ML20011F444

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Forwards Operability Evaluation Re Salt Svc Water Pumps P208 B,C,D & E,Per 900117 Telcon.Evaluation Concluded That Salt Svc Water Pumps P208 B,C,D & E Operable & Tech Spec 3.5.B.1 Requirements Met
ML20011F444
Person / Time
Site: Pilgrim
Issue date: 01/19/1990
From: Bird R
BOSTON EDISON CO.
To: Russell W
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20011F445 List:
References
BECO-90-017, BECO-90-17, NUDOCS 9003060041
Download: ML20011F444 (38)


Text

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Pilgrim Nuoear Power station - .;

Rocky Hill Road Plymouth, Massachusetts o2360 -

January 19.-1990 BECo Ltr 90-017 Ralph G. Bird '

' + Senior Vice President - Nuclear .j

. Mr. H1111am T. Russell t, Regional Administrator Region I ,,, J, 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 Docket-No.-50-293 '

License No. DPR ,

Subject:

Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Operability Evaluation'of. l Installed Salt Service Water Pumpr.  ;

Dear Mr. Russell:

c l

? This letter transmits the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station'(PNPS) operability

. evaluation discussed with your staff during~ a telephone conversation on- 'l f . ..f January 17, 1990 regarding the operability of Salt Service Hater (SSH) Pumps.P208.' l "B", "C", "D" and "E".- The: evaluation summarizes the results of Boston Edison-  ;

Company's-- materials- testing, inspections, and calculations- associated with the 360 )

- degree throughwall fracture of the "A" SSH pump column section.- The "A" SSH pump l

experienced;the column fracture while it was out of the. plant for maintenance on s

-January 11. 1990. The characteristics of the "A" SSH pump ~ columnifracture were i

L . evaluated regarding implications to operability of the installed SSH pumps, t-Our evaluation concluded that.SSN Pumps P208 "B", "C", "D" and "E" are-operable and that the requirements-of Technical Specification 3.5.B.1.regarding SSH Pumps are .

met.. This evaluation-has been reviewed,by,-and has the concurrence'of L

.Dr. William Cooper, Consulting Engineer Teledyne Engineering Services.

L

.Information regarding.this column fracture was provided to other Licensees via the -(

b

- Nuclear Network on January 18,1990, at 1936 EST.  ;

1 L .

Please feel free to contact me or Hr. R. N. Swanson of my staff if you have any gg{ questions or need additional information regarding the operability evaluation. .l

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  • RLC/bal Wb.

oo . cc: Mr. H. Fairtile o$ Licen;ing Project Manager '

L8om Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

- U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission S$a 1 White ~ Flint Nort' /

11555 Rockville Pike (

Rockville, MD 20852 E . . . _ . . . . _ _

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  • BOSTON EDISON COMPANY l

. OPERABILITY EVALUATION

. l

~1. Initiating Document F&MR 90-8/NCR 90-3

2. Affected Item (System, Subsystem,. Train, Component, or Device)  !

Salt Service Hater Pumps (P2088, C, D, E) i The salt service water pumps are vertical, single stage, deep well pumps e manufactured by Goulds Pumps.

3. Specified Function of the Affected Item w

The salt' service water pumps supply water at adequate flow and pressure to ,

the RBCCH heat exchangers as an ultimate heat sink for the RBCCH system for all accident and transient conditions.

, 4. References l

FSAR 10.7

. Technical Specification 3.5.B, 4.5.B PDCR 77-44 -I Specification H8 -

. l. Drawing M8-4

5. Operability Concern a

, On 1/11/90, while horizontally transporting the assembled pump (without .!

L motor) from the maintenance shop to the intake structure, the bow 1/

impeller end of SSH pump A' was dropped approximately 6 to 12 inches L leading to a 360 degree throughwall fracture of the second, 80 inch .i column section up from the bowl / impeller end. Further investigation indicated that the area of the fracture had reduced material properties L (e.g. yield ctrength, ultimi.te strength, percent elongation). relative to j f specification. The operability concern is that remaining pumps in service '

-)

i may have columns having similarly reduced material properties that could affect their operability under design loading conditions.

6. Operability Evaluation (check one)

[X] Operable 1 l

[ ] Inoperable

[ ]-Conditionally Operable '

7. Basis for Evaluation

) The service water system normally operates at approximately 30 psig and uses cold sea water. One train consisting of two pumps is required to satisfy the heat removal requirements for all design basis accidents and transients. Pumps A and B supply Train A, pumps D and E supply Train B and pump C normally acts as a swing pump.

1 o

1 The overall length of the assembled pump is in excess of 42. feet (drawing I M8-4).- The pump was being transported at each end by slings from two- -I

, forklifts. The fracture occurred approximately 17 feet from the bow 1/ impeller end. Analysis of the stresses resulting from this drop indicate loads of approximately 30 ksi from a drop height of 6 inches and approximately 42 ksi from a drop height of 12 inches. Lab tests of samples from the area of the failure indicated ultimate strengths ranging _ j from 23 to 32 ksi. Therefore, a failure was expected due to the drop.

l The' pump column material is an aluminum bronze casting (AFTH B148 C95200) with a required ultimate strength of 65 ksi minimum, yield strength of 25 ksi minimum, and elongation of 20% minimum. A total of four coupons from (

the area of the fracture were tested. These tests were performed at two i separate labs and'gave consistent results of significantly reduced strength. The worst coupon gave an ultimate strength of 23.9 ksi and an elongation of 0.5%. Lab tests of four samples from a " good" section of a pump A column indicated tensile strengths ranging from 70 to 85 ksi (ASTM '

specified at 65 ksi minimum) and yield strengths from 27 to 45 ksi (ASTM rpecified at 25 ksi minimum). Three of.the four samples had elongations n of 21 to 34% (ASTM specified at 20% minimum). The fourth sample had an '

elongation of 16% attributed to a localized crevice / pit.

Two factors are believed to have contributed to the fracture. First, the initial casting process likely led to reduced strength since metallurgical analysis has identified a eutectoid condition indicating-that the required single phase of the material _was not achieved. This resulted in the

-deposition of a low strength, copper-rich network. This eutectoid. ,

condition was in a relatively large section in the vicinity of the flange supporting the conclusion that the weakness was introduced by casting and not by some other process (e.g. welding). Improper cooling of the casting is believed to cause the eutectoid condition. Second, weld build-up had been done in the upper flange region of this column to restore a spider bearing support surface which had been worn due to operation.

Subsequently, a crack developed in the weld build-up. This crack was a pre-existing flaw ataroximately'2.5 inches maximum in length and throughwall. Examination determined that this crack had existed for some time prior to application of the impact load caused by dropping the pump.

.It was determined that the crack was not the result of fatigue and was not t propagating circumferential1y during operation. The primary origin of the fracture was at the weld build-up and it propagated rapidly through the low strength, copper-rich network.

Improvements have been made in the manufacture of replacement columns.

The new columns are centrifuga11y cast versus the sand casting used in the failed column. Also, the longer columns are cast in two smaller pieces which allows for more uniform cooling and reduces shrinkage and porosity concerns that can result from a single piece casting. The two castings -

I are then joined by a circumferential weld at the centerline to provide the finished product. Three of the operating pumps have some columns which have been manufactured using the improved processes. The pump manufacturer knows of no inservice failures of this new design. This j better quality casting is recognizable by the circumferential weld at its centerline. These columns were visually verified to be installed in the inservice pumps as indicated on Figure 1.

