of observed persons on each of the beaches on July 5, 1987.

The histograms identify the percentage of the total population that is located in approximately equivalent segments of each beach, For example, Attachment A depicts Green Harbor Beach and the percentage of the total population of 2,609 persons which is located in each of 23 segments, i

Page 4 Analysis of the population distributions shows that people tend nat to travel far from their parked vehicles.

For example, on Duxbury Beach (Attachment B),

approximately 60 percent of the beach population is concentrated along the 3/4 mile segment of beach from the entrance to the Ouxbury Beach parking field to the area just south of the Powder Point Bridge.

This area encompasses the twc major beach parking areas.

The remaining 40 percent of the beach-goers are distributad over the remaining beach south of the Powder Point Bridge.

These people have access to off-road vehicles.

A total of 521 off-road vehicles were counted along this stretch of beach.

This represents an average vehicle occupancy of 3.51 persons per off-road vehicle (0.4 X 4,583/521).

Aerial r' tos of Saguish Neck (Attachment C) indicate that access to the area is achieved principally by automobile via the road from Duxbury Beach, or by boat, and that persons in the area have access to a vehicle, a boat, and/or one of approximately 200 residences.

Similar conclusions may be drawn for Plymouth Beach (Attachment E).

Approximately 28 percent of persons at the beach are located along that section of beach abutting the parking facilities.

The remaining 72 percent of

)

the beach-goers are distributed along the remaining pcrtions of Plymouth Beach in proximity to the 565 off-road vehicles counted.

The average occupancy for Plymouth Beach off-road vehicles is 2.49 persons per vehicle (0.72 X 1,960/565).

Beach-goers at the other major public facilities (Brant Rock, Green Harbor, Gray's Beach, Priscilla Beach, Whitehorse Beach, and Hanomet Beach) all have ready access to adjoining roads where vehicles are parked.

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AGENDA DECEMBER 10, 1987 1.

E0P STATUS UPDATE 2.

DESCRIPTION OF PILGRIM E0Ps 3.

QUESTIONS AND DISCUSSION rh?

y UPDATE OF PNPS E0P STATUS SINCE AUGUST [ 1987 O

COMPLETED VAllDATION ON PLANT-SPECIFIC SIMULATOR

-(g.-

INTERIM VAL 10ATION' ISSUED -

Lbd $ N Cv E, n.

o COMPLETED OPERATOR TRAINING i

d0HOURSOFCLASSR0OM 140 HOURS OF SIMULATOR I" ' A

/it(/:h Y4

,e M at.

J 0

COMPLETED AN UPDATE OF THE DRAFT E0Ps INCORPORATED SIGNIFICANT VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION FINDINGS, AND OPERATOR COMMENTS I

REVIEWED, APPROVED AND ISSUED

'm t ~

g.m. ~

7

/

o COMPLETED AN UPDATE OF ALL E0P SATELLITE PROCEDURES A <.

iw.-

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Op L.,,< tttts t r.

...I s itw PROVID{DANUPDATEOFASSOCIATEDDOCUMENTATIONTON 0

oA 7 L..q,

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o FUTURE PLANS 1

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FUTURE PLANS Dr.t t ti.r REVISE PSTG AND E0Ps FOLLOWING FORMAL -

l NRC APPROVAL OF REV. f4 EPGs j

FINAllZE E0P VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION FINAllZE PROCEDURE GENERATION PACKAGE AND SUBMIT TO NRC FOR REVIEW t

l l

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CRITERIA FOR DEVELOPMENT OF FLOWCHART PROCEDURES o

Procedures must accurately reflect the technical content and intent of the PSTGs.

o Format must accommodate sequential, concurrent, and override actions.

Text of instructions and decisions should be simple and o

unambiguous, Procedures must include all cautions, figures, and tables o

required for execution of operator actions.

Overall arrangement should be clear, easy to follow; o

crossover of lines should be minimized, o

Text must be readable, o

Sheet size must be no larger than 36" x 60".

