ML073100335
ML073100335 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Clinton |
Issue date: | 11/06/2007 |
From: | Ring M NRC/RGN-III/DRP/B1 |
To: | Crane C Exelon Generation Co, Exelon Nuclear |
References | |
IR-07-004 | |
Download: ML073100335 (45) | |
See also: IR 05000461/2007004
Text
November 6, 2007
Mr. Christopher M. Crane
President and Chief Nuclear Officer
Exelon Nuclear
Exelon Generation Company, LLC
4300 Winfield Road
Warrenville, IL 60555
SUBJECT: CLINTON POWER STATION
NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000461/2007004
Dear Mr. Crane:
On September 30, 2007, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an
integrated inspection at your Clinton Power Station. The enclosed report documents the
inspection results, which were discussed on October 4, 2007, with Mr. F.A. Kearney and other
members of your staff.
This inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and to
compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed
personnel.
Based on the results of this inspection, three self-revealed findings of very low safety
significance (Green) were identified. All of these issues involved violations of NRC
requirements. However, because of the very low safety significance and because they were
entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating these violations as Non-Cited
Violations consistent with Section VI.A.1. of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the subject or severity of a Non-Cited Violation, you should provide a response
within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C.
20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III, 2443 Warrenville Road,
Suite 210, Lisle, IL 60532-4352; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Clinton
Power Station.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter and its
enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the
C. Crane -2-
NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of
NRCs document system (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Mark A. Ring, Chief
Branch 1
Division of Reactor Projects
Docket No. 50-461
License No. NPF-62
Enclosure: Inspection Report No. 05000461/2007004
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
cc w/encl: Site Vice President - Clinton Power Station
Plant Manager - Clinton Power Station
Regulatory Assurance Manager - Clinton Power Station
Chief Operating Officer
Senior Vice President - Nuclear Services
Vice President - Operations Support
Vice President - Licensing and Regulatory Affairs
Manager Licensing - Clinton Power Station
Senior Counsel, Nuclear, Mid-West Regional Operating Group
Document Control Desk - Licensing
Assistant Attorney General
Illinois Emergency Management Agency
State Liaison Officer, State of Illinois
Chairman, Illinois Commerce Commission
C. Crane -2-
NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of
NRCs document system (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Mark A. Ring, Chief
Branch 1
Division of Reactor Projects
Docket No. 50-461
License No. NPF-62
Enclosure: Inspection Report No. 05000461/2007004
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
cc w/encl: Site Vice President - Clinton Power Station
Plant Manager - Clinton Power Station
Regulatory Assurance Manager - Clinton Power Station
Chief Operating Officer
Senior Vice President - Nuclear Services
Vice President - Operations Support
Vice President - Licensing and Regulatory Affairs
Manager Licensing - Clinton Power Station
Senior Counsel, Nuclear, Mid-West Regional Operating Group
Document Control Desk - Licensing
Assistant Attorney General
Illinois Emergency Management Agency
State Liaison Officer, State of Illinois
Chairman, Illinois Commerce Commission
DOCUMENT NAME:C:\FileNet\ML073100335.wpd
G Publicly Available G Non-Publicly Available G Sensitive G Non-Sensitive
To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the concurrence box "C" = Copy without attach/encl "E" = Copy with attach/encl "N" = No copy
OFFICE RIII RIII RIII RIII
NAME M. Ring for M. Ring
B. Dickson
DATE 11/05/2007 11/06/2007
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
Letter to C. Crane from M. Ring dated November 6, 2007
SUBJECT: CLINTON POWER STATION
NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000461/2007004
DISTRIBUTION:
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Docket No: 50-461
License No: NPF-62
Report No: 05000461/2007004
Licensee: AmerGen Energy Company, LLC
Facility: Clinton Power Station
Location: Route 54 West
Clinton, IL 61727
Dates: July 1 through September 30, 2007
Inspectors: B. C. Dickson, Senior Resident Inspector
D. Tharp, Resident Inspector
A. Barker, Senior Project Engineer
J. McGhee, Reactor Engineer
A. Koonce, Reactor Engineer
D. Melendez, Reactor Engineer
M. Mitchell, Health Physicist
Approved by: Mark Ring, Chief
Branch 1
Division of Reactor Projects
Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000461/2007004, AmerGen Energy Company LLC, on 07/01/07 - 09/30/2007 Clinton
Power Station, Event Follow-up.
This report covers a three month period of baseline resident inspection and announced
baseline inspection on radiation protection. The inspection was conducted by Region III
inspectors and the resident inspectors. Three Green findings, involving Non-Cited Violations,
were identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White,
Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination
Process (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be assigned a
severity level after NRC management review. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe
operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor
Oversight Process, Revision 3, dated July 2000.
A. Inspector-Identified and Self Revealing Findings
Cornerstone: Barrier Integrity
- Green. A performance deficiency involving a Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR Part 50,
Appendix B, Criterion IV, Procurement Document Control, was self revealed following
receipt of laboratory results that showed that Division 1 control room ventilation system
charcoal filter penetration values were higher than allowed by Clintons Technical
Specifications. This issue occurred because the licensee failed to establish proper
purchase specifications for charcoal used in the control room ventilation system.
Additionally, this issue led to Division 1 control room ventilation subsystem being
inoperable from May 9 through May 16, 2005, concurrent with the Division 2 control
room ventilation subsystem being inoperable due to planned maintenance from
May 9 through May 14, 2005. Licensee corrective actions included entering the issue
into the corrective action program, revising the charcoal purchase specifications, and
adding limitations to work orders to prevent scheduling work that could impact the
operability of redundant systems.
This issue was more than minor because it affected the objective of the Barrier Integrity
cornerstone of assuring that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide
releases caused by accidents or events. Additionally, this issue is associated with the
barrier performance attribute of maintaining Radiological Barrier functionality of the
control room. Failure to ensure adequate purchase specifications resulted in there
being a period where both trains of control room ventilation were inoperable without the
knowledge of the operators. The issue was of very low safety significance because it
only represented a degradation of the radiological barrier function provided for the
control room. (Section 4OA3.1)
- Green. The inspectors identified a performance deficiency involving a Non-Cited
Violation of Technical Specifications when the licensee failed to meet the required
completion time for an action statement in Technical Specification 3.4.5. Specifically,
Technical Specification 3.4.5 does not allow reactor coolant system pressure boundary
leakage and requires a shutdown to Mode 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> if pressure boundary
1 Enclosure
leakage is discovered. Upon entry into the drywell following a shutdown of the reactor
on June 19, 2007, the licensee discovered the existence of reactor coolant system
pressure boundary leakage. Indications of the leakage had been discovered at 0433 on
June 18, 2007, but the plant was not placed in Mode 3 until approximately 31 hours3.587963e-4 days <br />0.00861 hours <br />5.125661e-5 weeks <br />1.17955e-5 months <br /> later
at 1125 on June 19, 2007. Licensee corrective actions included replacing the leaking
flexible hose, scheduling replacement of other flexible hoses, and establishing a
preventive maintenance replacement frequency for the flexible hoses.
This issue was more than minor because operating with a degraded pressure boundary
affected the reactor coolant system equipment and barrier performance attribute of the
Barrier Integrity cornerstone, in that, reactor coolant system pressure boundary leakage
results in a reduction in the reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect
the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. The issue was of
very low safety significance because the potential maximum size of the leak was well
within the capability of the available mitigating equipment. The finding is related to the
cross-cutting area of Human Performance (Decision Making) in that operators had
initially entered TS 3.4.5 for pressure boundary leakage, but later chose not to treat the
leakage as pressure boundary leakage, and treat it as unidentified leakage until the
actual location could be determined (H.1(b)). (Section 4OA3.2)
- Green. A performance deficiency involving a Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR Part 50
Appendix B, Criteria V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was self-revealed
following an event on August 17, 2007, where a spent fuel bundle being moved to a
temporary storage location came in contact with and rested upon another fuel bundle
seated in its storage location. The licensee procedure that governs spent fuel pool
movement failed to provide adequate guidance on how high to lift the fuel bundle prior to
traversing across the spent fuel pool. Licensee corrective actions included revising the
fuel handling procedure to provide specific instructions regarding how high to lift a fuel
bundle during spent fuel pool movements.
This issue was more than minor because it affected the barrier integrity objective of
assuring that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases
caused by accidents or events. The inspectors determined that this issue only degraded
the Fuel Cladding Barrier and its associated cornerstone, therefore, this issue was of
very low safety significance. This finding is related to the cross-cutting area of Human
Performance (Resources) because the licensee did not provide complete and accurate
procedures. Specifically, the procedure relied on the skills of the operator, did not
provided specific values on how high to lift a fuel bundle, and did not require
independent verification (H.2(c)). (Section 4OA3.3)
B. Licensee-Identified Violations
No findings of significance were identified.
2 Enclosure
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
The plant was operated at approximately 96 to 97 percent rated thermal power (maintaining
100 percent electrical output) throughout the inspection period with several derates of
approximately 2-3 percent at the requests of the grid operator. The grid operator made those
requests due to concerns regarding grid stability.
Exceptions to relatively steady state operation occurred on July 1, 2007, when operators
lowered reactor power to approximately 82 percent to make repairs to an electrohydraulic
control system leak on the #4 main turbine control valve and on September 9, 2007, when
operators lowered reactor power of approximately 75 percent to perform control rod pattern
adjustments, quarterly main turbine valve testing and main steam isolation valve testing.
1. REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstone: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated site readiness for severe thunderstorms prior to arrival of
weather fronts associated with severe thunderstorms, high winds and rain that resulted
in severe thunderstorm and tornado watches being identified. On each occasion
operations shift manning was verified to be adequate and in accordance with site
procedures. Site walkdowns were performed to evaluate potential vulnerabilities for
missile generation during high winds or tornados and to assess the implementation of
the site procedures. The communications protocol between the control room and the
transmission system operator was also reviewed during the inspections and examples of
the quality of communication were observed due to severe weather conditions during
the inspection.
This review represented two inspection samples of review prior to impending weather
conditions.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignments (71111.04Q)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of accessible portions of divisions of
risk-significant mitigating systems equipment during times when the divisions were of
increased importance due to redundant divisions or other related equipment being
3 Enclosure
unavailable. The inspectors utilized the valve and electric breaker checklists listed at
the end of this report to verify that the components were properly positioned and that
support systems were lined up as needed. The inspectors also examined the material
condition of the components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify
that there were no obvious deficiencies. The inspectors reviewed outstanding work
orders and issue reports (IRs) associated with the divisions to verify that those
documents did not reveal issues that could affect division function. The inspectors used
the information in the appropriate sections of the Updated Safety Analysis Report
(USAR) to determine the functional requirements of the systems. The documents listed
at the end of this report were also used by the inspectors to evaluate this area.
The inspectors performed two samples by verifying the alignment of the reactor core
isolation cooling system and the Division 1 standby gas treatment system while
Division 2 was out of service.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05Q)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted fire protection walkdowns which were focused on availability,
accessibility, and the condition of fire fighting equipment, the control of transient
combustibles and ignition sources, and on the condition and operating status of installed
fire barriers. The inspectors selected fire areas for inspection based on their overall
contribution to internal fire risk, as documented in the individual plant examination of
external events with later additional insights, and their potential to impact equipment
which could cause a plant transient, to verify that fire hoses and extinguishers were in
their designated locations and available for immediate use, that fire detectors and
sprinklers were not obstructed, that transient material loading was within the analyzed
limits, and that fire doors, dampers, and penetration seals appeared to be in satisfactory
condition. The inspectors verified that minor issues identified during the inspection were
entered into the licensees corrective action program.
