ML20052H589

Forwards LER 82-011/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Submitted

ML20052H589
Person / Time
Site:	San Onofre
Issue date:	05/10/1982
From:	Ray H SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON CO.
To:	Engelken R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
Shared Package
ML20052H590	List: ML20052H589 ML20052H591
References
NUDOCS 8205210249
Download: ML20052H589 (2)

Text

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EECEIVED

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May 10, 1932 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region V 1450 Walnut Lane, Suite 210 Walnut Creek, California 94596-5368 Attention: Mr. R. H. Engelken, Regional Administrator Docket No. 50-361 Licensee Event Report No.82-011

. San Onofre, Unit 2

Reference:

Letter, H. B. Ray (SCE) to R. H. Engelken, dated April 28, 1982.

Dear Sir:

This letter describes a reportable occurrence involving inoperable Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) instrumentation at San Onofre Unit 2. Reporting is in accordance with the requirements of Section 6.9.l .12.b of Appendix A to Operating License NPF-10.

Technical Specification 3.3.2.b and Table 3.3-3, Action 13, require the Control Room Emergency Air Cleanup System to be maintained in the emergency mode of operation within one hour of the time that both channels l of the Control Room Airborne Radiation Monitor are made or discovered to be inoperable. On March 13, 1982, at 1005 hours0.0116 days <br />0.279 hours <br />0.00166 weeks <br />3.824025e-4 months <br />, the single operable channel of the Control Room Airborne Radiation Monitor was taken out of service for maintenance involving lubrication of the sample pump.

l Trains A and B of the Control Room Emergency Air Cleanup System had been in operation during the morning for reasons unrelated to this incident; however, both trains wcro secured and placed in the normal standby mode by 1025 hours0.0119 days <br />0.285 hours <br />0.00169 weeks <br />3.900125e-4 months <br />. The Airborne Radiation Monitor was not fully returned to service until operation of the sampling pump was verified at 1300 hours0.015 days <br />0.361 hours <br />0.00215 weeks <br />4.9465e-4 months <br />.

Thus, while both trains were available and demonstrably operable, operation of the Control Room Emergency Air Cleanup System was not maintained as required by Technical Specifications from l105 to 1300 hours0.015 days <br />0.361 hours <br />0.00215 weeks <br />4.9465e-4 months <br />, a period of I hour- and 55 minutes. Had the need arisen, either train could have been-activated manually.

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A subsequent investigation has determined that the Technical Spec-ification and Action Statement requirements had been reviewed and acknow-lodged by Control Room personnel and equipment control forms were property documented prior to the occurrence. Failure to maintain operation of the Emergency Air Cleanup System was an administrative oversight. The level of Control Room activity, involving as it did parallel activities required for the maintenance, surveillance, and operation of these and various other systems was a contributing factor. SCE has been unable to idontify any additlonal similar occurrences and concludes that thIs is, in fact, an isolated case and warrants treatment as such. This incident has been discussed with both the operators and equipment control personnel.

In these discussions, special emphasis was given to the optional use of magnetic caution tags as described in the existing PCE operating instruc-tion S023-0-19, "Use of Caution Tags, Magnetic Tags and Instrument Labels". Use of these tags could have prevented the untimely removal from service of the Train B Emergency Air Cleanup System. Their use may be called out on the Equipment Control form by simply noting it in the block entitled, " Capability Limitations / Options". Equipment control personnel agreed to employ these tags, as appropriate in the future.

This incident had no ef fect on public health or safety.

Discovery of this reporting omission was made during an internal review of recent operating incidents initiated unilaterally by SCE for the purpose of identifying this type of problem. This incident was discussed with the Unit 2 Resident inspector on April 27, 1982, immedi-ately following the evaluation of the event reporting status. Written notification by f acsimile transmission was provided to Region V on April 28, 1982. If you should require additional information concerning this occurre: ice, please contact me.

Sincerely,

/

Enciosure: ( LER 82-01 I )

cc: U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Management Information and Program Control (MPIC) institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO)

A. E. Chaf fee - (USNRC Resident inspector - San Onof re, Unit 2)