ML18054A152

Forwards Exceptions,Clarifications & Schedule Changes & Sys Functional Evaluation Program Update from 1986-1987 Maint Outage,Per 870914 Ltr in Response to NRC Confirmatory Action Ltr Dtd 860521

ML18054A152
Person / Time
Site:	Palisades
Issue date:	10/30/1987
From:	Buckman F CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.)
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
CAL, NUDOCS 8711030234
Download: ML18054A152 (293)

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• ... ***' :; Frederick W Buckman

~ 1 ...._ -. ....... ' . l:; ! Vice President

~ -. . . ,1..; -*.  ; ... l Nuclear Operations General Offices: 1945 West Parnall Road, Jackson. Ml 49201 * (517) 788-1217 October 30, 1987 Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 DOCKET 50-255-LICENSE DPR-20-PALISADES PLANT - UPDATE TO ACTION ITEMS FROM 1986-87 MAINTENANCE OUTAGE Our letter of September 14, 1987, provided information regarding schedule differences in action plans described in our submittals to the 10CFR50.54(f)

Confirmatory Action Letter of May 21, 1986 (Consumers Power Company letters dated July 3, 1986, December 1, 1986, and January 28, 1987). In that letter, we agreed to provide information on any further cpanges in plann~d completion of remaining actions, together with an update on the Safety Functional Evaluation (SFE) Program and any other appropriate clarifications. This letter provides that response as follows:

1. Exceptions, Clarifications, and Schedule Changes Our submitted responses to the 10CFR50.54(f) Confirmatory Action Letter have been further reviewed. The enclosed table provides a list of items we have identified in the following categories:

a. Exceptions to actions that were originally planned and stated in our response submittals, along with the basis for the change. There were two such exceptions identified at this point.

b. Clarification statements for a number of actions. where we felt such statements were appropriate.

c. Schedule extension of the date we had planned and stated for four items of the original list, along with reason for the change.

d. Schedule improvement for a number of action items, primarily resolu-tion of equipment problems. This category includes items we felt appropriate to update, but does not cover all actions completed ahead of our original plans.

2. System Functional Evaluation (SFE) Program Update The SFE Program was first described in our December 1, 1986, submittal and later expanded in the January 28, 1987, submittal. Tests required to provide acceptability of equipment (as described in the FSAR) were con-ducted prior to plant restart in April 1987. The results of the pre-8711030234 871030 OC1087-0027A-NL02 PDR ADOCK 05000255 P PDR

ee 2 startup tests were provided to NRC Region III staff. Our original plan was to prepare ongoing periodic tests by July 1987, but this was extended to July 1988 in our letter of September 14, 1987.

The original SFE Program, as described in our January 28, 1987, submittal, has since been revised slightly with no change in basic content. The changes are corrections and clarifications resulting from further reviews, including discussions with NRC Region personnel. This updated version is provided as attachment 1 to this letter. This revision will be filed as the final document to describe the program. Changes made are indicated by a slash mark on the right side of appropriate items.

From the revised SFE of attachment l, we have extracted an action list of post-startup items~ some of which have been completed, since the end of the 1986-1987 maintenance outage. This list is provided as attachment 2.

A technical review of the original SFE list has been performed by three experienced members of the plant staff. This review resulted in 62 additional actions as shown by the list of items under attachment 3 of this letter. Taken together, the list of actions in attachment 2 and 3 represent the total work scope and provide the documents we will use for tracking purposes.

One final review performed was to screen for actions which may be appro-priate to complete prior to the overall SFE completion date of July 1988.

This review identified 22 actions which will be given earlier due dates for staff completion. The earlier dates were primarily to evaluate items in time for possible completion during the 1988 refueling outage.

We feel the SFE Program has been adequately reviewed at this point and staff attention to work list completion will be appropriate to other workloads. Although we plan no further formal updates, progress will be open to your inspectors on a continuing basis.

The information contained herein provides an update of the status on our followup efforts. to the Confirmatory Action Letter. Man~of the original list of items involve evaluations or investigations, with followup to be taken if necessary. Final disposition of these items will be made available for future NRC inspection attention.

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• F~ederick W Buckman ~ ..__

Vice President Nuclear Operations Departmnet OC1087-0027A-NL02

CPCo SUBMITTAL DATE ORIGINAL SCHEDULED COMPLETION TABLE 1 - EXCEPTIONS, CLARIFICATIONS, AND SCHEDULE CHANGES ORIGINAL ACTION EXCEPTIONS/CLARIFICATIONS/

SCHEDULE

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12/01/86 88RFO (SSFI) 1.1 Recirc Actua- Exception - The intent of this tion signal seal - Modify proposed modification will be 2400V fast transfer cir- superseded by the station cuitry to increase ef f i- blackout modification now ciency associated with scheduled for 1988-1989. A recovery of offsite power description of this modification by the 88RFO. has been provided to the NRC.

There will be no fast transfer required after that change in power systems.

12/01/86 - Att 2 88RFO MCTF - ESS-05: Shutdown Exception - The radioactive hot cooling heat exchanger spot has been removed and shield-inlets & outlet valves - ing of the HTX will not be permanently shield shut- required.

down heat exchanger.

12/1/86 - Att 2 88RFO MCTF - CVC-28: AE-0203 - Clarification - The Boronometer Remove or replace borono- has been abandoned in place, due meter & associated to expense and exposure of instruments. (1/28/87 removal.

Boronometer is currently not used).

12/01/86 - Att 2 88RFO ' MCTF - EPS-06: Emergency Clarification - The lighting units lighting units replace were modified to meet Appendix R Appendix R emergency requirements, and will not be lighting units. replaced. No further action planned.

OC1087-0195-NL02

2 TABLE 1 - EXCEPTIONS, CLARIFICATIONS, AND SCHEDULE CHANGES CPCo SUBMITTAL DATE ORIGINAL SCHEDULED ORIGINAL ACTION EXCEPTIONS/CLARIFICATIONS/

COMPLETION SCHEDULE 12/01/86 - Att 2 88RFO MCTF - MSS-03: CV-0779, Clarification - New atmos-780, 781, 782 atmospheric pheric damp valves have been dump valves - write pacs installed during the fall 1987 to replace diaphragms maintenance outage, which should every 4 years or so. alleviate past problems that led to this MCTF concern. Any future PM required will be addressed under our PM program for the new valves, and may not include this action. This action will be closed.

12/01/86 - Att 2 5YP MCTF - SPS-02: 480V, Clarification - The decision on 2400V, 4160V switchgear - this action is to improve condi-pursue addition of P-55B tion of the load breakers, rather and P-55C motor starters. than add motor starters. The breakers will be returned to the vendor for overhaul on an increased frequency basis.

12/01/86 - Att 2 88RFO MCTF - VAS-01: Control Clarification - The source of room air condition VC-10 vibration damage has been removed and VC investigate and no modifications will be made.

sources of vibration and propose modifications to resolve.

1/28/87 - Att lA 12/31/87 Test program update - Schedule/Extension - Special pump

- special testing/ head verification tests were post maint testing - completed last year and will not ~e PPACS's will be developed required again for at least two by the end of 1987 to years. This effort will be combined verify pump head curves with PPACS development under the SFE for these pumps at least program and completed by July 1988.

OC1087-0195-NL02

3 TABLE 1 - EXCEPTIONS, CLARIFICATIONS, AND SCHEDULE CHANGES CPCo SUBMITTAL DATE ORIGINAL SCHEDULED ORIGINAL ACTION EXCEPTIONS/CLARIFICATIONS/

COMPLETION SCHEDULE 1/28/87 - Att 2 10/30/87 System performance rqmts Schedule Extension - The analy-uncontrolled rod with- sis of RTD response time required drawal: hot leg RTD time for accident scenarios has been constants will be verified completed. Two of the four RTD by test or analysis prior elements were tested at power, with to startup. (Analysis response of less than 3 seconds complete). (Time delay versus the 10 second limit.

will be measured at power Failure of a separate RTD prevented when vendor arrangements further testing until after cold can be made). shutdown, because of LCO requirements.

The other two RTD will be tested soon after startup from the fall 1987 maintenance outage.

1/28/87 - Att 2 88RFO Sys performance rqmts - Schedule Extension - The PCS: Prior to end of engineering and procurement cycle of 88RFO, new certified will not support replacement PORV block valves will be of PORV valves and block valves installed - also either prior to mid-1989. Partial certified PORVS will be completion of the MCTF concern installed or the PORVS (packing leakage) is being will be removed and addressed by a new type of block tested at feed and bleed valve packing being used during pressures. the fall 1987 maintenance outage.

1/28/87 - Att 5 12/30/87 Question/response #5: Schedule Extension- Staff Upgrade service water workload on other priority items

!SI flow instrumentation prevents completion of this by end of 1987. action by the original planned date. Proposed schedule for this modification is during the 1988 refueling outage.

12/01/86 - Att 2 88RFO MCTF - CDS-03: P-2A Schedule/Improvement - The and P-2B condensate pumps spare condensate pump has been rebuild spare pump and installed during the current install during the next fall 1987 maintenance outage convenient outage in rather than the 88RFO.

place of P-2A.

4 TABLE 1 - EXCEPTIONS, CLARIFICATIONS, AND SCHEDULE CHANGES CPCo SUBMITTAL DATE ORIGINAL SCHEDULED ORIGINAL ACTION EXCEPTIONS/CLARIFICATIONS/

COMPLETION SCHEDULE 12/01/86 - Att 2 88RFO MCTF - CDS-03: P-2A and Schedule/Improvement - P-2A P-2B condensate pumps - pump well was inspected during test for ground water the current outage. No leakage leaks and repair as was found. Review of plant required. chemistry for the past year also shows no evidence of ground water.

leakage. No further action is planned.

12/01/86 - Att 2 88RFO MCTF - CRD-02: CRD seals Schedule/Improvement - This item

& autoclave gaskets - was completed during current fall replace remaining auto- 1987 maintenance outage rather clave gaskets (19). than the 88RFO. All CRD auto-clave gaskets are now the improved type.

12/01/86 - Att 2 88RFO MCTF - CRD-04: CRD Schedule/Improvement - This item primary & secondary - was completed during the current .

replace secondary posi- fall 1987 maintenance outage. All 45 tion indication. secondary rod read switch assem-blies are now the new type.

12/01/86 - Att 2 88RFO MCTF - CVC-14: EC Schedule/Improvement - Repair I boric acid heat trace of boric acid heat trace (BHAT) control panel - repair circuits has been completed.

& restore to original as- Operations and engineering groups bu:Ut condition. agree with BART operability.

12/01/86 - Att 2 88RFO MCTF - CWS-01: P-39 & Schedule/Improvement - The cooling P-39B cooling tower tower pumps were completely pumps - refurbish pumps. overhauled during the current fall 1987 maintenance outage, rather than the 88RFO.

OC1087-0195-NL02

CPCo SUBMITTAL DATE ORIGINAL SCHEDULED COMPLETION TABLE 1 - EXCEPTIONS, CLARIFICATIONS, AND SCHEDULE CHANGES ORIGINAL ACTION EXCEPTIONS/CLARIFICATIONS/

SCHEDULE 5

12/01/86 - Att 2 88RFO MCTF - EPS-01: Emergency Schedule/Improvement - This diesel generator instru- replacement has been accomplished

. mentation - replacement during the current fall 1987 of panel meters. maintenance outage rather than the 88RFO.

12/01/86 - Att 2 88RFO MCTF - ESS-05: Shutdown Schedule/Improvement - The cooling heat exchanger radioactive hot spot was removed inlet & outlet valves. by a special flush (not chemical) 500R/HR hot spot. Per- and will require no.further form chemical flush of action.

heat exchanger when condi-tions permit (1/28/87 -

due date changed -

exception of executive review board - completion requires alternate shut-down cooling path.

12/01/86 - Att 2 88RFO MCTF - PCS-11: Primary Schedule/Improvement - The PCP coolant pump/ motor motor RTD units have been instrumentation - repaired during the curre~t disassemble and PM either 1987 fall maintenance outage, the P-50A and P-50B PC not 88RFO. Future plans are to pump motor; repair assoc overhaul one motor each motor bearing temp indi- refueling after spare can be cator and determine purchased - tentatively 1989.

whether the other pump should be disassembled for PM in 89RFO.

ll/01/86 - Att 2 5YP MCTF - RIA-04: RIA-0631 Schedule/Improvement - This off gas monitor - consi- item is being completed by der adding ref lash addition of ref lash during the capability to the

• current fall 1987 maintenance annunciator system. outage, not the 88RFO.

OC1087-0195-NL02

cPCo SUBMITTAL DATE TABLE 1 - EXCEPTIONS, CLARIFICATIONS, AND SCHEDULE CHANGES ORIGINAL SCHEDULED COMPLETION ORIGINAL ACTION EXCEPTIONS/CLARIFICATIONS/

SCHEDULE 6

12/01/86 - Att 2 88RFO MCTF - RIA-20: RIA-5711 Schedule/Improvement - The radwaste addition venti- modifications are being completed lation monitor - continue during the current fall 1987 with planned modif ica- maintenance outage, not the 88RFO.

tions.

12/01/86-- Att 2 88RFO MCTF - RIA-21: RIA- Schedule/Improvement - This 5712 fuel handling vent modification is being completed monitor -.continue w/ during the current fall 1987 planned modification. maintenance outage, not the 88RFO.

OC1087-0195-NL02

i LICENSING CORRESPONDENCE - RECORD

SUMMARY

DATE: October 30, 1987 DOCKET 50-255 LICENSE DPR PALISADES PLANT UPDATE TO ACTION ITEMS FROM 1986-87 MAINTENANCE OUTAGE

SUMMARY

Provides information on changes in planned completion of items in our 7/3/86, 12/1/86, and 1/28/87 letters as well as an update to the System Functional Evaluation Program.

COMMITMENTS MADE: (Identify Close-out Document)

Refer to Table 1, Attachment 2 and 3.

COMMITMENTS CLOSED:

To provide changes and update by end of October.

Previous NRC/CP Co Correspondence Special Distribution NRC letters dated 5/21/86 RDOrosz CPC letters dated 9/14/87 '* 1/28/87 DWJoos

• AIR No 12/1/86, 7/3/86 UFI No 950-70*05*03 TABuczwinski Individuals Providing Information: Individuals Assigned Responsibility for Implementing Commitments:

JGLewis RMR.ice, et. al.

Concurrences: Individual Responsible for Obtaining Budget Approval:

JGLewis, PAL 6S~eettp7-PM:i DPHoffman, PAL TCBordine N/A RMB.:i:ee7-PM:i KWBerry Budget - N/A FSAR/FHSR Change (Identify):

NSB - N/A

'/.'-f./No Category II N/A

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No reply Originator: Individual Responsible for Initiating Change Request:

JLKuemin (85867)

N/A IC1087-0197-NL02

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ATTACHMENT 1 Consumers Power Company Palisades Plant Docket 50-255 UPDATED SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL EVALUATIONS October 30, 1987 OC1087-0195-NL02

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HIGH PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION EXCEPTION/

SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FShR One high-pressure pump has sufficient capacity with 25~ spillage R0-65 verifies HPSI pump flow higher It is not clear if the 1,.l. * .1 to maintain the core water level at the start of recirculation. than design flow of 300 gpm from SIRW 25i allowed spillage tank to PCS. has been factored into the R0-65 acceptance criteria or if the 300 gpm design flow was used to determine the allowed percent spillage.

R0-65 verifies HPSI flow higher than the design limit of 300 gpm. The spill is limited to 25i by the pressure drop across measuring orifice and the throttling capa-bilities of the HPSI safety injection valve.

The 300 gpm design flow is indepdent of spillage to less than 25~ flow. The 300 gpm design flow is independent of spillage. In other words, the accident analysis assumes 220 gpm minimum flow to the core which accounts for 300 gpm including spillage.

FSAR will be clarified.

Re*:ision l 1 HPSI SYSTEM-OP02

HIGH PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION EXCEPTION/

SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION

!SAR The hot leg injection is designed to split HPSI flo~ so that half R0-65 verifies that we can send No test exists to

' .1.1 goes to one hot leg and the other half goes to the four cold legs. greater than 250 gpm through hot verify we can leg injection path. achieve a 50 '50 spilt of HPSI flow tc the hot and cold injection legs. R0-65 does veiify hot leg flow of greater than 250 gpm.

As long as 220 gpm is injected to hot leg, adequate core cooling is achieved and boron mixing will ocru1. Preop on system verified greater than 220 gpm per loop. FSAR will be clarified.

FSAR The high-pressure safety injection pumps inject borated water at R0-8 verifies pumps start and valves None

• . 1. 2. 3 high pressure into the Primary Coolant System during emergency position for safety injection *

tern 3 conditions. 00-1 verifies pumps start and valves position for safety injection.

R0-65 proves system can pump design flows to PCS.

00-5 times valves to ensure operability.

00-2 ensures system responds properly during RAS.

M0-22 ensures pumps operable at required pressure.

Revision l 2

HPSI SYSTEM-OP02

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• HIGH PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION EXCEPTION/

SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR The pump motor is capable of starting and accelerating the pump to Design feature which is not tested A periodic test is not 6.1.2.2 full speed with 70! of rated voltage. periodically. performed to

!terr. 3 demonstrate that the HPSI pump motor is capable of starting and accelerating the pump to full speed at 70~ of rated voltage.

A review of* the Clasp lE motor startina requirements was-performed.

All subject motors were designed and procured for the capability to start and accelerate their loads with 70~ of rated voltage at the terminals (see Specification E-10).

It is not feasible or necessary to test this feature. Analysis of technical data is adequate to verify the function. The plant  ;*.

transient loading *i:

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studies calculate the ,.t.**

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motor terminal voltages for the most conservation bus

\'cltages. These studies support the '.

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motor design features by verifying all t:

motors will start and .'

accelerate the pumps with their minimum postulated bus voltage. The pump;motor speed torque curves also show there exists sufficient excess [.'

torque to accelerate the pumps with 70~ of terminal voltage. ,.

F<-*:ision 1 3 HPSI SYSTEM-OP02

HIGH PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION EXCEPTION,.

SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR

... l . 2. 2 These transient

!~em 3 loading studies are r0r.tinued periodically performed, reviewed, and updated to ensure the adequacy of the diesel generator and electrical equipment.

(Note: The Class lE 2400 volt buses are undervoltage protected tQ prevent operation at a degraded voltage condition. Setpoints are 92! of rated voltage for 6 seconds.

Ff:AF. The hot leg injection is initiated by operator acticn and is LOCA Emergency Operating Procedure None

( . l. 2. 2 accomplished by realigning the valves in hot and cold legs fo1 lists actions for aligning system for Item 3h simultaneous hot leg and cold leg injections. hot leg injection.

00-5 ensures valves operable.

R0-65 ensures flow path available.

00-8A ensures check valve stroking.

FSAf; An interconnection is provided from the Chemical and Volume Con- Crosstie from eve system to HPSI is None

,*.. L2.l trol System to allow testing of the injection line inner check used to stroke inner check valves valves during reactor operation. during O~-BE and 00-BC.

Crosstie MOV-3072 is stroke tested by 00-5, 00-BF and BC.

Spillage is limited to a maximum of 25t by use of the flQwmeters Flow meters calibrated per PAC ESS 006. None t .... 2. 3 ic each injection line and the throttling capability of each Sa! ety Injecli on MO\" s verified operable 1 t er1 3a safety injection valve. I per R0-8, 00-1, 00-5.

FS.<,F. The SIS starts the high-pressure injection pumps, opens the safety M0-29 verifies system lined up for safety None i . ; . 2. 3 injection valves and closes the primary system check valve leakage injection.

ctem 3a paths. The rest of the system is always aligned for safety injec- R0-8 and 00-1 verifies pumps start and tion during power operation. valves align upon initiation of a safety injection signal. 00-5 verifies valve stroke time. M0-22 verifies pumps operable.

fip*:ision 1 4 HPSI SYSTEM-OP02

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HIGH PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION EXCEPTION/

SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION

?SAR Except for certain primary system instrumentation sensors, all M0-22 verifies pumps operable.

tern 5 None active components which must function individually for the 00-5 verifies valves operable.

system's performance to meet the criteria stated for core protec-tion can be tested during normal reactor operation.

FSAR A line from the discharge header of the charging pumps provides Crosstie f rorn CVC system to HPSI is None

• • . 1. 3 .1 the capability of testing th~ check valve closest to the primary available for testing .

l t.ern 2 system. Crosstie MOV-3072 is stroke tested by Q0-5, QO-BB, C test the check valves.

lable HPSI Pump Design Flow 300 gprn R0-65 verifies pumps pump > 300 gprn. The full pump perfor-

• • -3 Maximum Flow 600 gprn R0-65, M0-22 ensures pumps run with > mance curve will be Minimum Flow 30 gprn minimum flow. verified for HPSI Design Head 2500 feet T-220 has been run during '86 Outage pumps during the next Head at to ensure pump capacity and minimum flow. Refueling Outage. No Maximum Flow 1000 feet This tested pump performance to the problems are expected extent possible without removing the because P-BC the third

reator head. AFW pump which is a converted HPSI pump, was tested sati-factorily this outage.

~ S/..F A low-flow alarm is provided on the seal cooling water to Flow switches are calibrated per Annunicntor is not

'.l.2.2 the pumps to warn of cooling water or seal cooling malfunction. PAC CCS-005. specifically tested.

em 3 This will be verified this outaoe and periodicaily in the future. ( #41) r:'AF. The pumps are provided with minimum-flow protection to ensure Mini-flow valves are verified locked None

. l. 2. 2 that no damage will occur from operatic~ against a closed . open on CL 3.9 during start-up. Mini

:-em 3 discharge. flow will also be verified rnonthly*during the pump surveillance test, M0-22.

FSAR Each of the four cold leg high-pressure branch lines is equipped PAC ESS-006 and PCS-005 calibrate None

• .1. 2. 2 with flowrneters which can be used to balance injection flow flow instruments.

~em 8 rates. The hot leg injection lines also have flow indication.

Revision 2 5 HFSI SYSTEM-OP02

HIGH PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION EXCEPTION/

SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION F;jAf! Motor-operated valve and system p1p1ng design are such that R0-65 verified flow through injection None

.1. 2. 3 safety injection flow will be distributed approximately equally lines. Equal distribution is not 1

em 3. a between the four PCS cold legs. No throttling of motor-operated specifically verified per acceptance valves or other operator action is required to distribute flow. er lter la. Review of R0-65 performe*::

in early 1986 shows approximate equal distribution.

!"OP-3 Start/stop HPSI pump. Evolutions are conducted per SOP. None

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\*::-rk A review of Work Order history revealed approximately 37 Work Work Orders were post-maintenance None C*r:'ler Orders completed between 11/30/85 and 05119/86. tested and declared operable.

H: rtory

~:ork A re\*iew of Work Order history revealed approximately 51 Work Work Orders were post-maintenance None 01der Orders completed between 05/19/86 and 12/15/86. tested and declared operable.

I!'. story

~!odif ication i..-.*:iew A review of modification hhtory was performed since start of Preoperational testing was performed None 1985 Refueling Outage. as part of the FC closeout.

FC-623 replaced position switches on several valves in the HPSI system.

PP\"ision l 6 HPSI SYSTEM-OP02

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ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS CONTROLS EXCEPTION/

SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR Test circuits test the redundant circuits separately. Should an Q0-01 tests ESF equipment control None

7. 3 .1 accident occur while testing is in progress, the test will not circuit in right and left channels interfere with initiation of the safeguards equipment required. separately. Testing of one channel does not disable other channels.

FSAR Two independent and isolated cirouits initiate operation of redun- Q0-01 test verifies control circuit Pressurizer pressure and

7. 3. 2. 2 dant engineered safeguards equipment. These control circuits responds with and without standby containment high pressure monitor whether standby and/or emergency power is available and power. 2/4 sensing logic is common select load groups in accordance with the available power supply. to both SIS initiation channels.

The SIS is derived from pressurizer pressure or containment pres- RI-06 calibrates containment None sure. Pressurizer signal is from four pressure sensors installed pressure sensors.

on the pressurizer. Each sensor supplies a signal to a pressure RI-07 verifies pressurizer low-indicator/alarm instrument. Each is connected to a latching-type pressure 2 out of 4 (SIS) logic.

auxiliary relay. Each containment pressure sensor is connected to R0-12 verifies CHP 2 out of 4 logic.

a latching-type auxiliary relay. Either two out of four pressur-izer low-low pressure or two out of four containment high-pressure signals initiate the SIS signal, in turn, actuates two safety injection control circuits.

Actuation of each safety injection control circuit can be performed R0-08 verifies manual actuation of None manually via a push button. Relay logic circuits control the safety injection circuits and DBA loading sequence. sequencers have been calibrated.

R0-12 verifies logic and equipment actuatior..

Containment spray activation requires containment high-pressure R0-12 verifies CHP 2 out of 4 logic. None signal.

FSAR Upon loss of standby power during normal operation, each emergency R0-66C and R0-66D verify D/G start None 7,3.2.2 generator will be started dependent upon undervoltage on the from under volta9e and auto loading start-up transformer, or a turbine generator trip. Buses will of diesel generator. CL-36 verifies then be energized from the emergency generators, normal shutdown D/G start on turbine trip.

sequencers automatically start re,uired shutdown equipment. R0-8 verified auto loading of diesel R0-13 verifies operability of normal shutdown sequencers.

Revision 2 1 ENG SAFEGUARDS CONTROLS-OP02

ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS CONTROLS EXCEPTION/

SOURCE SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR Safety Injection With Standby Power Available - If standby power Q0-01 documents signals to start No periodic test documents

7. 3. 2. 2 is available at the time of initiation of the SIS, fast transfer necessary equipment upon SIS. operability of the fast Continued to the standby source is effected by the turbine generator trip. transfer relays associated The SIS relays initiate the simultaneous start of the engineered with standby power.

safeguards equipment.

This test was completed during early 1986 under HFA relay test procedure J-SC-84-06118A and 12A.

An appropriate test will be generated to periodi-cally test in the future.

If standby power fails, all loads will be shed at the time the R0-08 verifies this feature. None diesel generators receive an automatic start signal.

With load shedding completed, the diesel generator breakers close R0-08 verifies this feature. None when generator voltage is normal. Closing of the breakers resets Q0-01 verifies sequencer sends the load shedding signals and starts the OBA sequencers. Sequen- appropriate signals.

cers initiate operation of engineered safeguards equipment.

Safety injection system block is manual and is effective only RI-07 calibrates PIA's and verifies None when three of the four pressurizer pressure sensors are between block permissive logic.

the low-pressure and the low-low-pressure set points.

Safety injection circuit block will be automatically reset when RI-07 verifies auto un-block. None two or more of the four pressurizer pressure sensors detect normal operating pressure.

FSAR Testing will initiate the safeguards equipment unless their opera- 00-01 verifies operability of None

7. 3. 2. 2 tion would adversely affect the normal plant operation. A light control circuits.

is provided to show that the initiating signal has energized the control circuit of the specific engineered safeguards equipment where either operation is not desirable during the test or equip-ment is already in operation.

FSAR CHP and CHR - Coincident two of out four high-radiation or two out R0-11 and R0-12 test logic and A modification made this

7. 3. 3. 2 of four high-containment pressure signals trigger an alarm in the actuation for containment high- outage causes the CCW main control room, close all containment isolation valves not radiation and containment containment isolation required for engineered safeguards except the component cooling high-pressure respectively. valves to close on CHP line valves which are closed by SIS, and isolate control room R0-30 ensures refueling accident instead of SIS. R0-12 ventilation system. Refueling accident high-radiation monitors monitors initiate containment checks this feature.

will also close all containment isolation valves not required for isolation. Also, instrument air and engineered safeguards when locked in by key switches. MSIV bypasses are not closed by SIS. The FSAR will be corrected.

Revision 1 2 ENG SAFEGUARDS CONTROLS-OP02

ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS CONTROLS EXCEPTION,'

SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR To de-isolate the containment, circuits must be manually reset. At R0-11 verifies manual reset Surveillance Test R0-11 and 7.3.3.2 least three out of four pressure sensors must sense normal pres- requirements for CHR. R0-12 do not test the high-Continued sure, three out of four radiation sensors must sense normal radia- R0-12 was run in Feb '87. radiat ion or high-containmen tion level and the refueling accident high-radiation monitors Upon resetting CHP it was I pressure three out of four (when locked in) must sense normal radiation level before the verified valves did not I reset logic.

operator can reset the pressure 1solation circuits or the radia- automatically change position. /

tion isolation circuits. Resett,ing the isolation circuits will The reset logic is basically not result in automatically opening the containment isolation a reverse of the initiation valves, the operator must manually reopen each valve. logic. If three channels fall below the setpoint for high radiation or high pressure, the channel will reset. Therefore, testing of this function is not considered necessary.

Resetting CHP will result in CCW valves reopening. FSAR will be clarified.

Containment high-pressure signal will initiate SIS, start contain- R0-12 documents required None ment spray and open the hydrazine spray injection valves. responses.

Containment high-pressure signal will also initiate a reactor trip M0-03 verifies trip logic. None with a two out of four logic. MI-5 verifies channels trip /

from actual pressure signals. ,

Containment high-pressure signal will initiate closure of the main RI-17 documents MSIV's circuits None steam isolation valves. responses.

R0-12 verifies MSIV closure on /

2/4 logic. I FSAR Failure in control source power to the pressure/radiation sensor Containment isolation relays are Four of the eight CHP sensin

7. 3. 3. 3 relay circuit or to the redundant initiating circuit causes the normally de-energized. Testing to channels use auxiliary relay circuit to fail in a mode to initiate isolation, but isolation determine thier action upon loss of which, if de-energized, fail will not be effected unless a second failure occurs. power is not necessary. in a mode to initiate isolat The actuating relays however for pressure and radiation isolation are energized to actuate. Each independent channel is powered from a separate preferred AC bus; t fore loss of any single powe supply will neither prevent isolation, nor cause inadver containment spray actuation.

The FSAR statement will be enhanced to be more specific Revision 2 3 ENG SAFEGUARDS CONTROLS-OP02

ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS CONTROLS EXCEPTION/

SOURCE SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR Coincident two out of four low-level in SIRWT signals will initi- Rl-14 documents logic and actuation A modification installed thi

7. 3. 4. 2 ate valve operations and trip both low-pressure safety injection of required equipment. outage changed the 2 out of pumps. A manual bypass is provided so that the low-pressure 00-02 verifies equipment 4 logic to 1 out of 2 taken safety injection pumps may be restarted. operability. twice. The FSAR will be corrected.

A key switch is provided in parallel with the SIRW tank low-level Operation of key switch for recirc None contacts. Minimum recirculation valves may be closed without valve is administratively controlled; having low level in the SIRW tank. le, SOP-3, Section 7.3.2.

FShR Functional response-time testing of subsystems is performed (for M0-07 verifies D/G start times. None

7. 3. 5. 3 example, emergency generator load-sequencer timing, emergency R0-8 documents timing of signals generator start times and stroke time of important valves). from DBA sequencers.

00-21, Q0-5, and Q0-6 document valve stroke timing.

FSAR Failure of the control power on any one redundant circuit will Annunlcators EK-1372 and EK-1378 Annunicators are not

7. 3. 2. 2 be annunicated in the control room. are available. periodically tested.

These will be tested prior to start-up and periodically in the future. (#49)

FSAR There are two sets of DBA sequencers with each set connected Q0-1 verifies separation and None.

7. 3. ~. 2 to a separate control circuit. The sequencers load the sequencing.

required equipment in sequence.

FSAR Testing - The containment high-pressure detectors and auxiliary MI-5 checks CHP initiation FSAR wording will be

7. 3. 3. 2 relays. can be tested at power without actuating containment circuits. verified.

isolation by tripping one out of the four local pressure MR-6 checks CHR initiation switches. Actuation of the auxiliary relay is annunicated circuits.

in the control room. The detectors and auxiliary relays for R0-11 and MR-6 check CHR /

containment high radiation are te~ted in the same manner as initiation circuits.

containment high-pressure circuit~.

Revision 2 4 ENG SAFEGUARDS CONTROLS-OP02

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ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS CONTROLS EXCEPTION/

SOURCE SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR Testing the containment isolation circuits ls done only during CHP test push buttons are avail- FSAR will be clarified on

7. 3. 3. 2 shutdown. One of two redundant switches located in the control able to perform this function. test method.

room turned to test position, may be operated at a time to CHR initiate push buttons are de-energize two of the four containment high-pressure channels available to perform this which will cause containment isolation, initiate SIS, and start function. These push buttons are the containment spray pumps. The spray valves will not open not used for testing. R0-11 in test position. Actuation of GOntalnment isolation from the and R0-12 use simulated sensor high-radiation channels is done using redundant switches inputs to test containment isola-in the same manner as isolation via high-pressure channels. tion.

SIS is not actuated during this test.

FSAR Testing - The RAS control circuit may be tested while the Plant Q0-2 verifies RAS circuity. None

7. 3. 4. 2 is shutdown. This test will initiate the operation of the valves RI-14 checks level interlocks I and the trip signal of both LP safety injection pumps. for RAS. I SOP-3 Safety injection actuation circuits - disable/restore. Pressurizer low pressure SIS is None 7.7 disabled during plant cooldowns per GOP-9 and restored on heatup per GOP-2.

SOP-3 Reset of SIS equipment repositioning criteria. Reset feature is checked during None Attach 5 R0-8 MCTF OBA/normal shutdown sequencers: Perform Technical Specification Q0-1 has been performed on the NOne ESS-20 Surveillance tests on each sequencer to ensure operability. DBA sequencers. R0-13 has been performed on the normal shutdown sequencers. Q0-1 (OBA) operability testing for continued operation will be in accordance with E-PAL-86-100 which requires monthly performance testing after start-up for an initial period of 4 months.

MCTF Safety Inspection Circuity - Complete FC-683 and perform Q0-1 was performed to verify None ESS-29 Q0-1 "Remove Pressurizer Heater Load Centers from SIS Trip" circuitry. FC-683 has been signed off.

Revision 2 5 ENG SAFEGUARDS CONTROLS-OP02

• ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS CONTROLS EXCEPTION/

SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION Work A review of Work Order history revealed approximately 78 Work Orders were post-maintenance None Order Work Orders completed between 11/30/~5 and 05/19/86. tested and declared operable.

History Work A review of Work Order history revealed appr*oximately 19 Work Orders were post-maintenance None Order work Orders completed between 05/19/86 to 12/15/86. tested and declared operable.

History Modlf icat ion Review A review of modification history was performed since start of 1985 Refueling Outage.

FC-683 removed pressurizer heater load centers from SIS trip. Tested satisfactorily via Q0-1. None Revision 1 6 ENG SAFEGUARDS CONTROLS-OP02

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AUXILIARY FEED SYSTEM EXCEPTION/

SOURCE SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFOl~ED JUSTIFICATION FSAR 9.7.2.l The auxiliary feed pumps take suction from the 125,000 gallon con- DW0-1 verifies 100,000 gallons of makeup Condensate storag densate storage tank of which 60,000 gallons are required to water to AFW pumps available. Level tank requirements achieve primary system cooldown in eight hours if all of the steam switch is calibrated per DMW-002 are being sub-is blown to atmosphere. The condensate storage tank level is stantiated by the monitored in the control room. In addition, a low-level switch is Accident Analysis provided to alarm at low water level of 66,750 gallons. Group. Results will be defined in EOPs.

FSAR 9.7.2.l The primary system makeup tank provides an additional source of DW0-1 verifies 100,000 gallons of makeup water None water to the AFW pump suction. A low-level switch is set to alarm to AFW pumps available. Level switch is at 65,600 gallons which assures a minimum combined inventory of calibrated per DMW-002.

132,000 gallons.

FSAR

9. 7. 2 .1 A* cross tie from the fire system provides an additional backup Q0-21 verifies backup water supply available. None water supply to the original two AFW pumps (Pumps A and B). The third pump (Pump C) may be supplied water from the Service Water System.

FSAR

9. 7. 2 .1 Minimum flow recirculation is provided through breakdown orifices No testing was performed. Flow measurement which are designed to pass minimum pump design flow at maximum of AFW pump re-pressure. circulation flow is not designed to be monitored.

Flow instrumenta-tion will be added as part of the 5-year Plan.

FSAR

y. 7. 2. 3 In the event that a loss of normal and standby electric power MI-39 AFW logic testing verifies proper logic. None.

occurs, the turbine-driven pump is started from the control room R0-97 verifies proper pump starting.

and is used to supply feedwater to the steam generators. The turbine-driven auxiliary feed pump and auxiliary feedwater control valves can also be operated locally.

Revision l l AUX FEEDWATER SYSTEM-OP02

AUXILIARY FEED SYSTEM EXCEPTION/

SOURCE SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR 9.7.2.3 Driving steam for the turbine driven pump is supplied from the T-187 verifies 10% overspeed trip (Feb '86). None main steam header and the turbine exhaust steam ls discharged to T-181 verifies turbine operation at low steam the atmosphere. The turbine operates at constant speed with steam pressures (Feb '86).

pressures down to 40 psig and is protected by a 10% overspeed trip.

FSAR 9.7.2.3 Auxiliary feedwater flow to the steam generators will be automat-. R0-97 verifies this feature. None ically initiated on a low-steam generator water level.

FSAR 9.7.2.3 The normal valve positions on all valves of the suction side of CL 12.5 verifies AFW valve positions. None the pumps, between the condensate storage tank and the pumps, are This is performed each startup from locked open and the steam admission valves to the turbine-driven cold shutdown, if deemed necessary by /

pump are closed. The flow control valves and the steam admission Ops supt. /

valves are designed to fail open.

FSAR 9.7.2.3 Safety grade flow rate indication for auxiliary feedwater flow to Flow rate indicators are calibrated by FWS-034, None each steam generator is provided in the main control room. In the 035, 036, 037 and checked by Q0-21 and RI-95.

event of loss of offsite power, the motor-driven auxiliary feed- R0-8, R0-13 verify pumps sequencing on diesels.

water pumps are sequentially loaded onto their respective diesel generator.

FSAR

~.7.2.3 In the event of loss or depletion of the water supply from the Q0-21 verifies valve operation. None condensate storage tank, the backup water supplies from the fire Special Test T-190 verifies service water flow system or Service Water system can be utlli~ed by opening the hand to P-8C.

valves in the cross ties and, in the case of the fire systems, starting one of the fire pumps.

FSAR 9.7.2.3 For any condition during which feedwater to the steam generators AFW flow requirements of 300 gpm @ 985 psig for None from the main feedwater pumps is interrupted and the reactor is P-8A, B were verified by T-186, T-192 Feb '86.

tripped, sufficient feedwater flow ls maintained by the motor- P-BC was verified by T-201 (Sept '86).

driven or the turbine-driven auxiliary feed pumps to remove decay T-202 (12/86) developed system differential heat from the primary system and maintain the reactor in a safe pressure by flowing AFW to each steam generators.

condition.

Revision 2 2 AUX FEEDWATER SYSTEM-OP02

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AUXILIARY FEED SYSTEM EXCEPTION/

SOURCE SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSl\R

9. 7. 2. 3 The Feed Only Good Generator (FOGG) actuation system monitors FOGG actuation is not currently used or These are passive steam generator pressure. The steam line break will result in a tested. normally open lower pressure in the affected steam generator and the FOGG actua- valves. They tion system will terminate AFW flow to that steam generator. Due were originally to nuclear safety considerations, the automatic isolation feature designed to allow has been disabled although the operator may manually isolate the for feeding an affected steam generator from the control room. intact steam generator. This feature is presently disabled. These valves will be tested against differential pressure as part of the plant response to IE Bullet in 85-03.

FSAR 9.7.5 Tests and Inspection The auxiliary feedwater pumps are tested periodically during plant M0-38 and Q0-21 periodically start the AFW None operation by starting each pump, opening the control valves and pumps.

observing the flow. Testing will be in accordance with Section XI 00-21 and R0-97 start the pumps and establish of the ASME B&PV Code with applicable addenda. Diaphragm-operated flow to the steam generators.

valves are exercised periodically during plant operation to ensure proper functioning.

All components of the system are accessible for inspection ,during Design feature. None plant operation.

A 48-hour endurance test has been performed on the original motor- P-8A was 48-hour tested per T-131A in 1980. None driven pump and turbine-driven pump. The results demonstrated P-8B was 48-hour tested per T-131B in 1980.

that the pumps performed in an acce~table manner without exceed- P-8C was 48-hour tested per T-196 in 1986.

ing design limits. -,

Revision 1 3 AUX FEEDWATER SYSTEM-OP02

AUXILIARY FEED SYSTEM EXCEPTION/

SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION All valves on the suction side of the auxiliary feedwater pumps Checklist 12.5 verifies suction valves are No monthly check are inspected monthly to ensure that they are in the locked-open locked open each startup. of AFW pump suc-position. tion valves in locked-open posi-tion exists.

Quarterly sur-veillance test Q0-21 on AFW verifies suction flowpath ava 11-abili ty. Monthly Surveillance Test M0-38 verifies recirc flow capability, which also verifies an open flowpath from the con-densate storage tank to the AFW pumps. FSAR will be clarified.

FSAR

'lable 9-13 Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (P-8A) Pump capacity tests were performed on each pump. As a result of th T-186 (Feb '86) P-8B Operational Readi Capacity 415 gpm T-192 (Feb '86) P-8A ness Assessment o Head 2,730 ft T-201 (Sept '86) P-8C AFW, PRC approved analysis which clarified AFW flow requirements Special testing has been performe which verifies AFW system can Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Fee~water Pump (P-8B) meet these re-quirements (T-186 Capacity 415 gpm T-192, T-201, Head 2,730 ft T-202). Surveil-lances will be modified to verif Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (P-8C) these requirement periodically.

Capacity 330 gpm Head 2,500 ft Revision 1 4 AUX FEEDWATER SYSTEM-OP02

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AUXILIARY FEED SYSTEM EXCEPTION/

§Q!!!@ SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR 7.4.l.4 The steam turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump may be used in M0-38 and Q0-21 verify availability of P-BB for None all in.stances, including loss of all ac power, to supply water to normal operations.

either or both steam generators if necessary. RO-B and R0-97 ensure availability of P-BB tur-bine pump in all conditions.

FSAR 7.4.l.4 The condensate storage, including the Primary Coolant System DW0-1 verifies 100,000 gallons of water avail- Condensate stor-makeup tank, must contain no less than 100,000 gallons of water able. age tank require-per Technical Specification requirements. This is enough for ments are being eight hours of auxiliary feedwater operation without makeup to the substantiated b~*

tank. the Accident Analysis Group.

The results will be included in the EOPs.

F'SAR 7.4.l.4 The fire mains drawing water fr.om Lake Michigan can be used to 00-21 verifies operability of fire water cross None supply water to the turbine-driven AFW pump in the event the water tie to P-BB.

supply in the condensate storage tank is depleted or cannot be utilized. Manually operated valves can be used to shift the AFW pump suction.

FSAR i.4.l.4 The turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump can be started from 00-21 verifies operability of P-BB and its con- None the Auxiliary Shutdown Control Panel C-150, the auxiliary f~ed trol valves from C-150. Motor operated valves water valves can be controlled locally, in the case of the motor- are cycled on M0-38.

operated isolation valves, or remotely from the Auxiliary Shutdown Control Panel C-150, in the case of the air-operated flow control valves, using Steam Generator A as the steam source.

FSAR 7.4.l.4 Assured opening of a steam supply v~lve for the turbine-driven Q0-21 verifies operability of steam supply valve None auxiliary feedwater pump is provided by an alternate solenoid from main control room and C-150.

valve for control of the Steam Generator A steam supply valve.

The power source for this solenoid valve is from the auxiliary shutdown control panel and energizing of either normal or alter-nate solenoid valve will open the steam valve.

FSAR 7.4.l.4 Control of the applicable auxiliary feedwater control valves is Q0-21 verifies operability of control valves None accomplished by enabling the auxiliary shutdown control panel from C-150 ~nd main control panel.

devices and disabling the main control panel devices via a trans-fer switch.

Revision 1 5 AUX FEEDWATER SYSTEM-OP02

AUXILIARY FEED SYSTEM EXCEPTION/

SOURCE SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR 7.4.1.4 In the event a fire causes the loss of normal control air, standby Special Test T-187 was performed (2/86) to Special Test T-le 2,400 psig nitrogen bottle systems with manifold and pressure verify 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> of N* backup to P-SB steam verified N* syste reducers located in the auxiliary feedwater pump room and in the valves. would supply 12 component cooling room will supply the steam valves, steam pres- hours of N* to sure regulating valve and .IU'W flow control valves for 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. PCV-0521A and cv-os22:e *. This function will be verified for the other flow contra valves supplied with backup N*

prior to start-up A PACS will be generated to periodically test this function in the future.

FSAR

?.4.1.8.3 There are two auxiliary feedwater flow indication channels for 00-21 checks the flow* indication at c-150 and None each steam generator loop. Indication of flow is available both main control room. Indicators are calibrated in the control room and at the Auxiliary Shutdown Control Panel by PACS FWS-034, 035, 036, 037 and RI-95.

C-150.

FSAR 7.4.1.8.5 Detection of low condensate tank level will be via a low suction PS-07410 provides this function. Prior to the next pressure switch which is installed on the turbine-driven auxiliary Calibrated 1/8/86 Work Order t 24600187 Refout a surveil-feedwater pump. This pressure switch turns on an alarm light on lance procedure the auxiliary shutdown panel. PAC-FWS-026 calibrates and tests this switch. I will be developed to calibrate this pressure switch each refueling.

Revision 2 6 AUX FEEDWATER SYSTEM-OP02

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91 AUXILIARY FEED SYSTEM SOURCE EXCEPTION/

SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR 7.4.l.8.5 Upon receipt of the condensate storage tank low level alarm, the FWS-026 calibrates P-8A, B low suction pressure These pressure auxiliary feedwater pump suction source will be transferred man- trips. switches will be ually to the fire water system. Redundant pressure switches are SOP-7 gives procedure for supplying backup water added to a sur-provided to trip (three switches; two of three required for trip) to AFW pumps on low condenser storage tank veillance proce-the auxiliary feedwater pumps on low suction pressure, thus avoid- level. P-8C suction pressure trip switch dure prior to the ing pump failure due to low or none~istent tank level. calibrated (Feb 86). T-202 measured pump suction next Refout.

pressures during high flow rates. The calibration performed this outage, plus T-20 is adequate test!

FSAR to verify functio 7.4.3.1.1 Delivery of AFW flow to the steam generators must occur within two R0-97 verifies this feature. None minutes of sensor's activation.

FSAR 7.4.3.1.2 If no action by the operator !s performed, low-level signals from R0-97 verifies proper AFW pump start sequence. None two out of four (2/4) steam generator level sensors on an OR logic R0-8 verifies proper AFW pump sequence on a between the two steam generators energize a timer relay if the simulated OBA.

motor-driven AFW pumps' mode selector switches are in the "Auto* R0-13 verifies AFW pump start on normal shutdown position. Upon completion of the timing cycle, the timer contacts sequencer.

actuate closing of the motor-driven AFW Pump A circuit breaker provided offsite or onsite standby (emergency generator) power is available. If offsite power is unavailable, the auto start is blocked until the normal shutdown or OBA sequencer allows loading the pump motor onto the emergency generator.

FSAR 7.4.3.1.2 The motor-driven AFW Pump c is called to start if Pump A circuit R0-97 verifies proper AFW pump start logic. None breaker trips or AFW flow does not materialize. The AFW low flow*

initiation logic is one out of two.

FSAR 7.4.3.l.2 The mode selector switch position of~ the "Auto" position is indi- R0-97 verifies proper AFW pump start logic. None.

cated as an off-normal condition on the main control panel, The actuation timer is provided with a suitable time setting to block unwanted automatic starting due to normal transients in the steam generator level.

Revision l 7

AUX FEEDWATER SYSTEM-OP02

AUXILIARY FEED SYSTEM EXCEPTION/

SOURCE SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR 7.4.3.l.2 An occurrence of low flow in either AFW line to the steam genera- R0-97 verifies proper AFW pump starting logic. None tors or motor-driven Pump C trip, together with a time delayed auto-start signal for the turbine-driven pump will open the tur-bine drive Steam Inlet Valve B and start the turbine-driven AFW pump. The steam inlet valve control switch must be in the "Auto" position for the auto-start signal ~o be effective.

FSAR 7.4.3.1.2 The AFW low flow initiation logic for the turbine-driven AFW pump R0-97 verifies proper AFW pump starting logic. None.

is one out of two (1/2).

FSAR 7.4.3.l.2 In the case of a successful start of one of the motor-driven R0-97 verifies proper AFW pump starting logic. None.

pumps, the start of the turbine-driven pump ls overridden by the reset of the AFW discharge line flow switches on a two out of two (2/2) basis.

FSAR 7.4.3.1.2 Manual starting of the turbine-driven pump can be accomplished at M0-38 and Q0-21 verify manual operation of the None an~* time by its steam inlet valve control switch "Open" position. turbine-driven pump.

Manual trip can also be accomplished at any time by the same switch in the "Close" position. The control switch position in "Close" is indicated on the main control panel as an off-normal condition.

FSAR 7.4.3.1.2 The AFW automatic initiation system is placed in operation when Checklist 3.9 places AFW in automatic prior to None the Primary Coolant System is heated above 325°F. Operation of 325°F.

the system is normally from the control room1 if the control room M0-38 and Q0-21 verify operation of the system becomes unavailable, manual controls can be taken over from the* from the main control room and C-150.

Auxiliary Shutdown Control Panel C-150. The AFW automatic initia-tion system status is annunciated onlthe main control board.

FSAR 7.4.3.1.2 Both the motor-driven and the turbine-driven AFW pumps' automatic H0-38 and Q0-21 verifies their functions. None initiation circuits are individually tested from the main control room according to Technical Specification requirements. After a start test switch (one for each pump) has been turned to the "Test" position, a white light indicates the test status and the test- signal passes through the automatic initiation circuit, including the timers, and starts the applicable pump. The test signal is sent into the circuit after the steam generator low-level signals logic, and in the case of the turbine-driven pump, after the AFW low-flow signals.

Revision l 8 AUX FEEDWATER SYSTEM-OP02

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AUXILIARY FEED SYSTEM EXCEPTION/

SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR 7.4.3.l.2 The steam generator low-level signal's logic is provided with MI-39 verifies low-level logic. None test push buttons for test of the coincidence logic and bistable trip modules.

FSAR 7.4.3.1.2 The entire automatic initiation circuit is tested on line and the Initiation circuit is tested by MI-39. None pumps themselves are tested on line by the test switches. Water M0-38 and Q0-21 test pumps and valves and Q0-21 is delivered to the steam generators during the test, thus check-* delivers flow to the steam generators.

ing the suction pressure and discharge flow switches operation. S/G level signals are calibrated by RI-04.

The steam generator level signals are checked as a part of the Flow switches are calibrated under PAC-FWS-034, /

Reactor Protective system input channels test. 035,036,037. I FSAR 7.4.3.1.3 Open circuitry or loss of power supply of one of the instrument This feature is not tested. Testing is not channels initiates an alarm and a channel activation. required to verif open circuit or loss of power sin both events lniti ate an alarm or channel trip. An time a channel ls removed from ser-vice for testing this function is witnessed via ala This alarm functl is not considered important to safe plant operation.

A channel trip satisfies one of the 2 of 4 logic trips required an places the actua-tion circuit closer to a trip condition.

Revision 2 9 AUX FEEDWATER SYSTEM-OP02

AUXILIARY FEED SYSTEM EXCEPTION/

SOURCE SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR 7.4.3.1.3 Loss of 125 volt de power from one de power source disables only This feature is not tested. I Testing is not one AFW pump auto start channel and this loss of power is alarmed. required to verif open circuit or loss of power sin both events initi ate an alarm or channel trip. An time a channel is removed from ser-vice for testing this function is witnessed via ala This alarm functi is not considered important to safe plant operation.

A channel trip satisfies one of the 2 of 4 logic trips required an places the actua-tion circuit closer to a trip condition.

FSAR 7.4.3.2 In the event of a main steam line break, the AFW flow toward the Automatic isolation feature (FOGG) is disabled No interlocks affected steam generator must be terminated. This function must and not tested. exist to prevent be performed using isolation valves in each steam generator's AFW manual isolation supply line which automatically close upon simultaneous sensing of of AFW flow to low water level in one steam generator and excessive pressure both steam differential between steam generators. Both steam generators are generators during prevented from being isolated, either automatically or manually, a MSLB. This through interlocked controls. function is addressed proce-durally by the Emergency Operati Procedures. The FSAR will be corrected.

FSAR 7.4.3.2 In each flow control channel, a flow indicating controller main- Q0-21 verifies operation of flow controls and None tains constant flow rates to the applicable steam generator and indications.

provides flow indication in the main control room. Indications are calibrated and checked by FWS-034, 035, 036, 037 and RI-95.

Revision 2 10 AUX FEEDWATER SYSTEM-OP02

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AUXILIARY FEED SYSTEM EXCEPTION/

SOURCE SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR 7.4.3.2 The flow controllers keep the control valves shut until one of 00-21 verifies valves operation. None the AFW pumps is started. This is accomplished using two flow Flow control valves. are checked by RI-95.

set points on the controllers, one for shutdown (valve closed)  : Flow controllers are calibrated by /

and one for operation (valve opened for predetermined flow). PAC-FWS-034,035,036,037. I Set point switching ls provided by the motor-driven pumps' cir-cuit breaker auxiliary contacts anq the turbine-driven pump steam admission valve controls auxiliary contacts on an OR logic basis.

This design allows timely and smooth opening of the AFW flow con-trol valves without operator intervention.

FSAR 7.4.3.2 A separate Class lE AFW flow indication channel for each AFW flow AFW flow instruments are checked on 00-21 and None path and a wide-range steam generator level indication channel for are calibrated by PACS FWS-034, 035, 036, 037 each steam generator are also provided allowing indication of flow and RI-95.

independent from the control channel and monitoring of steam gen- Wide-range level indication is calibrated per erator water level to cover all anticipated transients. RI-04.

FSAR 7.4.3.2 Concurrent excessive differential pressure between steam genera- FOGG system is not used or tested periodically. Due to nuclear tors and low level in the depressurized steam generator initiates safety considera-isolation of the depressurized steam generator by closing corre- tions, the auto-sponding motor-operated isolation valves in the AFW supply lines. matic isolation Two out of four (2/4) differential pressure logic is used in feature of the coincidence with the output of the steam generator low-level FOGG system has logic. The isolation signal is generated through electronic been disabled bistable modules. and the operator ls instructed by Plant Emergency Operating Pro-cedures to manual isolate the affected steam generator.

The FSAR will be clarif led.

Revision 2 11 AUX FEEDWATER SYSTEM-OP02

AUXILIARY FEED SYSTEM EXCEPTION/

SOURCE SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION SOP-12 To start/stop P-8A and P-8C M0-38 and 00-21 start/stop and operate flow 2/3 low suction 7 .1.1 valves in similar manner. pressure trip of 7 .1. 2 pump is not verified by test.

R0-97 simulates automatic operation of pumps This will be and verfies flow to the steam generators. verified prior to start-up and R0-8 verifies start of auxiliary feed water periodically ther pumps following a simulated OBA. FS-0727 and after. (24) I FS-0749 calibrated by FWS 34 and FWS 35.-

SOP-12 To start/stop P-8B M0-38 and 00-21 start/stop and operate flow 2/3 low suction control valves in a similar manner. pressure trip of pump is not verified by test.

This will be R0-97 simulates automatic operation of pumps verified prior to and verfies flow to the steam generators. start-up and periodically thereafter. (24)/

Overspeed testing of turbine was completed on T-186.

FS-0736 and FS-0737 calibrated by FWS 37 and FWS 36.

SOP-12 Alternate operations EOP-10.2 placing C-150 in operation: None 7.2.3 00-23 places C-150 in operation in similar manner.

00-21 places C-150 in operations and starts P-8B and control to steam generators.

EOP-10.2 starts motor driven pumps locally:

M0-38 verfies local status of pumps.

EOP-10.2 controls A.FW flow from C-33 00-21 verifies C-33 control of flow.

Accident and rransient Analysis revision 2 12

/,'JX FEEDWATER SYSTEM-OP02

.. '/

\. ...... ~

AUXILIARY FEED SYSTEM EXCEPTION/

~ SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION MCTF Testing of auxiliary feed pumps should be performed at hot shutdown. Special Tests T-202 and T-203 will be performed None AFW-03 prior to startup. Special Test T-201 tested P-8C (9/86).

MCTF Make necessary tests at hot shutdown to verify performance and make Special Test T-203 will be performed prior to None AFW-06 necessary adjustments to PC-0521. to startup, adjustments will be made during this test.

MCTF Test AFW check valves for back leakage. Special Test T-222 was completed satisfactorily None AFW-07 during hot shutdown testing period.

MCTF Test AFW power supplies. AFW power suplles were tested (Work AFW-08 Order # 24606295) and PAC-FWS-072 written to /

perform on refueling basis. I Revision 2 13 l\UX FEED\olATER SYSTEM-OP02

AUXILIARY FEED SYSTEM EXCEPTION/

SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION i**ork A review of Work Order history revealed approximately 52 Work Orders Work Orders were postmaintenance None Order completed between 11/30/85 and 05/19/86. tested and declared operable.

History Work A review of Work Order history revealed approximately 67 Work Orders Work Orders were postmaintenance None Order completed between 05/19/86 to 12/15/,86, many of these were for tested and declared operable.

History instrumentation required for special tests or EEO Audit.

Modification fieview A review of modification history was performed since start of 1985 Refueling Outage.

FC-675 added backup N* supply to P-8B steam Special Test T-187 was verified 12 None supply (moved bottle location). hour N* backup.

Revision l 14 AUX FEEDWATER SYSTEM-OP02

., >.')

/

HYDROGEN RECOMBINER EXCEPTION/

SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR Containment atmosphere is drawn through the unit by RE-39 verifies physical integrity and Air Flow Capability 6.L.2.2 natural convection and the temperture of the air is raised absence of obstruction to air flow. Is Not Directly to a level sufficient for recombination of the hydrogen RI-40 calibrates recombiner instruments. Measured. A docu-and oxygen to occur (approximately 1,150 °F). ment search will will be performed to ensure adequate shop testing or analysis was done to backup 100 ssfm air flow.

Capacity (Min @ l Atmosphere) 100 scfm S0-3 and R0-61 document operability of units.

Power (Maximum) 75 kW FS1-.P. Calibration of the power consumption involves a correction factor for Use of correction factors addressed in SOP-5. None 7 . .J. 4. 2 containment pressure and temperature to be used for operation after an accident.

SOP 5 To place a recombiner in Operation following a LOCA. S0-3 Periodically starts recombiners in same None

7. 2 .1 manner. Correction factors for containment conditions are used during LOCA.

SOP 5 To shutdown a recombiner. S0-3 Secures recombiner in same manner. None 7.;;;. 2 MCTF No items identified None None fieview Ac.-:ident And Transient Analysis Review Ma int. One work order on each recombiner worked since 1985. To install RI-40 completed satisfactorily. *None Review and remove temporary instrumentation for performance of RI-40.

temporary instrumentation for performance Mods No modification performed since start of 1985 Refueling Outage. None None Review fievision 1 1 HYDROGEN RECOMBINER-OP02

• .)