The inspectors reviewed portions of the licensees fire protection evaluation report and
the USAR to verify consistency in the documented analysis with installed fire protection
equipment at the station.
The inspectors completed seven samples by inspection of the following areas:
- Fire Area D-5d, Division 1 diesel generator room;
- Fire Area A-2b, Division 1 residual heat removal pump and heat exchanger
room;
- Fire Area A-1, 707' auxiliary building, general access area;
- Fire Area CB-1c, 719' control building, heating ventilation and air conditioning
equipment area;
- Fire loading and associated fire hazard permits in approved storage area;
4 Enclosure
- Fire Area A-2 and Fire Zone A-2a, reactor core isolation cooling pump room; and
- Fire Area D-6a, b, Division 2 diesel generator and day tank room.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R06 Flood Protection Measures (71111.06)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed the flood protection equipment in the B and C residual heat
removal pump rooms. The inspectors verified that flooding mitigation plans and
equipment were consistent with the design requirements and risk analysis assumptions.
The inspectors reviewed USAR Section 3.4.1 for internal flooding protection measures,
reviewed the licensees flooding mitigation procedures, and reviewed issue reports
related to possible flood protection issues. Additionally, plant walkdowns were
performed to verify design barriers were properly maintained. Penetrations between
rooms, watertight doors, electrical conduit seals and covers, and room drains were
inspected to verify material condition met design assumptions. The inspectors
performed a review of the stations maintenance database to verify preventative
maintenance was current and equipment deficiencies were being appropriately reported
and resolved. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the maintenance rule scoping and
performance criteria and determined that the function was being tracked appropriately.
The corrective action program was also reviewed for the past 12 months for issues
related to internal flood protection. The inspectors completed a one inspection sample
by completing the internal flooding review of the B residual heat removal pump and
heat exchanger room and the C residual heat removal pump room.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R07 Heat Sink Performance (71111.07A)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors verified readiness and availability of the Division 3 emergency diesel
generator heat exchanger by performing the following activities:
- Observed in-progress eddy current testing and reviewed post-eddy current
testing results;
- Observed the condition of heat exchanger end bell and tube sheet during
walkdown;
- Reviewed the results of tube inspections and outage work packages to
determine whether maintenance was performed in accordance with the
licensees maintenance program for heat exchangers and reviewed issue
reports to verify that deficiencies were identified and incorporated into the
licensees corrective action program;
5 Enclosure
- Reviewed the evaluation and corrective actions for Action Request 678934,
Div III DG HX (1DG13A) Chemistry Results,
- Reviewed the evaluation and corrective actions for Action Request 675035,
Excessive Erosion Discovered on the Flange Faces 1VH03A, and
- Verified the heat exchanger was properly classified under the Maintenance
Rule and identified issues received appropriate program reviews.
This inspection represented the completion of one annual sample.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification (71111.11)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed an evaluation of an operating crew on September 19, 2007.
The scenario (ESG LOR Exam 87d) consisted of a failure of the A reactor recirculation
flow control valve, a failure to scram using the manual pushbuttons, unisolable flooding
in emergency core cooling system pump room and an emergency depressurization.
The inspectors reviewed licensed-operator requalification training to evaluate operator
performance in mitigating the consequences of a simulated event, particularly in the
areas of Human Performance. The inspectors evaluated operator performance
attributes which included communication clarity and formality, timely performance of
appropriate operator actions, appropriate alarm response, proper procedure use and
adherence, and senior reactor operator oversight and command and control.
Additionally, simulator physical fidelity and training department actions to incorporate
current plant deficiencies and annunciators were evaluated.
The inspectors also assessed the performance of the training staff evaluations involved
in the requalification process. For any weaknesses identified during the session, the
inspectors observed that the licensee evaluators also noted the issues and discussed
them in the critique at the end of the session. Discrepancies were reviewed with the
training staff. The inspectors verified that all issues were captured in the training
program and licensee corrective action program.
These activities completed one inspection sample.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
6 Enclosure
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the effectiveness of the licensees maintenance efforts in
implementing 10 CFR Part 50.65 (the maintenance rule (MR)) requirements, including a
review of scoping, goal-setting, performance monitoring, short and long-term corrective
actions, and current equipment performance problems. These systems were selected
based on their designation as risk-significant under the maintenance rule. The
inspectors also reviewed issue reports and associated documents for appropriate
identification of problems, entry into the corrective action system, and appropriateness
of planned or completed actions. The inspectors completed three samples by reviewing
the following:
- Containment and reactor vessel isolation system and
- Reactor core isolation cooling system primary containment isolation valves.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed the licensees risk assessment processes and considerations
used to plan and schedule maintenance activities on safety-related structures, systems,
and components particularly to ensure that maintenance risk and emergent work
contingencies had been identified and resolved. The inspectors completed five
samples by assessing the effectiveness of risk management activities for the following
work activities or work weeks:
- Reviewed licensee risk assessment and subsequent area operator staging
associated with standby liquid control system pump and valve quarterly
operability run;
- Reviewed licensees risk assessment and detailed work plan for reserve auxiliary
transformer static VAR compensator prior to the removal of test equipment;
- Reviewed licensee risk assessment for planned surveillance on high pressure
core spray system;
- Reviewed licensee risk assessment associated with six-year preventative
maintenance of the Division 3 diesel generator (including walkdown of risk
sensitive area to ensure proper flagging);
- Reviewed the licensees risk assessment of 138 kv line work by Ameren IP and
subsequent emergency reserve auxiliary transformer outage.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
7 Enclosure
1R15 Operability Evaluations (71111.15)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the following operability determinations and evaluations
affecting mitigating systems to determine whether operability was properly justified and
the component or system remained available such that no unrecognized risk increase
had occurred. The inspectors completed four samples of operability determinations and
evaluations by reviewing the following:
- Operability Evaluation 655836: Residual heat removal water leg pump supply
check valves (1E12F084A and 1E12F085A) failure to close;
- Operability Evaluation 630815-03: Division 1, 2, and 3 shutdown service water
valves (1SX025A, 1SX025B, and 1SX025C) exceed the vendor allowable
deflection;
- Action Request 667663: Through body leak of shutdown service water valve
(1SX019B);
- Action Request 660299: Type C Integrated leakage rate testing for test lines
going through containment penetration 1MC-152 not being performed;
- Operability Evaluation 664280: Through wall leak on shutdown service water line
(1SX20AB); and
- Operability Evaluation 671001: Division 3 essential switchgear/shutdown service
water piping wall thickness below minimum screening criteria.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the post maintenance testing activities associated with
maintenance or modification of important mitigating, barrier integrity, and support
systems that were identified as risk significant in the licensees risk analysis. The
inspectors reviewed these activities to verify that the post maintenance testing was
performed adequately, demonstrated that the maintenance was successful, and that
operability was restored. During this inspection activity, the inspectors interviewed
maintenance and engineering department personnel and reviewed the completed post
maintenance testing documentation. The inspectors used the appropriate sections of
the Technical Specifications (TS) and USAR, as well as the documents listed at the end
of this report, to evaluate this area.
Testing subsequent to the following activities was observed and evaluated:
- Work Order 00318466: Troubleshooting and repair of Division 2, 250 Volt
battery charger (1DC07E);
- Work Order 01048964-03: Post maintenance testing for optical isolator pair
(manual scram push button) P664-A-A81-A313/A305;
8 Enclosure
- Work Order 00914954-03: Replacement of 1SX-303A;
- Work Order 00909977-04: Replacement of standby gas treatment system
pressure switches;
- Work Order 00909977-02: Replacement of combustible gas control system
pressure switch;
- Work Order 00969911: Replacement of Division 1 main control room ventilation
supply fan; and
- Reviewed post maintenance testing of Division 3 emergency diesel generator
following six year maintenance.
Performance of this review comprised seven samples.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors witnessed selected surveillance testing and/or reviewed test data to
verify that the equipment tested using the surveillance procedures met the TS, the
Technical requirements Manual (TRM), the USAR, and licensee procedural
requirements, and demonstrated that the equipment was capable of performing its
intended safety functions. The activities were selected based on their importance in
verifying mitigating systems capability and barrier integrity. The inspectors used the
documents listed at the end of this report to verify that the testing met the frequency
requirements; that the tests were conducted in accordance with the procedures,
including establishing the proper plant conditions and prerequisites; that the test
acceptance criteria were met; and that the results of the tests were properly reviewed
and recorded. In addition, the inspectors interviewed operations, maintenance, and
engineering department personnel regarding the tests and test results.
Seven samples were completed.
The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:
- CPS 9069.01, Shutdown service water operability test pump B;
- CPS 9051.01, High pressure core spray and water leg pump operability;
- CPS 9052.01, Low pressure core spray and residual heat removal A pumps
water leg pump operability;
- CPS 9052.04, Low pressure core spray and residual heat removal A vent and
fill;
- CPS 9054.01, Reactor core isolation cooling operability; and
- CPS 9080.02, Diesel generator 1B operability - manual and quick start
operability.
9 Enclosure
These tests included three in-service testing (IST) surveillance samples and one reactor
coolant system leakage detection surveillance sample.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications (7111.23)
The inspectors reviewed and evaluated the following temporary plant modification on
risk significant equipment to verify that the instructions were consistent with applicable
design modification documents and that the modifications did not adversely impact
system operability or availability. The inspectors interviewed operations, engineering
and maintenance personnel, as appropriate, and reviewed the design modification
documents and the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations against the applicable portions of the
USAR. The documents listed at the end of the report were also used by the inspectors
to evaluate this area. The inspectors reviewed the issues that the licensee entered into
its corrective action program to verify that identified temporary modification problems
were being entered into the program with the appropriate characterization and
significance. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees corrective actions for
temporary modification related issues documented in selected condition reports. The
condition reports are specified in the List of Documents Reviewed.
The inspectors completed one inspection sample by reviewing the following temporary
modification:
- Defeating Inclined fuel transfer system upender/fuel handling platform Interlock,
Revision 0.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1EP6 Drill Evaluation (71114.06)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed the emergency response activities associated with the drill
conducted on August 9, 2007. Specifically, the inspectors verified that the emergency
classification and simulated notifications were properly completed, and that the licensee
adequately critiqued the training. Additionally, the inspectors observed licensee
activities during the drill in the simulated control room and the Technical Support Center
(TSC).
The drill included an explosion in the Division 2 emergency diesel generator and a
subsequent anticipated transient without a scram.
10 Enclosure
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
2. RADIATION SAFETY
Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety
2OS1 Access Control to Radiologically Significant Areas (71121.01)
.1 Review of Licensee Performance Indicators for the Occupational Exposure Cornerstone
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees Occupational Exposure Control cornerstone
performance indicators (PIs) to determine whether or not the conditions surrounding the
PIs had been evaluated, and identified problems had been entered into the corrective
action program for resolution. These reviews represented one inspection sample.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Plant Walkdowns and Radiation Work Permit Reviews
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed licensee controls and surveys in the following two radiologically
significant work areas within radiation areas, high radiation areas and airborne
radioactivity areas in the plant and reviewed work packages which included associated
licensee controls and surveys of these areas to determine if radiological controls
including surveys, postings and barricades were acceptable:
- Spent fuel pool re-rack project; and
- Phase separator resin transfer.
