IR 05000483/2023010

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NRC License Renewal Phase 1 Inspection Report 05000483 2023010
ML23317A389
Person / Time
Site: Callaway Ameren icon.png
Issue date: 11/15/2023
From: Nick Taylor
NRC/RGN-IV/DORS/EB2
To: Diya F
Ameren Missouri
References
IR 2023010
Download: ML23317A389 (15)


Text

November 15, 2023

SUBJECT:

CALLAWAY PLANT - NRC LICENSE RENEWAL PHASE 1 INSPECTION REPORT 05000483/2023010

Dear Fadi Diya:

On October 12, 2023, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Callaway Plant and discussed the results of this inspection with Warren Witt, Senior Director of Nuclear Operations and Plant Manager, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified during this inspection.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely, Nicholas H. Taylor, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket No. 05000483 License No. NPF-30

Enclosure:

As stated

Inspection Report

Docket Number:

05000483

License Number:

NPF-30

Report Number:

05000483/2023010

Enterprise Identifier:

I-2023-010-0017

Licensee:

Ameren

Facility:

Callaway Plant

Location:

Steedman, MO

Inspection Dates:

October 09, 2023, to October 12, 2023

Inspectors:

S. Graves, Senior Reactor Inspector

J. Mejia, Reactor Inspector

Approved By:

Nicholas H. Taylor, Chief

Engineering Branch 2

Division of Operating Reactor Safety

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a Post-Approval Site Inspection for License Renewal at Callaway Plant, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified.

Additional Tracking Items

None.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2516, Policy and Guidance for The License Renewal Inspection Program. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

- TEMPORARY INSTRUCTIONS, INFREQUENT AND ABNORMAL

===71003 - Post-Approval Site Inspection for License Renewal The inspectors evaluated the material condition of Callaway Plant the week of October 9, 2023, while the plant was shut down for refueling outage RF26. This is the last refueling outage before the period of extended operation. This allowed the inspectors to evaluate the material condition of inaccessible areas prior to entry into the period of extended operation and to evaluate the licensee implementation of aging management activities. The period of extended operation is the additional 20 years beyond the original 40-year licensed term and begins after midnight on October 18, 2024.

In addition, the inspectors evaluated whether the licensee:

(1) completed the necessary actions to comply with the license conditions and commitments related to aging management; and (2)implemented programs that agreed with those approved in the safety evaluation report and described in the updated final safety analysis report. NRC issued the safety evaluation report in NUREG-2172, Safety Evaluation Report Related to the License Renewal of Callaway Plant, Unit 1 (ML15068A342). Specific activities evaluated during this inspection are described in the following paragraphs.

Post-Approval Site Inspection for License Renewal===

(1) The inspectors evaluated the aging management programs (AMPs) and commitments described below and walked down selected areas of the facility while performing phase one of this post-approval license site renewal inspection.

A1.3 Reactor Head Closure Stud Bolting and Commitments 41 and 42 This was an existing program, consistent with the Generic Aging Lessons Learned (GALL) report with two additional commitments required by License Condition #3 in the safety evaluation report (NUREG-2172). The program is credited with managing cracking and loss of material by conducting ASME Section XI inspections of reactor vessel flange stud hole threads, reactor head closure studs, nuts, and washers. The program includes periodic visual and volumetric examinations of reactor vessel flange stud hole threads, reactor head closure studs, nuts, and washers as well as visual inspection of the reactor vessel flange during primary system leakage tests. The program is implemented through station procedures consistent with the examination and inspection requirements specified in ASME Section XI, Subsection IWB, Table IWB-2500-1.

Commitment 41 specified:

To allow for monitoring of the condition of the threads on the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) stud and flange hole threads, Ameren Missouri commits to remove RPV stud #18 through nondestructive or destructive means. If RPV stud hole repair is required following removal of RPV stud #18, the repair plan will include inspecting the RPV stud hole prior to the repair to assess the as-found condition and an inspection after the repair is complete to assess the results of the repair.

