ML19305B785
| ML19305B785 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Zimmer |
| Issue date: | 02/29/1980 |
| From: | Borgmann E CINCINNATI GAS & ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | James Keppler NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| References | |
| IEB-79-27, NUDOCS 8003200361 | |
| Download: ML19305B785 (27) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:r -
. . "GC- .r l '.
J THE CINCINNATI GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY., C CINCIN N ATI OHIO 4 5208 Feb. 29, 1980 C. A. BORG M AN N vsct ents.ote United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region III 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137 ATTN: Mr. James G. Keppler Director RE: WM. H. ZIMMER NUCLEAR POWER STATION - U"'T 1 I.E. BULLETIN 79-27, " LOSS OF NON-C P INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL POWER S .u4 . DURING OPERATION, W.O. 57300, JOB E-5590, FILE # 956, DOCKET # 50-358 Gentlemen: This letter and attachments are in response to IE Bulletin No. 79-27 concerning the loss of non-lE instrumentation and control power sys-tem bus during operations. We have completed the review of the ma-jor Class lE and Non-Class lE buses and reviewed the emergency pro-cedures for loss of power to each bus as directed by the bulletin. We feel that the results of the review completely answer the con-cerns of this bulletin. The results of this review for the WM. H. ZIMMER NUCLEAR POWER STATION - UNIT 1 are summarized in the following items.
- 1. REVIEW OF CLASS lE AND NON-CLASS lE BUSES:
The scope of this review encompassed those buses which supply safety and non-safety related systems listed in Table 8.1-2 and 8.1-3 of the FSAR for the WM. H. ZIMMER NUCLEAR POWER STA-TION - UNIT 1. These buses include the 4160V medium voltage buses, 480V unit substations and 480 volt motor control centers. The 24/48V, 125V and 250V DC systems, 120V RPS buses 120V AC instrument buses, and the 120V AC non-essential uninterruptible power supplies that serve these loads are also included in the review scope. A. REVIEW OF ALARMS AND/OR INDICATORS IN THE CONTROL ROOM: The results of the review of alarms and indications pro-vided in the control room are summarized in the attach-ment A. This attachment is comprised of seven (7) major sections. Each section is dedicated to a particular sys-tem utilized to bring the reactor to a cold shutdown con-dition. The individual sections identifies a bus compon-ent and lists the alarms and/or indications provided in the control room for a loss of power. This table dem-onstrates that the operator is provided with adequate in- . MAR 3 1980 80032co Wz.
.i
** 4.E. BULLETIN 79-27 Page 2 indications, annunciator alarms and computer output to rec-ognize and identify a loss of power to each bus.
B. IDENTIFY INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL SYSTEM LOADS: The instrumentation and control for those systems tabulated in Table 8.1-2 and 8.1-3 connected to the bus have been iden-tified. The loss of any one of the buses serving these sys-tems and the resulting loss of control and instrumentation will not affect the ability to achieve cold shutdown since redundant systems are supplied from independent buses. The WM. H. ZIMMER NUCLEAR POWER STATION - UNIT 1 electrical distribution system is described in Chapter 8 of the FSAR, portions of which are included as Attachment B to this re-sponse. Paragraph 8.3 of this section provides a detailed description of the onsite A-C power system. Each diesel generator set has ample capacity to supply the maximum load required from its associated division for safe shutdown of the unit under normal as well as accident conditions, including a loss-of-coolant accident. It also meets this re-quirement in the event that one of the two remaining divisions of segregated power supply may be inoperative. ( 8 . 3 .1. 7 .1) Thus, the loss of any one complete A-C division will not pre-vent a safe shutdown of the plant. C. RESULTS OF REVIEW AND DESIGN MODIFICATION: Based on the results of this review we conclude that:
- a. The operator has adequate information to identify a loss of power to buses which could affect the ability to achieve cold shutdown.
- b. The loss of any one of these buses will not affect the ability to achieve a cold shutdown condition.
As a result of these conclusions, no design modifications to control room indicators and alarms are required.
- 2. REVIEW OF EXISTING EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES:
Emergency Operating Procedures, OP.EOP.21, " Loss of All Auxiliary Power ( AP) , " e .g . loss of all offsite power and OP.EOP.28, " Loss of DC Power" were reviewed to ensure that the operators could achieve a cold shutdown condition, upon loss of' power to each class 1-E and non-class 1-E bus supplying power to safety and non-safety related instrument and control systems. A. Section 1.0 of the above procedures lists the conditions which alert the operator to the fact that a specific elec-trical division has been lost. The conditions address diagnostics / alarms / indicators /symntoms, etc. which aid the operator in determining the exact failure. The most i 1
8 .f.E. BULLETIN 79-27 Page 3 predominate indicators are listed first with others noted in decreasing order of importance. The automatic actions are stated in Section 2.0 of the EOP's. These automatic actions are often classified as conditions or symptoms themselves because the operator can use this information to assess the problem and in-itiate the appropriate corrective action. B. Once the condition is identified, the Immediate Actions of each EOP, plus the necessary actions stipulated in the Reactor Trip procedure OP.EOP.01, provide guidance in the use of alternate indication and control. These emergency procedures are being carefully reviewed with the goal of providing the operator with clear and con-4 cise contingency plans based on equipment available to place the unit in cold shutdown. This phase of proced-ure review is targeted for completion by August, 1980. Additionally, operating procedures will be reviewed annually during the first several years of plant oper-ation to determine if changes are necessary or desirable. Section 4.0 of each Emergency Operating Procedure addresses restoring power to the bus.