MAIN STEAM SYSTEM EXCEPTION/

~ SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR The steam dump system is arranged for automatic operation and for Special Test T-207 was performed during None 10.2.1 remote manual control from the Control Room. 1986 Maintenance Outage to ensure Item 3 operability of valves and controls.

Special Test T-211 will be performed at hot plant conditions. SOP-7 provides for normal testing of the system.

FSAR The atmospheric dump valves may be manually controlled from the Special Test T-207 verified this feature None. .1 10.2.1 Control Room or Engineered Safeguards Control Panel. SOP-7 tests this feature during hot/ I Item 3 plant conditions. PAC MSS042 performs I T-207 periodically. I FSAR The main steam isolation valves (MSIV's) are closed on either a R0-12 ensures valves close on containment RI-17 will be revised 10.2.1 low steam generator pressure signal or a containment high- high-pressure. signal. to document the Item 4 pressure signal. feature of MSIV closure on low S/G pressure. This function will be verified prior to start-up.

FSAR Closure of the MSIV's will also result in a turbine-generator RI-17 tests that a standing turbine trip Turbine generator 10.2.1 trip. Manual closure of one valve will cause automatic signal is removed if key operated MSIV trip on MSIV closure Item 4 closure of the other valve. defeat/enable switch is placed in defeat is inferred.

position. RI-17 tests that manual closure of one valve will cause automatic closure of the other valve.

FSAR Each main steam header is provid~d with 12 spring-loaded safety Safety valves are tested per RM-29. None 10.2.1 valves and two atmospheric dump valves upstream of the main CV-0511 turbine bypass was tested by steam isolation valves (MSIV's). The safety valves discharge T-207 during 1986 Maintenance Outage.

of the atmosphere and are in accordance with the requirements Hot testing of turbine bypass valve will of the ASME B&PV Code,Section VIII. I In addition, there is a be performed per T-211 during plant steam bypass to condenser valve downstream of the MSIV's heatup. SOP-7 provides for normal testing of turbine bypass valve and atmospheric dump valves.

Revision 2 l MAIN STEAM SYSTEM-OP02

MAIN STEAM SYSTEM EXCEPTION/

SOURCE SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR The MSIV's are normally open, and closed in five seconds in a Valves are verified to shut within five We do not verify 10.2.l no-flow condition. When flow does exist, the valve will close seconds under no-flow conditions during closure within one Item 4 in less than one second. normal plant start-up by GOP-2. second with steam RI-17 verifies MSIV's close in five flow. This is seconds. considered a design feature. Repeated closure of MSIVs under full steam differential pressure may damage valves.

FSAR Four pressure transmitters on each steam generator actuate con- RI-5 calibrates pressure indicators. RI-17 will be revised 10.2.l tacts in indicting meter relays which are connected in a to document this Item 4 two-out-of-four logic to close both main steam isolation valves. feature. Presently RI-17 only tests feedwater regulating and bypass valves auto closure. ( 26) ./

FSAR Automatic closing of the-main steam isolation valves can be RI-17 verifies proper operation of RI-17 will be revised 10.2.l blocked by pushing both of two isolation block push buttons as blocking circuits for feedwater to document this (26) /

Item 4 the steam pressure ls decreasing toward the isolation set point. regulating valves and bypass valves. feature. Presently The isolation block is automatically removed by a two-out-of-four RI-17 only tests logic when the steam generator pressure rises to 50 psi above the feedwater regulating isolation set point pressure. and bypass valves auto closure, but technically procedure is adequate to test MSIVs. Auto block of MSIVs auto closure is on low S/G pressure only not on containment high pressure. FSAR clarification needed and will be clarified.

Revision 2 2 MAIN STEAM SYSTEM-OP02

/

• MAIN STEAM SYSTEM SOURCE EXCEPTION/

SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR An accumulator is provided for each MSIV to hold the valve open None 10.2.1 No testing is pre-in case of a loss of air supply to the valve operator. sently performed to Item 4 address this design feature. The accumulators are provided for reli~bility purposes. On loss of air, the accumulators provide the operator enough time to regain pressure to prevent the valves from drifting/slamming closed and causing damage. There is a low pressure alarm on each header and backup from the H/P air system. The testing of these accumulators will be evaluated.

FSAR The steam generator blowdown system is continuously monitored by a RIA-0707 continuously monitors blowdown 10.2.l Current testing does process monitor which detects radioactivity which may have leaked flow and ls calibrated per RR-09A, read not verify that all S/G Item 5 into the steam generator from the primary system. This radiation by DW0-1 and source checked by MR-14. blowdown valves close monitor is on the effluent of the blowdown tank and detects QR-22 verifies receipt of an alarm and on receipt of high radioactivity which may have leaked into the blowdown water through closure of mixing basin discharge valve radiation signal.

the steam generators. High activity is annunicated in the main on receipt of a high radiation signal QR-22 will be revised /

control room. If the radioactivity level reaches a preset valve, to add the steam the surface and bottom blowdown containment isolation valves and the generator blowdown mixing basin discharge valve all close. valves. This function will be tested prior to start-up and periodically in the future. (#9) I FSAR The standby blowdown pump starts autoinatically on high blowdown None No testing is l 0. 2 .1 tank level. presently performed Item 5 or necessary to test this design feature.

This function does not impact safe or reliable plant operation. Normal plant operations would identify a problem if one existed.

F-evision 2 3

MAIN STEAM SYSTEM-OP02

MAIN STEAM SYSTEM EXCEPTION/

SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION Accident And Transient Analysis SOP-7 At Shift Supervisor's discretion use auxiliary boilers steam Normal plant operation on a start-up None

7. l. 4 through the superheater to seal the main turbine and draw vacuum. typically does not utilize the super-heater because of the demand on the auxiliary boiler. However, this method

• is fully described in SOP-13 and has been utilized by Operations in the past.

SOP-7 Steam generator continuous blowdown. Normal operations validate that this None 7.4 design feature is satisfied.

SOP-7 Steam generator recirculation. Normal operations validate that this None 7.5 design feature is satisfied.

SOP-7 To establish/secure steam generator nitrogen blanketing. Normal operations validate that this None 7.6/7.7 design feature is satisfied.

MCTF CV-0511 turbine bypass valve insure operability. Cold post-maintenance testing (T-207) Operability deter-MSS-01 and hot (400 psi) testing were performed. mination at thirty Item 1 percent power to assure adequate flow capacity (T-211) will be performed (#8) I MCTF CV-0511 turbine bypass valve, evaluat, testing in conjunction Periodic testing will be completed None MSS-01 with monthly turbine valve testing. during turbine valve testing and the Item 2 following intervals: Once a month for the first three months of plant operationr then quarterly the next four months of plant operation, and then.once every six months of plant operation. Attachment l of SOP-7 presently performs the above testing monthly.

Revision 2 4 MAIN STEAM SYSTEM-OP02

• ' .... *~.

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.i MAIN STEAM SYSTEM EXCEPTION/

~ SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION MCTF CV-0522A and CV-0522B auxiliary feedwater pump steam supply Initial valve timing has been set as None MSS-02 valves: Determine correct stroke times for these valves part of the respective Work Orders.

(minimum and maximum) and adjust as necessary. Surv Test 00-21 presently determines valve stroke time.

MCTF CV-0779, CV-0780, CV-0781 and CV-078~ atmospheric dump valves: Valves were stroked and tested cold None MSS-03 Stroke and test all valves. (T-207). All valves were satisfactorily stroked under full steam pressure (SOP-7 Attachment 4) during hot testing and will be performed each start-up and shutdown.

MCTF M0-0501 and M0-0510 MSIV bypass valves1 Valve operability. Both MSIV bypass valves were test None MSS-04 operated satisfactorily at full steam pressure during hot testing.

These valves are routinely used during normal plant start-up.

MCTF MV-101 MS, MV-102 HS, MV-103 MS, and MV-10~ MS steam dump All valves operated satisfactory None MSS-06 manual isolation valves1 Insure valves move/operate freely. after repairs. PAC-HSS-034 have I Initiate a PACS to include periodic test. been developed to include I periodic test operation. I

\~ork A review of Work Order history revealed approximately 213 Work Orders were post-maintenance tested None Order Work Orders completed between 11/30/85 to 05/19/86. and declared operable.

History Work A review of Work Order history revealed approximately 96 Work Orders were post-maintenance tested None Order Work Orders completed between 05/19/86 to 12/15/86. and declared operable.

History Revision 2 5 MAIN STEAM SYSTEM-OP02

HAIN STEAM SYSTEM EXCEPTION/

SOURCE SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED .JUSTIFICATION Modifi- A review of modification history was performed since start of cation 1985 Refueling Outage.

Review FC-709 installed a test tap upstream of CV-0511 to facilitate None required. None performance of valve testing via T-211.

FC-624 replaced several pieces of instrumentation with Replaced equipment was preoperationally None environmentally qualified equipment. tested as part of the FC closeout.

FC-445-02 installed motor operators on HSIV Bypass Valves. ~oth MSIV bypass valves were test None operated satisfactorily at.full steam pressure during hot testing.

FC-603 installed thermal performance monitoring instrumentation. None required. None Revision 1 6 MAIN STEl'.M SYSTEM-OP02

r.'**

• SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS SAFEGUARDS ROOM HVAC TEST PERFORMED EXCEPTION/

JUSTIFICATION FSAR The engineered safeguards equipment room coolers are started by a M0-34 verifies auto-start and both local and None

9. e. 2. 4 signal from wall-mounted thermostats and provide cooling for the remote manual start of each fan. Air flow is Item 13 protection of the engineered safeguards equipment. also verified by this test.

Service water is automatically admitted to the fan cooling coils ESF room cooler valves were modified via facility Automatic feature when each fan starts.

• change such that they are no longer repositioned for service water by a SIS. valves has been eliminated.

As a result of Consumers Power Company's evalua- The FSAR will be tion of IE Bulletin 80-06, "Engineered Safety modified to System (ESF) Reset Controls," circuitry correct this modifications were made to ESF Room Cooler Valves discrepancy.

SV-0825 and SV-0878 such that these valves do /

not close upon an ESF reset signal. In addition, to preclude an advertent closure of the service water valves supplying cooling to the ESF room coolers, the hand switch controllers (HS-0825A and HS-0878A) for these valves were changed from I hand switches without locks to hand switches with cylinder lock operators.

M0-29 verifies proper valve lineup.

Each room has redundant fan coolers to maintain suitable service None Each safeguards conditions for the equipment located in these rooms. room does not have redundant fan cooler. Each room does have redundant fans, but the fans share common cooling coils.

Need for redundant cooling coils will be addressed prior to start-up. (23)/

Cooler performance is not verified by surveillance. None The performance of the Safeguards Room Coolers will be verified prior to startup and periodically thereafter.(22)/

Revision 2 1 SAFEGUARDS ROOM HVAC-OP02

SAFEGUARDS ROOM HVAC EXCEPTION/

SOURCE SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR One radiation monitor is installed for each engineered safeguards RR-9E and RR-9F calibrated radiation monitors for / None 7.4.5.2 pump room to provide a room isolation signal upon high radio- east and west ESF rooms respectively.

activity levels in the applicable room. QR-22 verifies isolation function.

~OP-24 To start Engineering Safeguards Coolers. M0-34 operates fans in similar manner. None 7.5.1 MC"TF VAS-02 Leak Test Heat Exchangers. VHX-27A and VHX-27B were leak tested and None declared operable during 1986 Maintenance Outage.

Mainten- A review of completed Work Orders from 11/30/85 to 5/19/86 revealed All work completed and declared operable. None

~nee three Work Orders.

fie*.>iew

~l:iinten- A review of completed Work Orders from 5/19/86 to 12/15/86 revealed All work completed and declared operable. None

• c~e three Work Orders.

RE-\'iew M~<l fi- A review of modification history was performed since start of

~c.t on 1985 Refueling Outage.

Rev ew FC-661 modlf ied ESF sump pump circuitry. Performed a revise R0-11 to test this feature. None k~*.'ision 2 2 ShFEGUARDS ROOM HVAC-OP02

":... .- vft~;;0 1 /

. ' .*-.~

_.,,/

• . *..... \

CONTAINMENT AIR COOLERS EXCEPTION/

SOIJRCE SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR The service water supply line for each cooler has an air-operated M0-29 verifies valves open. None ii.:,. 2.1 stop valve which is normally open and de-energized.

FSAR The return line for each cooler has an air-operated discharge Return line valve is operated during None 6.3.2.l valve which is normally held closed. 00-1, RO-B and R0-12.

Q0-5 times the valve stroke.

FSAR The* service water discharge and supply valves may be manually Q0-5 times each valve stroke from No periodic test is 6.3.2.l operated from the main control room and the engineered safe- the main control room. performed to operate guards local panel. service water supply and return valves from the engineered safeguards local panel. The surveillance will be modified to periodically stroke these valves from the local panel. (28) I These valves will be stroked locally prior to start-up.

FSA!i All fans may be manually started or stopped from the main Q0-1 and normal plant operations No periodic test is

(,. ~. 2 .1 control room or at the individual breakers. verifies fans can be started or stopped performed to verify from the main control room. fan operation from their breakers. A PACS will be generated to periodically operate the fans locally. (29) I V-lA and V-4A were operated locally this outage. V-2A and V-3A will be started locally prior to start-up.

FSAR If q cooling coil leak or steam leak occurs to cause a flow PPAC SWS-012 calibrates this leak None

6. 3. 2. l through the drain greater than 20 gpm, the level in the sump detection system.

will rise to the liquid level switch and initiate an alarm in the control room.

Revision 2 1 CONTAINMENT AIR COOLERS-OP02

CONTAINMENT AIR COOLERS EXCEPTION/

SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FShR Replaceable air filters are located in each cooler ahead of PPAC CRS-001-004 changes filters on air I None f;.3.2.1 the coll bank to maintain coil surface cleanliness. coolers.

FSAE During post DBA operation, water flows of over 150 gpm will flow None The design of the

6. 3. 2 .1 thrpugh the overflow valves. containment air coolers provides a breakaway panel which opens on high differential .

pressure due to high water level. This panel is designed to pass greater than 150 gpm flow. This panel will be visually inspected this outage and a PACS developed for future inspections.

(17) I FS/..li The coil capacity is based upon 75°F service water which is the Temperature is verified on SH0-1 Event Report ER f.. J. 3 maximum expected temperature. surve ill a nee.86-091 documents l t j,-JT, 2 this problem.

Admin. controls now exist to limit plant operation based on SW temperature.

Further analysis I has determined that /

no limitations need be/

placed on plant I operations based on /

SW temperature. /

F;'.i,h The coolers are automatically changed to the emergency mode by a R0-8, Q0-1 and R0-12 verifies proper None

( . '.!. 2. 2 safety injection signal (SIS). This signal will trip the normal fan operation and valve positioned on It em 3 rated fan motor in each unit and open the high-capacity service a SIS.

water discharge valve from each unit.

Fo:hR If standby power is not. available and a SIS occurs, the emergency R0-8 verifies proper fan operation on a Recent technical

6. *,. 2. 2 diesel generators are started and the OBA sequencers allow all simulated DBA specification change

aem 3 four coolers to start using the DBA rated fans. submittal is to required only three coolers for DBA requirements.

Revision 2 2 COI'TAINMENT AIR COOLERS-OP02

CONTAINMENT AIR COOLERS EXCEPTION/

SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSJ..R The coolers units' performance may be tested with portable thermo- T-2i6 and T-219 were conducted this Containment cooler

(.. 3. 2. 2 eters, manometers and pitot tube in the field at any time the con- outage to verify design requirements testing during the tainment building is accessible. per FSAR. current outage does not measure service water dp across the cooler.

A surveillance test will be developed to verify air cooler operability on a refueling frequency in the future. Prior to start-up, the capability of the air cooler coils to transfer heat will be verified either through test or analysis. (18) I FSAfl Four units are normally in operation with two fans in each Normal plant operation verifies this None f.* .1. 2. 2 unit operating. mode of operation per SOP-5.

l~em 1 FSAR During normal operation, the service water discharge valves for M0-29 verifies valves for emergency No testing is done to

6. 3. 2. 2 emergency operation are closed and the service water flow is operation are closed. PPAC SWS-028 verify operability of

r tern 1 modulated by temperature control valves which bypass the discharge inspects temperature control valves temperature control valves. mechanically each refueling. loop for the control valves. Normal

• plant operations adequately demonstrates this non-safety temperature control function.

(Restart Plan) I FShR During plant shutdown, all cooling units continue to operate Normal plant operation verifies this None f.. 3. 2. 2 as in normal operation. mode of operation per SOP-5.

It'=m 2 FS;.R A steam leak or primary coolant leak would be accompanied by RI-25 tests the function of these None

. j . 3 an increase in the containment atmosphere humidity which instruments.

r:em 7 would be detected by the containment humidity sensors and indicated in the control room.

Revision 2 3 CONTAINMENT AIR COOLERS-OP02

CONTAINMENT AIR COOLERS EXCEPTION/

SOURCE SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR An excessive drain water flow from the coil will be indicated PPAC SWS-012 calibrated this leak None 6.3.3 in the control room by an.alarm. detection system.

Item 7 FSAR If a leak does exist, the cooler in the .vicinity of the defective These return line valves are operated None 6.3.3 unit may meet the increased duty, by th~ manual opening of the and tested during 00-1, RO-B and 00-5.

Item 7 service water stop valve and permitting the emergency flow of 00-5 times the valve stroke.

1625 gpm through the coolers.

MCTF VHX-1, 2, 3, 4 containment air coolers have sufficient service Special Test T-216 verified that each None SWS-04 water flow. cooler required in an accident was provided its required flow i~ all DBA situations.

work A review of Work Order history revealed approximately 14 Work Work Orders were post-maintenance test~d None Order Orders completed between 11/30/85 and 05/19/86. and declared operable.

History Work A review of Work Order history revealed approximately 40 Work Work Orders were post-maintenance tested None Order Orders completed between 05/19/86 to 12/15/86. and declared operable.

• History Modification Rev:ew A review of modification history was performed since start of 1985 Refueling outage.

FC-713 changed VHX-4 service water outlet 00-1 was performed to verify valve R0-12 will be revised valve (CV-0867) from fail-open to fail- attains proper accident position. to address this closed. modification.

00-5, Attachment l, page 5 of 14 will be revised to address closure time instead of opening time.

(30) I FC-660 added lube access connections to air None None required.

cooler fan motor bearings.

SOI?- 5 To place coolers in operation. Normal plant operations verify this None

7. l. l function on plant start-up.

SOP-5 Normal operation service water flow through each cooler is Normal plant operation verifies this None 7 .l. 2 automatically controlled by a temperature controller that function.

senses cooler outlet temperature and modulates a bypass valve around the emergency discharge valve.

Revision 2 4 CON~AINMENT AIR COOLERS-OP02

• • • .~)

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"}

CONTAINMENT AIR COOLERS SOURCE EXCEPTION/

SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION SOP-5 7 .l. 3 Accident condition operation. R0-12 tests this design feature to R0-12 will be place the fans and coolers in their revised to address post accident condition. the auto closure of VHX-4 service water outlet valve (CV-0867) on a safety injection signal.

SOP-5, Section 7.1.Ja will be revised to reflect the correct accident condition of the fans and coolers.

Re*! is ion 1 5

COllTAINMENT AIR COOLERS-OP02

_/

COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM EXCEPTION/

SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION 9.3.2.l The parts of the system located inside containment are isolated in ccw to the spent fuel pool and evapora- No evidence located to the event of a SIS as is the component cooling water to the evap- tors is isolated on a SIS and verified per show that testing was orator and spent fuel cooling systems. R0-8, 00-1. During '86 Maintenance Outage completed for the modi-valves to containment were rnodif ied to close fication to close CCW on a containment high-pressure vice SIS. isolation valves on R0-12 tests closure of containment isolation containment high valves. pressure instead of SIS and allow reopening of valves using the bypass key(s). Normal modification closeout testing will test these features prior to start-up.

9.3.2.l The system is continuously monitored by a process monitor which RE-0915 continuously monitors CCW water None detects radioactivity which may have leaked into the system from and is checked on DW0-1.

the fluids being cooled.

9.3.2.l The pumps can be started and stopped from the main control room H0-18 operates the pumps from the Control Surveillance proce-and also locally at the switchgear. Room and locally from switchgear. I dures will be modified to start pump locally periodically. The pumps will be started locally prior to start-up. (#12) I

~*. 3. 2 .1 The system can be vented to the auxiliary building through a A three-way vent valve exists to switch The automatic reposi-diaphragm-operated three-way valve on the surge tank. The other vent from atmosphere to waste gas system tioning of the CCW port on the three-way valve is connected to the gas collection upon high activity in the CCW system. vent valve, CV-0915, header and is automatically transferred in the event the Component on ccw high radiation Cooling System contains radioactive gases due to leakage from is not periodically radioactive systems being cooled. tested. This will be verified prior to start-up. A PACS will be generated to periodically test this function in the future. (#40) I Revision 2 l COMPONENT COOLING WATER-OP02

COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM EXCEPTION/

SOURCE SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION 9.3.2.l Supply valves to systems shown below are operable from the main Design condition. No periodic cycling of control room and all, except the containment isolation valves and 00-5 and 00-6 cycle valves to components valves from engineered the fuel pool supply line valve, are operable from the Engineered . from the Control Room. safeguards auxiliary Safeguards Auxiliary Panel. Switches exist on Engineered Safeguards panel (C-33) is per-auxiliary panel. formed. These valves

1. To Shutdown Cooling Heat E~changers. will be cycled from C-33 prior to start-up.

2. To Engineered Safeguards Pumps Surveillance proce-dures will be

3. To Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchangers and Radwaste Equipment reviewed to determine which valves are not

4. To Services Inside the Containment periodically cycled from C-33. The procedures will then be modified to test these valves locally periodically. ( #38) I 9.3.2.3 On initiation of the Safety Injection Signal (SIS), the supply of RO-B and 00-1 verify proper actuation of None.

lrem 3 component cooling water to the Spent Fuel Cooling System and to isolation valves during a SIS.

the radwaste evaporators will .be cut off by automatic closure of 00-5 times the stroke of these valves.

supply and/or return line valves.

9.3.2.3 The valves in the gland cooling water supply and return headers The isolation valves to Engineered Normally open CCW l~em 3 are automatically opened by a SIS to supply CCW to Engineered Safeguards Rooms for pump cooling are isolation valves to Safeguards pumps. verified to open during SIS per RO-B, ESS pumps are not 00-1. periodically cycled.

These valves will be cycled prior to start-up and a PACS will be generated to cycle periodically in the future. However this is a normally open passive valve.

(115 I I 9.3;2.3 If standby power to the ccw pumps is available during an SIS, 00-1 verifies proper starting of CCW None

!~em 3 all three pumps will be started. pumps during a SIS.

9.3.2.3 If standby power is not available during a SIS, the component RO-B verifies proper starting of ccw pumps None Hem 3 cooling pumps are momentarily shed from the power supply buses. during a DBA.

after the emergency diesel generators have energized the buses, two of the pumps are automatically started by the DBA sequencers and the third pump is put on standby.

Revision 2 2

~OMPONENT COOLING WATER-OP02

• * . . . ,. :~,,>'

COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM EXCEPTION/

~ SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION 9.3.2.3 Starting of the third ccw pump is initiated by a low-pressure None No testing is per-signal received from the pressure switch on the CCW pumps formed to check the common discharge header. auto start of the third CCW pump on CCW low pressure. A test will be generated to periodically test this function in the future and prior to start-up. (#14) I 9.3.2.3 Upon receipt of a SIS, valves in the component cooling water- R0-8 and Q0-1 verify proper operation of None Item 3 supply lines to the shutdown cooling heat exchangers open. these valves during a SIS.

Q0-5 times the stroke of these valves.

9.3.2.3 Upon receipt of a low-level signal from the SIRW tank, valves ln Q0-2 verifies proper actuation of these ccw heat exchanger Item 3 the component cooling heat exchanger service water outlets and valves during a RAS. inlet valves CV-0945, component cooling water inlets open to ensure maximum cooling 0946 are not checked water supply during the containment spray and safety injection to open on RAS. Q0-2 recirculation mode. verifies that valves which are normally open won't close from hand switch upon RAS.

These are normally open valves which get an open signal on RAS. Q0-2 verifies upon RAS, these valves will not close from a manual signal (handswitch in Control Room). This testing is determined adequate, since closing these valves totally isolates ccw.

9.3.2.3 The control valve in the supply line to the Spent Fuel Cooling controls exist and valve ls stroked from None Item 3 System can be opened and closed remotely from the control Room at Control Room during Q0-5.

the discretion of the operator in order to prevent overheating of the spent fuel pool.

RE>vision 2 3 COMPONENT COOLING WATER-OP02

COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM EXCEPTION/

SOURCE SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION 9.3.2.3 Low cooling water flow in the supply header to each Engineered Low flow is annunicated in the main Service water backup

i:em 3 Safeguards Equipment Room is annunciated in the Control Room. Control Room. to ESS pump cooling Changeover from ccw supply to the service water is performed by Flow switches are calibrated per CCS 005. is not periodically remote-manual closing of the component cooling supply valve and tested. These valves return valve and opening one of the two service water supply will be cycled prior valves and the return valve from the main control room or from the to start-up. A ~ACS local Engineered Safeguards Auxiliary P~nel. will be generated to cycle them periodically in the future. (#15) I 9.3.2.3 In the event of an accident which results in a SIS simultaneous Containment high pressure now will close The FSAR will be Item 3 with component cooling low pressure, the containment isolation the CCW to containment supply and return modified to clarify.

valves in the Component Cooling Water System will close. valves. R0-12 tests containment isolation valves. (This outage we modified the system such that a CHP signal rather than .a SIS will cause containment isolation.)

9.3.2.3 If instrument air is also lost during a simultaneous accident con- The check valve in the supply header is leak Air accumulators of Item 3 dition, the integrity of the containment will be maintained by the tested per Q0-6 and isolation valves leak CCW return header check valve in the supply header to containment and by the return tested per R0-32-14 and R0-32-15. isolation valves is header isolation valves which are provided with an air accumulator not periodically sized to place and maintain the valves in a "closed" position. tested. Valves are cycled via Q0-6 with instrument air available. PACS being written to address.

Testing will be performed prior to start-up and will be included as part of the augmented test program. (#16) I 9.3.3.l For post-OBA operation, one CCW pump canlfurnish at least 50% of Special Test T-223 was performed during None Item 1 the required capability for cooling the containment spray and 1986 Maintenance outage to verify sufficient safety injection recirculation water. flow to all safety related loads following a OBA.

Re*1ision 2 4

OHPONENT COOLING WATER-OP02

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COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM

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EXCEPTION/

SOURCE SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION 9.3.3.l Under post-OBA conditions, each ccw heat exchanger is capable of Special Test T-223 was performed during None Item 3 handling at least 50% of the heat duty required. 1986 Maintenance Outage to verify sufficient flow to all safety related loads following a DBA. Also the ccw heat exchangers were opened and inspected to verify tube cleanliness to establish any analysis penalties due to degradation of tube heat transfer capability. This information was fed back into the containment pressure analysis. See

-E-PAL-86-083.

Table Component Cooling Pumps 9-6 Page l Capacity (Each) 6,000 gpm (Based on Shutdown Cooling Require- Special Test T-206 was performed during None ments), Including Approximately lOQ 1986 Maintenance Outage to verify pump Wear Margin design values.* See E-PAL-86-083.

Head 164 ft Table Time Required to Accelerate Pump acceleration to 9-6 Pump to Full Speed at 70% full speed at 70%

Page l Voltage ~ s voltage in four seconds is a design feature which is not periodically tested. A review of the Class 1E1 motor starting requirements was performed. All subject motors were designed and procured for the capability to start and accelerate their loads with 70%

of rated voltage at the terminals (see Spec! f icat ion E-10). It is not feasible or necessary to test this feature. Analysis of technical data is adequate to verify the function. The plant transient loading studies calculate the motor Revision l 5 COMPONENT COOLING WATER-OP02

COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM EXCEPTION/

SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION TaLle 9-6 terminal voltages for Paoe l the most conservative Continued bus voltages. These studies support the motor design features by verifying all motors will start and accelerate the pumps with their minimum postulated bus voltage. The pump/motor speed torque curves also show there exists sufficient excess torque to accelerate the pumps with 70% of terminal voltage.

These transient loading studies are periodically performed, reviewed, and updated to ensure the adequacy of the diesel generator and electrical equipment.

(Note: The class lE 2400 volt buses are undervoltage protected to prevent operation at a degraded voltage condition.

Setpoints are 92% of rated voltage for 6 seconds).

Revision 1 COMPONENT COOLING WATER-OP02 6

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COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM EXCEPTION/

~ SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR Design DuGy (Each) Component Cooling Cooling Heat Exchanger Table None Heat exchanger capa-50.5 x 10 Btu/h (Normal) 9-6 city is not tested.

94.8 x 106 Btu/h (At Start of Shutdown Cooling) See E-PAL-86-083.

Page 2 43.2 x 10~ Btu/h (24 Hours After Shutdown Cooling) Combining the SWS 85.0 x 10 Btu/h (Post-DBA) and CCW systems flow testing, plus the visual inspection of the internals of the CCW HX, the heat exchanger performance is adequate. This will be reverified prior to start-up via reanalysis of the data.

lte>vision 1 C0!1PONENT COOLING WATER-OP02 7

COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM EXCEPTION/

SOURCE SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR Table 9-7 At Initia- 24 Hours Post-tion of After Ini- DBA Shutdown tiation of DBA Long Subsystem Cooling Shutdown Initial Term Number of Opera- Special Test T-213 and T-223 were performed M0-29 ESS alignment ting Pumps l 2 2 l 2 during the 1986 Maintenance Outage to verifies ccw valves

.verify sufficient flow to all safety lined up to P-55B or C.

related loads following DBA. M0-29 will be modified Number of Operating to include CCW supply to Heat Exchangers l 2 2 2 P-SSB and P-5SC. ccw lineup is controlled also via CL-16,*which Shutdown Heat includes these valves.

Exchanger (gpm) 8,000 8,000 8,000 See E-PAL-86 093.

FSAR will be-modified Primary Coolant Sample for final values.

Heat Exchanger (gpm) 20 20 20 Letdown Heat Exchanger (gpm) 1,280 158 CROM Seal Cooling (gpm) 50 50 Charging Pumps Cooling (gpm) 73 41 41 41 P!imary Coolant Pump t"ocling (gpm) 200 200 En9ineered Safeguards Pumps Cooling (gpm) 70 70 140 140 Spent Fuel Pool (gpm) 1,840 l,840 i,h4o Shield Cooling HX (gpm) 126 126 Waste Gas Compressor Aftercoolers (gpm) l l l l l

'Jacuum Degas if ier Pump, seal Water Cooler (gpm) 8 8 8 8 8 Radwaste Evaporator Condensers (gpm) _.£QQ ---1QQ Total gpm 3,798 10,714 10,139 190 8,190 Pump Capability (gpm) 6,000 12,000 12,000 6,000 12,000 OLING WATER-OP02

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COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM EXCEPTION/

SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FShR The component cooling water system uses demineralized water to Automatic makeup is verified through None 9.3.2.l which an inhibitor is added for corrosion control. Makeup to the routine operation.

system is automatically supplied from the primary system makeup storage tank.

FSAR High component cooling temperature ls apnunclated in the Control PPAC sws-021 & ccs-007 calibrates temperature None I 9.3.2.3 Room. The service water discharge temperature from each component indicators for service water Item l cooling heat exchanger ls indicated in the Control Room. out of component cooling heat exchangers.

FShR Tank low level ls annunciated in the Control Room. PACS-CCS-009 has been developed to I This will be verified 9.3.2.3 calibrate level instrumentation I prior to start-up.

Item 1 (#40) A PACS will /

be generated to test/

periodically in the I future.

FSAR High activity is annunlcated in the main control room. None This will be verified 9.3.2.3 prior to start-up. A Item l PACS will be generated to check periodically in the future. (#40) I SOP-16 To start first pump/to start subsequent pumps/to place Normal system operations verify None 7.3.l pumps in standby/to stop. these features.

7.3.2 7.3.3 7.3.4 SOP-16 To place component cooling water heat exchangers in/remove Normal system operations verify None 7 . .; .1 from operation. thise functions.

7.~.2 Revision 2 9 COMPONENT COOLING WATER-ciP02

COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM EXCEPTION/

SOURCE SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION SOP-16 To supply cooling water to engineered safeguards pumps using None ECCS pump backup 7.6 service water. service water supply valve will be cycled prior to start-up and periodically in the future. (#6) I MCTF FS-0958 and FS-0954, component cooling water flow switches Operability was determined through None CCS-03 test operability. .normal post-maintenance testing and is periodically tested on PPAC CCS-005.

Work A review of Work Order history revealed approximately 22 Work Work Orders were post-maintenance None Order Orders completed between 11/30/85 and 05/19/86. tested and declared operable.

History

~iork A review of Work Order history revealed approximately 47 Work Work Orders were post-maintenance None Order Orders completed between 05/19/86 and 12/15/86. tested and declared operable.

History Modification neview A review of modification history was performed since start of 1985 Refueling Outage.

FC-657 modified ccw isolation valve circuitry from SIS coincident Modification test procedure tested None with low ccw pressure to isolation on CHP. this feature satisfactorily.

FC-638 added ccw pumps to the normal shutdown sequencers. R0-13 was revised to incorporate this None change and tested satisfactorally.

Redsion 2 10 COMPONENT COOLING WATER-OP02

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SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM Source System Test Requirements Test Performed Exceptions/Justifications FSAR The shutdown cooling system is brought into use when the RI-59 Surv Test (lB Month) calibrates and None 6.1.2.3 primary coolant temperature falls below 325°F and the verifies hi-pressure interlock to initiate Item 2 primary coolant pressure falls below 270 psia. At this time, the shutdown cooling.

system must be realigned for shutdown cooling. Standard Operating Procedure 3 covers normal use of shutdown cooling.

Periodic plant cooldowns verifies this ability.

FSAR 6.1.2.3 Valves MV-3189, MV-3190, MV-3198 and MV-3199 have motor operators Standard Operating Procedure 3 covers normal None Item 2 to provide for remote realignment for shutdown cooling due to use of shutdown cooling. Periodic plant potential high radiation in the area. Realignment consists of .cooldowns verifies this ability.

unlocking and opening four valves on the low-pressure pump suc-tion, closing the valves in the low-pressure pump suction line from the SIRW tank, unlocking and opening the two crossover valves from the low-pressure pumps to the shutdown cooling heat exchangers and locking the manual valves in the spray header lines closed.

FSAF.

6.1.2.3 Prior to placing the system in operation, the boron concentration Generic Checklist 2 and Standard Operating None Item 2 is verified at various points in the system. Procedure 3 ensures boron concentration prior to using shutdown cooling.

FSAR t.1.2.3 During the early stages of shutdown cooling, the cooldown rate is Standard Operating Procedure 3 covers normal None Item 2 controlled by limiting the flow through the tube side of the heat use of shutdown cooling. Periodic plant exchanger. Constant flow through the core is maintained with a cooldowns verify this ability.

heat exchanger bypass valve. In order to use this valve, it must be unlocked, its air supply returned to service and its flow con-troller placed in automatic operation.

FShR 7.~.1.6 When the Primary Coolant System pressure has been reduced to below Normal plant conditions have verified Analysis and testing has 250 psig, one of the two low-pressure safety injection pumps is ability to cooldown to cold shutdown been performed as a started (if not already operating) in recirculation mode to pro- in 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. result of the ccw heat vide shutdown cooling. The decay heat f~om the Primary Coolant exchanger flow limita-System is transferred to the Component Cooling system via a shut- tion issue (See E-PAL down cooling heat exchangeri in turn, the decay heat is transfer- 083). The results show red to the Service Water System via a component cooling water heat that redirecting flows exchanger. It is expected that the cold shutdown condition can be from non required CCW achieved within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. loads allow required flowrates to be met.

Special Test T-223 has been performed to set up the system to meet these flows.

Revision 1 Page 1 SHUTDOWN COOLING SYST/MDOl

SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM Source System Test Requirements Test Performed Exceptions/Justifications FSAR 7 .... 1. 6 Instrumentation is provided to indicate shutdown cooling return Shutdown cooling flow is calibrated by FSAR Section 7.4.l.6 flow, service water pump flow, component cooling pump flow and PAC ESS 025 (Refueling). states that instrumen-component cooling surge tank level. ccw surge tank level is calibrated by tation is available to PAC CCS 009 (12 Months). indicate service water and ccw flow. Such instrumentation is not available. Instrumen-tation is available to

• indicate" flow, but not to quantify flow.

Evaluation of modif i-cations to provide adequate instrumentation for system performance testing is planned.

7.4.l.6 Analysis of fire damage in any of the areas containing portions of Local starting of LPSI pumps is checked by Manual stroking of shutdown systems required for the shutdown cooling operation shows there M0-23. cooling valves needs to be will always be an undamaged power .supply to one or the other of verified during valve PACS.

the shutdown cooling pumps (low~pressure safety injection pumps). Long-Term cooling can The electrical operators and power supplies for powered valves may be accomplished through be damaged1 however, valve alignment can be achieved manually. steam generators until LPSI pumps used for cooldown can be started locally. (Last sen- shutdown cooling system tence paraphrased from related sections of FSAR. can be assigned. 111108) /

9.1.2.3 Service water flow requirements during shutdown cooling will None. A reanalysis was performed remain essentially the same as for normal operation. Both com- for ccw with a 4000 gpm ponent cooling water heat exchangers are required to be in service flow to the shutdown in order to cool the primary coolant from 300°F to 130°F in 24 cooling heat exchanger hours and the supply to all noncritical equipment except the aux- with 6000 gpm shutdown iliary building chiller is discontinued. cooling flow. The result was 53 hrs is required to cool PCS to 130°F. The FSAR will be clarified.

see E-PAL-86-083 for more detail.

This same section states that all noncritical service water is dis-continued. This is not the normal plant practice. Typically, we continue service water flow to FWP, VRS, condensate pumps, etc.

The FSAR will be corre~ted to clarify this statement.

Revision 2 Page 2 SHUTDOWN COOLING SYST/MDOl

SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM

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Source System Test Requirements Test Performed Exceptions/Justifications FSAR Table 9-1 Service Water System Duty Requirements Shutdown Special Test T-216 balanced service water service water flow to Cooling flows during '86 Maintenance Outage. CCW heat exchangers Flow - Gpm for shutdown cooling may not meet FSAR Component Cooling Heat* Exchangers (2) 13,000 Table 9-1 requirements.

SWS and CCW issues addressed via ER 86-091 and ER 86-083.

FSAR Table 9-7 Component cooling system Operational Modes (Flows)

At Initia- 24 Hours Special Test T-223 balanced ccw flows during same as Item 7.4.l.6 tion of After Ini- '86 Maintenance Outage. above. See E-PAL-86-083 Shutdown tiation of for more detail.

Cooling Shutdown Shutdown Heat Exchanger (gpm) 8,000 8,000 FSAR

{,. l . 2. 2 The Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchangers, operating together, are sized Periodic plant cooldowns verify capability None Item 4 to hold a refueling temperature of 130°F with the design component of system to cool and hold PCS temperature.

cooling water temperature of 90°F at 27-1/2 hours after shutdown of an infinitely irradiated core.

FS,..R Two power-operated relief valves provide automatic Primary Coolant LTOP is armed per SOP l and GOP 9 before None 6.~ .2.2 System pressure relief during low temperature water solid system shutdown cooling is placed in service.

Item 6 operation which in turn provides relief protection for the Shutdown Automatic operation is verified monthly Cooling System. per M0-27. RI-59 verifies calibration of LTOP.

FShR Temperature before and after the shutdoJn cooling heat exchangers PAC ESS-004 and ESS-032 calibrate I None 6 .l.2.2 is monitored in the control room. Each shutdown cooling heat shutdown cooling temperature indication.

Item 8 exchanger discharge is monitored by local temperature indicators.

FSAR The shutdown cooling function may be used during the early stages of SOP 3 covers normal use of shutdown cooling. None 6.1.2.3 Plant start-up to control the primary coolant temperature. As the Periodic plant heatups verify this Item 2 primary coolant temperature approaches 315°F and the primary coolant capability.

pressure approaches 270 psia, this function is discontinued, and the system aligned for emergency operation.

• J:ie*1ision 2 Page 3 SHUTDOWN COOLING SYST/MDOl

SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM Source System Test Requirements .Test Performed Exceptions/Justifications Table SHUTDOWN COOLING HEAT EXCHANGER DATA

SUMMARY

6-4 Operating Parameters (27.5 Hours after Shutdown Assuming an None Periodic testing of these infinitely Irradiated core) specific parameters is not performed. Verification Tube Side of Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchanger performance is Flow 1,500,000 lb/h performed each shutdown when shutdown cooling is Inlet Temperatures 130°F put on line and the Plant is cooled down and main-Outlet Temperature 111. 7°F tained cool. Specific beat exchanger performance Shell Side will be evaluated for future trending.

Flow 2,000,000 lb/h Inlet Temperature 90°F Outlet Temperature 103.5°F Heat Transfer 27,500,000 :Stu/h Tech Spec 3.8 The shutdown cooling pump ls used to maintain a uniform boron SOP 3 requires a minimum of 3000 gpm from None Basis concentration. a LPSI pump before a Primary Coolant Pump may be shut off.

Periodic checks of refueling water boron concentration ensure DWC 2 verifies boron concentration at None the proper shutdown margin. least twice per 7 days.

SOP 3 Shutdown Cooling Operations are conducted per steps of the None 7.3 SOP.

ONP 17 Shutdown cooling using a HPSI pump upon loss of normal shutdown None The ability to use HPSI 4.3.0 cooling. pumps*for shutdown cooling is not periodically tested.

HPSI is a "last resort" alternative for shutdown cooling. Containment Spray*

Pumps and Spent Fuel Pool Cooling are priority backups available to the operator in case of loss of a normal shutdown cooling. Also because of Re*Ji s ion 1 Page 4 SHUTDOWN COOLING SYST/MDOl

SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM Source System Test Requirements Test Performed Exceptions/Justifications ONP 17 Low Temperature Over-4.3.a pressure Protection Cont'd concerns, the risk of using HPSI for Shutdown Cooling (Solid Plant) may outweigh the benefit of routine testing.

This Off Normal Procedure will be reviewed and modified if necessary with respect to this concern.

ONP 17 Shutdown Cooling using Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System upon loss None The ability to use Spent 4.3.b of normal shutdown cooling. Fuel Pool Cooling for shutdown cooling is not periodically tested.

This evolution requires the Rx Head to be removed and the Rx Cavity full and refueling gates open.

This will be verified during the next refout.

ONP 25.2 Shutdown Cooling from outside the Control Room. PAC X-OPS279 verifies operability of None selected shutdown cooling valves from C-33 panel. This exercises all the active components required to enter shutdown cooling from outside the control room.

MCTF ESS-22 M0-3015, M0-3016 Shutdown Cooling Inlet Isolation Valves. Both valves stroke tested satisfactorily None Test stroke time after repacking. after implementing live load packing on WO' s 2460 5077 I 2<160 2037. I Work A review of Work Order history revealed approximately 22 Work Work Orders were postmaintenance tested None Order Orders completed between ll/30/85 and 05/19/86. and declared operable.

History Work A review of Work Order history revealed approximately 14 Work Work Orders were postmaintenance tested None Order Orders completed between 05/19/86 to 12/15/86. and declared operable.

History Modifi- A review of modification history was performed since start of None cation 1985 Refueling Outage. Modifications are addressed in the Review LPSI section.

Revision 2 Page 5 SHUTDOWN COOLING SYST/MDOl

PRIMARY COOLANT SYSTEM Source System Test Requirements Test Performed Exceptions/Justifications FSAR

~.2.2 The following design cyclic transients were used in the fatigue The indicated transients are recorded in The following PCS transients analysis required by the applicable code: the Reactor Engineer's limited cycle record are not logged:

log.

500 heatup and cooldown cycles.during the system 40-year Logged design life at a heating and cooling rate of 100°F/h. The pressurizer is designed for a cooldown rate of 200°F/h.

10 cycles of hydrostatic testing the primary system at 3,110 .Logged psig and at a temperature at least 60°F above the Nil Ductility Transition Temperature (NDTT) of the component having the highest NDTT.

320 cycles of leak testing at 2,485 psig and at a tempera- Logged ture at least 60°F greater than the NDTT of the component having the highest NDTT.

500 reactor trips from 100% power. Logged 15,000 power change cycles over the range of 10~ to 100~ 15,000 cycles over 40 of full load with a ramp load change of 5% of full load year life of plant per minute increasing or decreasing. translates to ~l cycle/day. This is logically not a concern.

15,000 power changes cycles over the range of 50% to 100% 15,000 cycles over 40 of full load with a ramp load change of 15% of full load year life of plant per minute. translate to ~l cycle/day. This is logically not a concern.

15,000 cycles of 10% of full load step power and increasing 15,000 cycles over 40 from 10% to 90i of full power and decreasing from 100% to

• year life of plant 20% of full power. I translate to ~l cycle/day. This is logically not a concern.

350,000 cycles of normal operating pressure variations of +/- 50 350,000 cycles over 40 psi at operating pressure. year life of plant translate to ~l cycle/hr. This is logically not a concern.

The following abnormal transients were also considered: The indicated transients are recorded in None the Reactor Engineer's limited cycle record 200 cycles of loss of turbine load from 100% power. log.

Revision l Page l PRIMARY COOLANT SYST/MD0l-op02

PRIMARY COOLANT SYSTEM Source System Test Requirements Test Performed Exceptions/Justifications FSAR 4.2.2 200 cycles of total loss of reactor coolant flow when at 100% Logged Cont'd power.

2 cycles of loss of secondary system pressure. Logged FSAR To compensate for any increase in the NOTT shift caused by Plant Operating Procedures are period- None 4.2.3 irradiation, the plant Operating Procedures for the pressure- ically revised to account for vessel temperature relationship during heatup and cooldown will be

• irradiation. Last revision 11/20/85.

periodically revised to stay within the stress limits.

FSAR 4.3.1 Overpressure protection ls provided by three ASME Code spring- RV-1039, 1040, 1041 are installed and None 4.3.7 loaded safety valves connected to the top of the pressurizer. checked by RM-41.

4.3.9.4 FSAR A reactor internals vibration monitoring surveillance program has None Amendment 91 to our 4.3.3 been instituted to ensure reactor vessel internals integrity. Tech Specs date 9/5/85 Refer to the Technical Specifications. deleted this requirement.

The FSAR will be changed to correct this statement.

FSAR Overpressure protection for the shell side of the steam generators Twenty-four safety valves are installed None 4.3.4 and the main steam line piping up to the inlet of the turbine stop on the main steam lines upstream of MSIV's valve is provided by 24 safety valves. and are tested by RM-29.

FSl\R Cyclic transients for each steam generator are considered for the The indicated transients are recorded in The following steam

.j. 3. 4 following accident conditions: the Reactor Engineer's limited cycle generator transients are record log. not _logged.

B cycles during which the primary side ls at 2,500 psia and Logged 600°F while the secondary side is depressurized to atmos-pheric pressure.

One cycle during which the steam on the shell side ls at 900 Logged psia and 532°F while tube (primary) side is depressurized to atmospheric pressure.

10 cycles of hydrostatic testing of the secondary side at Logged 1,250 psia.

Revision 1 Page 2 PRIMARY COOLANT SYST/MD01-op02

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PRIMARY COOLANT SYSTEM Source System Test Requirements Test Performed Exceptions/Justifications FSAR 320 cycles of leak testing of the secondary side at 1,000 Logged 4.3.4 psia.

Cont'd 8 cycles of adding a maximum of 300 gpm of 70°F feedwater Logged with the steam generator secondary side dry and at 600°F.

2400 cycles of transient pressure differentials of 85 psi None 2400 cycles in 40 years across the primary head divider plate due to starting and t1anslates to "-1 starting stopping the primary coolant pumps. of primary coolant pumps per week. This is not a concern.

5,000 cycle of adding 426 gpm of 70°F feedwater with the Plant None 5,000 cycles over the 40 in hot standy conditions. year life of the plant translates to 125 cycles per year, or "-1 cycle every 3 days. This is logically not a concern.

FSAR An inservice inspection program has been instituted under Tech- RT-60 inspection program for steam genera- None

... 3. 4 .1 nical Specifications to assure continued integrity of the steam tor tubing is performed.

generator tubes.

FSAR Pressurizer heater controls de-energize all beaters on receipt of None This feature has been

~. 3. 7 a Safety Injection Signal (SIS) and remain de-energized until SIS deleted during the 1986 is reset. Maintenance Outage per FC-683. The FSAR will be changed to correct this statement.

FSAR In the event of a loss of offsite power, one half of the heate~ Half the heaters are normally on the lD None 4.3.7 capacity (750 kW) is normally connected to the lD emergency bus bus and heater controls exist in the and can be manually controlled via a hand switch in the Control main control room. No special testing Room g ls done since this is a normal condition.

FSAR Should the other half of the heater capacity be needed, methods Plant Procedure ONP 2.1 and ONP 25.2 None

4. 3. 7 and procedures have been established for manually connecting them lists steps to establish this capability.

to the lC emergency bus via a "jumper cable." The amount of time required to make this connection is less than five hours.

Revision l Page 3 PRIMARY COOLANT SYST/MD01-op02

PRIMARY COOLANT SYSTEM Source System Test Requirements Test Performed Exceptions/Justifications FSAR If an abnormal incident results in pressurizer pressure rise which MI-02 calibrates the pressurizer The FSAR will be clari-4.3.7 exceeds the relieving capacity of the pressurizer spray, this pressure reactor trip setpoint. fied, since the PORV block 4.3.9.3 pressure will open two power-operated relief valves (note that valves are closed during these valves are currently isolated from the Primary Coolant normal plant operation.

System during normal power operations and therefore not available for automatic pressure relief) and trip the reactor. The relief valves are opened as a secondary action to a reactor trip. Since no credit has been taken for the relief capacity of these valves in Chapter 14, "Safety Analysis," the plant is permitted to oper-ate at full pressure and temperature with the PORV isolation v*alves closed.

FSAR Acoustical monitors and associated electronics.for the power- Acoustical monitors exist for each PORV None

~.3.9.l operated relief valves and the safety relief valves provide posi- and safety relief in the Control Room and 4.3.9.3 tive valve position indication in the Control Room should they are checked by RI-77.

ever actuate.

• FSAR The flow ute established through the spray valves must provide Normal pressure control during plant The accident analysis 4.3.9,2 acceptable pressure response during transients. The pressurizer operation verifies spray flow. assumes less than 280 gpm spray line and valves are sized to allow sufficient spray to pre- spray flow. This will be vent high steam pressure from opening the safety valves during verified during start-up.

normal transients. (t35) I FSAR The PORV's are actuated by the high primary system pressure MI-02 calibrates the high pressure We do not perform periodic 4.3.9.3 reactor trip signal. (Note that the block valves are shut during reactor trip. tests of the PORV or their normal operations.) block valves but our EOPs take credit for this oper-ation. We do test the valves in M0-27 for low pressure protection how-ever this does not ensure they will open when sub-jected to accident pres-sures.

The PORV's are tested for low pressure protection via M0-27. They have not been tested at system differential pressures required for the feed and bleed success path for controlling the high PCS pressure. Prior to the end of the next Refout, new certified PORV block Revision 2 Page 4 PRIMARY COOLANT SYST/MD01-op02

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PRIMARY COOLANT SYSTEM Source System Test Requirements Test Performed Exceptions/Justifications FSAR valves will be installed.

4.3.9.3 Also, either certified Cont'd PORVs will be in-stalled or the PORV's will be removed and tested at feed and bleed pressures.

FSAR The PORV's and their block valves would' be used if a feed and Plant Emergency Operating Procedures Same as above item 4.3.9.3 bleed type operation was required to cool the Primary Coolant address this cooling path.

system in an emergency shutdown situation.

FSAR Sampling system lines are provided from the primary coolant piping None 4.3.13 to provide a means for taking periodic samples of the coolant for chemical analysis. The water chemistry ls maintained as indi-cated.

PRIMARY COOLANT CHEMISTRY Chemistry samples are taken and analyzed per the following procedures to ensure acceptable values.

Specific Resistivity, Prior to Additives 0.5 Megohm - cm COP-1 Total Solids, Other Than Additives < 0.5 ppm COP-1 pH (Normal Operation and Cold Shutdown) <!.5 to 10.2 COP-1 Hydrogen (Normal Operation) 15-50 cm (STP) per kg COP-1 Chloride (Normal Operation) < 0.10 ppm DWC-2 Lithium (Normal Operation) 0.1-2.0 ppm COP-1 Fluoride (Normal Operation) < 0.1 ppm DWC-2 Dissolved Oxygen (Normal Operation) < 0.1 ppm DWC-2 Boric Acid, Plant Cold (Maximum, (15,000 ppm1 DWC-2 Nominal) (a) 2,280-9,800 ppm)

Boric Acid, Plant Hot (Maximum, (12,000 ppm1 DWC-2 Nominal) (a) 0-9,800 ppm)

FSAR The surveillance program monitors the radiation-induced changes in T/S Table 4.3.3 provides removal schedule. I None 4.5.3 the mechanical and impact properties of the pressure vessel materials. A schedule for removal of *the surveillance samples is shown in the Plant Technical Specifications.

Revision 2 Page 5 PRIMARY COOLANT SYST/HD01-op02

PRIMARY COOLANT SYSTEM Source System Test Requirements Test Performed Exceptions/Justifications FSAR An inservice inspection program is detailed in Section 6.9 of the RT-35 implements the required ISI program None

~.5.6 FSAR. for PCS welds.

FSAR Small leaks_ from the Primary Coolant System can be detected by one None 4.7.l or a combination of the following systems:

l. Containment Atmosphere Relative Hu~idity - Four humidity RI-25 checks and calibrates the containment detectors. humidity instruments.

2. Containment Sump Level - Level alarm. RI-68 checks and calibrates the containment sump level instruments.

3. Containment Area Radiation - One radiation monitor, sensing RE-1817 monitors containment ventilation and/

from the discharge of all operating containment air coolers. is checked per DW0-1 I

4. Reactor Vessel Flange Leak Off - The inner seal leakage goes LS-0160 ls calibrated per PAC PCS-005.

to a closed drain line and leakage will be detected by a pres-sure alarm set at 1,500 psig. The outer seal liquid leakage is collected and drained to a closed drain line and will be detected by action of a level switch set at 120 inches.

5. Steam Generator Tube Leakage - Radiation detectors are pro- RE-0707 monitors S/G blowdown and is cali-vided to monitor the liquid effluent from the blowdown tank brated by RR-09A and checked per OR-22 and and gas effluents from the air ejector. MR-14. RE-0631 monitors condenser off gas and is calibrated by RR-09D and checked per OR-22 and MR-14.

6. Each control rod drive mechanism face seal is equipped with a Control rod drive seal leak off temperatures leak off and each contains a thermocouple which will activate are monitored and alarmed by TRA-0150.

an alarm should above-normal temperatures occur. PAC CRD-008 calibrates recorder and verifies annunciator.

7. The safety and power-operated relief valves may be a potential Relief valve downstream temperatures are indi-source of contained leakage detected by temperature monitors cated and alarmed in main control room and are located in the valve discharge piping. Large amounts of seat checked by PAC PCS-018.

leakage would also be detected by ipcreases in level and tem- Quench tank level and temperature is indicated perature in the pressurizer quench tank. Acoustical monitors in Control Room by PPAC PCS-005 & PCS-018 /.

provide positive position indication in the Control Room. Acoustical monitors exist for each PORV and safety relief and are checked by RI-77.

8. Small leaks may also be determined by comparing charging pump Daily leak rate test is performed per DW0-1.

and letdown flow rates and observing makeup quantities to the volume control tank.

FSAR The Primary Coolant Gas Vent System (PCGVS) is designed to relieve Pressurizer and reactor head vent valves None 4.8 steam or gas bubbles in the reactor vessel head and pressurizer are stroke tested per 00-6.

areas of the Primary Coolant System. Pressure indicator is calibrated per PAC PCS-005.

Revision 2 Page 6 PRIMARY COOLANT SYST/MD01-op02

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PRIMARY COOLANT SYSTEM Source System Test Requirements Test Performed Exceptions/Justifications FSAR The system consists of a flow-limiting orifice on both the reactor 4.8 vessel vent and pressurizer vent lines, solenoid valves, a pres-Cont'd sure transmitter for pressure indication and alarm, and connecting piping.

FSAR The Primary Coolant system overpressurl;ation subsystem (OPS) has M0-27 checks operation of PORV's and con- specific temperatures 4.J.9.3 been designed to provide automatic pressure relief of the Primary trols for low temperature overpressure and pressures at which 7.4.2.1 Coolant System whenever the conditions of low temperature (250°F control. RI-59 calibrates pressure and relief ls required or lower) and high pressure (400 psia or higher) exist concur- .temperature indicators. varies with amount of rently. vessel irradiation.

Values will be clarified as necessary.

FSAR Three annunciators are provided for interface of the system with M0-27 checks operation of alarms. None

7. 4. 2 .1 the operator. The first annunciator advises the operator to arm the system when the Primary Coolant System (PCS) decreases to a temperature of 300°F as the system is cooled down from an operat-ing condition. The second annunciator advises the operator of an approaching high-pressure condition. The third annunciator advises the operator that the pressure has increased to 400 psia and the PORV's have been opened.

Table 4-5 Secondary Safety Valve Parameters None Fluid - Saturated Steam capacity, Minimum per Valve 486,600 lb/h Design.

Total capacity 11,678,400 lb/h 2~ valves times valve capacity.

Design number.

Set Pressure Eight Valves, Four per Unit l,OfO psia Relief valves set per RM-29.

Eight Valves, Four per Unit 1,020 psia Relief valves set per RM-29.

Eight Valves, Four per Unit 1,000 psia Relief valves set per RM-29.

Revision 1 Page 7 PRIMARY COOLANT SYST/MD01-op02

PRIMARY COOLANT SYSTEM Source System Test Requirements Test Performed Exceptions/Justifications Table Pressurizer Safety Valve Parameters None 4-10 Capacity, Each 230,000 lb/h Design.

Number and Set Pressure 3. Design.

RV-1039 2:500 psia Relief valves set per RM-41.

RV-1040 2,540 psia RV-1041 2,500 psia Table Pressurizer Power-Operated Relief Valve Parameters See Exception/Justif i-4-14 cation under FSAR capacity, Each 153,000 lb/h Design. 4.3.9.3.

Set Pressure 2,235 psia FSAR The Primary Coolant System is designed to operate at a power level Heat Balance Calculation (GOP 12) is None 4.2.1 of 2,650 MWt. The present licensing limit is, however, 2,530 HWt performed daily when critical per core power plus 15 HWt for the primary coolant pump heat input for D/W0-1.

a total Primary Coolant System output of 2,545 HWt.

FSAR A continuous feed and bleed operation is maintained by the Chemical Normal operation per SOP 2. None

.;. 3.2 and Volume Control System.during normal operation

• During Plant cooldown, water is removed from the Primary Coolant Normal operation per SOP 3. None System via this nozzle, circulated through the shutdown cooling heat exchangers by the low-pressure safety injection pumps where it is cooled and then injected back into the Primary Coolant System through the safety injection inlet nozzles.