Commitment 42 specified:

It is noted that Ameren Missouri experienced problems with the reactor vessel head closure studs and stud holes early in plant life (1986-1992) and that multiple RPV stud holes required ASME Section XI repairs to remove damaged threads. To supplement the monitoring that is accomplished through regular volumetric inspections and to confirm that additional thread degradation is not occurring in the RPV stud holes, Ameren Missouri commits to perform a one-time inspection of select RPV stud holes using a method consistent with the Babcock and Wilcox laser inspection that was applied following stud hole repair in 1989 and 1992. RPV stud hole locations 2, 4, 5, 7, 9, and 53 have had more than one thread removed and will be inspected. If inspection of these RPV stud holes confirms that there was minimal or no additional degradation since the prior video inspection, then it is a reasonable conclusion that there will be minimal additional degradation in the period of extended operation. If additional degradation is observed in any of the repaired stud holes where more than one thread has been removed, the condition will be entered in the corrective action program for evaluation and corrective action, and the remaining repaired RPV stud hole locations 13, 25, 39, and 54 will be inspected. The inspection is expected to confirm that further degradation is not occurring in the repaired stud holes and will provide a basis for the conclusion that acceptance criteria for thread engagement will continue to be met through the period of extended operation.

The licensee committed to completing Commitments 41 and 42 no later than 6 months prior to the period of extended operation or the refueling outage prior to the period of extended operation, whichever occurred later.

The inspectors reviewed the UFSAR supplemental, work documents and inspection procedures including current testing and inspections, as well as the program evaluation report document. The inspectors performed a walkdown, ISI records review, and a visual inspection to review the material condition of the studs, stud hole threads, nuts and bolts and the vessel head flange surface. The inspectors held discussions with the AMP owner about the commitments and about additional historical issues related to stuck RPV studs and stud holes. The inspectors determined the licensee had met the requirements of License Condition #3 and the two commitments, specifically related to the successful removal of Stud #18 required by commitment 41, and the performance and acceptable results of one-time inspections of the other stud holes in Commitment 42. No issues of concern were identified.

Based on our review of the actions implemented related to the reactor head closure stud bolting program, we conclude the program will continue to effectively manage the effects of aging through the period of extended operation and conclude the licensee met the conditions of Commitments 41 and 42. These commitments are considered closed.

A1.4 Boric Acid Corrosion and Commitment 3 This was an existing program, consistent with the GALL report that had an additional commitment. The program is credited with managing loss of material and increased resistance of connections due to borated water or reactor coolant leakage. The program includes provisions to identify leakage through inspection and examination.

When leakage is identified, an inspection is performed that includes identification of the leakage path, visual inspections of adjacent structures, components and supports, and cleaning of the leakage. If the evaluation identifies aging effects, corrective action will be taken. Monitoring is provided by tracking and trending of existing and repaired leaks and the establishment of a component-based visual history of leakage. The principal industry guidance document used is WCAP-15988-NP, "Generic Guidance for an Effective Boric Acid Inspection Program for Pressurized Water Reactors." The program relies, in part, on implementing recommendations in NRC Generic Letter 88-05, "Boric Acid Corrosion of Carbon Steel Reactor Pressure Boundary Components in PWR Plants." Additionally, the program includes examinations conducted during ISI pressure tests performed in accordance with ASME Section XI requirements.

Commitment 3 specified:

  • Ensure that system engineers will observe for signs of boric acid residue when performing system walkdowns.
  • Specify that the corrective actions taken by the program will include a consideration to modify the present design or operating procedures to mitigate or prevent recurrence of aging effects caused by borated water leakage.

Consideration will be given to modifications that

(a) reduce the probability of primary coolant leaks at locations where they may cause corrosion damage and
(b) entail the use of suitable corrosion resistant materials or the application of protective coatings or claddings.

There were no associated completion timelines established for this commitment.

The inspectors reviewed the UFSAR supplemental, work documents, the program evaluation report document, as well as revised Procedure EDP-ZZ-01004, Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program, Revision 25, which contained procedural steps implemented, in part, to satisfy license renewal Commitment 3. The inspectors performed walkdowns of the boric acid corrosion program on both trains A and B as part of the ISI inspection to observe material conditions and program implementation.

The inspectors reviewed corrective action documents for the program, ISI records and results, and held discussion with the previous and current boric acid corrosion program owners to go over inspection program health and trends. No issues of concern were identified.

