IR 05000483/2020011
| ML20106F187 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Callaway  (NPF-030) |
| Issue date: | 04/15/2020 |
| From: | Vincent Gaddy Region 4 Engineering Branch 1 |
| To: | Diya F Ameren Missouri |
| References | |
| IR 2020011 | |
| Preceding documents: |
|
| Download: ML20106F187 (22) | |
Text
April 15, 2020
SUBJECT:
CALLAWAY PLANT - DESIGN BASIS ASSURANCE INSPECTION (TEAMS)
INSPECTION REPORT 05000483/2020011
Dear Mr. Diya:
On March 31, 2020, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Callaway Plant. On March 31, 2020, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
Two findings of very low safety significance (Green) are documented in this report. Two of these findings involved violations of NRC requirements. We are treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violations or the significance or severity of the violations documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Callaway Plant.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Callaway Plant. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Vincent G. Gaddy, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety
Docket No. 05000483 License No. NPF-30
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Number:
05000483
License Number:
Report Number:
Enterprise Identifier: I-2020-011-0012
Licensee:
Ameren Missouri
Facility:
Callaway Plant
Location:
Steedman, MO
Inspection Dates:
March 2, 2020 to March 20, 2020
Inspectors:
J. Braisted, Reactor Inspector
G. Callaway, Senior Reactor Technology Instructor
S. Gardner, Contractor
G. George, Senior Reactor Inspector, Team Lead
S. Makor, Reactor Inspector
M. Yeminy, Contractor
Approved By:
Vincent G. Gaddy, Chief
Engineering Branch 1
Division of Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a design basis assurance inspection (teams) inspection at Callaway Plant, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to evaluate Class 1E 4160 VAC (NB) System Train A for (a)(1) Status in Maintenance Rule Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000483/2020011-01 Open/Closed
[H.8] -
Procedure Adherence 71111.21M The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(1), for failure to evaluate a maintenance preventable functional failure of Class 1E 4160 Vac system for 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(1) status following the failure of breaker NB0101.
Failure to Use Appropriate Design Pressure Inputs for Diesel Generator Room and Essential Service Water Pumphouse HVAC System Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000483/2020011-02 Open/Closed None (NPP)71111.21M The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III,
"Design Control," for the failure of the licensee to specify design inputs for design pressures of the emergency diesel generator and essential service water pumphouse ventilation ducts that are required to withstand the negative pressure caused by the fan when its suction path is blocked by a tornado damper.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the coronavirus (COVID-19), regional inspectors were directed to begin teleworking. The inspection documented below was determined that the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be completed remotely.
REACTOR SAFETY
===71111.21M - Design Bases Assurance Inspection (Teams)
The inspectors evaluated the following components and listed applicable attributes, permanent modifications, and operating experience:
Design Review - Risk-Significant/Low Design Margin Components (IP Section 02.02) (6 Samples 1 Partial)
From March 2, 2020, to March 20, 2020, the team inspected the following components and listed applicable attributes.
(1)480 V Bus NG02
Component walkdown and visual inspection was performed to assess the material condition and configuration
Maintenance and testing procedures and performance history was reviewed to assure consistency with vendor and industry recommendations
Design bases documents, updated safety analysis report, technical specifications and bases to assure licensing bases match component capabilities
Component maintenance history and corrective action program reports to verify the monitoring of potential degradation
Calculations for electrical distribution, system load flow, voltage drop, short-circuit, and electrical protection to verify that bus capacity and voltages remained within minimum acceptable limits
(2)4.16 KV Bus NB02
Component maintenance history and corrective action program reports to verify the monitoring for potential degradation
Short circuit calculation to determine adequacy of design
Procedures for circuit breaker inspection and testing to compare maintenance practices against industry and vendor guidance Calculations for DC control voltage to meet acceptance criteria for new Square D breakers
Breaker tracking for maintenance history by serial number
(3)480 V Motor Control Center, NG03C
Component walkdown and vendor document review to verify installed configuration, specifications and acceptance criteria and design bases functions
Procedures for circuit breaker inspection and testing to compare maintenance practices against industry standards and vendor guidance
Maintenance and testing procedures and performance history was reviewed to assure consistency with vendor and industry recommendations
Design bases documents, updated safety analysis report, technical specifications and bases to assure licensing bases match component capabilities
- (4) Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump A, PAL01A
Pump inservice testing plan which established the test intervals and parameters to be measured to meet ASME Code requirements
Results of comprehensive and quarterly motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump testing
Calculations for auxiliary feedwater pump available net positive suction head and suction pressure setpoints for suction source swapover
Flow models of the auxiliary feedwater system during normal operating conditions or postulated scenarios
Design bases document and piping and instrumentation diagram for the auxiliary feedwater system.