These reviews represented one inspection sample.
The inspectors reviewed the radiation work permits (RWP) and work packages used to
access these two areas and other high radiation work areas to identify the work control
instructions and control barriers that had been specified. Electronic dosimeter alarm set
points for both integrated dose and dose rate were evaluated for conformity with survey
indications and plant policy. Workers were interviewed to verify that they were aware of
the actions required when their electronic dosimeters noticeably malfunctioned or
alarmed. These reviews represented one inspection sample.
The inspectors walked down and surveyed (using an NRC survey meter) these two
areas to verify that the prescribed radiation work permit, procedure, and engineering
11 Enclosure
controls were in place, that licensee surveys and postings were complete and accurate,
and that air samplers were properly located. These reviews represented one inspection
sample.
The inspectors reviewed RWPs for airborne radioactivity areas to verify barrier integrity
and engineering controls performance (e.g., HEPA ventilation system operation) and to
determine if there was a potential for individual worker internal exposures of greater
than 50 millirem committed effective dose equivalent. No areas in the plant were
airborne areas with a potential of greater than 5 millirem committed effective dose
equivalent. Work areas having a history of, or the potential for, airborne transuranics
were evaluated to verify that the licensee had considered the potential for transuranic
isotopes and provided appropriate worker protection. The license has not had a history
of transuranic contamination. These reviews represented one inspection sample.
The adequacy of the licensees internal dose assessment process for internal exposures
greater than 50 millirem committed effective dose equivalent was assessed. These
reviews represented one inspection sample.
The inspectors also reviewed the licensees physical and programmatic controls for
highly activated and/or contaminated materials (non-fuel) stored within spent fuel or
other storage pools. These reviews represented one inspection sample.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.3 Problem Identification and Resolution
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees self-assessments, audits, Licensee Event
Reports, and Special Reports related to the access control program to verify that
identified problems were entered into the corrective action program for resolution.
These reviews represented one inspection sample.
The inspectors reviewed seven corrective action reports related to access controls and
high radiation area radiological incidents when available (non-PIs identified by the
licensee in high radiation areas greater than 1R/hr). Staff members were interviewed
and corrective action documents were reviewed to verify that follow-up activities were
being conducted in an effective and timely manner commensurate with their importance
to safety and risk based on the following:
- Initial problem identification, characterization, and tracking;
- Disposition of operability/reportability issues;
- Evaluation of safety significance/risk and priority for resolution;
- Identification of repetitive problems;
- Identification of contributing causes;
- Identification and implementation of effective corrective actions;
12 Enclosure
- Resolution of Non-Cited Violations (NCVs) tracked in the corrective action
system; and
- Implementation/consideration of risk significant operational experience feedback.
These reviews represented one inspection sample.
The inspectors evaluated the licensees process for problem identification,
characterization, and prioritization and verified that problems were entered into the
corrective action program and resolved. For repetitive deficiencies and/or significant
individual deficiencies in problem identification and resolution, the inspectors verified
that the licensees self-assessment activities were capable of identifying and addressing
these deficiencies. These reviews represented one inspection sample.
The inspectors reviewed licensee documentation packages for all PI events occurring
since the last inspection to determine if any of these PI events involved dose rates
greater than 25 R/hr at 30 centimeters or greater than 500 R/hr at 1 meter. Barriers
were evaluated for failure and to determine if there were any barriers left to prevent
personnel access. Unintended exposures greater than 100 millirem total effective dose
equivalent (or greater than 5 rem shallow dose equivalent or greater than 1.5 rem lens
dose equivalent), were evaluated to determine if there were any regulatory
overexposures or if there was a substantial potential for an overexposure. There were
no unintended exposures approaching 100 millirem. These reviews represented one
inspection sample.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.4 Job-In-Progress Reviews
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed the following two work activities that were being performed in
radiation areas, airborne radioactivity areas, or high radiation areas that presented the
greatest radiological risk to workers:
- Spent fuel pool re-rack project; and
- Phase separator resin transfer.
The inspectors reviewed radiological job requirements for these two activities including
RWP requirements and work procedure requirements, and attended
As-Low-As-Reasonably-Achievable (ALARA) job briefings. These reviews represented
one inspection sample.
Job performance was observed with respect to these requirements to verify that
radiological conditions in the work area were adequately communicated to workers
through pre-job briefings and postings. The inspectors also verified the adequacy of
radiological controls including required radiation and contamination surveys; radiation
13 Enclosure
protection job coverage; and contamination controls. These reviews represented one
inspection sample.
Radiological work in high radiation work areas having significant dose rate gradients
was reviewed to evaluate the application of dosimetry to effectively monitor exposure to
personnel and to verify that licensee controls were adequate. These work areas
involved areas where the dose rate gradients were severe (diving activities in the fuel
pool re-rack project) which increased the necessity of providing multiple dosimeters.
These reviews represented one-inspection sample.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.5 High Risk Significant, High Dose Rate (HRA), and Very High Radiation Area Controls
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors held discussions with the acting Radiation Protection Manager
concerning high dose rate/high radiation area and very high radiation area controls and
procedures, including procedural changes that had occurred since the last inspection, in
order to verify that any procedure modifications did not substantially reduce the
effectiveness and level of worker protection. These reviews represented one inspection
sample.
The inspectors discussed with RP supervisors the controls that were in place for special
areas that had the potential to become very high radiation areas during certain plant
operations, to determine if these plant operations required communication beforehand
with the RP group, so as to allow corresponding timely actions to properly post and
control the radiation hazards. These reviews represented one inspection sample.
The inspectors conducted plant walkdowns to verify the posting and locking of
entrances to high dose rate HRAs, and very high radiation. These reviews represented
one inspection sample.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.6 Radiation Worker Performance
a. Inspection Scope
During job performance observations, the inspectors evaluated radiation worker
performance with respect to stated radiation protection work requirements and
evaluated whether workers were aware of the significant radiological conditions in their
workplace, the RWP controls and limits in place, and that their performance had
accounted for the level of radiological hazards present. These reviews represented one
inspection sample.
14 Enclosure
The inspectors reviewed radiological problem reports which found that the cause of the
event was due to radiation worker errors to determine if there was an observable pattern
traceable to a similar cause, and to determine if this perspective matched the corrective
action approach taken by the licensee to resolve the reported problems. These
problems, along with planned and taken corrective actions were discussed with the
acting Radiation Protection Manager. These reviews represented one inspection
sample.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.7 Radiation Protection Technician Proficiency
a. Inspection Scope
During job performance observations, the inspectors evaluated Radiation Protection
Technician (RPT) performance with respect to radiation protection work requirements
and evaluated whether they were aware of the radiological conditions in their workplace,
the RWP controls and limits in place, and if their performance was consistent with their
training and qualifications with respect to the radiological hazards and work activities.
These reviews represented one inspection sample.
The inspectors reviewed radiological problem reports which found that the cause of the
event was radiation protection technician error to determine if there was an observable
pattern traceable to a similar cause, and to determine if this perspective matched the
corrective action approach taken by the licensee to resolve the reported problems.
These reviews represented one inspection sample.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Cornerstone: Public Radiation Safety
2PS2 Radioactive Material Processing and Transportation (71122.02)
.1 Radioactive Waste System
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the liquid and solid radioactive waste system descriptions in
the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), and the 2006 Annual Radioactive
Effluent Release Report for information on the types and amounts of radioactive waste
(radwaste) generated and disposed. The inspectors reviewed the scope of the
licensees audit/self-assessment activities, with regard to radioactive material processing
and transportation programs to determine if those activities satisfied the requirements of
15 Enclosure
10 CFR 20.1101(c) and the quality assurance audit requirements of Appendix G to
10 CFR Part 20 and of 10 CFR 71.137, as applicable.
These reviews represented one inspection sample.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Radioactive Waste System Walkdowns
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors walked down portions of the liquid and solid radwaste processing
systems to verify that these systems were consistent with the descriptions in the UFSAR
and in the Process Control Program and to assess the material condition and operability
of those systems. The inspectors reviewed the status of radioactive waste process
equipment that was not operational and/or was abandoned in place. The inspectors
discussed with the licensee the administrative and/or physical controls preventing the
inadvertent use of this equipment to ensure that the equipment would not contribute to
an unmonitored release path or be a source of unnecessary personnel exposure.
The inspectors reviewed changes to the waste processing system to verify the changes
were reviewed and documented in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59 and to assess the
impact of the changes on radiation dose to members of the public. The inspectors
reviewed the licensees processes for transferring waste resin into shipping containers
to determine if appropriate waste stream mixing and sampling was performed so as to
obtain representative waste stream samples for analysis. The inspector also reviewed
the methodologies for waste concentration averaging to determine if representative
samples of the waste product were provided for the purposes of waste classification in
accordance with 10 CFR 61.55.
These reviews represented one inspection sample.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.3 Waste Characterization and Classification
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees methods and procedures for determining the
classification of radioactive waste shipments including the use of scaling factors to
quantify difficult-to-measure radionuclides. The inspectors reviewed the licensees most
recent radiochemical sample analysis results for each of the licensees waste streams,
and the associated calculations used to account for difficult-to-measure radionuclides.
These waste streams consisted of radwaste demineralizer resins, various filter media,
and dry active waste (DAW). The inspectors also reviewed the licensees use of scaling
16 Enclosure
factors to quantify difficult-to-measure radionuclides (e.g., pure alpha or beta emitting
radionuclides). The reviews were conducted to verify that the licensees program
assured compliance with 10 CFR 61.55 and 10 CFR 61.56, as required by Appendix G
of 10 CFR Part 20. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees waste characterization
and classification program to determine if reactor coolant chemistry data was
periodically evaluated to account for changing operational parameters that could
potentially affect waste stream classification and thus validate the continued use of
existing scaling factors between sample analysis updates.
These reviews represented one inspection sample.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.4 Shipment Preparation and Records
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the documentation of shipment packaging, surveying, package
labeling and marking, vehicle inspections and placarding, emergency instructions, and
licensee verification of shipment readiness for six selected non-excepted radioactive
material and radwaste shipments, made between March 2006 and January 2007. The
shipment documentation reviewed included:
- Equipment in a B-25 Box Shipped as Low Specific Activity (LSA);
- Two Spent Resins Shipped as Type A;
- Two Phase Separator Resins Shipped as Type A; and
- Part 61 Resin Samples Shipped as LSA.
For each shipment, the inspectors determined if the requirements of 10 CFR Parts 20
and 61 and those of the Department of Transportation (DOT) in 49 CFR Parts 170-189
were met. Specifically, records were reviewed, and staff involved in shipment activities
were interviewed to determine if packages were labeled and marked properly, if
packages and transport vehicle surveys were performed with appropriate
instrumentation, whether survey results satisfied DOT requirements, and if the quantity
and type of radionuclides in each shipment were determined accurately. The inspectors
also determined whether shipment manifests were completed in accordance with DOT
and NRC requirements, if they included the required emergency response information, if
the recipient was authorized to receive the shipment, and if shipments were tracked as
required by 10 CFR Part 20.