2

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Because the material'in the area of the break had very low percent elo'ngation. the potential for brittle fracture was considered in this evaluation.- For brittle fracture to occur, the material must be susceptible. The likelihood of brittle fracture is affected by the size of the load, how the load is applied, and whether a flaw exists in the material prior to the load being applied. An existing flaw provides an initiation site for a fracture. The eutectoid condition caused the embrittled-type properties in the failed material making it susceptible to brittle fracture. With the pre-existing flaw and high impact load from the drop, the situation was such that a- brittle fracture was likely.

However, impact loads of sufficient magnitude will not occur during operating or accident conditions such that a fracture would occur.

Material basic allowable stress values were adjusted for the non-ductile and reduced material properties.Section VIII of the ASME code (UCI'23) requires a safety factor of 10 between the minimum tensile and allowable ,

stress for cast iron which is.similarly brittle to the degraded casting.

o The lowest of four test specilhens from the degraded material had a tensile strength of approximately 23.9 ksi. Thus, the allowable would be 2.4 ksi. However, the loading of concern is primarily bending and the allowable in bending is 11/2 times that for tension. Thus, the adjusted allowable value for the degraded material is 3.6 ksi. This gives an equivalent safety factor of about 6.7.

Table 1 is a summary of calculated versus allowable stress values of the

_P four operating SSH pumps for the normal, operating basis earthqur.ke (OBE) and safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) conditions. The allowable stress vt,1ue has a safety factor of 6.7 and was derived as has been explained previously. Stress values in Table 1 are at the top of the upper pump column', which is the normal location of highest stress, except where the upper columns were new. The stress location for this case was taken at

.the top of the highest old column.

Results of Table 1 show that the four operating pump stress levels would be below the code allowables except for the SSE case for Pump C. This

. case was over the allowables but still had-a significant margin against tensile. If average tensile properties of the four test coupons had been used instead of the lowest values, the allowable stress would be approximately equal to the calculated stress. In addition, a more detailed analysis that accounted for water damping would be expected to reduce the calculated stress. Therefore, even with an assumed significant loss of design margin, the salt service water system can still perform its safety function for all accidents and transients described in the FSAR.

This analysis is consistent with FSAR structural loading criteria. This evaluation has been reviewed by and has the concurrence of Dr. H1111am 1 Cooper, a consulting engineer with Teledyne Engineering Services. (See -

@ attached letter)

For all design basis accidents except earthquakes, the pump loads seen during the accident are identical to those seen during normal operations.

+ } Since pump loads during normal operation are low (1.2 ksi), a low probability SSE would have to occur to significantly challenge the pumps.

The likelihood of an SSE occurring coincident with an accident is even more remote. Since two pumps in the same train are needed to mitigate this event, multiple pump failures must occur to pose a safety problem.

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Also, if only one SSH pump fails, a coincident diesel failure must also occur to challenge plant safety. PNPS diesels have a demonstrated reliability of over 991.- An inservice pump must be in a more severely degraded condition than the worst section of pump A (the fractured pump) in order for a failure to be considered possible. All of these factors i combined demonstrate a low- risk situation.

During our investigation, we learned that Pilgrim had one other column failure in 1977 in pump D. Discussions with a consultant at AMPCo (the company that repaired the column) indicate that this failure was due to fatigue. At that time, the pump tripped on high amperage. On troubleshooting, a 360' circumferential failure of the uppermost column '

was discovered at the upper. flange transition. The pump experienced high vibration and was apparently operated after bearing damage had occurred.

He believe that the cause for the vibration was flow instabilities which were aggravated during certain pump operating combinations. Design ,

changes to the pump suction end and system operational changes have been implemented which have reduced flow induced vibration. Also, a Boston i E Edison records search of work on the salt service water system was "

L performed and no other failures of the older design column were found .'

other than the 1977 and 1990 failures. Goulds has reported no other failures of the older design column. Further research indicates that no other aluminum bronze castings exposed to sea water are used in safety-related applications at PNPS.

T Ultrasonic testing of the uppermost section of pump A was performed to verify minimum wall requirements in the area of highest stress. The results indicated a uniform, acceptable wall thicki;ess. Also, liquid penetrant examinations of the outside diameter in the vicinity of the flange in all columns of pump A were performed. Shallow surface anomalies were found and blended out. This testing was performed because the fractured section had a throughwall crack that would have been detected bv '

liquid penetrant testing.

Calculations indicate that the static dead weight loads resulting fru "

horizontal transport of the pumps are on the order of 5 ksi at the midpoint. The static loads in the columns adjacent to the mid-column of l the pump are in the range of 3 to 5 ksi during transport. This is roughly '

twice the normal operating load. Dynamic effects during transport would tend to increase these loads somewhat. Therefore, the mid-columns of several inservice pumps have probably experienced loads (during transport for maintenance) that are significantly greater than normal operating loads and a significant percentage of SSE loads. During transport, no failures other than pump A have occurred.

Operators would become quickly aware of any pump failures by the high -

I~ current pump trip and low header pressure indications in the control room. High current pump trip led the operators to recognize the 1977 event.

I .

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8.-CoahensatoryMeasures/ConditionsRequired The following actions will be taken as prudent measures to verify-materials' and integrity of the remaining salt service water pumps: ,

1) In the short term, Pump A will be inspected, tested, further repairs l performed if necessary, and returned to service.(Target - 1/27/90 i early finish).
2) Remaining pumps (B, C, D and E) will be inspected, tested and returned to service. (Target - 3/09/90 early finish).
3) Prior to returning old design columns to service, the following 1 inspection plan shall be used and satisfactory results obtained: ,

a) LP examination on the 0.D. at the vicinity of the column flanges, b) UT wall thickness measurement in the upper column in the-vicinity _ of the flanges, c) Visual inspection of the ID near the flanges.

d) Hydro Test at 125 psig with a 15 minute holding time.  !

J_

P e) . Perform alignment checks to verify that flanges are parallel and there is no appreciable offset between flanges for columns involved in the pump drop.

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These actions will be worked expeditiously with a dedicated crew.

4) Columns found to have degraded properties will be systematically  !

replaced with new style columns.

5) If a second pump becomes inoperable and pump column fracture can not Lbe eliminated as the cause, a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> LC0 to reach cold shutdown will '

be entered..

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Recommends Approval dab Date ///9 /90 .

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ORC Meet'ing Number 90-OG .