Vendor manuals for the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump
Corrective action documents to verify the monitoring of potential degradation
- (5) Diesel Generator Supply Fan, CGM01A
Component walkdown and vendor document review to verify installed configuration, specifications and acceptance criteria, and design bases functions
Fan and duct design drawing, vendor specifications, pressure curves, flow calculations and structural integrity calculations
Emergency room heating and ventilation calculations
Protection against external events (seismic and tornado)
Setpoints and instrument uncertainty of recirculation damper system operating instrumentation and controls
Normal and emergency operating procedures
Maintenance effectiveness
- (6) Load Shed and Sequencing Train B, NF039B
Validate qualification and seismic requirements
Control logic for capacitor bank permissives
Procedures for response time testing to determine consistency between design bases, calculations, and testing acceptance criteria
Effect of charging times of new Square D breakers on sequencing interval
- (7) Evaluation of Operator Procedures and Actions Related to Components
1. Control room operator actions resulting from a simulated steam generator
tube rupture (SGTR) with a stuck open atmospheric steam dump (ASD). Verify the following actions are performed within the required completion times in accordance with the FSAR:
a. Close block valve to failed open ASD 20 minutes after the ASD opens b. Isolate the failed train to the control room HVAC filtration system in 30 minutes from event initiation c. Initiate a reactor coolant system (RCS) cooldown in 40 minutes from event initiation d. Complete the RCS cooldown in 56 minutes from event initiation e. Complete the RCS depressurization in 60 minutes from event initiation f.
Terminate safety injection (SI) in 5 minutes after the depressurization is completed g. Equalize RCS and ruptured steam generator pressures in 15 minutes after SI termination
2. Control room operator actions resulting from a simulated feedwater line break
to the steam generators between the feedwater isolation valve and the check valve. Verify the resulting internal flooding is isolated in 30 minutes from event initiation.
3. Control room operator actions resulting from a simulated loss of secondary
heat sink. Verify that the crew re-establishes main feedwater flow prior to the need to initiate bleed and feed cooling of the reactor coolant system.
4. Auxiliary operator actions to locally line up the hardened condensate storage
tank (HCST) to the non-safety auxiliary feedwater pump within 20 minutes of task assignment.
Design Review - Large Early Release Frequency (LERFs) (IP Section 02.02)===
From March 2, 2020, to March 20, 2020, the team inspected the following large-early-release-frequency component.
- (1) Residual Heat Removal Pumps to Reactor Coolant System Cold Leg Loops Check Valves, EP8818 A, B, C, D
Valve inservice testing plan which established the test intervals and parameters to be measured to meet ASME Code requirements
Results of inservice testing of full stroke open capability and seat leakage rate (valve closure)
Results of instrument calibrations for seat leakage rate testing.
Design bases document and piping and instrumentation diagram for the emergency core cooling system
Vendor manuals for the residual heat removal pumps to reactor coolant system cold leg loops check valves
Corrective action documents to verify the monitoring of potential degradation
Modification Review - Permanent Mods (IP Section 02.03) (4 Samples)
From March 2, 2020, to March 20, 2020, the team inspected the following permanent modifications.
- (3) MP 17-0006, "ESW Water Hammer Mitigation Modification"
Review of Operating Experience Issues (IP Section 02.06) (3 Samples)
From March 2, 2020, to March 20, 2020, the team inspected the following operating experience issues.
- (1) Callaway OpE 201801880, "OE Received from Comanche Peak Station Electric Station Related to Component Cooling Water System Cross Tie Valves"
- (2) Callaway OpE 20190019, "Ametek Solid State Controls Part 21"
- (3) NRC Operating Experience Smart Sample (OpESS) 2019/01, "Commercial Grade Dedication, Procurement, and Design Control"
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to evaluate Class 1E 4160 VAC (NB) System Train A for (a)(1) Status in Maintenance Rule Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems
Green NCV 05000483/2020011-01 Open/Closed
[H.8] -
Procedure Adherence 71111.21M The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(1), for failure to evaluate a maintenance preventable functional failure of Class 1E 4160 Vac system for 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(1) status following the failure of breaker NB0101.
Description:
The functions of the breakers of the Class 1E 4160 Vac system, in addition to providing circuit protection, are to shed load by demand from the control room or engineered safety features actuation system and load shedder and emergency load sequencer (LSELS).