Y,('o,s,,,A,l, t c.s cA,t-:l i.-;.w L' h.c u s..*'

Entries to and exits from each procedure must be clearly o

and unambiguously presented.

NUREG-0899 Sections PNPS BOPS (Writers' Guide & Busan Factors)

_(Writers' Guide Section) 5.2 General Guidance 5.2.1 Consistency Among the Procedures III.D,E,P, & IV.A,B,P 5.2.2 Cross-Referencing Within and Among Procedures III.A.11 & IV.D 5.2.3 Operator Aids III.A.12 5.3 Presentation of Information for Readability III.D,E,P & IV.B 5.4 Organization of EOPs 5.4.1 Cover Page N/A 5.4.2 Table of Contents N/A 5.4.3 Scope N/A 5.4.4 Entry Conditions III.A.1 5.4.5 Automatic Actions III.A.4 5.4.6 Immediate Operator Actions III.A.4 5.4.7 Subsequent Operator Actions III.A.4 5.4.8 Supporting Material (Attachments)

III.A.12 5.5 Format Of EOPs 5.5.1 Identifying Information II.A,B,C 5.5.2 Page Layout III.E 5.5.3 WARNING, CAUTION, and NOTE Statements III.A.13,14 5.5.4 Placekeeping Aids (Training) 5.5.5 Divisions, Headings and Numbering III.A.3 & III.B 5.5.6 Emphasis III.D 5.5.7 Identification of Sectiona Within a Procedure or Subprocedure III.A.3 & IV.D 5.5.8 Figures and Tables III.A.15,16 5.5.9 Use of Flowcharts N/A 5.6 Style of Expression and Presentation 5.6.1 Vocabulary IV.G 5.6.2 Abbreviations, Acronyms and Symbols IV.G 5.6.3 Sentence Structure III.A & IV. A, B 5.6.4 Punctuation IV.P 5.6.5 Capitalization IV.D 5.6.6 Units IV.H 5.6.7 Numerals IV.H 5.6.8 Tolerances IV.H 5.6.9 Formulas and Calculations IV.B 5.6.10 Conditional Statements III.A.5,6,7,8

NUREG-0899 Sections PNPS BOPS (Writers' Guide & Busan Factors)

(Writers' Ouide Section) 5.7 Content of EOPs 5.7.1 Sequencing III.B & III.E 5.7.2 Verification Steps III.A.8,9 5.7.3 Nonsequential Steps III.A.2 & III.C 5.7.4 Equally Acceptable Steps III.C & IV.D 5.7.5 Recurrent Steps III. A.7,8,10 5.7.6 Time-Dependent Steps N/A 5.7.7 Concurrent Steps III.A.2 5.7.8 Diagnostic Steps N/A 5.7.9 WARNING and CAUTION Statements III.A.14 5.7.10 NOTE Statements III.A.13 5.7.11 Location Information IV.E h

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PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES EOP-01,"RPV CONTROL" EOP-02,"FAILURE TO SCRAM" EOP-03,"PRIMARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL" EOP-04,"SECONDARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL" EOP-05,"RADIOACTIVITY RELEASE CONTROL" EOP-06,"RPV FLOODING" EOP-07,"ALTERNATE RPV DEPRESSURIZATION" EOP-08,"STEAM COOLING" EOP-09,"PRIMARY CONTAINMENT FLOODING"

SHEET #

EOP#

PSTG SECTIONS 1

1 3 Entry Conditions RPV Water Level RPV Pressure Reactor Power 7 - Alternate Level Control 8

9 - Steam Cooling 2

2 3 Entry Conditions RPV Pressure Reactor Power 11

!.evel/ Power Control 3

3 4 - Entry Conditions Suppression Pool Temperature I. Ywell Temperature Pc. nary Containment Preasure Suppression Pool Water Level Primary Containment Hydrogen Concentration 4

4 5 - Entry Conditions Secondary Containment Tempvatures Secondary Containment Radiation Levels Secondary Containment Water Levels 5