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TABLE 1 EVALUATION OF OPUtATING RNF 00Lifel5 NITH ASSUMED DEGRADED MTERIAL PROPERTIES *

! PUMP 'B' RNF 'C' PUMP 'D' Pl#F *E'

Top 2 Columns New Top Column Old Top 3 Column New tr Top Column Old and Stress Top 3rd Col. Stress Top Column Stab 11rer - Stress Top Stab 11zer-Stress Top 4th Column Column Calc Allow Calc Allow Calc Allow Calc Allow Stress Stress Stress Stress Stress Stress Stress Stress Ks1 Ks1 Ks1 Ks1 Ks1 Ksl Ks1 Ks1 i

Normal 1.2 2.4 1.2 2.4 1.2 2.4 1.2 2.4 Operation OBE 3.5 5.9 5.6 5.9 <4.0 5.9 4.0 5.9 i

SSE 6.5 8.6 9.8** 8.6 <6.8 8.6 6.8 8.6 (over) s An allowable of 1/10 of the minimum tens 11e strength of the four degraded test coupons per ASME VIII UCI-23 was used. ~

More detailed analysis techniques that include water damping and use an average of the four test coupon tens 11e values which were 23.9 ksi, 28.7 ksi, 28.9 ksi and 31.9 ksi would show that pump C would pass for the SSE case.

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ConnigantEngine NED File Action: Release C. Release w/Cyrents incorporated C. Resutnit w/Coments Inter. D neject O tetters w^ tate Part 21 Evalwation tee's: Yes _ne *.

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I Additional Coments - C/S (NED) 1 In Section 1.0 of the calculation, Sheet 2, of the text of the accident l description and scenario, was furnished to Cygna by J.G. Dyckman, Civil / Structural Division Manager, based on witness accounts furnished by:

Peter Ginnetty, Mechanichi Maintenance Supervisor  :

Rick Hyrick, Hechanical Maintenance Supervisor '

Charles Brazel, Senior Quality Assurance Engineer '

The actual column fracture location is approximately 16'-B" away from the tip of the suction bell, slightly different than shown on Sheet 7 of the ,

calculation. For the purposes of this calculation, this difference is not particularly relevant.

While the height of the impeller end off the ground was variously estimated at 4" to 12" before the accident, the most common account was 6" i or more. Thus Cygna was instructed to base their analysis on 6" initially, and to also investigate the stresses with larger drop heights.

The casing material is an Aluminum Bronze allo ,(ASTM B148 UNS No O p,

C952DD.

This has a unit weight of approximate y S W 1b per cu. ft., and about 6% heavier than carbon steel. While the calculation uses the I

I density of carbon steel to compute casing weights, Sheet 7, this difference is judged to have no significant effect on results.

Input data, assumptions, method of analysis and summary of results have been independently reviewed by C/S Division-NED._ The calculation is found to be conforming to the conventional analytical practice, and the objectives of the root cause investigation.

Note: Calculation being revised to reflect modulus of elasticity and density of the Aluminum Bronze Alloy. (see sheet 5). Revised >

modulus of elasticity is E - 15 X 106 psj M l

b. w - 477 lbs per cu. ft.

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Salt Se:Vice Water hrp P20BA. 1 Casing stresses due to >ccidental Drop i

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Estinate the bending stresses in the se:vice water prp casing due to a drrp of 6 to 12 inches of the inpeller end of the pxp onto a 6" ir:h concrete slab on grade.

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Sources of Data A ' '

See Calculation, Section 4,0.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.0 Background and Problem Statement 2.0 Method of Analysis 3.0 Summary of Results 4.0 References and Drawing List -

5.0 Calculations 3

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/.O B& ,o9 un c/ nd /404 km sA,4w f On January 11, 1990, Salt Service Water Pump P208A was being

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transported from the maintenance shop (on 1tfe first floor of the New  ;

Administration Building) enroute to the Intake Structure Building, l The pump, without the motor attached, was being carried in a horizontal orientation, supported by slings from forklift trucks at either end. The pump assembly is shown on BECo Drawing M8 4, Rev. j Et., and has an overall length in excess of 42' from its discharge head &

baseplate to the. tip of the suction bell.  ;

The pump. discharge head was leadir.g and the bowl / impeller end I was following.. The lead end was passing through the overhead door, f on the north side of the maintence shop, and was just beginning to make a turn. The rear forklift and bowl / impeller portion of the pump was still within the building line of the maintenance shop.  ;

Just prior to the turn of the lead fo'rklift, the individual who was .

directing the handling operation had walked toward that operator,  :

and had his back to the rear forklift. As the lead forklift operator began to executs a turn, the bowl / impeller end fell to the floor. None of the people present actually saw the bowl / impeller end as it was falling.

Immediately after the bowl / impeller end fell, it was observed that one of the five column sections had a 360 degree through wall fracture. The fracture occurred in the second 80" column section up .

from the bowl / impeller end, approximately 3" frorn the flange away .

I from the bowl / impeller end. The pump discharge head was still suspended in the sling from the lead end forklift. The column sections from the fracture back to the bowl / impeller end were resting flat on the ground. The impeller / bowl with its sling was laying on the concrete surface just inside the overhead door. The two 4

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abutting column sections were laying on the pavement just outside l the building. The impeller shaft was intact preventing significant axial or lateraj separation at the fracture. Subsequent examination showed it did not experience any permanent deformation. The ,

position of the impeller / bowl end was such that the forks , of the forklift were no longer directly over the sling point, as if the sling had been pulled off the forks.

l The impeller / bowl end was estimated to be somewhere between 4" an<l 12" above the maintenance shop floor when the accident i occurred. The pump end, suspended in its sling, was estimated to be  :

approximately 12" to 24" off the ground. The most likely accident scenario is that the forklift movements were not fully coordinated

^ resulting in the 411ngs of the rear forklift slipping off the forks. A less likely scenario is that the column section fractured suddenly under '

its own weight, and then slipped off the forks of the rear forklift. The evidence supporting the former is as follows:

  • The pump had been lifted and moved some distance before the accident. Thus it was successfully " proof tested", and had sustained its own dead weight.

. The front slings were restrained from coming off the forks by an "A" frame assembly while the rear slings were not. The rear slings depended on friction to remain on the forks if the pump were to .

i move awg from the forklift.

. The position of the rear forklift and the impeller / bowl immediately after the accident suggests relative movement occurred in a direction which would pull the slings off the forks.

The purpose of this calculation is to estimate the bending stresses in the pump casing resulting from a drop of 6 to 12

)

inches of the impeller end of the pump onto a six inch concrete slab on grade,

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2.0 Method of An'alysis -

The pump casing is modeled as a beam with lumped masses. An energy balance approach is used to estimate the stresses in the beam after impact with the concrete slab. The work associated with the gravity forces acting over the displacements due to angular rotation of the pump just prior to impact in calculated. The work is - then equated to the strain energy of deformation of the beam after impact.

Additional work done by the forces acting over the beam displacements are neglected for the strain energy calculations. This is conservative. The strain energy is calculated by replacing the beam by < a series of springs representing the stiffness of the beam at the mass points.

Each spring exactly represents the resistance of the beam to the kinetic energy of the mass. The spring forces are then calculated by, conservation of energy. These forces represent

& the dynamic loads imparted on the structure from the masses.

The forces are used to calculate beam shears, moments and bending stresses. Due to the stiffness of the concrete / soil spring, the frequency of response near the contact point will be much greater than the natural frequency of the pump casing (approximately 6 Hz, Reference 4.1.3), therefore high frequency contact forces will not significantly alter the stresses near the break location. The concrete soil spring is assumed rigid and acts as a support point af ter the initial impact. Local forces near the contact point were not investigated.

