IR 05000483/2016003
| ML16314C022 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Callaway  |
| Issue date: | 11/08/2016 |
| From: | Nick Taylor NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-B |
| To: | Diya F Union Electric Co |
| NICK TAYLOR | |
| References | |
| IR 2016003 | |
| Download: ML16314C022 (36) | |
Text
UNITED STATES ber 8, 2016
SUBJECT:
CALLAWAY PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000483/2016003
Dear Mr. Diya,
On September 30, 2016, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Callaway Plant. On October 7 and October 19, 2016, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. T. Herrmann, Site Vice President, and Mr. B. Cox, Senior Director, Nuclear Operations, respectively, and other members of your staff.
Inspectors documented the results of this inspection in the enclosed inspection report.
NRC inspectors documented one finding of very low safety significance (Green) in this report.
This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. The NRC is treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violation or significance of this NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC resident inspector at the Callaway Plant. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Nicholas H. Taylor, Branch Chief Project Branch B Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 50-483 License No. NPF-30
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000483/2016003 w/ Attachment: Supplemental Information
REGION IV==
Docket: 05000483 License: NPF-30 Report: 05000483/2016003 Licensee: Union Electric Company Facility: Callaway Plant Location: Junction Highway CC and Highway O Steedman, MO Dates: July 1 through September 30, 2016 Inspectors: T. Hartman, Senior Resident Inspector M. Langelier, P.E., Resident Inspector J. Braisted, Reactor Inspector, Engineering Branch 1 J. Drake, Senior Reactor Inspector, Engineering Branch 2 S. Hedger, Operations Engineer B. Larson, Senior Operations Engineer Approved By: Nicholas H. Taylor Chief, Project Branch B Division of Reactor Projects-1- Enclosure
SUMMARY
IR 05000483/2016003; 07/01/2016 - 09/30/2016; Callaway Plant, Licensed Operator
Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance The inspection activities described in this report were performed between July 1 and September 30, 2016, by the resident inspectors at the Callaway Plant and inspectors from the NRCs Region IV office. One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved violations of NRC requirements. The significance of inspection findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, or Red), which is determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process. Their cross-cutting aspects are determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0310, Aspects within the Cross-Cutting Areas. Violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process.
Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
- Green.
The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 55.46(c),
Plant-Referenced Simulators, for failure of the licensee to ensure that the plant-referenced simulator demonstrated expected plant response to transient and accident conditions to which the simulator is designed to respond. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure simulator modeling of the control rod motor generator sets was consistent with the actual plant, introducing the potential for negative operator training. Due to the licensee not considering 1989 vendor design input on how long the control rod motor generator sets would keep control rod drive mechanisms energized after their input breakers were opened, the simulator was modeled to keep control rods withdrawn approximately two minutes longer (maximum case) than they would have been withdrawn. The licensee documented their corrective actions for this issue in Condition Report 201503621.
Failure of the licensees simulator staff to ensure that the plant-referenced simulator demonstrated expected plant response to transient and accident conditions for which the simulator was designed to respond is a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more than minor because it adversely impacts the human performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.
Using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix I, Licensed Operator Requalification Significance Determination Process (SDP), dated December 6, 2011, the finding was determined to have very low safety significance (Green) because there was no actual event at the plant where inappropriate actions were taken in the control room based on training with incorrectly modeled components in the simulator. This finding has no cross-cutting aspect assigned because the cause was not indicative of current licensee performance. (Section 1R11)
PLANT STATUS
Callaway began the inspection period at 100 percent power. On September 26, 2016, the licensee reduced power to approximately 65 percent power to address an issue with their digital feedwater control system. Callaway returned to 100 percent power on September 28, 2016, and stayed there for the remainder of the inspection period.
REPORT DETAILS
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection
Readiness for Impending Adverse Weather Conditions
a. Inspection Scope
On July 13, 2016, the inspectors completed an inspection of the stations readiness for impending adverse weather conditions. The inspectors reviewed plant design features, the licensees procedures to respond to severe thunderstorms, and the licensees implementation of these procedures. The inspectors evaluated operator staffing and accessibility of controls and indications for those systems required to control the plant.