6 Entry Conditions Radioactivity Release S

6 10 - RPV Flooding 7

8 Emergency RPV Depressurization 9

12 Primary Containment Flooding CORRELATION BETWEEN EOPs and PSTGs

KEY FEATURES OF FLOWCHART PROCEDURES o

PRESENTS ON A SINGLE SHEET OF PAPER ALL INFORMATION REQUIRED FOR SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL TO DIRECT EMERGENCY RESPONSE ACTIONS o

BEST FORMAT FOR MAINTAINING A BROAD PERSPECTIVE ON OVERALL PLANT CONDITIONS AND ASSOCIATED OPERATOR 2

ACTIONS i

o ORDER OF CONDITIONS / ACTIONS IS VERY CLEARLY PRESENTED SEQUENTIAL BRANCH CONCURRENT 1

o FLOWCHART ELEMENTS ARE SELECTED TO REINFORCE THE 3

"UNIQUE" TYPES OF ACTIONS DECISIONS i

OVERRIDES 1

CONDITIONAL ACTIONS WAIT UNTIL....

ETC, l

i l

EOP-08 STEAM COOLING 81 START V

_V I

[

While executing this procedure:

IF THEN Afternate RPV Depressurization Exit this procedure and enter is required EOP 07, 'AP.e nate RPV Depressurizaton.'

RPV watar level cannot be Exit this procedure and enter determined EOP 07,'Atemate RPV Depressuriza on.'

g,g Any source of injecton is lined Exit this procedure and enter up to the RPV wdh at least one EOP 07,'A.9emate RPV mp running Depressuritaton.'

V V

AIT UNT RPV wator V

83 kvel drops to 163 in.

Entt this procedy e and enter EOP 07,

'Ahernate RPV Depressuriration.'

0*4 v

EOP-06 RPV FLOODING 6-1 START V

If r

While e. ecuting this procedure:

IF AND THEN RPV wates svol can be determined AI control rods are inserted to or beyond Ext this procedure and enter the RPV posson 02 Water I avel section and RPV Pressure sed > of EOP-0t, RPV Control.-

execute these sections of eof'-J1 concurrently.

RPV water levelcan be determined Any co1rol rod cannot be determined to Ext this procedure and enter the RPV tm inserted to or beyond posstion 02 Water Level sedion and RPV Pressure section of EOP-02. Failure to Scram.-

execute these sections of EOP42 concurrent'y.

Pnmary cratanment water level and Irrespective of whether adequate core torus pressure cannot be mantained cooErg is assured, terminate injection belowthe AFCWLL(FgureE1) irsa the RPV from sources external to the primary contai.went UNTIL pnmary containment water level and torus 6-2 1

Pressure can be mantained below the

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MARFP e

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CHANGES FROM DRAFT B TO REV. O

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(PARTIAL LISTING) i l

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1.

CORRECTED ENTRY CONDITION FOR E0P-04 l

2.

RESTRUCTURED PARAMETER TABLES IN E0P-04 l

, ' L 's 4,,. <y e'

,,, r 3.

CORRECTED HCLL CURVE 4.

REVISED MSBWP FROM 00 TO 02 4

4 i

5.

CORRECTED CRITERIA FOR TERMINATING RPV VENTING IN E0P-09 I

i 4

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t 6.

REVISED CAUTION #1 t,, f 4.w i

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MISCELLANE0US TYP0 GRAPHICAL ERRORS

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I jf An azolusive report on the U.S. Nuclear IterulatoryCo ntnission j-

URMy N

s bk b

wi. 9, No. :s--Dmm ber 7,19s 7 g EAILU0E OF MARK @ILMOST CERTAIN IN SEVERE CORE MELT, PANEL SAYS h,

0 '"There is littlp th doubt that Mark I containments would fall rapidly in the event of a seve t

mel3 ceause rn'olten core would melt through the steel containment liner a group of containment ex.

ladfart report submitted to NRC November 2S. The group, formed by NRC to review the perts.

Mark I melt.through issue, also says in its report that there is no technical basis for industry's long held position that Mark Is could withstand a severe core melt and melt through of the steelliner is highly un.

likely.