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()L A L

S * ** '

pg /g Q j, y Joo No 8 u' No j lilllilllilillllilllilllilltti 700M /// i sy:iem sr.eet No Aa.io4 No_ M a , No O ]

3.0 Summary of Results The highest bending stresses occur at about 17 feet from the 4 N[/,:

impeller end of the pump. The actual break occurred at or very near the predicted point of highest stress. The maximum l "If,,-

stress ranged from about ksi for a drop of 6 inches, to 39 #

ksi for a 12 inch drop. These represent lower bound values ,

due to. conservative estimates of the pump flange and bearing weights, a-nd neglect of additional work energy associated with the beam deflections.

E g4 t

9 b

9 4

I E

I

. - _ -- _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .. -__ _ - r ---- 1

Calculation Sheet -yn h,,=

-. v. ,

duha  !

,,w,, on kn unn 4,. E'."'N IIi c/sa lillliifililli111 Sub*ri  !" dfU '

11111111 p j/g

$ rite m sam No  !

Aaairs$ No me . No O -

9 I

j 4.0 References and Drawing List 4.1 References

~!= 4.1.1 Dynamics, by J.L. Mariam, 2nd Edition, John Wiley and. Sons, 1971.

4.1.2 Ladish Catalog No. 55, " Forged and Stainless Welding .

k Pipe Fittings".

4.1.2 Seismic Stress Analysis of Vertical Pumps, Model VIT-X-SD size 16 DHLO-1, Mcdonald Engineering i

Analysis Company.

4.1.4 Vibrations of Soils and Foundations, by T.E.

4 p Richart, Jr. et al, Prentice-Hall, 1970.

  • i 4.2 Drawing List 4.2.1 Boston Edison Company, Drawing No. MB-4, Rev. E4,

" Service Water Pump Assembly Drawing".

4.2.2 Boston Edison Company, Drawing No. 1065, Rev. EO,

" Administration Building Foundation Plan".

t 4

4 Oder /?efeteecer o.: nole/ in [s/crll0n l

L

}

- - . _ .- __ _ _ _ __ ____._________ __ _ . . . - , , . . . - . _ __. i._.,m. -.,,- m- . , , _ ,

, ,: ,. . o.,,

Calculation Sheet 77>. W.a=- <

i/u ho

,,,,,,, n. sh n 1d*ison db. e,.

% .5b /

o.

ris s-le o r Immimmilimimlim Swo*c' !""' I aleogq //r

~

$yltem Sheet No an. v., we A m,, so O 7

'S.0- [ o /cu /dions for dimen siens, :ee fr/. 42,I 413 SeptorJed Loc + hon oi m/EnER End ored suo 2  ?

\

puiny cssiny $

, ~/7-5 i ,. [,

  • bA*d .

a f 4 3 ' , .c If D

} cl .c & l2 , Us e f '-kt inib d a ks

~ .fo 0.377

/2 .- 6 0 0. iz.*? T I. D . c J 2 fle/. 4./.3 A 277!?f r /4.4 su '

I 274- iu ' irnfe/let end sIi A/*/e$er hq I v'st /ssi' yAflf 3

5, 4y ,, .t

~N""' '

.Sho,f/ Diu meleF = 2.93 " . ' . W = IT t? lH G riny , swr 14.54 lf4 /?eb A /JU/-P1 pale : AJ. ~/ n te i

& 8es+>ny.s.,F/nje.1 rMisc , w = tr '"/H w itJ 'ht ter /. 4.1, z

<W' =

9176 t /T' ?? + IT ' PD 44 ,19 70 Vff

_) W = sv.,I = 70.< 4 3 ' 3 9 4 0 l}

/vde

HJer,'d /)em s//y ,Gr Alun,o'ow dronze c 9 7200 ~ 410 IUR ' ., fd e f. A sTH & l4 8

.:r w.w s" W

. Calculation Shcet 7# o.,he s /t e c ..o ., < o.ie pr gcq bOS Oh ' Yi3On

- &, W' J l '\T  % c) ni lin nIinil$in 5**c'  ?' "# !"' M "

System --

~

ho"egn

  • [/A

. Shee No Analysis No Re, No O [

1 The h ee h d/ s/<s4-<e u sms// an-#/

// e wos erJen /4 //y } o er ien /s),

cos te7

.. Use JAe ,4 / /o w u y m e a 'e I h syynon- de Yde c' de A+vior ol t/Ae fung cs sin y TAe .ymic numlet t t e /er /v Me /ocd*n of /voyed mosses

. IN / r /A L . - 37.A & E I

/ 2 3 4 C 6 7  ? *) 10  !!

g  !  :  :  :  ; 2  :  :  :  :

y .

c/s: f" f -- - 3 < J

~

Xe tY d f .0 , a '0 cc\

o .c

/0 e7 spes (# f.30' .r/./ "

I np f &

2o

= 1 9 40 /. tit.+

zo

.443'iv-hdre'

$ t-10 =YQ - 3 410 b!/.4 -

< f 90 isi-)dilec *

/0 10 A fdei relesse of /Ae i:m/ve//e> end -fde p ony u s i ny rs +a'e.<

4,a' psio / , J .

A f -)A e ' in e;&nce de/ne inpc/, JAe ,

y msde/ & r epies ea'es/ a., sAown A> /h .,in y

'M N

c .

F '

Calculation Shcet '7M-m %s,. o./,

/

/+h o i cresce ny / caw I pyg, Ses len Eddon b. "' N 's \ l l T f9 0 i- LN.k 6 4 p., ,j g g g f,y Joe No Few No j

lilllllllllillililllilllilllll SW68"'  ;

, TOo //f'

$ystem - $htet NO Ah81rS4 No Rev No -

s rA u 2 \

5 F: r, ,,

R & Foi  !

l l. ]' fI i 1 , l W ,

' b

] l, l \

-4 ' -

R T u g es /iu / fo n es on moss e.s m; c/ve h upu/ar oerelershon d  ;

E y Jion: o/ .mo k

.,4+ faed es Adon .-

f&=m7a /?e/. .Oy on, a

' g. //4 E Mo - I; a (o repe.rwoh j nel. 41 1

<G p A/

Mo= Wx.//2 = m9 1 /z '

I .7, , 4 (t ' , t ' ) : m Qu',,fzfJ ') m l' it sc,r.

3 e.i.1 c4 = f Mo /Io - m*)ll2  :

h rd/sec'

. m l ' /3 z/

fFi-mice =ml2n =Lw .

2 2P +

h p p,, poih l l n = m; , x; g , x, . . u , . a

. +c .

) z/

F i = )_. W i X'i

. z 1 5%%$ T .

,. -- . , . , . . . ~ . . . - -

Calculation Sheet rh.Av b o,,,

i //

'che I c,. ... ...  !

Fr: ct S* YO M '$YUen h. A' ?.- '

\IY *) O '

, EmmmnMmnim s~n A "* /"*v' M "' ' "' ', ,4 j

- "{e*m.