Selected staff involved in shipment activities were interviewed by the inspectors to
determine if they had adequate skills to accomplish shipment related tasks and to
determine if the shippers were knowledgeable of the applicable regulations to satisfy
package preparation requirements for public transport with respect to NRC
Bulletin 79-19, Packaging of Low-Level Radioactive Waste for Transport and Burial.
Also, the inspectors reviewed the transportation specific training for the authorized
shippers to assure that they met the requirements of 49 CFR Part 172, Subpart H.
17 Enclosure
These reviews represented two inspection samples.
b. Findings
(1) Shipment Total Quantity Re-characterized After Shipping
A shipment of phase separator resins was shipped from Clinton Power Station
September 30, 2005, and delivered to a vendor on October 1, 2005. The total curie
quantity in the shipment was in excess of the vendors Agreement State license limits.
The vendor communicated this discrepancy to shipping personnel at Clinton Power
Station on October 3, 2005. The shipper then re-characterized the total quantity of the
shipment by reviewing dose rate survey data and applying a dose to curie
methodology. Contrary to Clinton procedure, the re-characterization was not reviewed
by other Clinton personnel and new paperwork for the shipment, including a new NRC
Form 541 was generated and transferred to the recipient.
This event remains under review by the NRC and is categorized as an Unresolved Item
(URI) (URI 05000461/2007004-01).
.5 Identification and Resolution of Problems for Radwaste Processing and Transportation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed selected condition reports, self-assessment and audit reports,
along with field observation reports that addressed the radioactive waste and radioactive
materials shipping program, since the last inspection to determine if the licensee had
effectively implemented the corrective action program and if problems were identified,
characterized, prioritized, and corrected. The inspectors also determined whether the
licensee's self-assessment program was capable of identifying repetitive deficiencies, or
significant individual deficiencies in problem identification and resolution.
The inspectors also selectively reviewed other corrective action program reports
generated since the previous inspection that dealt with the radioactive material or
radwaste shipping program, interviewed staff, and reviewed documents to determine if
the following activities were being conducted in an effective and timely manner,
commensurate with their importance to safety and risk:
- Initial problem identification, characterization, and tracking;
- Disposition of operability/reportability issues;
- Evaluation of safety significance/risk and priority for resolution;
- Identification of repetitive problems;
- Identification of contributing causes;
- Identification and implementation of effective corrective actions;
- Resolution of Non-Cited Violations tracked in corrective action system(s); and
- Implementation/consideration of risk significant operational experience feedback.
These reviews represented one inspection sample.
18 Enclosure
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4. OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)
To perform a periodic review of performance indicator (PI) data to determine its
accuracy and completeness.
Cornerstones: Mitigation Systems
1. Mitigating Systems Performance Indicators (MSPI)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors sampled the licensees submittals for performance indicators for the
period of July 2006 through June 2007. The inspectors used performance indicator
definitions and guidance contained in revision 5 of Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI)
document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, to verify
the accuracy of the performance indicator data. The inspectors performed three
samples by reviewing the following:
- MSPI Shutdown service water.
b. Issues and Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
2. Safety System Functional Failures Performance Indicator
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed, at a minimum, the most recent 24 months of Licensee Event
Reports, licensee data reported to the NRC, plant logs, issue reports, and NRC
inspection reports to verify the following performance indicators reported by the
licensee for the 2nd Quarter of 2007 for Safety System Functional Failures.
The inspectors verified that the licensee accurately reported performance as defined by
the applicable revision of Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, Regulatory
Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline.
This performance indicator review constituted one inspection sample.
19 Enclosure
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Cornerstones: Public Radiation Safety and Barrier Integrity
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees determination of PIs for the Public Radiation
Safety Performance Indicator (Radiological Environmental Technical
Specification/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Radiological Effluent Occurrences) and
Barrier Integrity Performance Indicator (Reactor Coolant System Specific Activity) to
determine if the licensee accurately determined these performance indicators and had
identified all occurrences. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed the licensees
corrective action program documents for the 4th quarter of CY 2006 and the 1st, 2nd, and
3rd quarters of CY 2007 and Public Radiation Safety and Barrier Integrity Performance
Indicator data to ensure that there were no PI occurrences that were not identified by
the licensee. In addition to record reviews, the inspectors observed a chemistry
technician obtain and analyze a reactor coolant system sample. The inspectors
interviewed members of the licensees staff who were responsible for performance
indicator data acquisition, verification and reporting, to determine if their review and
assessment of the data was adequate.
These reviews represented two inspection samples.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152)
a. Inspection Scope
As discussed in previous sections of this report, the inspectors routinely reviewed
issues during baseline inspection activities and plant status reviews to verify that they
were being entered into the licensees corrective action system at an appropriate
threshold, that adequate attention was being given to timely corrective actions, and that
adverse trends were identified and addressed. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the
following issue:
b. Findings
There were no findings of significance identified. The inspectors reviewed procedure
OP-AA-102-103, Operator Work-Around Program, and the issues being tracked for
program resolution. As of July 23, 2007, there were two operator workarounds that
were being tracked for resolution. The inspectors review determined that the issues
were appropriately characterized as operator workarounds.
20 Enclosure
The inspectors also reviewed selected operations department concerns and out of
tolerance items that were identified in operations narrative logs to identify potential
operator workarounds that were not in the program. The inspectors concluded that
there were no additional workarounds identified from the sources reviewed.
On August 2, 2007, the inspector attended a WorkAround Board (WAB) meeting. One
of the items under review that was identified during forced outage C1F049 and
documented by IR 642141, was the operation of 1E12-F009, residual heat removal
shutdown cooling inboard isolation valve, from the main control room. The valve would
not open or close electrically (i.e., mechanically bound). An operator workaround
program review was not requested by IR 642141. The resident inspectors questioned
the licensee on the appropriateness of not conducting an operator workaround program
review. This resulted in the August 2 review of this condition. In addition, the licensee
generated IR 656515 on the missed opportunity to conduct an operator workaround
program review of 1E12-F009 valve operation. On August 2, 2007, the WAB approved
1E12-F009 valve operation as an operator workaround. The WAB member dialogue
on the issues that were reviewed on August 2, 2007, was at the appropriate level of
detail, and considered operator compensatory actions required to comply with plant
procedures, design requirements and technical specifications.
4OA3 Event Follow-up (71153)
.1 (Closed) LER 05000461/2005-001-00. Inadequate Procurement Specification for
Charcoal Results in Inoperable Control Room Ventilation Subsystem.
Introduction: A performance deficiency involving a Non-Cited Violation of
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion IV, Procurement Document Control, was self
revealed following receipt of results that showed that Division 1 control room ventilation
(VC) system charcoal filter penetration values were higher than allowed by Clintons
Technical Specifications. This issue occurred because the licensee failed to establish
proper purchase specifications for charcoal used in the VC system. Additionally, this
issue led to Division 1 VC subsystems being inoperable from May 9 through
May 16, 2005, concurrent with Division 2 VC subsystems being inoperable due to
planned maintenance from May 9 through May 14, 2005.
Description: On May 4, 2005, the licensee took charcoal absorber samples from the
Division 1 VC recirculation charcoal bed filter in order to perform charcoal penetration
testing as required by VC system Technical Specification surveillance requirement 3.7.3.3. On May 9, 2005, planned maintenance was performed on the Division 2
emergency diesel generator resulting in it becoming inoperable. The licensee also
declared the Division 2 VC subsystem inoperable because of the diesel inoperability.
The Division 2 emergency diesel generator and the Division 2 VC system were
declared operable on May 14, 2005, following completion of planned maintenance on
the emergency diesel generator. On May 16, 2005, the licensee received the
Division 1 charcoal sample analysis results which showed that after applying a
correction factor, the charcoal penetration value was 8.168. This charcoal penetration
was higher than the charcoal penetration operability value of 6.0 contained in Clintons
Technical Specifications.
21 Enclosure
Because of the unsatisfactory results, the licensee concluded that the seven day
required action completion time to restore an inoperable VC subsystem was not met,
nor was the required action to be in Mode 3 and Mode 4 per Clintons Technical
Specifications. Additionally, the Division 2 VC subsystem was inoperable from
May 9 to May 14, 2005, due to the Division 2 emergency diesel generator maintenance
outage. The licensee concluded that the station was in Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.3 required action D.1, requiring entry into TS limiting condition for operation
(LCO) 3.0.3. The licensee did not enter the TS 3.7.3 required action and LCO 3.0.3,
since the sample results were not known during the emergency diesel generator
outage.
A licensee investigation concluded that the cause of this event was that charcoal
purchasing requirements were inadequate for the unique application at Clinton. The
licensee purchased the charcoal installed in the Division 1 VC system to
ANSI/ASME N509-1980, Nuclear Power Plant Air Cleaning Units and Components.
According to the licensee, this industry standard had no limit on as-manufactured
moisture levels. The licensee concluded that the Clinton VC systems unique design
attributes, which included higher than normal airflow velocity, thin charcoal beds, and
no airflow heaters coupled with high as-manufactured moisture levels significantly
reduced the charcoal residence time and increased the penetration levels. The
licensee investigation also concluded that 10 percent of the charcoal contained in the
failed filter was caked after 17 months of operations. The licensee stated that this
caking was again proof of high as-manufactured moisture content.
The failed charcoal bed filter contained coal from lot 55, batch 68. The licensees extent
of condition review determined that this event was limited to the VC A recirculation
charcoal bed filter. The bases of this conclusion were that penetration tests results
were satisfactory for the other beds in the VC system and no lot 55, batch 68, charcoal
was in storage. The licensee investigation also determined that the charcoal in lot 55,
batch 68, had as-manufactured high moisture content of at least 12 percent by weight.
All charcoal currently in storage was confirmed to have a moisture content of less than
eight percent.
The inspectors were concerned that the licensee maintenance scheduling process
would allow for the redundant VC subsystem to be made inoperable without knowing
the results of the Technical Specification required sample analysis. The inspectors
concluded poor scheduling of work contributed to both VC subsystems becoming
inoperable per the licensees Technical Specifications. The licensee did not address
this issue in the root cause report. In response to the inspectors questions in this area,
the licensee provided issue report 340314, Enhancement to Manage Risk of Charcoal
Samples. This issue report addressed the inspectors concern, in that, it incorporated
corrective actions that implemented an administrative trigger using model work orders
to ensure that no work would be scheduled for the next work week that would cause an
inoperability of the opposite train or its support systems. This administrative trigger
was placed into model work orders for all VC system and standby gas treatment
system predefined activities.
Analysis: The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to provide adequate
purchase specifications to satisfy the requirements for the Clinton unique VC system
22 Enclosure
was a performance deficiency warranting a significance evaluation. The inspectors
concluded that the finding was more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, Power
Reactor Inspection Reports, Appendix B, because the finding affected the objective of
the Barrier Integrity cornerstone of assuring that physical design barriers protect the
public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Additionally, this
issue is associated with the barrier performance attribute of maintaining Radiological
Barrier functionality of the control room. Failure to ensure adequate purchase
specifications resulted in there being a period where both trains of control room
ventilation were inoperable without the knowledge of the operators.