Drains from the primary coolant piping to the radioactive waste Normal operation per SOP 1 and SOP 17A. None disposal system are provided for draining the Primary Coolant system for maintenance operations. A cpnnection is also provided on the quench tank for draining it to the radioactive waste disposal system following a relief valve or safety valve discharge.

Sampling system lines are provided from the primary coolant piping, Normal operation per CH 3.1 None the pressurizer and the quench tank to provide a means for taking periodic samples of the coolant for chemical and radiochemical analysis.

A connection to the quench tank from the nitrogen supply system is Normal operation per SOP l. None provided to supply nitrogen for the quench tank gas blanket. A pressure regulator in the supply line maintains a constant quench tank pressure.

Revision l Page 8 PRIMARY COOLANT SYST/MD01-op02

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PRIMARY COOLANT SYSTEM Source System Test Requirements Test Performed Exceptions/Justifications FSAR 4.3.2 A connection to the quench tank spray header from the demineralized Normal operation per SOP l None Cont'd water supply is provided for adding water to the quench tank.

Component cooling water is supplied to the primary coolant pumps. Cooling water supplied per SOP 16 and None Any loss of component cooling water to* the pumps is alarmed in SOP l.

the control room. ccw flow alarms are calibrated per PAC CCS 006.

FSAR Flange sealing is accomplished by a double-seal arrangement Pressure/Level switches are calibrated None 4.3.3 utilizing two silver-plated Ni-Cr-Fe alloy, self-energized per PAC PCS 005.

0-rings. The space between the two rings is monitored to allow detection of any inner ring leakage.

FSAR The performance of the shaft seal system is monitored by pressure Seal pressure and temperature instruments None (#55) I 4.3.5 and temperature sensing devices in the seal system. A controlled are calibrated per PACS PCS 006 and PCS OLB.

bleedoff flow through the pump seals is maintained. The controlled Controlled bleedoff is normal operation bleedoff flow is collected and processed by the Chemical and Volume per SOP l. PPAC SWS-012 calibrates I Control System. Any leakage past the vapor seal (the last mechani- controlled bleed-off flow recorders. I cal seal) is collected in the Radwaste System.

Each seal is designed to accept the full operating system pressure Seal pressures are monitored in the control None but normally operates at one-third system pressure. Room. ARP 5 requires the pump be shut down if 2 seals fall.

FSAR A total installed capacity of pressurizer beaters (l,500 kW) is Heater capacity is monitored in the Control None

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• 3. 7 available. Heater kW output is nominal value at 460 volts

• Room The plant now operates with the backup heaters on continuously Normal operation. None

• and the proportional heaters remaining in auto. A low-low ./

pressurizer level signal de-energizes all heaters to prevent heater burnout.

An auxiliary spray line *is provided from the charging pumps to None Auxiliary spray is not permit pressurizer spray during Plant heatup or cooling if the periodically tested.

primary coolant pumps are shut down. This will be verified functional during start-up and periodi- I cally in the future. I 1#56) I A small continuous flow is maintained through the spray lines when Normal operation. None Primary Coolant Pump PSOB or PSOC is operating.

fSAR In the event a small leak is indicated in the Primary Coolant System ONP 23.l addresses actions ~o take if a None

. 7. 2 immediate steps will be initiated to identify the source and nature PCS leak occurs.

of the leak.

Revision 2 Page 9 PRIMARY COOLANT SYST/MD01-op02

PRIMARY COOLANT SYSTEM Source svstem Test Requirements Test Performed Exceptions/Justifications FSAR 4.7.2 The initial operator action following an indication of a leak in Normal operation per SOP-1 and Tech None Cont'd the Primary Coolant system is to check that the pressurizer level Specs.

and the volume control tank level are being maintained. If the leakage rate exceeds the ability of the Chemical and Volume Control System to maintain pressurizer level, the reactor is taken to a hot shutdown condition and the procedu,res for a loss-of-coolant incident are followed.

If the leak is small and pressurizer and volume control tank levels Normal operation per SOP-1 and Tech None can be maintained, the next step is to attempt to determine the Specs.

leak rate. If the leak rate is greater than l gpm and the leak location is not known, the Plant is shut down and efforts initiated to locate the leak.

Table 4-l Licensed Core Power 2,530 HWt None Operating Pump Power (Nominal) 15 HWt Measured daily on GOP-12, Heat Bal per DW0-1 when critical.

Operating Thermal Power (NSSS) 2,545 HWt Measured daily (GOP 12 Heat Balance) per D/W0-1 when critical.

Coolant Flow Rate(a) 127.5 x 106 lb/h Steam generator DP instruments calibrated per RI-01.

Cold Leg Temperature Determined daily per D/W0-1 if >95% power.

Average Temperature 559.5°F Hot Leg Temperature 583°F Normal Operating Pressure 2,010 psia Normal operation.

Table 4-6 Total Seal Assembly Leakage and Standby Operation Controlled bleedoff is monitored in the None Control Room.

Three Seals Operating f.2 gpm PPAC SWS-012 calibrates controlled I Two Seals Operating 1.47 gpm bleedoff flow controllers. I One Seal Operating 2.08 gpm Revision l Page 10 PRIMARY COOLANT SYST/MD01-op02

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PRIMARY COOLANT SYSTEM Source System Test Requirements Test Performed Exceptions/Justifications Table PRESSURIZER PARAMETERS 4-8 Normal Operating Pressure 2,010 psia Normal operation.

Normal Operating Temperature 636.5°F Installed Heater Capacity ,1,500 kW Heater capacity is monitored in the Control Room.

Spray Flow, Maximum 375 gpm None The accident analysis assumes <200 gpm spray Spray Flow, Continuous 1.5 gpm flow. This is much less than this design number.

This will be verified during start-up. (#35) I Table 4-9 PRESSURIZER LEVEL CONTROL PROGRAM (Zero Corresponds to Programmed Level at any Power Level)

Rising Level

• Falling Level Pressurizer level control is calibrated None I per RI-20.

Hi Level Error Alarm "ON" 5.78%(15") Hi Level Error Alarm "OFF" Open No 3 Orifice Stop Vlv 4.6, (12")

Backup Heaters "ON" (Backup Signal "STOP 2 & 3 Pumps Open 2 & 3 Orifice")

Minimum Pump Capacity 33 gpm 2.H (7")

Open No 2 Orifice Stop Vlv 2.3% (6 11 ) Close No 3 Orifice Stop Vlv/

Backup Heaters "OFF"

.77' (2") Close No 2 Orifice Stop Vlv No l Pump Operating at 44 gpm (-0-) No l Letdown Orifice Stop Valve Open Stop No 2 Pump -.77' <12")

Stop No 3 Pump -l.5U. (-4")

-2.2% (-6') Start No 2 Pump

-2.H (-7") Signal for Max Pump Capacity (53 gpm)

-3.08% (-8") Start; No 3 Pump Low level Error Alarm "OFF" -5.78% (-15")Low Level Error Alarm "ON*

Backup Volume Control Signal A. Start No 2 & No 3 Pumps B. Close No 2 & No 3 Orifice Stop Valves

-36% (-172") Low Low Level Alarm Trip All Heaters Close No l Orifice Stop Valve Revision 2 Page 11 PRIMARY COOLANT SYST/MD01-op02

PRIMARY COOLANT SYSTEM Source System Test Requirements Test Performed Exceptions/Justifications Tech Spec 3.1 Sufficient mixing of the primary coolant (boron) is assured if SOP 3 requires shutdown cooling flow of None Basis one shutdown cooling or one primary coolant pump is in 3,000 gpm before a PCP may be stopped.

operation.

The operability of two PORVs or a PCS vent openin*g of greater SH0-1 verifies that this condition exists than 1.3 square inches ensures thst th~ PCS will be protected each shift. M0-27 verifies operability of from pressure transients. PORV.

SOP 1 7.1/7.2/ Operation of Primary Coolant System/Primary Coolant Pump/ Operations are performed per steps of the None 7.3 Pressurizer. SOP.

ONP 25.2 Attach 1 Alternate pressurizer Heater Control PAC X-OPS 304 verifies jumper is staged None upon electrical penetration.

EOP 9.0 Natural Circulation Cooldown None Natural circulation cool-PC-5/HR-2 down is not periodically EOP 8.0 tested. Natural circula-tion* has been verified for CE NSSS at other plants. Operators prac-tice natural circulation procedures at the simulator.

Work A review of Work Order history revealed approximately 234 Work Work Orders were postmaintenance tested None Order Orders completed between ll/30/85 and 5/19/86. and declared operable.

History Work A review of Work Order history revealed approximately 150 Work Work Orders were postmaintenance tested None Order Orders completed between.05/19/86 and 12/15/86. and declared operable.

History Modifi-cation A review of modification history was performed since start of Review 1985 Refueling Outage.

FC-624 replaced pressurizer level instrumentation with Replacement equipment was preop tested None environmentally qualified instrumentation. as part of FC.

FC-563 installed a power operated valve in series with Preop tested satisfactorily as part of None CV-2083 (PCP controlled bleedoff). FC* closeout.

FC-620 upgraded the valve monitoring program. Satisfactorily tested as part of FC None closeout via existing Tech Spec Surveillance Procedure RI-77 Revision 1 Page 12 PRIMARY COOLANT SYST/MD01-op02

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PRIMARY COOLANT SYSTEM Source System Test Requirements Test Performed Exceptions/Justifications MCTF PCS-01 CV-1059 & POS-1059 Pressurizer Spray Valve. After repair and Was performed during startup and several / None return to Hot Shutdown valve should be repetitively stroked times thereafter on a weekly basis. I and open/close indication verified with each stroke.

Calibrate positioners and E/P'.s for both CV-1057 & CV-1059. Instrumentation for both valves was cali- None brated. *'

Prepare, review and perform a post maintenance test for CV-1057 Post maintenance test was prepared for None

& 1059. both pressurizer spray valves. To be tested during start-up.

MCTF PCS-04 EC-32 NSS Panel TE-1902 ' Solenoid Valves SV-1916, SV-1917 - Valves and temperature element verified None checkout operable by work Orders.

MCTF PCS-05 PCP Motor Lube Oil Lift Systems. Ran all eight lift pumps and manually None Ensure proper pressures, flows and backstop low flow alarm rotated motor and pump shafts to ensure concerns are resolved. lift system pressures and flows were proper. Upon starting each lift pump the appropriate backstop pump started as verifi_ed by alarm clearing in Control Room.

MCTF PCS-06 TR-Olll/TR-0121 Primary loop measurement channels 1 & 2 Reactor Recorders were checked out and calibrated None Regulating Recorder. Perform PACS (PCS-I-38) for calibration. by Work Order.

MCTF PCS-09 PIA-0102A Pressurizer pressure S.I. "A" channel - input/output. Performed calibration after repairs and None Test PIA-0102A to identify aged or defective internal components. .performed tech spec test MI-2A to verify Perform loop calibration. loop calibration.

MC:TF PCS-13 Pressurizer Heater Breakers. Verify all pressurizer heater All heaters verified operable. None breakers are operational.

MCTF PCS-14 PRV-1067, 1068, 1069, 1070, 1071, 1072 I Test T-210 was utilized to perform leak None Stroke all PRV's for reactor head vent and demonstrate proper test and determine operability.

open/close indication. Perform leak test.

MCTF PCS-17 Pressurizer Block Valves M0-10~3A and MO-l0~2A. Test T-212 was performed and quantified None Quantify leakage through valves. leakage of each valve to be approximately

.2 gpm.

MCTF PCS-18 P-50B Primary Coolant Pump. Upon startup, perform vibration Vibration testing will be performed upon None analysis to determine accuracy of installed pump vibration pump sta.rt-up.

monitoring equipment and independent measurement of pump vibration.

Revision 2 Page 13 PRIMARY COOLANT SYST/MD01-op02

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REACTOR REGULATING SYSTEM Source System Test Requirements Test Performed Exceptions/Justifications FSAR Control rod motion is used for short-term regulation. Control rod motion is controlled per Automatic rod motion is 7 .5.11 Sequential insertion or withdrawal of the control rods SOP-6. not used and ls therefore in the regulating groups is used for normal power not tested.

regulation in both manual and automatic modes of operation.

FSAR A temperature programmer establishes de~ired primary Tavg - Tref deviation alarm is verified None 7.5.2.l coolant temperature (Trefl based on a power reference per R0-19. Temperature indication/

signal from first-stage turbine pressure. Tref is calculation loops are calibrated per subtracted from actual loop Tavg* This difference .PAC PCS-017.

signal is monitored by a Tavg -Tref deviation alarm.

Tavg signal is used for the pressurizer level set point Deviation alarms are checked per R0-19 None programmer and steam dump controller. Difference between Tavg signal is checked per PAC PCS-107.

the individual loop Tavg signals are monitored and alarmed by a deviation alarm unit.

The shutdown control rods may be moved in the manual control Interlock alarms are checked per R0-21 I None mode only with either individual control rod or individual Rod motion is verified per SOP-6 on each group movement. A select*or switch prevents wl thdrawal of start-up. R0-22 verifies individual rod more than one shutdown group at any time. The shutdown motion.

groups must be withdrawn above the lower limit of their exercise band before regulating group withdrawal ls possible. The upper 10 inches of shutdown group control rod travel is designated as the exercise band and is provided so the. shutdown control rods may be exercised while the reactor is at power. An interlock from the primary control rod position indication system prevents the shutdown groups from being driven down more than 10 inches unless the regulating control rods are fully inserted.

Regulating control rods may be moved in manual or automatic Rod motion is conducted per SOP-6 on None control with sequential group movement. Individual and each start-up. I groups of control rods may be moved in manual control.

All control rods will be prevented from ~eing withdrawn Interlocks are verified per R0-21. None if either a high power or high power rat~-of-change pretrip condition exists.

The part-length control rods may be moved manually either Rod motion is conducted per SOP-6 on None individually or as a group. A selector switch prevents each start-up.

simultaneous manual movement of the part-length and any other control rods.

Revision 2 Page l REACTOR REGULATING SYSTEM/MDOl

REACTOR REGULATING SYSTEM Source System Test Requirements Test Performed Exceptions/Justifications FSAR The part-length control rods are completely withdrawn from Part-length rods are withdrawn each None 7.5.2.1 the core during power operation. start-up per GOP-3 and SOP-6.

SOP-6 Operation of control rods. Evolutions are conducted per steps of None 7 .J.. thru the SOP.

7.13 I

EOP 9.0 Control rod drive down after failure to trip. None This ls an emergency RC-4 condition which can only be performed on a stuck rod and is not testable; Werk A review of Work Order history revealed approximately 2 Work Orders were post-maintenance None Order Work Orders completed between 11/30/85 and 05/19/86. tested and declared operable.

History Work A review of Work Order history revealed approximately 3 Work Orders were post-maintenance None Order Work Orders completed between 05/19/86 to 12/15/86. tested and declared operable.

Modification Review A review of modification history was performed since None None 1985 Refueling Outage. No modifications were performed on this system.

Revision 1 Page 2 REACTOR REGULATING SYSTEM/MDOl

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REACTOR PROTECTIVE SYSTEM EXCEPTION/

SOURCE SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR A trip signal from any two out of four protective channels M0-03 tests logic matrices and trip None 7.2.2 causes a reactor trip. contacts Open circuit, or loss of power supply of the channel logic, Design feature of RPS system. Testing is not required to initiates an alarm and channel trip. verify that an open circuit Testing is not required to verify trips or loss of power supply from open circuit or loss of power supply initiates an alarm and due to the fact that both conditions channel trip. Any duplicate normal trip function, le time a channel is open contact for trip. M0-03, MI-1, MI-2, removed from service MI-2A, MI-5 ' R.I. Tech Spec test and cali- for testing a trip brations verify Rx tr~p signlas by making function this function contact logic open/or relays de-energize is indicated via alarm.

by removing voltage or bucking process Also, the alarm function signals until actuation. is not important ~or safe plant operation.

The alarm indicates the channel is tripped.

It is important to reliable plant opera-tion*.

The manual trip is totally independent of the automatic trip CL-36 tests both manual trip push None system. buttons.

Trip signals are preceded by alarms where the operator could MI-01, MI-02, MI-02A and MI-05 None avert a reactor trip. calibrates alarm and trip set points. Verifies control room alarms and annunciators function.

FSAR Reactor trips are initiated when the reactor core power level MI-01 calibrates overpower alarm and None 7.2.3.2 exceeds a nominal value of 106.5% of indicated full power. trip set points.

Provisions have been made to select different trip points for various combinations of primary coolant pump operation.

The power range channels range chaqge sw. itch increases the gain CL-35 verifies functioning or sensitivity None of the channel by a factor of 10, providing a full-scale power switch.

indication at 12.5% full power. This also decreases the over-power trip from 106.5% to 10.65%.

Pre-trip alarms at 10.4% or 104% of indicated full power MI-01 calibrates overp9wer alarm and None depending upon range switch. Pre-trip alarms provide annunication trip set points.

in addition to rod withdrawal prohibit signals. R0-21 verifies AWP and RWP interlocks. I Revision 2 1 REACTOR PROTECTIVE SYSTEM-OP02

REACTOR PROTECTIVE SYSTEM EXCEPTION/

SOURCE SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION

. FSAR Neutron flux at the out-of-core detectors for a given reactor DW0-01 calibrates power range safety None 7.2.3.2 power level is affected by control rod position, radial core channels. RI-23 verifies /lT nuclear power distribution, and average coolant temperature. These deviation alarm set point.

effects are compensated for by performing periodic plant heat balances and adjusting the calibration of the power range channels accordingly. An.alarm indicates when power based on steam generator /lT measur~ment is different than that based upon neutron monitoring.

FSAR Low flow trip points and the overpower trip points are simultane- RI-1 checks coupling of Pwr/Flow trip. Since we can only run with 4 7.2.3.3 ously changed by a manual switch to the allowable values for the PCS coolant pumps this may selected pump condition. This feature is not utilized. not be significant. The we only run with four coolant pumps. plant does not presently allow operation with less than 4 pumps running. The plant will trip if a PCP is tripped. Therefore the testing of the trip setpoints with less than four pumps operating is not required. The FSAR will be changed to clarify this function.

Revision 1 2

~EACTOR PROTECTIVE SYSTEM-OP02

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'.".I REACTOR PROTECTIVE SYSTEM EXCEPTION/

SOURCE SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR Pre-trip alarms are initiated if the coolant flow approaches MI-02 checks alarm set point. Since we can only run with 7.2.3.4 minimum required for corresponding power level. RI-01 checks coupling. 4 PCS coolant pumps this may not be significant. The plant does not presently allow operation with less than 4 pumps running. The plant will trip if a PCP is tripped. Therefore the testing of the trip setpoints with less than four pumps operating is not required. The FSAR will be changed to clarify this function.

A key-operated bypass switch ("Zero Power Mode Bypass" switch) GCL 2 documents removal of keys from **None allows t~is trip to be bypassed. Bypass is automatically reset switches. GCL 3 documents removal of above 10 4% full power. bypass.

FSAR A reactor trip is initiated by two out of four coincidence logic M0-03 tests logic matrices. None 7.2.3.4 from the four independent measuring channels if the pressurizer MI-02 calibrates trip set point.

pressure exceeds a preset pressure (~ 2,255 psia).

Pre-trip alarms are initiated if the pressurizer pressure.exceeds MI-02 calibrates alarm set point. None a preset pressure (2,205 psia).

FSAR The variable therma1 margin/low pressure trip set point is a MI-02A calibrates trip set point. None 7.2.3.5 calculated value.

TM/LP pre-trip alarms are actuated on approach to reactor trip MI-02A calibrates alarm set point. None conditions.

A key-operated bypass switch ("Zero Power Mode Bypass" switch) GCL 2 documents removal of keys from None allows TM/LP trip to be bypassed at low power level. Bypass is switches. GCL 3 documents removal of automatically reset above 10-4% ful~ power. bypass.

Revision 1 3 REACTOR PROTECTIVE SYSTEM-OP02

REACTOR PROTECTIVE SYSTEM EXCEPTION/

SOURCE SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR A low steam generator water level reactor trip signal is initi- M0-03 tests logic matrices. None 7.2.3.7 ated by two out of four logic from four independent downcomer MI-02 calibrates trip set point.

level differential pressure transmitters on each steam generator. MI-02 calibrates alarm set point.

The set point is 6 feet, 0 inch below the normal water level.

Pre-trip alarms are actuated for approach to reactor trip conditions.

FSAR Trip set point is >soo psia for low steam generator pressure MI-02 calibrates trip set point. FSAR 7.2.3.8 states that 7.2.3.8 trip. Four pressure transmitters on each steam generator M0-03 tests logic matrix. I S/G low pressure trip actuate trip units are connected in a two out of four logic to RI-17 calibrates isolation set point signal will close the initiate the reactor protective action. Signals from two of and verifies logic. turbine stop valves.

the four indicating meter relays from either steam generator MI-02 calibrates alarm set point. This interlock does close main steam isolation valves on both steam generators, not exist. The S/G main feedwater regulating and bypass valves to the applicable low pressure trip steam generator and the turbine stop valves. Pre-trip alarms signal does not close also provided. the turbine stop valves. The reactor trips, which trips the turbine, which closes the turbine stop valves. This will be clarified in the FSAR.

A key-operated bypass switch (*zero Power Mode Bypass") allows GCL 2 documents removal of keys from None the Rx t£~ unit to be bypassed. Bypass is automatically reset switches. GCL 3 documents removal of above 10 ' full power. bypass.

FSAR Four independent containment high-pressure switches actuate trip M0-03 tests logic matrices. FSAR 7.2.3.9 states that 7.2.3.9 when the containment pressure reaches 4 psig. A pre-trip alarm MI-05 verifies trip logic. CHP pre-trip alarm occurs when the containment pressure reaches 3 psig. VAS 016 calibrates PIA. occurs at 3 psig. The RI-06 calibrates pressure switches. actual pre-trip setpoint is 0.9 psig and MI-5 does not document the pre-trip setpoint of alarm annunication.

These are calibrated every 11 months via PACS VAS-016. This PACS calibrates contain-ment pressure indicators and was last performed on 10/21/86. The FSAR will be corrected for actual pre-trip alarm setpoint.

Revision 2 4 REACTOR PROTECTIVE SYSTEM-OP02

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REACTOR PROTECTIVE SYSTEM EXCEPTION/

.§Q!IBQ; SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR One manual trip push button interrupts the control power to the CL-36 (4.1) tests PB-1. None 7.2.3.10 holding coils of four contactors whose contacts break ac power CL-36 (4.2) tests PB-2.

to the clutch power supplies. The second push button interrupts power to the undervoltage coils of two circuit breakers which disconnect all ac power to the clutch power supplies.

FSAR The instrument channels which supply protective action, operate M0-03 tests trip logic matrices. None 7.2.5.1 channel trip units in the corresponding channel cabinet of the M0-03 tests logic ladder matrices.

Reactor Protective System1 each unit includes three sealed, M0-03 tests trip contacts.

electromagnetically actuated reed relays and associated contacts. CL-36 (.4) tests manual trip I Four units are actuated for each trip condition, eg, high primary CL-36 (.5) tests turbine trip function./

coolant pressure. The relays in each unit are numbered one, two.

and three. Each relay has a single-pole, double-throw (SPOT) contact. The normally open contacts of the No l relays in the Channels A and B trip units are connected into a two out of two logic ladder matrix. The respective No 2 and No 3 relay contacts are similarly connected into separate logic ladder matrices.

With the Channels c and O trip units arranged in a similar manner, there are a total of six independent matrices. These logic ladders are designated the AB, AC, AO, BC, BO and CO logic trips.

FSAR The output of each logic ladder is a logic trip set of four- H0-03 tests trip contacts. None 7.2.5.l sealed, electromagnetically actuated power reed relays. Each relay in these sets has a SPDT contact. The contacts from one relay of the set from each logic ladder output are placed in series with corresponding contacts from the remaining sets in each of the four trip paths. Each of these paths is the power supply line to a power trip relay which interrupts the power to the CRDM clutches. De-energizing of any one power trip relay interrupts one trip path and effects a one half trip.

De-energizing any set of logic trip relays causes an interruption of all trip paths and a full trip.

Revision 2 5 REACTOR PROTECTIVE SYSTEM-OP02

REACTOR PROTECTIVE SYSTEM EXCEPTION/

filllIBQ,; SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR Nuclear channel bypass is an automatic bypass. High rate-of- CL-35 tests operation of bypass Periodic testing is not 7.2.5.2 change is bypassed when the reactor power ls below 10-4' of trip units. performed to verify that full power or above 15% of full power. The loss-of-load trip removal of a power range ls bypass when power ls below 15% of full power. Bypassing safety channel or a log-is accomplished by contacts operated from the wide range arithmic channel results logarithmic nuclear instrumentation channel for the high rate- in removal of nuclear of-change at 10-4% and by contacts from the power range safety channel bypasses for channel at 15% full power. A given power range channel bypasses rate of change of change the corresponding rate-of-change power trip channel above 15% of of power and loss of .

full power and removes the bypass for loss of load above 15i of

• load trip. This circuitry full power. A single logarithmic channel feeds two rate-of-change ls designed into the same of power level bypass circuits. Removal of a power range safety module, so specific testing channel or a logarithmic channel results in removal of the bypasses occurs anytime the channel associated with that channel. ls removed.

Zero power mode bypass is manually initiated. This bypass is SOP-36 controls establishments and *None low flow, low pressure SG No 1 and 2, and TM/low pressure. removal of ZPM bypass.

This bypass is automatically removed by wide range logarithmic GCL 3 documents removal of bypass. None channel above 10-4%. Each channel resets two RPS trip channels.

FSAR Trip units are tested by inserting a voltmeter in the circuit, MI-02, MI-02A, MI-05 test utilize None 7.2.6 noting the signal level, and initiating a test input which ls test devices described.

also indicated on the voltmeter. Test signal is provided by an external test signal generator at the input terminals. Signal ls inserted into the trip unit by manual test switch.

Sets of logic trip relays of each logic matrix are tested one at M0-03 tests logic matrices. None.

a time. Test circuits permit only one pair of relays tripped while one set can be held. Application of hold power to one set of matrix output relays denies the power source to the other sets.

FSAR I

Nuclear channel bypass relays can be tested as part of the CL-35 tests operation of bypass None 7.2.6 norma Reactor Protective System tests by varying the trip units.

wide-range logarithmic channel output above and below 10-4%

full power and the power range safety channel output above and below 15% full power.

Revision 1 6 REACTOR PROTECTIVE SYSTEM-OP02

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REACTOR PROTECTIVE SYSTEM EXCEPTION/

~ SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR When one of the four channels is taken our of service for The change in logic by bypassing or None 7.2.2 maintenance, the protective system logic can be changed removing a channel is indirectly to a two-out-of-three concidence for reactor trip by tested anytime a channel is taken bypassing the removed channel. If the bypass ls not out of service for calibration.

effected, the out-of-service channel assumes a tripped condition, which results in a one-out-of-three channel logic.

The RPS can be tested during reactor operation and when M0-3 tests the RPS during operation. None shutdown.

FSAR A reactor trip ls initiated if the rate-of-change of None Periodic testing of high 7.2.3.1 reactor power exceeds 2.6 decades per minute (dpm), over rate-of-change trip and a range of about 10-4% to 15% full power, by either alarm is not performed.

of the two wide-range channels. The trip signal is auto- This will be tested matically bypassed below 10-4% and above 15% full power. prior to start-up and Alarms for high rate-of-change of power are initiated periodically in the /

at 1.5 amp over the operating range of 10-4% to 15\ full future. I power by the two wide-range channels.

FSAR A reactor trip will automatically be initiated after a None Periodic testing of loss 7.2.3.6 turbine trip occurs. The reactor trip will be initiated of load trip is not when the turbine auto stop oil pressure decreases. This performed. This will be trip is automatically bypassed when three of four power verified prior to start-range saf.ety channels indicate <15% full power. up an*d periodically in the future.

SOP-36 Reactor protection system operation/zero power mode bypass/ Evolutions are performed per steps None

.1/7. 2/ matrix logic test/clutch power trip circuit test. of the SOP.

7.3/7.4 EOP-9.0 Open CRD clutch power feeder breakers./Turn "off clutch R0-20 verifies toggle switch I None RC-1 power toggle switches. I operability. I MCTF TM/LP (A) PX-0102A ensure operability. Performed Technical Specification None RPS-02 Surveillance Procedure HI-2A "Reactor Protective Trip Units" to prove satisfactory operation of TM/LP trip circuits. Procedure was performed as part of Work Order operability.

Revision 2 7 REACTOR PROTECTIVE SYSTEM-OP02

REACTOR PROTECTIVE SYSTEM EXCEPTION/

SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION Work A review of Work Order history revealed approximately 22 Work Orders were post-maintenance None Order Work Orders completed between 11/30/85 and 05/19/86. tested and declared operable.

History Work A review of Work Order history revealed approximately 4 Work Orders were post-maintenance None Order Work Orders completed between 05/l?/86 to 12/15/86. tested and declared operable.

History Modification Review A review of modification history was performed since start of 1985 Refueling Outage. No modifications were performed on this system.

Revision 1 8 REACTOR PROTECTIVE SYSTEM-OP02

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SERVICE WATER EXCEPTION/

~ SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR Each pump can be started or stopped remotely from the main H0-16 starts pumps from the Control Room. Periodic testing is not 9.l.2.1 control room or locally at the switchgear. Switches exist for starting and stopping performed to verify pumps from Control Room and switchgear. starting and stopping of pumps from local switchgear.

Surveillance procedure will be modified to periodically start locally. (#5)

• I FSAR Each pump can be isolated from their common header by a hand- Desi~n condition. Periodic cycling of manual 9.l.2.1 operated valve in the pump discharge. or automatic valves used to isolate service water pumps, common header or critical service lines ls not performed. A PACS will be developed to cycle CV-0844, 0845, 0846, 0857 and CV-1318 and 1319 in the future. Special Test (T-216) plus normal opera-ting evolutions performed this outage cycled these valves. A PPAC was developed to test these valves.

X-OPS-281 I FSAR 9.l.2.1 The common header contains sectionalizing valves which can be Control valves exist with hand- Periodic cycling of manual 9.1.3.1 closed from the main control room if isolation of a portion of the switches in main control room. or automatic valves used Item 3 service water supply system is required. to isolate service water 9.1.3.3 pumps, common header or critical service lines is not performed. A PACS will be developed to cycle CV-0844, 0845, 0846, 0857 and CV-1318 and 1319 in the future. Special Test (T-216) plus normal opera-ting evolutions performed this outage cycled these valves. A PPAC was devel-oped to test these valves.

X-OPS-281. I l'evision 2 l SERVICE WATER-OP02

SERVICE WATER EXCEPTION/

~ SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR 9 .l.2.l Two critical service lines are joined in the auxiliary building by Design condition. Periodic cycling of manual 9.1.3.l a double-valved crosstie. Each line has an isolation valve imme- Control valves exist with manual or automatic valves used Item 3 diately upstream of the crosstie * . These four valves permit the operators to perform this function. to isolate service water 9.l.3.3 isolation of either critical line. Each valve is a fail open type* pumps, common header or and can be actuated remotely from the main control room or by a critical service lines is local handwheel. not performed. A PACS will be developed to cycle CV-0844, 0845, 0846, 0857 and CV-1318 and 1319 in the future. Special Test (T-216) plus normal opera-ting evolutions performed this outage cycled these valves. A test was devel- I oped to test these valves. I X-OPS-281. No resolution /

required for valve fail /

open comment. I FSAR The service *water discharge from equipment carrying potentially RIA-0833 monitors all service water None 9.l.2.1 contaminated fluid is continuously monitored for radioactivity. discharge and is calibrated by RR-09J and checked by OW0-1.

FSAR Provisions are made to connect.the fire system to the Service Manual valves exist to crosstie fire None 9.l.3.1 Water System as a partial backup. and service water.

ltem 4 ONP 6.'l addresses this capability. I Valves are cycled on PAC X OPS 281.

FSAR 9.l.2.3 If plant normal and standby power sources are lost, two pump R0-8 verifies pump operation during None Item 3 motors are automatically supplied with power from the emergency a s imu*1ated OBA.

'1.1. 3.1 diesel generators with one pump on each diesel.

Item 2 Revision 2 2 SERVICE WATER-OP02

• • SERVICE WATER

• . . ...1 EXCEPTION/

SOURCE SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR Service water through the noncritical systems is terminated by Noncritical isolation is verified per Leakage past non-critical 9.1.2.3 automatic closure of the noncritical header shutoff valve on a R0-8, R0-12, Q0-5, 00-1. service water isolation Safety Injection Signal (SIS). valves is not determined periodically. Special Test T-216 tested required critical service water flows this outage.

The non-critical service water header isolation valves were closed during this test. By passing T-216, leakage to the non-critical headers was acceptable. System and pump performance testing in the future will indirectly verify acceptable isolation point leakage.

FSAR The noncritical header automatic shutoff valve can also be actu- Handswitch in main control room. None 9.1.2.3 ated remotely from the main control room or by a local handwheel. Valve cycled on 00-5.

Local operator exists on this valve.

FSAR On loss of instrument air, valves to the CCW heat exchangers fall Special Operating Procedure SWS-02 I None 9.1.2.3 open. Hard *stops are placed on these valves to prevent them from verifies proper setting of these going full open and starving other critical services. Service valves. Valves set per T-216 during water is continued to all critical system heat exchangers. 1986 Maintenance Outage.

T-216 verified flow to all critical systems.

FSAR Engineered safeguards pumps seal cooling is normally provided from Control switches exist for these ESS pump backup service 9.1.2.3 the Component Cooling System; however, if that system is not oper- valves. water cooling on loss able, service water can be selected from the main control room for of CCW is not tested seal cooling. periodically. Valves will be cycled prior to start-up. PACS will be generated to periodically test in the future. (#6) I Revision 2 3 SERVICE WATER-OP02

SERVICE WATER EXCEPTION/

SOURCE SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR Normal Operation - Two pressure switches are provided in the None No testing is performed 9.1.2.3 discharge of each pump connecting to the starting circuits of to check the auto start ltem 1 the remaining two pumps. If the service water pressure falls of service water pumps on below a preset value, one of the switches initiates automatic low discharge pressure.

starting.

• A test will be generated to periodically test this function in the future and prior to start-up. (17) I FSAR Shutdown Operation - Both component cooling water heat Normal plant operations including None 9.1.2.3 exchangers are required to be in service in order to plant shutdown has both ccw heat ltem 2 cool the primary coolant from 300°F to 130°F in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> exchangers in service. Normal

,and the supply to all non-critical.equipment except the plant cooldowns achieve this rate auxiliary building chiller is discontinued. routinely.

FSAR Each of the three service water pumps is capable of supplying 50% Special Test T-216 measured flows None

~*.1.3.l service water during normal, shutdown and post-DBA conditions. to all loads during '86 Maintenance Outage.

F'SAR Each service water pump can be periodically tested for auto-start None No testing is performed to 9.1.3.2 by selection of one pump for standby service and tripping of one check the auto start of operating pump. service water pumps on low discharge pressure.

A test will be generated to periodically test this function in the future and prior to start-up. (#7) I FSAR All miscellaneous critical equipment connected to common These valves are not routinely cycled None

!:! .l. 3.3 discharge line is provided with block valves in the but normal plant operations and individual discharge and can be isolated if required. maintenance operate these valves periodically.

Revision 2 4

. SERVICE WATER-OP02

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SERVICE WATER EXCEPTION/

~ SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION Table 9.1 Service Water Flows HHA Subsystem Flow - GPM Critical Service Water Headers Containment Air Coolers (4) 6,500 Some design flows to service water loads Component Cooling Heat Exchangers (2) 6,600 measured during Special Test T-216 did not meet Engineered Safeguards Room Coolers (2) 400 Table 9.1 design require-ments. Also, service Emergency Diesel Generators (2) 800 Special Test T-216 performed water pump capacity during 1986 Maintenance Outage specified in Table 9.2 Control Room A-C Condensers (2) 25 measured flow to critical loads. was 'not met. These areas will require resolution.

Air Compressors (3) 5 ER-86-091 addresses this.

Emergency Safeguards Pump Seals Containment Fire Hose Reel Stations (2)

Table 9.2 Service Water Pumps capacity (Each) 8,000 gpm Some design flows to service water loads Head 140 ft Special Test T-216 measured pump measured during Special flow. Test T-216 did not meet Table 9.1 design require-ments. Also, service water pump capacity specified in Table 9.2 was not met. These areas will require resolution.

ER-86-091 address this.

11.evision 1 5 SERVICE WATER-OP02

SERVICE WATER EXCEPTION/

SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION Table Normal Shutdown 9.1 Operation Cooling Subsystem Flow - Gpm Flow - Gpm None Critical Service Water Headers No periodic testing is Containment Air Coolers (4) 2,000 2,000 performed to verify normal flows per Table Component Cooling Heat Exchangers (2) 6,000 13,000 9.1. Normal plant opera-tions provide other Engineered Safeguards Room Coolers (2) 400 parameters to monitor with attendant instru-Control Room A-C Condensers (2) 25 25 mentation and annunication to alert operators of flow Air Compressors (3) 15 15 problems to components cooled by service water.

Special Test T-216 Non-Critical Service Water Headers verified adequate service water flows to critical Auxiliary Building Chiller 125 125 loads.

Turbine Lube Oil Coolers 2,510 Turbine Gen EH Oil Coolers 20 Generator Hydrogen Coolers 2,610 Exciter Air Coolers 370 Generator Seal Oil Coolers 360 Isolated Phase Bus Cooler 35 FW Pumps Lube Oil Coolers and Gland Seal Condenser 120 Heater Drain Pumps Seal Cooling so Condensate Pumps Seal Cooling 20 Sample System Cooling Coils 15 Volume Reduction System 250 Total 14,525 15,565 Revision 1 6 SERVICE WATER-OP02

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SERVICE WATER EXCEPTION/

SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION Surveillance Test M0-29, Monthly valve alignment check of engineered safety M0-29 Service water valves M0-29 systems. CV-0876 and 0877 are not included in M0-29, but will be added. They are normally open passive valves which supply the diesels and CR HVAC.

Other checks exist which would indicate improper valve position so no past problem exists.

SOP-15 To start/place in standby/transfer/stop service water pumps. Normal plant operations verifies None 7.1 these functions.

SOP-15 Basket strainer operations. Normal plant operations verifies None 7.2 these functions.

SOP-15 To start/stop service water booster pumps. Normal plant operations verifies None 7.3 these functions.

SOP-15 Seal water supply strainers' operations. Normal plant operations verifies None 7.4 these functions.

SOP-15 To start/stop generator seal oil cooler service water Normal plant operations verifies None 7.5 booster pump. these functions.

SOP-15 Screen wash system operations. Normal plant operations verifies None

.6 these functions.

SOP-15 To supply cooling water to ESF pumps using service water. None ESF pump backup service 7.7.1 water cooling on loss of CCW is not tested periodi-cally. Valves will be cycled prior to start-up.

PACS will be generated to periodically test in the future. (#6) I Revision 2 7 SERVICE WATER-OP02

SERVICE WATER EXCEPTION/

~ SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION SOP-15 To supply AFW pump (P-8C) suction using service water. 00-21 verifies backup water supply None 7.7.2 I is available.

SOP-14 Emergency service water makeup supply using warm water Normal plant operations verifies This will be verified 7.14.2 recirculation pump (P-5). operability of warm water recircula- prior to startup tion pump (P-5) and its ability to per SOP-14.

supply water to the service water bay.

MCTF Identify critical service water valves with current problems All valves with current problems were None SWS-01 and repair/replace as necessary. Rebuild actuators ons identified and repaired. The listed CV-1359, CV-0861, CV-0873 and CV-0864. CVs were rebuilt. All valves were tested per our post-maintenance test program and declared operable.

MCTF Rebuild pump P-7C. Pump was rebuilt and T-216 will be None SWS-02 performed prior to start-up.

Work A review of Work Order history revealed approximately 83 Work Orders were post-maintenance None Order Work Orders completed between 11/30/85 to 05/19/86. tested and declared operable.

History Work A review of Work Order history revealed approximately 111 Work Orders were post-maintenance None Order Work Orders completed between 05/19/86 to 12/15/86. tested and declared operable.

History Modification Review A review of modification history was performed since the start of the 1985 Refueling Outage.

FC-623 replaced position switches on reveral valves in Preoperational testing was performed None the Service Water System. as part of the FC closeout.

FC-698 added leak-off connection to critical service NDT testing completed as part of None water header. installation.

Revision 2 8 SERVICE WATER-OP02

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CONTAINMENT ISOLATION EXCEPTION/

~ SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED .JUSTIFICATION FSAR Manual valves which are not opened during power operation are Containment Integrity Checklist None 6.7.2.l equipped with a manual lock on each valve to insure the valve is CL J.l is performed to verify each not left open or inadvertently opened during power operation. valve is in proper position prior to exiting each cold shutdown condition.

FSAR Each power-operated isolation valve m9y be opened or closed Control switches are located in the None Ii. 7. 2. 3 during normal plant operation by means of a hand switch in main control room for all power operated the main control room. containment isolation valves and are stroke timed on oo-s, oo-6, Q0-10 and RI-17.

FSAR The containment isolation signal initiates closure of certain R0-11 and R0-12 verify two out of four None 6.7.2.3 automatic isolation valves. This signal is derived from two out logic and closure of associated contain-of four containment high-pressure signals (CHP) or two out of four ment isolation valves.

containment high-radiation signals (CHR).

FSAR The main steam line isolation signal initiates closure of the main RI-17 verifies closure logic and RI-17 will be revised 6.7.2.3 steam line isolation valves and is derived from two out of four time stroke the MSIV's on CHP. to document the feature low-pressure signals from either steam generator or the contain- of MSIV closure on low ment high-pressure signals (CHP). SIG pressure. This function will be verified prior to start-up.

FSAR The containment spray valves can be manually opened by means of Q0-10 time strokes containment spray None 6.7.2.3 their individual hand switches located in the Control Room. valves from the main control room.

FSAR Containment de-isolation is accomplished by a manual reset push R0-11 and R0-12 check the reset of This is not precisely 6.7.2.3 button on each circuit when containment pressure and radiation containment hi pressure and hi true for MOIVs and CCW have decreased below the isolation trip points on at least three radiation. Electrically locked and ccw valves. This of the four pressure and radiation sensors. In response to closed feature is also checked by will be reviewed and NUREG-0737, all automatic containment jsolation valves are elec- R0-11 and R0-12. the FSAR clarified.

trically locked closed to preclude autbmatic opening upon reset-ting of the containment isolation signal (CIS). Subsequent to resetting of CIS, the control switch for each valve will need to be moved to the "close" position and then to the "open" position to reopen the valve.

Revision l l CONTAINMENT ISOLATION-OP02

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION EXCEPTION/

~ SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR Instrumentation and control circuits in the Containment Isolation None CCW valves from con-6.7.2.3 System are fail-safe1 le, the valves will fail closed upon the tainment are air to loss of voltage or control air, with the exception of the compo- close valves with nent cooling water return isolation valves. These valves are accumulators to allow fail-open with normally de-energized solenoid valves, thereby pre- valve closure on loss venting the loss of component cooling water through the primary of instrument air.

coolant pumps' beat exchangers and lpbe oil coolers upon failure This feature is not of the supply voltage, air supply or mechanical equipment and the periodically tested.

resultant serious upset to the plant's operating condition and PACs being written to safety. address. Testing will be performed prior to to start-up and periodi-.

cally in the future. Also, ST and SR relays are ener-gized to isolate. FSAR will be clarified. (#16) I FSAR Provisions are made for pressure testing between all isolation R0-32 checks are performed on all None 6.7.3.2 valves in a series arrangement enabling the verification of valve required containment penetrations.

seating or check valve operation.

FSAR The containment isolation signal can be manually initiated R0-11 (CHR Test) and R0-12 (CHP Test) Implied logic function is 6.7.2.3 with the test switch in the following sequence of operations: verify operability of containment not completely true as Either of two redundant switches located in the control room isolation system. The CHP test specified in FSAR. FSAR pushed to test position de-energizes two of four channels switches are not utilized in R0-12. will be clarified.

which will initiate.containment isolation, initiate SIS and The CHR test switches are used in start the containment spray pumps. The spray valves will not R0-11. The containment spray valves open in test position. The containmen~ spray valves can be are tested via Q0-5 and Q0-6.

manually opened by means of their individual hand switches located in the control room.

FSAR Operation of the automatic isolation valves can be tested R0-11 (CHR Test) and R0-12 (CHP Test) This testing cannot be 6.7.3.2 during power operation or while shutdown by means of push verify operability of containment be performed during buttons located in the main control room. - isolation system. The CHP test power operations. The switches are not utilized in R0-12. FSAR will be clarified.

The CHR test switches are used in R0-11. The containment spray valves are tested via Q0-5 and Q0-6.

CJS-01 MZ-19 personnel air locks leak test (S0-4A) after performance Integrity verified by performance None of PACs. of Tech Spec Test S0-4A.

C!S-02 MZ-50 escape lock leak test (S0-4B) after performance Integrity verified by performance None of PACS. of Tech Spec Test S0-4B.

CIS-03 Perform local leak rate test on penetrations 40, 41, 52, 64, Stated penetrations were tested None 69 and SE electrical penetrations. satisfactorily (R0-32).

Revision 2 2 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION-OP02

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CONTAINMENT ISOLATION EXCEPTION/

SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION C'IS-04 Stroke test SV-2414A, SV-2414B, SV-2412A, SV-2412B, SV-2415A, Valves cycled using R0-30 and R0-11 None SV-2415B, SV-2413A, SV-2413B (containment hydrogen monitoring to verify proper operation. As left system valves) to verify position indication is proper. testing for penetrations 21, 21A, 40A, and 40B completed (R0-32).

Work A review of Work Order history revea~ed approximately 60 Work Orders were post-maintenance None Order Work Orders completed between 11/30/85 and 05/19/86. tested and declared operable.

History Work A review of Work Order history revealed approximately 19 Work Orders were post-maintenance None Order Work Orders completed between 05/19/86 to 12/15/86. tested and declared operable.

History Modification Review A review of modification history was performed since*start None None of 1985 Refueling Outage. No modifications were performed.

RPvision 1 3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION-OP02

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CONTROL ROD DRIVE MECHANISMS EXCEPTION/

~ SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR The total stroke of the drive ls 132 inches. The speed of R0-22 verifies control rod drop times. Rod speed will be verified 3.3.4.2 the drive is 46 inches per minute. For a*reactor trip, the 5_ 46 in/min during time from receiving a trip signal to 90% of the full-in start-up. (#34) I position of the rod ls less than 2-1/2 seconds.

By de-energizing the magnetic clutch,* the control rod drops R0-22 verifies rod drop. None into the reactor under ~he influence ~f gravity.

A seal leakage collection cup is provided with a thermo- PAC CRD-008 calibrates seal leak-off None couple in the seal leak-off line to monitor for cooling temperature indication.

water or seal failure.

Two independent position readout systems are provided Rod positions for each rod are compared None for indicating the position of the control rod. each shift per SH0-1 and calibrated each refueling per R0-19.

FSAR The Plant Information Processor ("PIP") utilizes the output R0-19 calibrates rod position indication.

• None 7.6.l.3 of a synchro geared to the control rod extension to provide SH0-1 checks position indication each shift.

a signal. Control rod position is visually displayed and R0-21 verifies interlocks and alarms.

ls printed out on a typewriter. Position information ls R0-22 measures rod drop times.

also used to initiate alarms under certain limiting conditions M0-8 compares PIP/SPI and out of sequence I to provide contact closures for control rod sequencing and margins. I control, and to monitor for excessive control rod position deviation between individual rods within a group.

The PIP ls capable of measuring and recording the time for a control rod to reach bottom after the control rod clutch ls released during a control rod drop test.

The Secondary Position Indication (SPI) data processor R0-19 calibrates rod position indication. None utilizes the output of a voltage divider network controlled SH0-1 checks position indication each by a series of reed switches. Position information is shift.

supplied to a typewriter for printout. The SPI provides M0-8 verifies control rod out-of-sequence alarms to alert the operator to abnormal control rod alarm and insertion limit alarms.

control patterns.

FSAR 7.6.2.3 '

Should any control *rods within the group deviate in position more than a preset amount from any other control rod in the group, a deviation alarm will alert the opera-Deviation alarms for each control rod are tested every two weeks per DW0-1.

M0-8 compares PIP/SPI and out of sequence /

None tor to this fact. margins. I Revision 2 1 CONTROL ROD DRIVE MECH-OP02

CONTROL ROD DRIVE MECHANISMS EXCEPTION/

~ SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR Interlocks and Limit Signals - Limit switches independent of Interlocks a*re tested per R0-21. None 7.6.2.3 either the primary or secondary control rod position schemes are provided within the control rod drive mechanism.

These switches, which are controlled by cams on the control rod synchro shaft, provide shutdown control rod insertion limit signals and control rod upper .and lower electrical limit signals.

Additional Control Rod Position Indication - Located on a

• Lights are continuously in view None vertical panel immediately behind the main control console, of the control operator and change is a group of 45 light displays arranged.in a shape in status is noted when moving corresponding to the control rod distribution. Each control rods.

display, which represents one control rod, contains four different colored lights. These lights give individual control rod information.

Work A review of Work Order history revealed approximately 60 Work Orders were post-maintenance None Order Work Orders completed between. ll/J0/85. and 05/19/86. tested and declared operable.

History Work A review of Work Order history revealed approximately 21 Work Orders were post-maintenance None Order Work Orders completed between 05/19/86 to 12/15/86. tested and declared operable.

History

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Modification Review A review of modification history was performed since start None None of 1985 Refueling Outage. No modifications were p.erformed on this system.

MCTF Test rod Number 34 bottom indication after repair. Tested after repair per Work Order.

CRD-05 Revision l 2 CONTROL ROD DRIVE MECH-OP02

MAIN FEEDWAT!R AND CONDENSATE SYSTEM EXCEPTION/

~ SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR During Plant start-up conditions, feedwater may be recirculated Checklist 12.l verifies the feedwater None 10.2.3.l from the discharge of Heaters E-6A and B back to the condenser for recirculation path ls isolated during purposes of recycling through the condensate demineralizers for power operation.

system cleanup. This path is isolated during power operation.

FSAR At low power levels (less than 25\ power) a single element control Normal plant operation verifies and None l0.2.3.3 unit is used to control feedwater flow. provides for use of the single element control unit, i.e., steam generator water level signal input to the feed-water regulating bypass valves.

FSAR In 1980, additional automatic controls were placed on the feedwater RI-17 tests this feature. None 10.2.3.3 regulating and bypass valves such that they would close on receipt of a low steam generator pressure (500 psia) signal.

FSAR Each feed pump turbine driver and pump must be started locally SOP-12 verifies feed pump turbine I None 10.2.3.3 and brought up to speed before the driver can be controlled driver and pump start-up and from the main control room. subsequent transfer of control to the main control room.

FSAR The suction and discharge pressures of the feedwater pumps are Instruments are located on panel c-01 None 10.2.3.3 indicated and annuniciated in the main control room. and annunicate on panel K-01. PACS FWS-017 and HED-002 verify operability. /

FSAR If the suction pressure falls (2 out of 3 logic) below a preset The overspeed trip test was performed The 2/3 logic for the low 10.2.3.3 critical value, the pump will be automatically tripped. The during the 1985/86 outage. pressure trip of the main turbine drivers will also be tripped from thrust bearing feedwater pumps is not failure and overspeed. tested. This will be verified prior to start-up.

FSAR Steam flow to each turbine driver ls 1Adicated and recorded in The instruments are located on panel None 10.2.3.3 the main control room. The*turblne speed is also indicated in C-11 and are calibrated on PACS FWS-029 /

the control room. FWS-032.

FSAR The turbine driver speed control system can be divorced from SOP-12 verifies this feature on I None 10.2.3.3 the feedwater regulating system and operated automatically to start-ups/shutdowns.

maintain parallel operation of each turbine driver at a manually set speed. The feedwater regulating valve system will then function to control steam generator level by automatically throttling the discharge of the feed pumps.

Revision 2 l HN FEED CONDENSATE SYSTEM-OP02

.MAIN FEEDWATER AND CONDENSATE SYSTEM EXCEPTION/

~ SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR The speed of each turbine driver may be manually adjusted from SOP-12 verifies this feature on I None 10.2.3.3 the control room. start-ups/shutdowns.

FSAR On a main turbine trip, the turbine drivers will be automatically PACS FWS-029 verifies this function, I None 10.2.3.3 ramped down at a rate of 1.58% per second to a speed corresponding to 5\ of full load feedwater flow. A,t the same time, the feedwater regulating valves will be locked in place at their respective existing positions.

FSAR In the event of low steam generator pressure less than 500 psia, RI-17 tests the auto closure of these None. Although the re-7.5.1.3 the main feedwater regulating and regulating bypass valves are val~es; including the override feature; gulating bypass vaives closed to prevent excessive flow into the steam generators. have key switches, the Administrative control of the bypass of the steam generator main regulating valves pressure signal to close these valves is facilitated by using have push button key-operated switches to override the signal for manual take- override switches. The over of the controls. push buttons override auto closure of regulat-ing bypass valves, regulating valves and main steam isolation valves. The FSAR will be revised accordingly.

The higher of the two signals provides a speed control signal PACS FWS-033 and FWS-032 verifies this I None to the main feedwater, turbine-driven pumps. When plant power function.

is between ~' and 25%, feedwater is automatically controlled by a single-element controller monitoring steam generator downcomer level and positioning the feedwater regulating bypass valves.

Three overrides are provided1

1. When contacts in the steam dump permissive switch are actuated PACS FWS-029 tests this feature. I None on a main turbine trip, feedwater regulating control valves are maintained in the position which existed prior to the switch activation. The feedwater pumps ~re then ramped down in speed to obtain a linear ramp flow decr~ase to 5% flow in 60 seconds following the trip.

2. When an abnormally high-steam generator level is sensed by an PACS FWS-027 and FWS-028 test this I None.

independent downcomer level sensor, a signal is sent to close feature.

the associated feedwate'r regulating control valve and a control room alarm is annunciated.

3. During low steam generator pressure less than 500 psia, the RI-17 tests this feature. None main feedwater control valves and the bypass valves are closed automatically.

Revision 2 2 MN FEED CONDENSATE SYSTEM-OP02

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MAIN FEEDWATER AND CONDENSATE SYSTEM EXCEPTION/

SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR For power above 25% full power, conventional three-element, Normal plant operation verifies this None 7.5.3.3 feedwater control is used with fail-as-is, feedwater control feature.

valves. Manual override of the automatic control is always available.

FSAR Accurate measurements of reactor powe~ output use the feedwater GOP-12 performs daily calorimetric. None 7.5.3.3 flow instruments as a base for calorimetric calculations. These PACS FWS-030, FWS-002, FWS-031, and flow instruments' calibration ls thus regulated by the Technical RI-24 ensures calibrated instruments.

Specifications.

SOP-11 To start/stop condensate pumps. Normal plant start-up and shutdown None 7.4.1 verifies ability to operate con-7.4.2 densate pumps. Pumps were run during hot shutdown testing.

SOP-12 To start/stop main feed water pumps. Normal plant start-up and shutdowns None 7.3.1 verifies ability to operate main 7.3.2 feed water pumps.

SOP-12 Manual and automatic feedwater control during plant Normal plant start-up and shutdown None 7.4.l start-up of feed regulation bypass valves. verifies manual and automatic control 7.4.2 functions.

SOP-12 Manual and automatic control of main feed regulating Normal plant start-up and shutdowns None 7.4.3 valves. verifies manual and automatic control 7.4.4 of main feedwater controls.

During plant start-up and power escalation from the 1986 Maintenance Outage, feed controls will be monitored by I&C and Operations and several deliberate pertruba-tions will be introducted into the control scheme to verify system response as part of post maintenance testing, following fine tuning of feed control system. Refer to HCTF observation FWS-015.

Revision 1 3 MN FEED CONDENSATE SYSTEM-OP02

MAIN FEEDWATER AND CONDENSATE SYSTEM EXCEPTION/

SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION Maintenance Review A review of completed Work Order history revealed approximately Work Orders were completed and equipment None 138 Work Orders completed from start of 1985 Refueling Outage declared operable.

till 5/19/86.

Maintenance I Review A review of completed Work Order history revealed approximately work Orders were completed and equipment None 102 Work Orders completed from 5/19/86 to 12/15/86 declared operable.

Modification Review A review of modification history was performed since the start None None of 1985 Refueling Outage.

Modification Review FC-624 replaced several pieces of instrumentation with Replacement equipment was preop tested None environmentally qualifed equipment. as part of FC closeout.

Modification Review FC-664 modified the main feedwater pump seal injection and Preop testing was completed as part of None seal drain system. FC closeout. We will continue to monitor for water content in the oil after start-up.

MCTF Test and check_ out controls for CV-0710 and CV-0711. Control systems were verified to be None CDS-01 correct and valves tested satisfactorily during hot shutdown testing. Proper operation of CV's will be verified per SOP-12, during plant start-up.

MCTF Test and adjust controls for CV-0730 during start-up. Control valve and actuator were rebuilt PM's are being CDS-01 and interim testing completed. During developed to clean power escalation CV-0730 will be the condenser hotwell monitored for proper operation. and to disassemble/

inspect CV-0730 each Refueling Outage.

• MCTF Insure temperature indicator/alarm ls checked out and TE-0794 and TE-0795 were replaced, None CDS-04 calibrated (TIA-0794 and TIA-0795). calibrated and loop checked during the 1986 Maintenance Outage. PACS CDS-004 calibrates these instruments every three months.

Revision 1 4 MN FEED CONDENSATE SYSTEM-OP02

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MAIN FEEDWATER AND CONDENSATE SYSTEM EXCEPTION/

SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION MC'TF Check proper pump operations Hotwell sample pumps (P-64A/B). P-64A/B were repaired and tested None.

CDS-OS Radwaste caustic injection pumps (P-lOOA/B). satisfactorily with partial condenser vacuum. They will be post maintenance tested under full condenser vacuum during start-up.

P-lOOA was repaired and satisfactorily tested. P-lOOB operated well during the last plant run and will be tested when plant conditions permit. PACS CHM-004 tests P-lOOA/B.

MCTF Check out CV-0733 and adjust. CV-0733 was repaired and tested satis- None CL*S-06 factorily. PACS CDS-007 performs PMs on this valve.

"MCTF Replace CV-0608 and CV-0609 positloners and insure proper New positoners were installed and None CDS-07 operation. calibrated. Both valves were stroke tested during 1986 Maintenance Outage and will be functionally tested during plant start-up. PACS HED-004 and FWS-001 perform PMs on these valves.

MCTF Test both P-lOA and P-lOB heater drain pumps for leakage. P-lOA/B were pressure tested at 100 pslg None c::s-08 satisfactorily. They will be post-maintenance tested under full pressure after power operations.

MCTF Test RV-0765, condensate pump seal relief. RV-0765 was removed from the system, *None CDS-10 repaired, bench-tested, reinstalled and exhibited no leakage under normal condensate pump discharge pressure.

w:TF Test PCV-0764 condensate pump seal pressure control. PCV-0764 was adjusted and tested None CDS-11 satisfactorily under normal condensate pump discharge pressure.