The Ameren maintenance rule program procedures outline the requirements and responsibilities for compliance with Paragraphs (a)(1), (a)(2), and (a)(3) of 10 CFR 50.65, Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants. These maintenance rule procedures consist of EDP-ZZ-001128, Revision 28, Maintenance Rule Program; EDP-ZZ-001128 Appendix 2, Revision 36, Summary of SSC Performance Criteria; EDP-ZZ-001128 Appendix 4, Revision 22, Maintenance Rule System Functions; and APA-ZZ-0500, Appendix 5, Revision 30, Maintenance Rule. These procedures identify the applicable structures, systems, and components to which 10 CFR 50.65 applies, their performance criteria, the thresholds for meeting their performance criteria, and requirements in the event the criteria are not met.
On March 21, 2019, a control room hand switch malfunction created an electrical short around the trip coil circuit of Class 1E 4160 Vac breaker NB0101, which resulted in the unavailability of the load shed function for the residual heat removal pump motor. On August 26, 2019, the maintenance rule expert panel determined that the failure of breaker NB0101 was a maintenance preventable functional failure. It was considered to be a maintenance preventable functional failure of the residual heat removal system, load shedder, and emergency load shed sequencer system, the 13.8 kV system, and the Class 1E 4160 Vac system. In accordance with EDP-ZZ-01128 Appendix 4, Revision 22, Maintenance Rule System Functions, the maintenance rule expert panel determined that maintenance rule criteria, NB-03, Provides protective features for Class 1E busses, which includes the isolation of certain Non-Safety Related loads from the Safety Related bus in the event of an SIS, was not met. According to EDP-ZZ-001128, Appendix 2, Revision 36, the 4160 Vac system A train performance criteria NB-03 has a threshold of 0 maintenance preventable functional failures per rolling 18 months.
Procedure EDP-ZZ-001128, Revision 28, Maintenance Rule Program, step 4.5.3(b)requires, when a structure, system, or components performance criterion has not been met or repetitive maintenance preventable function failures are identified, initiate a condition report in accordance with APA-ZZ-00500, Corrective Action Program.
Procedure APA-ZZ-00500, Appendix 5, Revision 30, step 4.1.2, requires that a 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(1) evaluation be completed within 60 days of the initiation of this condition report. Contrary to this, on August 26, 2019, no condition report was initiated following the expert panel determination of the maintenance preventable functional failure on the Class 1E 4160 Vac system A train. Consequently, no 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(1) evaluation was initiated or completed within 60 days.
Corrective Actions: On March 19, 2020, a 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(1) evaluation was completed under CR 202001216. It was determined that the Class 1E 4160 Vac system was to be moved to 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(1) status and performance goals and monitoring criteria were identified.
Corrective Action References: Condition Report 202001216-001
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The failure to initiate a condition report and complete a 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) evaluation in accordance with EDP-ZZ-001128, Maintenance Rule Program, was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, similar to Example 8.g of Manual Chapter 0612 Appendix E, "Examples of Minor Issues," the inspectors determined that the significance was more than minor because the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objectives were adversely affected because, when the Maintenance Rule functional failure was considered, performance indicates that the SSC was not being effectively controlled through appropriate preventive maintenance and that the SSC was not moved to 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1).
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Using Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, the inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding affected the qualification of a mitigating SSC and did not affect its operability or PRA functionality.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.8 - Procedure Adherence: Individuals follow processes, procedures, and work instructions. This finding had a human performance cross-cutting aspect, associated with procedure adherence, because individuals failed to follow maintenance rule processes and procedures.
Enforcement:
Violation: Title 10 CFR Part 50.65 (a)(1) requires each holder of an operating license for a nuclear power plant shall monitor the performance or condition of structures, systems, or components, against licensee-established goals, in a manner sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that these structures, systems, and components are capable of fulfilling their intended functions. These goals shall be established commensurate with safety and, where practical, take into account industry wide operating experience. When the performance or condition of a structure, system, or component does not meet established goals, appropriate corrective action shall be taken.
Contrary to the above, from August 26, 2019, to March 19, 2020, the licensee failed to monitor the performance or condition of structures, systems, or components, against licensee-established goals, in a manner sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that these structures, systems, and components are capable of fulfilling their intended functions. When the performance did not meet established goals, appropriate action was not taken.