But members of the expert group and NRC staffers in the Of6ce of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES) who are reviewing the report stressed in intervie w s that relatively simple 5xes to the containment buildings that surround Mark is could ensure that liner melt through and early containment failure would not result in substantial off site releases.

"We have essentia!!y unanimous agreement that the liner is highly vulnerable to melt through." said one member of the expert group. "The consensus of the group is that if you have a core ort the. floor situation, there is no doubt that the containment w111 fail and fall rapidly. It was dif6 cult to even c up a set of conditions under which the steelliner would sursive core on the floor."

The report. "Review of the Status of the BWR Mark 1 Melt Through Issue." says: "It is conchded that the drywell pressure bouwary (the stcel liner) is vulnerable to even the most optimistic assumptio of in vessel meltdown and melt ejection from the failed reactor vessel, and that primary containment (contime.t on pp 14)

MUTANT FROG IS BAD NEWS FOR KERR MCGEE'S NRC APPROVED WASTE P A nine legged frog that tumed up in a drainage pond near Kerr McGee Corp.'s uranium conversion plant in Gore. Okla. has given local residents and environmentalists who have long opposed the a graphic piece of media ammunition against the company and NRC which licented the plant. And while plant opponents insist that no responsible federal or state agency is monitoring the envircr' mental effects of plant operations, Kerr McGee is already in the Oklahoma Supreme Court chat'enging strict new standards for renewal ofits water discharge permit that could,if the company ultimately loses itt case, force a shutdown of the plant.

With NRC's permission, Kerr McGee has been applying treated raf$nve-nitrogen fertiti:er d

produced from reprocessed wastes -on grating landa it owns around the facility, which is operated by j

its subsidiary Sequoyah Fuels Corp. The plant converu uranium mide (U308) to t'ranium hexa!!coride (UF6), an interrnediate step in production of nuclear fuel. Nitric acid from the conversion process is l

neutralized with anhydrous ammonia, and the majority of heavy metals and radionuclides-princip uranium, thorium, and radiu:n-are precipitated out with a be.rium compcund, leaving a dilete am.

mcaium nit 7te solution.

Environmentalists ct: tim. however, that the radionuclide and heavy metal content of the fertilint is polluting water and poisoning the forage around the Sequoyah Fuels plant.The nine legged frog, maintain, was the product of environmental damage caused by Kerr McGets use of the raf6nate.

Ilut the celebrated jumping frog of Gore, Okla.-apparently the only one eger found-is just INSIDE THIS ISSUE,..

i Zech indicates he'll push for fitness for duty rule early in 19M......................, page 3

Ex NRC staffers say truthfulness of U hite letter nev er mattered..................... pa2e 3

NitC bulletin on tube breaks to focus on leak detection procedures................... page 5

NitC f. ulna two court battles nver newly enacted cme.qency planalnd rule............ t.aae f

I AM predicts incrsased spendin,1 on backfits and o ther modification s................ pn;c 7

NRC responds to GAO report cr:tical of agency's perfortna nce........................ag e 11 wu

w Under the schedule approved bp NRC, Commonocalth allt change out the reactor protection switches during refueling outages scheduled for next fall at LaSalle.2, and fst the last quarter of 19S9 at unit 1. ECCS and RCIC system switches will be replaced during refueling Acheduled for the last hclf of

\\

1990 at LaSalle 2, and for the 1.ut half of 1991 at unit 1.

Commonwealth is "still working with S.O.R. Inc. to cvaluate the exact cause of the switch problems," a utility spokesman said. "Liability isn't an issue yet."-Erle Lindeman, WasMngton CORRECTIONS AND CLARIFICATIONS:

A story in the November 23 :ssue of Inside N.R.C. concerning remarks made during a session at the American Nuclear Society's WOtter Meeting on degreed operators misidentified a speaker at the ses.

sion.The speaker, who was talking about the background of the current commission and World War 11 empirical data, was not session organizer Max Clausen of NRC. Instead, he was session chairman Wil.

Ilam Corcoran ofIT.Delian Corp.