Revision 1 5 MN FEED CONDENSATE SYSTEM-OP02

MAIN FIEDWATIR AND CONDENSATE SYSTEM EXCEPTION/

~ SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION MCTF Verify proper feedwater control during and after During plant start-up and power escalation, None FWS-15 plant power ascension. feedwater controls will be monitored by I&C and Operations. Several deliberate perturbations will be introduced into the control scheme to verify system response.

Revision l MN FEED CONDENSATE SYSTEM-OP02 6 (i) * '.

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eve SYSTEM EXCEPTION/

SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR When the level in the volume control tank PPAC CVC-035 calibrates volume control tank level None 9.10.2.l reaches the high level set point, the instrumentation. Normal plant operations (SOP-2A) letdown flow is automatically diverted verifies makeup capability to the volume control tank to the liquid radwaste system. When the and letdown flow diversion on high level of VCT. I level in the volume control tank reaches the low-level set point, makeup water, borated to the existing concentration of the Prlmauy Coolant System, may be automatically or manually supplied to the suction of the charging pumps.

FSAR The Primary Coolant System may be pressure R0-70F provides the mechanism to satisfy this function. None 9.10.2.l tested for leaks by means of the variable speed charging pump. The system ls also provided with connections for installing a hydrostatic test pump.

FSAR The eve automatically adjusts the volume of RI-20 calibrates level instrumentation for the None 9.10.2.2 water in the Primary Coolant system using pressurizer. Normal plant operations verify a signal from the level instrumentation operability.

located on the pressurizer.

FSAR The volume control tank coolant level may PPAC CVC-035 calibrates level instrumentation. None 9.10.2.2 be automatically controlled. SOP-2A provides instructions for makeup operations to the volume control tank.

FSAR When the level in the volume control tank CVC-035 calibrates volume control tank level Valve operation will 9.10.2.2 reaches a low-low set point, the system instrumentation. eve -024 verifies lo level be verified during startup.

automatically closes the outlet valve switch LS-0204 operatTon.

on the tank and switches the suction of the charging pumps to the safety injection and refueling water tank.

FSAR Gases may be vented from the volume contril Normal plant operations (SOP-2A) verifies None 9.10.2.2 tank to the waste gas surge tank. this function.

Revision 2 l eve SYSTEM-OP02

eve SYSTEM EXCEPTION/

SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR Any one of the three charging pumps can This statement does not 9.10.2.4 inject boron into the primary system at impact safety analysis a rate of 460 ppm/h1 whereas the increase on record and is not an in reactivity due to cooldown and xenon issue for normal cooldown.

decay is equivalent to a boron reduction The two limiting analysis rate of about 160 ppm/h. using ~eactivity addition rates are Main Steam Line Break (MSLB) and Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR). This minimum required charging flow is the MSLB analysis and is 68 gpm. For normal cooldown, plant procedures require establishment of cold shutdown boron prior to leaving hot shutdown, so reactivity increase due to xenon decay and cooldown is not an issue.

FSAR change is required to eliminate this state-ment. See DV 88-029 and JAM 86-038.

FSAR The Primary Coolant System can be tested for GOP-13 provides steps necessary to conduct None 9.10.2.5 leaks while the plant ls at power by a daily leak rate of the PCS.

monitoring pressurizer level and charging rate.

FSAR Upon a safety injection signal, the R0-8 lines up charging pumps on None 9.10.2.6 charging pumps are started and discharge simulated SIS. H0-20 ensures pumps Item 7 concentrated boric acid into the can pump to PCS. CL 2.2 pumps from 9.10.3.4 Primary Coolant System. concentrated tanks to PCS. Q0-1 starts charging pumps and boric acid pumps.

Revision 1 eve SYSTEM-OP02 2

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~ SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST f ERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSl\R The variable capacity charging pump ls H0-20 ensures P-55A 47 to 51 gpm. The variable speed charging 9.10.2.6 capable of supplying a variable output H0-20 ensures P-55B 35.7 to 38.8 gpm. pump was tested and its max Item 7 of 33-53 gpm. The fixed capacity M0-20 ensures P-55C 36.7 to 39.8 gpm. flowrate is 50 gpm (620 rpm charging pumps have a design output Special test T-214 verifies variable @ 1385 psia PCS pressure.

of 40 gpm. speed feature of P-55A. Special Test T-214 will be run again prior to start-up at increased speed to determine maximum flow. The safety requirement for charging pump flow ls 68 gpm for two charging pumps (main steam line break analysis). See JAM 86-038.

Therefore, present surveillance testing is adequate. FSAR will be changed to clarify.

FSAR The chemical addition tank is used to prepare Chemistry Operating Procedure (COP-1) address None 9.10.2.6 chemicals for primary coolant pH and oxygen PCS chemical additions.

Item 8 control. These chemicals are added to the suction of the charging pumps with the metering pump.

FSAR Each of the two concentrated boric acid MC-llA verifies proper boron concen- None 9.10.2.6 tanks stores enough concentrated boric tration. Control Room alarm on tank Item 10 acid solution to bring the reactor to level less than 118" (checked on a cold shutdown condition at any time R0-16).

during the core lifetime. Standing order is in place to maintain each tank ~ 118". I Revision 2 3 C"!C SYSTEM-OP02

eve SYSTEM EXCEPTION/

~ SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR The tanks are heated to maintain a Primary AO logs concentrated boric 9.10.2.6 temperature above the saturation temp None acid tank temperature shiftly. Tank alarms on I Item 10 of the concentrated solution, and high/low temp in Control Room. MC-llA verifies sampling connections are used to verify boric acid concentration proper.

that proper concentration is maintained.

TICA's for tank temp controls are checked by PAC eve 043 and eve 031.

FSAR Upon a safety injection signal, the R0-8 verifies pumps start and flow 9.10.2.6 boric acid pumps line up with the None paths established on.SIS.

Item 11 charging pumps to permit direct intro- QOl verifies pumps start on SIS.

duction of concentrated boric acid into the Primary Coolant System.

FSAR Each boric acid pump ls capable of M0-21 verifies pump head on minimum 9.10.2.6 supplying boric acid at the maximum A performance test will be com-recirc flow. Checklist CL 2.2 pleted on each boric acid pump *

tern 11 demand conditions. Maximum demand is verifies pumps can deliver greater than prior to startup.

assumed to be the supply required with 68 gpm and is performed each cooldown.

all three charging pumps operating - The maximum required flow is 68 gpm, 133 gpm.

as defined by the HSLB analysis.

CL-22 presently verifies this flow can be met each startup (actual results of past test is 79 gpm.

The acceptance criteria will be modified to 68 gpm). The FSAR wlli be modified to clarify this require-ment.

FSAR The boronmeter provides a signal which is None r*.10.2.6 scaled and applied to a recorder located in The borometer and its recorder Item 12 the control room. are presently not in our pre-ventive maintenance program.

This will be evaluated in the future for need for boronometer.

Re\*ision 2 C'!C SYSTEM-OP02 4

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eve SYSTEM EXCEPTION/

~ SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR The process radiation monitors RR-09L calibrates RIA-0202A. RR 09L only checks RIA-0202A as 9.10.2.6 RIA-0202A and B monitor the fluid from DW0-1 provides daily readings of RIA. required by tech specs.

Item 13 the primary coolant loop for high levels of activity which would provide an RIA-0202B ls not required by Tech indication of failed fuel. specs. A test will be generated periodically calibrate RIA-0202B in the future.

FShR During the heatup and after the steam Normal plant operations verify these None 9.10.J.l bubble ls established, the operator adjusts functions on plant heat-up.

the pressurizer water level manually, with the intermediate pressure letdown control valves, the letdown orifice bypass control and/or the letdown orifices. The level controls of the volume control tank auto-matically divert the letdown flow to the waste disposal system.

FSAR The volume control tank ls initially vented Normal plant operations (SOP-2A) provides None 9.10.3.l to the radioactive waste treatment system. guidance and ver!f ies these functions on each After the tank ls purged with nitrogen, a start-up.

hydrogen atmosphere ls established and the vent ls secured.

FSAR When the Primary Coolant System reaches hot Normal plant operations verifies this lineup None 9.10.l.l standby temperature and pressure, one or on each start-up.

both purification ion exchangers are put into service.

FSAR During Normal operation:

9.10.J.2

l. Level instrumentation on the pressurizer RI-20 calibrates pressurizer level instrumentation. None automatically controls the volume Normal plant operations verifies this lineup on of water in the primary system by each startup.

adjusting the charging rate of the variable capacity charging pump.

2. Instrumentation on the volume control SOP-2A provides for automatic makeup control. None tank automatically controls the level PPAC CVC-035 calibrates level instrumentation.

of water in the tank as described in NOTE: Normal operations are with the automatic Subsection 9.10.2. makeup system disabled. The manual mode is utilized during day to day operations.

J. The operator controls the hydrogen COP-1 provides direction tor PCS chemistry. None concentration and pH of the coolant Normal plant operations verify adequacy of as described in Subsection 9.10.2.J. PCS hydrogen chemistry control.

Revision 1 5 eve SYSTEM-OP02

eve SYSTEM SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS EXCEPTION/

TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR 4. The operator may compensate for Normal plant operations verifies these modes of 9.10.3.2 changes in the reactivity of the core None control per SOP-2A. Integrated system testing Continued by controlling the concentration of on eve during start-up will verify proper operation boric acid in the primary coolant. of dilution, boration, and blender operation, using He may operate in four modes. SOP-2A.

a. In the dilute mode, the operator, preselects a quantity of pr~mary makeup water and introduces it into the charging pump suction at at preset rate. When the selected quantity of makeup water has been added, the flow is secured upon signal from the integrating flowmeter.

b. In the borate mode, the operator pre-selects a quantity of concentrated boric acid and introduces it at a preset rate as described in a. above.

c. In the manual blend mode, the operator presets the flow rates of the primary makeup water and concentrated boric acid. This mode is primarily used to supply makeup to the safety injection and refueling water tank.

d. In the automatic mode, the operator presets the flow rates of the Normal operations are with the primary makeup water and concentra- automatic makeup system disabled.

ted boric acid to achieve the The manual mode is used during concentration present in the day to day operations.

primary coolant. The solution is automatically blended and introduced into the charging pump suction line according to signals received from the volume control tank level program.

Revision 1 eve SYSTEM-OP02 6

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eve SYSTEM EXCEPTION/

SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR Shutdown 9.10.3.3 Before the plant is cooled down, the Normal plant operations verify operability None volume control tank is vented to the of degasification of PCS each shutdown/cool-gaseous Radwaste System to reduce the down, per GOP-9.

activity and hydrogen concentration in the Primary Coolant System. The operator may also increase the letdown flow rate to accelerate degasif ication, ion exchange, and filtration of the primary coolant.

Before the plant is cooled down, the Normal plant operations verifies this function None operator increases the concentration of each shutdown/cooldown, per GOP-B.

boric acid in the primary coolant to the value required to cold shutdown. This ls done to assure that the reactor has an adequate shutdown margin throughout its period of cooldown. However, the operator does not insert the shutdown group of control rods until he verifies the concentration of boric acid in the primary coolant by sample analysis.

Puring cooldown, the operator uses the Normal plant operations verifies these Makeup water is not auto-charging pumps to adjust and main- functions each shutdown/cooldown. matically introduced at the tain the level of water in the shutdown boric acid concen-pressurizer. Makeup water is auto- tration. Makeup to the matically introduced at the shutdown volume control tank is boric acid concentration. The operator normally operated in the may switch the suction of the charging manual, dilute or borate pumps to the safety injection and re- mode. This will be reviewed fueling water tank, or a portion of the and the FSAR will be clarified.

charging flow may be used as an auxiliary spray to cool the pressurizer, when the pressure of the primary system ls below that required to operate the primary coolant pumps.

Revision 1 7 eve SYSTEM-OP02

eve SYSTEM EXCEPTION/

SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED .JUSTIFICATION FSAR Emergency Operations 9.10.3.3 Under emergency conditions, the charging EOPs provide proper guidance on charging pump We do not verify charging pumps pumps are used to inject concentrated operation to inject concentrated boric acid start on receipt of a pressurizer boric acid into the Primary Coolant into the PCS, RI-20 calibrates pressurizer level low level signal. This will be System. Either the pressurizer level instrumentation and controls. Q0-1 and R0-8 verified prior to start-up and control or the safety injection signal , verifies charging pumps auto start and suction periodically in the future.

will automatically start all charging switch to discharge of boric acid pumps on FSAR needs to be clarified that pumps. The safety injection signal will* receipt of SIS. 00-5 and 00-6 time charging all 3 charging pumps do not also cause the charging pump suction to pump suction valves stroke. start by SIS. The 3rd pump starts be switched from the volume control tank on low level in the pressurizer.

to the discharge of the boric acid pump.

FSAR The safety injection signal will cause Q0-05 times valves. None 9.10.3.4 the charging pump suction to be switched 00-06 times valves in cold shutdown.

from the volume control tank to the RO-OB verifies valve cycle on SIS.

discharge of boric acid pump.

FSAR If the boric acid supply from the boric Gravity feed valves verified operable None 9.10.3.4 acid pump is not available, boric acid during SIS on R0-8.

9.10.4 from the concentrated boric acid tanks Checklist CL 2.2 verifies gravity feed ma~ be gravity fed into the charging available at 68 gpm and is performed each line. cooldown.

• Q0-6 times valve in cold shutdown.

9.10.3.4 If the charging line inside the reactor 00-5 times cross tie valve. None 9.10.4 containment bldg is inoperative, the SOP-2A establishes valve lineup if path I charging pump discharge may be routed is necessary.

via.the Safety Injection System to Flow path is verified frequently during inject concentrated boric acid into maintenance shutdowns due to equipment the Primary Coolant System. tagouts, plus each startup via SOP 3, I Attachment 4.

FSAR The charging and boric acid pumps are R0-8 verifies proper electric lineup. None 9.10.4 powered by the diesel generators under Review of electric prints.

emergency conditions. One diesel 00-l verifies proper channel condition.

generator supplies Charging Pumps A and B and Boric Acid Pump A. *The other diesel generator supplies Charging Pump C and Boric Acid Pump B.

FSAR Additionally, Charging Pumps B and C M0-20 verifies each refueling that None 9.10.4 can be powered from an alternate power pumps can be started on alternate supply (refer to FSAR Section 7.4 for power supplies. M0-20 verified details). alternate power supplies during hot shutdown testing period.

Revision 2 8 eve SYSTEM-OP02

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~ SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR The boric acid pumps and the charging Switches exist on switchgear. M0-20 has been revised 9.10.4 pumps may be controlled locally at to start the B&C their switchgear. charging pumps locally periodically. This was performed during Hot Shutdown Testing. The A charging pump will be started locally prior to start-up. This will also be added to the surveillance.

FSAR The boric acid solution piped in heat- DW0-1 ver!f.ies piping temp greater than 155°F. None 9.10.4 traced lines to preclude precipitation EC-lOA and B calibrated per PAC eve 038.

of the boric acid. Two independent and redundant heating systems are provided for the boric acid tanks and lines.

FSAR Low temp alarms and automatic temp EC-30A and B calibrated per PAC None 9.10.4 controls are included in the h~ating eve 038.

systems. Alarms alarm in Control Room.

FSAR During normal operation, all duplicate Standard Operating Procedure 2A covers manual None 9.10.5 components of the eve system are cycled operating of the chemical and volume control to demonstrate operability. system.

T-224 to be performed this outage will verify proper operation of eve system (includes letdown portion).

PACS-XOPS 282 Periodic Activity (Refueling PH) verifies proper functioning and absence of pack-leaks in eve charging and letdown stop valves.

PACS eve 042 and cvc*o24 Periodic Activity (12 Months and Refueling PH) verifies set point and operability of high-temperature trips on letdown stop and ion exchanger bypass valves.

Tech An alternate method of boration will be Checklist CL 2.2 verifies SIRW tank None Spec 3.2 to use the charging pumps directly from flow greater than 68 gpm to charging pumps Easis the SIRW storage tank. and is performed each cooldown.

Revision 1 9 eve SYSTEM-OP02

eve SYSTEM EXCEPTION/

SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION SOP 2A Operation of Charging pumps from M0-20 individually starts and stops None 7 .1.1 Control Room. charging pumps. Normal heatup/

7 .1. 2 operations/cooldown routinely starts and stops charging pumps.

Checked during Hot Shutdown testing period.

SOP 2A To provide alternate power to P-SSB M0-20 verifies alternate power ability None 7 .1. 3 (P-SSC). each refueling outage. Checked during 7 .1. 4 Hot Shutdown testin9 period.

SOP 2A To switch charging pumps. M0-20 shifts between operating pumps. None

7. l. Sd Normal plant operation/maintenance requires frequent shifting of charging pumps.

Checked during hot shutdown testing period.

SOP 2A Charging Pump seal lubrication. Normal A.O. rounds ensure seal None 7.2 lubrication system functioning.

Checked during Hot Shutdown testing period.

SOP 2A To stop charging and letdown. Frequently performed to allow for None 7.3.1 maintenance on system.

Special test T-224 performed during 86 maintenance outage to verify proper isolation.

fOP 2A To start charging and letdown. Frequently performed following None 7.3.2 maintenance on system.

Special test T-224 performed during 86 maintenance outage to verify proper isolation.

ROP 2A To increase/decrease charging and Routinely performed during plant None 7.3.3 letdown flow. heatup/cooldown and for chemistry 7.3.4 control during operation.

Checked this outage during Hot Shutdown Testing period.

fievision l 10 eve SYSTEM-OP02

eve SYSTEM EXCEPTION/

SOURCE SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION SOP 2A Operation with variable speed charging Frequently performed during repacking None 7.3.5 pump out of service. maintenance on P-SSA.

Checked this outage during Hot Shutdown Testing period.

SOP 2A Purging Volume Control Tank to establish, Routinely performed during plant None 7.4.l Hydrogen or Nitrogen overpressure heatup/cooldown.

Checked this outage during Hot Shutdown Testing period.

SOP 2A Makeup additions to the volume control Routinely checked during plt cooldowns None 7.4.2 tank. and to makeup for PCS sampling/leakage Checked this outage during Hot Shutdown Testing period.

SOP 2A Boration Routinely performed prior to plant None 7.5.1 cooldown, and during scheduled power decreases for testing/maintenance.

SOP 2A Emergency Manual Boration Flow path verified during CL 2.2 each None 7.5.2 cold shutdown.

CL 2.2 ran during this outage to verify flow path available.

SOP 2A Dilution Routinely performed during plant None 7.5.4 heatup and startup. Will be verified during next startup.

SOP 2A To add makeup to SIRW tank. Routinely performed to maintain None 7.8 level in SIRWT.

Performed several times this maintenance outage.

SOP 2A Recirculating concentrated Boric Acid. Performed monthly for Pump surveil- None 7.10 lance M021 and chemistry sample MCllA.

SOP 2A To transfer recycled Boric Acid to Routinely performed to maintain None 7.10.3 concentrated Boric Acid tanks. concentrated Boric Acid Tnk Levels.

Revision 1 11 eve SYSTEM-OP02

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~ SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS EXCEPTION/

TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION SOP 2A To start/stop concentrated Boric Acid Monthly Pump surveillance M0-21 and 7.11 Pumps. None chemistry sampling MCllA verifies pump operation.

SOP 2A Charging via HPSI flow path. Path is routinely used during 7.12 None maintenance outages. Q0-5 ensures valves in pathway are operable.

SOP 2B Purification filter operations. Routinely performed during plant normal operations.

7.1 None SOP 2B Purification or deborating ion exchanger Routinely performed during plant normal operations.

7.2 operations. None MCTF CVC-01 Develop a test program to ensure proper Test instruction were written and operation and determine acceptable None incorporate into applicable work values for leakage for CR-2154, 2156. orders.

MCTF Test CV-2001 letdown isolation valve. Special test T-224 performed during CVC-02 None 86 maintenance outage tested CV-2001.

MCTF CVC-03 Test CV-2003, 2004, 2005 letdown Valves were tested prior to maintenance orifice stop valves. None and retested by T-224 performed during 86 maintenance outage.

MCTF CVC-04 Test and determine extent of leakage. Valves were tested during 86 None maintenance outage.

MCTF Inspect packing for leakage stroke test Special test T-224 stroke tested valve CVC-05 valve prior to startup CV-2009. None.

and check for packing leakage during hot shutdown testing period.

Revision l eve SYSTEM-OP02 12

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eve SYSTEM EXCEPTION/

~ SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION MCTF Perform dynamic testing of intermediate Special test *T-224 was performed to None CVC-06 letdown backpressure regulators and adjust regulators during the hot adjust this outage. shutdown testing period with limited success. Special Test T-224 will be performed prior. to start-up to adjust regulators.

MCTF Stage and test a replacement valve as Spare parts for rebuild of valve are None CVC-07 a contingency for leakage problems on site.

which may occur during startup (CV-2056).

MCTF CVC-09 Stroke test CV-2111 Special test T-224 stroke tested None CV-2111 satisfactory during the hot shutdown testing period.

• MCTF Test valves CV-2115, 2113 Special test T-224 stroke tested None CVC-10 and check for packing leakage during the bot shutdown testing period.

MCTF Adjust packing and stroke to ensure Adjust packing and stroke tested None CVC-11 proper operaton. satisfactorily during the hot shutdown testing period.

MCTF Test CV-2130, 2136 Special test T-224 verified None CVC-12 operation during hot shutdown testing period.

MCTF Test CV-2153, CV-2155, CV-2165 Leak testing was performed None CVC-l3 satisfactorily on those valves during the 86 maintenance outage as part of post maintenance testing.

MCTF Rebuilt and test P-56B Pump rebuilt and H0-21 performed. None CVC-16 MCTF Post installation testing on letdown Special test T-224 verified proper None CVC-17 orifices and trim valves. operation during hot shutdown testing program.

Revision 1 13 eve SYSTEM-OP02

eve SYSTEM EXCEPTION/

~ SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION MCTF Replace/Rebuilt RV-2006 following 'RV-2006 will be rebuilt following T-224 None CVC-18 letdown testing. letdown test prior to start-up.

MCTF Test P-SSC discharge check for exterior VT-2 exam was performed during hot None CVC-21 leakage. shutdown*testing period.

MCTF Test MV-2035, 2046, 2248 eve Valves were bench tested satisfactory None CVC-22 during 86 maintenance outage.

MV-2035 had a slight packing leak during the hot shutdown testing period. Check MV-2035 eve packing leakage following repack during next hot shutdown.

MCTF Test MV-2106 P-SSC outlet isolation. Valve replaced and tested during 86 None CVC-24 maintenance outage as part of post maintenance testing.

MCTF Test P-57 Hydrazine Metering Pump Pump replaced and tested during 86 None CVC-26 maintenance outage as part of post maintenance testing.

MCTF Tes't MV-2201, 2162 Primary Makeup Water. Valves were tested leak tight when None CVC-27 CV-2165 was removed during 86 maintenance outage.

Ma int. A total of 130 work orders have been Post maintenance testing was performed None Review worked since the start of the BS satisfactorily on all work orders.

refueling outage on the eve system.

Maint. A total of 157 work orders have been Post-maintenance testing was I None Review worked since the start of the 86 performed satisfactorily on all maintenance outage on the eves system. work order.

Revision 2 14 eve SYSTEM-OP02

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eve SYSTEM EXCEPTION/

~ SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION Modica- FC-690 Added test tap upstream of CV-2001 Test tap installed and leak tested None

~ ion FC-693 during hot shutdown testing program.

i<evlew FC-700 Added temporary leak collection Tested collection system satisfactorily None system to P-SSA CHG Pump. during hot shutdown testing program FC-703 Added clamp to P-SSA head Tested clamp satisfactorily during hot None shutdown testing program.

FC-636 Added local charging flow Tested as part of FC closeout. None indication.

FC-623 replaced position switches on Position switches were preop tested as None several valves in the eve system. part of FC.

Revision 1 15 eve SYSTEM-OP02

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FSAR 9.5.2.1 A fail-open isolation valve in series with a check valve is Q0-6 stroke tests isolation valve. FSAR 9.5.2.l states instru-located in the instrument air line outside the containment build- R0-32-65 performs local leak rate testing ment air is required after ing. These valves are containment isolation valves. Compressed on this penetration. a DBA but system is not air is required after a DBA and the valves are designed to fall- designed to be available open to provide a supply of instrument air to controls inside the following a DBA.

containment.

The instrument air system was designed as a non-safety system/ The Emergency Operating Procedures are heavily dependent on the availability of instrument air, however procedural direction is provided if air ls lost. A backup means of providing instru-ment air is available in case offsite power ls lost per ONP 25.2. FSAR will be clarified.

9.5.2.l Two banks of 2,400 psig nitrogen bottles provide limited backup of Special Test T-187 was performed 2/26/86 Nitrogen pressure is main-the compressed air system for operation of the Auxiliary Feedwater and verified N* to Steam Supply Valves tained at 60 psig vs 90 System valves. One bank of five bottles is beadered into the CV-0522B and PCV-0521A available and pslg stated in Section instrument air system and supplies 90 psig N* to valves in the valves will cycle. 9.5.2.l of FSAR. Also steam supply to the auxiliary feedwater pump turbine drive. The 8 nitrogen bottles are second bank, of three bottles, is piped to supply 90 psig N* to now in service to operate valves in the auxiliary feedwater supply piping to the steam gen- the AFW steam supply valve erators. versus 5 stated in the FSAR.

Special testing (T-197) verified 60 psig ls adequate to operate AFW valves. FSAR will be changed to clarify this, plus the numbers of bottles available.

No periodic testing is I performed on the Nitrogen I supply system to the AFW /

valves.

Special Test T-187 verified 60 pslg N* system would supply 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> of N* to PCV-0521A and CV-0522B.

This function will be veri-fied to the flow control

• valves supplied with backup N* prior to startup. A PACS will be generated to periodically test in the future.

Revision 2 Page 1 INSTR AIR SYST/MDOl

INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM Source System Test Requirements Test Performed Exceptions/Justifications 9.5.2.3.1 The instrument air header downstream of the filters has a pr*es11ure None We do not periodically switch which initiates the closing of a shutoff valve on the ser- functionally test the vice air header in the event the instrument air pressure drops to pressure switches down-85 psig. In addition, low-pressure is alarmed ln the control stream of the air filters Room. which isolates service air if it drops to 85 psig - nor do we test its alarm feature.

A PACS will be developed to periodically verify this func.tlon.

9.5.2.3.1 A continuous supply of 80-100 psig instrument air is supplied to Normal operations verifies the instrument hold power operated valves in positions required for operations air pressure in this range. The pressure positions and modu1ating valves. is verified adequate via operator rounds.

9.5.2.3.1 In the event of a DBA with 1oss of standby power, the compressor R0-8 tests this feature during a simulated None motors are shed from the normal ac bus. Subsequently, the emer- DBA.

gency diesel generators are started and the compressors can be manually started after all engineered safeguards equipment has started to provide the air supply.

9.5.3.1 Each of the three air compressors in the compressed air system ls Normal instrument air load is approximately No periodic testing is rated to deliver 200 scfm and the total requirement ls 195 scfm. 180 scfm. performed to verify air compressor capacity.

Additionally normal instru-ment air load is now "' 180 scfm versus 195 scfm stated in the FSAR.

Compressor cycle time ls being trended by System Engineer, which will flag degraded compressor or system performance.

F.e*.'ision 1 Page 2 INSTR AIR SYST/MDOl

Exceptions/Justif icatlons Each compressor can be tested to 8nsure operability wlth manual Design feature. None "on-off" switches located in th* main control room (one *wltch fo.r Compressors are routinely operated from the each compressor). Control Room.

9.5.3.3 During a Design Basis Accident or post-DBA condition, operation of Design condition. Our backup nitrogen sys-piston-type, air-operated valves may be desired. The piston air Special Test T-187 verified 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> tem is maintained at 60 operator requires a minimum of 70 psig to function and will become. capacity of N* backup. psig. The adequacy of 60 inoperable or will assume its failed position in l.~ minutes. psig vs 70 psig will be When the instrument air supply drops to below 90 psig, a check reviewed and the FSAR valve in the nitrogen supply from the high-pressure bottles opens corrected. Special Test and continues to feed auxiliary feedwater valves. The bottles are T-187 verified 60 pslg N*

designed to supply the valves for a minimum of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. No fail- system would supply 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> ure of valves due to loss of .instrument air precludes maintaining of N* to PCV-0521A and the plant in a safe condition. CV-0522B. This function will be verified to the flow control valves supplied with backup N* prior to startup.

A PACS will be generated to periodically test in the future.

~.5.3.3 In the unlikely event a Design Basis Accident occurs simultane- Design feature. CCW containment isolation ously with loss of instrument air, no valve failure will limit valves have accumulators the ability of the engineered safeguards systems. Maximum cooling to position valves during is initiated to the containment air coolers upon loss of air and a OBA in response to loss the containment spray header isolation valves fail open. No other of instrument air. This air-operated valve operation is required of valves supplied from feature is not tested.

the compressed air system.

PACS being written to address future testing.

Testing will be performed prior to startup.

SOP 19 Operation of Instrument Air System/Air Compressors/Instrument Air Evolutions are performed per steps of None 7.1!7.2 Dryer/Instrument Air Filters. the SOP.

7.417.6 o::i' 1 .1 Tie Feedwater Purity Building Air to plant air supply (open CV-1221). C.rosstie of FWP compressors to the Plant None 3.3 Instrument Air System is performed occasionally to allow maintenance on the in-plant compressors.

RP*:ision 1 Page 3 INSTR AIR SYST/MDOl

INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM Source System Test Requirements Test Performed Exceptions/Justifications ONP 25.2 Restore Instrument Air (using LCC-13 power feed to LCC-91) None Alternate power feed to 4.12 LCC-91 is not periodically tested. This will be tested prior to startup and periodically in the future.

EOP 9.0 Cool Air Compressors with Fire Water. This backup compressor cooling is None MVAA-1 periodically used to allow for Oper Act maintenance on the SW System.

4 MCTF CAS-03 M-2 Instrument Air Dryer. Perform post-installation testing to Tested an~ operability verified per None ensure dryer is acceptable for use. Facility Change 694.

Work A review of Work Order history revealed approximately 54 Work Work Orders were postmaintenance tested None Order Orders completed between 11/30/85 and 05/19/86. and declared operable.

History Work A review of Work Order history revealed approximately 59 Work Work orders were postmaintenance tested None order Orders completed between 05/19/86 and 12/15/86. and declared.operable.

History Modifi- A review of modification history was performed since the start cation of 1995 Refueling Outage.

Review FC-694 replaced the instrument air dryer (H-2) Vendor assisted operational tests com- None pleted as part of FC closeout.

FC-694 installed i" and l" blowdown lines into instrument Leak test completed as part of Work None.

air system. Order closeout.

FC-640 installed filter assembly into air supply line Hot testing completed on CV-0511. None to CV-0511.

Revision l Page 4

!tlSTR AIR SYST/MDOl

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CONTROL ROOH HEATING AND VENTILATION EXCEPTION/

SOURCE SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR Emergency mode of operation is actuated either by a containment H0-33 verifies emergency flow path and flow by None 9.8.2.4 high-.radiation or a containment high-presiiure or manually. During ~anually initiating Emergency Mode of operation Hem 2 emergency operation, the air handling units and the charcoal for each train, one at a time.

filter units of both Train A and Train B operate. Condensing R0-28 verifies local and remote control of fans Units VC-10 and VC-11 are manually started by the operator. During and dampers, filter dp acceptable, and system an emergency, operation of Purge Fan V-94 and Isolation Damper warning lights operable. System and filter D-15 and D-16 is blocked, toilet exhaust,fan in the viewing gallery flows ~re documented in both Emergency and is shut off, and Fan Isolation Dampers D-17 and D-18 close. Recirc Modes.

R0-11 and R0-12 verify auto-initiation of Emergency Hode.

RO-BSD documents collection efficiency of filter units.

Purge Mode - Smoke can be purged from the Control Room by Fan Preoperational Test Procedure 8721-5010 completed This system V-94. This fan is manually started by the operator, when in Spring of 1984. serves a post required. When the purge fan ls started (with V-95 running), accident function Dampers D-15 and D-16 open1 return Damper D-3 closes1 and Dampers to remove smoke D-1 and D-2 open fully to bring in 12,450 ft/min outside air and from the control prevent recirculation. When the purge fan is started (with V-96 room to allow running), Dampers D-15 and D-16 open; Damper D-10 closes1 and re-entry. A PACS Dampers D-8 and D-9 open. will be developed to per idically test the function in the future and prior to startup.

Tornado Protection - Tornado dampers are provided in all the out- Tornado dampers are a passive mechanical device. A PACS will be side air intakes, the purge exhaust and the toiler exhaust ducts. They were tested by the vendor COAD) and verified developed to During tornado depressurization, the tornado dampers close to to be installed to the manufacturer's specification periodically isolate the HVAC system from the outside. in early 1984. inspect. They will be visually inspected prior to startup.

RP\'ision l l CONTROL ROOM HVAC-OP02

CONTROL ROOM HEATING AND VENTILATION EXCEPTION/

SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR In the event of isolation, all the makeup air for the Control Room R0-28 verifies proper control room pressure. NUREG-0800 para

. ~. 5 .1 is drawn through a charcoal filter such that 0.5 inch of water II. 3. a requires positive pressure design in the air recycle is provided to ensure positive pressure no in-leakage of radioactivity. "relative to all surrounding air spaces". The turbine building and the attached corridor constitute the surrounding air space for normal entry to the Control Room.

Reviewing the different options to locate the reference point, this location was considered the.

best. See E-PAL-85-022.

The acceptance criteria of R0-28 requires greater than 0.125 inch of water vice 0.5 inch of water.

The FSAR will be changed to correct this discrepancy.

F"S.Z,R A smoke detector downstream of outside air dampers in the outside None No testing can be

'*. B. 2. 4 duct is provided to detect smoke. found to document

rPm 12a smoke detector operable. A PACS will be generated*

to periodically test the smoke detector.

R1>vision 1 2 CONTROL ROOM HVAC-OP02

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-.,y CONTROL ROOM HEATING AND VENTILATION EXCEPTION/

SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR Design basis ambient conditions table. NOTE: Table reviewed as a whol~ not only for Some design basis Table Control Room HVAC. numbers in Table 9-15 No specific monitoring of ambient temperature do not reflect except control room inside temperature is normal plant performed. operation. The FSAR will updated.

SOP-24 To start/secure control room ventilation. M0-33 and R0-28 routinly starts and stops None 7.6.2 Control Room HVAC. Trains are rotated on a 7.6.3 weekly basis per the SOP Procedure.

SOP-24 To purge Control Room with fresh air. Non routine purging of Control Room ls currently A PACS will be 7.6.6 performed. Purging is occasionally performed to developed to 7.6.7 remove welding smoke. periodically test the purge mode and will be completed prior to startup.

SOP-24 Control Room HVAC emergency operation. R0-11 and R0-12 verifies operation of Control None 7.6.10 Room HVAC System on A CHP or CHR condition.

7 .6.ll SOP-24 Fire in Control Room HVAC charcoal filters. Emergency operation which should not be routinely Calibration 7.6.12 checked. Walk down of system shows equipment PAC's for available for performance as written. temperature indicators addressed for SOP TE-1733, 1734, 1735, and 1736 and their alarms can not be found. This will be *added to PACS for periodic checks in the future. -

Accident and Transient Analysis Revision l 3 CONTROL ROOM HVAC-OP02

CONTROL ROOM HEATING AND VENTILATION SOURCE EXCEPTION/

SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION MCTF No testing proposed prior to startup. None None Main- A review of completed Work Orders from 11/30/85 to 5/19/86 revealed All work completed, tested and declared None tenance nine Work Orders (four preventative). operable.

Review Main- A review of completed Work Orders from 5/19/86 to 12/15/86 revealed All work completed, tested and declared None tenance nine Work Orders. operable.

Review Modifi- No minor or major modifications were completed on Control Room HVAC None None cation since start of 1985 Refueling Outage.

Review.

Re*1ision l 4 CONTROL ROOM HVAC-OP02

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1~.-::;:::h LOW PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION, SAFETY INJECTION TANKS, AND SAFETY INJECTION AND REFUELING WATER TANK EXCEPTION/

~ SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR The borated water in the elevated safety injection tanks (SIT) is Shiftly verify SIT pressures and levels None 6.l.2.1 at safety injection and refueling water C*SIRW) tank concentration per SH0-1.

range of l,720 to 2,000 ppm boron1 the tanks are pressurized with Monthly verify boron concentration per nitrogen to greater than 200 psig. (The tanks are maintained HC-llB.

between 186" and 198" as required by Tech Specs.) Verify pressure and level instruments per RI-lSA, RI-lSB, and RI-lSC.

FSAR The SIT's are connected to the Primary Coolant System cold legs -Motor operated valves are verified open None 6.l.2.l through isolation valves which are normally open and have had the during plant heatups per CL 3.9.

electrical power removed from the valves' electrical system in Valves are checked electrically locked order to meet the ECCS single failure criteria. open monthly on H0-29.

FSAR Two check valves prevent primary coolant from entering the tanks. Loop check valves are partially stroked The capability to 6.1.2.l Injection will occur whenever the primary system.pressure falls on oo-ec. provide flow from below the combined pressure of the static waterhead plus the tank Loop check valves are full flow stroke the safety injection gas pressure. test on oo-es. bottles to the PCS SIT outlet check valves partially was verified via stroked on 00-SC. PAC-ESS-008 / preop test #12 by calibrates SI tank pressure completely dumping controllers. S0-9, plus level alarms the SI bottles.

on the SITs, verify leak tightness Presently, the of check valves. capabill ty to provide flow is verified quarterly while shutdown, per surveillance procedure oo-ec.

This procedure partially strokes the check valves, which verifies free swing, and therefore flow capability.

FSAR The safety injection pumps are started automatically by a safety R0-8 lines up pumps for a simulated None 6.l.2.l injection signal (SIS). safety injection.

00-1 ensures pumps start on safety injection signal.

H0-23 verifies monthly pumps are operable.

Revision 2 1 LPSI SYSTEMS-OP02

LOW PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION, SAFETY INJECTION TANKS, AND SAFETY INJECTION ANO REFUELING WATER TANK EXCEPTION/

~ SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR Flow from the low pressure safety injection pumps ls ensured CL 3.9 lines up bypass valve during None 6 .l.2.1 since the shutdown cooling heat exchanger bypass valve is nor- plant heatup. M0-29 verifies valve lined mally locked open and has had the air supply removed in order up for SIS condition and air supply to meet the ECCS single failure criteria *. valve locked closed.

FSAR The safety injection signal also opens' certain valves, as shown LPSI MOV's verified open on 00-1 on safety FSAR will be clarified 6.1.2.1 on P&ID 203, Sheets 1 and 2. injection signal. on P&ID numbers.

LPSI MOV's open on R0-8 test of safety injection.

FSAR Borated *water at a minimum concentration of 1,720 ppm boron is Boron concentration in SIRW tank verified The capability to i .l.2.1 initially pumped from the SIRW tank to the Primary Coolant system. on MC-llC. provide flow from Pumps verified operable on M0-23. the SIRW tanks to Flow path verified operable on M0-23. the PCS ls verified Flow path verified during R0-8, 00-1, periodically.

00-8B and 00-8C. Monthly safeguards Manual valves verified in correct pump tests take position on M0-29. suction from the SIRW and recirc via mini-flow lines.

Quarterly and refueling tests (Q0-1, 00-8B and 00-8C, plus R0-8) also verify the flow path. Containment spray pump flow testing this outage (modified 00-10) pumped greater than 1500 gpm from the SIRW tank through the pump and back to the SIRW tank.

Also, shutdown cooling flow through the LPSI pumps into the PCS was tested at 3000 gpm this outage via Special Test T-225.

This testing verifies the capability to provide flows from the SIRW tank to the PCS.

Revision 1 2 LPSI SYSTEMS-OP02

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LOW PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION, SAFETY INJECTION TANRS, AND SAFETY INJECTION AND REFUELING WATER TANK EXCEPTION/

~ SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR The pump suction is automatically switched to the containment Level sensors calibrated per RI-38. The capability to 6.l.2.1 sump when the SIRW tank level falls to a preset point. At this Level switch interlock verified on provide recircula-time, the flow path from the containment sump is opened, the SIRW RI-14. Components actuate to safety tion flow from the tank flow path. is closed, the low-pressure safety injection pumps position verified on 00-2. sump to the HPSI are stopped and water is recirculated from the sump by the high- Low-pressure pumps verified stopped pumps is verified pressure pumps. by 00-2 via 00-2.

This procedure verifies the sump valves open and SIRW tank discharge valves close, plus the sump check valves are verified they will free swing. These tests provide verification of recirc flow capability.

FSAR The low-pressure safety injection pumps can also be used for long- Pumps verified operable on M0-23. None 6.l.2.1 term cooling, if the primary coolant pressure ls sufficiently low. Valve lineup checked on M0-29.

Table 6.2 LPSI Pump Design Flow Rate 3,000 gpm Pump curves verified during 1986 *None LPSI Pump Minimum Flow 163 gpm Maintenance Outage per Special Test T-209 and T-225. Minimum flow on recirc verified > 163 gpm on M0-23.

FSAR The SIRW tank contains a minimum of 250,000 gallons of water Volume is checked shiftly per SH0-1. None 6.l.2.2 containing boron in the range of 1,720 ppm to 2,000 ppm. Boron concentration is checked on Item 1 MC-llC.

FSAR During safety injection, with all injeclion pumps and containment Volume is checked shiftly per SH0-1. None 6.l.2.2 spray pumps running, the tank will provide approximately 20 min- Pump operability is checked on monthly Item 1 utes supply of water (201,000 gallons) before the pump suction surveillance. Special Tests during 1986 must be switched to the containment sump Maintenance Outage verified ESS pump performance (T-209, T-225, modified 00-10).

FSAR Heating steam is provided to maintain the SIRW tank above 40°F to SIRW tank temperature is verified to be > None 6.1.2.2 prevent freezing. 40°F per SHO-l.

Item 1 Revision l 3 LPSI SYSTEMS-OP02

LOW PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION, SAFETY INJECTION TANKS, AND SAFETY INJECTION AND REFUELING WATER TANK EXCEPTION/

SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR The LPSI pump motor is capable of starting and accelerating the A periodic test is f, .l.2.2 pump to full speed with 70% of rated voltage. not performed to Item 2 demonstrate that the LPSI pump motor is capable of starting and accelerating the pump to full speed at 70%

of rated voltage. A review of the Class lE motor starting requirements was performed. All subject motors were designed and procured for the capability to start and accelerate their loads with 70% of rated voltage at the terminals (see Specification E-10). It is not feasible or necessary to test this feature.

Analysis of technical data is adequate to verify the function. The plant transient loading studies calculate the motor terminal voltages for the most conservative bus voltages. These studies support the motor design features by verifying all motors will start and accelerate the pumps with their minimum postualated bus voltage. The pump/motor speed Revision l 4 LPSI SYSTEMS-OP02

LOW PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION, SAFETY INJECTION TANKS, AND SAFETY INJECTION AND REFUELING WATER TANK EXCEPTION/

~ SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR torque curves also 6.1.2.2 show there exists Item 2 sufficient excess Continued torque to accelerate the pumps with 70%

of terminal voltage. These transient loading studies are periodically performed, reviewed, and updated to ensure the adequacy of the diesel generator and electrical equipment. (NOTE:

The Class lE 2400 volt buses are undervoltage protected to prevent operation at a degraded voltage condition. Setpoints are 92% of rated voltage for 6 seconds.

FSAR The four safety injection tanks are used to flood the core with Volume of tanks verified on SH0-1. None i .l.2.2 borated water following a depressurization of the Primary Coolant Boron concentration checked by MC-llB.

Item 5 System. The tanks contain borated water at a boron concentration Overpressure verified on SH0-1.

of l,720 ppm to 2,000 ppm. The tanks are pressurized with nitro- Flow path verified by CL 3.9, H0-29, gen to greater than 200 psig which, together with the elevation 00-BB and Q0-8C.

head, assures that the core is protected.

FSF\R The SIS starts the low-pressure injectibn pumps, opens the safety Pumps start and valves align is checked None

(. .1.2.3 injection valves and closes the primary system check valve leakage during R0-8, 00-1.

Item 3.a paths. The rest of the system is always aligned for safety injec- Valve stroking times are verified during tion during power operation. 00-1 and oo-s.

M0-29 verifies valve lineup for safety injection FShR The safety injection tanks will discharge into the primary system Nitrogen overpressure is verified > 200 None f,,1,2,J when the pressure drops to approximately 240 psig. psi during SH0-1. The remaining 40 psig ltem J.a ls made up in elevation head provided via plant design.

Revision l 5 LPSI SYSTEMS-OP02

LOW PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION, SAFETY INJECTION TANKS, AND SAFETY INJECTION AND REFUELING WATER TANK EXCEPTION/

~ SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR The RAS opens the containment sump valves, closes the SIRW tank Q0-2 verifies RAS. None 6.l.2.3 valves, stops the low-pressure pumps and provides a permissive to Valves cycle to RAS position and low-Item 3 .b manually close the valves in the pump minimum flow lines. pressure pumps trip, and a close permissive is sent to the minimum flow line valves. Minimum flow lines are verified to close manually.

FSAR The supply valves from the SIRW tank and sump are designed to Q0-2 ensures valves cycle and gives The acceptance 6.l.2.3 ensure at least a one-minute overlapping stroke to allow mixing acceptance criteria. Currently the criteria 00-2 may Item 3 .b and assure adequate NPSH during the transfer. SIRW valves close in 45 seconds and not positively the sump valves open in 35 seconds. demonstrate that flow from the sump and SIRW tank will overlap for a minimum of one minute following receipt of a RAS. The acceptance criteria to 00-2 will be reviewed and modified prior to startup.

Clarify FSAR on this issue. I FSAR The safety injection tank check valves may be tested during opera- SIT check valves are tested per oo-ec None 6.l.3.1 tion. Each safety injection tank has two check valves in series for partial stroke.

Item 2 between the tank nozzle and the Primary Coolant System.

FSAR Because the low-pressure safety injection line check valves pro- SOP-3 requires check of closure each None 6.1.3.l vide overpressure protection from the high-pressure Safety Injec- startup when shutdown cooling is Item 3 tion System, their proper closure is confirmed after each use of removed from service.

the system for shutdown cooling, per Technical Specification requirements.

FSAR Except for certain primary system instrumentation sensors, all Active components of low-pressure safety None

6. l. 4 active components which must function individually for the injection are tested per H0-23, 00-5.

Item 5 system's performance to meet the criteria stated for core protec-tion can be tested during normal reactor operation.

Revision 2 6 LPSI SYSTEMS-OP02

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LOW PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION, SAFETY INJECTION TANKS, AND SAFETY INJECTION AND REFUELING WATER TANK EXCEPTION/

SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR The LPSI pumps are provided with minimum flow protection CL 3.2 locks open the mini-flow None 6.1.2.2 to ensure that no damage results when starting against valves when securing shutdown cooling.

Item 2 a closed system. Monthly pump surveillance test M0-23 verifies mini-flow path.

FSAR The SIRW tank temperature ls indicated and alarmed for high Temperature indication ls calibrated Annunicator feature 6.1.2.2 and low temperatures in the main control room. per RI-18 is not specifically Item 8 checked. RI-18 will be modified to verify alarm function. The alarm will be verified prior to startup.

Alarm set at ll0°F.

Must be changed to less than 100°F prior to startup.

F!::AR Pressure in each safety injection header is indicated in PAC ESS-013 calibrates indication. None 6.1.2.2 the main control room.

Item 8 Pressure between the injection check valves is indicated in PAC ESS-008 calibrates controllers None the main control room. The pressure ls individually controlled and indicators.

in each of these four injection lines.

The pressure of each safety injection tank is indicated in the Pressure indicators and switches are None main control room. Redundant high- and low-pressure alarms are calibrated per RI-lSA and RI-lSB.

provided.

The water level in the safety injection and refueling water tank Level indication is calibrated per RI-38. None is monitored by either of two separate level indicators in the Operation of control room annunciators main control room. Each indicator is equipped with both high- is verified.

and low-level alarms.

Revision l 7 LPSI SYSTEMS-OP02

LOW PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION, SAFETY INJECTION TANKS, AND SAFETY INJECTION AND REFUELING WATER TANK EXCEPTION/

SOURCE SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR Level instrumentation mounted on each safety injection tank pro- Level indicators and switches calibrated Annunicator not 6.1.2.2 vides indication in the main control room. Redundant high- and per RI-15C. tested. The alarms Item 8 low-alarms on each tank are provided. will be tested prior Continued to start-up and perodically in the future.

Containment sump water level indication is provided by two level LIA-0359, LS-0358, and LS-0360 I Annunicator is not indicators in the main control room. Each level indicator and a are calibrated per PAC ESS-001. specifically checked.

redundant level switch actuate a redundant high-water level alarm. The high-level alarm In 1982, pursuant to NUREG-0578, a modification was completed which will be tested prior added diverse and redundant Class lE sump level transmitters. to start-up and These transmitters and associated control room recorders were periodically in the added to provide better assurance that Plant operators will under- future.

stand plant conditions.

Water level in each engineered safeguards pump room is indicated in None This will be the main control room. calibrated prior to start-up and periodically in the future.

Shutdown cooling and total low-pressure injection flow rates are PAC ESS-025 calibrates this instrument None measured by an orifice meter installed in the low-pressure injec- loop.

tion header. Flow rate is indicated in the main control room.

• The flow element also transmits a signal to a controller which will provide automatic flow control during shutdown cooling operation.

Each of the four cold leg low-pressure injection branch lines is PAC ESS-006 calibrates flow instruments. None equipped with flowmeters which can be used to balance injection flow rates.

A flowmeter installed in the safety injection test and leakage This flow meter is calibrated periodically None return line is used during operation tests of the Safety Injection via Maintenance Order prior to use System. on the monthly pump tests.

FSAR Motor-operated valve and system piping design are such that Q0-8B verifies approximately equal None 6.1.2.3 safety injection flow will be distributed approximately equally distribution of flow.

Item 3 .a between the four PCS cold legs. No throttling of motor-operated valves or other operator action is required to distribute flow.

Revision 2 8 LPSI SYSTEMS-OP02

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LOW PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION, SAFETY INJECTION TANKS, AND SAFETY INJECTION AND REFUELING WATER TANK EXCEPTION/

~ SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR After RAS, the low-pressure pumps may be manually restarted None 00-2 verifies that 6.1.2.3 to obtain increased cooling flow when the primary coolant LPSI pumps trip Item 3.b system pressure ls reduced. on RAS, but does not verify that the pumps can be restarted with a RAS still in.

This will be verified prior to start-up.

FSAR Leaks in the engineered safeguards pump room during the 6.1.2.3 recirculation mode are detected as follows1 Item 3.b (1) Room Vent Radiation Monitor (2) Sump Water Level (3) Process Flow Instrumentation Isolation will be required if the leakage ls beyond the capability Room sump pumps are turned off on None of the room sump pumps (50 gpm). receipt of RAS per EOP 4.0 If the event radiation releases are beyond permissible limits, RAD monitors are calibrated per None the vent exhaust damper is automatically closed and the recir- RR-09E/F, and verified operational culation cooling units will permit continued equipment dally per D/W0-1. QR-22 verifies operation. automatic damper closure.

• If sump and/or high radiation indication ls accompanied by an SOP-3, Paragraphs 7.6.2 and 7.6.3 None observable change in process flow, the appropriate valve will be describe room isolation steps.

closed and the alternate flow path will be activated. If this Valves required to perform header action does not stop the leakage, the affected system will be shut isolation are stroked during 00-2.

down or all equipment in the affected room will be shut down, minimum safeguards in the other room will be started and the suction header isolation valve for the affecte.d room will be closed.

I I . I Revision 2 9 LPSI SYSTEMS-OP02

LOW PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION, SAFETY INJECTION TANKS, AND SAFETY INJECTION AND REFUELING WATER TANK EXCEPTION/

SOURCE SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR To prevent highly radioactive waste from being transferred to the R0-11 verifies pumps are off after a None 6.1.2.2 dirty waste drain tank and possibly beyond in a post-accident CHR signal.

Item 8 scenario, the receipt of a containment high-radiation signal Continued will prevent auto start or stop the engineered safeguards pump rooms sump pumps if the pumps are running in the normal auto position.

Table Design Flow Rate 3,000 gpm Special Test T-225 and T-209 verified pump None f.-2 Design Head 350 ft capacity.

Shutoff Head 410 ft Maximum Flow 4,500 gpm Head at Maximum Flow 250 ft Tech Spec Prior to the time the reactor is brought critical, the valving CL's 3.1, 3.2, 3.8 and 3.9 ensure the None

3. 3. of the safety injection system must be checked for correct system is correctly aligned prior to Basis alignment and appropriate valves locked. critical. M0-29 checks lineup monthly.

SOP-3 Start/stop LPSI pump Operations are performed per steps of None 7.2 the SOP.

SOP-3 SIRW tank operations/SI tank operations. Operations are performed per. steps of None 7.4 1 7.5 the SOP.*

SOP-3 Engineered safeguards pump room. Operations are performed per steps of None 7.6 the SOP.

MCTF CV-3031, CV-3057 (SIRW outlet isolation valves). Check valve Valve stroke timing checked per Tech None ESS-06 stroke timing. Spec Test Q0-2.

MCTF P-67B LPSI pump decreased performance. I Performed Special Test T-225 satis- None ESS-17 factorily after rebuild of pump.

MCTF CV-3040, CV-3044, CV-3048, and CV-3050 (N* supply to SI tanks). CV-3044 and CV-3050 tested satis- None ESS-21 Test valves and ensure valves are leak tight. factory following repair CV-3040 and CV-3048 did not leak during test.

Work A review or Work Orders history revealed approximately 115 Work Orders were post-maintenance None Order Work Orders completed between 11/30/85 and 05/19/86. tested and declared operable.

History Revision l 10 LPSI SYSTEMS-OP02

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LOW PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION, SAFETY INJECTION TANKS, AND SAFETY INJECTION AND REFUELING WATER TANK EXCEPTION/

SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION Work A review or Work Orders history revealed approximately 92 Work Orders were post-maintenance None Order Work Orders completed between 05/19/86 and 12/15/86. tested and declared operable.

History Modification Review A review of modification history was p~rformed since start of 1985 Refueling Outage.

FC-514-05 rotated MOV-3008. Valve operability verified during Q0-5.

FC-679 added support and funnel to nozzle of HC-23-3" No specific testing required for (corroded SIRW tank nozzle). for installation of support and funnel. Program established to visually inspect nozzles.

FC-571 upgraded the SIRW tank foundation. Extensive testing performed as part None of the modification including ASME required testing on piping work,.

functional test on electrical work, concrete sample testing, preop testing of new heat tracing and final tank deflection testing.

Revision 1 11 LPSI SYSTEMS-OP02

CONTAINMENT SPRAY AND IODINE REMOVAL Source Sys*tem Test Requirements Test Performed Exceptions/Justifications 6.2.l Two of the three pumps have starting times off the emergency Procedure ESS-I-13 verifies sequencer start ESS-I-13 is a maintenance diesel generator of 17 and 35 seconds. of pump timing and is performed prior to procedure which verifies R0-8. R0-8 specifies proper sequence sequencer operation and times for use in ESS-I-13. pump sequence times. The test is performed on a refueling cycle. The starting times are incorrect as presently stated in the FSAR. The FSAR will be changed to reflect the proper times of 2 seconds and 20 seconds.

t*. 2. l The spray lines in containment are maintained filled to elevation DWO-l verifies weekly containment spray None 735 feet to provide for rapid-spray initiation. headers filled to greater than 735 feet.

RI-98 calibrates spray header level and pressure instrumentation.

f;.2.2.3 The spray system is initiated by a containment high-pressure R0-12 verifies containment high pressure None Item 2 signal or remote-manual operation from the Control Room. system actuation. Emergency Operating Procedure and Control Room controls exist for manually initiating spray. Spray valves are stroked per 00-10. Pumps are started per H0-19.

6.2.2.3 If standby power is available, the containment high-pressure R0-12 verifies containment high-pressure None Item 2 signal starts all three spray pumps and opens the isolation valves system actuation.

to the dual containment spray headers.

Ii. 2. 2. 3 If the normal and standby AC power sources are not available, the R0-8 verifies containment spray pump None Item 2 emergency diesel generators are started and the OBA sequencers starting on a simulated OBA.

allow all three spray pumps to start.

Re*.rision l Page l CONT SPRAY IODINE/PMOl

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CONTAINMENT SPRAY AND IODINE REMOVAL Source System Test Requirements Test Performed Exceptions/Justifications

~.2.2.3 Initially, the pumps take suction from the SIRW tank. Upon RI-14 verifies SIRW tank level switch logic. RAS has been changed to

!tern 2 reaching low tank level, continuation of containment spray is *oo-2 verifies proper operation of valves 1/2 taken twice logic.

accomplished by automatic transfer of the pump suction to the con- during a simulated RAS. FSAR will be corrected.

tainment sump. Transfer is automatically accomplished by closing The SIRW tank suction valves and opening the containment sump out-let valves. Switchover is initiated on-coincident low level signals from two of the four level swlt~hes in the SIRW tank.

6.2.2.3 Coolant from the containment sump is recirculated and cooled by -Shutdown cooling heat exchangers are lined None Item 2 component cooling water in the shutdown heat exchangers prior to up when PCS is greater than 325°F for spray discharge into the containment atmosphere. cooling. H0-29 verifies proper flow path available.

6.2.2.3 During the recirculation phase from the containment sump, a por- Valves and control Room switches exist and Periodic testing of sub-Item 2 tion of the cooled effluent from the shutdown heat exchangers may Emergency Operating Procedures direct this cooled recirculation water be directed to the suction of the high-pressure safety injection operation. 00-5 times the valve. from the spray pump via the pumps. HPSI pumps ls not performed.

The capability to provide flow from the shutdown cooling heat exchangers to the suction of the HPSI pumps was verified initially via Pre-op #12 step D.13. A normally closed valve which is opened to allow flow is tested periodically via Q0-5 (CV-3070 & CV-3071). This flow path will be verified prior to startup.

6.2.3.2 A recirculation line is provided on the discharge of each spray H0-19 uses this recirculation line to None pump for testing purposes by recirculating water back to the SIRW pass minimum flow for pump head testing.

tank. The recirculation line is sized to pass the minimum allowable pump flow.

Revision 1 Page 2 CONT SPRAY IODINE/PMOl

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CONTAINMENT SPRAY AND IODINE REMOVAL Source System Test Requirements Test Performed Exceptions/Justifications 6.2.3.2 Minimum required spray flow to achieve the design basis is M0-19 ensures pumps deliver proper head The capability to provide 2500 gpm. The minimum spray flow delivered is 2680 gpm. while on minimum recirc flow. Pump flow from the SIRW tank curves were verified during 1986 through the containment Maintenance Outage on a modified Q0-10. spray nozzles is verified.

The following testing verifies this capability:

l. A modified 00-10 veri-fied containment spray pump performance per its original head flow curve. This tested the pumps taking suction from the SIRW tank, pumping through the .

normal containment spray flowpath through the shutdown cooling heat exchangers to a 6-inch recirc line back to the SIRW tank. A pump flow of greater than 1500 gpm was seen, 1270 gpm through the 6-inch recirc path and the remaining through the mini-flow recirc.