Specifically, the licensee failed to evaluate the Class 1E 4160 Vac system for 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(1) status, when the performance criteria of "0" maintenance preventable functional failures per rolling 18-month period was not met. Additionally, the licensee did not take any corrective action to ensure the Class 1E 4160 Vac bus would be capable of meeting their intended functions.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Failure to Use Appropriate Design Pressure Inputs for Diesel Generator Room and Essential Service Water Pumphouse HVAC System Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems
Green NCV 05000483/2020011-02 Open/Closed
None (NPP)71111.21M The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," for the failure of the licensee to specify design inputs for design pressures of the emergency diesel generator and essential service water pumphouse ventilation ducts that are designed to withstand the negative pressure caused by the fan when its suction path is blocked by a tornado damper.
Description:
Each emergency diesel generator room is equipped with an inlet duct, connecting the outside air source for room ventilation and combustion air. The system design incorporates a recirculation damper designed to protect the room temperature from overcooling in case the outside air temperature is very low. The recirculation damper modulates its opening and closing based on emergency diesel generator room temperature; thus, providing part of the 120,000 CFM flow rate from inside the room, such that the volumetric flow rate from the cold environment is greatly reduced. When the room temperature reaches 101 °F, the inlet duct supply fan operates to provide additional air flow for cooling the emergency diesel generator room. However, when the emergency diesel generator room temperature reaches 103 °F, the recirculation damper closes to maximize the air flow rate from outdoors in order to maximize cooling.
The system is also equipped with a tornado damper designed to shut at the onset of a reverse flow, because of low ambient air pressure caused by a tornado. The tornado damper reopens when the tornado event passes. The tornado damper is designed to seal the air inlet opening, thereby shutting air flow to the supply fan. The closing of the tornado damper is not accompanied with logic to stop operation of the fan. When the tornado damper closes, the fan will continue to operate at full angular speed attempting to provide 120,000 CFM to the room. Therefore, in a design basis tornado event that causes a corresponding loss of offsite power with emergency diesel generators running, there is a potential condition where little to no air will flow to the fan, while operating, when the tornado damper is fully closed coincident with a mostly closed recirculation damper because of elevated room temperature while the diesel generators are running.
The fans design curve shows that the fan can create a negative pressure of -6.8 inches of water in the duct while operating with no air flow. The inlet duct design documents show that the duct was built to withstand a negative pressure of only -3.75 inches of water. Therefore, during the postulated design basis conditions, the negative pressure created by the fan can exceed the documented duct design pressure, causing the duct to potentially implode. When the tornado damper then opens, the reduced area duct would potentially limit the suction flowrate below the design flowrate necessary to maintain the emergency diesel generator room at operable temperatures. This condition affected both emergency diesel generator rooms.
Following the discovery of emergency diesel generator room issue, the licensee determined that the essential service water pumphouse ventilation system is subjected to the same condition, where the inlet fan suction can draw pressure of -6.4 inches of water, while the ventilation duct is designed to withstand a documented maximum pressure of -3.75 inches of water. Therefore, under postulated design conditions, the duct would potentially implode and limit the flowrate below the required flowrate which provides cooling air to maintain the essential service water pumphouse at operable temperatures.
After discovery of the issues, the licensee performed a prompt operability determination because there was no information or analysis available to ensure that the ventilation ducts would maintain structural integrity to support emergency diesel generator operability. The licensee contracted an engineering firm to analyze the strength of the ventilation ducts and their ability to resist collapse at internal pressures greater than its design value of -3.75 inches of water. The analysis evaluated an internal pressure on the inlet duct of -7 inches of water using the ANSYS Version 19.2 Finite Element Analysis software. The analysis illustrated that minor yielding would occur in localized regions near the bottom of the duct at a ninety-degree bend near the inlet to the fan; however, the yielding was very small at 0.00025 in/in. This is below the 0.19 in/in strain necessary to cause a failure. Therefore, the emergency diesel generators and essential service water system remain operable.
The Callaway Operating Quality Assurance Manual states that Ameren Missouri complies with the recommendations of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.64, Revision 2. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.64 endorses ANSI 45.2.11-1974, Quality Assurance Requirements for the Design of Nuclear Power Plants, as acceptable method to comply with the quality assurance requirements of Title 10 CFR Part 50. ANSI 45.2.11-1974, Section 3.1, Design Requirements, states, The design input shall be specified on a timely basis and to the level of detail necessary to permit the design activity to be carried out in a correct manner and to provide a consistent basis for making design decisions, accomplishing design verification measures, and evaluating design changes. The inspectors determined that Callaway failed to specify design inputs for design pressures of the emergency diesel generator and essential service water pumphouse ventilation ducts to provide a consistent basis for making design decisions, accomplishing design verification measures, and evaluating design changes.