- 3. RE-REVIEW OF I.E. CIRCULAR 79-02:
This circular concerned the failure of an uninterruptible power supply (U.P.S.) to supply its load from the D.C. battery during a degradation of the normal A.C. power supply. An investigation of the design of the non-essential UPS systems for the WM. H. ZIMMER NUCLEAR POWER STATION - UNIT 1 demonstrated that the systems are of a different design than those described in cir-cular 79-02. The inverters have a rapid transient response when subjected to load changes and are not affected as much as the SCI inverters apparently were. Additionally, a special test was conducted according to special test procedure SU.SP.08 to verify factory settings of the D.C. undervoltage trip and the static transfer switch. As a result of this investigation and test,we conclude that no design changes or administrative controls are required. Normal surveillance and preventive maintenance is deemed adequate for this equipment. We believe that this response fully addresses all concerns of I.E. Bulletin 79-27 and that no further action is required by the Cin-cinnati Gas & Electric Company. Very truly yours, THE CfNjC.NNA GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY WPC/kjd ((s - -M E.A. BORGMANN, S
=
ICE PRESIDENT
~ ENCLOSURES cc: W.W. Schwiers H.C. Brinkmann W.D. Waymire(pink)
S.G. .Salay W.E. Smith ATTN: Gen. File - J.R. Schott R.J. Pruski USNRC,co y n vs___ __ _ . . Off o f T cr.
' ~
ATTACHMENT A RHR A & SUPPORTIVE SYSTEMS LOSS OF DEVICES INDICATION ANNUNCIATION COMPUTER INPUT I) RHR PUMP A 1) BREAKER POSITION
- 1) RHR PUMP TRIP BREAKER (lA007) RHR PUMP BREAKER INDICATION LIGHTS (OPEN/ CLOSED)
- 2) CURRENT METER 2) RHR SYSTEM OUT OF SERVICE ALARM II) ESS SUB 1A-1 1) BREAKER POSITION 1) FEED BREAKER 4KV BREAKER 1A004 FEED BREAKER (lA004) INDICATION LIGHTS TRIP ALARM (NORM / TRIP)
- 2) VOLT & CURRENT METERS III) ESS SUB 1A-2 FEED BREAKER (lA006) 1) BREAKER POSITION 1)" FEED BREAKER 4KV BREAKER lA006 INDICATION LIGHTS TRIP" ALARM (NORM / TRIP)
- 2) VOLT & CURRENT METERS IV) 125VDC MAIN SUPPLY 1) LOSS OF POSITION 1)SWITCHGEAR 1A DC TO SWITCHGROUP 1A SWITCHGEAR 1A DC INDICATION LIGliTS ON CONTROL POWER CONTROL POWER FAILURE
! ALL SWITCHGEAR lA FAILURE ALARM (NORM / FAIL) BREAKERS V) 480V ABMCClA 1) LOSS OF INDICATION 1) LOSS OF POWER ALARMS ABMCClA FEED BREAKER FEED BREAKER (IAIN16) LIGHTS TO ALL VALVES, FOR VALVES PUMPS, ETC. FEED OFF (CLOSED / TRIP) THIS MCC ! VI) 480V ABMCClF 1) LOSS OF INDICATION 1) LOSS OF POWER ALARMS ABMCClF FEED BREAKER FEED BREAKER (lA2Nll) LIGHTS TO ALL VALVES, FOR VALVES PUMPS, ETC. FEED OFF (CLOSED / TRIP) THIS MCC I VII) 125VDC DISTRIBUTION RHRA 125VDC RELAY PANEL 1A FEED TO LOGIC POWER FAILURE RHR CONTROL LOGIC ALARM i i
B. RCIC AND SUPPORTIVE SYSTEMS LOSS OF DEVICE INDICATION ANNUNCIATION COMPUTER INPUT I) ENTIRE 250VDC 1) LOSS OF POWER ALARM 1) 250VDC BATTERY MAIN DISTRIBUTION TO DC VALVES, PUMPS, CHARGER 1A/lB PANEL 1A ETC. FEED OFF TilIS BREAKER (NORM / TRIP DISTRIBUTION PANEL
- 2) 250V BATTERY 2) 250V BATTERY CilARGER AC POWER CHARGER 1A/lB FAILURE ALARM (NORM / FAIL)
- 3) 250VDC DISTRIBUTION 3) 250V BATTERY PANEL BREAKER CHARGER A/B VOLT TRIP ALARM (NLOW/ LOW)
- 4) 250V BATTERY 4) 250V BATTERY CIIARGER 1A/lB CHARGER A/B VOLT DISTRIBUTION PANEL (NilIGil/!!IGil)
OV/UV/GND OR BATTERY CilARGER 1A LO/ IMP ALARM
- 5) 250VDC BUS 1A (NGND/GND)
- 6) 250VDC BATTERY LOW /IMBAL (NLOW/ LOW)
II) 250VDC RXMCClA 1) LOSS OF POWER ALARMS 1) 250VDC RXMCClA FEED BREAKER TO DC VALVES, PUMPS BREAKER (CLOSE/ TRIP) ETC. FEED OFF TilIS MCC III) 250VDC RXMCClB 1) LOSS OF POWER ALARMS 1) 250VDC RXMCClB FEED BREAKER TO DC VALVES, PUMPS BREAKER (CLOSE/ TRIP) ETC. FEED OFF TilIS MCC
B. RCIC AND SUPPORTIVE SYSTEMS (CON'T) LOSS OF DEVICE INDICATION ANNUNCIATION COMPUTER INPUT IV) 125VDC CONTROL 1) LOSS OF POSITION LIGHTS - FEED TO 250VDC FOR ALL 250VDC MOTOR RXMCClA & IB OPERATED VALVES & PUMPS V) 125VDC DISTRIBUTION PANEL lA FEED TO 1) RCIC LOGIC BUS RCIC CONTROL LOGIC RELAY LOGIC POWER FAILURE ALARM, VI) DAMPERS 1) DAMPER POSITION lVYO9Y 1) LOSS OF POWER TO MCC 1) RXMCCIA INDICATION LIGHTS IS ALARMED BY VALVES' FEED BREAKER IVYllY lVY14Y LOSS OF POWER CLOSED / TRIP FEED FROM ESS MCClA VII) CSCS-RCIC ,
- 1) PUMP STATUS 1) OVERLOAD, LOSS OF EQUIPMENT ROOM INDICATION LIGHTS POWER AND PUMP OUT COOLING FAN (1VYO3C) OF SERVICE ALARM VIII)
RBCC HEAT EXCHANGER AND PUMPS ARE DESCRIBED IN SECTION A OF RHR AND SUPPORTIVE SYS e 9
! RHR B SYSTEM & SUPPORTIVE SYSTEMS I .