The inspectors completed a Phase 1 significance determination using IMC 0609,
Significance Determination Process, Appendix A, Attachment 1, dated
March 23, 2007. Using IMC 0609 Appendix A, SDP Phase 1 screening worksheet, the
inspectors determined that this issue degraded the Containment Barrier. The
inspectors answered Yes, to whether the finding only represents a degradation of the
radiological barrier function provided for the control room, or auxiliary building, or spent
fuel pool, or SBGT system (BWR). As a result, the Phase 1 Worksheets screened as
Green.
The finding is also related to the cross-cutting area of Human Performance as defined
in IMC 0305, Operating Reactor Assessment Program, specifically, the finding is
related to the resources and work control component because the licensee did not
provide an adequate purchase specification reflective of the requirements for the VC
system. However, this issue was determined not to have a cross-cutting aspect
because it was over two years old and not reflective of current performance in this area
based on the inspectors review of the licensees effectiveness review of corrective
actions established to prevent this issue from occurring again.
Enforcement: 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criteria IV, Procurement Document
Control states that measures shall be established to assure that applicable regulatory
requirements, design bases, and other requirements which are necessary to assure
adequate quality are suitably included or referenced in the documents for procurement
of material, equipment, and services, whether purchased by the applicant or by its
contractors or subcontractors.
Contrary to the above, Clinton Power Station failed to specify in a procurement
document the moisture content for charcoal filters to be used in the VC system. This
issue resulted in charcoal being used in the division 1 VC system that was outside the
penetration limits established by Technical Specification 3.7.3, from May 4 to
May 16, 2007. This issue also resulted in both control room ventilation systems being
inoperable. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program (CAP)
as issue reports 335698 and 340314. Corrective action for this issue included revising
the charcoal purchase specifications to limit as-manufactured content of eight percent
by weight. Additionally, the licensee added limitations to model work orders to prevent
or limit the scheduling of work that could impact the operability of redundant systems
that contained charcoal. Because the licensee entered the issue into the CAP and the
finding is of very low safety significance, this violation is being treated as an NCV,
23 Enclosure
consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement policy.
(NCV 05000451/2007-004-01)
.2 (Closed) LER 05000461/2007-003-00, IGSCC Causes RCS Pressure Boundary Leak
and Reactor Shutdown
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed the station response to a steam leak in the drywell on
June 18, 2007. The inspectors arrived in the control room approximately two hours
after the initial alarms and indications of a leak were received and discussed the
actions that had been taken with control room operators. The inspectors then
proceeded to the outage control center, which had been manned for troubleshooting
and to support the control room in decision making, to discuss proposed actions with
licensee management. The inspectors reviewed the licensees troubleshooting
documents, equipment prompt investigation, root cause report, and LER 2007-003.
b. Findings
Introduction: A Non-Cited Violation of Technical Specifications (TS) having very low
safety significance (Green), was self-revealed when the licensee failed to meet the
required completion time for an action statement in TS 3.4.5. Specifically, TS 3.4.5
does not allow reactor coolant system pressure boundary leakage and requires a
shutdown to Mode 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> if pressure boundary leakage is discovered. Upon
entry into the drywell following a shutdown of the reactor on June 19, 2007, the
licensee discovered the existence of reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure boundary
leakage. Indications of the leakage had been discovered at 0433 on June 18, 2007,
but the plant was not placed in Mode 3 until approximately 31 hours3.587963e-4 days <br />0.00861 hours <br />5.125661e-5 weeks <br />1.17955e-5 months <br /> later at 1125 on
June 19, 2007.
Description: At 0433 on June 18, 2007, plant operators responded to main control
room alarms and other indications, and determined the presence of a steam leak in the
drywell. The initial alarms included: Transient Test Alarm, Fission Product Particulate
High Radiation, and Fission Product Iodine High. Other indications included transient
test system trouble, channel 119, main steam line C elbow tap differential pressure, an
increased trend in drywell pressure rise, and the fission product monitor particulate and
iodine channels had taken a step change. The operators took appropriate actions in
accordance with station procedures for reactor coolant leakage and abnormal release
of airborne radioactivity. The operators noted that a spike in main steam line C elbow
tap differential pressure was an indication of a steam leak somewhere in the area of
the elbow tap. The C main steam line elbow taps were located within the area
considered reactor coolant system pressure boundary. The operators entered TS 3.4.5
actions C.1, be in Mode 3 in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, and C.2, be in Mode 4 in 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.
The licensee manned the outage control center at 0641. After further deliberations, the
licensee noted that there were other components (mechanical joints for flexi-hose) that
are associated with the C main steam line flow instrumentation that are not considered
pressure boundaries and, therefore, the increase in drywall leakage was not
24 Enclosure
necessarily pressure boundary leakage. Based on this, the licensee then decided to
consider the steam leak as unidentified leakage. With the change in classification to
unidentified leakage the leak rates did not meet any of the requirements for remaining
in TS 3.4.5. The licensee exited action statements C.1 and C.2. However, although
small, the leakage continued to increase. Due to the steady increase in unidentified
leakage, operators commenced a normal plant shutdown at 2011 on June 18, 2007, to
enter the drywell and identify the actual location of the steam leak. At 0635 on
June 19, 2007, maintenance personnel entered the drywell and found pressure
boundary leakage on a one-inch diameter ASME Section III Class II stainless steel
braided flexible hose assembly on the C main steam line flow elbow tap. Operators
once again entered the actions of TS 3.4.5 due to reactor coolant pressure boundary
leakage. The plant entered Mode 3 at 1125 on June 19, 2007, (approximately 31 hours3.587963e-4 days <br />0.00861 hours <br />5.125661e-5 weeks <br />1.17955e-5 months <br />
after indication of pressure boundary leakage), and Mode 4 at 2300 on June 19, 2007.
The licensee replaced the leaking flexible hose and initiated a root cause investigation.
The root cause determined that the leak was caused by intergranular stress corrosion
cracking of the flexible hose.
Analysis: The inspectors determined that failure to meet the required completion times
for TS actions was a performance deficiency warranting a significance evaluation. The
inspectors determined that the finding was more than minor by using Inspection Manual
Chapter 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, Appendix B, Issue Screening,
because operating with a degraded pressure boundary affected the reactor coolant
system (RCS) equipment and barrier performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity
cornerstone, in that, RCS pressure boundary leakage results in a reduction in the
reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide
releases caused by accidents or events. The finding also affected the cross-cutting
component of Decision Making in the area of Human Performance in that operators
had initially entered TS 3.4.5 for pressure boundary leakage, but subsequently, the
organization decided not to treat the leak as pressure boundary leakage, but rather as
unidentified leakage until the actual location could be determined.
The inspectors completed a significance determination using IMC 0609, Significance
Determination Process. The Phase 1 worksheet directed the inspectors to consider
the reactor coolant system leakage under the Initiating Events Cornerstone column.
The inspectors answered Yes to question one under the Initiating Events cornerstone
column stating that assuming worst case degradation, the finding would result in
exceeding the TS limit for identified RCS leakage. The Phase 1 worksheet directed the
inspector to Phase II. For the Phase II screening, the inspectors used the table for a
small break loss of coolant accident, and conservatively set the initiating event
frequency to 1 (X=0), because the event was actually occurring in the form of the
steam leak. Since all of the mitigating equipment was available, the finding was
determined to be of very low safety significance (Green). The licensee established the
following corrective actions to address this issue: 1) replaced the leaking flexible hose,
2) scheduled replacement of all other flexible hoses used on the main steam lines
during the next refueling outage and 3) established a 16-year preventive maintenance
replacement frequency for the flexible hoses used on the main steam line.
Enforcement: Technical Specification 3.4.5 a. limits RCS operational leakage to
No pressure boundary leakage, and states that if pressure boundary leakage is
25 Enclosure
present, the plant is required to be in Mode 3 in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and Mode 4 in 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.
Contrary to the above, on June 18, 2007, pressure boundary leakage was present and
the operators did not place the plant in Mode 3 for nearly 31 hours3.587963e-4 days <br />0.00861 hours <br />5.125661e-5 weeks <br />1.17955e-5 months <br /> and Mode 4 for
approximately 42 hours4.861111e-4 days <br />0.0117 hours <br />6.944444e-5 weeks <br />1.5981e-5 months <br />. Because this violation was of very low safety significance and
it was entered into the licensees corrective action program as IR 641375, this violation
was treated as a NCV, consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
The LER is closed. (NCV 05000461/2007004-02)
.3 Spent Fuel Bundle Incident During Rerack Project
Introduction: A performance deficiency involving a Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR
Part 50 Appendix B, Criteria V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was
self-revealed following an event on August 17, 2007, where a spent fuel bundle being
moved to a temporary storage location came in contact with and rested upon another
fuel bundle seated in its storage location. The licensee procedure that governs spent
fuel pool movement failed to provide adequate guidance on how high to lift the fuel
bundle prior to traversing across the spent fuel pool.
Description: During spent fuel moves on August 17, 2007, in support of the spent fuel
pool re-rack project, a spent fuel bundle being moved by a spent fuel bridge operator
came in contact with the bail handle of a spent fuel bundle seated in its storage
location. Upon recognition of this situation the spent fuel bridge operator immediately
stopped. Immediately following the stoppage of the spent fuel bridge the licensee
observed that the fuel bundle was leaning slightly and the grapple-engaged light was
no longer lit. The grapple-engage light being no longer lit was an indication that the
grapple switch was no longer engaged and that an interlock was in place that
prevented the fuel bundle from being lifted vertically. Prior to resuming fuel movement,
the licensee verified that the grapple was indeed engaged by use of an underwater
camera. After this verification, the interlock associated with the grapple-engage light
was bypassed. The spent fuel bundle was then raised and placed back in its original
location.
A situation where a fuel bundle comes in contact with and rests upon another fuel
bundle is a concern because it challenges the integrity of the fuel cladding. The fuel
cladding is considered one of three physical barriers designed to separate the fuel from
the public and the environment.
Upon review of procedure CPS 3703.02,Fuel Handling Platform Operations, the
inspectors concluded that the procedure failed to provide adequate guidance on how
high the bundle should be lifted prior to moving the bundle to a new location. This
procedure was the administrative procedure which governs the operation of the bridge
and is used by the bridge operators to perform spent fuel pool movement. For example
step 8.2.2.15 requires lifting the bundle or blade until the grapple normal up light is lit
if moving the fuel bundle into the inclined fuel transfer system upender. The normal
up indication occurs at a reference vertical position (Z coordinate) of 0 inches. As
the fuel bundle is lowered from the normal up position, the Z coordinate increases.
Appendix A of the CPS 3703.02, showed several minimum fuel grapple Z coordinates
26 Enclosure
for various movements. The appendix showed that the fuel bundle must be at or above
Z position of 66 inches to enter the spent fuel pool racks.
The inspectors noted that a caution prior to step 8.2.2.15 states, it is not required to
raise the main hoist to normal up prior to platform or trolley movement, however
adequate clearance shall exist. The inspectors concluded that this step does not
contain adequate guidance on how high to lift the fuel bundle prior to moving it to
another location in the spent fuel pool. The inspectors concluded that the lack of
specific guidance caused this event to occur. Additionally, the procedure did not
require any form of verification or peer checks prior to fuel movement.