These activities constituted one sample of readiness for impending adverse weather conditions, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.01.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignment
Partial Walk-Down
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed partial system walk-downs of the following risk-significant systems:
- August 17, 2016, train A safety injection system
- August 22, 2016, train A emergency exhaust system
- September 15, 2016, reactor coolant system pressurizer and pressurizer relief tank
- September 27, 2016, train B emergency diesel generator The inspectors reviewed the licensees procedures and system design information to determine the correct lineup for the systems. They visually verified that critical portions of the systems or trains were correctly aligned for the existing plant configuration.
These activities constituted four partial system walk-down samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.04.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection
Quarterly Inspection
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated the licensees fire protection program for operational status and material condition. The inspectors focused their inspection on five plant areas important to safety:
- August 3, 2016, auxiliary building 2047 general floor area (A-19)
- August 19, 2016, auxiliary building 2047 component cooling water surge tank area (A-20)
- September 10, 2016, train B electrical penetration room (A-17)
- September 10, 2016, train B control room air conditioning and filtration room (A-21)
- September 10, 2016, reactor trip switchgear room (A-27)
For each area, the inspectors evaluated the fire plan against defined hazards and defense-in-depth features in the licensees fire protection program. The inspectors evaluated control of transient combustibles and ignition sources, fire detection and suppression systems, manual firefighting equipment and capability, passive fire protection features, and compensatory measures for degraded conditions.
These activities constituted five quarterly inspection samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R06 Flood Protection Measures
a. Inspection Scope
On September 19, 2016, the inspectors completed an inspection of the stations ability to mitigate flooding due to internal causes. After reviewing the licensees flooding analysis, the inspectors chose the emergency diesel generator building which contains risk-significant structures, systems, and components that were susceptible to flooding.
The inspectors reviewed plant design features and licensee procedures for coping with internal flooding. The inspectors walked down the selected areas to inspect the design features, including the material condition of seals, drains, and flood barriers. The inspectors evaluated whether operator actions credited for flood mitigation could be successfully accomplished.
These activities constituted completion of one flood protection measures sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.06.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R07 Heat Sink Performance
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed licensee programs to verify heat exchanger performance and operability for the following heat exchangers:
- component cooling water heat exchanger EEG01B
- containment cooler SGN01D
- class 1E electrical equipment A/C unit SGK05A The inspectors verified whether testing, inspection, maintenance, and chemistry control programs are adequate to ensure proper heat transfer. The inspectors verified that the periodic testing and monitoring methods, as outlined in commitments to NRC Generic Letter 89-13, utilized proper industry heat exchanger guidance. Additionally, the inspectors verified that the licensees chemistry program ensured that biological fouling was properly controlled between tests. The inspectors reviewed previous maintenance records of the heat exchangers to verify that the licensees heat exchanger inspections adequately addressed structural integrity and cleanliness of their tubes.
These activities constitute completion of four triennial heat sink inspection samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.07-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
.1 Review of Licensed Operator Requalification
a. Inspection Scope
On August 16, 2016, the inspectors observed a portion of an annual requalification test for Crew 1 licensed operators. The inspectors assessed the performance of the operators and the evaluators critique of their performance. The inspectors also assessed and the modeling and performance of the simulator during the requalification activities.
These activities constituted completion of one quarterly licensed operator requalification program sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.11.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Review of Licensed Operator Performance
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed the performance of on-shift licensed operators in the plants main control room. At the time of the observations, the plant was in a period of heightened activity. The inspectors observed the operators performance of the following activities:
- August 26, 2016, shift turnover and annunciator response
- September 2, 2016, reactor trip breaker trip actuation device operational testing In addition, the inspectors assessed the operators adherence to plant procedures, including Procedure ODP-ZZ-00001, Operations Department - Code of Conduct, and other operations department policies.
These activities constituted completion of one quarterly licensed operator performance sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.11.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.3 Annual Review
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted an in-office review of the annual requalification training program to determine the results of this program.
On August 24, 2016, the licensee informed the inspectors of the following Callaway Plant operating test results:
- 8 of 9 crews passed the simulator portion of the operating test
- 51 of 51 licensed operators passed the simulator portion of the operating test
- 50 of 51 licensed operators passed the job performance measure portion of the operating test The individual that failed the job performance measure portion of the operating test has been remediated and passed a subsequent test.