Corrective Actions: After discovery of the issues, the licensee performed a prompt operability determination because there was no information or analysis available to ensure that the ventilation ducts would maintain structural integrity to support emergency diesel generator operability.
Corrective Action References: Condition Reports 202001566 and 202001602
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that the failure to specify design inputs for design pressures of the emergency diesel generator and essential service water pumphouse ventilation ducts, in accordance with ANSI N45.2.11-1974, was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, similar to example 3.e in Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, "Example of Minor Issues," in order to justify the as-found condition, the licensee had to revise calculations in order to establish operability and functionality of the ventilation ducts as-found conditions.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Using Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, the inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding affected the qualification of a mitigating SSC and did not affect its operability or PRA functionality.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: Not Present Performance. No cross cutting aspect was assigned to this finding because the inspectors determined the finding did not reflect present licensee performance.
Enforcement:
Violation: Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," states, "Measures shall be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis, as defined in § 50.2 and as specified in the license application, for those structures, systems, and components to which this appendix applies are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions."
Contrary to the above, since December 19, 1984, to March 20, 2020, the licensee failed to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis for emergency diesel generator and essential service water pumphouse ventilation systems were correctly translated into specifications. Specifically, the licensee failed to specify design inputs for design pressures of the emergency diesel generator and essential service water pumphouse ventilation ducts in accordance with ANSI N45.2.11-1974, Quality Assurance Requirements for the Design of Nuclear Power Plants.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
On March 20, 2020, the inspectors presented the design bases assurance inspection (teams) inspection results to Mr. F. Diya, Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer, and other members of the licensee staff.
On March 31, 2020, the inspectors presented the design bases assurance inspection (teams) inspection results to Mr. B. Cox, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
71111.21M Calculations
13000678.940
Diesel Generator Ventilation Supply Fan Flow Determined by
Velocty Pressure
71111.21M Calculations
7001280
Pipe Stress Analysis of ESW Supply Piping
71111.21M Calculations
81402-J-001
HCST Supply Valve ALHV0220 Opening Setpoint
71111.21M Calculations
AL-22
Aux Feedwater Pumps Suction Pressure Setpoints
71111.21M Calculations
AL-24
Determine the Effect of Dissolved Nitrogen on the NPSHa for
AL Pumps. Determine the Effect on Available NPSH for the
Aux Feedwater Pumps.
71111.21M Calculations
AL-29
Auxiliary Feedwater System Performance During Feedline
Break
71111.21M Calculations
AL-30
Auxiliary Feedwater System Performance During a Loss of
Normal Feedwater Flow and Loss of Non-Emergency A/C
Power
71111.21M Calculations
AL-56
Loop Tolerance Calculation for ALP-0037, 38, & 39
71111.21M Calculations
ARC-1590
EDG Suction Plenum Analysis
71111.21M Calculations
ARC-595
Aux. Feedwater Flow Model
71111.21M Calculations
B-10
Voltage Drop in MCC Control Circuits
71111.21M Calculations
Callaway Human
Reliability
Analysis
F
HRA Calculator output for Post-Initiator HFES
71111.21M Calculations
E-B-09
DC Control Circuits Voltage Drops
71111.21M Calculations
E-B-10
MCC Control Circuit Voltage Drop Calculation for MP 18-0003