Analysis: The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to provided adequate
details in the procedure was a performance deficiency warranting a significance
evaluation. The inspectors concluded that the finding was more than minor in
accordance with IMC 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, Appendix B, because
the finding affects the barrier integrity objective of assuring that physical design barriers
protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. The
finding is associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Barrier Integrity
cornerstone because it challenged the functionality of the fuel cladding.
The inspectors completed a Phase 1 significance determination using IMC 0609,
Significance Determination Process, Appendix A, Attachment 1, dated
March 23,2007. Using IMC 0609 Appendix A, SDP Phase 1 screening worksheet, the
inspectors determined that this issue degraded only the Fuel Cladding Barrier and its
associated cornerstone. Therefore, in accordance with the screening worksheet, this
issue screens directly as Green. This finding is related to a cross-cutting component
in the area of Human Performance associated with Resources (H.2(c)) because the
licensee did not provide complete and accurate procedures. Specifically, the
procedure relied on the skill of the operator and did not require independent
verification.
Enforcement: 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criteria V, Instructions, Procedures, and
Drawings states that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented
instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances and
shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings.
Contrary to the above, Clinton Power Station (CPS) procedure 3703.02 failed to
provide adequate instructions for handling spent fuel bundles. This resulted in a spent
fuel bundle that was being moved to a temporary storage location coming in contact
with another fuel bundle seated in its storage location on August 17, 2007. This issue
was entered into the licensees corrective action program as issue report 661918.
Corrective action included revising the fuel handling procedure. Because this violation
was of very low safety significance and was entered into the licensees CA program,
this violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC
Enforcement Policy. (NCV 05000451/2007-004-03)
27 Enclosure
4OA4 Cross-Cutting Aspects of Findings
.1 A finding described in section 4OA3.2 of this report had, as its primary cause, a Human
Performance deficiency, in that, licensee decision making in determining the source of
a steam leak in the drywell resulted in exceeding the TS allowed time for placing the
plant in Modes 3 and 4 when RCS pressure boundary leakage was present.
.2 A finding described in section 4OA3.3 of this report had, as its primary cause, a Human
Performance deficiency, in that, the licensee failed to provide adequate procedural
guidance in regard to moving spent fuel in the spent fuel pool.
4OA6 Meetings
.1 Exit Meeting
The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. B Hanson and other members of
licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on October 4, 2007. The
inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection
should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
.2 Interim Exit Meetings
Interim exit meetings were conducted for:
- Occupational Radiation Safety program for radiation monitoring
instrumentation and protective equipment with Mr. F. Kearney, Plant Manager on
August 10, 2007.
- Radioactive Material Processing and Transportation program with Mr. B. Hanson
on September 21, 2007.
ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
28 Enclosure
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee
B. Hanson, Site Vice President
R. Kearney, Plant Manager
R. Schenck, Work Management Director
G. Vickers, Radiation Protection Director
J. Gackstetter, Regulatory Assurance Manager
R. Frantz, Regulatory Assurance Representative
M. Hiter, Access Control Supervisor
M. Friedmann, Acting Regulatory Assurance Director
C. VanDerburgh, Nuclear Oversight Manager
J. Domitrovich, Maintenance Director
D. Schavey, Operations Director
J. Rappeport, Acting Chemistry Manager
J. Lindsay, Training Manager
C. Williamson, Security Manager
R. Peak, Site Engineering Director
T. Chalmers, Shift Operations Superintendent
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED
Opened
05000461/2007004-01 URI Shipment Total Quantity Re-characterized After
Shipping (Section 2PS2.3)
05000451/2007-004-01 NCV Inadequate Procurement Specification for
Charcoal Results in Inoperable Control Room
Ventilation Subsystem
05000451/2007-004-02 NCV Failure to Comply with Technical Specification 3.4.5 for RCS Pressure Boundary Leak
05000451/2007-004-03 NCV Inadequate Procedure Results in Spent Fuel
Bundle Incident
Closed
05000461/2007-003-00 LER IGSCC Causes RCS Pressure Boundary Leak
and Reactor Shutdown
05000461/2005-001-00 LER Inadequate Procurement Specification for
Charcoal Results in Inoperable Control Room
Ventilation Subsystem
1 Attachment
05000451/2007-004-01 NCV Inadequate Procurement Specification for
Charcoal Results in Inoperable Control Room
Ventilation Subsystem
05000451/2007-004-02 NCV Failure to Comply with Technical Specification 3.4.5 for RCS Pressure Boundary Leak
05000451/2007-004-03 NCV Inadequate Procedure Results in Spent Fuel
Bundle Incident
Discussed
None
2 Attachment
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
The following is a list of documents reviewed during the inspection. Inclusion on this list does
not imply that the NRC inspectors reviewed the documents in their entirety but rather that
selected sections of portions of the documents were evaluated as part of the overall inspection
effort. Inclusion of a document on this list does not imply NRC acceptance of the document or
any part of it, unless this is stated in the body of the inspection report.
1R01 Adverse Weather
OP-AA-108-111-1001, Severe Weather and Natural Disaster Guidelines; Revision 2
OP-AA-102-102, General Area Checks and Operator Field Rounds; Revision 5
WC-AA-107, Seasonal Readiness; Revision 3
CPS 1019.05, Transient Equipment/Materials; Revision 11
CPS 4302.01, Tornado/High Winds; Revision 18e
1R04 Equipment Alignments
CPS 3319.01V001, Standby Gas Treatment Valve Lineup; Revision 8
CPS 3319.01E001, Standby Gas Treatment Electrical Lineup; Revision 10c
1R05 Fire Protection
CPS 1893.04M310, 719 Control: HVAC Equipment Area Pre-fire Plan; Revision 5a
Section 3.2.1.2, Fire Area A-2: Zone A-2a, Fire Protection Evaluation Report,
CPS 1893.01, Fire Protection Impairment Reporting, Revision 16a
CPS Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Fire Hazard Analysis
CPS 1892.01, Fire Protection Impairment Reporting, 08/02/07, Revision 16b.
Section 6.2.6.3, Updated Safety Analysis Report
ANSI 56.8, 1987, Containment System Leakage Testing Requirements
Reg. Guide 1.163, Performanced - Based Containment Leak - Test Program
10 CFR 50 App. J., Primary Reactor Containment Leakage Testing for Water - Cooled Power
Reactors
CPS Risk Evaluation #1631, Risk Analysis for Missed Surveillance, failure to complete LLRT
on Containment Monitoring Test Lines
IR 660299, Type C Testing for LLRT Test Lines
1R06 Flood Protection
CPS 4304.01, Flooding, Revision 4e
IR 670686, Setpoints For Maximum Normal Operating Water Level Switches
IR 670693, Flood Water Level & Secondary Containment Temperature Instrumentation
IR 670429, Max Safe Flood Alarm Out of Cal in RH [residual heat removal] A Room
IR 670415, Max Safe Flood Alarms Out of Cal in RI Pump Room
1R07 Heat Sink Performance
WO 1005225, Open, Inspect, Boroscope, Eddy Current 100%, and Clean 1DG13A
ER-AA-340-1002, Service water heat exchanger and component inspection guide; Revision 3
IR 678934, Division three diesel generator heat exchanger chemistry results; October 2, 2007
IR 675035, Diesel generator jacket water cooler zinc modification execution impact;
September 24, 2007
3 Attachment
IR 675091, Excessive erosion discovered on the flange faces of 1VH03A; September 25, 2007
WO 01005225, Open, Inspect, Boroscope, Eddy Current 100%, and Clean
AR 00678934, Division II Diesel Generator HX (1DG13A) Chemistry Results
AR 00675035, Diesel Generator Jacket Water Cooler Zinc Mod Execution Impact
ER-AA-340-1002, Service Water Heat Exchanger and Component Inspection Guide,
Revision 3
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
IR 518197, NOS ID MSPI Basis Document Requires Revision
IR 519897, Potential Air Leak on 1VQ002 or 1VQ005
IR 520828, CPS 4001.02C001 Setpoint Update Needed
IR 524365, Automatic Reactor Scram on Reactor High Water Level
IR 524768, RCIC Isolation Troubleshooting Results
IR 552156, Condition Monitoring Failure - LD Inst 1E31N085A - RCIC Isolation
IR 550868, 1SX01PA: Low Margin for Division I SX Design Flows
IR 548493, 1C91P633: STS Failure, 5004-3H, RCIC Division 1 Card C-A14-A125
IR 530970, Invalid Assumption in Calculation
IR 556556, Unexpected Annunciators during STS Summary Card B-A11-A111
IR 557804, Evaluate Transmitter 1E31N085B Time Delay Settings
IR 557809, Received Annunciator 5004-3H, STS Failure
IR 648094, 1E51-F054 RCIC Drain Pot Bypass Valve has Small Packing Leak
IR 639727, RCIC Pump Outboard Bearing Bubbler Crosshairs not @ 90 Degrees
IR 631320, NRC Question: Impact of EC 365827 Changes on Close Time Test
IR 589210, RCIC Speed > 4600 RPM during Surveillance Testing
IR 589461, Found RCIC Turbine & Governor Oil Below the Standby Band
IR 627033, 1E51-N590: New RGSC Card Cat ID 1148300-01 Failed Testing
IR 587482, 1E51F046 Potential MOV Over Thrust Risk
IR 584757, 1E51N590: RCIC RGSC Module Replacement & Procedure Enhance
IR 562400, 1 Foot Steam Plum Leak at Base of 1E51N010
IR 555469, 1E51N010: 5063-2C Turbine Stm Line Wtr Drain Trap Level High