The inspectors completed one inspection sample of the annual licensed operator requalification program.
Using the same inspection procedure, the inspectors completed evaluation of a simulator fidelity issue where review started during last years biennial licensed operator requalification program inspection (Inspection Report 05000483/2015003, Adams Accession Number ML15306A580).
b. Findings
Introduction.
The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 55.46(c),
Plant-Referenced Simulators, for failure of the licensee to ensure that the plant-referenced simulator demonstrated expected plant response to transient and accident conditions to which the simulator is designed to respond. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure simulator modeling of the control rod motor generator sets was consistent with the actual plant, introducing the potential for negative operator training.
Due to the licensee not considering design input provided by the vendor on how long the control rod motor generator sets would keep control rod drive mechanisms energized after input breakers were open, the simulator kept the control rods withdrawn out of the core for maximum case of approximately two minutes longer than they would be if operator action had been taken to open the motor generator set input breakers in response to an anticipated transient without scram event. The licensee documented their corrective actions for this issue in Condition Report 201503621.
Description.
During the December 2014 initial licensing examination, one of the scenarios involved a main feedwater pump trip at approximately 95 percent power, with a failure of the reactor to trip, known as an anticipated transient without scram. During the event, NRC examiners observed that a low pressurizer pressure safety injection signal was received within three minutes of the initiation of the anticipated transient without scram. The safety injection actuation signal set points are established to protect the reactor fuel and cladding during loss of coolant and steam line break accidents.
Since the simulated event should not have caused a safety injection actuation within this short time frame, NRC examiners questioned the licensee as to why this safety injection actuation occurred for the specified conditions. NRC examiners documented this issue in Examination Report 05000483/2014301 (Adams Accession Number ML15021A562),and the licensee began their evaluation. The evaluation involved comparison of simulator performance versus available plant design data, input from plant vendors, and comparison to similarly designed plants in the country. The status of the evaluation was reviewed by NRC inspectors during the September 2015 biennial licensed operator requalification program inspection. At that time, the licensee was still assessing applicable information in consultation with the plant vendor. It was determined that the review would take longer than the time allotted for the inspection activity.
NRC Inspection Report 05000483/2015003 documented that the simulator anticipated transient without scram with subsequent safety injection event review would not be completed until the licensee provided all of the evaluations results.
On May 18, 2016, licensee staff provided NRC inspectors the results of the evaluation.
Simulator testing documentation showing the results of modeling changes dated June 30, 2016, were provided as part of the subsequent dialogue. Review of the evaluation results concluded on July 8, 2016. The evaluation revealed that there was a difference in how the simulator modeled the time it took for the control rods to drop into the core after the control rod motor generator input breakers were opened when compared to plant vendor information. In 2014, the simulator was modeled to take two minutes for the rods to fully insert into the core once the motor generator input breakers were opened. It was determined that the licensee had set the time to two minutes in all cases in 1985. However, in 1989 Westinghouse answered the question of how long it should take for the control rods to insert into the core when the control rod motor generator input breakers were opened in document DW-88-004. It states, in part,
[a]ctual plant experience demonstrates that this time delay will vary from several seconds to one minute. If operators were taking action to manually insert the control rods while the motor generator sets were coasting down, it would take several seconds for all of the control rods to drop into the core. If there was no operator action during the coast down period, the time would be on the order of a minute. There was no evidence of a licensee review of the vendor documentation made available on this topic in 1989.
Information provided to the NRC indicates the licensee implemented action to change the simulator model so that control rods will be inserted in the core during the recommended timeframes. The changes in simulator modeling were based on recent licensee discussions with Westinghouse and similarly designed plants. Follow-on simulator testing with a scenario similar to that used in the 2014 initial licensing examination showed that no safety injection signal was generated during the transient.
Analysis.
The failure of the licensees simulator staff to ensure that the plant-referenced simulator demonstrated expected plant response to transient and accident conditions for which the simulator was designed to respond is a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more than minor because it adversely impacts the human performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, Appendix I, Licensed Operator Requalification Significance Determination Process (SDP), dated December 6, 2011, the finding was determined to have very low safety significance (Green) because the simulator fidelity deficiency did not negatively impact operator performance in the actual plant during a reportable event.