2. Flow capability through the piping from the 6-inch recirc line to the containment spray penetration is verified by the normal 00-10 check valve test. This partially strokes these valves by pumping 70 gpm through the valves and recircing the water back to the SIRW tank.

These check valves were also inspected in Aug 1985 to verify free swing.

Revision l Page 3 CONT SPRAY IODINE/PMOl

CONTAINMENT SPRAY AND IODINE REMOVAL Source System Test Requirements Test Performed Exceptions/Justifications

3. The containment isolation valves are cycled periodically using 00-5.

4. The containment spray riser header inside containment is required to be maintained at a certain level. Normal operation fills this header periodically.

5. The capability to pro-vide flow through the riser pipe and through each spray nozzle is verified every five years via FT-03. This is an air flow test which verifies nozzle flow capacity.

This combined testing verified the capability of the Containment Spray system to provide adequate flow. Plant design will not allow for a full system performance test.

Table 6-7 Containment Spray Pumps Injection Recirculation Capacity (each) l,340 gpm 1,800 gpm A periodic test is not Pump curves were verified during 1986 performed to demonstrate Head 450 fta 405 ft Maintenance outage with a modified 00-10 surveillance test.

that the spray pump motor is capable of starting Pumps' Acceleration Time 4 secs at 70% voltage and accelerating the pump to full speed at 70%

voltage in four seconds.

The four-second acceleration time will be verified at normal bus voltage prior to startup.

Revision l Page 4 CONT SPRAY IODINE/PMOl

• • CONTAINMENT SPRAY AND IODINE REMOVAL Source System Test Requirements Test*Performed Exceptions/Justifications A review of the Class IE motor starting requirements was performed. All subject motors were designed and procur.ed for the capability to start and accelerate their loads with 70% of rated voltage at the terminals (see Specification E-10). It is not feasible or necessary to test this feature. Analysis of technical data is adequate to verify the function. The plant transient loading studies calculate the motor terminal voltages for the most conservative bus voltages. These studies support the motor design features by verifying all motors will start and accelerate the pumps with their minimum postulated bus voltage. The pump/motor speed torque curves also show there exists sufficient excess torque to accelerate the pumps with 70% of terminal voltage. These transient loading studies are periodically performed, reviewed, and updated to ensure the adequacy of the diesel generator and electrical equipment. (note:

The class IE 2400 volt buses are under voltage protected to prevent operation at a degraded voltage condition.

Setpoints are 92% of rated voltage for 6 seconds).

Revision 1 Page 5 CONT SPRAY IODINE/PMOl

CONTAINMENT SPRAY AND IODINE REMOVAL source System Test Requirements Test Performed Exceptions/Justifications Table 6-7 Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchangers Capacity (Each) - 83.5 x 106 btu/h based on 4000 gpm of cooling Special test T-223 verified CCW flow to We are not able to deliver water at ll4°F inlet temperature and 1420 gpm of spray water at shutdown heat exchanger but did not a ccw flow of 4000 gpm to 183°F inlet temperature. achieve 4000 gpm. each shutdown heat exchanger.

T-223 did establish a lesser value. ER-86-083 addressed reduced ccw flow to the shutdown cooling heat exchanger (2500 gpm per HXJ.

Special test T-223 set the CCW system up to provide this flow.

The capability of providing 1420 gpm through the shut-*

down cooling heat exchangers is performed each cooldown when shutdown cooling is lined up. This, combined with the containment spray flow testing performed via 00-10, verified the capability to provide spray flow through the shutdown cooling heat exchanger (containment spray pump performance testing this outage via modified 00-10 pumped 1270 gpm via this flowpath).

Revision l Page 6 CONT SPRAY IODINE/PMOl

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CONTAINMENT SPRAY AND IODINE REMOVAL Source System Test Requirements Test Performed Exceptions/Justifications Table 6-7 Spray Nozzles FT-03 air tests 160 spray nozzles. Flow capability of the containment spray nozzles Number - BO Nozzles per Spray Header ls verified on a 5-year frequency per procedure Flow per Nozzle - 15.2 gpm FT-03. This test verifies air flow through each Pressure Drop - 40 psi nozzle. The accident analysis for containment Maximum Spray Droplet Size - 1,000 microns (mean) spray system assumes a flowrate and header pressure at the inlet to the spray nozzles. This will give proper droplet size. The header pressure was derived from the pump performance curves and system design. No modifications have been performed on this piping, so the analysis ls good.

6.4.2.l An iodine removal hydrazine tank and an iodine removal makeup Indications and alarms exist in Control Alarms set points sodium hydroxide tank are provided with redundant tank heating and Room for high/low temperature and heat will be verified.prior temperature controls to maintain a minimum temperature in both tracing trouble. M0-25 verifies tank to startup. PACS will tanks to avoid freezing or precipitation. temperatures. be written for future testing.

6 . .a. 2. l Redundant indicator alarm devices for level and temperature are Redundant temperature and level indication Alarms set points provided as well as pressure indicator alarms. as well as pressure indications exist and will be verified prior are checked on PACS ESS 018, 017, 019, I to startup.

086, 087, 088. M0-25 verifies temperature/

pressure and level. I 6.4.2.l Each spray header is provided with two locked open gate valves, a M0-29 checks gate valves locked open. None.

normally closed power-operated valve, and two check valves. 00-10 and H0-29 check the spray valves.

00-10 test strokes the check valves.

6.4.2.l The iodine removal hydrazine tank contains 270 +/- 17 gallons of M0-25 verifies proper tank level and Alarms set points 15.5 +/- 0.5% by weight of hydrazine solution with a nitrogen cover pressure. SC-05 verifies proper will be verified prior gas pressure of 11.2 +/- 2 psig. concentration and level. Alarms exist to startup. PACS will in main Control Room on tank Hi/Lo be written for future level and Hi/Lo pressure. ESS-086 testing.

and ESS-OBB verify level.

Revision 2 Page 7 CONT SPRAY IODINE/PMOl

CONTAINMENT SPRAY AND IODINE REMOVAL Source System Test Requirements Test Performed Exceptions/Justifications 6.4.2.l The sodium hydroxide tank provides a storage volume of 4200 +/- 300 M0-25 verifies proper tank level. Alarms set points will gallons of 30.0 +/- 0.5% by weight sodium hydroxide solution with a ESS-017 and ESS-087 check tank level be verified prior to nitrogen cover gas. instrument calibration. SC-05 verifies startup. PACS will be proper concentration and level. Alarms written for future exist in main Control on tank Hi/Lo testing.

level.

I 6.4.2.l Periodic samples will be taken to determine pH and necessary Sampling is addressed in Emergency None ii. 4. 2. 2 additions of NaOH. Operating Procedures.

6.4.2.2 Upon receipt of a containment high-presure signal, the power- R0-12 verifies valves open on containment None operated valves in the chemical injection lines from the iodine high-pressure following a one-minute delay *

. removal hydrazine tank will be opened after a one-minute time 00-13 time strokes outlet valves.

delay.

ii. 4. 2. 2 . Operating procedures require the operator to proceed with injec- Emergency Operating Procedures address EOPs do not address early tion prior to the one-minute time delay if radiation levels indi- blocking hydrazine injection on a initiation of hydrazine cate cladding failure and fission product release. If, at the end spurious signal or a main steam/feed injection for high rad of one minute, it ls determined to be a spurious signal or a line break. levels. The procedures secondary line break, the hydrazine injection signal will be will be reviewed and manually overridden. modified and the FSAR clarification will be made.

6.4.2.2 Injection of hydrazine will cease when the level in the iodine Design feature. Tank level of 270 gallons None removal hydrazine tank reaches a point corresponding to a total ls ensured by M0-25 and SC-05.

of 270 gallons delivered to containment.

6.4.2.2 After injection and mixing of the hydrazine ls complete, the com- Emergency Procedure address sampling, None position of the mixed solution will be maintained at a pH of and procedures exist for manually approximately 7.0 by manually adding NaOH from the makeup sodium adding NaOH.

hydroxide tank into the engineered safeguards pump suction.

6.1.2.3 One or more spray pumps can also be used to augment flow to the SOP 1, Step 7.2.4, uses this flow path EOPs do not address use of Item 3.b core after the pressure is reduced. when first starting PCPs. spray pumps as alternate injection pumps. Operating Procedures will be reviewed and modified as necessary to address this evaluation.

SOP 4 Containment Spray System Operations/Iodine removal injection Operations_ are conducted per steps None 7.1/7-2 system operations. of the SOP.

Revision 1 Page B CONT SPRAY IODINE/PMOl

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CONTAIHHENT SPRAY AND IODINE REMOVAL Source System Test Requirements Test Performed Exceptions/Justifications MCTF ESS-08 FI-0303, FT-0302, FI-0301, FT-0301 (Containment Spray Flow Performed loop checks on flow transmitters. None indication). Perform loop check. Per PACS ESS-033 and ESS-089.

ESS-31 CK-3226, CK-3216 Containment Spray check.valves - Pass 00-10. 00-10 was performed and flows above None minimum acceptance criteria achieved through containment spray header check valves and down stream one inch recirc line.

Work A review of Work Order History revealed approximately 21 Work Orders were post-maintenance None Order Work Orders completed between 11/30/85 and 05/19/86. tested and declared operable.

History Work A review of Work Order History revealed approximately 23 Work Orders were post-maintenance None Order Work Orders completed between 05/19/86 to 12/15/86. tested and declared operable.

History Modifi- A review of modification history was performed since None cation start of 1985 Refueling Outage.

Review FC-419 increased pressure on T-102 and added CHP actuated solenoid Facility Change was not worked after None valves to N2 supply. 11/30/851 however, SC 86-180 was completed to resolve some design inadequacies from FC-419.

FC-686 added manual valve to containment spray pump P-54A None None discharge.

Revision 1 Page 9 COllT SPRAY IODINE/PMOl

STATION POWER SYSTEM.

EXCEPTION/

~ SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR If the turbine* generator is out of service for an extended This function is routinely performed None

8. l.2 period, the generator disconnect links may be removed and when shutdown if work is required to Main Transformer 1 can be placed in service to supply be performed on start-up transformers auxiliary power through the station power transformers.

FSAR Cooling tower pumps, fans and lighting supplies are normally None1 this is a design feature that is None 8 .l. 2 shared between 345-4.16 kV Start-up Transformers 1-1 and 1-3 available should we wish to spare one with the capability of supplying total load on either of the start-up transformers.

transformer.

FSAR The non-vital instrumentation and controls are supplied from None SOP-30 provides instruc-B.l. 2 a 120 volt AC instrument bus. The instrument bus is normally tions for transferring supplied from one of two 480-120 volt transformers, each power sources. This auto transformer being connected to a separate 480 volt motor control transfer function will be center. The transfer to the alternate source is automatic. verified prior to start-up and periodically in the future.

FSAR Station loads, including the safety loads, are normally supplied Normal plant trips (<16' power) func- This function will be B.2.3 from the main generator through the station power transformer. tionally test this design. This fast periodically verified in On loss of the main generator there is an automatic transfer transfer was tested in early 1986 as the future. This is not from this normal source to the immediate access offsite power part of a HFA relay replacement job. tested during plant opera-circuit. The design includes provisions to test this feature tion. The FSAR will be during Plant operation. clarified.

FSAR The capabilities of the four 4,160 volt sections are sufficient Bus lA and lB cannot be taken out FSAR will be clarified.

B.3.1.2 to permit plant operation under reduced load with any 4,160 volt of service because operation on PCPs bus out of service. is not allowed.

Revision l 1 STATION POWER SYSTEM-OP02

STATION POWER SYSTEM EXCEPTION/

~ SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FRAR Normal and Shutdown Operation - Power to buses lA and lB during Routine operations verify this None B.3.1.2 normal operation is furnished from the main generator via capability during each start-up and Station Power Transformer 1-1. During start-up or shutdown, shutdown.

power is furnished from the power system grid via the switchyard and Start-up Transformers 1-1 and 1-3. Buses lF and lG (cooling towers) are supplied from Start-up Transformers 1-1 and 1-3, respectively, during both normal and,shutdown operation.

If the standby power source is not available, power may be This function is routinely per- None furnished by the main transformer backfeeding the plant auxiliary formed when shutdown or work is required buses. This mode of operation is allowed during plant shutdown. on start-up transformers.

After the main turbine generator ls started and before 20% reactor Routine operations each start-up None power is reached, buses lA and lB are manually transferred from verifies this capability.

the start-up transformers to the station power transformer.

During normal operation, all 4,160 volt buses are energized.

FSAR Operation of all 4,160 V.and 2,400 V equipment is effected Normal design configuration allows None 8.3.l.2 and monitored in .the control room. Important functions operation, control and monitoring 8.3.2.2 are annunlcated in the control room. of all 4,160 V and 2,400 V equipment from the control room. Normal plant evolutions verify this capability.

FSAR Testing 8.3.l.2 Testing of parts of the system can be performed when Relays* and protective devices are None B.3.2.2 the system ls in operation and carrying load. calibrated by electric lab at fre-quencies determined by experience.

FSAR The reserve transformer will provide capability of sparing None This installed reserve 8.3.2.2 Start-up (Standby) Transformer 1-2 during shutdown conditions. transformer has provisions to supply plant buses.

Instructions are provided in SOP-30, however, there are no tests routinely performed to validate this design feature.

This will be verified prior to start-up.

Revision 1 2 STATION POWER SYSTEM-OP02

• STATION POWER SYSTEM EXCEPTION/

SOURCE SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR A spare .345-2.4/4.16 kV, 25 MVA transformer can be brought None This ls an installed spare.

8.3.2.2 on-line within 3 days to provide full replacement of a failed No testing is performed, start-up transformer. however, normal maintenance procedures may be used to connect this transformer to spare a start-up transformer.

FSAR 2,400 Volt System Routine plant start-ups and Bhutdowns None 8.3.2.2 Normal and Shutdown Operation - Power during normal operation verify this design feature.

is furnished from the main generator via Station Power Trans-former 1-2. During start-up or shutdown, the power is furnished from the power system grid via the switchyard and Start-up Transformer 1-2.

FSAR After the main turbine generator is started and before 20% Routine plant start-ups perform this None 8.3.2.2 reactor power is reached, the buses are manually transferred evolution. CL-30 controls electrical from the start-up transformer to the station power transformer. lineups to have all three 2,400 volt During normal operation, the three 2,400 volt buses are energized. buses energized.

FSAR 480 Volt System CL-30 aligns breakers for normal opera- None 8.3.3.2 .During normal operation, all incoming bus breakers and motor tion. Administrative procedures provides control center feeder breakers are closed and all bus tie for equipment status controls.

breakers are open. The status of these breakers will be changed only for emergency or maintenance.

FSAR DC and Pref erred AC system SOP-30 and CL-30 control operation of I None 8.3.5.2 Administrative controls limit the operation of battery battery chargers such that only one chargers such that only one charger per battery is in charger per battery ls in service.

service.

• FSAR Each inverter, one at a time, can be ~anually bypassed This feature is routinely utilized when None 8.3.5.2 and its preferred AC bus supplied from the instrument performing maintenance and is described AC panel via a bypass regulator. in SOP-30. Kirk key interlock exists allowing only one preferred AC bus to be powered from the instrument AC panel, at one time.

Revision 2 3 STATION POWER SYSTEM-OP02

STATION POWER SYSTEM EXCEPTION/

~ SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR Instrument AC System None SOP-JO provides instruc-8.3.6.2 The instrument AC system is supplied by two three- tions to test this feature, 8.3.6.3 phase transformers from Motor Control Centers 1 and 3. however, no periodic An automatic transfer switch is provided to transfer testing is performed.

supply to the instrument AC panel between the two This will be verified power sources. Automatic transfer is initiated by an prior to start-up.

undervoltage relay on the panel and ~nnunicated in the control room. Transfer in either direction may be made manually. The operation of the transfer switch may be checked at any time without affecting plant operation.

FSAR In order to permit the main transformer backfeed mode of This function is routinely performed Diesel Generators are 8.6.2 operation (Subsection B.2.3), the fast transfer on when the generator is off line. only blocked by manual turbine generator trip and the emergency generators action. FSAR will be automatic start signals are blocked manually using a clarified.

selector switch in the main control room ("Instant Transfer Cutout").

FSAR 4,160 Volt system - Automatic transfer of the 4,160 volt This feature is demonstrated during This function will be B.6.2 buses from the normal power source (Station Power a normal plant trip above 16% power. periodically verified in Transformer 1-1) to the standby power source (Start-up Fast transfer was verified in early the future.

Transformer 1-1 and 1-3) is initiated by turbine trip 1986 as part of the HFA relay or generator trip. replacement job.

FSAR Automatic transfer is blocked if the start-up transformer None There is no testing per-B.6.2 voltage is iow. The lockout relays may also be operated formed to verify the manually to prevent bus transfer if a start-up transformer auto transfer block is inoperable for any reason. feature on low voltage.

The manually operated lockout relays although calibrated, are not covered by periodic testing.

These lockout relays will tested periodically in the future.

FSAR 2,400 Volt system - Automatic transfer of the 2,400 volt This feature is demonstrated during This function will be 8.6.2 buses from the normal power source (Station Power a normal plant trip above 16% power. periodically verified

• Transformer 1-2) to the standby power source (Start-up Fast transfer test was performed in in the future.

Transformer 1-2) ls initiated by turbine trip or early 1986.

generator trip. Two separate turbine auto stop oil pressure sensors are provided for initiating the transfer.

Revision l 4 STATION POWER SYSTEM-OP02

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STATION POWER SYSTEM EXCEPTION/

SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR Automatic transfer is blocked if the start-up transformer None There is no testing (j. 6. 2 voltage ls low. Each of the lockout relays may also performed to verify the be operated manually to prevent one of the bus transfer auto transfer block if the corresponding start-up transformer breaker is feature on low voltage.

inoperable for any reason. The manually operated lockout relays although calibrated, are not covered by periodic testing.

These lockout relays will be tested periodically in the future.

FSAR The 480 volt Buses 11 and 12 may be tied together by closing SOP-30 provides instructions and No testing is performed

~.7.1 Breakers 52-1118 and 52-1217 (normally open). An interlock normal plant maintenance provides to verify interlocks.

prevents the closure of these tie breakers if both breakers the opportunity to verify buses This will be verified connecting the redundant sources to Buses 11 and 12 can be tied. prior to start-up.

(Breakers 52-1102 and 52-1202,* respectively) are closed1 one of these two supply breakers must be open in order to close the time breakers.

Associated nonsafety-related 480 volt Bus 77 is inter-connected with nonsafety-related Bus 78 by a single tie breaker. The supply breakers to Busses 77 and 78 are interlocked with the time breaker such that one of the two supply breakers must be open to close the time breaker.

Work A review of Work Order history revealed approximately 302 work Orders were post-maintenance None O?der Work Orders completed between 11/30/85 and 05/19/86. tested and declared operable.

History

\oiork A review of Work Order history revealed approximately 95 Work Orders were post-maintenance None (Jr :ler Work Orders completed between 05/19/86 to 12/15/86. tested and declared operable.

r.istory Revision l 5 STATION POWER SYSTEM-OP02

STATION POWER SYSTEM EXCEPTION/

SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION Modification A review of modification history was performed since start Re~iew of 1985 Refueling Outage.

FC-631 replaced transfer switch for bus Y-01 (instrument AC) Preoperational testing was satis- SOP-30 provides instruments factorily performed. to test this automatic bus transfer device, however, no periodic testing is performed.

This will be verified prior to start-up.

FC-652 removed electrical penetration EZ-104 for repairs1 Cables were tested satisfactorily None cable rerouted to EZ-102. via post-maintenance testing.

MCTF Charging Pump Motor Breakers:

SPS-02 1. Replace 52Y coils. Coils were replaced and tested None satisfactorily. PPACS SPS-049 performs PM.

2. Inspect breaker latch springs. Latch springs were inspected and None no problems noted. Step added to procedure to include this inspection for future.

3. Evaluate reliability of this switchgear. INPO failure rate was reviewed for Evaluation is underway all 2,400 volt and 4,160 volt to either replace switch-switchgear types and evaluation gear or to refurbish determined that failure rates were existing switchgear.

3 to 15 times higher than other switchgear types in use.

4. Develop recommendation for a revised PM PMs were modified to be performed None Program. during plant operation through use of spare breakers vice each outage.

The intent is to monitor performance of breakers and determine if improved PMs will serve to lower failure rate.

MCTF Evaluate importance of DC ground alarm in control room None A procedure and/or check-SPS-03 and troubleshooting techniques for isolating/repairing list will be devised with DC grounds. operations to determine which breakers can be troubleshot during specific plant conditions.

Revision l 6 STATION POWER SYSTEM-OP02

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STATION POWER SYSTEM EXCEPTION/

~ SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION SOP-30 7.1 4,160 V Buses 7 .1.1 To Transfer From Start-up to Station Power Transformer Normal plant operations verifies this None 7 .l. 2 To Energize Buses lF l**EA-23) and lG (**EA-24) From None The F and G bus are Alternate Source . . . * , * * * , *.*** considered part of the grid system. No testing is done to verify this.

7.2 2400 V Buses * .

7.2.1 To Transfer From Start-up to Station Power Transformer Normal plant operations verifies this None or Station Power to Start-up Transformer * * . * *

• feature each start-up and shutdown~

7.2.3 To Remove Start-up Reserve Transformer From Service 7.2.4 To Energize Bus lE Following SIS With Offsite Power R0-8 cause bus lE to trip. I None Available . * * * * * * * * * * **** We routinely place bus lE back in service following these tests.

7.3 480 V Buses .

7.3.1 To Feed Load Center 480 V Bus 11 l**EB-11) From Station Routine plant operations and main- None Power Transformer No 12 (**EX-121 * * * * * *

• tenance activities verifies these functions.

7.3.2 To Feed Load Center 480 V Bus 12 (**EB-12) From Station Routine plant operations and main- None Power Transformer No 11 (**EX-lll * * . * * *

• tenance activities verifies these functions.

7.3.3 To Feed Load Center 480 V Bus 13 (**EBtlJ) From Station Routine plant operations and main- None Power Transformer No 14 (**EX-14) . . * * . * . tenance activities verifies these functions.

7.3.4 To Feed Load Center 480 V Bus 14 (**EB-14) From Station Routine plant operations and main- None Power Transformer No 13 (**EX-131 . * * * * *

• tenance activities verifies these functions.

Revision 2 7 STATION POWER SYSTEM-OP02

STATION POWER SYSTEM EXCEPTION/

SOURCE SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION SOP-30 7.3.5 To Feed Load Center 480 V Bus 77 <**EB-77) From Station Routine plant operations and main- None Power Transformer No 78 <**EX-78) * * * * . . . tenance activities verifies these functions.

7.3.6 To Feed Load Center 480 V Bus 78 !**Ea-78) From Station Routine plant operations and main- None Power Transformer No 77 !**EX-77) * * * * . *

• tenance activities verifies these functions.

7.3.7 To Supply Load Center 90 V (**EB-90) From Station Routine plant operations and main- None Power Transformer No 13 !**EX-13) tenance activities verifies these functions.

7.3.8 To Supply Load Center 91 V l**EB-91) From Station Routine plant operations and main- None Power Transformer No 13 !**EX-13) tenance activities verifies these functions.

7.4 Pressurizer Heater Buses 15 and 16 (**EB-15 and **EB-16) 7.4. l To Energize * * * . . . * * * * * * * * * * * * * * .

• Routine plant operations and main- None tenance activities verifies these functions.

7.5 Preferred AC Buses * . *

• Routine plant operations and main- None tenance activities verifies these functions.

7.5.l To Energize . . . . * * * * * * * *

• Routine plant operations and main- None tenance activities verifies these

'functions.

• 7.5.2 To Supply A Preferred AC Bus With the Bypass Regulator Routine plant operations and main- None tenance activities verifies these functions.

7.5.3 To Transfer A Preferred AC Bus From the Bypass Regulator Routine plant operations and main- None To Its Associated Inverter . * * * * * * * * * . .

• tenance activities verifies these functions.

Revision 1 8 STATION POWER SYSTEM-OP02

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SOURCE SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION SOP-30 7.6 Instrument AC Bux Routine plant operations and main- None tenance activities verifies these functions.

7.7 Battery Chargers . * . * * * * , *

• Routine plant operations and maint- None tenance activities verifies these functions.

7.7.l To Load Batter Chargers Routine plant operations and main- None tenance activities verifies these functions.

7.7.2 To Change Operating Station Battery Chargers Routine plant operations and main- None tenance activities verifies these functions.

7.7.3 To De-Energize Batter Chargers Routine plant operations and main- None tenance activities verifies these functions.

7.7.4 To Place CFMS/Datalogger Inverter In Service . . * * * *

• Routine plant operations and main- None tenance activities verifies these functions.

7.7.5 To Shutdown Inverter Y210 & Place On Alternate Supply Routine plant operations and main- None tenance activities verifies these functions.

7.7.6 To Shutdown Inverter Y220 & Place On ~lternate Supply Routine plant operations and main- None tenance activities verifies these functions.

e. 3 .11 Backfeeding Through Main Transformer These functions are routinely performed None when sparing the start-up transformer 1-2.

8.3.12 To Return To Normal From Backfeeding Through Main Transformer These functions are routinely performed None when sparing the start-up transformer 1-2.

Revision l 9 STATION POWER SYSTEM-OP02

STATION POWER SYSTEM EXCEPTION/

SOURCE SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION ONP-2.l Emergency feed of pressurizer heater transformer #15 from Bus lC. None No periodic testing is httach l performed to verify this feature. However, normal electrical maintenance procedures may be used to change the electrical feed to the pressurizer heater transformer fl5.

Revision l 10 STATION POWER SYSTEM-OP02

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• • • • • *J EMERGENCY ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM Source System Test Requirements Test Performed Exceptions/Justlf ications FSAR Zone relaying is provided for the circuit from the switchyard to Relays are calibrated by electric lab at zone relaying functions to 0.2.2 the generator main power transformer and for the two switchyard frequency determined by experience. protect power grid system main buses. One of the main bus zones includes the circuit from from outside faults. It the switchyard_to the startup transformers. The six outgoing is not used for protection lines are each provided with high-speed relays. In a~dltion, all of the internal plant.

345 kV power circuit breakers are provided with relays to trip Existing testing is there-the second zone breakers for each circuit should the line breakers fore satisfactory.

fail to trip.

FSAR Description - Switchyard Control System - 2,400 volt Buses lC and *Normal switchyard power ls provided by None B.2.2 lE supply the swltchyard control power through the 2400-240/120 the plant systems. Normal plant evolu-volt, 60 hertz swltchyard power transformers. Bus lE may be sup- tions provide control power to the switch-plied from either diesel generator after the disconnect links on yard. R0-8 recovery exercises this Station Power Transformer 1-2 are removed. Each of the trans- function.

formers supplies half the 240/120 volt, 60 hertz power require-ments for the switchyard1 however, either transformer can be connected to carry the total load via a bus tie breaker. The AC load ls divided among four power panelsJ the loss of one po!ier Panel !iill not affect operation of the other three and hence will not jeopaidize the total 240/120 volt, 60 hertz auxiliary power ln-the swltchyard.

The 125 volt DC switchyard auxiliary power is supplied from a PM SWY 002 is performed on switchyard switchyard battery capacity 60-cell battery which ls located in the swltchyard and can supply batteries. The January 1984 loss of and load testing is not the switchyard DC power requirements for six hours without power incident proved the batteries routinely performed. This recharging. The DC load ls divided between two power panels1 the functioned to recover offsite power will be reviewed. Removing loss of one power panel will not disrupt all the 125 volt DC aux- on a total loss of AC. Batteries were battery and performing iliary power in the switchyard. supplying the switchyard for greater capacity checks affects than 4.3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />. No periodic testing the reliability of the is performed to verify battery capacity. swltchyard, which is con-trolled by power control.

This ls handled the same way all other switchyards in the Consumers grid.

.FSAR The 345 kV power circuit breakers have enough air stored in their None, Testing of the 345 kV breaker

8. 2. 2 high-pressure receivers to permit five bfeaker operations. to cycle on loss of their air compressors is not periodically performed.

This will be tested prior to the start-up and periodi-cally in the future.

Revision l Page l EMERGENCY ELEC POWER SYS/MDOl

EMERGEHCY ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM Source System Test Requirements Test Performed Exceptions/Justifications FSAR The main generator breakers are normally controlled remotely from Control room function verified during Control of switchyard 8.2.2 the plant main control room1 in an emergency, they can be con- normal operations. breakers from the switch-trolled from the switchyard relay house. yard panels is a design feature which is not routinely tested.

Control of the main generator breakers from the switchyard is an un-necessary design feature.

No scenario would require this. Therefore no testing is necessary.

FSAR The relays are supplied with test switches that will permit the Relays are routinely removed for testing. None.

8.2.2 removal of one relay or one set of relays from service for main-tenance at any time. Because of the redundancy in the relay cir-cuits, the power circuit will still be relay protected.

FSAR All circuits or portions of the buses and overhead lines have pri- Switchyard relay protection is calibrated None.

B.2.3 mary and backup relaying. The outgoing lines have three sets of and checked by System Lab on an as high-speed relays. The circuit breakers have dual trip coils on needed basis.

separate DC control circuits, and breaker failure relays to trip the adjacent breakers. The two redundant control circuits will operate even with one set of relays out of service.

FSAR Station loads, including the safety loads, are normally supplied Buses are manually transferred during Generate a test to from the main generator through the station power transformer. On each start-up and shutdown. This was periodically test fast loss of the main generator there is an automatic transfer from tested in early 1986 under HFA relay test transfer in the future.

this normal source to the immediate access offsite power circuit I-SC-84-06811A and 12A. This is not Clarify FSAR that this (see Section 8.6). The design includes provisions to test this tested during normal operation. function is not tested feature during plant operation. during normal operation.

Revision 1 Page 2 EMERGENCY ELEC POWER SYS/MDOl

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'./ j;Y EMERGENCY ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM Source System Test Requirements Test Performed Exceptions/Justifications FSAR The delayed access circuit ls established by removing disconnect Established back feeding lineup ls a normal Four to six hours ls B.2.3 links at the main generator (to establish the main transformer maintenance function. normal, non-emergency time backfeed mode of operation). In accordance with 10CFRSO, Appendix Plant batteries are load tested per FE-SA period required as defined A, General Design Criterion 17, this delayed circuit must be and B and RE-83A and B. by performance in a typical designed to be available in sufficient time, following a loss of Delayed access circuit ls used during outage. This therefore has all onsite AC power supplies and the other offslte immediate refueling. been verified in an informal access circuit, to assure that specifled*acceptable fuel design way. No further action limits and design conditions of the primary coolant pressure required.

boundary are not exceeded. In the plant design, the time required to remove the disconnect links ls 4 to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. The DC battery system is designed to supply the required shutdown loads, with total loss of AC power for at least 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> (see Subsection B. 4. 2. 3).

FSAR STATION DISTRIBUTION 4160 VOLT SYSTEM B.3.l FSAR Following a turbine or reactor trip, the 4,160 volt Buses lA and This has been verified in the past on Last cycle the plant B.3.l.2 lB will automatically transfer to the standby source and all aux- reactor trips. operated normally on lliar ies will continue to run. start-up power. This mode of normal plant operations is presently being evaluated. If it is determined to operate on station power, fast transfer testing will be periodically performed.

FSAR If the trip is accompanied by a failure in the standby source, the During start-up testing this feature was This function will be B.3.l.2 turbine generator will supply power to the primary coolant pumps verified. reviewed. Periodic for a limited time while coasting down to BO\ speed. testing will be per-formed if this is determined to be necessary.

FSAR STATION DISTRIBUTION - 2400 VOLT SYSTEM FSAR The 2400 volt system has sufficient capac\ty to start the RO-B verifies pump starting during a RO-B does test the Class lE B.3.2 largest motor when all the other motors are energized. simulated OBA. A load study is performed power system under full 8.3.2.2 any time loads are added to the bus. accident load. We do not verify the 2,400 V can start the largest motor with all other motors energized.

Load studies will be reviewed to verify this function.

Revision l Page 3 EMERGENCY ELEC POWER SYS/MDOl

EMERGENCY ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM Source System Test Requirements Test Performed Exceptions/Justifications FSAR Following a turbine or reactor trip, the 2400 volt buses will Availability of standby source is None.

8.3.2.2 automatically transfer to the standby source and all auxiliaries demonstrated by normal plant trip from will continue to run. If the trip ls accompanies by a failure in above 20% power. R0-8 verifies power the standby source, the emergency generators will supply power to available upon loss of standby power.

the engineered safeguards FSAR Breakers 152-103, 107 and 110 have special remote/local isolation Isolation switches tested under FC-639. periodic testing is not 8.3.2.2 switches to allow control in the event of fire in certain areas of performed to verify remote/

8.4.1.2 the plant. These switches are intended to ensure operability of local operation of Appendix safe shutdown equipment per 10CFRS0.48 and 10CFRSO, Appendix R. R isolation switches for -

Reference FSAR Section 7.4 for critical fire areas. the 2400V breakers.

Testing was performed in early 1986 as part of modification closeout process. (Completed under T-FC-639-501.) A PACS will be generated to periodically verify the function.

FSAR Important control circuits, such as bus transfer and load shed- RE-66 checks Bus 1-C and 1-D undervoltage None 8.3.2.2 ding, have white indicating lights to show circuit availability. relays.

Undervoltage relays initiate an alarm upon loss of potential.

FSAR All 2400 breakers on Buses lC and lD are also capable of being None No routine testing is 8.3.2.2 controlled from the switchgear. performed to verify control of Bus lC and lD breakers from the switchgear. Excep-tions found during the review of the mechanical systems resulted in changing surveillance to start various loads locally periodically.

These breakers will there-for be operated locally prior to start-up and periodically in the future.

FSAR The engineered safeguards loads can be supplied by standby power, Demonstrated by normal plant evolut~ons, None.

8.3.2.3 diesel power or from the switchyard through the main transformer R0-8, and normal refueling operation while after disconnecting the turbine generator. backfeeding.

Revision l Page 4 EMERGENCY ELEC POWER SYS/MDOl i\.J.b:~; \~ ._

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EMERGENCY ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM Source System Test Requirements Test Performed Exceptions/Justifications FSAR STATION DISTRIBUTION - 480 VOLT SYSTEM 8.3.3 Station Power Transformers 11, 12, 19 and 20, corresponding Load Verified during normal operation when None 8.3.3.2 Centers and Motor Control Centers 1, 2, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25 and 26 Load centers removed for maintenance.

are an integral part of the engineered safeguards electrical system. This equipment is arranged into two channels so that multiple pieces of equipment with a common function are fed from opposite channels. The capacities of the station power trans-formers and the 480 volt bus tie breakers for Load Centers 11 and 12 are sufficient to permit plant operation at full load with one transformer out of service.

FSAR The 480 volt system has sufficient capacity to start and acceler- R0-8 does test the lE power sy~tem (FSAR 8.3.3.2) The 480 8.3.3.2 ate largest motor when all other motors on the system are ener- under full accident load. volt system is not capacity gized. tested with all 480 volt motors at full accident loads.

Load studies are performed whenever additional loads are added to buses. This method will be reviewed to determine if this criteria is an input to those loads.

FSAR Starters in the 480 volt motor control centers assigned to engi- Lights verified in the control room and (FSAR 8.3.3.2) Local control 8.3.3.2 neered safeguards loads may be controlled from the control room or locally by operators. of 480V is not demonstrated from local panels. Status of these starters is indicated by periodically. Local control lights in the control room and at the local panels. Other associated annunciators and starters are controlled at the motor control centers or at local indicating lights are not panels. Critical breaker and motor overload trips are annunciated periodically tested.

in the control room.

The annunciation of critical breaker trips and motor overload trip will be verified prior to startup and periodi-cally in the future to the extent practical.

FSAR The 480 volt load center breakers are equipped with thermalmag- Trip devices calibrated by electric lab on None 8.3.3.2 netic devices. Motor control centers are equipped with thermal- an every other refueling basis.

magnetic breakers for nonmotor loads, and magnetic breakers and starters with thermal protection for the motor circuits.

FSAR 480 volt loads will continue to run when the 2400 and 4160 volt Buses manually transferred each start-up None systems transfer to the standby source. Cooling tower 480 volt and shutdown.

loads are supplied from Start-up Transformers 1-1 and 1-3 via 4160 volt buses lF and lG and are not transferred.

Revision 1 Page 5 EMERGENCY ELEC POWER SYS/MDOl

EMERGENCY ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM Source System Test Requirements Test Performed Exceptions/Justifications FSAR Loss of Normal and Standby Power - If the standby source fails, RO-B and R0-13 tests system response None 8.3.3.2 all cooling tower and nonessential loads will be shed. Load Cen- following a simulated DBA or loss of ters 11, 12, 19 and 20 and Motor Control Centers 1, 2, 21, 22, 23 I standby power.

and the essential loads will be supplied by the emergency genera-tor through the 2400 volt buses.

FSAR Shutdown Operation - No change in status of the incoming bus Demonstrated by normal plant shutdown. None 8.3.3.2 breakers and tie breakers is required during shutdown. Other breakers and the motor starters are operated manually or auto-matically as required by the shutdown sequence.

FSAR Operation After Loss of Coolant Accident - A Loss of Coolant Demonstrated by RO-B. None 8.3.3.2 Accident affects the 480 volt in-plant system only if accompanied by loss of standby power in which case all loads except the engi-neered safeguards load centers and motor control centers are shed automatically. Upon return of power to 2400 volt Buses lC and lD, additional 480 volt loads may be energized manually by the oper-tor.

FSAR Fuses are provided to ensure containment electrical penetrations Q0-1 verified pressurizer heaters Fuses are a backup design 8.3.3.2 overcurrent backup protection for circuit breakers in the HCC do not trip on receipt of an SIS feature which are not 8.3.5.2 starters feeding submerged equipment not de-energized following a signal. tested. Fuses were added Loss of coolant Accident (LOCA) and also to ensure that the opera- as modification for sub-tion of backup protection does not lead to interruption of the merged electrical equipment power supply to other safety-related equipment. Fuses are pro- concerns. Fuses are backup vided for electrical penetration backup protection in motor protection of the penetration starters 120 V AC control circuits to protect electrical penetra- downstream of the breakers.

tions against damage by overcurrent. For similar reasons, the Fuses are passive devices.

Pressurizer Heater Transformers XlS and Xl6 are tripped upon No testing is necessary.

safety injection signal actuation. Pressurizer heaters do not trip on a SIS signal. FC-683 was completed during 1986 Maintenance Outage.

FSAR will be corrected.

FSAR STARTUP DISTRIBUTION - CONTROL ROD DRIVE POWER B.3.4 Loss of control rod drive power does no~ affect the rod position. Control rod drive power is independent None B.3.4.2 Loss of power is annunciated in the conlrol room of rod hold power. The emergency rod drive power interrupt alarm operability is verified as part of normal plant evolutions.

Revision 2 Page 6 EMERGENCY ELEC POWER SYS/MDOl

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EMERGENCY ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM Source System Test Requirements Test Performed Exceptions/Justifications FSAR DC AND PREFERRED AC SYSTEMS 8.3.5 The following design features assure the availability of 125 volt 8.3.5.2 DC power for the operation of Diesel Generators 1-1 and 1-2, safe-guards 2400 volt Buses lC and lD, nonsafeguards Buses 13 and 14 and the Auxiliary Shutdown Control Panel Cl50 in the event a fire damages 125 volt DC distribution equipment in the cable spreading room.

Fuses between each battery and its bus are located in the*lr Fuses are considered a non-testable design None respective battery rooms. feature.

In each battery room, a nonautomatic circuit breaker with a shunt None (FSAR 8.3.52., Items 2 and trip ls provided in the circuit between the battery fuse and its 3) The shunt trip device bus. The shunt trip device of these circuit breakers is a trip associated with the 125 coil that is energized by battery voltage via the 125 volt DC dis- volt DC buses are not tribution panel. The nonautomatic circuit breakers were specified periodically tested. These for use in 125 volt DC systems and for a steady-state load of 400 will be tested prior to amperes. They are qualified per lEEE 323-1974 and lEEE 344-1975. startup and periodically They do not contain fault detectors and are not intended to inter- in the future.

rupt fault currents although they have that capability. They are manually operated open or closed.with the capability of being opened remotely via the shunt trip device.

If the shunt trip push button ls closed inadvertently, the battery The 125 volt DC buses will be separated from the principal 125 volt DC bus. An under- undervoltage relays are voltage relay has been installed on the battery and will detect not periodically calibrated.

the separation of the battery from its charging source. Operation This was tested under of the relay is annunciated in the control room. modification procedure FC-407-148. This relay and annunciator will be verified functional prior to startup and periodi-cally in the future.

FSAR The chargers are provided with filters and surge protection to Recovery from RE-83A/B and FE-5A/B None e.3.5.2 enable either charger to supply the DC loads including the opera- provide testing of this function.

tion of 2400 volt circuit breakers with tre battery disconnected.

FSAR Both DC systems are ungrounded and are equipped with ground detec- Shiftly checks of ground indications are The ground detectors and 8.3.5.2 tors continuous monitoring. Monitoring is also provided on other performed. No periodic testing is per- annunciators will be veri-important system parameters. such as bus voltage and current. formed. fied operable prior to Abnormal conditions are annunciated in the control room. startup and periodically in the future.

Revision 1 Page 7 EMERGENCY ELEC POWER SYS/MDOl

EMERGENCY ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM Source System Test Requirements Test Performed Exceptlons/Jus t ff lea t ions FSAR The preferred AC buses operate ungrounded and are equipped with Bus status is verified each shift. Any The ground detectors will B.3.5.2 ground detectors. problems or changes would be identified be verified operable prior and addressed. This ls deemed adequate. to start-up and periodi-cally in the future.

FSAR In order to comply with the electrical isolation requirements of Rirk key interlock exists with only one key None lEEE 384, Regulatory Gulde 1.75 and Regulatory Gulde l.6, the available.

bypass regulator output breakers are interlocked to preclude sup-plying more than one preferred AC bus at a time.

FSAR The battery on each bus ls kept fully charged, floating at approxi- ME-12 measures battery voltage and None B.3.5.2 mately 130 volts. specific gravity.

FSAR Periodically, the charger voltage is raised to approximately 138 HE-12 speclf ies a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> equalize charge None B.3.5.2 volts for battery equalizing. at 138 volts.

FSAR Emergency Operation - On loss of normal and standby AC power, all Tested during R0-8, but is not documented R0-8 will be revised to B.3.5.2 DC loads will be supplied from the station battery. As soon as on the checkoff list. document auto operation of one of the diesel generators has started and is ready for loading, battery chargers.

the battery chargers will automatically resume operation and sup-port the battery.

FSAR Testing - A test push button ls provided at the DC control center Containment DC lights are tested by RE-87 None to check the operation of the DC.emergency lights. and DC lights outside containment are tested by AE-5 and AE-5A /

FSAR system Monitoring - The DC and preferred AC power systems (ie, Bus status is verified each shift. Periodic testing and 8.3.5.2 chargers, inverters, batteries and breakers) are controlled any problems or changes would be calibration of alarm and locally. The operational status information is displayed locally. identified and addressed. monitoring devices associated with DC and preferred AC power systems ls not performed. Proper operation of these devices will be verified prior to startup and periodically in the future.

Revision 2 Page 8 EMERGENCY ELEC POWER SYS/MOO!

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EMERGENCY ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM Source System Test Requirements Test Performed Exceptlons/Justif ications FSAR In order to meet lEEE 30B-197B, Paragraph 7.1.3 requirements, the Alarm response procedures exist for these Periodic testing and cali-8.3.5.3 control room features an assortment of DC power system alarms (le, *conditions. bration of alarm and moni-

"Battery Chargers Power Off", "125 Volt DC Bus Ground", "125 Volt toring devices associated DC Bus Undervoltage/Trouble" and "Preferred AC Bus Trouble"). with DC and preferred AC power systems ls not per-The proper combination of these alarms will alert the operator formed. Proper operation of most conceivable malfunctions, misalignments or maladjustments of these devices will be which might occur to render any part of the system inoperable. verified prior to startup and periodically in the future.

FSAR Each of the two battery chargers provide on the DC bus ls cap- Battery chargers are rested for capacity Modifications have been 8.3.5.3 able of supplying the normal DC loads on the bus and simultane- under RE-83A/B each refueling performed to add loads ously recharging the battery in a reasonable time. A fully to preferred AC buses.

discharged battery can be recharged in less than nine hours. The This will be reviewed inverters are rated at 20% higher than the maximum anticipated to verify excess cap-power requirement of the preferred AC buses. acity still exists. If not the FSAR will be clarified.

FSAR Emergency Operation - Complete loss of all AC power analysis ls RE-83A and B and FE-SA and B test the None 8.3.5.3 given in Subsection 8.4.2.3. battery for this mode of operation.

FSAR INSTRUMENT AC SYSTEM 8.3.6.2 This system can only furnish power to one of the preferred AC Kirk key interloc~ exists allowing only one None buses through a bypass regulator. preferred AC bus to be powered.

FSAR Each of the two instrument AC transformers is sized to supply the Periodic operation with inverter in None 8.3.6.3 panel load and one preferred AC panel bus via the bypass regula- bypass adequately verifies ability tor. of inverter to handle its load.

FSAR EMERGENCY POWER SOURCES 8.4 The synchronizing equipment is automatically bypassed by breaker R0-8 demonstrates this. None 8.4.l.2 position interlocks to permit manual and automatic closing of the emergency generator breaker or a dead bus.

FSAR The four 2400 volt bus s~ation power and f tartup transformer Interlocks are tested via normal None 8.4.l.2 incoming breakers are interlocked to prevent automatic closing operation each time a line bus when the associated emergency generator breaker is closed. The transfer ls performed (from D/G transformer breakers can be closed manually only by using syn- to station or start-up power.

chronizing equipment when the associated emergency generator breaker is closed.

Revision l Page 9 EMERGENCY ELEC POWER SYS/MDOl

EMERGENCY ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM Source System Test Requirements Test Performed Exceptions/Justifications FSAR Each engine has two independent starting control circuits, one for M0-7A-l*and 2 test both diesel starters None 8.4.l.2 each air motor, each initiated from a separate signal and ener- and control circuits on an alternating gized from separate battery sources. The diesel engines, fuel oil monthly basis. Monthly load tests pick systems and air start systems are equipped with instrumentation to up any abnormal instrumentation.

monitor all important parameters and annunciate abnormal condi-tions. Water and oil heaters are provided to maintain the engines to "start" readiness.

FSAR The generators and their 2400 volt breakers have overcurrent and Relays are periodically checked by Lab None 8.4.l.2 differential protection. Services.

FSAR The automatic start initiation circuits are a part of the safety R0-8 tests these circuits. None injection control circuits and are redundant and physically iso-lated.

FSAR The controls for the governor, voltage regulator, synchronizing M0-7A tests this. None 8.4.l.2 and for the generator breaker are located in the control room.

FSAR Normal Operation - As shown on Figures 8-17, 8-19, 8-20 and 8-21, R0-8 tests starting by undervoltage. None 8.4.l.2 both diesel generators are automatically started:

Whenever power is unavailable from the startup transformer, or When the main turbine generator trips while connected to the utility system grid, or If the undervoltage is sensed on either 2400 volt Bus lC or lD.

section 8.6 provides additional details on undervoltage starting.

FSAR Shutdown Operation - During a normal shutdown operation, the R0-13 checks normal shutdown sequencers. None I! .... l.2 emergency diesel generators will supply power only if the standby power source fails. At this time, the automatic features will govern and normal shutdown sequencers will sequentially load the generators.

FSAR Operation After Loss of Coolant Accident - The emergency genera- R0-8 tests the OBA sequencers. None 8.4.l.2 tors are required to supply power only Jf the standby power source fails. At this time, the automatic fea~ures will govern and DBA sequencers will sequentially load the diesels.

Revision l Page 10 EMERGENCY ELEC POWER SYS/MDOl

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EMERGENCY ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM Source System Test Requlreme.nts Test Performed Exceptions/Justifications FSAR In addition, each generator has enough reserve capacity to start R-8 test sequencing of all loads We do not test to demonstrate 8.4.1.3 and carry the largest single engineered safeguards device that may onto the diesel. that the diesel generator has.

be loaded on the bus by a control circuit malfunction. enough reserve capacity to start and carry the single largest safeguards device that could be loaded on the bus due to a circuit malfunction. A load study addresses this. (See Report OAS-83-RP-50). No testing other than R0-8 performed.

FSAR The emergency generators are designed to reach rated speed and H0-7A and R0-8 test start time and load None 8.4.1.3 voltage and to be ready for loading with ten seconds after the time.

receipt of a start signal and be capable of carrying full load within 30 seconds.

FSAR Each emergency generator and diesel engine is provided with H0-7A verifies normal control of diesels Not all alarms, interlocks 8.4.1.3 several alarms, interlocks and trips. Each engine may be started from control room and trips on page 8.4.4 of and placed in service locally or from the control room. The gen- FSAR are covered by periodic erators may be synchronized from the control room so that they can testing. The ones not tested be paralleled with the system for loading tests. will be tested or justif ica-lon for continued operation will e provided.

FSAR The diesel will be automatically tripped on generator differential M0-7A verifies several diesel generator Not all diesel engine trips 8.4.1.3 or overcurrent relay action, engine overspeed/underspeed, over- parameters are in this normal operating are testing periodically. See crank or low lube oil pressure, low jacket water pressure and can range. previous item.

be manually tripped at any time from the local station or from the control room.

FSAR Either of the two 20 gpm fuel oil transfer pumps are used for Oil transfer pumps are tested per H0-7C None 8.4.1.3 transferring fuel oil from the storage tank to the day tasks should additional fuel oil be required.

FSAR The jacket water pump on each diesel is fonnected to a surge line Monthly and Refueling Surveillances, None 8.4.1.3 I running to a 40 gallon expansion and makeup task located eight plus operator rounds on the diesel feet.above the crankshaft. Makeup water from the condensate stor- during surveillance ls adequate to age tank is supplied through an automatic fill valve. When the define problems with jacket water engines are not running, the jacket water is heated by two thermo- cooling.

statically controlled heating elements mounted in the engine jackets.

Revision 2 Page 11 1

EMERGENCY ELEC POWER SYS/MDOl

EMERGENCY ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM Source System Test Requirements Test Performed Exceptions/Justifications FSAR RACEWAY AND CABLING SYSTEM 8.s High-speed clearing of faults is applied to prevent damage of All breakers overcurrent trip setpoints None 8.s.2 cable. The design prevents the conductor temperature from exceed- on safety buses are periodically tested.

ing 250°C for thermosetting insulation materials, 200°C for rubber No testing is reguired on non-safety insulated cable or 150°C conductor temperature for plastic insu- bus breakers.

lated cable.

I FSAR The safety-related cabling system does not fully meet the reguire- H0-26 checks fire suppression and hose None 8.5.3.1 ments of Regulatory Guide 1.75 since the plant was designed and station alignment.

constructed before the Guide was established. As a result, fixed automatic water fire suppression systems have been provided in

-areas of dense safety-related cables. Manual hose stations and portable extinguishers are provided as backup.

FSAR In order to meet the intent of Regulatory Gulde 1.75 and NRC BTP 8.5.3.4 CMEB 9.5-1, the following design features are provided for protec-tion against a fire in the cable spreading room:

Fire detection provided by flow alarms in the sprinkler system. S0-6 tests sprinkler alarms None FSAR Smoke detectors to detect incipient fires. Smoke detectors are tested periodically None 8.5.3.6 per SI-7.

FSAR The ventilation ducts leading to the turbine building and into the RH-93 checks and tests safety-related fire None 8.5.3.4 battery rooms have fusible link fire dampers installed. dampers.

FSAR As a result of this potential for fire, fire detection devices are RI-67 checks containment fire detection None 8.5.3.8 provided in the reactor containment instrument room and cable system. PCP indications are available penetration area1 primary coolant pump bearing temperature and and normally used in control room.

motor winding temperature readout are also available to give indi-cation of a fire in the primary coolant pump area1 portable carbon dioxide and water extinguishers are provided.

Revision 1 Page 12 EMERGENCY ELEC POWER SYS/MDOl

EMERGENCY ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM Source System Test Requirements Test Performed Exceptions/Justifications FSAR AUTOMATIC TRANSFER,* VOLTAGE PROTECTION AND LOAD SHEDDING CONTROLS 8.6 Voltage protection and load shedding features for safety-related R0-8 tests the single DBA sequence FSAR Chapter 14 time buses at the 2400 volt and lower voltage levels are designed in triggered on undervoltage. RE-66 A ' B delays will be verified.

accordance with 10CFR50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria 17 and R0-66 C and D calibrates and tests and the following features: Bus lC and lD undervoltage relays.

Two levels of automatic voltage protecti~n from loss or degrada-tion of offsite power sources are provided. The first level pro-vides normal loss of voltage protection. The second level of protection has voltage and time delay set points selected for automatic trip of the offsite sources to protect safety-related equipment from sustained degraded voltage conditions at all voltage levels in accordance with ANSI C8.4.l-1977, with coinci-dence logic to preclude spurious trips. Maximum time delays for second level trip do not exceed the maximum time delay assumed in Chapter 14 analysis for engineered safeguards actuation while allowing short duration bus voltage disturbances without trip and short enough to prevent damage or failure of safeguards systems and components. This second level of protection meets lEEE 279-1971, lEEE 308-1978, lEEE 501,1978 and its components are located in a controlled atmosphere not requiring environment qualification.

The voltage protection system automatically prevents load shedding None Past procedures will be of the safety-related buses when the emergency generators are sup- reviewed to determine if plying power to the safeguards loads. Automatic bypass and rein- this is indirectly verified.

statement is verified by periodic testing. If not this will be verified prior to startup and periodically in the future.

FSAR PHYSICAL SEPARATION, ELECTRICAL ISOLATION AND SUPPORT SYSTEMS Ii. 7 Fire Protection of Switchgear Room 0.7.2.5 Fire detection is provided by smoke detectors and flow alarms SI-7 checks fire detection circuits. None actuated by water flow in the sprinkler system. Fire extinguish- M0-26 checks fire suppression and hose ment capability is provided by an automatic sprinkler system in station alignment.

the switchgear rooms and the cable tunnelr backed up by water RM-93 checks and tests safety-related fire hose stations and portable extinguishers. dampers.

• Additional protection factors are provided as follows:

Smoke detectors for detection of incipient fires (both rooms)1 Dampers in ventilation duct penetrations of fire barriers1 and Fire sensitive closure device on fire doors.

Revision 1 Page 13 EMERGENCY ELEC POWER SYS/MDOl

EMERGENCY ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM source System Teet Requirements Test Performed Exceptions/Justifications FSAR 8.7.2.7 Batter Room Protection A sail switch in the ventilation duct warns the control room of a None Verify this sail switch loss of battery room ventilation. functions prior to startup and periodically in the future.

Each room has a pressurized air intake from the cable spreading RM-93 checks and tests safety-related None room with fusible link dampers installed. The battery rooms' fire dampers.

ventilation exhausts to the outside. SI-7 checks fire detection circuits.

H0-26 checks fire suppression and hose None Smoke detection ls provided for these rooms. Fire extlngulshment station alignment.

ls provided by water hose stations located in adjacent areas and by portable extinguishers.

MCTF EPS-04 Replace hoses and clean diesel belly and day tanks for 1-2 D/G. All flex hoses were replaced. Belly and None day tanks were cleaned. Visual inspection.

of hoses with D/G in operation during testing, and observation of acceptable fuel oil pressure during operation was performed.

MCTF EPS-05 Complete maintenance on K-6A Lube Oil temperature switch, TS-1478. New indicator was installed and calibrated. None PACS EPS-011 performs yearly calibration on instrumentation. H0-7A performed on K-6A and lube oil temperatures and alarms functioned normally.

MCTF EPS-07 Obtain output voltage data on D/G battery chargers and evaluate An automatic battery charger has been None for acceptability. installed on both D/G 1-1 and 1-2.

Chargers have been in service approximately one year and adequately maintain the charge for the air compressor batteries. PPAC EPS-027 performs yearly PM on batteries and chargers.

MCTF EPS-09 Complete evaluation as to adequacy and stability of D/G controls Load instabilities were corrected by None including the implications of these factors on each mode of replacing electric governor operation. circuitry and motor operated potentiometer.

Injection nozzle for cylinder 3L was replaced. Full load portion of H0-7A was performed and load stability was satisfactory.

• Revision l Page 14 EMERGENCY ELEC POWER SYS/MDOl

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EMERGENCY ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM Source System Test Requirements Test Performed Exceptlons/Justif icatlons Work A review of Work Order history revealed approximately 99 Work orders were post maintenance None Order work orders completed between ll/30/85 and 05/19/86. tested and declared operable.

History Work A review of work order history revealed approximately 92 Work Orders were postmaintenance None Order work orders completed between 05/19/86 to 12/15/86 tested and declared operable.

History Modification Review A review of modification history was performed since start of 1985 Refueling Outage.

FC-639 installed isolation switches on lC Engineered Tested satisfactorily via a modification None Safeguards bus and on l-l Diesel Generator. test procedure.

FC-653 installed DC Panel short circuit protection. Tested satisfactorily during post None maintenance test.

SOP-30 7.2.1 To transfer from startup to station power transformer Normal plant operations during startups None or station power to startup transformer. and shutdowns verifies these operations.

SOP-30 7.2.2 To supply 2400 V lC, lD and lE from the startup reserve None This capability ls not transformer. routinely tested. The reserve transformer is a spare transformer located on site. It is only re-quired during long shutdown conditions when the startup is not available. Testing is not required for improving reliable or safe plant operations.

SOP-30 7.3 480V Buses -.feeding load centers througp bus tie breakers. Normal plant electrical operations None utilize these bus tie breakers routinely. M0-29 and CL-30 verifies proper electrical lineup.

SOP-30 7.5 Preferred AC buses - to energize and to transfer to/from Normal plant electrical operations None a bypass regulator. verifies these functions. H0-29 and CL-30 verifies proper electrical lineup.

Revision l Page 15 EMERGENCY ELEC POWER SYS/MDOl

EMERGENCY ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM Source System Test Requirements Test Performed Exceptions/Justifications SOP-30 7.7 Battery chargers operations H0-29 and Cl-30 verifies proper electrical None lineup and normal plant electrical operations verifies these functions.

SOP-22 7.5 Diesel Engine and Generator Operations* H0-7A, 1/2, M0-7C and R0-8 verify diesel None generator operability.

ONP-20 / Diesel Generator manual control. This procedure has been performed This will be performed once however, this is not routinely prior to startup.

tested.

• Revision 2 Page 16 EMERGENCY ELEC POWER SYS/MDOl

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• • • TURBINE GENERATOR EXCEPTION/

SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR 7.5.2.6 The electronic controller performs basic analog computations on Tested by PAC TGSOlO None reference signals and turbine feed-back signals and generates an output to the actuators.

The operator's panel contains push buttons and switches which These controls are used during turbine None are used to change the reference input to the controller to startup and normal operations.

vary the speed or load.

Indicators provide continuous monitoring of steam admission Tested by PAC TGSOlO None valve position, load limit setting and control signal.