IR 555312, Crack Found in Housing for Level Switch during WO 924362
IR 535878, Minor Steam Leak under Insulation of RCIC Turbine 1E51-C002
IR 531654, RCIC Quick Start Surv CPS 9054.01C004
IR 531065, RCIC Turbine Stayed at Incorrect Speed during 9054.01C004
IR 529655, NOS IDD RCIC Restoration with out of Cal Pressure Transmi
IR 528901, IMD Lessons Learned form 1E31N085A Replacement
IR 524345, RCIC Division 1 Isolated Following Scram
IR 517311, Revise ARPs 5062-3D & 5063-2E and 3310.01
IR 517453, New Fittings for RCIC Vortex Mod does not Match Design
IR 517558, Mini-PM for RCIC Turbine 1E51-C002 - C1R11
IR 517768, Feasibility Study for RPV Head Piping
IR 517775, Security Required for RCIC Tank Control Sooner than Planned
IR 517874, TS 3.3.3.2, Remote Shutdown Instrumentation, Enhancement
IR 518522, E51-N655F Failed Initial +/- .25% Input/Output Comparison
IR 518849, Heater Support Stands not secured to Tank
IR 518932, Free Release of Transmitters
IR 519207, Transposition Error for RPM Values - RCIC Turbine Speed
IR 519208, 1TR-CM018 Points above Alarm Setpoint with no Alarm Leds Lit
IR 519566, Items Discovered on Carts not Properly RAM Tagged/Controlled
4 Attachment
IR 519776, Red Hose Found by RCIC Tank
IR 520032, NOS ID - Unavailability Baseline Data Errors in MSPI Basis Doc
IR 520069, Work Week Preps Did Not Identify Issues
IR 520293, NRC Question on MSPI Implementation
IR 520803, Contamination Found on Floor in RCIC Tank Valve Room
IR 520906, TS LCO 3.3.5.1/3.3.5.2 Logical Connections Need Indenting
IR 522049, NSRB Issue - Unsecured Cables at Contaminated Area Boundary
IR 522119, NOS ID - Deficiencies Found During NSRB Tour
IR 523330, NRC Identified MSPI Basis Document Error for HP
IR 524547, Possible Training Process Problem
IR 524893, Poor Decision Making in PORC Meeting
IR 525078, Actions Required RCIC High Steam Flow Time Delay EC 362261
IR 526991, Correction Needed for IR 518932 Response
IR 528013, New Card Received Damaged from Stores
IR 528655, NOS ID Line Not Properly Controlled
IR 528787, RP Work Practices Need Improvement
IR 529288, Enhancements to RCIC Restoration Procedure
IR 529423, NOS ID Technical Rigor Weakness for RCIC OpEval 524768-02
IR 529475, Revise Tornado Missile Hazard Analysis
IR 529411, Change to 9054.01C004, RCIC Quick Start Surveillance
IR 529718, Process Improvements in Status Control
IR 531090, Enhancements: Clarify Tech Spec Bases for LCO 3.5.3 RCIC
IR 531215, RCIC Procedure Lacks Steam Line Draining Steps
IR 531392, Ramp Generator Card Received with Jumper not used at CPS
IR 531410, FLS Provided Inaccurate Estimate for First Time Performance
IR 531412, RCIC Ramp Generator Card in Repair Program
IR 537945, Support for Estimating Flows for Mitigating Strategies
IR 539389, Trng: Simulator: Simulator Responses to Evaluated Scenario
IR 541955, RCIC Isolations Incorrectly Referenced in CPS 9532.16
IR 543371, Potential Trend in Equipment Failure Cause Identification
IR 543520, Evaluate Common Causes of RCIC System Issues
IR 543638, NOS-ID Appropriate Cause Evaluation not Assigned
IR 543661, Enhancement IR to Revise 9080.23
IR 546682, Trng: Drawing Reference is Incorrect
IR 553475, 1LL59BP18E: Electrolyte Level below Plates on Two Cells
IR 554669, B.5.B Phase 2 and 3 Closure Actions
IR 555735, Expectation not Met as Required by CPS Policy #54
IR 556474, Ownership of 3209.01 Raw Water Treatment
IR 557274, E-2 Ready to Work Exceptions not in Goal for WW645
IR 557833, RCIC Vent Pipe Leaks at Sampling Point with Sample Equipment
IR 558269, Fix RCIC Sampling
IR 559377, NOS ID Separation Criteria not Maintained During EC Install
IR 560786, NOS IDd Gaps in Technical Rigor Used in OP Determinations
IR 561779, 9030.01C034 & C035 Missing an Expected Alarm
IR 562215, Security Tour Improvement Opportunities
IR 562813, Procedural Conflict for RCIC Instrument Valve Position
IR 563344, 1E51F378 has Minor Packing Leak
IR 563348, Minor Oil Leaks on Oil Sightglass & Govenor Assembly
IR 563632, Replace LD Transmitters to Prevent RCIC Isolation
5 Attachment
IR 563745, Generate WO for LD Transmitter in Relation to CR-563632
IR 565444, NRC Non-Cited Violation 2006-11-02, RCIC Suction Vortexing
IR 567532, RCIC Valve 1E51-337 with Lockwire
IR 569112, ORM NTSP Value Incorrect for RCIC Storage Tank Level Low
IR 570095, NOS ID Project Plan for PI&R Inspection not Developed
IR 570783, Cause Analysis for HPCS Vortex Issue
IR 574514, Inappropriate Assignment of Corrective Actions
IR 579912, C1R11 Surv Opt HIT - 9438.05 Enhancements
IR 582944, Non-Oily Sheen on Top of Suppression Pool
IR 583348, Clean Up of Cask Wash Down Pit
IR 585490, Black Marker Found Floating in Suppression Pool
IR 588801, Procedure Enhancement to 9030.01C34
IR 588802, Procedure Enhancement to 9030.01C035 RI MS Sup Press
IR 588886, Enhance to 9054.02
IR 589228, 1RI01T: Notice of Violation (White Finding) Related to HPCS
IR 590313, Division 1 ADS Backup Air Bottles Losing 25-50 # per Day
IR 596320, Perform ISI/NDE and Provide Support Work Pre C1R11
IR 597183, Trng - Revision Needed to Operations Strategies Document
IR 599370, Install Walkway across Berm at the RCIC Tank
IR 599388, Install Sidewalk to RCIC Tank
IR 599404, Install Gate on Existing Walkway
IR 599942, Procedure Review/Enhancement for Remote Shutdown Actions
IR 599989, RCIC TTV Gimpel Valve Discontinuation Future Material
IR 600927, RCR Identifies Weakness in OP-AA-108-115/OP-AA-106-1006
IR 600993, INPO CDE Website, MSPI PRA Data
IR 603347, NOS ID Post August 2006 Organization Weakness not Addressed
IR 603659, NOS ID Inadequate Appl of Standards during Work Activities
IR 604716, 1E51-N636A as Found DAC Values OOT
IR 608092, Trng - Changes to Transient Mitigation Needed
IR 608292, 2007 NRC PI&R Observation on Use of OPEX
IR 610762, Work Orders Removed from Week 0719 Parts
IR 610943, PMRQ for RV 1E12-F036 Specifies Incorrect Testing and Freque
IR 613782, 9027.01C007 Section 8.7.7 Challenges SX Loads
IR 613800, Work Orders Removed from Week 0719
IR 615740, NOS ID Stated Apparent Cause was not addressed in EOC
IR 617461, RCIC Isolation Bypass Switch Operations in not Crisp
IR 618123, E-4 Clearance Indicator not at Goal of 100%
IR 602553, RCIC Transmitters not Available for SOW
IR 602760, Perform Inspection of Component Supports and Support
IR 602867, Procedure Enhancement for Filling RCIC Storage Tank
IR 618251, Fuse Missing form Interlock for Doors 329 and 330
IR 618423, Trng - Enhancement to 3310.01 RCIC
IR 619749, Tornado Missile Found in the RCIC Berm
IR 621632, NOS ID Trend Codes for CAP Products not Consistency Entered
IR 622636, Enhancement to ECCS Availability Due to WL Pump Availability
IR 622674, Missed Opportunity: Late Cancellation of a Work Order
IR 623199, RAT SVC Tripped Resulting in Unplnd Entry into 72 hr SD LCO
IR 623608, RCIC System Outage Questions
IR 623611, CDBI FASA Â Configured Design Specification not Updated
6 Attachment
IR 624129, Use of Admin Controls during RCIC Surveillance
IR 624937, WO 19406 Removed from Week 0719 due to Parts
IR 625517, MSPI Related Work Windows are not Consistently Scheduled
IR 626291, A TDRFP Oil Leak at 1PSFW105
IR 626496, RHR Unprojected Unavailability SSPI/MSPI Impact
IR 626577, Clearance Program Tag Font Remains Ambiguous/Unclear
IR 626578, Safety - Cannot Access Scaffold #5465 Safely
IR 627067, 1C88N2403: TT Point 30 Failed Calibration
IR 627527, 1E51N003: Computer Point E51DA001 Out of Spec Low (OOT)
IR 627710, Enhancement to ARP 5063-2D
IR 628094, 1C88K607: Received Spurious Trip of TTHMI Server Channel 119
IR 628259, CDBI FASA Enhancement to Loss of AC Off Normal 4200.01
IR 629191, CDBI FASA - Check Valve 1E22-F016 Not in ATLAS
IR 630647, 1RIX-AR013 Alert Alarm due to Spike
IR 632033, PMS Requires Valve Cycling in D/W and STM Tunnel
IR 632043, LL on LLRT Type C Test
IR 632321, Enhancement to CPS 3315.02, Leak Detection (LD)
IR 632785, CDBI FASA: Leakage to RCIC Tank not Updated in Alt. ST Docs
IR 634385, Placement of Red/Green Dots in the MCR
IR 634633, INPO Walk Downs List of Discrepancies
IR 635283, 1VX14S Air Gap Between Housing and Cooling Coils 1VX14AA/AB
IR 636156, NRC Performance Indicator for SSFFS in Action Region
IR 636753, Chemistry Sample Results for 1VY04A RCIC Room Cooler
IR 636859, 9030.01C007 Enhancement
IR 637549, Trng - Procedure Enhancement 3310.01 RCIC
IR 638917, 1C71S001C: Unexpected Alarms Division 3 NSPS Inverter
IR 641088, No Engineered Test Points for Jumper/Test Leads in 9532.13
IR 644916, Set Test Condition for RI Min Flow Valve Therm. Overl. Test
IR 647267, 1C91P633: Received 5004-3H STS Failure
IR 648508, 3220.01 Requires Revision to Support C1R11
IR 649191, Procedure Step Needs Revision Regarding Bypass Switch
IR 652248, CAPR not Implemented as Worded
IR 654201, NOS ID: Trending of PAR Data for Common Causes
IR 616603, 1E51N052: Unexpected MCR Alarm During 9054.06
IR 654764, NRC Questions RCIC Turbine Inboard Bearing Oil Level
IR 627562, 1E51F064: Abnormal Voltage Indicated During Surveillance
IR 627546, 9861.02D015 Test Set A had Leakage in Excess of 20,000 SCCM
ER-AA-310, Implementation of the Maintenance Rule, Revision 6
ER-AA-310-1001, Maintenance Rule - Scoping, Revision 3
ER-AA-310-1002, Maintenance Rule - SSC Risk Significance Determination, Revision 2
ER-AA-310-1003, Maintenance Rule - Performance Criteria Selection, Revision 3
ER-AA-310-1004, Maintenance Rule - Performance Monitoring, Revision 5
ER-AA-310-1005, Maintenance Rule - Dispositioning Between (a) (1) and (a) (2), Revision 5
ER-AA-310-1006, Maintenance Rule - Expert Panel Roles and Responsibilities, Revision 3
ER-AA-310-1007, Maintenance Rule - Periodic (a) (3) Assessment, Revision 4
Performance Criteria Report for RI System
Failure Report for RI System
Scoping/Risk Significance Detailed Report for RI System
7 Attachment
Assessment of Maintenance Effectiveness; 10CFR50.65 (a) (3) Assessment; Clinton Power
Station; 3/1/2004 to 3/1/2006.