This finding has no cross-cutting aspect assigned because the cause is not reflective of current licensee performance. The annual review process of similar documentation by the licensees emergency operating procedure steering committee in place today would likely have prevented the omission of an appropriate evaluation of owners group documentation for simulator fidelity information.
Enforcement.
Title 10 CFR 50.46 (c), Plant-Referenced Simulators, requires, in part, that plant-referenced simulators demonstrate expected plant response to transient and accident conditions to which the simulators have been designed to respond. Contrary to the above, from March 2, 1989, through June 30, 2016, the licensee failed to ensure that its plant-referenced simulator demonstrated expected plant response to transient and accident conditions to which it was designed to respond. Specifically, the simulator failed to model the response of the control rods after control rod motor generator input breakers were opened as prescribed by the vendor. This had the potential to cause negative operator training in the simulator. Because this finding is of very low safety significance (Green) and has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report 201503621, this violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRCs Enforcement Policy.
NCV 05000483/2016003-01, Failure to Maintain Simulator Fidelity.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed three instances of degraded performance or condition of safety-related structures, systems, and components:
- June 6, 2016, essential service water system after water hammer event
- June 18, 2016, train B control room air conditioning unit loose bolts and compressor damage
- June 28, 2016, nitrogen service gas system, water infiltration into system and failure of electrical penetration to train A residual heat removal containment sump suction isolation valve The inspectors reviewed the extent of condition of possible common cause structure, system, and component failures and evaluated the adequacy of the licensees corrective actions. The inspectors reviewed the licensees work practices to evaluate whether these may have played a role in the degradation of the structures, systems and components. The inspectors assessed the licensees characterization of the degradation in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65 (the Maintenance Rule), and verified that the licensee was appropriately tracking degraded performance and conditions in accordance with the Maintenance Rule.
These activities constituted completion of three maintenance effectiveness samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.12.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
a. Inspection Scope
On August 23, 2016, the inspectors reviewed risk assessments performed by the licensee for work on the emergency exhaust system. The inspectors also reviewed the risk management actions taken by the licensee in response to the elevated risk.
The inspectors reviewed the risk assessments to evaluate if they were performed timely and in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65 (the Maintenance Rule) and plant procedures. The inspectors reviewed the accuracy and completeness of the licensees risk assessment and reviewed the risk management actions implemented based on the result of the assessment to evaluate if they were appropriate.
The inspectors also observed portions of four emergent work activities that had the potential to cause an initiating event, or to affect the functional capability of mitigating systems:
- July 28, 2016, train B emergency diesel generator 14 cylinder fuel injector pump stuck open
- August 8, 2016, PJ31 failed while placing in service
- September 19, 2016, train A containment spray pump room cooler replacement
- September 27, 2016, train B main feedpump removed from service for digital feedwater control issues The inspectors verified that the licensee appropriately developed and followed a work plan for these activities. The inspectors verified that the licensee took precautions to minimize the impact of the work activities on unaffected structures, systems, and components.
These activities constituted completion of five maintenance risk assessments and emergent work control inspection samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.13.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed three operability determinations and functionality assessments that the licensee performed for degraded or non-conforming structures, systems, or components:
- August 24, 2016, functionality determination of the fire protection system
- August 25, 2016, functionality determination of class 1E switchgear air conditioning units
- September 7, 2016, operability determination of train A containment spray pump The inspectors reviewed the timeliness and technical adequacy of the licensees evaluations. Where the licensee determined the degraded structures, systems, or components to be operable or functional, the inspectors verified that the licensees compensatory measures were appropriate to provide reasonable assurance of operability or functionality. The inspectors verified that the licensee had considered the effect of other degraded conditions on the operability or functionality of the degraded structure, system, or component.
On September 30, 2016, the inspectors reviewed operator actions taken or planned to compensate for degraded or non-conforming conditions. The inspectors verified that the licensee effectively managed these operator workarounds to prevent adverse effects on the function of mitigating systems and to minimize their impact on the operators ability to implement abnormal and emergency operating procedures.