7.5.2.6 Emergency trip action is caused by the operation of trips PAC TGS016 calibrates low vacuum and low Overspeed testing is per-located in the hydraulic mechanical system protective* bearing oil pressure trip switches. formed after each refueling device unit: low-vacuum, low bearing oil pressure, Solenoid trip is manually actuated on outage as part of the overspeed trip and loss of generator load, or manually each turbine startup per SOP 8. turbine inspection program with the overspeed trip lever. This action is also but is not documented on caused by operation of the solenoid trip which is actuated a controlling document.

by the manual trip switch in the control room and by Loss of load trip is not electrical system protective relays. periodically tested.

This will be verified prior to startup and periodically in the future (item 59).

7.5.2.6 A reactor trip results from a turbine generator trip only RI-17 tests the turbine trip on MSIV None when the reactor is about 15% full power level. A turbine closure.

generator trip on closure of the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) is provided to protect the MSIVs from experiencing the full differential pressure of a steam generator.

7.5.2.6 The turbine generator unit ls controlled from the operator's Tested by PAC TGSOlO None panel. The panel shows which devices are controlling the turbine generator. The controller computes signals to position the governor valves. As the speed reference ls changed during start-up, the speed transducer signal ls compared to the reference speed setting. The difference or speed error then sets the position of the governor valves servo actuators. The governor valve servo actuators change the steam flow to the turbine. The result is a change in turbine speed which is detected by the speed transducer and ls compared to the reference speed setting.

7.5.2.6 When the turbine ls under dispatch control, load reference None This feature is not changes are made manually. The impulse chamber pressure ls used at Palisades.

compared to the load reference setting. The difference is a The FSAR will be clarified.

load error to the controller, which repositions the governor valve actuators until the load error becomes zero.

Revision 1 1 TURBINE GENERATOR SYSTEM/ANO)

TURBINE GENERATOR EXCEPTION/

SOURCE SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION

7. 5. 2. 6 The reheat stop and interceptor valves can be tested while Tested by PAC X-Ops 240. None the turbine is loaded. A signal can be introduced to the servo amplifier to cause the servo valves to exercise the stop and governor valves.

7.5.3.6 To have an uncontrolled source of steam from the main steam None line, all of the following turbine, control devices would have to fail:

1. Main governor and governing valves. Tested each startup per SOP B and tested monthly per PAC X-OPS 240

2. Auxiliary governor. This is an acceleration response device None Auxiliary governor overspeed which closes the turbine main governing valves and the moisture limiter is not periodically separator intercept valves. tested. This will be tested prior to startup and periodi-cally in the future.

3. Emergency trip. This is a centrifugally actuated device which Tested each refueling outage. None trips the turbine throttle valves and the moisture separator I stop valves. I 10.2.2 STEAM TURBINE In the event of turbine trip initiated from a RI-37 calibrates the low auto-stop Turbine trip input to RPS solenoid trip, overspeed, low bearing oil pressure, low condenser oil pressure switch. is not periodically vacuum, thrust bearing failure or a manual trip, a signal is tested. This will be veri-supplied from the turbine auto-stop oil system to the Reactor fied prior to startup and Protective System to trip the reactor. periodically in the future.

10.2.2 Upon turbine control's receipt of a dropped rod signal from the None This feature is disabled Control Rod Drive System or a rapid flux change signal from the and is no longer used.

power range nuclear instruments, the turbine output is The FSAR will be clarified.

automatically limited by the turbine controls to a maximum of 70%

of full load output. The 70% of load limit is accomplished within 30 seconds by the turbine governor control. If Plant power is less than 70% when a dropped rod signal occurs, the turbine output will not be affected~ If the reactor temperature moderator coefficient is positive, this featu.re will be defeated to prevent power peaking problems within the dore.

10.2.2.2 In order to minimize the possibility of turbine disc rupture, it This inspection is performed every 5 years None is necessary to periodically inspect the critical disc bore region. as part of the turbine overhaul.

Re\*ision 2 2 TURBINE GENERATOR SYSTEM/AN03

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TURBINE GENERATOR EXCEPTION/

~ SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION l:J.2.2.3 Electrical Generator Seal Oil System - The turbine bearing oil system serves as a seal None Turbine bearing oil pump oil backup should the seal oil pump stop or if the seal oil auto start is not pressure should drop below B psi. periodically tested.

This will be verified prior to startup and periodically in the future.

10.2.2.3 Signal System - This system provided the operator with signals on Hydrogen supply low the operating conditions present in Table 10-4. pressure, Hydrogen high temperature and hydrogen SIGNAL SYSTEM OPERATING CONDITIONS side low oil level switches are not periodically tested.

1. Hydrogen Purity - High or Low PAC TGS 032 These will be verified prior to startup and periodically

2. Hydrogen Pressure - High or Low PAC TGS 032 in the future.

3. Hydrogen Supply Pressure - Low None

4. Water Detection - High AC TGS 022

5. Hydrogen T.emperature - High None

6. Defoaming Tank Level - High PAC TGS 021

7. Air Side Seal Oil Pump - Off PAC TGS 015

8. Seal Oil Pressure - Low PAC TGS 015

9. Hydrogen Side Level - Low None

10. Seal Oil Turbine Backup Pressure - Low PAC TGS 015

11. Hydrogen Side Seal Oil Pump - Off PAC TGS 015

12. Air Side Seal Oil Backup Pump RuJning PAC TGS 028 10.3.1 REACTOR AND/OR TURBINE TRIP Following a reactor and/or turbine trip, the feedwater flow to PAC FWS 032 calibrates feedwater control. None the steam generator is ramped down to 5' of full flow in the first EOP 1.0 directs operator action after a 60 seconds. Once the system transient has terminated, the operator, reactor trip.

while monitoring the primary coolant temperature, can restore and maintain the steam generator level. The feedwater temperature will decrease to that of the stored condensate.

Revision 1 3 TURBINE GENERATOR SYSTEM/AN03

TURBINE GENERATOR EXCEPTION/

SOURCE SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION 10.4 TESTS AND INSPECTIONS The turbine governor and stop valves, reheat stop and intercept PAC X-OPS 240 test turbine valves H0-38 None valves, bleeder trip valves and auxiliary feedwater pump may be tests AFW pump. SOP-10, section 7.5, tested while the turbine is in operation. tests bleeder trip valves monthly.

Intercepts and reheat stop valves are I tested per SOP-8, Attachment 2. I SOP 8 7.1 Turbine Generator Operations Normal operations verify these functions. None 7.2 Electrohydraulic Control System Operations Normal operations verify these functions. None 7.4 Provide HP Cylinder Heating Steam Normal operations verify these functions. None 7.5 Lube Oil Purification System Operation Normal operations verify these functions. None 7.6 Lube Oil System and Turning Gear Normal operations verify these functions. None 7.7 Seal Oil System Normal operations verify these functions. None 7.8 Hydrogen Gas System Normal operations verify these functions. None 7.9 Isophase Bus Coolers Operations Normal operations verify these functions. None 7.10 Main Transformer Normal operationi; verify these functions. None 7.11 Pilot Wire Transfer Trip Operations The trip relays are reset after actuation None per the steps of SOP-32. I SOP 8 Test intercept, reheat stop, main stop and governor valves. Periodically tested per PAC X-OPS 240. None Items l Ii 2 SOP B Testing of Main Turbine Protective Trip Devices. Tested per the SOP None Item 3 I

SOP B Pilot Wire Test/Exciter Field Ground Test Exciter field ground is automatically Pilot wire is not Items 4 & 6 checked every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. periodically tested.

This will be tested during startup.

SOP B Test start Turbine/Seal Oil System Oil Pumps. None Testing ls not Items 5 Ii 7 periodically performed.

This will be performed during startup.

Revision 2 4 TURBINE GENERATOR SYSTEM/AN03

TURBINE GENERATOR EXCEPTION/

SOURCE SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION SOP 8 Generator condition monitor and generator RTD temperature None Testing is not 6 records checks. periodically performed.

Perform during escalations.

EOP l.O Manually trip main turbine at turbine pedestal. None Local manual trip is not Step 5.a. periodically tested.

This will be performed as part of startup testing.

MCTF Generic issue EHC problems. Perform turbine valve testing Turbine valve testing was verified during None TGS-01 with System Engineer. post maintenance testing with System Engineer and Westinghouse representative.

See Test Instructions "Post Maintenance Test of T-G Electro-Hydraulic Control System*

Rev l~

MCTF Generator Hydrogen Leakage. Perform a generator air drop test Generator drop test was performed and None TGS-02 and evaluate results for acceptability. consistent with past leakage. See internal memo JOA 86-062/JDS86-022 Attachment I "Acceptance Action Level Critical for Generator Hydrogen Leakage*.

HCTF Gland Seal Air In-Leakage. Continue with current rebuild. Leak tests were performed at 18" Vac and None TGS-06 no major leaks identified.

HCTF Automatic turbine functions. Turbine auto latch has been adjusted Latch:was tested satisfactorily under None TGS-08 during current outage. Test and verify. SC-86-208.

HCTF Turbine Lube Oil lift pumps. Test and ensure lift pump starts Test performed verifying the proper None TGS-10 at 600 RPM on a turbine trip. operation of the bearing lift pumps. See Test Instructions "Post Maintenance Test of Turbine Generator Lift Pumps and Turning Gear."

MCTF CV-0571 & CV-0575 Turbine stop valves. All turbine valves were stroked to verify None TGS-13 Inspect test and repair as necessary This included complete proper operation of the valves, position verification of closing times, limit lswitch and events recorder switches and data logger. See test circuitry. instructions "Post Maintenance Test of T-G Electro-Hydraulic Control System* Rev l.

HCTF TGS-16 Turbine-Generator EHC Power Supplies verify proper operation of The-15 and +15 volt and +48 volt were None

-15 voe, and +48 voe supplies1 check voltage regulation and ripple. checked out and voltage regulation and ripple verified. Testing was conducted via work order close out.

Revision 1 5 TURBINE GENERATOR SYSTEM/AN03

TURBINE GENERATOR EXCEPTION/

SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION Work A review of Work Order history revealed approximately 307 Work Work Orders were postmaintenance tested None Order Orders completed between 11/30/85 and 05/19/86. and declared operable.

History Work A review of Work Order history revealed approximately 140 Work Work Orders were postmaintenance tested None Order Orders completed between 05/19/86 to 12/15/86. and declared operable.

Modification heview A review of modification history was performed since start of 1985 Refueling Outage.

FC-650 added hydrogen supply flowmeter for main generator. Tested as part of FC closeout via None operational test instructions.

FC-651 installed high capacity dual tower H' dryer. Tested as part of FC closeout via Part of H' dryer was operational test instructions. recently returned to Westinghouse to have a vendor reconunended mod completed to an electrical penetration. Part needs to be reinstalled prior to startup.

FC-681 added valve on auto stop oil system down stream of 1/16" No testing necessary. None orifice.

FC-682 added pressure and vacuum gauges on main turbine glands. Data collection verified proper None installation.

FC-710 added isolation valve to main condenser vacuum sensing line. Verified turbine low vacuum alarm and None trip set points1 performed freon leak test during hot testing.

FC-692 Installed alarm for loss of power supplies at EC-23. Post Maintenance test satisfactory per None closeout of WO #24606503.

Revision 1 6 TIJRBINE GENERATOR SYSTEM/AN03

MISCELLANEOUS HVAC (D/G ROOM AND AUXILIARY BUILDING)

EXCEPTION/

~ SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR The redundant supply units for the diesel generator room PAC VAS-015 calibrates the thermostats. None 9.B.2.4 supply recirculated air or fresh air as the cooling load Auto start is verified by normal Item ? requirements demand. These fans are started automatically operation.

in sequence by thermostats.

FSAR Operation of the air supply units for *the fuel handling 9.B.2.4 area and the radwaste area is as follows:

The preheat coil is energized by an outside air thermostat None* Thermostat is not periodi-at temperatures lower than 35°F. cally checked. This will be verified prior to 100%

power.

The reheat coil is contro.lled by a leaving air thermostat None Thermostat is not periodi-set a 60°F. cally checked. This will be verified during startup.

A thermostat senses the coll leaving air temperature and PAC VAS-019 calibrates the thermostat. The annunicator is not closes an alarm circuit on low temperature to signal specifically checked. This faulty coil performance. The alarm ls located in the control will be verified prior room HVAC panel. to 100% power.

If the fan motor ls shut off, the fresh air inlet dampers None Fan/damper inte.rlock is close. not tested. This will be verified during startup.

FSAR The radwaste area exhaust system operates as follows:

9.B.2.4 Item 16 Normally both fans, each rated at 50% of the normal flow, PAC VAS-014 calibrate the damper and None operate continuously. Dampers in the fan discharge controller. SOP-24 directs operation modulate to maintain a uniform status pressure in the of both fans.

filter intake plenum.

In the event of failure of the radwaste area supply fan, PAC VAC-014 calibrates the exhaust Supply/exhaust fan inter-one of the exhaust fans is* automaticaliy shut down but the plenum pressure controller. lock is not periodically pressure control apparatus will limit ihe amount of the tested. These interlocks negative pressure developed by the lack of supply air and will be verified perio-prevent excessive pressure differentials. dically in the future.

'Revision l 1 MISC HVAC D/G RM AUX BLDG-OP02

MISCELLANEOUS HVAC (D/G ROOM AND AUXILIARY BUILDING)

EXCEPTION/

SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR In the event of a spillage of radioactive material in the None Automatic actions resulting 9.B.2.4 radwaste area, the radiation monitor at the filter plenum from high radiation are.not Item 16 senses the activity and stops the supply fan, closes the periodically tested. These radwaste area supply Damper P0-1809, and stops the interlocks will be verified selected exhaust fan1 however, a low flow alarm periodically in the future.

will override the high radiation signal and keep the standby exhaust fan running. The duct to access control remains open and is isolated from the radwaste area by Damper P0-1809.

FSAR The fuel handling area exhaust system operates as follows:

9. 0. 2. 4 Item 17 During normal operation, one or both of the exhaust fans SOP-24 directs this operation. None run, as required, and draw air through a prefilter and high-efficiency filter.

FSAR During refueling operations the exhaust air is diverted to H0-37 verifies refueling mode of None

9. 0. 2. l flow through a high-efficiency radiological filter (high- operation.

Item 3 efficiency filter) which is in parallel with the high-efficiency filter used durin~ normal operation.

In the event of a fuel handling accident in the spent fuel ONP-11.2 directs this operation. None pool, the exhaust airflow is reduced to one-half by tripping the supply fan and closing the inlet damper and tripping one of the 50% capacity exhaust fans. All of the exhaust flows through the high-efficiency radiological filter.

FS.*.R The operation of the auxiliary building addition fuel handling 9.;:. B. 4 supply and radwaste supply is as follows:

Item lB The preheat coil is controlled by a thermostat in the fresh PAC VAS-023 calibrates the thermostat. None air intake set at 35°F. The reheat coil is controlled by a leaving air thermostat to maintain a discharge temperature of 60°F. I Another thermostat is provided in the leaving air stream which PAC VAS-023 calibrates the thermostat. None is set at 45°F and alarms in the control room when this tempera-ture is reached to indicate faulty coil performance.

If the fan motor is shut off, the fresh air inlet dampers close. None Interlock is not periodi-cally tested. This will be verified periodically in the future.

He*1ision l 2 MISC HVAC D/G RM AUX BLDG-OP02

'-~tc>

MISCELLANEOUS HVAC (D/G !ROOM AND AUXILIARY BUILDING)

EXCEPTION/

SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR .The supply fans will trip on a high-radiation signal from None Trip is not periodically

!I. 2. 8. 4 radiation monitors located in the corresponding exhaust tested. This will be

!~em 18 system ducts. verified periodically in the future.

FSAR The operation of the auxiliary buildiqg addition fuel handling

,, . 2. 8. 4 area exhaust and radwaste exhaust systems is as follows1

~rem 19 Normally both fans, each rated at 50% of the normal flow, operate SOP-24 directs operation of the system None continuously. Dampers in the fan discharges modulate to main- PAC VAS-024 calibrates the dampers and tain a uniform static pressure in the filter intake plenum. controllers.

In the event of an exhaust fan failure, the supply fan may be SOP-24 directs this operation. None shutdown.

In the event of failure of a supply fan, one of the exhaust None Interlock is not periodi-fans will shutdown. cally tested. This will be verified periodically in the future.

In the event of release of radioactive material in the area None Automatic actions from serviced by the system, the radiation monitor at the filter high radiation are not plenum senses the activity and trips the supply fan which in periodically tested. This turn trips one of the exhaust fans. However, a low flow will be verified perio-condition will override the high-radiation signal and keep dically in the future.

the standby exhaust fan running.

F:';,R The penetration and fan rooms' heating and ventilating

., . ~. B. 4 system:

: ""' 20 The supply and exhaust systems run concurrently and are PACS VAS-012 calibrates the differential None controlled by a thermostat located in the exhaust duct. pressure controller, thermostat and The supply and exhaust fans are starteq when the exhaust damper positions.

air temperature is 90°F and stop when dhe exhaust air tempera-ture is 70°F.

A differential pressure controller which measures differential pressure across the filters and filter inlet damper, modulates the filter inlet damper to maintain a preset negative pressure across the filters and dampers.

P.e*Jision 1 3 ms-: HVAC D/G RM AUX BLDG-OP02

MISCELLANEOUS HVAC (D/G ROOM AND AUXILIARY BUILDING)

EXCEPTION/

~ SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR The electrical equipment, switchgear, cable spreading and 9.2.8.4 battery rooms' HVAC system.

Item 24 supply fan V-33 provides air to the areas identified. Makeup None Temperature controller and air to v-33 is a blend of outside air and recirculated air damper positioners are not from V-43. This blend is controlled by a mixed air tempera- periodically tested. This ture controller. will be verified perio-dically in the future.

Cable spreading, switchgear and 2.4 kV switchgear rooms PAC VAS-043 caJibrates the temperature The annunicator is not per-increases above 104°F, temperature switches 1824, 1825 and switches. Alarm response procedure iodically tested. This will 1826 will initiate a control room annunicator. The operator (ARP-8) directs starting V-47. be verified periodically in manually starts the supplemental exhaust fan V-47. the future.

FSAR LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR TO VENTILATION DAMPERS 9.8.4 The normal radwaste area and engineered safeguards room PAC VAS-014 calibrates the dampers and None ventilation mode is with all dampers open, supply fan V-10 controller. SOP-24 directs operation running, one or both exhaust fans (V-14A and/or V-14B) of both fans.

running, and the exhaust dampers (P0-1839 and P0-1840) controlled by filter intake pressure to maintain balanced airflow from all radiation monitor (RE-1809) which will close the radwaste area supply damper (P0-1809), trip one exhaust fan (V-14A or 14B) if both are running, close the respective exhaust damper, and trip the supply fan (V-10) which will in turn close the supply damper.

The remaining exhaust fan will maintain a slight negative PAC VAS-014 calibrates the dampers and None pressure on the radwaste area to prevent leakage out of controller. SOP-24 directs operation the building. The tripped exhaust fan will restart if of both fans.

2.5 inches of water vacuum is not maintained in the exhaust plenum.

The normal ventilation mode in the fuel handling area during SOP-24 directs this operation. None reactor operation or reactor shutdown is supply damper P0-3007 open, supply fan V-7 operating, one or both exhaust fans (V-8A or V-8B) operating, and one or both gtavity exhaust dampers open.

Revision l 4 MISC HVAC D/G RM AUX BLDG-OP02 9

MISCELLANEOUS HVAC (D/G ROOM AND AUXILIARY BUILDING)

EXCEPTION/

SOURCE SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST P-ERFORMEO JUSTIFICATION FSAR No change in the normal ventilation mode occurs in the R0-8 verifies load shed. None 9.8.4 unlikely event of a OBA unless the OBA is accompanied by Continued a loss of standby power at which time the ventilation fans will be shed from their respective bus and the dampers will close.

Upon a fuel building high-radiation acea alarm, fan V-7 is SOP-24 directs this operation. None manually tripped which closes dampers P0-3007 and one exhaust fan is manually tripped closing its gravity damper. The remaining running fan continues to run maintaining a slight negative pressure on the fuel building to prevent leakage from the building.

SOP-24 System start-up and main exhaust fans. Functions are verified by normal None 7.1 operations.

SOP-24 Radwaste area ventilation.

7.3 SOP-24 Fuel handling area ventilation.

7.4 SOP-24 Piping penetration ventilation.

7.7 SOP-24 Test radwaste area fans and supply dampers. None This test is not periodi-Attach 2 cally performed. This will Item 2 be tested in the future.

,iork A review of Work Order history revealed approximately 52 Work Orders were post-maintenance None Order Work Orders completed between 11/30/8~ and 05/19/86. tested and declared operable.

History Work A review of Work Order history revealed approximately 34 Work Orders were post-maintenance None Order Work Orders completed between 05/19/86 to 12/15/8_6. tested and declared operable.

History Modification Review A review of modification history was performed since start of 1985 Refueling Outage. No modifications were performed on this system.

Revision 1 5 MISC HVAC 0/G RM AUX BLOG-OP02

SHIELD COOLING SYSTEM EXCEPTION/

~ SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR The system is designed to maintain concrete temperature below None. Concrete temperature is 9.2.1 165°F. It is capable of removing 180,000 Btu/h. not monitored. Heat capa-city is not measured.

Technical Specification basis lists capacity as 120,000 Btu/hr. This will be verified during startup by test or analysis. The FSAR will be clarified.

FSAR The supply header to each set of cooling coils is provided Normal plant maintenance activities None.

9.2.1 with a diaphragm-operated, fail-open valve operated from the required operation of these valves main control room. to the closed position.

FSAR During normal operation, one shield cooling pump and one set of Normal operation per SOP-29 sets The ability of the system 9.2.3.3 cooling coils are in continuous service. The idle pump is in pump and cooling coils use. to perform its function It.em l standby. The normal flow through the shield cooling coils is will be verified during 125 gpm. startup per above item.

FSAR Both pumps can be started and stopped from the main control room. Normal operation per SOP-29 verifies Automatic start feature 9.2.2.3 The standby pump starts automatically on low discharge header pump start and stop from the control is not periodically pressure. room. tested. This will be verified prior to startup.

FSl.R Makeup water to the surge tank ls pumped from the condensate Normal operation verifies this function. This supply comes from 9.2.2.3 storage tank through an on-off solenoid valve which is actuated condensate tank. Supply by a level switch on the surge tank. is from T-81. FSAR will be clarified.

FSl.R High and low level in the tank is annunicated in the con~rol room. PAC SCS-003 calibrates the level switch, The annunicator is not 9.~.2.3 transmitter and indicator. specifically tested. This will be verified prior to startup and perio-*

dically in the future.

FSAR The surge tank normally vents to the containment vent header. A None The surge tank vents to the 9.2.2.3 relief valve is provided to protect the surge tank from over- containment atmosphere.

pressure. The FSAR is incorrect. This will be corrected.

FSAR The temperature of the shield cooling water ls regulated by manual Component cooling water flow was set None 9.2.2.3 adjustment of the component cooling water outlet header butterfly by special test T-223.

valve.

Revision l 1 SHIELD COOLING SYSTEM-OP02

SHIELD COOLING SYSTEM EXCEPTION/

SOURCE SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR Temperature indication, high temperature (120°F) and low flow PAC SCS-006 calibrates temperature Annunicators are not

9. ::!

• 2. 3 annunication from the discharge of each set of coils are located indication. PAC scs-ooe calibrates specifically tested. These in the control room. flow switches. will be verified prior to startup and periodically in the future. .

If the cooling coil set in operation becomes inoperative, the Normal operation per SOP-29 verifies None standby set ls brought into operation by opening the inlet header this function.

control valve manually from the control room. Both pumps can supply cooling water to either set of coils.

Table Shield Cooling Pumps None. The ability of the shield 9-4 Capacity (each) 125 gpm cooling system to perform its function will be verified*

TDH 38 ft by test or data gathering and analysis during startup.

Shield Cooling Heat Exchanger None. The ability of the shield cooling system to perform Design Duty 200,000 Btu/h its function will be verified by test or data gathering Fluid Component Shield and analysis during startup.

Cooling Cooling Water Water Temperature In 90°F 100°F Temperature Out 93.2°F 96.B°F SOP-29 Shield Cooling System Operations Normal plant Operations verify system None 7.1/7.2/ function.

7.3 Work A review of Work Order history reveale~ approximately 9 Work Orders were post-maintenance None Order Work Orders completed between 11/30/85 and 05/19/86. tested and declared operable.

History Work A review of Work Order history revealed approximately 6 Work Orders were post-maintenance None Order Work Orders completed between 05/19/86 to 12/15/86. tested and declared operable.

History Revision l 2 SHIELD COOLING SYSTEM-OP02

---

___ ___J

SHIELD COOLING SYSTEM EXCEPTION/

SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION M:>dification Review A review of modification history was performed since start None. None.

of 1985 Refueling Outage. No modifications were performed on this system.

Revision l 3 SHIELD COOLING SYSTEM-OP02

/\.;-~~\

~* ~

~'.:!

CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEM EXCEPTION/

SOURCE SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR Motor-driven butterfly valves are provided in both pump discharge Normal operations per SOP-14 verify The interlock will l(;. 2. 4 .1 and condenser inlet piping. The valves are provided for throttling the valve functions. be verified.

during pump start-up and for maintenance isolation. The valves are interlocked with their corresponding pump motor breakers.

FSAR In order to minimize the discharge te~perature through the blow- Blowdown is controlled per SOP-14. None lG.2.4.2 down line, the blowdown is extracted from the circulating water Makeup basin level is monitored each piping just upstream of the condenser inlet and is discharged to shift by auxiliary operator rounds.

the discharge mixing basin. The blowdown is controlled to keep the discharge temperature in compliance with the Plant's NPDES permit and to maintain 1-1/2 cycles of concentration when compared to the lake inlet.

FShf< Dilution water is normally added to the Circulating Water system Normal operations per SOP-14 None l[J. 2. 4*. 3 on the inlet line downstream of the blowdown line. Two 30,000 verify these functions.

gpm vertical dilution pumps provide this flow. In addition, dilution flow may be directed to the mixing basin on an as needed bas ls.

Table Cooling Tower Pumps 10-9 Design Flow, gpm 205,000 None. Normal plant operation verifies adequate cir-Design Head, ft 106 culating water flow.

Trend program will monitor performance during power escalation.

SOP-14 Circulating water/diluton water/cooling towers/chlorination/ Normal operations verifies these None 7 .1 chemical control operations. functions.

th1ough

-7 .13 .

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.;~ .

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Revision l l (:'..

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CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEM-OP02 "~; .

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CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEM EXCEPTION/

SOURCE SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION SOP-14 Warm water recirculation and emergency service water makeup. None These backup functions 7.14 are not periodically tested. Warm water recirc ls provided in case of intake screen icing.

Failure of this system will not impact the plant immediately. Alternative actions could be taken in time to correct the problem.

However, this system func-tion capability will be exercised during power escalation to or at 100% power.

Work A review of Work Order history revealed approximately 108 Work Orders were post-maintenance None Order Work Orders completed between 11/30/85 and 05/19/86. tested and declared operable.

History work A review of Work Order history revealed approximately 85 Work Orders were post-maintenance None Order Work Orders completed between 05/19/86 to 12/15/86. tested and declared operable.

History Modification neview A review of modification history was performed since start of 1985 Refueling Outage.

FC-689 added a cooling water scaling inhibitor system. Preliminary equipment testing has Final acceptance test been satisfactorily completed. to be performed with plant on line.

FC-666 structurally upgraded and repaifed the cooling towers. No testing is required. None F<e*.'ision 1 2

<IRCULATING WATER SYSTEM-OP02

,.(~-7"~\

/

J NEUTRON MONITORING SYSTEM EXCEPTION/

~ SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR Each power range safety channel is provided with a rod drop RI-62 verifies this function. None 7.6.l.2 detection circuit and provides output to an axial power ratio calculator.

FSAR The output signal of the incore flux detectors will be Computer program software is updated None 7.6.l.4 calibrated or adjusted for changes ln sensitivity due based on burnup.

It:em 4 to emitter material burnup.

FSAR The incore instrumentation is required to measure radial DWT-l2A verifies lncore instrumentation None 7.6.l.4 peaking factors for Technical Specifications limits is available.

monitoring.

FSAR The incore instrumentation must also provide a diverse DWT-12A verifies these functions. None 7.6.1.4 monitoring of reactor core quadrant power tilt and linear heat rate, both parameters being monitored also by the excore nuclear instrumentation.

FSAR Quadrant power tilt is alarmed in the control room via DWT-12A and DWT-12B verifies the Quadrant power tilt alarm 7.6.l.4 the power range safety channels and linear heat rate ls lncore alarm. from power range safety alarmed in the control room via the incore alarm system. channels is not periodically tested. This will be verified prior to startup and periodically in the future.

FSAR Audible count rate signal from start-up channels are avail- GOP's 3, B, 10 and 11 places the None 7.6.2.2 able in the control room and in the containment building. audible count rate signal in operation.

FSAR The rate-of-change information from 10-4% to 15t full RI-47 verifies alarms and control rod Reactor trip on high

7. !;

• 2. 2 power (wide range logarithmic channels) actuates alarms, withdrawal prohibit. start-up rate is not a reactor trip, or a control rod withdrawal prohibit periodically tested. This signal. 8 will be verified prior to startup and.periodically ~:.

in the future.

FSAR Comparison between power range channels allows detection SH0-1 verifies no imbalance. None 7.6.2.2 of *radial flux imbalance. .!..,

FSAR The gain of each power range control channel is adjustable Adjustment is performed per SOP-35. None 7.6.2.2 to provide a means for calibrating its output against a when necessary.

plant heat balance.

Revision l l NEUTRON MONITORING SYSTEM-OP02

NEUTRON MONITORING SYSTEM EXCEPTION/

SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION STARTUP CHANNELS FSAR Start-up channel rate signal feeds a front panel meter, RI-99 and PAC NMS-003 calibrates the None i.6.2.2 a remote meter and alarm trip units. start-up channels.

FSAR Start-up channel detector voltage 1"s also monitored by a RI-99 verifies this function. None

7. f. 2. 2 trip unit which lights a light on ctecrease of voltage or removal of any of the drawer modules.

FSAR A drawer-mounted trip unit provides a visible alarm at RI-47 verifies this alarm function. None 7.6.2.2 approximately 1.5 decades/minute. Alarm trip units reset automatically when the trip condition clears. Each trip unit actuates a front panel light. This* light is reset manually to allow determination of the previous state of the the trip unit.

FSAR Wide Range Logarithmic Channels

7. f.. 2. 2 The logarithm of neutron flux ls obtained. This signal drives PAC NMS-002 calibrates wide range None a front panel meter (10-ei full power to 125% full power), a neutron monitoring.

remote meter, a remote recorder and trip units.

FSAR Wide range rate signal feeds a front panel meter, a remote PACS NMS-002 calibrates wide range None 7.6.2.2 meter and trip units. neutron monitoring.

FSAR Detector voltage is also monitored by a trip unit which PAC NMS-002 verifies high voltage None

7. ij. 2. 2 initiates an alarm on decrease of detector voltage or alarm trip setpoint.

removal of any of the drawer modules.

Revision l 2 NEUTRON MONITORING SYSTEM-OP02

NEUTRON MONITORING SYSTEM EXCEPTION/

~ SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR Each wide-range logarithmic channel contains eight trip PAC NMS-002 verifies all bistables on None 7.6.2.2 units. Operation of the trip units is according to the wide range channels.

Table 7-4 Table 7-4.

Approximate Input Signal Action Set Point Detector Voltage, Audible and Visible 15\ Below Normal Module Interlock, Alarm Operating Voltage Operate Calibrate Switch Log Power Level Bypass Rate-of-Change of Power Trip. Dis-able Zero Power Mode Bypass (Effective for One Protective Channel)

Log Power Level Bypass Rate-of-Change of Power Trip. Dis-able Zero Power Mode Bypass (Effective for One Protective Channel)

Rate-of-Change Pretrip Signal and Rod 1.5 Decades/Minute of Power Withdrawal Prohibit (Bypassed <10-4~

(Effective for Two and >15%)

Protective Channels)

Rate-of-Change Trip Signal to Reactor 2.6 Decades/Minute of Power Protective System (Bypassed <10-4%

(Effective for One and >15%)

Protective Channels)

Rate-of-Change Trip Signal and Reactor 2.6 Decades/Minute of Power Withdrawal Pr~hibit (Bypassed <10-4' (Effective for Two and >15%)

Protective Channels) *,._.

FSl.R POWER RANGE SAFETY CHANNELS 7.6.2.2 The outputs of a A and B subchannels are compared and the PAC NMS-001 calibrates the power ratio None deviation signal sent to an axial power ratio calculator recorder.

for axial power distribution monitoring.

Revision 1 3 NEUTRON MONITORING SYSTEM-OP02

e:':/;I NEUTRON MONITORING SYSTEM EXCEPTION/

~ SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR The output from the comparator average ls returned to each SH0-1 compares power range channels Quadrant power tilt alarm 7.6.2.2 channel drawer and compared to each channel via two deviation each shift and verifies deviation does ls not periodically checked.

comparators. The two levels of deviation are alarmed at the not exist. Incore neutron monitoring channel drawer and also by remote alarms as percent average is primary means of core power radial (quadrant) flux tilt, Level 1, or Level 2, quadrant power tilt measure-for operator .action to ensure the Technical Speciflctlons limits ment and alarm. This alarm on radial peaking factors are obser~ed. will be verified prior to startup and periodically tested in the future.

FSAR The axial power ratio recorder-alarm monitor consists of an. PAC NMS-001 calibrates the power ratio None 7.6.2.2 axial power ratio signal calculator, a power ratio set point recorder.

potentiometer, a power ratio deviation potentiometer and a power ratio recorder.

FSAR The alarm light alerts the operator in the event that the PAC NMS-001 calibrates the power ratio The power ratio alarm ls 7.6.2.2 power ratio signal violates an operator-set upper-or-lower recorder. not periodically checked.

limit which would be indicative of an undesirable axial This will be verified prior power distribution. to startup and periodically in the future.

FSAR Power range safety channels are an alternate (diverse) means DWT-12A verifies these functions. None 7.6.2.2 of ensuring the Technical Specifications* limits o~ reactor core parameters are observed, the primary means being the incore alarm system.

The power ratio signal calculators FSAR 7.G.2.2 Generates high- and low-power ratio signal alarm limits from PAC NMS-001 calibrates the power ratio The power ratio alarm is signals sent from the power ratio set point potentiometer and recorder. Power ratio set point is not periodically checked.

power ratio deviation potentiometer located on the control determined periodically by reactor The power ratio alarm console. These potentiometers are adjusted by _the operator engineering. ls not annunicated.

as a function of control rod position and NSSS power, or as This will be verified directed by the reactor engineer. prior to startup and periodically in future (same as earlier item).

-Compares the computed power ratio signal with the calculated high- and low-alarm limits and provides an annunicated alarm when either limit is violated.

-Generates from the power ratio set point potentimeter a power ratio set point signal which is displayed* on the two-pen power ratio recorder. The duel pen power ratio recorder gives the operator a continuous trace of the power ratio set point and the power ratio signal.

-An alarm light mounted on the recorder comes on whenever the high- or low-power ratio signal alarm limits are violated.

Revision 1 4 NEUTRON MONITORING SYSTEM-OP02

NEUTRON MONITORING SYSTEM EXCEPTION/

~ SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR The full-scale signal output is changed by the range 1elector GOP's 3, 8 and 10 specify when XlO None 7 .c..2.2 switch resulting in the high power trip and pretrip 1et points position is to be used.

being lowered by a factor of ten when the range selected is 0.1%-12.5%.

FSAR The sununing circuit also has X2 gain selector switch which CL-35 verifies this capability prior to None 7.6.2.2 disconnects the input.of one ion chamber and doubles the gain each start-up.

for the other ion chamber to allow full-scale power indication should one ion chamber fail.

Revision l 5 NEUTRON MONITORING SYSTEM-OP02

NEUTRON MONITORING SYSTEM EXCEPTION/

~ SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR Each power range channel contains eight trip units. Operation 7.6.2.2 of the trip units is according to Table 7-5.

Table 7-5 Input Signal Action Set Point Detector Voltage, Audible and Visible 15% Below Normal MI-1 verifies high power trips for None Module Interlock, Alarm Operating Voltage existing pump combination.

Operate Calibrate switch RI-47 verifies rod withdrawal prohibit condition.

Power Level Trips Signal to RPS ~106.5% Full Power (Four Pumps) MI-1 verifies rate trip inhibit and loss-of-load trip bypass.

Power Level Pretrip Signal to ,$104.5% Full Power Alarm and Rod With- MI-1 verifies high voltage trip alarm.

drawal Prohibit (Four Pumps)

Power Level Trip Signal to RPS ,S39% Full Power (Three Pumps)

Power Level Pretrip Signal to ,$3H Full Power Alarm and Rod With-drawal Prohibit (Three Pumps)

Power Levei Trip Signal to RPS ,S2U Full Power (Two Pumps)

Power Level Pretrip Signal to ,$17 i Full Power Alarm and Rod With-drawal Prohibit (Two Pumps)

Power Level Rate Trip Inhi~it to >15% Full Power Logarithmic Channel Bypass Loss-of-Load <15% Full Power

• Trip l\e'.'ision 1 6 NEUTRON MONITORING SYSTEM-OP02

NEUTRON MONITORING SYSTEM EXCEPTION/

~ SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED .JUSTIFICATION FSAR A reacitivy computer can be reconnected to one of the power None This equipment is not used.

7.6.2.2 range control channels to read reactivity for 10-2% to lOOt This will be clarified in full power. The output indication is located in the control the FSAR.

room next to the other meters above to provide surveillance during start-up and at power, as well as an accurate source of test data.

FSAR Reactor Internals Vibration Monitor - In order to provide the None This capability is no 7.6.2.2 necessary data for evaluation of the character~stics and degree longer used.

of reactor internals motion, the four excore nuclear instrumenta- Technical Specifications tion (safety channels) neutron flux detector signals are sent to have been revised to a minicomputer (noise analyzer located in the control room) to delete these limits.

monitor the changing patterns of the signal noise. The The FSAR will be corrected.

Technical Specifications have limits of motion amplitude at two separate levels calculated and displayed by the minicomputer FSAR Incore Instrumentation 7.6.2.4 Verification of incore channel readings and identification of Capability ls verified per the Palisades None inoperable detectors are done by correlation between readings Incore Detector Analysis System (INCA).

and with computed power shapes using an off-line computer program.

Quadrant power tilt and linear heat rate can be determined from SOP-35 directs performance of the None the excore nuclear instrumentation provided they are calibrated process.

against the lncore readings as required by the Technical Specifications.

The lncore alarm system function is verified by the plant M0-09 verifies this function. None information processor program out-of-sequence alarm and channel check feature.

Tech Incore alarm setpoints must be updated periodically based DWT-12B updates lncore alarms. None Spec on measured power distribution.

3.ll.l Basis Revision l 7 NEUTRON MONITORING SYSTEM-OP02

NEUTRON MONITORING SYSTEM EXCEPTION/

filllIBg SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION SOP-35 Place excore monitoring systems in operation

• Normal operations verify these functions. None

. 7 .1.2/

7.2.1/

7.3.l SOP-35 Change an indication channel while operating. None These are contingency 7 .1.2/ action which are only 7.2.2/ performed should a 7.3.3 channel fail.

SOP-35 Calibrate power range safety channels. Normal operations verify this function. None 7.3.5 SOP-35 Monitor power distribution/set target power ratio. These functions are performed, as needed, None 7.3.6/ per the steps of the SOP.

7.3.7 SOP-35 lncore neutron monitoring. Functions are performed per the steps None 7.4 of the SOP.

SOP-35 Calibrate power range control channels. Functions are performed per the steps None 7.5 of the SOP.

Work A review of Work Order history revealed approximately 70 Work Orders were post-maintenance None Order Work Orders completed between 11/30/85 and 05/19/86. tested and declared operable.

History Work A review of Work Order history revealed approximately 6 Work Orders were post-maintenance* None Order Work Orders completed between OS/19fa86 to 12/15/86. tested and declared operable.

History Modification Review A review of modification history was performed since start None of 1985 Refueling Outage. No modifications were performed on this system.

MCTF No entries. None None NMS Revision 1 e NEUTRON MONITORING SYSTEM-OP02

• PLANT DATA LOGGER EXCEPTION/

SOURCE SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR A data logging system ls provided to monitor, record and identify Routine plant operations verifies these No periodic testing is 7.C.1.5 sequences of events for safety and non-safety related plant para- functions. PPAC DTA-002 (6 month PM) performed to verify meters of the following systems1 calibrates power supplies. PPA DTA-003 the validity of inputs (3 month PM) performs calibration on to the data logging

1. Reactor Protection system field remote stations. system. This will be

2. Engineered Safeguards Controls evaluated to determine

3. Reactor Shutdown Controls methods to ensure proper

4. Fluid Systems Protection datalogger functionability.

5. Regulating Controls

6. Primary Plant Process Instruments

7. Secondary Plant Process Instruments

8. Electrical Power Distribution FSAR The software part of the system includes a command print These capabilities are routinely None 7.6.2.5 station switchover such that the remote print station exercised after each plant trip, in the feedwater purity building can take over the function in that the post trip review data of the CPS in the main control room if the CPS is non- is printed out on the remote print functional. A pre/post-event program also allows recording station. This is done to preclude in the main control room of significant event history. further distraction of the operator Finally, alarm, status, analog and diagnostic sunur1ar ies in the main control room. The CPS are provided. is monitored and used routinely during plant operation to verify its functions.

SOP-34 To request various printouts, to temporarily disable and These activities are routinely per- None 7.1 and reenable all major events, to modify data logger formed during normal plant operations.

system time.

Admin Post trip review requirements - collect hard copies of data. This is routinely performed after each None 4.06 plant trip.

r....

Work A review of Work Order history revea~ed approximately 23 Work Orders were post-maintenance None  :;=:

Order Work Orders completed between ll/30/S5 and 05/19/86. tested and declared operabie.

History Work A review of Work Order history revealed approximately 20 Work Orders were post-maintenance None Order Work Orders completed between 05/19/86 to 12/15/86 .. tested and declared operable.

History Revision l 1 DATA LOGGER-OP02

PLANT DATA LOGGER EXCEPTION/

SOURCE SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION Modification Review A review of modification history was performed since start None None of 1985 Refueling Outage. No modifications were performed on this system.

MCTF Some thirteen *points did not respond *when comparable event All thirteen points were repaired and None DTA-01 recorder pens operated during the 5/19/86 trip. Repair tested during this outage and all inputs identified. channels responded appropriately to the simulated inputs.

MCTF 1. Evaluate relocation of data logger printer to cable The data logger central printing None DTA-02 spreading room. station is now located in the cable spreading room (SC-86-173).

2. Improve documentation of maintenance activities on data I&C supervisors and engineers have None logger systems. been informed of expectations on keeping records of computer maintenance in accordance with memo RI<T86-006, dated 7/14/86.

Revision 1 2 DATA LOGGER-OP02

• * *~

. '}

• • POST ACCIDENT SAMPLING MONITORING SYSTEM EXCEPTION/

~ SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR 9.9.2 The post-accident sample system is designed to extract samples of EI 7.1 provides instructions for None primary coolant, low pressure injection pump discharge and obtaining samples from the indicated containment atmosphere following an accident involving fuel sources. The PASHS ls operated weekly damage. to insure samples can be drawn.

9.9.2 Liquid samples may be taken directly or diluted with demineralized EI 7.1 provides instructions for dilution None water to reduce the activity levels. The undiluted sample may be of samples.

injected into a shielded transportable sample flask for transport to the lab for analysis.

9.9.2 Each hydrogen monitor contains a sample pump, temperature, pressure RI Bl A and B verify systems ability to None and flow controllers, and a thermal conductivity cell. detect H'. In addition PACS MGS 004, MGS 014 PCS 027, PCS 026 and PCS 025 calibrate temperature pressure and flow lnstru.ments in the PASMS and u* monitoring system.

9.9.2 Piping from the containment to the u* analyzer panels are heat-traced and maintained at approximately 285° to prevent condensa-Heat Trace alarm in Control Room will alert Operators to implement ARP 33 PACS HGS-14 None i~-1*

tion in the sample stream. calibrates the Alarm. r*I

\'...*'

9.9.2 During normal Plant operation, the system is maintained at SOP 38 provides system operating None  :~:*

SOP 38 standby conditions permitting rapid start-up. instructions.

9.9.2 System operation may be initiated locally at the panel or SOP 38 (Step 7.13) provides instructions None SOP 3 remotely from the control room. Once initiated, operation for local/remote control.  ;::,

is automatic.~ EI-7.0 Jumpering CV-1910 and CV-1911 for PASH sample. This evolution is performed during the None annual emergency drill. '.*j

                                                                                                                                             ;*_~.;

[;: HCTF PAS-01 EC-103-1 Post Accident Sampling Panel I

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                                                                                                                                             '.':1 Calibrate                                                                                                                        :.
                                                                                                                                              ~,
                                                                                                                                                 ..:~

a. Liquid Sample hi/lo flow lights I FE/FS-1901 Calibrated None *J.

b. Containment Air hi/low flow lights FS-1900 Calibrated t;:c

c. Temperature elements 1900, 1902, 1903 TE-1900, 1902 & 1903 Calibrated

d. High Sump Alarm LS-1901 Tested .i:~~

1;.1

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f} Revision 2 1 **:

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PASH SYSTEH-OP02 ~--~

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POST ACCIDENT SAMPLING MONITORING SYSTEM SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS EXCEPTION/ TEST PERFORMED .JUSTIFICATION Work Order A review of Work Order history revealed approximately 6 Work Work Orders were postmaintenance History None Orders completed between 11/30/85 and 05/19/86. tested and declared operable. Work Order A review of Work Order history revealed approximately 30 Work Work Orders were postmaintenance History None Orders completed between 05/19/86 to,12/15/86. tested and declared operable. Modification Review A review of modification history was performed since start of None None 1985 Refueling Outage. No modifications were performed on this system. Revision l PASM SYSTEM-OP02 2

RADIATION MONITORING EXCEPTION/ §Q!IBf! SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FShR PROCESS AND EFFLUENT RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING AND SAMPLING SYSTEM

11. 5 Detection devices are located in the various process systems and OR-22 verifies annunication of process None*

at selected positions throughout the containment and auxiliary system hi-level alarms and circuit buildings to monitor radiation levels and annunicate any abnormally failures. FSAR high radiation activity. Additionally, all monitors in the stack-gas, containment air, MR-14 utilizes check sources to verify None

11. 5 .1 off-gas, waste gas, engineered safeguards areas ventilating detector response.

system discharge, radwaste ventilation and radwaste liquid discharge systems have been supplied with check sources. The check source is to simulate a radioactive sample and serve as a check for both the readout and detector. FSAF. The detection devices display their information in radiation OR-22. verifies annunication of process None 11.s.2 monitoring equipment panels located inside the main control system hi-level alarms and circuit room. The panel provide mounting for indicators, recorders, failures. power supplies and alarms for each of these radiation monitoring systems. Revision l 1 R~.DIATION MONITORING-OP02 __J

RADIATION MONITORING EXCEPTION/ SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR The type of detectors used and the information displayed are Health Physics or surveillance procedures None Table listed in Table ll-15. The alarm conditions for each perform the indicated activities as shown ll-15 instrument are also listed. below: Process Radiation Service and Equipment I Channel Process Radiation Detection Equipment/ Channel Source Channt!l Functional Monitoring Systems Sampling Equipment Alarm and Control Check Check Calibration Test Liquid Service Scintillation detec- Alarm.on high radi- DW0-1 MR-14 RR-9J QR-22 Water RIA-0833 tor/detector well in ation, circuit service water line to fallure. structure. Steam Generator Geiger-Mueller tube/ Alarm on high radi- DWO-l MR-14 RR-9A QR-22 Blowdown RIA-0707 external to blowdown ation, signal1 tank, drain to dis- isolates blowdown charge structure. tank. Radwaste Liquid Scintillation detec- Alarm on high radi- DWO-l HR-14 RR-9B QR-22 Discharge RIA-1049 tor/in well in radwaste ation, circuit liquid line to dis- failure1 high radi-charge structure. ation prohibits radwaste discharge to lake. Component Cooling Scintillation detec- Alarm on high radi- HP 6.B MR-14 HP 6.9A HP 6.B Water RIA-0915 tor/piping, valves, ation, circuit sample pump and failure1 isolates detector housing1 component cooling storage tank dis- water surge tank. charge to waste gas surge tank. Liquids Discharge Scintillation detec- Alarm on high HP 6.B MR-14 HP 6.9A HP 6.8 RIA-1323 . tor/piping, val~es, radiation, circuit sample pump and fallur*e. detector housing1 circulating after to discharge structure. Stack-Gas Scintillation detec- Alarm on high DWO-l MR-14 RR-9G QR-22 RIA-2318/2319 tor/piping, valves, .radiation, and filters, sample pump, circuit detector housing and fallure. sample nozzle1 dis-charge to atmosphere. Revision l 2 RADIATION MONITORING-OP02

    *     '**-.* '. ... t,

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RADIATION MONITORING EXCEPTION/ SOURCE SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION Process Radiation Service and Eguiement Channel Process Radiation Detection Equipment/ Channel Source Channel Functional Monitoring Systems Sampling Equipment Alarm and Control Check Check Calibration Test Off-Gas Monitoring Scintillation detec- Alarm on high DW0-1 HR-14 RR-9D QR-22 RIA-0631 tor/piping, valves radiation and and detector housing1 circuit main condenser steam failure. jet air ejector noncondensibles. Radwaste Area Geiger-Mueller tube/ Alarm on high HP 6.8 MR-14 HP 6.9A HP 6.8 Ventilation piping, valves, sample radiation and cir-RIA-1809 pump and detector cult failure1 iso-housing1 air monitoring lates radwaste prior to discharge vent system. through stack. Engineered Geiger-Mueller tube/ Alarm on high DW0-1 HR-14 RR-9F QR-22 Safeguards Pump piping, valves, sample radiation and cir- RR-9E Rooms Vent pump and detector cult failure1 RIA-1810/1811 housing1 to stack, 2 isolates pump room systems, east and west vent supply and rooms. exhausts. Waste Gas Gelger-Mueller tube/ Alarm on high DW0-1 HR-14 RR-9I QR-22 Radiation piping, valves and radiation and cir-RIA-1113 detector houslng1 from cult failure1 iso-the waste gas surge lates waste gas tank and waste gas surge tank and decay tanks to stack. decay tanks. Containment Gelger-Mueller tube/ Alarm on high DW0-1 MR-14 HP 6.9A HP 6.8 Building Gas piping, solenoid vavles radiation and cir-Monitoring and detector h7using1 cult failure 1 iso-System from 5 sample ocations lates waste gas RIA-1817 on (4) cooler fans dis- surge tank and charge arid (l) purge decay tanks. fan exhaust. Failed Fuel Scintillation detector/ Alarm on high radh- DW0-1 HP 6.8 RR-9L HP 6.8 RIA-0202A/B in sample line ti on, circuit boronometer. failure. Re\'ision 1 3 RADIATION MONITORING-OP02

RADIATION MONITORING EXCEPTION/ ~ SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION Process Radiation Service and Egui12ment Channel Process Radiation Detection Equipment/ Channel Source Channel Functional Monitoring S~stems Sam12ling Egui12ment Alarm and Control Check ~ Calibration Test Steam Generator Scintlllatlon Cjetector/ Alarm on high radi- DW0-1 MR-14 RR-9H QR-22 Slowdown in well on blowdown ation, circuit RIA-2320 vent line. failure. Turbine scintillation detector/ Alarm on high radi- DW0-1 MR-14 RR-9C QR-22 Sample piping, valves, sample at ion, circuit RIA-5211 pump, and detector failure. housing, sump pump dis-cha.rge to drain. Radwaste Addition Beta Scintillation/ Alarm on high radi-. HP 6.8 MR-14 HP 6.9B HP 6.8 Vent RIA-5711 moving paper, sample ation circuit failurer pump, motor, discharge high radiation iso-at radwaste addition lates fuel building vent. Fuel Building Beta Scintillation/ Alarm on high radi- HP 6.8 MR-14 HP 6.9B HP 6.8 Addition Vent moving paper, sample ation circuit failure1 RIA-5712 pump, motor, discharge high radiation iso-at fuel building lates fuel building addition vent. vent. Dirty Waste Scintillation detector/ Alarm on high radi- HP 6.8 MR-14 HP 6.9A HP 6.8 Sample RIA-8265 piping, valves, detector ation, circuit housing, discharge at failure. dirty waste sample. RGEMS Scintillation detectors Alarm, set recorder DW0-1 MR-14 RR-84A QR-22 RIA-2325 for beta and gamma, speed, isolate sam- SH0-1 I RR-84B RIA-2326 ionization chamber/ ple on alert level. RR-84C RIA-2327 piping, valves, fil- Alarm transfer flow ters,sample col~ection to upper range on bottler discharge to high radiation. atmosphere. Main Steam Gieger-Mueller tube/ Alarm on high SH0-1 MR-14 RR-9K QR-22 RIA-2323/2324 in lead collimator radiation. adjacent to main steam lines. Revision 2 4 RADIATION MONITORING-OP02

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• RADIATION MONITORING EXCEPTION/

.§Q!IBQ; SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR In 1983 a main steam relief monitoring system was installed RI-2323 and RIA-2324 are calibrated by No pacs could be found ll. 5. 3 to monitor accident releases in the event the atmospheric RR-9K, functionally* tested by QR-22 which calibrates the dump or safety valves lift. In the event of a steam release, source checked by MR-14 and channel acoustic switch or verifies an acoustic switch, triggered by the high speed for greater checked by SH0-1. recorder response. This resolution. will be verified period-ically in the future and prior to start-up. FSAR ORIGINAL STACK MONITORING SYSTEM ll.5.3.l Prior to 1983 the stack monitoring system consisted of an Surv Test DWR-10 is performed weekly to None isokinetic nozzle, dual particulate samplers, flow control analyze for I-131, particulate and other valve, pump, gas monitoring channel and a flow indicator/ radio nuclide. transmitter; The samplers are~analyzed by a cryogenic spectrum analyzer to determine isotopic identify. FSAR The flow rate through the particulate samples is automatically None These flow recorders are ll.5.3.l controlled to compensate for filter loading and stack flow. no longer used. A local The stack flow transmiter and sample flow indicator/transmiter continuous monitor is operate through a controller and current pneumatic converter now used and calibrated to regulate the control valve at the pumping system inlet. by RR-84D. The FSAR will A two-pen flow indicator/recorder with flow alarm outputs be corrected. continuously monitors the stack and sample flow. FSAR An encapsulated check source is also included in the gas HR-14 utilizes check sources to verify None ll. 5.3.l monitoring unit. The source is placed into service by detector response. actuating normally closed electric-solenoid-type isolation valves for the duration of the test-calibration period. FShR RADIOACTIVE GASEOUS EFFLUNET MONITORING SYSTEM (RGEHS) ll.5.3.2 Flow through the system ls provided b~ two 100\ capacity Surv Test RR-840 calibrates the flow None diaphragm vacuum pumps. The flow is controlled by auto- meter. matic flow control valves to maintain a constant flow rate of 2 scfm through the system. During normal operation, 2 scfm o~ the stack effluent is routed Surv Test DWR-10 ls performed weekly None through a particulate/radioiodine filter then through the beta to analyze stack effluent. detector. The filter is continuously monitored by the NaI detector to detect any buildup on the filter. The filter ls changed and counted on a regular basis by Plant personnel. Revision 1 5 RADIATION MONITORING-OP02

RADIATION MONITORING EXCEPTION/ SOURCE SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR On indication of abnormal stack effluent activity (alert QR-22 verifies the alarm. Grab sample feature 11.5.3.2 *level), a 15-second grab sample is automatically trapped in a testing is not docu-sample bottle and an .annunicator in the control room mented. Alert levels indicates the off-normal condition. are alarmed on the RIA, but are not annuciated. FSAR will be clarified. The grab sample and annunciator will be veri-fied prior to start-up and periodically in the future. Following a high level indication, the normal sample loop QR-22 verifies the alarm. Testing of changes in is bypassed and the sample flow is split with approximately sample flow paths are 0.02 scfm directed through the high-range filter and the not documented. This will balance of the 2 scfm through the ion chamber. A "high be verified and documented radiation* annunicator in the control room alerts the plant prior to start-up and operators to the condition. periodically in the future. FSAR AREA RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEMS 11.6.5.2 Table Thirty-nine continuous monitoring points within the plant are None 11-6 selected to provide indication and warning where radioactivity may be present: Channel Source Channel Instrument(s) Check Check Calibration East Engineering Safeguards Room - RIA-2300 DW0-1 MR-6 RI-86A Charging Pump Room Entrance-North - RIA-2301 DW0-1 MR-6 RI-86A Radwaste Control Panel C RIA-2302 DW0-1 MR-6 RI-86A Fuel Pool Equipment Room Corridor - RIA-2303 DW0-1 MR-6 RI-86A Radiochemistry Lab Entrance - RIA-2304 DW0-1 MR-6 RI-86A Access Control - RIA-2305 DW0-1 MR-6 RI-86A Outside of Cont Personnel Air Lock - 'IA-2306 DW0-1 MR-6 RI-86A Containment Purge Unit Room-North - RtA-2307 DW0-1 MR-6 RI-86A Radwaste Demineralizer Room Roof - RIA-2308 DW0-1 MR-6 RI-86A Control Room/Turbine Building Corridor - RIA-2309 DW0-1 MR-6 RI-86A Control Room/Entrance - RIA-2310 DW0-1 MR-6 RI-86A Containment 590' Elev SW Side - RIA-1806 SH0-1 MR-6 RI-86F Turbine Floor East Side - RIA-2311 DW0-1 MR-6 RI-86A Health Physics/Engineering Office - RIA-2312 DW0-1 MR-6 RI-86A Containment 490'Elev SE Side - RIA-1808 SH0-1 MR-6 RI-86F Containment 590'Elev NW Side - RIA-1805 SH0-1 MR-6 RI-86F Spent Fuel Pool - RIA-2313 SH0-1 MR-6 RI-86A I Revision 2 6 RADIATION MONITORING-OP02 t1>}

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                                                                                                                                               ***i RADIATION MONITORING EXCEPTION/

SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION Instrument(s) Check Calibration Air Room 590' Elev - RIA-2314 DW0-1 MR-6 RI-86D Containment 590' Elev NE Side - RIA-1807 SH0-1 MR-6 RI-86F Inside of Cont Personnel Air Lock - RIA-2315 DW0-'-1 MR-6 RI-86D Decontamination Room - RIA-5701 DW0-1 MR-6 RI-86B I Evaporator "A" - RIA-5702 DW0-1 MR-6 RI-86B Evaporator "B" - RIA-5703 DW0-1 MR-6 RI-86B Evaporator Control Panel C-105 - RIA-5704 DW0-1 MR-6 RI-86B Waste Gas Decay Tank T-101, A, B, and c - RIA-5705 DW0-1 MR-6 RI-86B Environmental Lab Entrance - RIA-5706 DW0-1 MR-6 RI-86B Radwaste Packaging Area-North - RIA-5707 DW0-1 MR-6 RI-86B Radwaste Packaging Area-South - RIA-5708 DW0-1 MR-6 RI-86B Radwaste Demineralizer 649' Elev - RIA-5709 DW0-1 MR-6 RI-86B Steam Dumps Area - RIA-5710 DW0-1 MR-6 RI-86B Resin/Filter Media Handling Area - RIA-8266 DW0-1 MR-6 RI-86C Cask Handling Area - RIA-8267 DW0-1 MR-6 RI-86C Flaked Filter Operator Area - RIA-8268 DW0-1 MR-6 RI-86C Makeup Water Area - RIA-8269 DW0-1 MR-6 RI-86C Phase Separator Area - RIA-8270 DW0-1 MR-6 RI-86C Demineralizer Access - RIA-8271 DW0-1 MR-6 RI-86C Holding Pump/Valve Gallery Area - RIA-8272 DW0-1 MR-6 RI-86C Containment 649' Elev Rx Cavity - RIA-2316 DW0-1 HR-6 RI-86E Containment 649' Elev Rx Cavity - RIA-2317 DW0-1 MR-6 RI-86E FSAR High-radiation levels and individual circuit failures are MR-6 verifies alarm response. None .:.l.6.5.2 alarmed both visually and audibly on the area radiation monitoring panel. FSAR The containment building gas monitor supplies a signal to a MR-14 and HP 6.8 verify alarm response. None -.l.6.5.2 linear rate meter. The output from this system is recorded and an alarm is given for both high-radiation levels and circuit failures. ll.6.8.2 Area and Process Radiation Monitors I Each area and process monitor is periodically tested to determine See Table 11-15 and 11-6 entries I None that: I

1. The calibration of the monitor ls correct so that control room readout instrumentation indicates true radiation levels.