71111.21M Calculations
FAI/18-0349,
Callaway ESW Water Hammer Mitigation Modification Support
Analysis
71111.21M Calculations
GM-03
EDG Room Temperature Without HVAC
71111.21M Calculations
H-9
Systems NG/PG Protective Relay Settings
71111.21M Calculations
M-EG-24
CCW Nuclear Aux. Component Train Switchover Single
Failure Analysis
71111.21M Calculations
M-FL-13
Auxiliary Building Flooding: Calculate the Maximum Flood
Level in Auxiliary Building Rooms 1304, 1305, 1324, 1325,
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
26, 1327, 1328, 1329, 1330, and 1331 due to a Pipe Break
or Crack
71111.21M Calculations
M-GM-320
Emergency Diesel Generator Building HVAC
71111.21M Calculations
NAI-1560-001
HELB in the Callaway Auxiliary Building with Additional
Openings
71111.21M Calculations
NG-22
NG Load Center Overcurrent Setpoint Calculation1
71111.21M Calculations
NG-23
MCC Set Point Calculation for MP 18-0003
71111.21M Calculations
NK-10
NK System DC Voltage Drop
71111.21M Calculations
ZZ-145
Short Circuit Calculation
71111.21M Calculations
ZZ-561
Open Phase Fault Study for Callaway Energy Center
71111.21M Calculations
ZZ-62
Plant Load Flow Calculation
71111.21M Corrective Action
Documents
Condition Report
201606143, 201703700, 201703962, 201703981, 201703992,
201705506, 201705509, 201705513, 201705514, 201801880,
201805948, 201800047, 201605682, 201703961, 201707011,
201707076. 201806177, 201900377, 201903601, 201701331,
201801897, 201803497, 201803907, 201906494, 200700040,
201901697, 201706449, 200711067, 201702850, 201703342,
201703699, 201802482
71111.21M Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
Condition Reports
2001172, 202001211, 202001216, 202001220, 202001256,
2001563, 202001566, 202001602
71111.21M Drawings
E-017-00004
AKD-6 Powermaster Indoor Unit Substation
71111.21M Drawings
E-018-00010
Motor Control Center Layout
71111.21M Drawings
E-018-00011
Motor Control Center Layout
71111.21M Drawings
E-1041A-00714
Replacement MCC Cubicles
71111.21M Drawings
E-1041A-00753
Replacement MCC Cubicles
71111.21M Drawings
E-1044-0014
XNB02 LTC Wiring Schematic
71111.21M Drawings
E-1044-0019
XNB02 DC Wiring Schematic
71111.21M Drawings
E-1044-0029
XNB01 DC Wiring Schematic
71111.21M Drawings
E-1052-0001
Control Diagram for 5GSB3, 15GSB3 and 15GSB4 Medium
Voltage 1200A, 2000A, 3000A Circuit Breakers
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
71111.21M Drawings
E-21001
Main Single Line Diagram
71111.21M Drawings
E-21NB02
Lower Medium Voltage System Class 1E 4.16KV Single Line
Meter and Relay Diagram
71111.21M Drawings
E-21NG01
Low Voltage System Class 1E 480V. Single Line Meter &
Relay Diagram
71111.21M Drawings
E-21NG02
Low Voltage System Class 1E 480V Single Line Meter &
Relay Diagram
71111.21M Drawings
E-22NF01
Load Shedding And emergency Load Sequencing Logic
71111.21M Drawings
E-23EG01C
Schematic Component Cooling Water Pump B
71111.21M Drawings
E-23EG01C
Schematic Component Cooling Water Pump B
71111.21M Drawings
E-23EG07
Schematic Diagram Component Cooling Water Supply to RHR
Heat Exchanger
71111.21M Drawings
E-23EG07
Schematic Diagram Component Cooling Water Supply to RHR
Heat Exchanger
71111.21M Drawings
E-23EG07
Schematic Diagram Component Cooling Water Supply to RHR
Heat Exchanger
71111.21M Drawings
E-23EJ01
Schematic Residual Heat Removal Pumps
71111.21M Drawings
E-23EJ04A
Schematic Diagram RHR Pump 1 to Charging Pump Valve
71111.21M Drawings
E-23NB16
ESF Transformers Auxiliary Power and Control Schematic
71111.21M Drawings
E-23NB18A
NB04 Capacitor Step 1 Control Schematic
71111.21M Drawings
E-23NE13(Q)
Schematic Diesel Generator KKJ01B Exciter/Voltage Control
014
71111.21M Drawings
E-23NG01
Low Voltage System Class 1E 480 V Three Line Meter and
Relay Diagram
71111.21M Drawings
J-22GM01B(Q)
Diesel Generator Building HVAC Exhaust Dampers
71111.21M Drawings
M-2014-00003
Size 6 Class 1690 CF8M Swing Check Clear Waterway
71111.21M Drawings
M-22AL01(Q)
Auxiliary Feedwater System
71111.21M Drawings
M-22AP01
Condensate Storage and Transfer System
71111.21M Drawings
M-22EF02(Q)