These activities constituted completion of three operability and functionality review samples and one operator work-around sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.15.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R18 Plant Modifications
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed two permanent plant modifications that affected risk-significant structures, systems, and components:
- June 28, 2016, modification of the service gas nitrogen supply piping to the containment electrical penetrations to prevent water intrusion (Modification Package 16-0014)
- July 8, 2016, modification of existing 2-pole potential test switch in NB0101 and NB0201 cubicles (Modification Package 01-1012)
The inspectors reviewed the design and implementation of the modifications. The inspectors verified that work activities involved in implementing the modifications did not adversely impact operator actions that may be required in response to an emergency or other unplanned event. The inspectors verified that post-modification testing was adequate to establish the operability or functionality of the structures, systems, and components as modified.
These activities constituted completion of two samples of permanent modifications, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.18.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed five post-maintenance testing activities that affected risk-significant structures, systems, or components:
- August 30, 2016, turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump speed sensor replacement
- September 10, 2016, train A class 1E room chiller repairs
- September 14, 2016, train A containment spray room cooler replacement
- September 22, 2016, train B class 1E room chiller planned maintenance
- September 28, 2016, train A emergency diesel generator planned maintenance The inspectors reviewed licensing- and design-basis documents for the structures, systems, or components and the maintenance and post-maintenance test procedures.
The inspectors observed the performance of the post-maintenance tests to verify that the licensee performed the tests in accordance with approved procedures, satisfied the established acceptance criteria, and restored the operability of the affected structures, systems, or components.
These activities constituted completion of five post-maintenance testing inspection samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.19.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed three risk-significant surveillance tests and reviewed test results to verify that these tests adequately demonstrated that the structures, systems, and components were capable of performing their safety functions:
In-service tests:
- September 7, 2016, inservice testing of train A essential service water from containment air coolers bypass isolation valve Other surveillance tests:
- September 15, 2016, load shed and emergency load sequencing channel calibration
- September 19, 2016, train B containment isolation signal - phase A slave relay testing The inspectors verified that these tests met technical specification requirements, that the licensee performed the tests in accordance with their procedures, and that the results of the test satisfied appropriate acceptance criteria. The inspectors verified that the licensee restored the operability of the affected structures, systems, and components following testing.
These activities constituted completion of three surveillance testing inspection samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.22.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
1EP6 Drill Evaluation
.1 Emergency Preparedness Drill Observation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed an emergency preparedness drill on September 1, 2016, to verify the adequacy and capability of the licensees assessment of drill performance.
The inspectors reviewed the drill scenario, observed the drill from the simulator and Technical Support Center, and attended the post-drill critique. The inspectors verified that the licensees emergency classifications, off-site notifications, and protective action recommendations were appropriate and timely. The inspectors verified that any emergency preparedness weaknesses were appropriately identified by the licensee in the post-drill critique and entered into the corrective action program for resolution.
These activities constituted completion of one emergency preparedness drill observation sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.06.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Training Evolution Observation
a. Inspection Scope
On August 16, 2016, the inspectors observed annual simulator-based licensed operator requalification training that included implementation of the licensees emergency plan.
The inspectors verified that the licensees emergency classifications, off-site notifications, and protective action recommendations were appropriate and timely. The inspectors verified that any emergency preparedness weaknesses were appropriately identified by the evaluators and entered into the corrective action program for resolution.
These activities constituted completion of one training observation sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.06.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, Emergency Preparedness, Public Radiation Safety, Occupational Radiation Safety, and Security
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification
.1 Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours (IE01)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed licensee event reports for the period of third quarter 2015 through second quarter 2016 to determine the number of scrams that occurred. The inspectors compared the number of scrams reported in these licensee event reports to the number reported for the performance indicator. Additionally, the inspectors sampled monthly operating logs to verify the number of critical hours during the period. The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the data reported.
These activities constituted verification of the unplanned scrams per 7000 critical hours performance indicator for Callaway Plant, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours (IE03)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed operating logs and corrective action program records for the period of third quarter 2015 through second quarter 2016 to determine the number of unplanned power changes that occurred. The inspectors compared the number of unplanned power changes documented to the number reported for the performance indicator. Additionally, the inspectors sampled monthly operating logs to verify the number of critical hours during the period. The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the data reported.