Proper calibration is assured by placing radiation sources at reproducible geometries on at least two points of the range of the instrument.

2. The alarm scale trip points function properly and that the alarms function properly.

RE>vision 2 7 RhDIATION MONITORING-OP02

RADIATION MONITORING filllIBQ; EXCEPTION/ SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION 11.6.B.3 Continuous Air Monitors Each continuous air monitor ls periodically tested to determine HP 9.42 ls performed at 6 .month intervals None that: for CAM which are place in service.

l. The calibration of the monitor ls correct and that readout in counts per minute can be converted to air contamination in uCl/cm'.

2. Air flow ls constant.

3. Trip alarm points are set and function properly.

SOP 37 7.1/7.2 Meter Functions Meter functions are verified dally per None D/W0-1. 7.3 Place Monitors in Operation Steps are performed per the SOP. None SOP 38 7.1/7.2 Meter Functions Meter functions are verified dally per None D/W0-1. 7.3 through 7.12 Place Monitors in Operation Steps are performed per the SOP. None 7.13 H' Monitoring Steps are performed per the SOP. None Revision 1 B RADIATION MONITORING-OP02

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                                                                           **~     :**.* .._.\

RADIATION MONITORING EXCEPTION/

~            SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS                                                           TEST PERFORMED                             JUSTIFICATION SOP 39 7.1/7.2     Area Monitor Functions                                                              Functions are verified dally per D/W0-1. None 7.3/7.6     Monitor Operation                                                                   Steps are performed per the SOP.           None 7.4         Alarm point setting                                                                 Steps are performed per the SOP.           None 7.5         Test meter reading                                                                  MR-6 performs this test monthly.           None MCTF RIA-01       FR-2318 Stack Gas Flow Recorder                                                     w.o. Testing verified component/system Ensure Operability                                                                                                             None working properly.

Performed Tech Spec Test RR-84b. MCTF RIA-02 P-1811 West Engineering Safeguards Room Monitor See HCTF RIA-31 None Ensure Operability of sample pump MCTF RI~-03 RIA-0202A failed fuel monitor ensure operability radiation Performed H.P. 6.8. aProcess monitor None indicator operational check-quarterly" test dem-onstrates operability through internal testing capabilities for meter response and calibration. MCTF RIA-04 RIA-0631 Off Gas Monitor Radiation Indicator MR-14 and OR-22 were satisfactorily None performed to assure proper alarm logics and unit operation. MCTF RIA-05 RIA-1049 Liquid Radwaste Discharge Process Monitor Assured operability through Tech Spec Test None MR-14 and Tech Spec Test QR-22. Revision 1 9 RADIATION MONITORING-OP02

RADIATION MONITORING EXCEPTION/ SOURCE SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION MCTF RIA-06 RIA-1805 Containment Isolation High Radiation Monitor Assured operability through Tech Spec Test None Ensure operability HR-6. MCTF F.IA-07 RIA-1808 Containment Isolation High Radiation Monitor Assured operability through Tech Spec Test None Ensure operability HR-6. MCTF RIA-08 RIA-2304 Controlled Lab Monitor Assured operability through Tech Spec Test None Ensure operability HR-6. MCTF RIA-09 RIA-2307 Containment Purge Room Monitor Assured operability through Tech Spec Test None Ensure Operability RI-86A. MCTF RIA-10 RIA-2315 Personnel Air Lock Monitor Performed Tech Spec Surveillance Procedure None Ensure Operability HR-6 I MCTF RIA-11 RIA-2318 Stack Gas Radiation Alarm Indicator Ensures Assured operability through Tech Spec Test Operability OR-22. MC'TF Ji.IA-12 RIA-2319 Stack Gas Monitor Radiation Assured operability through Tech Spec Test None Alarm Indicator HR-14 and OR-22. Ensure Operability MCTF RIA-13 I RIA-2320 S/G Blowdown Tank Vent Assured operability through Tech Spec Test None Monitor MR-14 &,>QR-22. Ensure Operability MCTF RIA-14 RIA-2321 Containment Gamma Assured operability through Tech Spec Test None Radiation Monitor (Left) MR-6 Ensure Operability MCTF RIA-15 RIA-2322 Containment Gamma Assured operability through Tech Spec Test None Radiation Monitor (Right) HR-6 Ensure Operability MCTF RIA-16 RIA-2323 Mainstream Safety & Dump Assured operability through Tech Spec Test None Valve 'Area Monitor HR-14 & QR-22 Ensure Operability Revision 2 10 RADIATION MONITORING-OP02

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                                                                         ,1"*                 *t RADIATION MONITORING EXCEPTION/

~ SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION MCTF RIA-17 RIA-2324 Main Stream Safety & Dump Valve Area Monitor Assured operability through Tech Spec Test None Ensure Operability HR-14 & QR-22 MCTF RIA-18 RIA-2326 Normal Range Noble gas stack monitor Assured operability through Tech Spec Test None Ensure Operability MR-14 & QR-22 MCTF RIA-19 RIA-2327 High Range Noble Gas Stack Monitor Assured operability through Tech Spec Test None Ensure Operability HR-14 & QR-22 MCTF RIA-20 RIA-5711 Radwaste Addition Assured operability through HP Test 6.8 None Ventilation Monitor Ensure Operability MCTF RIA-21 RIA-5712 Fuel Handling Ventilation Monitor Assured operability through HP Test 6.8 None Ensure Operability MCTF RIA-22 RIA-8258 Flat bed filter Assured operability through Tech Spec Test None Room Radiation Monitor HR-6 Ensure Operability MCTF RIA-23 RIA-2316 Fuel Handling area monitor fl Exception. This monitor is Ensure Operability used during refueling activities only and the detector head is removed after they are complete. Not needed during power operations. Will be in-stalled and verified operable prior to refueling activities by RI-86E. MCTF RIA-25 RIA-0707 S/G Blowdown Monitor Assured operability through Tech Spec Test None Ensure Operability HR-14 & QR-22 MCTF RIA-26 RIA-1113 Waste gas discharge Assured operability through Tech Spec Test None Ensure Operability MR-14 & QR-22 Revision 1 11 RADIATION MONITORING~OP02

.7 RADIATION MONITORING EXCEPTION/

  ~             SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS                                             TEST PERFORMED                             JUSTIFICATION MCTF RIA-27       RE-1805 Containment Isolation High Radiation Monitor                  Assured operability through Tech Spec Test None Ensure Operability                                                    MR-6 MCTF RIA-28       RE-1807 Containment Isolation High Radiation Monitor                  Assured operability through Tech Spec Test None Ensure Operability                                                    MR-6 MCTF RIA-29       RE-1809 Radwaste Ventilation Monitor                                  Assured operability through H.P. Test      None Ensure Operability                                                    HP 6.8 MCTF RIA-30       RE-1810 East Engineered Safeguard Radwaste Isolation Vent             Assured operability through Tech Spec Test None Ensure Operability                                                    MR-14 & OR-22 MCTF Rih-31       RIA-1811 West Engineered Safeguard Radwaste Isolation Vent            Assured operability through Tech Spec Test None Ensure Operability                                                    MR-14 & OR-22 Work Order        A review of Work Order history revealed approximately 77              Work Orders were postmaintenance tested    None History      Work Orders completed between 11/30/85 and 05/19/86.                  and deplared operable.

Work Order A review of Work Order history revealed approximately 54 Work Orders were postmaintenance tested None History Work Orders completed between 05/19/86 to 12/15/86. and declared operable. Modification Review A review of modification history was performed since start of 1985 Refueling Outage. FC-514-01 replaced RE-1805 through RE-1808 Satisfactorily tested via a Modification None Test Procedure Revision l 12 RADIATION MONITORING-OP02

FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM EXCEPTION/ ~ SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR The fire system may also provide a backup water supply to 9.6.2 the following:

1. Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Suction Q0-21 verifies operability of fire None water cross-tie. Emergency Operating Procedures address this capability.

2. Critical Service Water Supply Manual valves exist to cross-tie fire None and service water. Emergency Operating Procedures address this capability.

Valves are cycled on PAC X-OPS-281, each refueling outage.

3. Spent Fuel Pool Fill None This is a design feature which is not tested periodically. A six inch swing elbow is in place with appropriate valving should it become necessary to use lake water to fill the fuel pool. SOP-27 provides appropriate instructions.

Ff:AR Indication of individual systems in various areas is S0-6 verifies operability of fire None !I.;,. 3 .1 indicated on an annunicator panel in the main control system annunicator panel (C-47). room. FSAR Fixed fog deluge systems protect the main, start-up, CL-21.2 tests all these transformers There are no PACS to station auxiliary, and the spare station transformer deluge systems semi-annually periodically schedule Each of these deluge systems are automatically actuated these activities. Opera-and annunicated by a general alarm in the main control tions Department manually room. schedules and controls these checklists. This scheduling system will be reviewed for effectiveness. i FS.:.R A manaal operated fixed fog deluge system protects the CL-21 verifies proper valve lineup. None 9.6.3.l charcoal filters used to maintain control room habitability. The system operating procedure (SOP-24) provides instructions on how to activate

                                                                                                                                                        ;~

the system. I~ f;

                                                                                                                                                        ..r**'

J~. Re*:ision l ~I l '*,. FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM-OP02  !~ t'

FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM EXCEPTION/ SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FShR Wet pipe fusible link sprinkler systems are provided to S0-6 verifies operability of these systems, None

9. 6. 3 .1 protect various areas and rooms throughout the plant. including annunication in the control room.

Actuation of any system is annunicated by a general alarm in the main control room. F~:M A dry pipe fusible link sprinkler sys~em is provided for CL 21.17 verifies operability of this This activity is not 9.6.3.l protection of the track alley. It is annunicated and system, including annunication in the scheduled periodically indicated in the same manner as the wet pipe systems. control room on a quarterly basis. by a PACS. Operation Department manually schedules and controls this checklist. This scheduling system will be reviewed for effectiveness. FShR Fire detection is provided *in the form of smoke detectors. SI-7 verifies operability of smoke None ~*. 6. 3 .1 These detectors are located throughout the plant. detector zone alarms. Initiation of any of these detector zones alarms on the annunicator panel located in the main control room and in switchgear room lD. FSM Portable fire extinguishers are provided at convenient and CL 21.15, CL 21.16, CL 21.4, CL 21.5 There are no PACS to

., . .; . 3.1 accessible locations. The extinguishing media are pressurized          CL 21.6, CL 21.7 and CL 21.9 provide        periodically schedule water, co*, or dry chemicals as appropriate for the service            instructions for monthly inspections of     these activities.

requirements of the area. all fire extinguishers. Operations Department manually schedules and controls these check-1 i sts. This system will be reviewed for effective-ness. FShR Water for the fire system is supplied by one of three full R0-52 verifies the capacities of the This statement is a design '*. i* .3.1 capacity fire pumps. Each pump is capable of providing fire water pumps criteria which was used to water to the largest system demand plur hose streams in establish pump capacity. the area of demand. F:ihR One pump is electrically driveni the other two are diesel M0-7B and R0-52 verifies automatic None

, . f. 3 .1 engine-driven. Any pump will start automatically and can start features of fire pumps. SOP-21 be manually started from the pump control panel. provides instructions for manually starting each pump locally.

Pe*:ision 1 2 F!RE PROTECTION SYSTEM-OP02

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FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM EXCEPTION/ SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR A jockey pump with local controls is provided to maintain Normal plant operations provides the None 9.G.3.1 the system full and pressurized. plant with this function. FSAR A cross-connection provided with two, series, hand operated Q0-21.verlfies operability of this None

9. (,. 3. l valves connects the fire pump discharge header to the suction cross-connect feature.

header of the auxiliary feedwater pu~p. FSAR One cross-connection provided with a hand-operated valve These cross-connect valves are cycled None 9.t..3.1 connects the fire pump discharge header to each of the via PAC X-OPS-281 each refueling outage critical service waterlines. to verify this function. FSAR A header terminating in a blind flange is provided at the None This is a design feature 9.~.3.1 spent fuel pool for emergency filling. which is not tested periodically. A six-inch swing elbow is in place with appropriate valving should it become necessary to use lake water to f 111 fuel pool. SOP-27 provides instructions to perform this task. It will not be tested. FSAR The motor driven pump starts automatically on a low fire M0-7B and R0-52 verify operability of None ~.6.3.3 system header pressure of 90 psig with the first diesel automatic start features for each fire driven pump being started at 75 psig. The second diesel pump. driven pump starts upon a pressure drop to 60 psig. The diesel driven pumps are thus arranged to back up the electrically driven pump in case the latter does not start. FS.A.R The jockey pump operates continuously to keep the system M0-7B and R0-52 verifies these functions. None ~. 6. 3. 3 pressurized to 110 pslg on the pump discharge. In case of failure of the jockey pump or if the ~ockey pump ls out for maintenance, the system will be pressurized by automatic operation of the motor driven fire pump by tripping of the pump discharge header pressure switch. Operation of the motor driven pump is annunicated in the control room to alert the operators of system usage. Revision l 3 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM-OP02

FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM EXCEPTION/ SOURCE SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION FSAR The fire protection system is provided with connections with R0-50A/B hydrostatically tests all fire None 9.6.4 test hose valves on the supply header for periodic testing. hoses inside and outside of containment. All equipment is accessible for periodic inspection. FSAR Procedure are in effect to maintain and test in accordance See the list of fire protection systems None 9.o.4 with the Technical Specifications and,established standards. tests. FSAR There is a five-man fire brigade onsite at all times. Fire Protection Implementing Procedures None 9.6.6 Procedures are in effect that provide fire brigade training (FPIP) controls all these ac.tivities. and actions required for the Emergency Response Plan. The Fire Protection Implementing Procedures cover the following topics: Organization Fire Emergency Responsibility Plant Fire Brigade Fire Protection Systems Inspection Maintenance and Testing Training Fire Prevention Activities FSAR 1. Fire Pump, Motor Driven Table 9-12 capacity 1,500 gpm R0-52 verifies the motor driven and both There ls no periodic Discharge Pressure 125 psig diesel driven fire pumps capacity and test to verify capacity discharge pressure. of the fire system jockey pump (P-13). Normal plant operations and indications would denote if system pressure (flow) degraded to cause the other pumps to start. This will be reviewed for inclusion in the equipment trend program.

2. Fire Pump, Diesel Driven Capacity 1,500 gpm Discharge Pressure 125 psig

3. Fire System Jockey Pump Capacity 50 gpm Discharge Pressure 110 psig Revision 1 4 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM-OP02

                                                                                                                                       *        .. . .J

             **.,                                                                                                                                      !~

FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM EXCEPTION/ ~ SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION SOP-21 To place system in operation. Normal plant operations places the None 7.1 system in operation. SOP-21 To test run/manually start/stop electric fire pump (P-9A). Normal plant operations, M0-7B and None 7.2 R0-52 verifies these functions. SOP-21 To test run/manually start/stop diesel fire pump (P-9B). Normal plant operations, M0-7B and None 7.3 R0-52 verifies these functions. SOP-21 To test run/manually start/stop diesel fire pump (P-41). Normal plant operations, M0-7B and None 7.4 R0-52 verifies these functions. SOP-21 Supplying service water system using the fire water system. Manual valves exist. to cross-tie the None 7.5 systems. Emergency Operating Procedures address this feature. Valves are cycled each refueling outage via PAC X-OPS-281. SOP-21 Supplying auxiliary feedwater pump suction using the fire water 00-21 verifies operability of this None 7.5.2 system. cross-tie feature. SOP-21 Warehouse fire protection system None There is no testing or 7 .i, periodic inspection of the warehouse fire protection systems with the exception of fire extinguishers and hose reels. This is an external plant building. No further testing will be performed. SOP-21 Emergency fill of diesel fire pump daJ tanks. None This is*a design feature 1."I which is not periodically tested. A hand pump and 150 feet of hose are readily available to the operators. This will be verified prior to full power. Revision l 5 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM-OP02

FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM EXCEPTION/ SOURCE SYSTEM TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST PERFORMED JUSTIFICATION SOP-21 To connect fire water to the fuel pool system. None This is a design feature 7.4 which is not tested periodically. A six inch swing elbow is in place with appropriate valving should it become necessary to use lake water to fill the fuel pool. MCTF Resolve the problem of ability to open the cross-tie MV-130FP and MV-131FP were modified None FPS-03 valves between the fire protection system and service to add a 3:1 ratio valve operator. water system under differential pressure. Both valves were stroked satisfactorily against a differential pressure of approximately 105 psi during the conduct of special test T-2.16. Wo~k A review of Work Order history revealed approximately 62 Work Orders were post-maintenance None Order Work Orders completed between 11/30/85 and 05/19/86. tested and declared operable. History Wc.rk A review of Work Order history revealed approximately 45 Work Orders were post-maintenance None Order Work Orders completed between 05/19/86 to 12/15/86. tested and declared operable. History Mo:Hf icat ion Review A review of modification hi.story was performed since start of 1985 Refueling Outage. FC-564 added auxiliary hot shutdown panel (C-150A). Tested satisfactorily via modification None test procedure. FC-642 address sprinkers in the lC sw\tchgear room. Tested satisfactorily during work order None closeout. FC-705 provided early fire detection for intake structure Tested satisfactorily via modification None room 136. test procedure. Re*.*ision 1 6 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM-OP02

SYSTEM PERFORMANCE REQUI*:~) IMPOSED BY ACCIDENT ANALYSES (As Documented in Chapter 14 of Palisades FSAR, Rev 1, Effective December, 1985) Test Source System Reguirement Performed Exception/Justification FSAR 14.2 1. Reactor Protection System (Note l)g Uncontrolled 0 High Nuclear Flux Reactor Trip Rod Low power range  : ;:; 15:t MI-01 None Withdrawal High power range ~112% MI-01 None Maximum trip delay' time $0.4 sec None Trip delays will be verified by test or analysis prior to startup. Rele-vant safety analyses will be reviewed to assure consistency with results of this verification if necessary. COMPLETE Six logic combinations for high neutron flux were time delay tested with maximum delay time .054 sec. 0 High Pressurizer Pressure Trip $2277 psia MI-02, None HI-02A RI-03

                                                       ~TM/LP 0

Thermal margin/low pressure trip - 165 psia RI-02, None MI-02A 0 TM/LP Maximum Trip Delay $0.6 sec None Trip delays will be verified by test or analysis prior to startup. Rele-vant safety analyses will be reviewed to assure consistency with results of this verification if necessary. COMPLETE Response time of two pressurizer transmitters were tested along with six logic combinations. Maximum time delay measured was 0.2 seconds. Revision l SYSTEM PERF REQ IMP/MDOl 1

SYSTEM PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS IMPOSED BY ACCIDENT ANALYSES (As Documented in Chapter 14 of Palisades FSAR, Rev 1, Effective December, 1985) Test Source System Reguirement Performed Exception/Justification

                   °Cold leg RTD time constant             ;<;;S sec          None       RTD time constants will be verified by test or analysis prior to start-up. Relevant safety analyses will be reviewed to assure consistency with results of this verification if necessary.

0 Hot leg RTD time constant  ;<;;9 sec None RTD time constants will be veri-fied by test or analysis prior to startup. Relevant safety analyses will be reviewed to assure con-sistency with results of this verification if necessary.

2. Chemical and Volume Control System:

0 Pressurizer spray flow Note 2 None Note 2

3. Control Rod Drive System:

0 Max rod withdrawal rat*e $46 in/min None Maximum rod withdrawal speed will be verified during startup. COMPLETE Rod withdrawal verified <46 in/min.

                                                                   'sion 1 SY       ERF REQ IMP/MDOl                                                                                                      2
                                                                                                                      !     1
                                                                                                                        ..*j

SYSTEM PERFORMANCE REQU NTS IMPOSED BY ACCIDENT ANALYSES (As Documented in Chapter 14 of Palisades FSAR, Rev 1, Effective December, 1985) Test Source System Requirement Performed Exception/Justification FSAR 14.3 1. Chemical and Volume Control System: Boron 0 Maximum charging pump flow ~ 133 gpm M0-20 None Dilution Incident 0 Minimum PCS boron Gone (Refueling) i;;l720 ppm MC-llC,D None (Hot Standby) ~1150 ppm EM-04-08& None Tech Data Manual (Cold Shutdown) ~1720 ppm MC-llC,D None

2. Engineered Safeguards System:

0 Minimum low level alarm on NaOH M0-25 None Storage Tank guarantees ~3900 gal 0 Maximum NaOH storage tank Vol ~6000 gal M0-25 None 0 Procedural controls ensure closure CL-3.5 None of redundant isolation valves between iodine removal system and PCS during outages. FSAR 14.4 1. Chemical and Volume Control System: 0 Control Rod Maximum pressurizer spray flow Note 2 None COMPLETE Max pressurizer spray Drop Event I flow in analysis ~375 gpm. Max charging flow to aux spray is 133 gpm. Revision 1 SYSTEM PERF REQ IMP/MDOl 3

SYSTEM PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS IMPOSED BY ACCIDENT ANALYSES (As Documented in Chapter 14 of Palisades FSAR, Rev 1, Effective December, 1985) Test Source

• System Requirement Performed Exception/Justification FSAR 14.7 1. Reactor Protection System:

Loss of Cool- 0 Low PCS flow trip ~93% RI-94 None ant Flow Incident 0 Maximum trip delai ~0.6 sec None Trip delays will be verified by test or analysis prior to startup. Relevant safety analyses will be reviewed to assure consistency with results of this verification if necessary. COMPLETE Four PCS flow transmitters (Channel A) and the six logic com-binations were time delay tested~ Maximum time delay measured was 0.527 seconds.

2. Chemical and Volume Control System:

0 Maximum pressurizer spray flow Note 2 None Same as Control Rod Drop Event spray flow response. 1 SY~PERF REQ IMP/MDOl 4

SYSTEM PERFORMANCE REQUIR S IMPOSED BY ACCIDENT ANALYSES (As Documented in Chapter 14 of Palisades FSAR, Rev 1, Effective December, 1985) Test Source System Requirement Performed Exception/Justification FSAR 14.9 1. Feedwater System: Excessive 0 Maximum enthalpy rise across ~58 Btu/lb None Historical operating data prove Feedwater last stage of high pressure this assumption to be non-conserva-Incident headers

• ti ve. The excessive feedwater incident will be evaluated taking plant data into consideration.

If a reanalysis is necessary, assumptions regarding FW system performance will be reviewed or modified to ensure that they are conservative with respect to actual system performance limits. COMPLETE The Excessive Feedwater event has been reviewed by ANF (Exxon). The bounding case for this incident was reviewed, resulting in MDNBR of 1.2 which is above the 1.17 limit. See JDE 87-08. 0 Minimum time to ramp feedwater ~8 sec None In the event of a reanalysis, reg valve from 50% flow to assumptions regarding feedwater 100% flow control point system performance will be reviewed or modified to ensure that they are conservative with respect to actual system perform-ance limits. COMPLETE ANF de.termined the Safety Analysis to be insensitive to this parameter. Revision 1 SYSTEM PERF REQ IMP/MDOl 5

~------------------------------------------- - I SYSTEM PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS IMPOSED BY ACCIDENT ANALYSES (As Documented in Chapter 14 of Palisades FSAR, Rev 1, Effective December, 1985) Test Source System Reguirement Performed Exception/Justification 0 Maximum flow capacity through ~120% nominal None In the event of a reanalysis,

                         ~ither main feedwater reg                                            assumptions regarding feedwater valve                                                                system performance will be reviewed or modified to ensure that they are conservative with respect to actual system perform-
                                                                                            . ance limits.

COMPLETE The Excessive Feedwater event has been reviewed by ANF (Exxon). The bounding case for this incident was reviewed, resulting in MDNBR of 1.2 which is above the 1.17 limit. See JDE 87-08. 0 Minimum time to ramp main  ;;:;2 .8 sec None In the event of a reanalysis, feedwater reg valve/main assumptions regarding FW syst~m feed pump speed from 102% performance will be reviewed or flow to 120% flow control modified to ensure that they are point conservative with respect to actual system performance limits. COMPLETE ANF determined the Safety Analysis to be insensitive to this parameter.

• s.ion 1 SY ERF REQ IMP/MDOl 6

SYSTEM PERFORMANCE REQUI IMPOSED BY ACCIDENT ANALYSES (As Documented in Chapter 14 of Palisades FSAR, Rev 1, Effective December, 1985) Test Source System Requirement Performed Exception/Justification 0 Maximum main f eedwater pump ~5500 rpm None System was tested in March, 1986, overspeed trip setpoint and trip setpoints were found to be 5500 rpm +/- 1%. PACS will be established to verify this set-point. Also see above. COMPLETE The Excessive Feedwater event has been reviewed by ANF (Exxon). The bounding case for this incident was reviewed, resulting in MDNBR of 1.2 which is above the 1.17 limit. See JDE 87-08. FSAR 14.10 1. Reactor Protection System Trip Setpoints: Excessive 0 High Nuclear Flux Trip Load Increase Low power range  ;;)15% MI-01 None Incident High power range  ;;)112% MI-01 None Maximum trip delay time $0.4 sec None Trip delays will be verified by test or analysis prior to startup. Relevant safety analyses will be reviewed to assure consistency with results of this verification if necessary. 0 Low Pressurizer PJressure SIS Trip ~1571 psia RI-03 None Revision 1 SYSTEM PERF REQ IMP/MDOl 7

SYSTEM PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS iMPOSED BY ACCIDENT ANALYSES (As Documented in Chapter 14 of Palisades FSAR, Rev 1, Effective December, 1985) Test Source System Reguirement Performed Exception/Justification 0 Auto closure of ADVs & Turbine ~532°F RRS-1-1 None Bypass Valve on PCS Tav

2. Engineered Safeguards System:

See "Steamline Break1', entry in this table.

3. Main Steam System:

0 Maximum excess flow capacity <£5% of 2450 Mwt None Maximum valve capacities have of turbine control valves been verified through review of procurement specs. If necessary, the excessive load increase analysis will be redone based on the results of this verification. COMPLETE Maximum valve capac1t1es have been verified through procure-ment spec review as acceptable. 0 Maximum flow capacity of ADVs <£35% of 2450 Mwt None See above 0 Maximum flow capacity of turbine <£5% of 2450 Mwt None See above. bypass valve I FSAR 14.12 1. Reactor Protection System (Note 1): 0 Loss of Load High Pressurizer Pressure Rx Trip <£2277 psia MI-02, None Incident MI-02A RI-03

                                                               'sion 1 SY       ERF REQ IMP/MDOl                                                                                                  8 I.
                                                               \ .      .: /
                                                                '-~._*,__,,*

SYSTEM PERFORMANCE REQUIR TS IMPOSED BY ACCIDENT ANALYSES (As Documented in Chapter 14 of Palisades FSAR, Rev 1, Effective December, 1985) Test Source System Requirement Performed Exception/Justification FSAR 14.13 Loss of 1. Reactor Protection System (Note l): Feedwater Incident 0 Low SG Level Reactor Trip ~82 11 below nominal level MI-02, RI-04 None 0 Maximum trip delay on SG Level ~0.6 sec None Trip delay times will be verified Trip by test or analysis prior to startup. Relevant safety analyses will be reviewed to ensure consistency with results of this verification if necessary. COMPLETE Two S/G level transmitters (B&C) and the six logic combinations were time delay tested. Maximum time delay measured was 0.322 sec for S/G

                                                                                         #1, and 0.195 sec for S/G #2.

0 Low Pressurizer Pressure SI ~1571 psi a RI-03 None Actuation

2. Main Steam System:

0 Minimum SG water inventory @ low Note 3 RI-04 Note 3 level trip (less margins) MI-02

3. Feedwater System:

0 Maximum time to activate AFWs 16 min R0-97 None Revision 1 SYSTEM PERF REQ IMP/MDOl 9

SYSTEM PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS iMPOSED BY ACCIDENT ANALYSES (As Documented in Chapter 14 of Palisades FSAR, Rev 1, Effective December, 1985) Test Source System Requirement Performed Exception/Justification FSAR 14.14 1. Reactor Protection System (Note 1): 0 Steam Line Reactor trip on SG low pressure ~478 psia MI-02, None Rupture (incl uncertainty) MI-05 I 0 Low Pressurizer Pressure SI ~1571 psia RI-03 None Actuation

2. Chemical and Volume Control Systems:

0 Minimum boric acid concentration ~10,940 ppm MC-llA MC-llA indicates Tech Spec limits on charging pumps concentration to range from 10,928 ppm to 17,483 ppm. The lower end of this range is not conservative w.r.t. the safety limit. Admini-strative concentration limits are 11,500 ppm - 17,000 ppm. Safety analysis will be corrected as necessary or a Tech Spec change increasing the lower limit to 10,940 ppm will be implemented. COMPLETE ANF determined that the 12 ppm difference has negli-gible impact on the Safety Analysis results.

                                                         ~34 0

Minimum charging pump flow gpm/pump M0-20 None SY ERF REQ IMP/MDOl 9*i,on I 10

                                                                \.::~:.~;/                                               /

I

    *     \

SYSTEM PERFORMANCE REQUIR-)IMPOSED BY ACCIDENT ANALYSES (As Documented in Chapter 14 of Palisades FSAR,.Rev 1, Effective December, 1985) Test Source System Reguirement Performed Exception/Justification 0 Maximum charging pump startup delay with power ~ 5 sec None Pump starting times will be tested prior to startup. Relevant safety analysis will be reviewed to assure consistency with results of these tests if necessary. COMPLETE* Starting time verified <l sec for each charging pump with power and <17 sec without power (Item 61) without power ~17 sec None See above 0 Maximum time to purge charging ~BO sec None Testing has demonstrated that the lines (incl pump startup delay) charging pumps are capable of delivering their design flow rates. Relevant safety analyses will be reviewed to ensure that line purge time calculations are consistent with demonstrated pump performance. COMPLETE ANF has determined limiting case MSLB is insensitive to this number (see JDE 87-08) Revision l SYSTEM PERF REQ IMP/MDOl H

~--------------- --- SYSTEM PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS IMPOSED BY ACCIDENT ANALYSES (As Documented in Chapter 14 of Palisades FSAR, Rev 1, Effective December, 1985) Test Source System Requirement Performed Exception/Justification 0 Minimum charging water temperature ~ 140°F DW0-1 Surveillance procedure ensures SH0-1 that SIRW temperature is ~40°F and boric acid tanks and lines are ~155°F. Safety analyses will be reviewed to assure consistency with these temperatures. COMPLETE ANF determined charging temp has negligible impact on safety analysis results.

3. Engineered Safeguards Systems 0

Minimum boric acid concentration ~1720 ppm MC-llC None via HPSI pumps 0 Minimum HPSI pump flow ~Fig 14.14-17 T-220 Testing has demonstrated that the HPSI pumps meet or exceed their design performance curves. Relevant safety analyses will be reviewed to ensure that analysis values are consistent with demon-strated pump performance. COMPLETE HPSI system configuration was taken into account and design performance curves were shown to satisfy the assumed delivery curve Fg 14.14-17. SY.Elff REQ IMP/MDOl 9:ion I 12

           .                                                 <~~-j                                                  '/

                                                                                                                           *-: * .. i SYSTEM PERFORMANCE REQUI         TS IMPOSED BY ACCIDENT ANALYSES (As Documented in Chapter 14 of Palisades FSAR, Rev 1, Effective December, 1985)

Test Source System Requirement Performed Exception/Justification 0 Maximum HPSI pump startup delay with offsite power ~6 sec None Pump starting times will be tested prior to startup. Relevant safety analyses will be reviewed to assure consistency with results of these tests, if necessary. COMPLETE HPSI pump start times verified ~ 6 sec with power and :;; 21 sec without power (Item 36) without offsite power  :;;21 sec None See above. 0 Minimum HPSI water temperature SH0-1 Surveillance procedure ensures that SIRW temperature is ~40°F. Safety analysis will be reviewed to ensure consistency with this tempera-ture. COMPLETE Analysis is consistent with ~ 40°F. Revision 1 SYSTEM PERF REQ IMP/MDOl 13

SYSTEM PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS IMPOSED BY ACCIDENT ANALYSES (As Documented in Chapter 14 of Palisades FSAR, Rev 1, Effective December, 1985) Test Source System Requirement Performed Exception/Justification 0 Maximum time to purge HPSI L_sec None Testing has demonstrated that the injection lines HPSI pumps meet or exceed their design performance curves. Rele-vant safety analyses will be reviewed to ensure that line purge time calculations are consistent with demonstrated pump performance. COMPLETE ANF has determined that the current MSLB analysis will support operation with an end of core life moderator temperature coefficient of -32 pcm/°F when neglecting boron injection due to HPSI.

4. Primary Coolant System:

0 PCS pump coastdown ~Relap 4-EM curve FSAR Fig None 14.14-15 "sion 1 SY ERF REQ IMP/MDOl 14

                                                                                                                       * ........_...,/

SYSTEM PERFORMANCE REQU

                                                                     '    ... I i~::r' NTS IMPOSED BY ACCIDENT ANALYSES (As Documented in Chapter 14 of Palisades FSAR, Rev 1 9 Effective December, 1985)

Test Source System Requirement Performed Exception/Justification

5. Main Steam Systemg 0

Maximum SG Mass full power Note 3 None Note 3 hot standby Note 3 None Note 3 0 Maximum MSIV closure time ~4 sec RI-17 RI-17 performs a stopwatch test to verify valve closure in ~5 sec with no flow through the valve. Since the MSIV is a stop-check design, closure times are expected to be much less than 4 sec when there is flow through the valve. MPR study shows MSIV closure less than 1 second. Se P-528 memo dated 6/12/80 (MPR report 653, Rev 1).

6. Feedwater System:

0 Maximum AFW flow to SG with ~650 gpm R0-97 Automatic initiation and flow ruptured line Q0-21 limiting controls have recently T-201 been added to the AFWS. Safety T-202 analyses will be reviewed to T-192 ensure that assumptions in the T-196 analyses are consistent with measured performance of this system. Plant testing has demon-strated that the new system meets all specified design requirements. COMPLETE Safety analysis group has determined it is possible to supply 675 gpm to a ruptured S/G vice 650 gpm. This has a negligible effect on analysis. See JOE 87-08. Revision 1 SYSTEM PERF REQ IMP/MDOl

~------------ - SYSTEM PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS IMPOSED BY ACCIDENT ANALYSES (As Documented in Chapter 14 of Palisades FSAR,'Rev 1, Effective December, 1985) Test Source System Requirement Performed Exception/Justification 0

                     **   Min.imum time for AFW flow to        ~5 sec                     R0-97     None ramp from 0 to maximum flow                                     Q0-21 0

AFW temperature 70°F None COMPLETE ANF has determined that AFW temperature decrease of 30°F has negligible impact on steam line break event. See JDE 87-08 0 Main feedwater temperature None COMPLETE ANF determined small changes in initial steady state full power l00°F None temperature of main Feed would hot standby 4J6°F None have negligible effect on steam line break event. See JDE 87-08. 0 MFW control valves must be None This is a representative assumption capable of controlling main used for the analysis. It is not feedwater flow to SGs following intended to limit feedwater system SLB to less than the integrated operation. The safety analysis flow that would be delivered will be reviewed to justify the assuming a linear ramp from conservatism of this assumption. 100% to 5% flow for 60 sec following reactor trip. COMPLETE ANF determined safety analysis is insensitive to this number. See JDE 87-08.

7. Turbine Generator System:

PERF REQ IMP/MDOl

                                                                     .~ ~:* :_::., ~..*
                                                                     \d(ijJ 1
                                                                                                                          *..     . ; . /,

16

                                                             ,<'{)::*~~~\

SYSTEM PERFORMANCE REQUIR-~! IMPOSED BY ACCIDENT ANALYSES (As Documented in Chapter 14 of Palisades FSAR, Rev 1, Effective December, 1985) Test Source System Reguirement Performed Exception/Justification 0 Maximum delay from scram to ~70 sec None Plant trip data and safety analy-end of T/G-assisted PCS sis will be reviewed to ensure pump coastdown that this is a conservative safety assumption. COMPLETE ANF determined the safety analysis insensitive to turbine generator assist delay time, however coastdown delay time must be >10 sec for the pump seizure transient. Present trip setpoint is at 50% rated speed.

8. Engineered Safeguards System:

See "Containment Pressure Analysis" entry in this table. FSAR 14.15 Steam 1. Reactor Protection System (Note l)g Generator 0 Tube Rupture Low Pressurizer Pressure ~1571 psia RI-03 None SIS Trip

2. Chemical and Volume Control System:

g 0 Maximum charging pump flow ~133 gpm M0-20 None (3 pumps) Revision 1 SYSTEM PERF REQ IMP/MDOl 17

SYSTEM PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS IMPOSED BY ACCIDENT ANALYSES (As Documented in Chapter 14 of Palisades FSAR, Rev 1, Effective December, 1985) Test Source System Reguirement Performed Exception/Justification

3. Engineered Safeguards System:

0 Maximum HPSI flow from L _ gpm T-220 Testing has demonstrated that 2 pumps L _ psia the HPSI pumps meet or exceed their design performance curves. Relevant safety analyses will be reviewed to ensure that analysis values are consistent with demonstrated pump performance.

4. Main Steam System:

0 Temperature setpoints for ~535°F RS-1-1 None auto closure of ADVs FSAR 14.17 LOCA 1. Reactor Protection System (Note 1): 0 Thermal Margin/Low Pressure Trip ~1750 psia RI-02 None MI-021 0 SIS or high containment pressure ~5 psig RI-06 None (for HPSI & LPSI initiation only) MI-05

2. Engineered Safeguards System:

0 Minimum HPSI pump flows See Att Curves T-220 None 0 Maximum HPSI pump startup ~21 sec None Pump starting times will be delay after SIS, tested prior to startup. Relevant safety analyses will be reviewed to assure consis-tency. COMPLETE HPSI starting delay time verified ~ 21 sec. (see Item 36) 1 SY.PERF REQ IMP/HOOi 18

I,' . .'*:.\

                                                                   .":*:" . ~-:'
                                                                                                                          -~
                                                                                                                                   /

SYSTEM PERFORMANCE REQUIR TS IMPOSED BY ACCIDENT ANALYSES (As Documented in Chapter 14 of Palisades FSAR, Rev 1, Effective December, 1985) Test Source System Requirement Performed Exception/Justification 0 Maximum SIRW tank temperature ~70°F SH0-1 LOCA analysis is relatively in-RI-18 sensitive to HPSI and LPSI temps. SIT temp has overriding effect. ECCS water spills out break cooling containment, reducing containment back pressure and therefore reflood rate. This effect outweighs the effect or reduced subcooling for core cooling. SIRWT temp should not be listed here. An SIT temp of 90°F was assumed, historial data is being checked, but containment atmospheric temperature remains relatively high during operation. Therefore, < 70°F is not a concern. The FSAR will be modified. 0 Minimum LPSI pump flows See Att Curve T-209 None T-225 0 Maximum LPSI pump startup ~28 sec None Pump starting times will be delay after SIS tested prior to startup. Relevant safety analyses will be reviewed to assure consis-tency with results of these tests. COMPLETE LPSI start time verified

                                                                                            <28 sec after SIS (Item 36).

Revision 1 SYSTEM PERF REQ IMP/MDOl 19

SYSTEM PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS IMPOSED BY ACCIDENT ANALYSES (As Documented in Chapter 14 of Palisades FSAR, Rev 1, Effective December, 1985) Test Source System Requirement Performed Exception/Justification 0 Minimum Safety Injection Tank  ;;:1100 ft 3 SH0-1 RI-15C shows a Tech Spec limit of (SIT) volume RI-15C 1103 ft 3 which is used to set low alarm setpoint for tank level. The FSAR reports a value of 1150 cubic feet and will be changed to 1100 cubic feet. 0 Minimum SIT pressure  ;;:215 psia SH0-1 None RI-15A/B 0 Maximum spray flow (2 pumps)  :£4840 gpm Testing has demonstrated that T-86-250 spray pumps meet or exceed their T-86-256 design performance curves. Relevant safety analyses will be reviewed to ensure that analysis values are consistent with demonstrated pump performance. COMPLETE System delivery curve which includes system flow losses shows this value to be conservative. 0 Minimum spray water temperature M0-25 None SH0-1 1 s PERF REQ IMP/MDOl 20

                                                                 **~<L:;;j

                                                                                                                           \
                                                                                                                        ** _i SYSTEM PERFORMANCE REQU         NTS IMPOSED BY ACCIDENT ANALYSES (As Documented in Chapter 14 of Palisades FSAR, Rev 1, Effective December, 1985)

Test Source System Requirement Performed Exception/Justification

                 °Containment air cooler capacity        ;;;Table 14.17-10     None       Bases for air cooler heat capacity will be reviewed to verify conserva-tism.

COMPLETE Values assumed here are correct. Westinghouse analysis shows we meet this curve.

3. Emergency Power System:

0 Maximum time to load HPSI L _ sec R0-8 ESF sequencer timings will be veri-pumps on DG fied prior to startup. Relevant safety analyses will be reviewed to ensure that analysis values are consistent with demonstrated sequencer performance. COMPLETE Eliminate. Limiting case does not assume loss of offsite power. 0 Maximum time to load charging L _ sec R0-8 See above. pumps on DG FSAR 14.18 Containment 1. Reactor Protection System (Note 1): Pressure Analysis 0 Maximum high containment  ;;; 5 psig RI-06 None pressure SIS MI-05 Revision 1 SYSTEM PERF REQ IMP/MDOl 2ll.

SYSTEM PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS IMPOSED BY ACCIDENT ANALYSES (As Documented in Chapter 14 of Palisades FSAR, Rev 1, Effective December, 1985) Test Source System Requirement Performed Exception/Justification

2. Engineered Safeguards System:

0 Minimum flow from 1 HPSI pump ~450 gpm M0-22 Testing has demonstrated that HPSI T-220 pumps meet or exceed their design performance curves. Relevant safety analyses will be reviewed to ensure that analysis values are consistent with demonstrated pump performance. 0 Maximum delay for start of HPSI $33 sec None Pump starting times will be tested prior to startup. Relevant safety analyses will be reviewed to ensure consistency with results of these tests. 0 Maximum SIRW tank temperature  ;:Sl00°F None Surveillance procedures only ensure minimum SIRW temperature. Plant historical data will be reviewed to determine maximum SIRW tempera-tures, and if necessary, an assess-ment* will be made regarding the impact of higher temperatures on the analysis. 0 Hinimum flow from 1 LPSI pump ~5000 gpm M0-23 Testing has demonstrated that LPSI I T-209 pumps meet or exceed their design T-225 performance curves. Relevant safety analyses will be reviewed to ensure that analysis values are consistent with demonstrated pump performance. COMPLETE Value is conservative when compared to the system deli very curve. 1 SY ERF REQ IMP/MDOl 22

                                                                                                                         .*.-.)

SYSTEM PERFORMANCE REQU TS IMPOSED BY ACCIDENT ANALYSES (As Documented in Chapter _14 of Palisades FSAR 1 Rev 1, Effective December, 1985) Test Source System Reguirement Performed Exception/Justification 0 Maximum delay for start of LPSI  ::;;33 sec None Pump starting times will be tested prior to startup. Relevant safety analyses will be reviewed to ensure consistency with results of these tests. COMPLETE Max delay time for LPSI verified ~ 33 sec. (see Item 36). 0 Heat removal capacity of 2 spray ii;240 MBtu/hr None . Basis for spray heat removal pumps capacity will be reviewed to verify conservatism. COMPLETE Remove this number. This is not an input to the analysis. It is a result.

                 °Flow capacity of 2 spray pumps         ;;;2500 gpm             TCNs        Testing has demonstrated that spray (1 EDG)                                                      T-86-250    pumps meet or exceed their design T-86-256    performance curves. Relevant safety analyses will be reviewed to ensure that analysis values are consistent with demonstrated pump performance.

COMPLETE Head curve verification meets inputs into the analysis. Revision l SYSTEM PERF REQ IMP/MDOl 23

SYSTEM PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS IMPOSED BY ACCIDENT ANALYSES (As Documented in Chapter 14 of Palisades FSAR, Rev 1, Effective December, 1985) Test Source System Requirement Performed Exception/Justification 0 Maximum delay for start of spray ~48 sec None Pump starting times will be tested prior to startup. Relevant safety analyses will be reviewed to ensure consistency with results of these tests. COMPLETE Spary response verified

                                                                                        ~ 48 sec.   (SFE Item 4).
                                                         ~229 0

Heat removal capacity of 3 air MBtu/hr None Basis for air cooler heat removal coolers capacity will be reviewed to verify conservatism. COMPLETE Westinghouse calculation shows 3 coolers supply ~229 MBta/hr. 0 Maximum delay for start of air ~33.5 sec None Fan starting times will be tested coolers prior to startup. Relevant safety analyses will be reviewed to ensure consistency with results of these tests.

3. Service Water System:

                                                         ~53°F 0

Maximum service wat~r inlet temp SH0-1 None FSAR 14.20 Liquid 1. Radiation Monitoring System: Waste 0 Incident Treated waste pump primary QR-22 None discharge isolation valve trips closed on high radiation level 1 s PERF REQ IMP/MDOl 24 i

SYSTEM PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS IMPOSED BY ACCIDENT ANALYSES (As Documented in Chapter 14 of Palisades FSAR, Rev 1, Effective December, 1985) Test Source System Requirement Performed Exception/Justification 0 Treated waste pump backup discharge isolation valve trips closed on low circulating water 0 Backup radiation monitor in HP-6.8 None discharge canal alarms on high radiation level f'SAR 14.22 Maximum 1. Engineered Safeguards System: Hypothetical Accident 0 Hydrazine concentration of ~50 ppm SC-05 Design basis for SC-05 states that containment spray 15.5% wt concentration of hydrazine will produce ~50 ppm spray concen-tration under all conditions. However, surveillance requirements allow +/-0.5% deviation from 15.5%. The safety analysis will be reviewed to ensure that the tolerance on hydrazine concentration do not affect the analysis results. Complete: Re-review of SC-05 basis document calculation shows 15.0% wt concentration hydrazine corresponds to >50 ppm spray concentration. No further action required. 0 Maximum time delay for hydrazine  :$1 min R0-12 None addition to spray subsequent to Q0-13 spray initiation Revision l SYSTEM PERF REQ IMP/MDOl 25

ATTACHMENT 2 Consumers Power Company Palisades Plant Docket 50-255 SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL EVALUATION LONG TERM COMMITMENTS October 30, 1987 36 Pages OC1087-0195-NL02

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REFERENCE (FSAR or other) ASSIGNED LOGNO SYSTEM/PAGE/ITEM COMMITMENT INDIVIDUAL DUE DATE STATUS

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00001 AFW 1 1 9.7.2.1 Condensate storage tank requirements sub-stantiated by the Ace Anal group. Results will be defined in EOPs. (See Logno 00012) 00002 AFW 1 4 9.7.2.1 Flow measurement of AFW pump recirculation flow ls not designed to be monitored. Flow instrumentation will be added as part of the 5 year plan. See HCTF generic topic on pump testing instrumentation. 00003 AFW 10 2 7.4.3.2 In the event of a main steam line break, the AFW flow toward the affected S/G must be terminated. No interlocks exist to prevent manual isolation of AFW flow to generators during a MSLB. This function.is addressed procedurally by the EOPs. The FSAR will be corrected. 00004 AFW 11 3 7.4.3.2 Due to nuclear safety considerations, the automatic isolation feature of the FOGG system has been disabled and the operator is instructed by Plant Emergency Operating Procedures to manually isolate the affected steam generator. The FSAR will be clarified. 00005 AFW 12 1 7 .l.l SOP-12. To start/stop P-8A and P-ec. 2/3 low suction pressure trip of pump is not verified by test. This will be verified periodically. 00006 AFW 12 2 SOP-12. To start/stop P-BB. 2/3 lc:fl suction pressure trip of pump ls not verified by test. This will be verified periodically. 00007 AFW 3 1 9.7.2.3 The FOGG valves are passive normally open valves. They were originally designed to allow for feeding an intact steam generator. This feature is presently disabled. These valves will be tested against differential pressure as part of the plant response to IEB 85-03. SFE COMMITMENTS/MDOl Page 1 L__

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00008 AFW 3 1 9.7.2.3 The FOGG actuation system monitors S/G pressure. These are passive normally open valves. They were originally designed to allow for feeding an intact steam generator. This feature is presently disabled. These valves will be tested against differential pressure as part of the plant response to IEB 85-03. (Response could lead to periodic testing but a single test ls adequate for . this commitment. The bulletin should pick up any needed commitment. 00009 AFW 4 1 9.7.5 All valves on the suction side of the aux feed pumps are inspected monthly to ensure that they are in the locked-open position. This is not directly true. FSAR will be clarified. 00010 AFW 4 2 Table 9-13 As a result of the Operational Readiness Assessment on AFW, PRC approved analysis which clarified AFW flow requirements. Special testing has been performed which verifies AFW system can meet these require-ments (T-186, T-192, T-201, T-202). Surveillances will be modified to verify these requirements periodically. 00012 AFW 5 2 7.4.1.4 Requirements are substantiated by the Ace Anal group. Results will be included in EOPs. (See Log No 00001) 00013 AFW 6 l 7.4.1.4 Verify 12 hours of N' backup to P-8B steam valves Special Test T-187 verified N' system 1would supply 12 hours of N' to PCV-0521A and CV-0522B. This function will be verified for the other flow control valves supplied with backup N' prior to startup. A PACS will be generated to periodically test this function in the future. 00014 AFW 6 3 7.4.1.B.5 Detection of low condensate tank level will be via a low suction pressure switch which is installed on the turbine driven auxiliary feedwate pump. This pressure switch turns on an alarm on the auxiliary shutdown panel. Prior to the next Refout a surveillance procedure will be developed to calibrate this pressure switch each refueling. SFE COMMITMENTS/MDOl Page 2

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00015 AFW 7 l 7.4.1.8.5 Upon receipt of the condensate storage tank low level alarm, the auxiliary feedwater pump suction source will be transferred manually to the fire water system. Redundant pressure switches are provided to trip (3 swltchesi 2 of 3 required for trip) the aux feed pumps on lo~ suction pressure, thus avoiding pump failure due to low or nonexistent tank level.

                           - These switches will be added to a surveil-lance procedure prior to the next refout.

00016 AIR l 1 9.5.2.l Instrument air is not designed to be avail-able following a DBA - was designed as a non-safety system. The EOPs are heavily depend-ent on the availability of instrument air, however procedural direction is provided if air is lost. A backup means of providing instrument air is available in case offsite power is lost per ONP 25.2. FSAR will be clarified. 00017 AIR l 2 9.5.2.1 Nitrogen pressure ls maintained at 60 psig vs 90 psig stated in FSAR. Also B nitrogen bottles are now in service to operate the AFW steam supply valve versus 5 stated in FSAR. FSAR will be changed to clarify this, plus the number of bottles available. 00018 AIR l 6 9.5.2.3.1 Special Test T-187 verifies 60 pslg N' system would supply 12 hours of backup N' to the AFW flow control valves. This will be verified per iodlcally in the future. 00019 AIR 2 l 9.5.2.,.Ll PACS \/ill be developed to verify that instru-ment air header downstream of the filters has a pressure switch which initiates the closing of a shutoff valve on the service air header in the event the Instrument air pressure drops to 85 psig and low-pressure ls alarmed in the control room. 00020 AIR 2 5 9.5.3.l Normal instrument air load is now approxi-mately 180 scfm versus 195 scfm stated in tSAR. Compressor cycle time is being trended by System Eng which will flag degraded compressor or system performance. FSAR will be modified. SFE COMMITMENTS/MDOl Page 3

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00021 AIR 3 2 9.5.3.3 Our backup nitrogen system is maintained at 60 psig. The adequacy of 60 psig vs 70 psig will be reviewed and the FSAR corrected. 00022 AIR 3 2 9.5.3.3 During design basis accident or post-OBA condition, operation of piston-type air-operated valves may be desired. Generate PACS to periodically test the function to the flow control valves supplied with backup N'. 00023 AIR 3 3 9.5.3.3 Generate PACS to address testing to assure that CCW containment isolation valves have accumulators to position valves during a OBA in response to loss of instrument air. 00024 AIR 4 1 ONP-25.2 - 4.12 - Restore Instrument Air (*using LCC'-13 power feed to LCC-91) - Alternate power feed to LCC-91 will be tested periodically. 00025 CAC 1 3 6.3.2.1 The service water discharge and supply valves may be manually operated from the main CR and the engineered safeguards local panel.

                             - The surveillance will be modified to periodically stroke these valves from the local panel. (QQ-5) 00026       CAC      1   4  6.3.2.1 All fans may be manually started or stopped from the main CR or at the individual breakers.        A PACS will be generated to period\cally operate the fans locally.

00027 CAC 2 2 6.3.2.1 During post OBA operation, water flows of over 150 gpm will flow through the overflow valves. - PACS will be developed for future inspections. 00028 CAC 2 5 6.3.2.2 3 If standby power is not available and a SIS occurs the emergency D/Gs are started and the OBA sequencers allow all four coolers to start using the OBA rated fans. Recent T/S change submittal is to require only three coolers for OBA requirements. FSAR will be revised to pick this up; SFE COMMITMENTS/MOO! Page 4

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00029 CAC 3 l 6.3.2.2 A surveillance test will be developed to verify containment air cooler operability on a refueling frequency. Rev l 00030 CAC 4 6 FC 713 A review of modification history was per-formed since start of 1985 Refueling outage. FC-713 changed VHX-4 service water outlet valve (CV-0867 from fail-open to fail-closed. R0-12 will be revised to address this mod. 00-5, Att l, page 5 of 14 will be revised to address closure time instead of opening time. Rev l 00031 CAC 5 l SOPS 7.1.3 Accident condition operation. SOP-5 7.l.3a will be revised to reflect the correct accident condition of the fans and coolers. Rev l 00032 CAC 5 l SOPS 7.1.3 R0-12 will be revised to address the auto closure of VHX-4 service water outlet valve (CV-0867) on a safety injection signal. Rev l 00033 ccs 4 2 9.3.2.3 3 Containment high pressure now will close the ccw to containment supply and return valves. R0-12 tests containment isolation valves. (This outage we modified the system such that a CHP signal rather than a SIS will cause containment isolation.) The FSAR will be modified to clarify. 00034 ccs B l Table ~-7 Number of Operating Pumps: Special Test T-213 and T-223 were performed during the 1986 maintenance outage to verify sufficient flow to all safety related loads following OBA. FSAR will be modified for new values as a result of the new analysis. 00035 ccws l 3 9.3.2.l The pumps can be star.ted and stopped from the main CR and also locally at the switchgear.

                            - Surveillance procedures will be modified to start pump locally periodically.