An article on page 3 of the November 23 issue of Inside N.R.C. misidenti6ed Belgium's Tihange.3 as a 1,000 MW Framstome unit. In fact,Tihange.3 is of Westinghouse design.

On page 14 in the November 23 issue of Inside N.R.C.,in a story on 6tms offering to conduct Individual Plant Examinations (IPEs), Pickard, Lowe, & Garrick Inc. (PL&O) was inc orrecdy referred to in one instance as PO&E. A spokesman for PO&E-Paci$c Gas & Electric Co.-says the utility has not registered any complaints in this matter.

The diesel generators at Duke Power Co.'s McGuire 2 are not also patched into McGuire l a Duke spokesman said, correcting a statement he made in connection with a Gne proposed by NRC over McGuire l's eperation with only one diesel generator operational (INRC,9 Nov.,15). Duke has since paid the $50,000 base fine, and ;s appealing the additional 550,000 escalation on the grounds that prompt corrective acdoa was taken, the spokesman said.

MARK I CONTAINMENTS (conhdpom pte 4 failure by melt through (of the liner)is a highly probable mechanism of early containment failure."The report includes a critique of an analysis by the Industry Degraded Core Rulemaking Program (IDCOR) that shows a low probability of liner melt through and containment failure. "There appears to be no technically defensible basis for the IDCOR position," the report says.

}{ow ever, one panel member said the group also reached a consensus that its conclusions are not a condemnation of Mark Is. but rather present an opportunity for NRC and industry to break a long-run-ning impasse and 6nally resolve the Mark I issue.

Ifindustry accepts the high probability ofliner mell through and early containment failure, one of the researchers said, NRC could then acknowledge that BWR Mark I reactor buildings-with minor fises-could effectively mitigate off site consequences of a severe accident with early contain.

ment failure.

"Members of the task force were adamant in saying that they are not condemning Mark is," one member of the panel said. "There are simple d'ings that can be done to mitigate off si:e releases, but there are no c.uy 6tes to prevent liner melt.through and early containment failure. There are 6tes, but they have to be done in the context of recognizing the vulnerability of the liner and the containment."

"Industry has been quite adamant that the liner is not vulnerable " the panel member said.

"Everybody dug trenches and put in battle emplacements on the liner issue, and it's hard to move trenches and batde emplacements. IIanging up on the liner issue hangs up the whole Mark I issue. If we could settle this (liner melt.throught we cwid resolve the Mark 1 issue-not by shutting down all the Mark is, but with relatively simple 6xes."

Panel members and RES staffers said a BWR Mark I rcactor building would serve as a secondary containment and retain a large portion of the 6ssion products in the event of a severe core melt followed by liner melt through and rapid containment failure. One panel member said the effectiveness of the building in retaining fission products could be enhanced by adding more sprays. The threat to the reactor building from hydrogen detonation, said another task force member,"is not a prob!cm without a fix."

"You've got to recognize that there is a gre.$t big probability of surpassing the suppression pool once you'se failed the liner, and then you've got a substantial flow into the reactor building," one panel member said. "The ability of the reactor building to retain aerosols is dependent on not detonating hyd-rogen. Clegly there are relatively simple things that can be done."

Said one REs staffer:"You hue a structurally strong building that can probably retain some-15ing like 90% of the fission products, and if )ou can retain 90% er so, yeu're not gning to kill people 14 tNs!D E N.bt.C,- Duember 7,19 57

f.

i(

1 off site. But there are some problems assuring that you don't have hydrogen detonation."

"This is a problem that's been around a long time," the staffer added, "and we'd like to convince g

people one way or the other."

The report, which RES expects to relea;e in final form by hauary, will ts considered by another ex.

1 g

pert panel reviewing the draft version of Nureg.ll50-NRC's reassessment of reactor risk-and trying to narrow the wide range of uncertainty regarding the ability of Mark is to withstand severe core melis, "The task force armly believes that the liner would fall, and (RES) staffis committed to that being i

tefIccted in the revised !!50," one panel member said. "The report can't be unitized. We feel very strongly that the positions (taken in the report) need to be cemented."