Essential Service Water System
71111.21M Drawings
M-22EG01(Q), M-
2EG02(Q), M-
2EG03(Q)
Component Cooling Water System
71111.21M Drawings
M-22EJ01(Q)
Residual Heat Removal System
71111.21M Drawings
M-22EM01(Q)
High Pressure Coolant Injection System
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
71111.21M Drawings
M-22EP01(Q)
Accumulator Safety Injection
71111.21M Drawings
M-22GM01(Q)
P&ID Diesel Generator Building
71111.21M Drawings
M-2H5211(Q)
HVAC Diesel Generator Building Plan and Sections
71111.21M Drawings
M-924-00001
Drawing for Vaneaxial Fan
71111.21M Engineering
Changes
MP 07-0070
Replace Safety-Related and Non-Safety Metal-Clad Breakers
000.7
71111.21M Engineering
Changes
MP 13-0002
Replace EDG Supply Fans CGM01A & B
71111.21M Engineering
Changes
MP 16-0027
Approval of Remanufactured ESFAS and LSELS Circuit
Boards
71111.21M Engineering
Changes
MP 17-0006
ESW Water Hammer Mitigation Modification
71111.21M Engineering
Changes
MP 18-0003
Replace Safety Related 480VAC MCC BUckets
71111.21M Engineering
Changes
MP 18-0019
NG02BER2 - Replace Safety Related 480 VAC MCC Buckets
71111.21M Engineering
Changes
MP 19-0113
ESW Water Hammer Mitigation Phase 2
71111.21M Engineering
Evaluations
C-04A05S
Floor Response Spectra for Standardized Nuclear Unit Power
Plant System
71111.21M Engineering
Evaluations
E170.0102
Approval of ABC Fire Extinguishers on Carts
07/02/1997
71111.21M Engineering
Evaluations
RFR 21816
Determine Impact on M-AL-16 for N2 and Low AL Flow
A
71111.21M Engineering
Evaluations
STRIDE 18-03
Integrated Engineered Safety Features Actuation System
(ESFAS) Testing
71111.21M Miscellaneous
Inservice Testing Program
71111.21M Miscellaneous
10466-M-627A-
0149-02
Test Report For Tornado Dampers
71111.21M Miscellaneous
3857-RPT-003
Required Response Spectra for Seismic Qualification of
Replacement I&C Electronics for Callaway Plant
71111.21M Miscellaneous
BLUE 2066
Category C Justification of Class IE Equipment
03/05/1986
71111.21M Miscellaneous
C-04A05B
Floor Response Spectra for Standardized Nuclear Unit Power
Plant System (SNUPPS)
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
71111.21M Miscellaneous
E-017-00397
IM Load Center Unit Substations
71111.21M Miscellaneous
E-1052-00031
Instruction Manual for 5GSB3-350-1200/2000 Medium Voltage
Circuit Breakers
000
71111.21M Miscellaneous
E-mail DRS to Callaway regarding seismic failures
03/05/2020
71111.21M Miscellaneous
Seismic Test Report for Callaway and Wolf Creek Modules
B
71111.21M Miscellaneous
Acceptance Test Procedure for Isolation Module 6N234-1
71111.21M Miscellaneous
Quality Conformance Test Procedure #6N234
A
71111.21M Miscellaneous
Environmental Qualification Report for ESFAS and LSELS
F
71111.21M Miscellaneous
Environmental Qualification Report for ESFAS and LSELS
C
71111.21M Miscellaneous
Letter
Letter from Archon Engineering PC to AmerenUE, EDG
Suction Plenum Preliminary Results
03/20/2020
71111.21M Miscellaneous
M-105A
Design Specification for the Shop Fabricated Tanks (ASME III)
for the SNUPPS
71111.21M Miscellaneous
M-1205
Design Specification for ASME Section III Class 3 Stainless
Steel Air Accumulators
71111.21M Miscellaneous
M-627A
Specification for Dampers
71111.21M Miscellaneous
M-924
Specification for Safety Related Fans
71111.21M Miscellaneous
M-924-00025
Instruction Manual for 150 HP Fan Motor Data Package
71111.21M Miscellaneous
M-924-00026
Instruction Manual for VOLU Probe and Dwyer Gauge
71111.21M Miscellaneous
Performance
Monitoring
Circuit Breakers
03/03/2020
71111.21M Miscellaneous
SSA-201900029-
054
Design Basis Assurance Self Assessment
71111.21M Miscellaneous
System Health
Report - NB
Low Med Vlt Sys 1E
2/24/2020
71111.21M Miscellaneous
System Health
Report - NF
LSELS
2/24/2020
71111.21M Miscellaneous
TRRQ 201700343 Lesson Learned for Incorporation into ESP Training Program
05/03/2018
71111.21M Miscellaneous
ULDBD-AL-001
Auxiliary Feedwater System
71111.21M Miscellaneous
ULDBD-Class 1E-
001
Class 1E Design
71111.21M Miscellaneous
ULDBD-CLASS
Class 1E Design
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
