ML19326E157

Tech Spec Change Request 66 for Amend to License DPR-72, Deleting Power Level Cutoff Requirement Embodied in Tech Spec 3/4.1.3.8, Reactivity.

ML19326E157
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	07/23/1980
From:	FLORIDA POWER CORP.
To:
Shared Package
ML19326E151	List: ML19326E150 ML19326E157
References
TAC-42345, NUDOCS 8007280133
Download: ML19326E157 (6)

Text

.-

d TECHNICAL SPECIF ;ATION CHANGE REQUEST NO. 66, (APPENDIX A)

Replace pages III, 3/4 1-27, 3/4 1-28, 3/4 1-36 and B 3/4 1-4 with the attached pages III, 3/4 1-27, 3/4 1-28, 3/4 1-36 and B 3/4 1-4. '

Proposed Change Elimination of power level cutoff requirement by deletion of specification 3/4.1.3.8 XENON REACTIVITY and other references (Figures 3.1.1 and 3.1.2).

Reason for Proposed Change The auirement to hold power escalation at 92% Full Power, the current power ' level cutoff, until Xenon reactivity is less than 10% and stabiliz-ing, is a result of simplistic analysis assumption in standard Babcock &

Wilcox methodology. This conservative assumption is nu necessary to main-tain LOCA kw/ft limitations. Using more realistic assumptions (e.g. allow-ing Xenon worth to vary with appropriate control rod and APSR compensatory movement) resulting heat rates are still well within LOCA limits and are more conservative than those calculated using simplifying assumptions.

Therefore, the loss of generating capacity (approximately 70 MWe) while awaiting Xenon stabilization is unnecessary, and its associated costs are without any merit.

Safety Analysis of Proposed Change The analysis for, in summary, consisted of hypothesizing various load following transients for various power levels and at extreme points in the fuel cycle. The analysis focused on the point of minimum xenon worth

("undershoot") and hence maximum power peakHg. Control rod and APSR scans were performed, and the resulting margin with respect to LOCA kw/ft limits were calculated. These margins, in all cases, were conservative with re-spect to standard B&W methodology resuli- (discussed in previous section).

The following parameters were assumed to .save significant impact on peaking during such transients:

1) magnitude of power level change

2) rod position and imbalance during transient

3) effects of consecutive transients

4) cycle burnup

5) loading pattern With regard to Item 2, the analysis included cases where technical specifi-cation position limits were and were not observeJ.

As stated above, the analysis confirmed that for Crystal River 3, Cycle 3 ,

LOCA kw/f t limits were not violated, and in fact, the margin was greater I than that calculated during reload design ani'ysis. Later fuel cycles of i Crystal River 3 will be analyzed to confirm chat the results remain within acceptable limits. The analysis upgraded operation at a full rated thermal power of 2544 MWt will, therefore, be valid for upgraded power operations.

scow rol33

INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION APD__ SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS PAGE SECTION 3/4.0 APPLICABILITY........................ .................. 3/4 0-1 3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.1- B0 RATION CONTROL Shutdown Margin...................................... 3/4 1-1 Boron Dilution ...................................... 3/4 1-3 Moderator Temperature Coefficient.................... 3/4 1-4 Minimum Tempera ture for Cri ticali ty. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 1-5  !

i

{

3/4.1.2 B0 RATION SYSTEMS Flow Paths - Shutdown................................ 3/4 1-6 j Fl ow Pa ths - Op e ra ti ng . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 1-7

Makeup Pump - Shutdown............................... 3/4 1-9 Makeup Pumps - Operating............................. 3/4 1-10 Decay Heat Removal Pump - Shutdown................... 3/4 1-11 l

l Boric Acid Pump - Shutdown........................... 3/4 1-12 Boric Acid Pumps - 0perating......................... 3/4 1-13 Borated Water Sources - Shutdown..................... 3/4 1-14 Borated Water Sources - Operating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 1-16

.3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES Group Height - Safety and Regulating Rod Groups...... 3/4 1-18

^

Group Height -_ Axial Power Shaping Rod Group......... 3/4 1-20 Position Indicator Channels.......................... 3/4 1-21 Rod Drop Time........................................ 3/4 1-23 Safety Rod Insertion Limit.......... .............. 3/4 1-24 Regulating Rod Insertion Limits...................... 3/4 1-25 Rod Program....................... .................. 3/4 1-33 1

ll I

Axial Power Shaping Rod Insertion Limits............. 3/4 1-37 4

i CRYSTAL RIVER - UNIT 3 III

. . . - - . . . . _ . . _ , - _.a.. _.~ _ .._ _ _ . . . , . . -

I 110 (177,102) (230,Io2; 100 -

,90) 90 -

(177,90) ' i 80 -

(161,80)

UNACCEPTABLE OPERATION t 70 -

, 5 o.

60 -

5 5 50 -

(100,50) (300,so)

E 40 -

O 30 -

f ACCEPTABLE

$ 20 _ OPERATION 10 -

0 I'I i . t i ,

0 50 100 150 200 250 300 0 25 50 75 100 0 25 50 75 100 f i f ' i t i i e  !

Grcup c Grcup 7 0 25 50 75 100 t I t t  !

Grcup 6 l

FIGURE 3.1-1 REGULATING ROD GROUP INSERTION LIMITS FOR 4 PUMP OPERATION FROM 0 EFPD TO 250 + 10 EfPD CRYSTAL RIVER - UNIT 3 3/4 1-27 1

110 '

(300, 02)  !

100 - (26l.102);  :

90 -

,(261,90) l o

i f 80 -

(250,e0)  !

i

$ 70 .-

5 UNACCEPTABLE E 60 _

OPERAll0N  !

cc E 50 .-

g,73,go) e 40 -

E 30 -

20 -

ACCEPTABLE ,!

OPERATION 10 -

l 0 .

IO'0} ,  ! i i i i 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 Rod index, fi Withdrawn 0 25 50 75 100 0 25 50 75 100 t f , t i l , s , ,

'iroup 5 Grcup 7 0 25 50 75 100 t t  !  ! J Group 6 FIGURE 3.1-2 REGULATING R0D GROUP INSERTION LIMITS FOR 4 PUMP OPERATION AFTER 250 + 10 EFPD CRYSTAL RI VER - UNIT 3 3/4 1-28

9 DELETED CRYSTAL RIVER ~ UNIT 3 3/4 3 35

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES (Continued)

The maximum rod dron time permitted is consistent with the assumed rod drop time used in the safety analyses. Measurement with Tava 2,525 F reactor coolant pumps operating ersures that the measured drop times will be represenative of insertion times experienced during a reactor tip at operating conditions.

Control rod positions and OPERABILITY of the rod position indicators are required to be verified on a naninal basis of once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> with frequent verifications required if an automatic monitoring channel is i noperable. These verification frequencies are adequate for assuring that the applicable LOC's are satisfied.

The limitation on Axial Power-Shaping Rod insertion is necessary to ensure that power peaking limits are not exceeded.

CRYSTAL RIVER - UNIT 3 B 3/4 1-4

--