,,,,,.. 1 Analysis NO R,v NO i

[l,e Wof k lUne by ytoviYy jVJf debtf im c) u:

lAlt " ke =[ficll whet e dir d4obcemenl P i hocle i jus l bedre i+yoc b di = Xi x cl ~

A Cs/cu/de +A e wor i or kin e>Ly , g,egy, pg

,e, ,

,6 e esel man hedin :

it Me! . - Fi x di = 1 z wi Xi ed

/ I 1

t he<. .- 1L ze zu;x;'

s .

1 Now ey v&lt Ye 'foYal wots 'done jus ? L e hre impoc / .fo +Ae isfein/ '

drein enemy in die d em J rh

./im e of maim- de //eJion &

1 JAe dy nmic /od.s . TAe ,4 Nowin 9 s::viry/isn are mde:

a ne s -, ,e,,,/Jn se u-cn le rytem j sp in p

i t .d e m as poinh loco e .r Y

ly PAe in s tse of /Ae de//eeAn d ,coaf

Esd=

~~

Calculation Shcet 'm /hrhc I o,w, nos /on Edison 4 5 . W , '?'

u.41 ....,

~

~ ~ ~ ,~ a ,

,,,,,~,

~ . ,,)oeIno Ah6'yl'& N. Rey NO

)

i dut 0 0 .Vhi )Of pf /,

t a) TAe minn sw/ecAk d >ife <> o y caurs /

ressonstA for simdfueouN. s// 7Au .<Asa);e/ de o de.r excy/ p.o.re -

very oen c/Ae psof if an Ad.

7Au a decs v.re .Me kpancy of . r rAe uny csiin y n exfreme/..

hw p/ 1eIsAve A. + e /td. s.a  :

conkc/ . & pe ) frepeny:' de reipsore esiiny i nys <An y s/04 on yde -

cor.cr e fe. Any AiyA Squency p re.rpon.re n es > b wi // de AiyA Jy i y eF poo +

Acdaes/ '

i est nu/

nef upn///w Ny i/hd dAe ye37on.re o f do poin's s/ /dere:f non miobyn e $0 e /- e MO N/ M Y/n ft* C SA J/ l L

DEFL Ec 7E D POJITIo/J S TA & E 3_ [ g' - ele //ec lisn j .

dem J i da l

(

s g p e ,.

E3 kg g l 5

, r u u ,,, s ,e,,, ,.c, n . a Sf f e n f U $2 # I hi h[z / ed.

2 cle flechen

.u e y- p ww v -,--,rmw-w a ,-+6 -- e-* e= v

L4lCulatliin Sheet 'm . Mw /hshe

... e c e. .

e,,u, Bos r'on Edae> 6.  % %rP- '

ll u cl9 o

- hmm$s?nsm$m sa n' A* f l W M ) 1~c*oy "" ~*j/p-

.,,,,- ,,,,~,

Ama'ysis No new No /2 IbeleNt e i Nr esc) .s,o M ry, egyc b ry wer h vaA .1 h in eneiyy kei - Sei -

F(+ i

  • J 2

k: si ll c (2 ke; llc; ) Atote : A ,)s/, % ,,) wer b s'on e Ay 9rwiYy 4 ?res over Ji s>e .rmoD -

f)yfe , C.cn Jft s be ,

,q TAe s/ H ny d>ree , f.r,. -

ki Ji or R; = (2 ke; x ki ) '/'

tau ren e.< ed, -tA e eyvtes/e J .4 ,ce on de sem o/ to eda / rey utred rr se//et/

i sie km Ji l f' errn .Me ey vivJeef drees schny or, Me l

J en, .+A e r e w % .r ,: h n t , incin es;& ,e

.c/ renes en de A hr m i n J. rAe.1 e edeu /h.r n d t e.iu M ,4/hw :

b -

.* e8 oc -

o Calculation Shcet WM catene er r

"[/ /* Ao e.it .

1 c,w,, Bedm fonen t Co. W JL v II's/ 9 0 j L J0D N0 I ' '

i bMCI f l g,,

  • F M 'N O llllllllllllllllllllllllllllll  %@M / jf S ylif fn $htet NO *l Amelya'l NO Rev No  !

l l

W [s /c v /p le for / Spri t, p &n U /4 v i JLA8 ou ',

  • a ,' N
  • s 9
  • \ *
  • 3 cr/?)DE - /

/?!

  • 4 2. E o, i

h = 4 & fh :t o'/ 3s Wnen /2e r' 4. J. 4 -

i l - t? pg 2&T

&: .C o s' / 5Lu> /4cA /ur

/?o ? /2+he: o/ Confsc/ A r e+ = & .

r i

V' fti)Jons /Eko ~~ 0,35 l

6 i.s es !ims lec/ s: .3000 psi 4, o / owe >

bo u nd be c o rpo<}e</ birJA// , // h nwcA hijder it ru4 }y Asses / on Ne c/n / onpy 20.7,

/?ef. 4.l.4 14e g w o is > irder ,J.

k t 3000 6 /i .n= /07,m phs n 8en l  % Wneu

.

  • h;ume j v,y or f ji i jy lc] hr &i Qrd '
luill hw na, /,y44 # Ne c/ cn .r/n:: es .

1 l 'fM M

,,,,,..b d+

L Calculation ShGet '7M- ,/,//r/Se ,

,,,,,,,, in L EAion G. l' N v $/?s/9 o

)

Ill tillit Illitisim S**c' - #"" /* Mf# h j  !

~ - '

sr.ie m sn.,i s.

h a n,,r.. ,, c. A m,, u, O /4 i

E := 29960604 Modulus of 1 := $16 Loneth in inches Elasticity ge/. f /J I := 279.0 Moment of s = 43.8 Section Modulus, Inertia t

1 := 2 . 19 Perform operations for points 2 to le 1-1 x  := 1 Distance to location i i le f 1 1 k  : = 3 E I 1 -- spring stiffness of. beam at 7 1 2 ,,

,2 location i p e/. A fsc

" 1~* M o n vo l TfA [ J.

i

~'

1 C e fm 2-//4 i - -

x k [

i i i ,

L 51.6 21611.7

{ L 103.2 6991.4 4 154.9 4096.2 5 206.4 3967.3 6 258 2826.8 7 292 3067.3 8 361.2 4996.2 9 412.8 6901.4

( 464.4 21811.7 l

1e l . _. .

d := 6 inches Assumed free fall distaneo of impeller end of the pump casing

)

w-:= 6.67 lbs por in (80 lbs per foot) 1 g := 386.4 in/sec2

c Calculation Sheet 2 77-~

.c,.. . <

n 2/tho Rc.. 1 p,ge, ' 8 t3 lb b f/lon G.  % ' t// T/ 9 O

6. LJL i. /hyp )9/ A gii d ** k * , ' ' "* ko

^,

1111111111llllll11111611111115veaei j

)

~

9pp gq $

-) Ersiem sheet No I aneiys.: No M n e , No M /I 1

J W't= wl total weight i

W  ;

m := - total mass

.y i w to weight at location 1, i= 2 to le i le ,

X W 3 i w -:= -

F  :=-*w * -

Force at location i- >

11 20 1 2 i ,1 , due to gravity ,

r . .' '

/

) x  !

i ,

Ke ~ = F 'd kinetic energy at each spring.

l 1 i 1  ;

t

. .5 Ke i 1

6  := 2, - deflection of the beam at location i i k

. 1 Alo fe - Thi.1 deNulars si sof J/t fois / /e flechen of /Ae Jew . l l Fs  := 8 'k restoring force at location i i i i

.. - _ . . - , . __ . . . = , . _ . . . . _ , . _ . , - . . - . _ . . _ . . . . . - - _ . , . . , - _ _ _ , ..