71111.21M Miscellaneous
ULDBD-ECCS-
001
71111.21M Miscellaneous
ULDBD-EG-001
Component Cooling Water
71111.21M Miscellaneous
ULDBD-GM-001
Diesel Generator Building HVAC System
71111.21M Miscellaneous
ULDBD-NB-001
Lower Medium Voltage (Class 1E 4.16 KV)
71111.21M Miscellaneous
ULDBD-NF-001
Load Shedding and Emergency Load Sequencing
71111.21M Miscellaneous
ULDBD-NG-001
Low Voltage (480V) - Class 1E
71111.21M Procedures
1046-M-627A-
0081-01
American Warming and Ventilating Test Procedure for
Tornado Dampers
03/16/1978
71111.21M Procedures
14005614.500
Determine Leak By of EAV0185 Per Post Change Test Plan
71111.21M Procedures
APA-ZZ-00322
Appendix B
Work Week Schedule and Execution
71111.21M Procedures
APA-ZZ-00323
Configuration Management Process
71111.21M Procedures
APA-ZZ-00356
Pump and Valve Inservice Test Program
71111.21M Procedures
APA-ZZ-00390
Environmental and Seismic Qualification of Safety-Related
Equipment
71111.21M Procedures
APA-ZZ-00395
Significant Operator Response Timing
71111.21M Procedures
APA-ZZ-00500
Appendix 5
Maintenance Rule
71111.21M Procedures
E-0
Reactor Trip or Safety Injection
71111.21M Procedures
E-3
Steam Generator Tube Rupture
71111.21M Procedures
EC Supp Guide
Emergency Coordinator Supplemental Guideline
71111.21M Procedures
EDP-ZZ-01122
Check Valve Predictive Performance Manual
71111.21M Procedures
EDP-ZZ-01128
Appendix
SSCS in the Scope of the Maintenance Rule at Callaway
71111.21M Procedures
EDP-ZZ-01128
71111.21M Procedures
EDP-ZZ-01128
Appendix 2
Summary of SSC Performance Criteria
71111.21M Procedures
EDP-ZZ-01128
Appendix 4
Maintenance Rule System Functions
71111.21M Procedures
EDP-ZZ-04015
Evaluating and Processing Requests for Resolution
71111.21M Procedures
EDP-ZZ-04600
Engineering Change Control
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
71111.21M Procedures
Emergency
Operating
Procedure
Addendum 30
Establishing Main Feedwater Flow
71111.21M Procedures
ETP-ZZ-01331
Crane Nuclear Diagnostic System for Testing Check Valves
71111.21M Procedures
FR-H.1
Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink
71111.21M Procedures
IP-ENG-001
Standard Design Process
71111.21M Procedures
Alternate Parts Equivalency Evaluation for 9N39 and 9N40
Assemblies
71111.21M Procedures
Acceptance Test Procedure for Isolation Module
71111.21M Procedures
Quality Conformance Test Procedure for Isolation Module
A
71111.21M Procedures
M-021-00061
Installation, Operation, Maintenance, Site Storage and
Handling Instructions for 4 HMTA-9 Stage Auxiliary Feed
Water Pumps
71111.21M Procedures
M-619.2-00136
Instructions Manual for Safety Related Fans
71111.21M Procedures
MDP-ZZ-0STOR
Staging and Storage of Materials, Equipment & Tools
71111.21M Procedures
MPE-ZZ-QS014
General Electric 4.16 KV Switchgear PM
71111.21M Procedures
MPE-ZZ-QS015
Square D Magnum Breaker Preventive Maintenance
71111.21M Procedures
MPM-ZZ-QH001
Inspection and Maintenance of Tornado Damper
71111.21M Procedures
Motor Driven Aux. Feedwater Pump a Inservice Test - Group
A
71111.21M Procedures
Train A Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Comprehensive
Pump and Check Valve Test
71111.21M Procedures
RCS Pressure Isolation Valves Inservice Tests-IPTE
71111.21M Procedures
Train A RHR and RCS Check Valve Inservice Test
71111.21M Procedures
Standby Diesel Generator B Periodic Tests
71111.21M Procedures
Train B SIS-CSAS Slave Relay Test
71111.21M Procedures
Train B Diesel Generator and Sequencer Testing
71111.21M Procedures
Control Room Shift and Daily Log Readings and Channel
Checks
71111.21M Procedures
OTA-RK-00016
Addendum 22B
Voltage Control Freeze
71111.21M Procedures
OTN-EF-00001
ESW Air Accumulator Operation
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
71111.21M Procedures
OTO-EG-00001
CCW System Malfunction
71111.21M Procedures
OTO-ZZ-00012
Severe Weather
71111.21M Procedures
ZZ-006
Engineering Design Guide
71111.21M Work Orders
Job
17502728, 19001424, 20500603, 18504744, 17513089,
19511872, 17508987, 14005288, 16506328, 19502282,
19502288, 05516338, 11504156, 12504716, 12509849,
2511442