These activities constituted verification of the unplanned power outages per 7000 critical hours performance indicator for Callaway Plant, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.3 Unplanned Scrams with Complications (IE04)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees basis for including or excluding in this performance indicator each scram that occurred between third quarter 2015 and second quarter 2016. The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the data reported.
These activities constituted verification of the unplanned scrams with complications performance indicator for Callaway Plant, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution
.1 Routine Review
a. Inspection Scope
Throughout the inspection period, the inspectors performed daily reviews of items entered into the licensees corrective action program and periodically attended the licensees condition report screening meetings. The inspectors verified that licensee personnel were identifying problems at an appropriate threshold and entering these problems into the corrective action program for resolution. The inspectors verified that the licensee developed and implemented corrective actions commensurate with the significance of the problems identified. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees problem identification and resolution activities during the performance of the other inspection activities documented in this report.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors selected two issues for an in-depth follow-up:
- On March 9, 2016, the train B emergency diesel generator experienced a rapid load decrease from 4 MW to 2.5 MW unexpectedly during surveillance testing.
This was entered into Callaways corrective action program as Condition Report 201602074. The cause was determined to be an issue with the governors digital reference unit, which was subsequently replaced to correct the issue.
The inspectors assessed the licensees problem identification threshold, cause analyses, and extent of condition reviews. The inspectors verified that the licensee appropriately prioritized the corrective actions and that these actions were adequate to correct the condition.
- On June 10, 2016, the high energy line break barriers (doors) in the auxiliary feedwater pump area were not controlled as required by procedure. This was entered into Callaways corrective action program as Condition Report 201605515.
The inspectors assessed the licensees problem identification threshold, cause analyses, and extent of condition reviews. The inspectors verified that the licensee appropriately prioritized the corrective actions and that these actions were adequate to correct the condition.
These activities constituted completion of two annual follow-up samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71152.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
Exit Meeting Summary
On September 8, 2016, the inspectors presented the annual requalification training inspection results to Mr. B. Farnam, Director, Training, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The licensee confirmed that any proprietary information reviewed by the inspectors had been returned or destroyed.
On September 29, 2016, the inspectors presented the triennial heat exchanger inspection results to Mr. B. Cox, Senior Director, Nuclear Operations, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The inspector asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
On October 7, 2016, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. T. Herrmann, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The licensee confirmed that any proprietary information reviewed by the inspectors has been or will be returned or destroyed.
On October 19, 2016, the inspectors presented updated inspection results to Mr. B. Cox, Senior Director, Nuclear Operations, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The licensee confirmed that any proprietary information reviewed by the inspectors has been or will be returned or destroyed.
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee Personnel
- A. Alley, Supervisor, Program Engineering
- R. Andreasen, Design Engineer
- J. Cordz, Safety Analysis Engineer
- B. Cox, Senior Director, Nuclear Operations
- L. Eitel, Supervisor, Engineering Systems
- T. Elwood, Supervising Engineer, Regulatory Affairs/Licensing
- B. Farnam, Director, Training
- M. Hoehn II, Supervisor, Engineering Programs
- T. Herrmann, Site Vice President
- R. Hughey, Manager, Shift Operations
- E. Keene, Senior Training Supervisor, Emergency Preparedness
- S. Kovaleski, Director, Engineering Design
- S. McLaughlin, Manager, Performance Improvement
- T. Parashar, System Engineer
- S. Petzel, Engineer, Regulatory Affairs
- J. Stollhans, Program Engineer
- R. Tiefenauer, Senior Training Supervisor, Licensed Operator Requalification
- K. Tipton, Supervisor, Engineering Systems
- D. Turley, Supervisor, Engineering Systems
- R. Wink, Manager, Regulatory Affairs
- T. Witt, Engineer, Regulatory Affairs
- C. Wood, Program Engineer
LIST OF ITEMS
OPENED AND CLOSED
Opened and Closed
- 05000483/2016003-01 NCV Failure to Maintain Simulator Fidelity (Section 1R11)