THE RHR B SYSTEM HAS THE SAME INDICATION, ANNUNCIATION AND COMPUTER INPUTS FOR THE 4KV LEVEL TO 480V BUS LEVEL AND DUPLICATE SUPPORTIVE SYSTEMS AS ARE SIIOWN IN THE RHR A TABLE EXCEPT THE RHR B SYSTEM IS DIVISION II. O O
, o RX VARIABLE MONITORING ,
LOSS OF DEVICE INDICATION ANNUNCIATION COMPUTER INPUT ENTIRE 120VAC LOSS OF STATUS INSTRUMENT BUS 1A LOSS OF POWER 1) 120 VOLT INSTRUMENT LIGHTS ON VARIOUS ALARMS AT VARIOUS (FEEDS RX PRESS & MCR PANELS BUS lA POWER LVL RECORDERS MCR PANELS NORM / FAIL) DIVISION I)
' 2) 120 VOLT INSTRUMENT BUS lA 480V FEED (CLOSED / TRIP)
ENTIRE 120VAC LOSS OF STATUS LOSS OF POWER 1) 120 VOLT INSTRUMENT INSTRUMENT BUS 1B LIGHTS ON VARIOUS (FEEDS RX PRESS ALARMS AT VARIOUS BUS 1B POWER MCR PANELS MCR PANELS
& LVL RECORDERS) (NORM / FAIL)
DIVISION II)
- 2) 120 VOLT INSTRUMENT BUS 1B 480V FEED (CLOSED / TRIP)
O
TURBINE BYPASS VALVES LOSS OF DEVICE INDICATION ANNUNCIATION COMPUTER INPUT 120V FEED FROM 1) DEH POWER SUPPLY UNINTERRUPTIBLE 1) DEH POWER SUPPLY TROUBLE ALARM (NORM / FAIL) DISTRIBUTION CAB TO TURBINE BYPASS VALVE CONTROLLER ENTIRE 120V 1) LOSS OF STATUS 1) LOSS OF POWER ALARMS UNINTERRUPTIBLE LIGHT AT NUMEROUS ON SOME OF THE PANELS BUS MCR PANELS FED FROM BUS
- 2) UPS T1100BLE ALARM (FROM INVERTER EQUIPMENT) 4
HPCS SYSTEM & SUPPORTIVE SYSTEMS THE-HPCS SYSTEM HAS THE SAME INDICATION, ANNUNCIATION AND COMPUTER INPUTS FOR THE 4KV LEVEL TO 480V BUS LEVEL AND DUPLICATE SUPPORTIVE SYSTEMS AS ARE SHOWN IN THE RHR A TABLE, BUT THE HPCS SYSTEM IS DIVION III. THE ONLY EXCEPTION IS THERE IS NOT A DIVISION III INSTRUMENT BUS. h i
I ATTACHMENT B
. ZPS-1 REVISION 12 JUNE 1975 8.3 ONSITE POWER SYSTEM 8.3.1 Onsite A-C power System 8.3.1.1 Descriction The ZPS-1 onsite A-C power system receives its power during operation frcm the unit auxiliary transfor=er or reserve auxiliary transformer 21 or 22. In addition, three standby diesel generators are available should offsite power not be available.
Onsite a-c power for all safety-related and non-safety-related systers is supplied by two 6900-volt and three 4160-volt switchgear assemblies. The connections f rom the offsite power supplies to the switchgear are shown in Figure 8.3.1. 8.3.1.2 6.9-kV Switchgear The 6900-volt switchgear consists of two indoor metal-clad asse=blies equipped with drawout type air circuit breakers located at elevation 510 feet 6 inches in the auxiliary building (see Figure 1.2-4 for - location). Main supply breakers for connection to the offsite power supplies are rated either 2000 or 3000 amperes, 7.2-kV nominal, 500 or 1000 MVA. Feeder breakers are rated 1200 amperes, 7.2-kV, 500 M7A. The 6900-volt switchgear supplies the reactor recirculation pumps, con-denser circulating water pumps, and condensate booster pumps. The 12 switchgear has been qualified to IEEE 323 and 344-1971 although it ' does not supply any Class 1E loads. 8.3.1.3 4160-volt Switchgear . The 4160-volt switchgear consists of three indoor metal-clad assemblies located at elevation 510 feet, 525 feet, and 546 feet of the auxilinry b uilding. Main supply breakers are rated 2000 or 3000 amperes, 4.16-kV, 350 MVA. Feeder breakers are rated 1200 amperes , 4.16-kV, 350 MVA. The
=ax1=um interrupting capacity is 50,000 a= peres r=s. Rated short circuit current at 4760-volts is 42,400 ampere rms sy= metrical.