The report could also play a key role in NRC's decision on how Mark is will be treated in the in.

i dividual plant enaminadons (IPEs) that utilides will begin ncat year. Moreover, the panel's conclusions y

will be considered by NRC staff when it reports to the commission sometime next year on the Mark I is.

j sue (INRC,26 Oct. 1).-#rias /ordan, Wadington a

THE NEW PRESIDENT OF CANADA'S ATOMIC ENERGY CONTROL BOARD,Rene J. A.Levesque, l

has hit the road "to increase the board's visibluty" at home and abroad. Replacing Jon Jennekens, the AECB's long. time chief executive of6cer and only full.dme member, Levesque says his 6tst priority is j

"to irnprove the transparency and openness" of the AECB's regulatory activides. "A more open and ac.

1 cessible organization is essendal to the AECB's ef6ciency and credibility as a regulatory agency. The pub!!c is afraid of nuclear facilities and hazards linked to them, but it is our job to make sure the public is safe and that the nuclear industry is following oc strict guidelines," he said.

In November Levesque toured New Brunswick Electric Power Commission's Point Lepreau plant 1

j and Ontario Hydro stadons at Bruce and Darlington. At each location he told news media he felt the public perception of AECB's regulation of the nuclear industry was often "incomplete and inaccurate."

i This was his top concern when he appeared (Nov.18) before a parliamentary committee considering the cost of nuclear energy in Canada. AECB of6cials told the committet that budget limitations have left the board's personnel "spread far too thin."-Ray Silver, Toronto BRIEFLY...

g Comanche Peak delayed asaln. Texas Utilities Electric Co. says slower than expected regulatory hearings and the company's failure to complete certain regulatory reports in time will further delay startup of Comanche Peak. TUEC had hoped to start up the $6.7 billion plant in early 1989, but now says Com.

i anche Peak.1 will not start up until after the summer of 19S9. The company also expecu to revise the l

project's cost estimates early nest y ear Comanche Peak 1 was originaUy scheduled to open in 1980, but quality control problems scuttled that schedule, Policy statement on integrated schedules issued NRC has issued for public comment a proposed policy statement on the use ofintegrated sdedules forimplementation of plant modi 6 cations.The state.

ment describes the policy NRC intends to use to promote voluntary licensee integrated schedules for im.

plementing regulatory requirements and other plant improvements. Integrated scheduling programs have been used at Iowa Electric Light & Power Co.'s Duane Arnold and Boston Edison Co 's Pilgrim, but the i

j gency has had only minimal success in convincing o'her utilities to participate, mainly because the in.

j dastry feels there has been a lack of guidancs. from the commission regarding the preparation and im.

i plementation of the schedules. Comments on the proposed policy statement are due January 25,1088.

County backs NRC consolidatioit.NRC's plans to consolidate all ofits headquarters of5ces in Mccitgomery County, Md. sot a tmt reo.ndy wben the county's planning beard indicated that a site ad.

Jacent to the agency's new White Flint North of6ce building may be rezoned to accommodate a second building. The coumy board had origins'.ly granted a ocveloper's request to construct a hotel-conference center on the site, but the developer Nw wants to build a second of 6ce building to accommodate NRC's

}

consolidaden needs. The teard met tast month to consider the developer's request, but defened action in part because of concerns that a second building would create signi0 cant trafGc congestion. According to NRC. the toard members told Executive Director for ONrations Victor Ste!!o that they want NRC to con.

solidate in the cour.ty and that the site could be made acceptable to all panics.

$50,000 fine proposed analnst CPA L. NRC has proposed a $50,000 Gne against Carolina Power

& Light Co. (CP&L) because of deficiencies in the utility's safe shutdown program in event of fire. The deficiencies, w hich were identined during an inspection in March, included inability of operators to quickly 6nd necessary valves and breakers, and lack of adequate radio communication, according to an NRC spoke < man. The problems wcre correctd by June, he said. CP&L has not >ct decieted w hett er to contest e r tuy the fine,a spck sman s.sid.

J IN St D E N.itC.- Dwes+w 7,19s7 is 1

J

,.

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