Calculation Shcet e

@h.. . <

///eAo e.,e pnggi [o) #M MOdM 0 'Y /[/ M9 8 '

L$ l sa j)m fyg pg,y Jok ko * ' '

-, 11161616l1i111llllllllllllllll $ **

  • 8 90ogq Fue

/ No// j i sneeine l svoem Analyl'8 NO Aev No ._

l x )

1 '

w -

F Ko S Fs "i i 1 i i i i

,,,3,,,,,,, 344.2 h 51.6 31 h' 1162.4 L 344.2 h 103.3 123.9 h 1307.7 )

4 154.9 278.8 9.4 1 344.2 .1 1 2 94.6

,J, ,,, 344.2 9.4 206.5 495.6 h JZ43 .7 6 344.2 - 3.5 258.1 774.4 9.7 2092.4 7 344.2 h 309.8 1115.1 M 2615.5 8 344.2 9.7 361.4 1517.8 0.9 3487.3 2

9 344.2 0.8 413 1982.4 h 5231

_},,3,,, 344.2 0.9 464.6 25e9 0.5 19461.9 .

t P

N.

't .O N

-$ \ Deflection .

1 N /

w AloYe : A/r l /s b /

-9.9 0 x 516 $t 'C Y'U^ 0"lY be '

i 5 Nt; k fo!Y 5 11000 /

Fs j Restoring Force i

'p/

1906 9 x 516 i

0 Fs

~

1-x Mee'en t coih t //

Wiy n dsic/eds ed c losit ,d joi I' . e f M t=

i i , i, dvt lD swie

--w ,

Caiculation Sheet *Ebu/.s nho E I N 1-

,,,,.c., Bo s k a EA)ea 4 [/) r/9 o y litill litililitilillisil 5d*c'  !@ b -

M '" hgq [/p

,,,,.- , .. , s .

an. irs,i so A m., we d /7 6

le h ,M = 4858513.4 R  := 4.86' R = 9418.6 Reaction at i 1 1 1 location 1 i

V  ? -R V  := V - Fs Shear force from location i to i+1 1 1 1 1-1 i 1

f,M  := e M  := M +V -

Moment at location i 1 i 1-1 1-1 le M  := e 11 1 M i

fb  := -

fb  := e Bending Stress at i 5 11 location i o

i := 1 . 10 x V M fb i i i i i

,,J,,,,,_ e 9418.6 e e L 51.6 8256.2 486000 11095.9 k 3 103.2 6948.4 912e18.4 20822.3 4 154.8 5453.9 127e557.4 29ee8.2 5- 206.4 3710.2 1551977.1 35433.3 6 258 1617.8 '743424.4 39804.2

_j 7- 309.6 -997.6 1826904.7 41710.2 1775426.3 40534.8 8 361.2 -4484,9 9 412.8 -9715.9 1544002.9 35251.2

,,,1,0,,, 464.4 -20177.8 1942662.2 23805.1

7# 4 4 =-

~

Calculation Shoot ///</m i e.,e c,

% ... h. -

LN l .I 6

,,, ,, oa h E d, son 6.

Jcb No

" dir/se 4

5 6 6 '"' 4 / y f,j

%oo$q 111111!!!ll111lll1lll1llllllll Fue/ No//

soiem sneet No  !

Anain's No m.No e O /

l 1

~l 10000 7~ '

f ll' '( f)' '

I Shear Diaptam ff/, ,, ',cl / e',;,,/ g.[

, lbs ,

V "'Y -

i

,',t.

i

-300ee 0 x 516

! i := 1 . 11 l A x  != 516 i 11 2eeeeee

/, s~~m N,

/ \

/ \ Moment Diagram M / inch-lbs l

/

/

/. s

/ \

L e

/ \

e x 516 g

}

l' mx

@W 2/#h#

Calculation Sheet eme. .- e. .

p,gg, Ass & fd' dan &. Ov' Y1 0 / WO o LJL s

~

L f,4 jQ Joo No M No lilillillilitillfilllilllilill Suo* ey o Qg

~ '

//f system . Sheet No Ame'Fl'6 No Rev No 56006 fb

/ '

Bending Stress

,/ psi

/ \.

?

/ .

0 7. . 516 L

per the above graphs ant:1 tables, the maximum predicted stress

( }at location 7, corresponding to 9.4 x 516 inches, or 17.2 foot from the impeller end of the casing. Actual failure occurred at approximately 17.4 feet from the end. Agreement is excellent with the predicted results.

Since Fs. the restoring force, is a function of the square root of Ke, then

.F O . V ( Shear ), M . (Moment) and fb (Sending Stress) are also a function of Ko. Ke is proportional to d. therefore the above parameters are o function of the square root of d, the distance the impeller end of the pump chaft easing fell before striking the ground.

The predicted bending stresses for free fall distances greater than 0 inches are as follows:'

J := 6 . 12 e ;u j 9W Y

=

~

a Galculation Sheet ?M. E :' ' E E T //s A o c~ceo ey '

o. ..

e,2:n dedm f./,Vn G. %h ///r/so til 181lll1111111ll , 54*ct MM M "/ q eg jjg

,,; ) System sam No Amanys.: No me , No O 2O

.e. .

. .5 d

J f6  := f 4171e f s= ~

j j 0 6 Distance to Maximum Bending Impact ( d ), inches Stress at location 7 d fb J J f f 41710

') 7 45851.9 8 48162.6 9 51984.1 l.f 53847.4 l.L 56475.6 1.2.,. 58986.8 l

l-(

.w v I

le6 ten (disen Cr$4ey i Swstlier Desig'n Det, rent As,te. Tom Ph 8 Watt 1 3 , Rey, 1 geterdt Muspgng 5.!!$/tf # 90 Inf.'Mtien teles .f 4,ttatvents 1 O S kn.0 0 ,

Ag g{dty $tudy Calc. . P208A Drop Accident -

toyverdi. Salt Service Water Pump P208A, Drop Analysis Cortratter Cygna Erargy services SWett/tF,90,04 Rev.1 Det'. ner.t Type: Dent Selel/Critgta/ Work $cepe Q, I lyl steli tien y, tevip $ peg / 854 e a ,t apt / Calt E, roc -

mot)t, o,.,

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, jag,an4s)teit

,e4.ir. ve i t,u,i.,/ eti,i,t

  • ** ~ ~ ~

Ot%r C ul ogther

  • P208A LettentJbnt[sIfl8 t 90089. File No.1/F.1st & Rev.1 n*'a-a iiiot n.te *estat1Q or.et: Yei a . o etie.: ca..e t 3 s ~  :

/ f J.G. Dyckman _

Cognit6nt Intr /DM (ltte) W.L. Shia _

CeGallant[ntr(s),Centratter J. Voe1xen _

L FSAR - NA

  • ' ' ' ' ' 8 % yf, ,

C'enf ams tc FlAR Rete.ts: Yes _ he_ Coment - ME 2 ,1 DYCkmen x W.L. snia, x genfams te eretWrement helpttl' Yellhe_ Coment 96 HM17 D hando y i Cen<er., te etur a ,ut.1e outer. n  : v.. _h_ [Jeg;;,  ; .

c_n, see .tt.cate ex,s.n. tory oreoent. , . ,,,, m , ,

e, ,

ont.< ie, .er< e. .nu - o. = --

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~, . ,  ;

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ie,at, or t,.io tto o ie., Consei,u..it 7 Coments ested/tenwiredCMnges)- Coeniaant tagine

, __ _ IEDFile . ,

Action: teiease G. Release s/Coments Interporated , telukit w/Come Reject Q tetterd NA Date Port 21 (vs vatten Req'g: Yes ,ng3

/$/ W.L. Shia bV N'b A tol

  • 741/_ Contributing Engineer

' gete

- Tcpuent tnge

'd

/5/J.G. Dyckman -

S/ _ _

G#^tr'#wt'nl Initneer DM Da te Division Mpgir' "fTI .