Each switchgear asse=bly supplies one division of safety-related Class 1E loads as well as non-Class lE loads. Loads 250 hp and larger are supplied directly from the 4160-volt switchgear. Loads smaller than 250 hp are fed f rom Class lE and non-Class lE unit substatiens and motor control centers. Small loads of h hp or less are fed from 120-vcle panels. The three 4160-volt switchgear asse=blies are physically and elec'trically separate from each other. In addition, each switchgear assembly has g assigned to it a diesel engine generator set for onsite standby power. 8.3-1
a . . ZPS-1 REVISION 16 SEPTEMEE2 1976 The arrangement of the 4160-volt buses is shown in Figure 8.3-2. Relay protection is shown in Tabic 0.3-10. The load tabulation and division assignment are shown in Tables 8.3-2, 8.3-3, and 8.3-4. 8.3.1.4 480-vole Unit Substations There are 15 480-volt unit substations, 5 of which supply Class lE systems. Each unit substation consists of a 750/1000-kVA 4160-volt to 480-volt dry type transformer connected to 600-vole metal-enclosed drawout circuit breakers. Breakers are rated 600-volt and 600 amperes, with a symmetrical inter-rupting rating of 30,000 amperes at 480 volts. The load tabulations for the Class 1E unit substations are shown in Tables 8.3-5 through 8.3-9. 8.3.1.5 Motor Control Centers Ten of the thirty-three motor control centers supply power to Class 1E systems. (Five motor control centers, including two for Class 1E systems, were added in the last year.) Epch motor control center consists of circuit breaker ev.ain ;f on starters in NEMA sizes 1 to 3. The breakers are rated 600-volt, F.,000 ampere rms symmetrical interrupting capacity. Where i!0-volt panels are included in the motor control center, the breakers are rated 7500 ampere interrupting capacity. The load tabulation is shown in Table 8.3-10 for the Class IE motor control centers. 3.3.1.6 120-Vac Panels Power to the Class 1E instruments in Divisions 1 and ! is supplied by 120-Vae panels. The breakers used in chase panels are molded case air circuit breakers rated 10,000 (1-pole) , and 22,000 (2-pole) ampere inter-rupting capacity at 120-volts. These are shown in Figure 8.3-3 and Table 8. 3-28. 8.3.1.7 Diesel Engine Generators ZPS-1 has three tandem diesel-engine-driven generate: sets capable of supplying onsite standby power to 4160-volt buses IA.13, and IC. l Each diesel generator is located in a separate room that is part of the (,j Seismic Category I diesel engine generator building (see Figure 1.2-3) . 8.3-2
ZPS-1 REVISION 12 JUNE 1976 The diesel-generator sets are designed so that each can be paralleled with the plant auxiliary system for exercising and test purposes. All auxiliaries directly associated with each diesel-generator unit such as cooling pumps, lube oil pumps, fuel supply pumps and ventilating fans, etc. , are powered f r'om the essential pcwer supply divition with whi h the diesel-generator unit is associated. All electrical power required for the diesel-generater unit is supplied from the 125-Vdc system serving that division. Other auxiliaries which are required to serve more than one diesel-generator unit are provided with a redundant counterpart arranged to operate from an alternate power supply division. An example of this is the service water pump system. Four service water pumps are pro-vided. Three are required for normal plant operation. A minimum of any one of the four pumps is required for safe shutdown. One pump is supplied from bus 1A, two pumps f rom bus 13, and one pump from bus IC. For automatic operation from the standby diesel-generator system, pro-vision is made for the start of two service water pu=ps from separate power supply divisions. 8.3.1.7.1 Rating Each diesel-generator set has a=ple capacity to supply the maximum load required from its associated division for safe shutdewn of the unit under normal as well as accident conditiona, including a loss-of-coolant accident. It also meets this requirement in the event that one of the two remaining divisions of segregated power supply may be inoperative. The diesel-generator sets are sir.ed so that the loss of one diesel will 12 not restrict the availability of adequate power to carry the ECCS power requirements of the unit for 8000 hours continuously, or that power necessary to safely shutdown the unit and maintain it in a safe shut-down condition. - The diesel-generator sets are rated as indicated in Table 8.3-11. They have adequate load pickup capability for starting all essential loads required for the safe shutdown under both normal and LOCA conditions. Other essential loads are arranged to start sequentially as required so as to avoid exceeding the load pickup capability of the diesel-generator set. This sequential loading is shova in Tables 8.3-12 through 8.3-15. 8.3.1.7.2 Starting Systems The starting systems are described in Subsection 9.5.6. 8.3.1.7.3 control Power Control power for the diesel-generator sets is supplied from independent 125-volt storage battery systems. Three such bartery systems are provoded, each serving central power requirements for one of the three segregated divisions of the auxiliary power supply. ' l _- 1 8,3-3
ZPS-1 REVISION 12 JUNE 1976 8.3.1.7.4 Automatic Starting The onsite diesel generators are a standby source of power and are used only if all other sources are not available. However, when required, it will take a maximum of 10 seconds from the time they are given the signal to start, until they are ready to accept load. For this reason, any time an abnormal condition exists which involves any of the other sources of power, the diesel generators will be automatically started. The other sources of power are:
- a. unit auxiliary transformer,
- b. 345-kV reserve auxiliary transformer 21, and 69-kV reserve auxiliary transformer 22.
c. Since any serious abnormal plant condition will cause a unit trip which in turn will cause the loss of the unit auxiliary transformer, the diesel generators will be automatically started, and will run under no load until it is certain they will not be required. The diesel genera-tors will start automatically on LOCA signal. 8.3.1.7.5 Manus 1 Starting Complete control of the diesel generators is provided at two separate locations. The locations are:
- a. main control room, and
- b. local diesel-generator panels.