CPS Technical Specifications: TS 3.8.4, 3.8.5, and 3.8.6 and associated bases
USAR Section 8.3.2
Vendor Manual K2989-0001, Power Conversion Products Battery Chargers
IR 546815, Division 2 DC Bus Voltage Fluctuations
IR 651865, Potential Adverse Trend on Division 4 DC Bus Voltage
CPS System DC Equipment Failure Report for July 2005 to July 2007
1R15 Operability Evaluations
IR 671001, Essential switchgear cooling C shutdown service water line thickness below
minimum screening criteria; September 13, 2007
EC 367363, Minimum wall calculation for reducer small ends for 3"X1.5" swg at valve
1SX025C on line 1SX23AC-3", Revision 0
IR 667633, Through body leak 1SX019B; September 4, 2007
IR 667865, Issues identified during disassembly of 1SX019B valve; September 5, 2007
IR 667974, LL valve has through body leak after decision to defer repair; September 5, 2007
IR 668216, ASME code case N-513-1, Augmented volumetric exam of 1SX20AA;
September 5, 2007
IR 668217, ASME code case N-513-1, augmented volumetric exam of 1SX23BA;
September 5, 2007
IR 668220, ASME code case N-513-1, augmented volumetric exam of 1SX23AB;
September 5, 2007
IR 668221, ASME code case N-513-1, augmented volumetric exam of 1SX23AC;
September 5, 2007
IR 668223, ASME code case N-513-1, augmented volumetric exam of 1SX04AC;
September 5, 2007
IR 668304, Division 3 control room ventilation chiller shutdown service water supply/return
vacuum breakers leaking; September 6, 2007
IR 670094, Division 3 shutdown service water ultrasonic testing results below screening
criteria; September 11, 2007
IR 670193, Essential switchgear cooling A shutdown service water piping ultrasonic testing
results below screening criteria; September 11, 2007
IR 670479, Isolated points on shutdown service water A piping less than minimum evaluation
criteria; September 12, 2007
EC 367242, Temporary acceptance of pitting of the VC-B head pressure controller valve body,
1SX019B; Revision 0
IR 666899, 1SX019B: Cavitation damage found in valve body; August 31, 2007
IR 658234, NRC Questions on OPEVAL 655836-02; August 07, 2007
1R19 Post Maintenance Testing
IR 671554, 0VC03CA fan replacement post job review - WW 0736; September 14, 2007
EC 366835, Modification to replace supply fan 0VC03CA; Revision 0
WO 969991, 0VC03CA -VC A Supply Fan Noise; September 9, 2007
IR 675847, Cut O-ings; September 26, 2007
IR 675914, Division 3 emergency diesel generator turbocharger drain tubing missing;
September 26, 2007
IR 676864, Out of specification parameters on Division 3 diesel generator during surveillance
run; September 28, 2007
8 Attachment
IR 676905, K1 Lockout relay failed to trip emergency diesel generator; September 28, 2007
WO 795653, Replace Normally deenergized relay 1E22S001B-8; September 28, 2007
WO 1005265, Division 3 diesel generator six year maintenance: September 28, 2007
CPS 9080.03, Diesel generator 1C operability - Manual quick start operability; Revision 28e
CPS 3316.01,
CPS Operations Narrative Logs for August 14, 2007
WO 909977, Replace Rosemount Transmitter
WO 318466, EM Troubleshoot/Repair 1DC07E
1R22 Surveillance Testing
CPS 9054.01D002, RCIC (1E51 - C001) High Pressure Operability Checks Checklist,
Revision 23a
CPS 9054.01C002, RCIC (1E51 - C001) High Pressure Operability Check, Revision 2b
CPS 9054.01, RCIC System Operability Check, Revision 42e
IR 657976, Unexpected Alarm 5063 -1D RCIC Pump Suction Press
IR 658065, 1E51-F059 Limit switch Didnt Operate Properly During 9054.01
IR 627527, 1E51N003: Computer Point E51DA001 Out of Spec Low (OOT)
IR 658055, RCIC Turbine Steam Disch Press Gauge Reads Zero #
CPS 9052.01, LPCS/RHR A Pumps & LPCS/RHR A Water Leg Pump Operability, 09/13/06;
Revision 43d,
IR 655830, 1E21F349A Unquantifiable Seat Leakage
IR 655831, 1E21F350A Unquantifiable Seat Leakage
IR 655833, 1E21R501, Gauge Overanged During 9052.01
IR 655836, 1E12F084A, WLP Check To RHR A, failed to close
IR 655838, 1E12F085A, WLP to RHR a, failed to close
IR 658200, Senior Resident Has Question on RCIC Alarm; August 07, 2007
Clinton Power Station Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
CPS Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.8.1.3 and associated bases
CPS 9080.02, Diesel generator 1B Operability - Manual and Quick Start Operability;
Revision 47d
IR 660893, NRC Questioned KVAR Loading on 9080.02 Division 2 Diesel; August 15, 2007
CPS 9069.01, Shutdown Service Water Operability Test; Revision 45
CPS Technical Specification 3.7.1/3.7.2 and associated bases
CPS 9861.09D007, Leakage Test on Valve 1CC075B and 1CC076B, Revision 1a
2PS2 Radioactive Material Processing and Transportation
USAR Chapter 11 Solid and Liquid Radwaste Management System, Revision 11
2006 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report; dated April 27, 2007
AR 435702; Chemistry, Radwaste, Effluent and Environmental Monitoring Audit Report Audit
NOSA-CPS-06-04; dated April 19, 2006
AR 302506; Contamination Found in a Twenty Foot Sea Van; dated February 17, 2005
AR 309873; Incorrect Dose Rate Listed in Waste Shipment Notification; dated March 8, 2005
AR 345179; Legacy Filter Waste Stores Without an Inventory; dated June17, 2005
AR 354609; Laundry Trailer Found with Small Hole in Flooring; dated July 19, 2005
AR 430473; FlatBed Trailer Separated from Semi-Tractor While Moving; dated
December 5, 2005
AR 451440; Incomplete Departure Survey Documentation; dated February 8, 2006
AR 476188; Radioactive Shipping Documentation Errors; dated April 7, 2006
AR 539967; Inability to Transfer Waste Sludge to Vendor; dated October 4, 2006
9 Attachment
AR 569198; Radiation Protection Audit Report; dated September 5, 2007
AR 577885; 0WX02TA:Lessons Learned On 10 CFR 61 Analysis; dated January 11, 2007
AR 578765; Invalid Data initially Generated; dated January 12, 2007
AR 585131; Deficiencies in Shipping Documents Found; dated January 30, 2007
AR 617139; Radwaste Vendor Processing Creates Elevated Dose Rates in Walkway; dated
April 14, 2007
AR 626907; Water on Floor of Sealand Number 59; dated May 8, 2007
AR 643431; Fluid Found on Incoming Radioactive Material Shipment; dated June 22, 2007
AR 661628; Rotor Cribbing Found Deteriorating More Than Last Inspection; dated August 17,
2007
AR 672300; Approximately 50 Milliliters Leak From Sealand Onto Trailer; dated
September 17, 2007
ASSA 563448; Transportation and Radwaste Self-assessment; dated July 20, 2007
ASSA 581780-04; detailed Review of 2004 Through 2006 Shipping Records; dated
January 31, 2007
RP-AA-100; Process Control Program For Radioactive Wastes; Revision 4
RP-AA-600; Radioactive Material/Waste Shipments; Revision 10
RP-AA-602; Packaging of Radioactive Material Shipments; Revision 12
RP-AA-603; Inspection and Loading of Radioactive Material Shipments; Revision 3
RP-CL-605-1001; CPS 10 CFR Part 61 Program; Revision 1
CPS 3909.01; Operating Spent Resin System; Revision 21
CPS 3909.02; Operating Phase Separators; Revision 20e
CPS 3909.03; Operating Waste Sludge System; Revision 20d
CPS 3909.04; Operating Concentrate Waste System; Revision 15b
CPS 3909.05; Operating Fuel Pool Filter Demineralizer Sludge System; Revision 12b
CPS 6418.04; Analysis of Radwaste Samples for Solid Waste Processing; Revision 9b
CY-AA-110-200; Sampling; Revision 5
CPS 3222.10; Reactor Sample Station; Revision 10
2OS1 Access Control to Radiologically Significant Areas
AR289955; NOSA-CPS-05-06; Health Physics Functional Area Nuclear Oversight Audit; dated
July 27, 2005
AR 537844; Purple Painted tool Found Outside the Radiologically Restricted Area; dated
August 29, 2006
AR 575308; Building wall Damaged in Rotor Storage Building; dated January 4, 2007
AR 582546; 1DR1-142 Door Hanging-up; dated January 24, 2007
AR 601273; High Radiation Area Near Miss Event; dated March 8, 2007
AR 633042; Emergent High Radiation Area Access; dated May 23, 2007
AR 630925; Radiography Inspection Terminated Due To Boundary Dose Rates; dated
May 16, 2007
RP-AA-210; Dosimetry Issue; Usage and Control; Revision 10
RP-AA-460; Controls for High and Very High Radiation Areas; Revision 12
RP-AA-460-101; Radiological Key Control and Area Access Requirements; Revision 3a
RP-AA-460-1001; Additional High Radiation Exposure Control; Revision 2
RP-AA-460-1002; High Radiation Area and Locked High Radiation Areas Briefing Form
RWP 10002868; Spent Fuel Pool Re-Rack Diving; Revision 0
RWP 10007956; Spent Fuel Pool Re-Rack; Revision 3
10 Attachment
OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems
OP-AA-102-103; Operator Work-Around Program; Revision 1
CPS 9000.10; Accident Monitoring And Remote Shutdown Instrumentation Log; Revision 31a
IR 610835; Eval. Division 1 & 2 H2O2 Monitor INOP Printers: OPS Workaround; March 30,
2007
IR 624538; NOS ID Operations Workaround Leads To Fire Door Impairment; May 2, 2007
IR 575009; Permanent Access Solution Needed For 1FW004 Valve; January 3, 2007
IR 617958; Off-Normal Response Enhancement; April 16, 2007
IR 572918; Eval. Main Turbine BRG #9 Vibe Problem As Operator Challenge; December 25,
2006
IR 567237; 1KYCP105H Repeat Timer Did Not Advance - OP Challenge; December 9, 2006
IR 642744; TDRFP B Turning Gear Failed To Disengage Automatically; June 21, 2007
IR 652502; 1HG02CA Greater Than 3 Hours Run Time In July 2007; July 22, 2007
IR 656515; Missed Opportunity For Operator Work Around/Challenge Review; August 2, 2007
WO 843352; Task 01; Contingent Task To Disassemble, Inspect And Repair Valve 1E12F009
Due Seat Leakage
OA3 Event Followup
LER 05-461/2007-003-00, IGSCC Causes Pressure Boundary Leak and Reactor Shutdown;
August 16, 2007
IR 641375, 4001.01 Reactor Coolant Leakage; June 18, 2007
RCR 641375, Flexible hose failure on Main Steam Line C results in manual reactor shutdown
for replacement
11 Attachment
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
ADAMS Agency wide Documents Access and Management System
ALARA As-Low-As-Reasonably-Achievable
CPS Clinton Power Station
CR Condition Report
DAW Dry Active Waste
DOT Department of Transportation
EP Emergence Preparedness
ERAT Emergency Reserve Auxilary Transformer
FPER Fire Protection Evaluation Report
HVAC Heating Ventilation and Cooling
IMC Inspection Manual Chapter
IR Issue Report
LCO Limited Condition for Operation
LPCS Low Pressure Core Spray
LSA Low Specific Activity
MR Maintenance Rule
MSPI Mitigating System Performance Indicator
NCV Non-Cited Violation
NEI Nuclear Energy Institute
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission
OPC Operational Support Center
OSC Operational Support Center
PARS Publicly Available Records
PI Performance Indicator
PMT Post Maintenance Testing
Radwaste Radioactive Waste
RP Radiation Protection
RPT Radiation Protection Technician
RWP Radiation Work Permit
SDP Significant Determination Process
SVC Static VAR Compensator
TS Technical Specification
URI Unresolved Item
USAR Updated Safety Analysis Report
WAB Work Around Board
WO Work Order 12 Attachment