ML18019A492

Forwards 47879-02, Test Rept on Electrical Separation Verification Testing for CP&L for Use in Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, in Compliance W/Rev 1 to Reg Guide 1.75 & Section 5.1.1.2 of IEEE Std 384-1974

ML18019A492
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	11/21/1985
From:	Zimmerman S CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML18019A493	List: ML18019A492 ML18019A494
References
RTR-REGGD-01.075, RTR-REGGD-1.075 NLS-85-401, NUDOCS 8511260452
Download: ML18019A492 (17)

Text

REGULATORY ~ORMATION DISTRIBUTION SY~M (RIDS)

I ACCESSION NBR;8511260452". DOC ~ DATE: 85/11/21 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET' FACIL:$ 50"400 Shearon Harris. Nuclear~ Power Plant'g Unit 1i Carolina 05000400 AUTH,NAMEl AUTHOR AFFILIATION ZIMMERMANiS~ R' Carolina Power~ 8 Light Co, RECIP ~ NAMEI RECIPIENT AFFILIATION DENTONiH ~ R ~ Office, of Nuclear Reactor Regulationr Director~ (pre~851125) 5~ CP(y

SUBJECT:

Forwards 47879 02'Test'ept on=,Electrical Separation.,

Verification>> Testing for CP8L for Usei in Shearon Harris-Nuclear. Power'Plant~" in compliance~ w/Rev 1 to Reg, Guide.

1 '5 3, Section Si 1, li2'. of IEEE<< Std 384 1974 CODE: B001D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL~(

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8&M Carolina Power & Light Company NGY 3 11985 SERIAL: NLS-85-001 Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Of fice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT NO. 1 - DOCKET NO.50-000 TEST REPORT ON ELECTRICAL SEPARATION VERIFICATION TESTING

Dear Mr. Denton:

Carolina Power & Light Company (CP&L) hereby submits additional information concerning Electrical Separation Verification Testing for the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant (SHNPP). This information is submitted to support the SHNPP compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.75, Revision 1, "Physical Independence of Electrical Systems,"

and with Section 5.1.1.2 of IEEE Standard 380-1970, "IEEE Trial-Use Criteria for Separation of Class lE Equipment and Circuits," which allows the use of testing and analyses to justify separation of less than the spatial requirements of Sections 5.1.3 and 5.1.0 of IEEE Standard 380-1970. Attached is a copy of the Wyle Laboratories Report, "Test Report on Electrical Separation Verification Testing for the Carolina Power &

Light Company Use in the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant - Test Report Number 07879-02," which contains the analyses and test descriptions to support the SHNPP criteria for electrical separation.

The test methodology, conditions, and results contained in the attached Wyle Test Report are summarized below:

TEST METHODOLOGY/SEQUENCE

l. Carolina Power & Light Company evaluation of SHNPP electrical auxiliary system design and breaker schemes, cable tray fill, etc., as input to development of the test conditions.

2. Carolina Power & Light Company/Wyle evaluation of field as-built installations and development of test configurations.

3. Carolina Power dc Light Company/Wyle development of Test Procedure No, 07879-01, Revision A.

damage potential.

5. Confi uration Tests - Verify acceptability of tested configurations and separation distances without interposing barriers. Configuration tests were only necessary for that voltage class where the capability of ignition was demonstrated (i.e., power class).

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Mr. Harold R. Denton Page 2 TEST CONDITIONS The following conditions/assumptions are bases of the test program:

l. A cable in the SHNPP raceway systeqexperiences a fault current in excess of the cables allowable energy let-through (I t) due to failure of the circuits primary overcurrent protective device.

2. The test current is that current just below the long-time trip setting of the circuits secondary overcurrent protective device, and is maintained at a constant value until conductor open-circuit or steady-state is reached.

3. No credit has been taken for operator initiated action to clear the fault.

0. The current was conservatively maintained at a constant level as the circuit impedance increases due to conductor heating.

. TEST RESULTS The test results are detailed in Wyle Test Report No. 07879-02. The minimum separation distances based on the test results are detailed on Table 1 (attached). Also contained in Table 1 are the minimum SHNPP acceptable separation distances which are based on the Wyle Test results with additional conservatisms added to some of the tested conf igurations.

In general, the SHNPP design philosophy for separation of electrical cables and raceways is to provide spatial separation as required by Sections 5.1.3 and 5.1.0 of IEEE Standard 380-1970 wherever possible. Where spatial separation is not possible, the minimum separation distances will be justified by analysis supported by test or suitable ban iers will be provided. Attached are marked-up pages for FSAR Section 8.3.1.2.30 to reflect this revised position. These changes will be included in a future FSAR amendment.