Controls are provided in the main control room for normal operating conditions . Controls are also provided on the local diesel-generator panel to facilitate testing and maintenance. The following diesel-generator control equipment is provided at the main control board:
- a. diesel-generator start and stop control switch,
- b. breaker control switch,
- c. synchronizing ruitch,
- d. synchro-check relay,
- e. synchroscope with voltmeters and lights,
- f. auto-manual synchronizing selector switch,
- g. voltage adjust control switch, and
# h. speed adjust control switch.
8.3-4
ZPS-1 REVISION 12 JUNE 1976 The diesel generator can be started and manually synchronized to the bus from the main control room. With the =anual-automatic synchronizing switch in the " manual" position, the operator will start the diesel generator by turning the control switch. The synchronizing switch will then be closed and the voltage and speed adjusted to match that of the running system. The diesel-generator breaker can then be closed. If the operator has made an error, the synchrocheck relay will prevent the breaker f rom closing. The diesel generator can also be started and automatically synchronized from the main control room. The manual-automatic synchronizing selector switch should be set ot the " auto" position and the diesel generator started. The synchronizing switch must then be closed. The automatic synchronizer located at the local diesel-generator panel will automatically close the diesel-generator breaker. The operator will then get an " auto-close" alarm for the diesel-generator breaker. He will remove this alarm by turning the breaker control switch to the "af ter close" position. The controls provided at the local diesel-generator panel are similar to those provided at the main control board. The procedures for manu-ally and automatically synchronizing will be similar. The following conditions are alarmed in the main control room:
- a. diesel-generator breaker automatically closed;
~ ~
- b. diesel-generator breaker locally closed; and 12
- c. diesel-generator breaker automatically tripped.
8.3.1.7.6 Protection and Supervision The protective interlocking and protective devices that will be used with the diesel generators can be separated into several basic cate-gories based upon the action that must be taken. These categories are as follows:
- a. signals that trip the diesel-generator breaker and the engine - emergency condition;
- b. signals that trip the diesel-generator breaker and the engine - test condition only, ,
I
- c. signals that trip the diesel-generator breaker only, and )
- d. signals that alarm only.
Signals that trip the diesel-generator breaker and the engine (emergency , condition): the following signals trip the diesel-generator breaker and j the engine: )
- a. generator differential, 8.3-5
ZPS-1 REVISION 12 JUNE 1976
- b. overspeed, and
- c. manual engine trip.
Generator differential: The initiating device is a relay located at the local diesel-generator panel. This relay simultaneously trips the diesel-generator breaker and actuates the engine trip relay. The diesel-generator breaker is locked out so that neither manual nor automatic action can reclose it until the lockout relay is reset. Overspeed: The engine is tripped by a shaft-mounted, mechanical device at 115% nominal speed. This condition is alarmed at the local diesel-generator panel. Another contact from the local diesel-generator panel is used to trip and lock out the diesel-generator breaker. Manual engine trip: A =anual engine trip is initiated by pushbuttons at the local diesel-generator panel or the control switch at the main con-trol board. The engine is tripped and the diesel-generator breaker is tripped if it is not already open; however, for this case, the diesel-generator breaker is not locked out. It can be reclosed by a =anual or automatic signal without any reset operation. The following signals trip the diesel-generator breaker and the engine (test condition only):
, a. ground fault,
- b. reverse power,
- c. engines 1 and 2 high coolant temperature, 12
- d. engines 1 and 2 low oil pressure, and
- e. failure to start (ove rcrank) .
The above signals will trip the diesel-generator and breaker only during a test condition. If there is a LOCA or a load shed of any kind, these trip signals will be bypassed. Only the alares will remain. Signals that trip the diesel-generator breaker only: The following signals trip the diesel-generator breaker only while leaving the engine running under no load:
- a. signal indicating parallel supply lost while exercising diesel generator, and
- b. manual diesel-generator breaker trip.
Signal indicating parallel supply lost while exercising diesel genera-tor: In the event the diesel generator is being exercised, and the parallel supply is lost, the diesel. generator will not be able to carry all the loads. This circuit immediately trips the diesel-generator breaker, and thus allows a reserve source a chance to reenergize the 8.3-6
ZPS-1 REVISION 12 JL'5E 1976 bus. When load shed occurs, the bus lockout relay disables this trip circuit so that, if the reserve scurces are not available, the diesel-generator breaker is able to ac*o=atically reclose and pick up emer-gency loads. Manual diesel-generator breaker trip: The diesel-generator breaker can be tripped manually f rem the main control board switch, or from the local diesel-generator panel. The diesel-generator breaker is tripped, but not locked out, and the engine is left running. The engine is then shut down manually. Signals that alarm only: A local annunciator is provided at the local diesel-generator panel in addition to the main annunciator in the con-trol room. For any alarm oniv condition, the action required is lef t to the discretion of the operator, taking into account the status of ~ diesel-generator operation (test or emergency), as well as the status of the plant in general. Local annunciator: The following signals actuate the local annunciator:
- a. lubricating oil, icw-high pressure, Engines 1 and 2;
- b. lubricating oil. low-high te=perature, Engines 1 and 2;
- c. high coolant te=perature, Engines 1 and 2;
- d. low coolant level, Engines 1 and 2;
- e. starting air, low pressure; 12
- f. cooling water, low pressure, Engines 1 and 2;
- g. low fuel level;
- h. failure to start;
- i. oil filter dif ferential, Engines 1 and 2; and J. overspeed trip.