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00036 ccws 1 4 9.3.2.1 The system can be vented to aux bldg through a diaphragm-operated three-way valve on the surge tank. - A PACS will be generated to periodically test this function in the future. 00037 ccws 10 1 7.6 SOP ECCS pump backup service water supply valve will be cycled periodically. 00038 ccws 2 1 9.3.2.1 Supply valves to systems shown below are operable from main CR and all, except the containment isolation valves and the fuel pool supply_line valve, are operable from the Engineered Safeguards Aux Panels 1 Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchangers 2 Enginered Safeguards Pumps 3 Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exch 7 Radwaste Equip 4 Services Inside Containment Surveillance Procedures will be reviewed to determine which valves are not periodically cycled from C-33. Procedures will be modi-fied to test these vlvs locally periodically. Rev 1 00039 ccws 2 3 9.3.2.3 3 The valves in the gland cooling water supply and return headers are automatically opened by a SIS to supply CCW to Engineered Safeguards pumps. - A PACS will be generated to cycle periodically., 00040 ccws 3 1 9.3.2.3 Starting of the third ccw pump is initiated by a l~w pressure signal received from the pressure switch on the ccw pumps common discharge header. - A test will be gener-ated to periodically test this function. SFE COMMITMENTS/MDOl Page 6

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REFERENCE (FSAR or other) ASSIGNED LOGNO SYSTEM/PAGE/ITEM COMMITMENT INDIVIDUAL DUE DATE STATUS

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00041 ccws 4 l 9.3.2.3 3 Low cooling water flow in the supply header I to each Engineered Safeguards Equipment Room is annunciated in the CR. Changeover from CCW supply to SW is performed by remote-manual closing of component cooling supply valve'and return valve and opening one of the two SW supply valves and the return valve from the main CR or from the local Engineered Safeguards Auxiliary Panel. - A PACS will be generated to cycle Service Water backup to ESS pump cooling periodically in the future. Rev 1 00043 ccws 4 3 9.3.2.3 3 Air accumulators of ccw return header isolation valves are not periodically tested. Valves are cycled via 00-6 with instrument air available. PACS will address and testing will be included as part of augmented test program. 00044 ccws e 1 Table 9-7 Number of Operating Pumps - M0-29 will be modified to include ccw supply to P-SSB and P-SSC. See E-PAL-86-093. 00045 ccws 9 2 9.3.2.3 1 High component cooling temperature annunci-ation is not tested. A PACS will be generated to check periodically. 00046 ccws 9 3 9.3.2.3 1 Tank low level is annunciated in the CR. A PACS will be generated to check periodi-cally. 00047 ccws 9 9.3.213 1 High activity ls annunciated in the main CR. A PACS will be generated to check periodi-cally. 00048 CIS l 6.7.2.3 The main steam line isolation signal initiates closure of main steam line iso-lation valves and is derived from two out of four containment high-pressure signals (CHP) or two out of low pressure signals from either S/G. - RI-17 will be revised to document the feature of MSIV closure on low S/G pressure. Rev l SFE COMMITMENTS/MDOl Page 7

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00049 CIS 1 6 6.7.2.3 Containment de-isolation is accomplished by a manual ieset push button each circuit when containment pressure and radiation have de-creased below the isolation trip points on at least 3 of the 4 pressure and rad sensors. In response to NUREG-0737 all auto contain-ment i.solatlon valves are electrically locked closed to preclude auto opening upon resettin of CIS. Subsequent to resetting of CIS the control switch for each valve will need to be moved to the "close" position and then to the "open" to reopen valve. This is not pre-cisely true for MSIVs and CCW valves. FSAR will be clarified. 00050 CIS 2 l 6.7.2.3 Instrumentation and control circuits in the CIS are fall-safe. - CCW valves from con-tainment are air to close valves with accumu-lators to allow valve closure on loss of instrument air. This feature is not periodi-cally tested. PACS being written to address. ST and SR relays aie energized to isolate. FSAR will be*clarlfied. 00051 CIS 2 1 6.7.2.3 ccw valves from containment are air to close valves with accumulators to allow valve closure on loss of instrument air. PACS be written to test periodically. 00052 CIS 2 3 7.7.2.3 CIS can be manually initiated with the test switch in the following sequence of ops: Either of 2 redundant switches located in CR pushed to test position de-energizes 2 of 4 channe~s which will initiate containment iso, initlaie SIS and start the containment spray pumps. The spray valves will not open in test position. The containment spray vlvs can be manually opened by means of their individual hand switches located in CR. Implied logic function is not completely true as specified in FSAR. FSAR will be clarified. 00053 CIS 2 6.7.3.2 Operation of the automatic isolation valves can be tested during power operation or while shutdown by means of push buttons located in the main CR. This testing cannot be performed during power operations. The FSAR will be clarified. SFE COMMITMENTS/MDOl Page 8

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REFERENCE (FSAR or other) ASSIGNED LOG NO SYSTEM/PAGE/ITEM COMMITMENT INDIVIDUAL DUE DATE STATUS

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00054 CRHV l l 9.8.2.4 2 A PACS will be developed to periodically test the post accident function to remove smoke from the control room to allow re-entry. 00055 CRHV l l 9.8.2.4 2 Tornado Dampers - are a passive mechanical device. A PACS will be developed to periodically test. 00056 CRHV 2 1 7.4.5.1 NUREG-0800 II.3.a requires positive pressure "relative to all surrounding air spaces*. The turbine building and the attached corridor constitute the surrounding air space for normal entry to the CR. Reviewing the different options to locate the reference point, this location was considered the best. See E-PAL-85-022. The acceptance criteria of R0-28 requires greater than 0.125 inch of water vice 0.5 inch of water. The FSAR will be changed to correct this discrepancy. 00057 CRHV 2 2 9.8.2.4 A PACS will be generated to periodically test the smoke detector. 00058 CRHV 3 1 Table 9-15 Some design basis numbers in Table 9-5 do not reflect normal plant operation. The FSAR will be updated. 00059 CRHV 3 3 SOP-24 7.6.6 & 7.6.7 - A PACS will be developed to periodically test the purge mode (purge CR with fresh air). 00060 CRHV 3 5 SOP-2417.6.12 PACS for calibration of temperature indi-cators TE-1733, 173~, 1735, and 1736 and their alarms will be developed. (Fire in CR HVAC charcoal filters) 00061 CSIR l l 6.2.l ESS-I-13 ls a maintenance procedure which verifies sequencer operation and pump sequence times. The test is performed on a refueling cycle. The starting times are incorrect as presently stated in the FSAR. The FSAR will be changed to reflect the proper time of 2 seconds and 30 seconds. SFE COMMITMENTS/MDOl Page 9

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00062 CSIR 2 l 6.2.2.3 2 Initially the pumps take suction from SIRW tank. Upon reaching low tank level, continu-ation of containment spray is accomplished by automatic transfer of the pump suction to the containment sump. Transfer ls automatically accomplished by closing the SIRW tank suction valves and opening the containment sump out-let valves. Switchover is initiated on coincident low level signals from two of the four level switches in the SIRW tank. - RAS has been changed to 1/2 taken twice logic. FSAR will be corrected. 00063 CSIR 7 2 6.4.2.l An iodine removal hydrazine tank and an iodine removal makeup sodium hydroxide tank are provided with redundant tank heating and temperature controls to maintain a minimum temperature in both tanks to avoid freezing or precipitation. Alarm set points will be verified periodically. 00064 CSIR 7 5 6.4.2.1 The iodine removal hydrazine tank contains 270 plus or minus 17 gallons of 15.5 plus or minus 0.5% by weight of hydrazine solution with a nitrogen cover gas pressure of 11.2 plus or minus 2 psig. Alarms exist in main CR and alarm setpoints will be verified periodically. 00065 CSIR 8 1 6.4.2.l The sodium hydroxide tank provides a storage volume of 4200 plus or minus 300 gallons of 30.0 plus or minus 0.5% by weight sodium hydroxide solution with a nitrogen cover gas. Alarms1exist in main control on tank hi/lo level. Alarm setpoints will be verified periodically. 00066 CSIR 8 .4 6.4.2.2 Op procedures require the operator to proceed with injection prior to the one-minute time delay if radiation levels indicate cladding failure and* fission product release. If at the end of one minute, it is determined to be a spurious signal or a secondary line break, the hydrazine injection signal will be manually overridden. - EOPs do not address early initiation of hydrazine injection for hi rad levels. The procedures will be reviewed and modified. SFE COMMITMENTS/MDOl Page lO

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00067 CSIR 8 7 6.1.2.3 One or more spray pumps can also be used to augment flow to the core after the pressure is reduced. EOPs do no address use of spray pumps as alternate injection pumps. Operating procedures will be reviewed and modified as necessary to address this evalu@tion. FSAR will be clarified. Rev l 00068 eve 2 l 9.10.2.4 Any one of the 3 charging pumps can inject boron into the primary system at a rate of 460 ppm/hi whereas the increase in reactivity due to cooldown and xenon decay is equivalent to a boron reduction rate of about 160 ppm/h. This statement does not impact safety analysis on record and is not an issue for normal cooldown. FSAR change is required to eliminate this statement. 00069 eve 3 l 9.10.2.6 Item 7 - The variable capacity of charging pump is capable of supplying a variable out-put of 33-53 gpm. The fixed capacity charging pumps have a design output of 40 gpm. The safety requirement for charging pump flow is 68 gpm for 2 charging pumps (main steam line break analysis) See JAM 86-038. Therefore, present surveillance testing is adequate. FSAR will be changed to clarify. 00070 eve 4 3 9.10.2.6 Item 11 - Each boric acid pump is capable of supplying boric acid at the maximum demand conditon. Maximum demand is assumed to be the surply required with all 3 charging pumps operat ng - 133 gpm. The maximum required flow is 68 gpm as defined by the MSLB analysis. 1) The acceptance criteria will be modified to 68 gpm. 2) The FSAR will be modified to clarify this requirement. 00071 eve 4 4 9.10.2.6 Item 12 - The boronmeter and its recorder are presently not in our preventive maintenance program. This will be evaluated in the future for need for boronmeter. SFE COMMITMENTS/~IDOl Page 11

I' f. [. f't.'. f; SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL EVALUATION LONG TERM COMMITMENTS ~.

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REFERENCE (FSAR or other) ASSIGNED ~:*: LOGNO SYSTEM/PAGE/ITEM COMMITMENT INDIVIDUAL DUE DATE STATUS .[, ===== ================ ~============================================ ================ ~======= ==================== i*:i: 00072 eve 5 l 9.10.2.6 [:, The process radiation monitors RIA-0202A & B k monitor the fluid from the primary cooolant ,p.. loop for.high levels of activity which would provide an indication of failed fuel.

                                                                                                                                            ~I RR-09L checks RIA-0202A as req by T/S.                                                                           f 1!'.

RIA-0202B is not req by T/S. A test will be t:1 generated to periodically calibrate RIA-0202B t.

                                                                                                                                                ~*

00073 eve 7 3 9.10.3.3 ~- Makeup water is not automatically introduced ~

                                                                                                                                               ~*

at the shutdown boric acid concentration. ~~ Makeup to the volume control tank is normally t. operated in the manual, dilute or borate "~*. l> mode. This will reviewed and the FSAR will !1'.: be Clarified. t; 00074 eve B l 9.10.3.3 ~'. fi Either the pressurizer level control or the SIS will automatically start all charging t-pumps. - FSAR needs to be clarified. All [.! 3 charging pumps do not start by SIS. The ,.,;:

                                                                                                                                                 !°

3rd pump starts on low level in the  ? pressurizer. r:., 00075 eve B 1 9.10.3.3 "i Under emergency conditions either the pressurizer level control or the safety ~{: injection signal will automatically start all charging pumps. The SIS will also cause the t~ charging pump suction to be switched from the 11:.

                                                                                                                                                   ;J control tank to the discharge boric acid pump. - Charging pumps start on receipt of                                                                              ~~l' a pressurizer low level signal will be verified periodically.                                                                                                  !t 00076       eve      9   1  9.10.4                                                                                                                  ""

The bof ic acid pumps and the charging pumps t'. may be controlled locally at their switch- 8.~. gear. - Charging pumps will be started [* locally periodically. t 00077 cws l 4* Table 10-9 Cooling Tower Pump Design Flow. ~i~ Trend program will monitor performance during F

                                                                                                                                                      ~Y power escalation.

00078 EEPS l 2 B.2.2 Switchyard battery capacity and load testing is not routinely performed. This will be F reviewed. SFE COMMITMENTS/MDOl Page 12 ~ f

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00079 EEPS 1 8.2.2 The 345 kV power circuit breakers have enough air stored in their high pressure receivers to permit five breaker operations. Testing of the 345 kV breaker to cycle on loss of air compressors will be tested periodically in the future. 00080 EEPS 11 3 8.4.l.3 Each emergency generator and diesel engine is provided with several alarms, interlocks and trips. Each engine may be started and placed in service locally or from the CR. The generators may be synchornized from the CR so that they can be paralleled with the system for loading tests. All alarms, interlocks and trips on page 8.4.4 of FSAR will be tested periodically. 00081 EEPS 11 4 8.4.l.3 The diesel will be automatically tripped on generator differential or overcurrent relay action, engine overspeed/underspeed, over-crank or low lube oil pressure, low jacket water pressure and can be manually tripped at any time from the local station or from the CR. Diesel engine trips will be tested periodically.

• 00082 EEPS 13 l 8.6 Voltage protection and load shedding.

FSAR Chapter 14 time delays will be verified. 00083 EEPS 13 l 8.6 The voltage protection system automatically prevents load shedding of the safety-related buses f.hen the emergency generators are supplying power to the safeguards loads. Automatic bypass and reinstatement is verified by periodic testing. This will be tested periodically. 00084 EEPS 1 8.7.2.7 Battery Room Protection. A sail switch in the ventilation duct warns the control room of a loss of battery room ventilation. Verify this sail switch functions periodi-cally. SFE COMMITMENTS/MDOl Page 13

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00085 EEPS 2 4 8.2.3 Station loads, including the safety loads, are normally supplied from the main generator through the station power transformer. On loss of the main generator there is an auto-matic transfer from this normal source to the immediate access offsite power circuit (see Sectiqn 8.6). This design includes provision to test this feature during plant operation.

                           - Clarify FSAR that this function is not tested during normal operation~

00086 EEPS 2 4 B.2.3 Station loads, including the safety loads, are"normally supplied from the main generator through the station power transformer. On oss of the main generator there is an auto-matic transfer from this normal source to the immediate access offsite power circuit (see Section 8.6). The design includes provisions to test this feature during plant operation.

                           - Periodically test fast transfer in the future.

00087 EEPS 3 2 8.3.l.2 . Following a turbine or reactor trip, the 4,160 volt buses lA and lB will automatically transfer to the standby source and all auxiliaries will continue to run. Last cycle the plant operated normally on startup power. If it is determined to operate on station powex, fast transfer testing will be periodically performed. Rev 1 00088 EEPS 3 2 B.3.1.2 Followlng a turbine or reactor trip, the 4,160 ~olt Buses lA and lB will automatically transfer to the standby source and all auxiliaries will continue to run. Last cycle the plant operated normally on startup power. This.mode of normal plant operations is presently being evaluated. Rev 1 SFE COMMITMENTS/MDOl Page 14

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00089 EEPS 3 4 8.3.l.2 If the trip is accompanied by a failure in the standby source, the turbine generator will supply power to the primary coolant pumps for a limited time while coasting down to 80% speed. Periodic testing will be performed if this is determined to be neces;iary. 00090 EEPS 3 6 8.3.2.2 The 2400 volt system has sufficient.capacity to start the largest motor when all the other motors are energized. - Load studies will be reviewed to verify this function. 00091 EEPS 4 2 8.3.2.2 8.4.1.2 also. Periodically test to verify remote/local operation of App R isolation switches for the 2400 V breakers. PACS will be.generated. 00092 EEPS 4 4 8.3.2.2 All 2400 breakers on Buses lC and lD are also capable of being controlled from the switch gear. Breakers will be operated locally to verify control of Bus lC and lD from switchgear periodically. 00093 EEPS 5 2 B.3.3.2 The 480 volt system has sufficient capacity to start and accelerate largest motor when all other motors on the system are energized. This method will be reviewed to determine if this criteria is an input to those loads. 00094 EEPS 5 3 8.3.3.2 Critical breaker and motor overload trips are annuncjated in the control room. - The annunc\ation of critical breaker trips and motor overload trip will be verified periodi-cally in the future to the extent practical. 00095 EEPS 6 4 8.3.3.2 Pressurizer heaters do not trip on a SIS signal. FC-683 was completed during 1986 maintenance outage. FSAR will be corrected. 00098 EEPS 7 2 8.3.5.2 Items 2 and 3. The shunt trip device associated with the 125 volt DC buses.will be tested periodically. Rev l SFE COMl4ITMENTS/MDOl Page 15

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00096 EEPS 7 3 8.3.5.2 Both DC systems are ungrounded and are equipped with g.round detectors continuous monitoring. Monitoring is also provided on other important system parameters, such as bus voltage and current. Abnormal con-ditions are annunciated in the control room.

                           - The ~round detectors and annunciators will be verified periodically.

00097 EEPS 7 4 8.3.5.2 The 125 volt DC buses undervoltage relays are not periodically calibrated. This was tested under modification procedure FC-407-148. This relay and annunciator will be verified periodically. 00099 EEPS 8 l 8.3.5.2 The preferred AC buses operate ungrounded and are equiped with ground detectors. The ground detectors will be verified periodically. 00100 EEPS 8 5 8.3.5.2 Emergency Operation. On loss of normal and standby AC power, all DC loads will be supplied from the station battery. As soon as one of the diesel generators has started and is ready for loading, the battery chargers will automatically resume operation and support the battery. - R0-8 will be revfsed to document auto operation of battery chargers. 00101 EEPS 8 7 8.3.5.2 system Monitoring. The DC and preferred AC power systems (le, chargers, inverters, bat-teries 1and breakers) are controlled locally. The operational status lnformat'ion ls displayed locally. Periodic testing and calibration of alarm and monitoring devices associated with DC and preferred AC power systems will be verified periodically. 00102 EEPS 9 l 8.3.5.3 Periodic testing and calibration of alarm and monitoring devices associated with DC and preferred AC power systems will be done to ensure proper operation. SFE COMMITMENTS/MDOl Page 16

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00103 EEPS 9 2 8.3.S.3 Modifications have been performed to add loads to preferred AC buses. This will be reviewed to verify excess capacity still exists. If not the FSAR will be clarified. 00104 ESC 2 1 7.3.2*.2 Safet~ Injection with Standby Power Available

                            - If standby power ls available at the time of initiation of SIS, fast transfer to the standby source ls effected by the turbine generator trip. The SIS relays initiate the simultaneous start of the engineered safe-guards equipment. - No periodic test documents the operability of the fast transfei relays associated with standby power. An appropiiate test will be geneiated to peiiodically test in the future.

00105 ESC 2 7 7.3.3.2 Instrument air and HSIV bypasses in contiol room aie not closed by SIS as implied by FSAR. FSAR will be corrected. 00106 ESC 3 1 7.3.3.2 Resetting the isolation circuits will not result in automatically opening the contain-ment isolation valves, the operator must manually reopen each valve, except ccw valves. Resetting CHP will result in ccw valves reopening. FSAR will be clarified. 00107 ESC 3 5 7.3.3.3 Failure in control source power to the pressure/radiation sensor relay circuit or to the redundant initiating circuit causes the circuit to fall in a mode to initiate lsola~lon, but isolation will not be affected unlesJ a second failure occurs. The FSAR statement will be enhanced to be more specific. 00108 ESC 1 7.3.4,2 Coincident two out of four low level in SIRWT signals will initiate valve operations and trip both low pressure safety injection pumps. A manual bypass is provided so that the low pressure safety injection pumps may be restarted. A modification installed this outage changed the 2 out of 4 logic to l out of 2 taken twice. The FSAR will be corrected. SFE COMMITMENTS/MDOl Page 17

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00109 ESC 4 4 7.3.2.2 Failure of the control power or any one redundant circuit will be annunciated in the control room. Annunciators are not periodically tested. These will be tested per.iodically in the future. 00110 ESC 4 6 7 .3.3 ** 2 TESTING. The containment high pressure detectors and aux relays can be tested at power without actuating containment -isolation* by tripping 1 out of the 4 local pressure switches. Actuation of the aux relay is annunciated in the control room. The detectors and aux relays for containment hi radiation are tested in the same manner as containment high pressure circuits. FSAR wording will be verified. 00111 ESC 5 l 7.3.3.2 Testing described in the FSAR is not the met~od used. FSAR will be clarified. 00112 FPS l 6 9.6.3.1 There *are no PACS to periodically schedule these activities. Ops Dept manually schedules and controls these checklists. The scheduling system will be reviewed for effectiveness. 00113 FPS 2 2 9.6.3.1 A dry pipe fusible link sprinkler system is provided for protection in track alley. It is annunciated and indicated in the same manner as the wet pipe systems. This acti.vity is not scheduled periodically by a PACS. Ops Dept manually schedules and controls this checklist (CL21.17). This schedu ing system will be reviewed for effectiveness. 00114 FPS 2 4 9.6.3.1 Portable fire extinguishers are provided at convenient and accessible locations. The extinguishing media are pressurized water, co* *or dry chemicals as appropriate for the service requirements of the area. - There are *no PACS to periodically schedule these activities. Operations Dept manually schedules and controls Checklists. This 5ystem will be reviewed for effectiveness. SFE COMMITMENTS/MDOl Page 18

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00115 FPS 4 5 Table 9-12 There is no periodic test to verify capacity of the fire system jockey pump (P-13). Normal plant operations and indications would denote if system.pressure (flow) degraded to cause the other pumps to start. This will be reviewed for inclusion in the equipment trend program. 00116 HPA 1 l 9.5.2.l We do not periodically test stroke the associated safety valves to verify that the HP air system ls capable of placing the valves in their safety position. - A PACS will be generated to perform Special Test T-205 periodically. 00117 HPSI l l 6.1.l One high pressure pump has suff iclent capacity with 25% spillage to maintain the core water level at the start of reclrcu-la t ion. FSAR will be expanded to define what this means. 00118 HPSI l 2 6.1.l The hot leg injection is designed to split HPSI flow so that half goes to one hot leg and the other half goes to the four cold legs. The FSAR will be clarified as to how much flow is required to get to each hot leg to meet design assumptions. 00119 HPSI 5 3 Table 6-3 HPSI Pump Design Flow - The full pump per-formance curve will be verified for HPSI pumps during the next Refueling Outage. 00120 HPSI 5 4 6.1.2,2 A low-flow alarm in provided on the seal cooling water to the pumps to warn of cooling water or seal cooling malfunction. Annunciator ls not specifically tested. This will be verified this outage and periodically in the future. SFE COMMITMENTS/MDOl Page 19

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00121 HVAC 1 1 9.8.2.4 13 As a result of evaluation of IEB 80-06 circuitry modifications were made to ESF Room Cooler Valves SV-0825 & SV-0875 such that* these valves do not close upon an ESF reset signal. In addition, to preclude an adver-tent closure of the SW valves supplying cool-ing t~ the ESF room coolers, the hand switch controllers (H0-0825A & HS-0875A for these valves were changed from hand switches w/o locks to hand switches with cylinder lock operators. FSAR will be modfied to correct this discrepancy. 00122 HVAC 1 4 9.8.2.4 The performance of the Safeguards Room Coolers will be-verified prior to startup and periodically thereafter. 00123 LPSI 2 2 6.1.2.1 The SIS also opens certain valves, as shown on P&ID 203, Sh 1 & 2. FSAR will be clarified on P&ID numbers. These numbers are not correct. 00124 LPSI 7 2 6.1.2.3 The. supply valves from the SIRW tank and sump are designed to ensure at least a one minute overlapping stroke to allow mixing and assure adequate NPSH during the transfer. The acceptance criteria 00-2 may not positively demonstrate that flow from the sump and SIRW tank will overlap for a minimum of one minute following receipt of a RAS. The acceptance criteria to 00-2 will be reviewed and the FSAR will be clarified. (Was Page 6, Item 2) 00125 LPSI 7 2 6.i.2J Item 3.6. The supply valves from the SIRW tank and sump are designed to ensure at least a one minute overlapping stroke to allow mixing and assure adequate NPSH during the transfer. The acceptance criteria of 00-2 may not positively demonstrate. 00-2 will be reviewed and modified. (Was Page 6) SFE COMMITMENTS/MDOl Page 20

., SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL EVALUATION LONG TERM COMMITMENTS

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I' 00126 LPSI 8 2 6.1.2.2 8  ;;:-..

                                                                                                                                   ~ ~ .*

The SIRW tank temperature is indicated and \,'.r

                                                                                                                                   ~*-

alarmed for high and low temperature in the if*. main control room. Annunciator feature is i'"

                                                                                                                                    ~......

not specifically checked. RI-18 will be f.;* modified to verify alarm function - Alarm i'. set 110°F. Must be changed to less than ~~: 100°F1 ...... (Page f changed from f7) u't::!i

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00127 LPSI 9 l 6.1.2.2 f' Level instrumentation mounted on each safety !k injection tank provides indication in the ..*. main control room. Redundant high and low ...f.'....

                                                                                                                                   /\
                                                                                                                                          ~.

alarms on each tank are provided. Alarms c*:: will be tested periodically. F* (page t changed from 8) ~-*:

                                                                                                                                   ;,1,.

I**' 00128 LPSI 9 2 6.1.2.2 8

                                                                                                                                   ~l. ,'

r~*: Containment sump water level indication is i*~: .. provided by two level indicators in the main control room. The high level alarm will be tested periodically.

                                                                                                                                   ~;!

(Page t changed from 8) t~. 00129 LPSI 9 3 6.1.2.2 8 Water level in each engineered safeguards kl!i; (*: pump room is indicated in the main control room. This will be calibrated periodically. (Page t changed from 8) r

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                                                                                                                                   ~i 00130       MFCS     2   3   7.5.l.3                                                                                               ~:,

In event of low S/G pressure less than 500 psia, the main feedwater reg and reg bypass vlvs are closed to prevent* excessive flow r1 FI

                                                                                                                                   ~: :

to S/Gs. Admin control of bypass of S/G pressure signal to close these vlvs ls facilitated by using key-operated switches to overriae the signal for manual takeover of .~:*. controls. Although the reg bypass vlvs have key switches the main reg vlvs have push ~ .. buttons. The push buttons override auto r> closure of reg bypass vlvs, reg vlvs & MSIVs. 1:* The FSAR will be revised accordingly. '*'t:*1

                                                                                                                                   ~-\.::

00131 MFCS 4 7 MCTF - CDS-01 t r PMs are being developed to clean the i:~.: condenser hotwell and to disassemble/inspect 1:.~ CV-0730 each Refueling Outage. i~. v

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SFE COMMITMENTS/MDOl  :-.~) Page 21 ~;r 5'1.

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00132 MISC 1 9 9.B.2.4 In the event of failure of the radwaste area supply fan, one of the exhaust fans is auto-matically shut down but the pressure control apparatus will limit the amount of the nega-tive pressure developed by the lack of supply air and prevent excessive pressure differen-tials.. Supply/exhaust fan interlock will be tested periodically. 00133 MISC 2 1 9.8.2.4 In the event of a spillage of radioactive material in the radwaste area, the radiation monitor at the filter plenum senses the activity and stops the supply fan, closes the radwaste area supply Damper P0-1809, and stops the selected exhaust fan1 however a low flow alarm will override the high rad signal and keep the standby exhaust fan running. Automatic actions resulting from high rad will be verified periodically in the future. 00134 MISC 2 9 9.8.2.4 Operation of the Aux Bldg addition fuel handling supply and radwaste supply ***** If the fan motor is shut off, the fresh air inlet dampers close. Interlock will be verified periodically. 00135 MISC 3 1 9.8.2.4 The supply fans will trip on high-radiation signal from radiation monitors located in the corresponding exhaust system ducts. This will be verified periodically. 00136 MISC 3 5 9.8.2.4 The operation of the aux bldg addition fuel handli~g area exhaust and radwaste system **** In the event of a failure of a supply fan, one of the exhaust fans will shutdown. Interlock will be verified periodically. 00137 MISC 3 6 9.8.2.4 In the event of release of radioactive material in the area serviced by the system, the radiation monitor at the filter plenum senses the activity and trips the supply fan which in turn trips one of the exhaust fans. However, a low flow condition will override the high radiation signal and keep the stand-by exhaust fan running. Automatic actions from high radiation will be tested periodi-cally. SFE COMMITMENTS/MDOl Page 22

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00138 MISC 4 2 9.8.2.4 Item 24 - Supply fan V-33 provides air to the areas ldentif ied. Makeup air to V-33 is a blend of outside air and recirculated air from V-43. This blend ls controlled by a mixed air temperature controller. Temperature controller and damper posltloners will be verified periodically. 00139 MISC 4 3 9.8.2.4 Item 24 - Cable spreading, switchgear and 2.4 kV switch gear rooms increases above 104°F, temperature switches 1824, 1825 and 1826 will initiate a control room annunciator. The operator manually starts the supplemental exhaust fan V-47. The annunciator will be verified periodically. 00140 MISC 5 7 SOP-24 Attachment 2 Item 2. Test radwaste area fans and supply dampers periodically. 00141 MSS l 3 10.2.l 4 The MSIVs are closed on either a low S/G pressure signal or a containment high pressure signal. - RI-17 will be revised to document the feature of MSIV closure on low S/G pressure. 00142 MSS 2 2 10.2.l 4 Four pressure transmitters on each S/G actuate contacts in indicting meter relays which are connected in a two-out-of-four logic to close both MSIVs. R-17 will be revised to document this feature. 00143 MSS 2 3 l0.2.1* 4 Auto block of MSIVs auto closure is on low S/G pressure only not on containment high pressure. FSAR clarification needed. 00144 MSS 2 3 10.2.l 4 Automatic closing of the MSIVs can be blocked by pushing both of two isolation block push buttons as the steam pressure ls decreasing toward the isolation set point. The isolation block is automatically removed by a two-out-of-four logic when the S/G pressure rises to 50 psi above the isolation set point pressure. - RI-17 will be revised to document this feature. SFE COMMITMENTS/MDOl Page 23

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00145 MSS 3 l 10.2.1 4 . An accumulator is provided for each MSIV to hold valve open in case of a loss of air supply to the valve operator.- No testing is presently performed to address. The MSIV accumulators are provided for reliability purposes. On loss of air, accumulators pro-vide operators enough time to regain pressure to prevent valves from drifting/slamming closed. There is a low pressure alarm on each header and backup for the H/P air syst. Testing of these accumulators will be evaluated. 00146 MSS 3 2 10.2.l The S/G blowdown system is continuously monitored by a process monitor which detects radioactivity which may have leaked into the S/G from the primary system. - QR-22 will be revised to add the S/G blowdown valves. Rev 1 00147 NHS l 5 7.6.1.4 Quandrant power tilt ls alarmed in the CR via the power range safety channels and linear heat rate is alarmed in the CR via the incore alarm system. Quadrant power tilt alarm from power range safety channels will be verified periodically. 00148 NHS l 7 7.6.2.2 The rate-of-change information (wide range logarithmic channels) actuates alarms, a reactor trip, or a control rod withdrawal prohibit signal. Reactor trip on high startup rate will be verified periodically. 00149 NHS 4 1 7.6.2.t! The ou~put from the comparator average is returned to each channel drawer and compared to each channel via two deviation compara-tors. Quadrant power tilt alarm will be verified periodically. (SH0-1 compares power range channels each shift and verifies deviation does not exist.) 00150 NHS 4 3 7.6.2.2 The alarm light alerts the operator in the event that the ratio signal violates an operator-set upper-or-lower limit which would be indicative of an undesirable axial power distribution will be tested periodically. SFE COMMITMENTS/MDOl Page 24

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00157 PCS 4 1 4.3.7 See 4.3.9.3 also. If an abnormal incident results in pressurizer pressure r!se which exceeds the relieving capacity of the press-urizer spray, this pressure will open two power-operated relief valves and trip the Rx. The relief valves are opened as a secondary action to a reactor trip. Since no credit been taken for the relief capacity of these valves in Chapt 14, the plant is permitted to operate at full pressure and temperature with the PORV isolation valves closed. The FSAR will be clarified. 00158 PCS 4 4 4.3.9.3 PORVs are actuated by the high primary syst pressure reactor trip signal. The PORVs are tested for low pressure protection via M0-27. They have not been tested at system differen-tial pressures required for the feed and bleed success path for controlling the high ECS pressure. Prior to the end of the next Refout new certified PORV block valves will be installed. 00159 PCS 5 l 4.3.9.3 PORVs will be installed or the PORVs will be removed and tested at feed and bleed pressures. Special Test if internals are not replaced. 00160 PCS 5 2 4.3.9.3 The PORVs and their block valves would be used if a feed and bleed type operation was required to cool the PCS in an emergency shutdown situation. PORVs will be installed or the PORVs will be removed and tested1at feed and bleed pressures. 00161 PCS 7 2 4.3.9.3 See 7.4.2.1 also. The PCS overpressurization subsystem (OPS) has been designed to provide automatic pressure relief of the PCS whenever the conditions of low temperature (250°F or lower) and high pressure (400 psia or higher) exist concurrently. Specific temperatures and pressures at which relief is required varies with amount of vessel irradiation. Values will be clarified as necessary. SFE COMMITMENTS/HDOl Page 26

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00157 PCS 4 l 4.3.7 See 4.3.9.3 also. If an abnormal incident results in pressurizer pressure rise which exceeds the relieving capacity of the press-urizer spray, this pressure will open two power-operated relief valves and trip the Rx. The relief valves are opened as a secondary action to a reactor trip. Since no credit been taken for the relief capacity of these valves in Chapt 14, the plant is permitted to operate at full pressure and temperature with the PORV isolation valves closed. The FSAR will be clarified. 00158 PCS 4 4 4.3.9.3 PORVs are actuated by the high primary syst pressure reactor trip signal. The PORVs are tested for low pressure protection via H0-27. They have not been tested at system differen-tial pressures required for the feed and bleed success path for controlling the high ECS pressure. Prior to the end of the next Refout new certified PORV block valves will be installed. 00159 PCS 5 l 4.3.9.3 PORVs will be installed or the PORVs will be removed and tested at feed and bleed pressures. Special Test if internals are not replaced. 00160 PCS 5 2 4.3.9.3 The PORVs and their block valves would be used if a feed and bleed type operation was required to cool the PCS in an emergency shutdown situation. PORVs will be installed or the PORVs will be removed and teste~ at feed and bleed pressures. 00161 PCS 7 2 4.3.9.3 See 7.4.2.l also. The PCS overpressurization subsystem (OPS) has been designed to provide automatic pressure relief of the PCS whenever the conditions of low temperature (250°F or lower) and high pressure (400 psia or higher) exist concurrently. Specific temperatures and pressures at which relief ls required varies with amount of vessel lrradlatlon. Values will be clarified as necessary. SFE COHMITMENTS/MDOl Pa e 26

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( 00162 PCS 9 4 4.3.5 The performance of the shaft seal system ls monitored* by pressure and temperature sensing devices in the seal system. A controlled bleedof f flow through the pump seal ls maintained. - No calibration PAC for seal bleedoff flow was found. This will be done periodically. 00163 PDL 1 1 7.6.1.5 Validity of inputs to the datalogger system will be evaluated to determine methods to ensure proper datalogger functionability. 00164 RAD 5 1 11. 5. 3 In 1983 a main steam relief monitoring system was installed to monitor accident releases in the event the atmospheric dump or safety valves lift. In the event of a steam release, an acoustic switch, triggered the Radiation Monitor to operate at high speed for greater resolution. The acoustic switch will be calibrated and the recorder response verified periodically. / Rev 1 00165 RAD 5 3 11.5.3.1 A two-pen flow indicator/recorder with flow alarm outputs continuously monitors the stack and sample flow. Flow recorders are no longer qsed. A local continuous monitor is now used and calibrated by RR-84D. FSAR will be corrected. 00166 RAD 6 1 11.5.3.2 On indication of abnormal stack effluent activity (alert level) a 15 second grab samplel is automatically trapped in a sample bottle and an annunciator in the CR indicates the off-normal conditon. - Grab sample feature testing is not documented. Alert levels are alarmed on the .RIA but are not annunciated. FSAR will be clarified. 00167 RAD 6 l 11.5.3.2 On indication of abnormal stack effluent activity (alert level), a 15 second grab sample is automatically trapped in a sample bottle and an annunciator in the control room indicates the off-normal condition. The grab sample and annunciator will be verified periodically. SFE COMMITMENTS/MDOl Page 27

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00168 RAD 6 2 11.5~3.2 Following a high level indication, the normal sample loop is bypassed and the sample flow is split with approximately 0.02 scfm directed through the high-range filter and the balance of the 2 scfm through the ion changer. A "high radiation* annunciator in the control room alerts the plant operators to the condition. - Testing of the changes in sample flow paths will be verified and documented periodically. 00169 RPS 2 2 7.2.3.3 Low flow trippoints and the overpower trip points are simultaneously changed by a manual switch to the allowable values for the selected pump condition. Since we can only run with 4 PCS coolant pumps this may not be significant. The plant does not presently allow operation with less than 4 pumps running. The plant will trip if a PCP is tripped. Therefore the testing of the trip setpoints with less than four pumps operating is not required. FSAR will be changed to clarify this function. 00170 RPS 3 1 7.2.3.4 Pre-trip alarms are initiated if the coolant flow approaches minimum required for corres-ponding power level. Since we can only run with 4 PCS coolant pumps this may not be significant. The plant does not presently allow operation with less than 4 pumps running. The plant will trip if a PCP is tripped. Therefore testing of the trip setpoints with less than 4 pumps operating ls not required. FSAR will be changed to clarlff this function. 00171 RPS 4 2 7.2.3.8 FSAR 7.2.3.8 states that S/G low pressure trip signal will close the turbine stop valves. This interlock does not exist. The S/G low pressure trip signal does not close the turbine stop valves. The reactor trips, which trips the turbine, which closes the turbine stop valves. This will be clarified in the FSAR. SFE COMMITMENTS/MDOl Page 28

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00172 RPS 4 4 7.2.3.9 FSAR 7.2.3.9 states that CHP pre-trip alarm occurs at 3 pslg. The actual pre-trip set-point is 0.9 psig and MI-5 does riot document the pre-trip setpoint of alarm annunciation. These are calibrated every 11 months via PACS VAS-016. This PACS calibrates contain-ment pressure indicators and was last per-formed on 10/21/86. The FSAR will be corrected for actual pre-trip alarm setpoint. 00173 RPS 7 4 7.2.3.6 A reactor trip will automatically be initiated after a turbine trip occurs. The trip will be initiated when the turbine auto stop oil pressure decreases. This trip is automatically bypassed when three of four power safety channels indicate less than 15% full power. - Loss of load trip will be tested periodically. 00174 scs 2 1 7.4.1.6 FSAR states that instrumentation is available to indicate service water and CCW flow. Such instrumentation is not available. Instrumen-tation is available to "indicate" flow but not to quantify flow. Evaluation of modif i-cations to provide adequate instrumentation for system performance testing is planned. 00175 scs 2 2 7.4.1.6 Analysis of fire damage in any of the areas containing portions of systems required for the shutdown cooling operation shows there will always be an undamaged power supply to one or the other of the shutdown cooling pumps (LPSI). Manual stroking of the shutdoyn cooling valves needs to be verified during valve PACS~ 00176 scs 2 3 9.1.2.3 A reanalysis was performed for CCW with a 4000 gpm flow to the shutdown cooling heat ex with 6000 gpm shutdown cooling flow. The result was 53 hrs is required to cool PCS to 130°F. (PAL-86-083) This same section

• states that .all noncritical service water is discontinued. This is not the normal plant practice. Typically we continue service water flow to FWP, VRS, condensate pumps etc.

The FSAR will be corrected to clarify this statement. SFE COMMITMENTS/MDOl Page 29

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00177 scs 4 1 Table 6-4 Shutdown Cooling Ht Exe Operating Parameters. Verification of Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchanger performance ls performed each shut-down when shutdown cooling is put on line and the plant ls cooled down and maintained cool .. Specific exchanger performance will be evaluated for future trending. 00178 scs 5 1 ONP 17 4.3 Low temperature overpressure protection concerns, the risk of using HPSI for shut-down cooling (solid plant) may outweigh the beneift of routine testing. This Off Normal Procedure will be reviewed and modified if necessary with respect to this concern. 00179 scs 5 2 OPN 17 4.3 The ability to use Spent Fuel Pool Cooling for shutdown cooling is not periodically tested. This evolution requires the RX head to be removed and the Rx cavity full and refueling* gates open. This will be verified during the next refout. Special Test? 00180 scs 5 2 ?? ONP-17. Shutdown Cooling using Spent Fuel Pool Cooling upon loss of normal shutdown cooling - Special Test to verify during the next Refout. 00181 scss 1 1 9.2.1 The system ls designed to maintain concrete temperature below 165°F. It is capable of removing 180,000 Btu/h. T/S basis lists capacity as 120,000 Btu/hr. FSAR will be clarified - design impact only. 00182 scss 1 5 9.2.2.~ Makeup water to the surge tank is pumped from the condensate storage tank through an on-off solenoid valve which is actuated by a level switch on the surge tank. This supply comes from condensate tank. supply is from T-81. FSAR will be clarified. 00183 scss 1 6 9.2.2.3 High and low level in the tank ls annunciated in the control room. - This will be verified periodically. 00184 scss 1 7 9.2.2.3 The surge tank vents to the containment atmosphere. The FSAR will be corrected. SFE COMMITMENTS/MDOl Page 30

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00185 scss 2 1 9.2.2.3 Temperature indication, high temperature (120°F) and low flow annunciation from the discharge of each set of coils are located in the control room. Annunciators will be tested periodically. 00186 SPS l 3 0.1.2, The non-vital instrumentation and controls are supplied from a 120 volt AC instrument bus. The instrument bus is normally supplied from one of two 480-120 volt transformers, each tranformer being connected to a separate 480 volt motor control center. The transfer to the alternate source is automatic. This auto transfer function will be verified periodically. 00187 SPS 1 4 8.2.3 Station loads, including the safety loads, are normally supplied from the main generator through the station power Xformer. On loss of main generator there is an auto Xfer from this normal source to the immediate access offsite power circuit. The design includes provisions to test this feature during plant operation. - This function will be periodically verified in the future. This is not tested during plant operation. The FSAR will be clarified. 00188 SPS 1 4 8.2.3 Station loads, including the safety loads, are normally supplied from the main generator through the station power transformer. On loss of the main generator there is an auto transfer from this normal source to the immedifte access offsite power circuit. The design includes provisions to test this feature during plant operation. This function will be verified periodically. 00189 SPS l 5 8.3.l.s The capabilities of the four 4,160 volt ~.. sections are sufficient to permit plant operation under reduced load with any 4,160 * .~' volt bus out of service. Bus lA and lB cannot be taken out of service because operation on without PCPs is not allowed. The FSAR will be clarified. SFE COMMITMENTS/MDOl Page 31 ,.'

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00190 SPS 2 6 8.3.2.2 The reserve transformer will provide capability of sparing SU (Standby) Trans-former 1-2 during shutdown conditions. This installed reserve transformer has provisions to supply plant buses. Instructions are provided in SOP-30. This transformer is only needed as a backup during shutdown operations. Evaluation of testing needs will be completed prior to the next Refout. 00191 SPS 2 6 8.3.2.2 The reserve transformer will provide capa-bility of sparing start-up (Standby) trans-former l-2 during shutdown conditons. Evaluation of testing needs will be completed prior to next Refout. 00192 SPS 4 2 8.6.2 In order to permit the main transformer backfeed mode of operation (Subsection 8.2.3) the fast transfer on turbine generator trip and the emergency generators automatic start signals are blocked manually using a selector switch in the main control room ("Instant Transfer Cutout"). Diesel Generators are only blocked by manual action. FSAR will be clarified. 00193 SPS 4 3 8.6.2 4,160 Volt System - Automatic transfer of the 4,160 volt buses from the normal powe1 source (station power transformer l-1) to the standby power source (Startup Transformer l-l and l-3) is initiated by turbine trip or generator trip. This function will be periodJcally verified in the future. 00194 SPS 4 4 8.6.2 Automatic transfer is blocked if the startup transformer voltage is low. The lockout relays may also be operated manually to prevent bus transfer if a startup transformer is inoperable for any reason. These lockout relays will be tested periodically in the future. SFE COMMITMENTS/MDOl Page 32

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00195 SPS 4 5 8.6.2 ii.'.1 2,400 Volt System. Automatic transfer of the fij,. 2,400 volt buses from. the normal power source (Station Power Transformer 1-2) to the f'.i: standby power source (Startup Transformer ~~I\ 1-2) is initiated by turbine trip or ~' generator trip. Two separate turbine auto y~- stop oil pressure sensors are provided for l**" initiating the transfer. This function !t:> will be periodically verified in the future. "f~ 1_;

                                                                                                                                        ;.:t 00196       SPS      5    l 8.6.2 Automatic transfer ls blocked if the startup                                                                 1.

transformer voltage ls low. Each of the f:' lockout relays may also be operated manually  ? to prevent one of the bus transfer if the * corresponding startup transformer breaker ls r~ inoperable for any reason. These lockout D relays will be tested periodically in the future. *~ 00197 SPS 6 6 SPS-02 Charging Pump Motor Breakers. ij s~ Evaluation is underway to either replace switchgear or to refurbish existing L f1 switchgear. MCTF item. t i. 00198 SPS 6 8 SPS-03 Evaluate importance of DC ground alarm in ,.;? CR and troubleshooting techniques for isolating/repairing DC grounds. A procedure and/or checklist will be devised with operations to determine which breakers if.' can be troubleshot during specific plant i conditions. MCTF Item. ~~ 00199 sws l l 9.1.2.l Each pµmp can be started or stopped remotely from the main control room or locally at the switchgear. Surveillance procedures will be modified to periodically start locally. 00200 SWS l 2 9.1.2.1 Each pump can be isolated from their common header by a hand-operated valve in the pump discharge. A PACS will be developed to cycle CV-0844, 0845, 0846, 0857 & CV-1318 & CV-1319 in the future. SFE COMMITMENTS/MDOl Page 33

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00201 SWS l 3 9.1.2.1 9.1.3.1 & 9.1.3.3 also The common header contains sectionalizing valves which can be closed from the main control room if isolation of a portion of the service water supply system is required.

                           -*A PACS will be developed to cycle CV-0844, 0845,10846, 0857 and CV-1318 and 1319 *.

00202 sws 2 1 9.1.2.1 9.1.3.1 & 9.1.3.3 also I PACS will be developed to cycle automatic valves used to isolate service water pumps, common header or critical service lines - CV-0844, 0845, 0846, 0857 and CV-1318 & 1319. Rev 1 00203 sws 3 4 9.1.2.3 PACS will be generated to periodically test ESS pump backup service water cooling on loss of ccw. 00204 SWS 4 1 9.1.2.3 Test will be generated to periodically test the auto start of service water pumps on low discharge pressure. - Normal Operation. Two pressure switches are provided in the discharge of each pump connecting to the starting circuits of the remaining two pumps. If the service water pressure falls below a preset value, one of the switches initiates automatic starting. 00205 SWS 4 4 9.1.3.2 Test will be generated to periodically test the auto start of service water pumps on low discharge pressure. - Each service water pump can be periodically tested for auto-start by selection on one pump for standby service and tripping of one operating pump. 00206 sws 7 1 Test H0-29 Monthly valve alignment check of engineered safety systems. - Service water valves CV-0876 and 0877 will be added to H0-29. 00207 .SWS 7 8  ? SOP-15 7.7.l - To supply cooling water to ESF pumps using service water. - PACS will be generated to periodically test. SFE COMMITMENTS/MDOl Page 34 t

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00208 TURB 1 4 7.5.2.6 Emergency trip action is caused by the operation of trips located in the hydraulic mechanical system protective device unit: low-vacuum, low bearing oil pressure, over speed trip and loss of generator load, or manual-ly wl th the over speed trip lever. This action ls also caused by operation of the solenoid trip which is actuated by the manual trip switch in the control room and by electrical system protective relays.* - Overspeed testing and loss of load trip will be verified periodically. 00209 TURB 1 7 7.5.2.6 When the turbine ls under dispatch control, load reference changes are made manually. The impulse chamber pressure is compared to the load reference setting. The difference is a load error to the controller, which repositions the governor valve actuators until the load error becomes zero. The FSAR will be clarified. 00210 TURB 2 3 7.5.3.6 Auxiliary Governor. This is an acceleration response device which closes the turbine main governing valves and the moi~ture separator intercept valves. Aux governor overspeed limiter will be tested periodically. 00211 TURB 2 5 10.2.2 Steam Turbine. Turbine trip input to RPS will be tested periodically. 00212 TURB 2 6 10.2.2 Upon turbine control's receipt of a dropped rod sl~nal from the CRDS or a rapid flux change signal from the power range nuclear instruments, the turbine output ls auto-matically limited by the turbine controls to a maximum of 70% of full load output. This feature is disabled and ls no longer used. The FSAR will be clarified. 00213 TURB 3 1 10.2.2.3 Electrical Generator. Seal Oil System. The turbine bearing oil system serves as a seal oil backup should the seal oil pump stop or if the seal oil pressure should drop below B psi. Turbine bearing oil pump auto start will be verified periodically. SFE COMMITMENTS/MDOl Page 35

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00214 TURB 3 2 10.2.2.3 Signal System 1 This system provides the operator with signals on the ope~ating condltons present in Table 10-4. - Hydrogen supply low pressure, hydrogenlhigh temperature and hydrogen side low ~il level switches will be tested periodically. I II SFE COMMITMENTS/MDOl Page 36

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• ATTACHMENT 3 Consumers Power Company Palisades Plant Docket 50-255 SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL EVALUATION TECHNICAL REVIEW LONG TERM COMMITMENTS October 30, 1987

       .....                                  OC1087-0195-NL02 8 Pages

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00689 87/12/31 Att lA Item c, Page 10. During the outage Special Test Procedures were developed/conducted to verify safety related pumps are capable of meeting safety design basis capacities. PPACS will be developed by the end of 1987 to verify pump'head curves at least every 10 years. AFW - See ST 201, 202, 186, 142 LPSI - See ST 225, 209 HPSI - See ST 220 ccw - See ST 206 SW - See St 215, 218 SPRAY - See 00-10 Modlf ied Rev l 00754 Attachment lA, Page 11 Due to sensitivity in the balancing of SW . and ccw to small changes in system resistance PPACS will be developed to periodically reperform the special tests conducted during the 86 shutdown period. These tests will initially be conducted every refueling outage. 00755 Attachment 2C Page 5 Shutdown Cooling System FSAR states that ccw is capable of cooling PCS to 130°F in 24 hours. For CCW at 50' of. design flow 53 hours are required to achieve' a PCS temperature of 130°F. Revise the FSAR to reflect this fact. 00756 Attachment 2C Page 16, LTOP Upon completion of the Investigation of new LTOP *ettings the Tech Specs will be revised if necessary. 00757 Attachment 3, Page 9 We have determined that the FSAR flow values for the ccw System in Table 9-7 require revision. Values in the attachment will be incorporated in the FSAR. 00687 5 SYSP Complete PACS will be established to verify main feedwater pump overspeed trip. Rev 1 TRC COMMITHENTS/10/19/87/MDOl Page 1

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00654 AFW 1 5 TRC 57 Local control of the turbine driven AFW pump and control valves will be verified periodi-cally. Rev 1 00655 AFW 7 5 TRC 83,87 Verify "off normal condition" indication periodically in future (modify R0-97). Rev 1 00656 AFW 8 2 TRC 87&86 88/09/01 Modify R0-97 to verify low flow logic and that successful start of one AFW pump prevents the turbine pump from starting. Rev l 00657 AFW 8 3 TRC 87'86 88/09/01 Modify R0-97 to verify low flow logic and that successful start of one AFW pump prevents the turbine pump from starting. Rev l 00736 AIR 1 2 TRC* FSAR 9.5.2.l These sections appear to be in conflict. The first states all valves can be operated twice,while the second states all valves can be cycled in one direction and enough air remains available to shift injection vales to a recirc phase. 00660 CAC l l TRC 156 88/09/01 Revise M0-29 to include verifying cooler inlet valves de-energized. Rev 2 00688 CAC 3 1 A survlillance test will be developed to verify air cooler (VHX 1,2,3,4) operability on a refueling frequency. Rev l 00727 CCWS 1 l TRC 183 FSAR will be revised to reflect the modification to close ccw isolation valves on containment high pressure instead of SIS and allow reopening of valves using the bypass key(s). TRC COMMITMENTS/10/19/87/MDOl Page 2

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00673 CIS 1 1 TRC 470 88/11/01 Checklist 3.3 and P&ID 232 not consistent for penetration #7 (748FWS) and #8 (749FWS). Correct checklist or P&ID. Rev 1 00734 CSIR 3 6. 4. 2*.1 PAC-E)SS-017 incorrectly lists T-102 as sodium hydroxide tank vice hydra~ine tank. Also El7 Sh 6 & 7 does the same. Correct PACS & El7 Sh 6 & 7 (NRC Open Item 255/86035-141). Rev 1 00735 CSIR 7 4 6.4.2.l FSAR Fig 6-2 Sh lB shows one open and one closed gate valve. FSAR will be corrected. Rev l 00738 CSIR B 4 6.4.2.2 Op procedures require the operator to proceed with injection prior to the one-minute time delay if rad levels indicate cladding failure and fission product release. FSAR will be clarified. 00739 CSIR 8 4 TRC* If, at the end of one minute, it is determined to be a spurious signal or a secondary line break, the hydrazine injection signal will be manually overridden. - The block isn't verified via testing. This will be verified in the future. 00741 CSIR a 7 6.1.2.3 Item 3 .b FSAR Section 6.1.6 will be clarified to address that it may take two spray pumps to ma\ntain core water level if primary coolant pressure permits. 00746 eve 1 TRC 537, 540, 541 Verify PAC CVC-035 and CVC-024 for all VCT level interlocks and alarms and revise as necessary. 00745 eve 'I TRC 537, 540, 541 Verify PAC CVC-035 and CVC-024 for all VCT level inter locks and alarms an.d revise as necessary. TRC COMMITMENTS/10/19/87/MDOl Page 3

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00675 eve 1 5 88/09/01 TRC 537, 540, 541 Verify PAC CVC-035 and CVC-024 for all VCT level interlocks and alarms and revise as. necessary. Rev 1 00753 eve 4 3 TRC"

• If A or C charging pump ls inoperable as allowed by Tech Specs, only one charging pump will start after SIS. This will not meet the 65 gpm requirement of MSLB analysis. This will be evaluated for corrective action.

00646 ESS 1 2 TRC 21 1!8/09/0l Tech review should be performed on 00-1 attachments to ensure "all redundant equip-ment ls operated". Also, why doesn't Att l have P55A&B running ln preheat status (& P7A&C) as is done in Att 3. Rev 1 00647 ESS 1 2 TRC 22 Verify SIS cannot be reset when signal present. Add Step to RI-7 to verify this. Also add step to RI-6 #4.2.2, logic also picks up SIS. Rev 1 00648 ESS 2 4 TRC 29 RI-7 should be revised to test 3 4 reset feature. Rev 2 00649 ESS 2 7 TRC 32 Revise R0-11 to check alarm actuated by 2:4 logic~ for CHP/CHR. Also revise R0-12 to include both CV 1103 and CV 1104. Rev l 00650 ESS 2 7 TRC 32 It isn't clear why R0-12 doesn/t list CHP valves such SV-1805 through SV-1808 or SV-2412 A,B through SV-2415A,B. Rev 1 00651 ESS 2 7 TRC 32 E-17, Sheet 6 needs to be revised to include SV-0436 A&B. Rev 1 TRC COMMITMENTS/10/19/87/MDOl Page 4 I

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                                                                                                                                                   ~l; REFERENCE (FSAR or other)                                 ASSIGNED LOG NO    SYSTEM/PAGE/ITEM    COMMITMENT                                               INDIVIDUAL             DUE DATE         STATUS             "'*

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00652 ESS 3 1 TRC 33  !( R0-11, 12 and or 30 need to be revised to  ;~ verify reset logic of CHP/CHR. Rev l ff.:

                                                                                                                                                    ;)'

00653 ESS 4 l TRC 38 ~r

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RI-14*still states 2/4 logic even though mod 1.. was done to revise to 1/2 taken twice. Rev 1 [: 00676 HPA 1 TRC 622 Special Test T-205 should be modified to BB./09/01 ~: r~ verify valve cycling at minimum pressure. :l.. Rev 1 I 00659 HVAC l 2 TRC 147 BB/09/01

                                                                                                                                                       ~I Modify M0-29 to include verification of ESF                                                                      .~::

cooler CV's. Rev 1 00737 LPSI 2 2 TRC* FSAR 6 . 1. 2. 1 ,.,~.~ R0-8 does not verify valves actually "change" f, position upon receipt of an SIS (le if the ~ safety position of valve is closed, the initial condition of the test should be that t the valve is open or verify the valve receives a signal that it change position). Also, CCW Hx SW outlet valves are normally throttled and open on SIS. R0-8 does not verify this. This will be evaluated for SIS, RAS, CHR and CHP will be evaluated and approp changes made. (NRC Open Item 255/86035-135). 00677 LPSI 3 6 TRC 679 BB/09 101 l&C develop PAC to periodically calibrate TI-0373 & TCV-1575. Rev l I 00674 MFCS l 5 BB/09./01 TRC 505/517/532 I&C verify requirements contained in SFE are accomplished by the PPACS indicated. It appears some PPACS have been revised or numbering changed. Rev 2 00731 MFCS 2 6 7.5.1.3 PACS will be modified to verify auto close feature of the feed reg valves. Rev 1 TRC COMMITMENTS/10/19/87/MDOl Page 5

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00743 MFCS 3 2 TRC 505/517/532 I&C verify requirements contained in SFE are accomplished by the PPACS indicated. It appears some PPACS have been revised or numbering changed. 00742 MFCS 5 3 TRC* i32 PACS FWS-001 no longer performs PM on CV-0608 and CV-0609 valves. I&C engineer to determine which PACS are appropriate or prepare new ones. 00744 MFCS 5 3 TRC 505/517/532 I&C verify requirements contained in SFE are accomplished by the PPACS indicated. It appears some PPACS have been revised or numbering changed. 00658 MSS l 4, TRC 121 88/09/0l Revise RI-17 to verify closure of one MSIV closes the other. Rev 2 00678 NMS l l TRC 1030 88/09/01 Revise RI-62 to verify rod drop detection circuit for output to axial pwr ratio recorder. Add to RI-62._ Rev 2 00679 NMS 2 2 TRC 1040 88/09/01 Modify RI-99 to verify S/U detector drawer removal annunciation. Rev l 00669 PCS 10 3 TRC333/4/5 87.'09/0l FSAR Wfll be modified to reflect current PCS temperature operating limits. Rev 1 00662 PCS 6 2 TRC 291 88/08/01 Modify PPACs PCS-005 to cycle SV-0160 & I CV-0101. Rev l 00663 PCS 6 5 TRC 291 88/08/01 Modify PPACs PCS-005 to cycle SV-0160 & cv-0101. Rev l TRC COMMITMENTS/10/19/87/MDOl Page 6

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REFERENCE (FSAR or other) ASSIGNED LOG NO SYSTEM/PAGE/ITEM COMMITMENT INDIVIDUAL DUE DATE STATUS

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00665 PCS 6 8 TRC 294 88/08/01 Modify PAC-PCS-018 to verify alarm annunciation. Rev 2 00666 PCS 9 6 TRC 322 88/09/01 Calibrate pzr htr l<w meters periodically in the future. Rev l 00667 PCS 9 7 TRC 323 87/09/01 RI-20 will be modified to verify low level cutoff. Rev l 00680 RAM 2 6 TRC 88/09/01 TRC 1103, 1106, 1109, 1113, 1114 I 1115 MR-14 does not source check RIAs 1323, 1809, 1817, 5711, 5712, 8265. Develop test or PPACS. Rev l 00747 RAM 3 2 TRC 1103, 1106, 1109, 1113, 1114, 1115 MR-14 does not source check RIAs 1323, 1809, 1817, 5711, 1712. 8265. Develop test or PPACS. 00748 RAM 3 5 TRC 1103, 1106, 1109, 1113, 1114, 1115 MR-14 does not source check RIAs 1323, 1809, 1817, 5711, 5712, 8265. Develop test or PPACS. 00750 RAM 4 4 TRC 1103, 1106, 1109, 1113 I 1114, 1115 MR-14 does not source check RI As 1323, 1809, 1817, p711, 5712, 8265. Develop test or PPACS. 00751 RAM 4 5 TRC 1103, 1106, 1109, 1113, 1114, 1115 MR-14 does not source check RIAs 1323, 1809, 1817, 5711, 5712, 8265. Develop test or PPACS. 00686 RAM 9 5 TRC 1179 RMBrzezinski 88/09/01 Develop test to check FR-2318 functionability Rev 1 TRC COMMITMENTS/10/19/87/MDOl Page 7

SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL EVALUATION LONG TERM COMMITMENTS

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REFERENCE (FSAR or other) ASSIGNED LOGNO SYSTEM/PAGE/ITEM COMMITMENT INDIVIDUAL DUE DATE STATUS

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00749 RAM 4 3 TRC 1103, 1106, 1109, 1113, 1114, 1115 MR-14 does not source check RIAs 1323, 1809, 1817, 5711, 5712, 8265. Develop test or PPACS. Q067:l RPS 7 3 TRC 410 88/09/01 The h1gh rate of change trip and alarm will be tested periodically in the future (develop PAC). Rev 1 00670 RRS l 2 TRC 367/8 88/09/01 I&C to verify these test requirements are adequately tested via R0-19 and PAC PCS-017. If not, modify PAC & R0-19 to properly verify. Rev 2 00671 RRS 2 3 TRC 375 88/09/01 Evaluate testability. Develop test to verify if testable. Rev 1 00661 scs l 2 TRC 219 88/09/01 Revise FSAR to change MV designators to "MO". Rev l 00740 TURB 2 4 . TRC* FSAR 7.5.3.6 - Emergency Trip Overspeed trip causes all 4 sets of steam valves to close, not just the 2 sets listed in the FSAR. - FSAR will be clarified. [ TRC_COMMITMENTS/10/19/87/MDOl

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