Yours very truly, S. R. Zi merman Manager Nuclear Licensing Section 3HE/ccc (30053DK)

Attachments CC: Mr. B. C. Buckley (NRC) Mr. H. A. Cole Mr. O. Chopra (NRC-PSB) Mr. Wells Eddleman Dr. 3. Nelson Grace (NRC-RII) Mr. 3ohn D. Runkle Mr. G. F. Maxwell (NRC-SHNPP) Dr. Richard D. Wilson Mr. Travis Payne (KUDZU) Mr. G. O. Bright (ASLB)

Mr. Daniel F. Read (CHANGE/ELP) Dr. 3. H. Carpenter (ASLB)

Wake County Public Library Mr. 3. L. Kelley (ASLB)

TABLE 1 MINIMUMSEPARATION DISTANCES Separation Minimum SHNPP Acceptable Wyle Configuration Acceptable Test/Analysis (From/To)i~ote 1 Separation Distances Separation Distances

1) Low level or control 1" horizontal, 1" vertical F/A cable or tray to 3" vertical Class IE raceway or cable

2) LV power tray to 12" horizontal, 12" horizontal, Class lE F/A cable, 36" vertical 36" vertical tray or flex conduit

3) LV power tray (H) to 0" horizontal, 1" horizontal, Class IE conduit 12" vertical 12" vertical

0) LV power F/A cable to 12" horizontal, 6" horizontal, Class lE F/A cable, 36" vertical 36" vertical tray or flex conduit

5) LV power F/A cable or 12" horizontal, 6" horizontal, tray (R) to Class 1E 12" vertical 12" vertical conduit

6) Conduit to Class IE tray or F/A cable F/A Free Air H Horizontal Tray R Riser Tray-LV Low Voltage Note 1 Separation distances shown only apply when considering the "from" as the damage source and the "to" as the protected raceway.

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SHNPP FSAR I'h" For a further description of isolation devices, refer to Sec t ion 8. 3. 1. 2. 14.

(b) Non-Class IE equipment is physically separated from Class I'::

equipment by the above mentioned methods ( i.e., separated safety class structures, distance, suitable barriers, or" any cuinbination thereof).

Specific Separation Criteria

1) Separation Criteria for Cables and Raceways (a) General Plant Areas: General plant areas are considered to be those areas in which the Class IF. raceways are not subject to pipe whip or other hazards as described in Paragraph (b) below, and with the exception of the cable spreading rooms. The minimum separation distances utilized in general plant areas are 3 f t (or ~

trays separated horizontally and 5 f t. for trays separated vertically. This separation distance I.s based on the following:

(1) Cable splices in cable trays are prohibited.

(2) Cable and raceways are flame retardant.

0< (3) b e ay are ot f led ove e iie l~

(4) Hazards are limited to failures or faults internal tn the electric-equi pment orcables.

If, in addition, high energy electric'equipment such as f~.9 kV switckgear, transformers over 480V or large rotating equipmt at Is excluded from the area, and power cables are installed in enclosed raceways or there are no power cables, the minimum separation distance is 1 ft- horizontally and three ft. vertlcaLLy.

Horizontal separation is measured from the side rail oF on< tray to the side rail of the adjacent tray. Vertical separation is ineasured from the bottom of the top trav to the top of the side rail of the bottom tray. C casu I A

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ere t e a ove separation diptance cou' not be nai af,ned suigable fire barriers and/~ appr>>ved protective oat ing. have utiIized .or cab'.es hale been instat'Ied In i i .losed in~~ways r'.

b 6n hich re s 'ftablp for p>>tect ~g the cable..r m;i . Ir. In ad j ent ceways. ~ In enera plas areas t't ee-hou f I.re ba riers >ave been in. al leg betw n red da cable trav whe e

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t e ab e separation Lstaqces c ld no be nai,nta ed. In ddit on maximum u e has Seen ade o inh rent b .rie.s su i as S

floors and walls i the design of th ra way sy tens.

3. 1-37

Sa!NPP FSAR MLS b05 go $ F' T mi 'mu separa- n di ce twe enclos r ew s et en arrier and prot ted racewa i on-Glass IE circuits are generally p'eparated from Clas 'E circuits by the same minimum spatiaL requirements as r dundant:

Class IE circu ts are s j>arated f om each o er. Ho ever, w re 21 the cynvergi circuit are cont ined in ass IE ay and on-Clasg IE coy duit, on) the non lass IE aceway c'rcuits re enclosed (p .e., in conduit). Analysis f this nfigur ion s demonstrated that /here uou be no a/verse ef ecrs of he n n-Class IP circuit pon the glass IE or recite. Non-Class IE,

. ~ circuMs need no't be ro ted from Class IE circui (b)'able and Raceway Hazard Areas Analyses of the effects of pipe whip, jet impingement, missiles, fire, and flooding demonstrate that safety related electrical circuits, raceways, and equipment are not degraded beyond an acceptable level.

The analyses are referenced as follows'.

High Pressure Piping (Seciion 3.6)

Missiles (Section 3.5)

Flammable Material (Section 9.5.1)

Flooding (Section 2.4)

In fire hazard areas outside the cable spreading rooms, where redundant safety related trays or safety relapsed and non-safety related trays are exposed to the same fire hazard, protection has.

been provided by spatial separation, Eire suppression systems, fire retardant coatings, fire barriers, or combination thereoE.