Control room annunciator: The following signals are alar =ed in the main control room:
- a. ground fault alarm,
- b. -
diesel-generator bri 'er auto-trip, 1
- c. diesel-generator breaker auto-close, I
- d. diesel-generator breaker locally closed,
- e. diesel-generator trouble (operates for any local alars),
8.3-7
-
- ZpS-1 REVISION 12 JUNE 1976
- f. diesel-generator cranking, and
- g. diesel-generator running (operates at normal running speed).
8.3.1.7.7 Fuel Systems The fuel oil storage and transfer systems are described in Subsection 9.5.4. 8.3.1.7.8 Lubrication Svstems The lubrication syste=s are described in Subsection 9.5.7. 8.3.1.7.9 cooling Syste=s The ecoling systems are described in Subsection 9.5.5. 8.3.1.7.10 Load Secuencing Sequencing of leads supplied from the standby diesel-generator system for safe shutdown is required to prevent exceeding the motor starting and dead load pickup capability of a diesel-generator unit. Therefore, provision is made for automatic sequencing of all loads arranged for autonatic start from the diesel-generator system. Automatic sequencing is done in severs 1 steps to prevent jeopardizing operation of the diesel-
'_ generator system by exceeding motor-starting capability. In so doing, those loads which must start within 30 seconds are started first, for example, the emergency core cooling system loads. Other loads which must start promptly but which can tolerate a time delay are started in the following starting sequences. These loads are started within a time period of 30 to 90 seconds after initiation of start 12 signal to the standby diesel-generator system. Service water pumps and reactor building closed cooling water pu=ps are started in the second starting sequence. Remaining loads are picked up in a similar manner after the second starting sequence. Under design conditions in which all three power supplies are operable, redundant auxiliaries which are not required to operate may be shut down by operator action, in which case loading of the standby diesel-generator system will be accordingly reduced.
In addition to supplying the loads listed, the diesel-generator system is available, on a manual basis, to feed other loads connected to the 4160-V systems. The connections of other such loads are =ade with regard to overload restrictions. 8.3.1.8 operating configurations If the offsite power s:urces are available then the preferred configura-tion is to have the 345-kV reserve auxiliary transformer 21 as the primary power source and the 69-kV reserve auxiliary transfor=er 22 ( ', as the secondary power source. If no offsite power is available, the diesel generators are the source. 8.3-8
ZPS-1 REVISION 12 JUNE 1976 8.3.1.9 Source Transfers - General Power is required at all times to operate the various auxiliary systa=s. Some of these systems are required only when the unit is operating; some are required only when it is shut down; others are required only for emergencies. Since engineered safety feature syste=s fall into each of these categories, it is essential to have auxiliary power at all times. Dupending on the condition of the unit at any given time (operating, shut down, pestaccident, etc.), certain sources 'of power may not be available. This means that power source transfers are required to keep the auxiliary buses energized at all times. The transfer =ay be either automatic or manual. If an abnor=al occurrence exists, then any neces-sary transfer is co=pleted automatically. 8.3.1.9.1 Manual Source Transfers All manual sour:e transfers are " live" transf ers, i.e. , the inco=ing source breaker is closed before the running source breaker is tripped. This assares that the buses are never without power during manual trans fe r. Manual transfer is nc"mally acco=plished by paralleling incoming supply with the running supply, and then tripping the running supply. Pro-visions are =ade to auto =atically trip the running supply breaker,1 second after the incoming supply breaker is closed. The 1-second delay is provided to assure that the incoming breaker latches. If it does not latch, no automatic trip takes place. 12 Provisions are also made to check and bring the incoming supply in synchronism with running supply before making the manual transfer. 8.3.1.9.2 Automatic Fast Source Transfers The only automatic fast transfer that is permitted is from the unit auxiliary transformer to the 345-kV reserve auxiliary transformer - (see Figure Q221.47-1). Both sources are full capatity, and both are always in phase with each other. Automatic fast transfer is accom-plished in approximately five cycles. 8.3.1.9.3 Automatic Slow d'urce Transfers There are several automatic slow transfers possible (see Figure Q221.47-1). They are as follows:
- a. unit auxiliary transfor=er to 69-kV reserve auxiliary transformer (345-kV reserve cuxiliary transformer not available) ,
- b. unit auxiliary transfor=er to dier21 generators (345-kV reserve auxiliary transformer and 69-kV reserve auxiliary transformer not available) ,
8.3-9
- l ,' 2pS-1 REVISION 12 JUNE 1976
- c. 345-kV reserve auxiliary transformer to 69-kV reserve auxiliary transformer,
- d. 345-kV reserve auxiliary transformer to diesel generators (69-kV reserve auxiliary transformer tot available),
- e. 69-kV reserve auxiliary transfor=er tc 345-kV reserve auxiliary transfor=er, and
- f. 69-kV reserve auxiliary transfor=er to diesel generator (345-kV reserve auxiliary transfor=er not available) .
A fast transfer to or from 69-kV reserve auxiliary transformer is not attempted even though it is a full-capacity source because there is a possibility that it may be out of phase with the running supply. All automatic slew transfers are accomplished within 3 seconds, and will be done on a load-shed basis. Anytime there is a load shed, all'
, nonessential loads are tripped and locked out, and required essential loads are automatically started in the sequence shewn in Tables 8.3-3 through 8.3-5.
8.3.1.9.4 Source Transf er Peraissives and Source Availability The various reserve power sources are listed in order of preference, starting with the most desirable reserve source as follows:
- a. first choice - 345-kV reserve auxiliary transfor=er 21 (full capacity source),
- b. second choice kV reserve auxiliary transformer 22 (full capacity source), and
- c. third choice - diesel generators (e=ergency source) .