I-ng-ts leibit 3.M. A e,,, 9

Attachment to SL'005/RF 90-04 '

REV. 1 Additional commentt - C/S (NED)

Revision 1 of this calculation was prepared in response to follow-up BECo comments concerning material properties of the Aluminum Bronze alley.

  • In Section 1.0 of the calculation, Sheet 2, of the text of the tecident description and scenario, was furnished to Cygna by J.G. Dyckman, Civil / Structural Division Manager, based on w tness accounts furnished by:

i Peter Ginnetty. Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor Rick Myrick, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor Charles Brazel, Senior Quality Assurance Engineer

  • The actual column fracture location is approximately 16'-8" any from the tip of the suction bell, slightly different thar *hown on Sheet 7. of the calculation. For the purposes of this calcule dis difference is not particularly relevant.

.

  • While the hetght of the impeller end off the grc.N was variously estimated at 4" to 12" before the accident, the most common account was 6" or more. Thus Cygna was instructed to base their analysis on 6"

,. initially, and to also investigate the stresses with larger drop heights.

  • The casing material is an Aluminum Bronze alley, ASTM B148. UNS No Cg5200, The. actual material properties (elastic modulus and unit weight) for this alloy are taken from the " Metals Handbook Ninth Edition.

Relevent pages of that handbook are photocopied and attached.

  • Input data, assumptions, method of analysis and sunnary of results have been indepelidently reviewed by C/S Division.NED. The caleviation is found to be conforming to the conventional analytical practice, and the objectives of the root cause investigation.

I '

._n

  1. g58/saw

kI  ;

a, . g y , _%;.

3 L

Metals 1 ~ Handbook Ninth Edition -

u

-l Volume 2 '

Proper.tles and s

Lf Selections a Nonferrous Alloys. '

l

.and Pure Metals ,

' Propored under the direction of-i the ASM Handbook Committee L [

l William H. Cubbely, Director of Referense Publiestions Mugh Beber, Meneging Editor bevid Benjamin,.Senter Editor Poul M. Unterweleet, Meneger, N Publications Development Cnig W. Kirkpot*k, Chief Copy $ditor

= Vicki Knoll, Prodvetien Ceevdinator 1(athy Niemen, Editoriel Assistent 4

,: } .

M AMER!CAN 50CifTY FOR METALS W META (5 PARK. CHIO 44073

7,; i . ,

g ,

f," , -!

- . /

, }

J , -i -

1= t l'

ll l' ,

\ +

Copreght8ltte by the AMEh!CAN BOCitTY FOR MITMA

.- All egnie reserved >

No part of this hash may be reproduced. stored in a mneval afstem. er unasensned, in ser Ibra er by ont means, elermnie, meehanisel, phee>

j 1

' aprin6 8ese'd as, of otherense. withest the ention pornuassen of the espregat ownef, i First panting. November,1979 i

-i Metale hadhoek is a se44esuve enin inveMag taeueande of teshmaea!

sponehens it knage septhef is one book a weale of andernamen from world. wide arvees to aelp etionuste, enensere and teshnimane selve eunent ead kng reage prehleme.

Great ease is inhos in the sapitsthe and production of thee seimas, but it shouM he made clear that as wartanues. esprees er implied, are given in

, senassues with the aerurney et osapleteness e(this publiesties, and no reseeneihihty eaa he nahen af any eleine that mar snee.

Nothing matassed is the Metale Headhoek shalt he sonstrued as a stent -

et est nett of meaudasewo, asie, use er reproduetten,la seasestica witA N ear metaed, pressee, apperstw, prodws sospesiues et eyenes, whetaer w set evend by lonere asenet. espynght et trademark, and methtag enstansed is the Metale hadbeek shall be construed as a defense ogsaaet ear elleged laktagement oflanes paesas, wayngna er trademark, or es a

, defenes esasant any liability ter susk nattagement.

Ceassata, snummia and suggesuene are invited, and should he infereNed to the Amenena Gamesy der Metale.

LArary of Congress Catalogiat ta Puhtleatwi Data

. - Amarteaa Sonstr for Metale Peepenies and slenaea. neederrow alleys and pwe metale

i ;

!Metais bame==h 9th ed., v.11 lash. des bibliographaeal redpreasse end tades.

t. Wisis 3. Alleys L Title. EL Seneer Amenean Seewty for Metala. Metale handansk: 9th ed. v. 3

.i) - tad 4 A3 Oth es. sol. 2 4805000e (tet) 4 31444 IERN 0 47170 00H s 1 Pnaise ta the United Steise of Amenea '

4

.{-

(--

], p

Propee90es of 8est SeppeP/481 e04800 mesaeWecropseHee renne str.nga. neating beam 78CeJSeetoph Magnene permeability.1.0 180 RPa (88 kats at 108 sysles Creep. rupture chassonertones.

Sommerelof 88eenes pobreestlea Shoresteristles Limiting eroep stresa fbr 10 *%%:

Conunca masse. Medlum bronse Machtaability. 80% ofC36000, free. 148 MPa (21 kal) at 330 *C (460 7);

eutting brass 64 MPa (7.9 kat) at 816 *C (800 T).

SpesifleeWoos See also hg. 46.

STM. Band castings. B66. Ingot:

Government. QQ&225. alloy 16; Mierostructure. As east, the micro-MLB 16261, alley I structure is pnmarily fet alpha, with 898300 p,ecipitates of iron rich alpha in the ebeenleet SempeelHea gggy.gyg,9Al foem of metus and spheres. De.

Composition limits. 6 0 to 8 0 Sn; 6em mercialBlesmes pending on W Mag rate, aman 18 te 22 Pb; 1.2 max Zn; 1.0 maa Ni; amounta of metastable eph beta or 0.8 maa Sb: 0.005 mas Ai; 0.15 max Previous trade natne. Ampoo Al alpha. gamma euteetold decomposi.

Fe 0.5 man Pfai; 0.08 max 8. 0.006 Common aame. Aluminum brov - tion products may be present. An.

max 51: rem Cu 9A; 86 3 9 nealing followed by rapid sooling re.

ied s nas r ter anunmi . ussi gpeeggg,,yaos duces the amount of residual beta to about 8% of the apparent volume.