(c) Cable Spreading Area and Control Room The cable spreading area is the space below the Control Room where the instrumentation and control cables converge prior to entering the control, termination, or instrumentation panels. Refer to Section 8.3.1.2.14 for further discussion of the circuits in these areas. s In the cable spreading rooms; cabling for redundant safety divisions A and B are separated by three hour fire barriers.

Automatic sprinklers are also provided in the cable spreading rooms. Non-safety related cables are run in separate raceways from safety related cables uith a~separation distance of I Et. Eor trays separated horizontally and 3 Et. for trays separated vertically. e the~inimum separat1o ~rrme 1nt ln f1 bar ers+Hand/o encl sed cew s, av ee W~se'-r t1 ze it a m 1mum mepar ion stan o 1 i . b we e clo d r ewaye or twee barr's a t pr ec ed rac ay( bpfere phe con/ergi rac ay are pec1fi lly Class tray and non-Glass I<F<cond t, denly he non-Class E

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+his co figuration has demonstrated Mat there would be no adverse effec of the nonMlass IE circu~s upon the Cl~s IE circuits. '] '=

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e ov5 'separation met o s are based on t e ollowing:

(I) Cable splices in cable trays are prohibited.

(2) Cable and raceways are flame retardant.

~3) J'athe trays are not. f ill above t e ~de caila.

(4) Hazards are limited to internal faults or faults internal to the electric equipment or cables.

(d) Identification - For ident:ification of cable and raceways, refer to Section 8.3.1.3.

2) Separation Criteria for the Emergency AC Zwwer Supply (a) Emergency Diesel Generators'. Redundant Class lE emergency diesel generators are located in separate safety class structures and have independent air supplies. The wall separating diesel generator sets is floodtight and fire resistant, and protects the redundant sets against internally generated missiles. Missile protection is described in Section 3.5.

3) Separation Criteria for the DC Power-Supplies (a) Batteries'Redundant. Class-1E batteries are installed in separate rooms in the Reactor Auxiliary Building.

(b) Battery Chargers: Battery chargers for redundant Class 1E batteries are physically separated by the methods described in Section 8.3.1.2.30(a).

(c) Distribution Panels: Redundant Class lE DC distribution panels are physically separated by the methods described in Section 8.3.1.2.30(a).

4) Separation Criteria for the Distribution System (a) Redundant Class 1E 6.9 kV switchgear and 480V power centers are located in separate electrical equipment rooms.

(b) Redundant Class 1E 480V motor control centers, 208/120V distribution panels and 120V uninterruptible power supplies are separated by the methods described in Section 8.3.1.2.30(a).

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INSERT A Where the above separation distance could not be maintained, the lesser separation distances have been established and )ustified by (1) test, (2) analysis or (3) the installation of suitable fire barriers/or approved protective coatings.

(1) Test CP&L has contracted Wyle Laboratories to perform testing in accordance with Section 5.1.1.2 of IEEE-384-1974 to )ustify lesser separation distances. The test methodology, conditions and results are documented in Wyle Test Report No. 47879-02 and are briefly described in the sections below.

a. Test Methodolo /Se uence CP&L evaluation of SH? ?P electrical auxi.liary system design and breaker schemes, cable tray fill, etc. as input to development of the test conditions.

2. CP&L/Wyle evaluation of field as-built installations and development of test configurations.

3. CP&L/Wyle development of test procedure No.

47879-01 Rev. A.

4. Screenin Tests to determine the cable(s) with ignition. potential and the- worst damage potential . ~

5. Confi uration Tests verify acceptability of tested configurations and separation distances without interposing barriers. Configuration tests were only necessary for that voltage class where the capability of ignition was demonstrated (i.e. power class).

b. Test Conditions The following conditions/assumptions are bases of the test program:

1. A cable in the SHNPP raceway system experiences a fault current in excess of the cables allowable energy let-through (I~t) due to failure of the circuits primary overcurrent protective device.

2. The test current is that current )ust below the long-time trip setting of the circuits secondary overcurrent protective device, and is maintained at a constant value untill conductor open-circuit or steady-state is reached.

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b. Test Conditions (continued)

3. No credit has been taken for operator initiated

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action to clear the fault.

4. The current was conservatively maintained at a constant level as the circuit impedance increases due to conductor heating.

C~ Test Results The test results are detailed in Wyle Test Report No.

47879-02. The minimum separation distances based on the test results are detailed in Table 8.3.1.10.

(2) ~Anal eie Vhete the damage potential ie contained within a conduit, and the class 1E cable(s) are in tray or are free air drop out cable, an analysis has been performed in accordance with the recommendations of Section 5. 1.1.2 of IEEE-384-1974 to justify a minimum separation distance of one inch. The results of the analysis indicate that provided one inch separation is maintained, any damage potential associated with the conduit

-will have no adverse affects on the Class 1E circuits.

(3) Installation of Barriers - Where the separation distances could not be justified by test or analysis suitable barriers/or approved protective coatings have been utilized, or cables have been installed in enclosed- raceways which are suitable for protecLing the ~bles. The minimum separation distance between enclosed -raceways or between nd the raceway/cable(s) is 1 in.

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