During any automatic transfer, these three power sources are automati-cally checked for availability by means of undervoltage relays. Timing circuits are used to give the.more desirable reserve sources the first t ry at reenergizing the buses. If any source is not available (no voltage), thrt source is blocked from closing and the next source is given a chanct to reenergize the bus. If neither of the transformer supplies close, tne diesel generators reenergize the buses. As soon as any reserve source closes, all other sources are blocked, sequenc-ing of essential loads is initiated, and the transfer circuitry is automatically reset so it is ready if called upon again. If a fault occurs on a bus, all automatic closing circuits are blocked. This prevents the transfe:. circuitry from alternately feeding the reserve sources to a faulted bus, thereby avoiding possible damage to the reserve supplies. s . 8.3-10
HtrM a e -
- L w
$Q&e ..c P. . ;,v:.
s.: ar g a' h
.a a
+-c y y e .
i i %, *;
,. . e EI @g
.5 ". $ .$
.r . e -
^
o $. i (% w= 2 ;2 3 x
;P 'N +
- 75E 9O I ( j$ 3I 35
- *)C,l l, { ^ n
e* .-
S *M
!q .o c 3 5,'dM 4 I! a x-h~b 4 's - , 45 .k I kf 5 %
i : P
.{
O
,j OW '
,L s
je !* g Ej
- g *q , . :: 3 v_
ts 7. , 'g w; - c. S 's ; ;* g l o g- i* .3 m .w -= r, 4: . e
~
l
. -~ . a, , $ ; i e :< t 5 h. 20i' i! E .
A v { J 5:
l
< e D Q^&
s
. '>-0 CMP W m . >' I OW i M r -
s' k h s.' k** t a l o j .A ~ dCt
?-:*i 1 E t 7'- ,
m - O O- > 31 e.2 h ed 7 2. 3uCD
] 0~$s .. 5 A ^
' 4 CMD W C>d>
f ?[ .1 -
)h I )( o '1 tg.pl ]; g*
c*
; s( ~h$e 3 ".:
s c je 1r. 1 kI@ i
,~. . E,$y5 ~l a s D. ! ,r :--
1 ', *
$% 47 C fil$
s ** E** q -
.* 3 , -
A *
'l {d * $-
- q o s :.
r.2 a
% s-1 ~ $
a -1 3t - 3 t :: s te .
;} .- {
a E= :: 5 e
*
- 2 e
G. "r~f m m n p
-e up e a 1
- k. .-
<-em 2 E.l ,A-
~
T M. ., , a ' e 4 i* o e, 7J 5 'm O
% [ gi
*I2 ^ g 1e 3 g {3
} % IN e: : e. -
- h. {. -
34 N h he
- f "f
- n < --o n e=
i:t i 3 L# l'g - di
", y $ o [ $!! )
+c s r2 g i .
o 3,
._ - !,.i a .d. C ,
p
* ,- o- <>- --o'~b,-o^o- EY. ' !g; -t I . =
4 ( > MC2
.I .
h j q eJ n r , o ,
.- ou n y, 4 e N o %
e la
.1 N e YO!
m a t ytc oc 2 DMD *D h - r - LLb o)f [E AO$
AtVI51&I 29
.MEf 1917 o
4 &o v MJPPL Y 9 tow seerty sno w **v I s mown swe e ( ggs swagra sa-s) ( sgs svag t. e. a) 4, asov ....e o ___ D=V e ew e r c 2 Gov e= 1 - tsov g.,y gnga 8A ~~~ gg s N C.
'3 Qi2mArusc
) w o.
1 1 i M - -
) )
p 9 (< 3 .
,VP
* 'L n L> w se 9 M
SS , uoits.
%v I~" o........c-..,...e...................
E*a v s a ,o a.3.a,c,g a , o , ,,, e , ,(,, ,,,,q,,, q ,
?) SE I POINISI UNDf M VOLT AGE M t AY 210 V ** M a=a**
- nuce e a= coman svar.n . s ., e OVI H W4 TAti REL AY 2nov * * * * * * * "
- a-=.** * * * =
b f if 2Pitt it.1 - 4 250- Vik l'1WIR D151RIBLIll0N SYSIlM e s .
d.' i . m . .
** .o f h,
h, k.b.1 V: , E Esi c~
-- !:- i
- E .s 1
!! ?
%b gu t
-. 5
- 2 M n I:
2
- g-
. :;t Ij ;!
- t. t
- zy'lii * $ .
c p 8 9f ; #g ,;
'f ! pcy m
*s s,
. !, : e.
h > l iflf!' ~ u i ' t @ Y ~ $ '( Uf f rI = m m a-p l 'Ik . .a;- . g k . fj
- v. ; 'I dy
- s. > e>
>J g
8a3 -
? ) 5 >
m le f2 '
>s g I
- ., I" 4 , f d fN 3b 6
~ Cr
'# o-\
-.1 r $e f# U >- ;
b *l ';'l"5 L' , I tl@f t'> - If
* ..i i!$t' I, r- ." f, r;i! 3
- ' s T 3 f!
- a. cil 21p-i ,3 j ;*
.h
%d!!! ' &
)
,i
.s E5 $ -I na n
[ !!s 5
}
+, 3: * ;a
< c. 7 g>
l 4 e, a
> 4 _.
.m J >> !
- 2*
. t ll.: d' sit #
s* $ l
't>> I
- ,l ~4 Gk l
p :=
,I *b b
n e
<w So J, 3l p :. n
- si
*% ,' $ f,$
-t
? titl+l & , =c
'; w R Q *s ;
" 2 L' $ = =
e..