Appliestlose ASME. Band eastings BB148. Cen. Metallographic etehant. Acid fbr-trifugal castings. 88271. rie chlande (10% HC1. 6% FeCls)

Typical uses. Locomotive was .ng ASTM. Sand casti  : 8148. Cen.

parta, high. load low. speed beanngs trifugal castinp: B 1. Conunuous Ansas thermetedsHes meshoaleel PropeMles castings: 3505. Ingot: B30 Density. 7.64 Mg/m8 (0.M6 lblie .

SAE. J462 at 20 *C (68 'TJ _

Tensile properties. Typical Tenalle Government. Centrifugal, sand and Volume ehsnge on freening. Ap.

strength.170 MPa (25 kei); yield continuous castings: QQ-C 390. Sand strength. 83 MPa (12 ksO, alcaga. castings: MLC.22229 hroximawly 1.7as contraction.atternm tien.12% in 80 mm or 2 in- Other. lnget Code No. 415 Compressive propertie6. Compre,. Therieel propeMles sive strength. 260 MPa (38 kai) SleemleelSempeeltlea Liquidus temperature.1045 'C Hardness. 40 MB Composition. limita. 86 min Cu; 8.5 (1915 7 )

Elastic modulus. Tension. 72 GPa to 9.6 A!;2.5 to 4.0 Fe;1.0 mas others Solidus temperature. 1040 *C i10.5 x 108 psir; shear.90 GPa(13 x (totah (1906 7 )

10' psi) Coeffleient of therinal erpanelon.

impu.

Fatigue strength. Rotating beam: Consequence rity limita. Possibleof exceediafortness hot a  ! inear 16.2 Sm'm K (0.0 Sin.!!ncT) 69 MPa (10 kaii at 10' cycles and.or hot cracking, embrittlement at 20 to 300 *C (68 to 672 T)

Impact strength. Isod 6.4 J (4.0 and reduced soundness of castings Spostfle beat. 377 J&g K (0.091 h%' Btullb Tl at 20 'C (68 T)

I APPI'80888 Thermal conductivity. 50 W/m K assee $becasteeleHes Typical uses. Acid. resisting pumps. (29.1 Stu/ft h TJ at 20 *C (48 T) 4 Mg m8 (0.34 lb'in.8) at De(ett bearings, buahings, gears, valve sesta, guides, plungers, ump reda.

p,,,,gg,,

y,;ume ebange on freening.1.1% pickling hooks, nonspar ing harti. Electrical conductivity. Volumet ware rie.12% 1ACS at 20 *C (68 Ti

%mel PropeMies Precautionsin use. Not suitable for Electrical resistivity.144 nflm at Liquidus temperature. 940 'C use in oxidizing acids 20 *C 168 'F.-

5% anageetle PrePeMio.

Solidue utsperature. 800 *C (1475 A8esbeslas! Propee96es T. Tensue properties. Typical data for Magnette Permeability.1.20 at incipient molting temperature, sand cast nos. bars: tensile strength.

. 16 000 A/m (200 oorsteds) 316'C(800 7 , 650 MPa (80 kai); yield strength.185 CoefBelent of thermal expansion. MPa (27 kai); elongation. 35% in 50 8besleal _ m_ _ - --

knear. 18.5 Sm.m K (10'3 Sin / mm or 2 in. See also Fig. 44. General conosion , behavior.

'_ in T at 20 to 200 'C (68 te 382 T) Haninees. 64 HRB: 126 MB (3000 C96200 has generally fair resistance

,, SP*cific heat. 376 jag K (0'09 Blu/ kg load) to attack in noncahng mW lb Ti at 20 *C (68 T) Poisson's ratio. 0.31 acida such as sulfuric. hydrochlorie Thermal conductivity. 52 Wrm K Elastic modulua. Tension.105 GPa and phosphoric, and in alkalies such

'30 Btu ft h 7) at 20 'C (68 T, (16 x 108 psi); shear. 39 GPa as modium and potassium hydroxide.

(6.7 x 108 pei) Cast componenta are used success-Elegerleet p,,,,,,g,, Imopact etrength. Charpy keyhole, 27 J i20 ft lb) at - 18 to + 36 'C (0 to fully in systema for seawater. brack.

iah water and potable waar. The

/

E t'ieal conductivity. Volumet.

. 100 Ti;laod. 40 J (30 ft lb) at - 18 to alloy resista many organic acids. in.

',' 100 IACS at 20 *C (66 Ti -36 'C to to 100 72 cluding ace *.c and lactic, plus all

a

- - ~ , , _

i

-M 5 eeners and othere Meiet ammortia

,  %. 44 W sherbelme toestle propeW6es of 998900, as - essespheres saa esuas stroemere.

east c; aies ersaking.

Petwiesetse therestects96es

' * " tiasWasbility. 30% of C80000, free-

.  ? '"

, ,,, aurang breas. Carbide er teet swel eutters may be used. Good surface

., Raiah and proclaion attainable with

"' all saventional methods. Typleal Q,g N

.I. eendluens using tool steel eutters:

roughing speed.106 m'mia (350 ft/ '

  • ,. min)wish a feed of 0.3 mairee t0.011 j . In.rev); Saishin speed. 360 mmin

{.

4 I m .,a j

(1160 ft/ min) wit a feed of 0.15 mrr.'

g  ;

rev t0.000 in.,rev) n'; . 1 . a Annettias temperature. 660 to 4

m ,

1 745 *C (1900 to 1875 T) m ... .m

,, w

~

/ * * "'""" _ ,, W :: : ELM 3 sessee

.* a io. *' * *

  • sees.treteAt <

snows. .e Gesemoretel IIennes Trade name. Ampes B2 i Commonnames. Aluminumbronas '

' " " . ' 0B; 89110 -

4. , . u =' tm an = in se Speellleettees

, o

, A ASTtf Sand,asatings: 5148.' Cen.

' ' " prlAssal eastings: 8271. CantinGbar*. t g

\3 . castin BAE.J449 gs: B606. Ingota: 580 1

" 3 Government. Centrifugal and sand .

4 castings: QQ C.300. Precision cast. -l N __

ings: MIL C 11848, composition 22 3'

T laget Adametaannian number. 415 Ebe nisel 6

,,1 u ii s u en es as se Compositten timita. 88 min cu;9.0 l- fem ** to 11.0 All 0.8 to 1.8 Fe; 1.0 mas i ethers (tetal)

Conseguemee of eseeeding impu- ,

rity limits. Possible het ehermess. I r ~ ~ .,' .oundsen, embrittle.  ;

te m er l- T ment, red response to heat treat-E most

. g e

-j ( N Typteal ases. Mekling baskets. i i- . %N( nuts, gears, steel udll slippers, ma.

rine equipment, welding jaws, non-

]- 3 3  %

nardware ,

seiensla use.Not suitable for  ;

B i" ', esposure to oxidising seids. Pro-  ;

y leased heating in the 320 to 666 *C  :

l' (610to1060'T) range can result in a a w n in me re an is less of duettlity and notch teush-Temes ews.*e ggg, j h epropertles

~

Tensile properties. Minimum val.

t

_ _ _ _ _ _ _