^
?
r l
~g -
U ;, <$ ~a
% V
*C% e
'b 7 *w r C
>s- =< ^
3 le: 3, r, *I f f . av
?
k[i llt X:
& S, uke
. "s'N I* ' .
4'- .
..9.1,t [N :. .$' . )
M 7. ;. t P.
)] '1, r-
.fj r %2 . ek4 af *.
.:3 f~t () .
ee e y g 5 4 = hf.I.k,1 _ 4 't
$ :: i "E f04d*1 ',1 $~
, *.' ';/,t I i
.sMr tG
~
5: y: _$ fi +
./:g 'd 1; 4f s , >=
I =i 4
%'d !I " . . ,pr I, I ,
z-
?.C i i*
'; 3 s: . .
'wk','y
t I s 1w
- I4 . I #
M,' 'i I
< .t j T.t I s E
* - 3
~
?
g
- t. 3
- v '. ' Illd , d, i I ,
h. p .. 9 fj
.~
3:
,' 4 o 3 9 ,
Og , ~ A .- ;&,e ~
~ { E
- e 0 O
-s jw^o- g}: ,
t, j , u _ , v
#. *
- E f
f1' 4 . <4 L,, a> e y ~6y '
-[ g*
I t Iy; Y J DE F g }" &1 t
} fiL-FC")
e 9 t Q $A* rag Wh,M e[ - hI %--fa L,*7 i+ :/.,1
'L- ~~~- 2 32 s d w s, i*%%,.} { - I
!O5 g*,gr e .
I
- 5 ,' )l $
3~O%~ **0$ * , t2
' 382
- to .
.)4 j
+
c~o--{"j -
*k
' l #. *
. I 13 J ,I 2
s - 5 - 1 7 aeI t t f d, *
.1 b, til,; <_-
s j i I wv et 5 3 et.ec L<g;--
, :5 w:>
1}. * )
'hin9< f ro ~ l > A} .-4-o 4: 2
; ,4 " 4 r =4-~t
~C+Y '
Io 5 n .f y rr L9"" ,, G(~$n s 5*I s ti -
-s l F -- ~' ;$lEE -
I'!
, -oEu i
Y
~,
n t s I
..! d k 4
- '
- r I 53 O
- j -l[
- e 1%
o--[ t p-o'o- i (G . I t. 2 e e-- y .: 5 i ';
~M @(
.a e sg. {.
n x 9,
- C hl; aplip i
- s.,
Gr 3 i i
- k.
- e. .- :
. 1
- 1
-r a -
ZPS-1 REVISION 12 JUNE 1976 TABLE 8.1-2 SAFETY-RELATED SYSTEMS THAT REQUIRE CLASS IE POWER SYSTD1 SAFET. FUNCTION POWER SOURCE
- HPCS/high-pressure Core cooling 4160-V, 480-Vac core spray l 12 LPCS/ low-pressure Core cooling 4160-V, 480-Vac core spray pMR/ residual heat Core cooling 4160-V, 480-Vac, removal 250 Vdc l 12 SSWS/ station service Support nuclear 4160-V, 480-Vac water systems safety functions ADS / automatic depres- Reactor vessel 125-Vdc surization system pressure relief RCIC/ reactor core isola- Core cooling 250-Vdc tion cooling SGTS/ standby gas treat- Limit offsite 480-Vac ment systems accident doses Control room HVAC Support nuclear 480-Vac systems safety functions Unit Class IE ac power Support nucicar 125-Vdc system safety functions Unit Class IE de power Support nuclear None system safety functions Diesel Generator " Support nuclear 480-Vac ventilation systems safety functions Reactor building closed Support nuclear 480-Vac cooling water system safety functions Essential switchgear Support nuclear 480-Vac heat removal systems safety functions ECCS equipment area Support nuclear 480-Vac heat removal systems safety functions NSSS/ nuclear steam supply Limit offsite 480-Vac, 125-Vde, system shutoff system accident dose 250-Vdc
- Power source (s) required for system to perfor n its safety function.
8.1-4
ZPS-1 REVISION 12 JUNE 1976 s 2 TABLE 8.1-2 (Cont'd) SYSTEM SAFETY FUNCTION POWER SOURCE
- Primary containment Limit offsite 480-Vac, 250-Vde, isolation control system accident dose 125-Vdc Isolation valve sealing Support nuclear 480-Vac system safety functions Standby liquid control Support nuclear 480-Vac system safety functions 12
? l
- Power source (s) required for system to perform its safety function.
8.1-5
, ZPS-1 REVISION 12 JUNE 1976 TABLE 8.1-3 NON-SAFETY-RELATED SYSTEMS THAT REQUIRE CLASS lE POWER SYSTEM COMPONENT SAFETY FUNCTION POWER SOURCE
- Control rod Containment isolation 480-Vac drive Process radiation Monitoring fuel cladding 120-Vac, 24/48-Vdc monitoring integrity RWCU/ reactor water Containment isolation 480-Vac, 250-Vdc cleanup NN/ nuclear boiler Containment isolation 480-Vac, 250-Vdc Drywell chilled Containment isolation 480 Vac water l 12 Instrument air Containment isolation 125-Vde, 480-Vac Service air Containment isolation 125-Vde, 480-Vac Drywell floor Containment isolation 125-Vde, 480-Vac l 12 drains Drywell equipment Containment isolation 125-Vde, 480-Vac drains l 12 Emergency lighting Supporting safety function 480-Vac, 125-Vdc Communications Supporting safety function 125-Vdc Reactor protection Supporting safety function 120-Vac system l 12 l
l
,
- Power source (s) required for component to perform its safety function.
l l 8.1-6 l l l}}