Based on the review of the actions implemented related to the boric acid corrosion program, we concluded the program will continue to effectively manage the effects of aging through the period of extended operation and concluded the licensee met the conditions of Commitment 3. This commitment is considered closed.

A1.13 Fire Protection and Commitments 9 and 39:

This was an existing program consistent with the GALL report credited with managing loss of material for fire-rated barriers including fire rated doors, fire dampers and the Halon system. The program is also credited with managing concrete cracking, spalling, and loss of material for fire barrier walls, ceilings and floors and increased hardness, shrinkage, and loss of strength of fire barrier penetration seals. The program also manages aging effects on all actuation signals, valves, nozzles, and discharges of the Halon system. The program credits periodic visual inspections of fire barrier penetration seals, fire dampers, and structural fire barriers (walls, ceilings, and floors) to ensure they can perform their intended functions. Visual inspections and functional tests are performed on fire-rated doors. The program also includes periodic visual inspection and functional testing of the Halon system.

Commitment 9 specified:

Enhance the fire protection program procedures to:

  • Include visual inspections of the external surfaces of Halon fire suppression system components for excessive loss of material due to corrosion.
  • Include trending of the performance of the Halon system during testing.

Commitment 39 specified:

A gap analysis of license renewal application (LRA) Tables 2.3.3-20 and 3.3.2-20 will be provided to identify differences between the existing and NFPA 805 post-transition changes. The results and the impacts of these gaps on the fire protection program described in LRA Tables 2.3.3-20 and 3.3.2-20 will be summarized, as the basis for transitioning to the NFPA 805 nuclear safety capabilities. The summary will also list the fire protection systems and components including structural fire barriers (e.g., fire walls and slabs, fire doors, fire barrier penetration seals, fire dampers, fire barrier coatings and wraps, equipment and personnel hatchways and plugs, metal siding)that will be added or removed based on the NFPA 805 transition in the scope of license renewal in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4(a) and whether they are subject to an aging management review in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1).

There were no associated completion timelines established for this commitments.

The inspectors reviewed the UFSAR supplemental, the program evaluation report document for the fire protection program, as well as revised Procedure APA-ZZ-00703, "Fire Protection Operability Criteria And Surveillance Requirements," Revision 34, which contains inspections credited, in part, with meeting the requirements of the fire protection aging management program, including the requirements of Commitment No. 9. The procedure also provided a listing of fire protection components tracked/trended by the licensee's maintenance rule program including associated unavailability goals. The inspectors reviewed unavailability tracking data spreadsheets for the Halon system from cycles 25 and 26.

The inspectors reviewed completed work documents and periodic test results performed to ensure fire protection program equipment continues to be able to perform intended functions; performed walkdowns of fire protection equipment subject to license renewal located inside the reactor building and the auxiliary building, and held discussions with the AMP program owner, including completion of the required gap analysis to satisfy Commitment 39. No issues of concern were identified.

Based on our review of the actions implemented related to the fire protection program, we concluded the program will continue to effectively manage the effects of aging through the period of extended operation and concluded that the licensee met the conditions of Commitments 9 and 39. These commitments are considered closed A1.22 Flux Thimble Tube Inspection:

This was an existing condition monitoring program, consistent with the GALL report that required no additional commitments. The program is credited with managing loss of material in all flux thimble tubes that form part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary. The pressure boundary includes the length of the tube inside the reactor vessel out to the seal fittings outside the reactor vessel. The program performs Eddy Current inspections on the portion of the tubes inside the reactor vessel to monitor for changes in wall thickness, and provides measures for inspection, evaluation, and trending to monitor for loss of material. If the current measured wear exceeds the acceptance criteria or the predicted wear for a given flux thimble tube is projected to exceed the established acceptance criteria prior to the next refueling outage, corrective actions are taken to reposition, cap or replace the tube. All flux thimble tubes are inspected at least every other refueling outage with examination frequencies being determined from wear measurements and predictions of future wear using the methodology established in Westinghouse Commercial Atomic Power (WCAP) -12866, Bottom Mounted Instrumentation Flux Thimble Wear, as noted in the safety evaluation report.

The inspectors reviewed the UFSAR supplemental, the program evaluation report document for the Flux Thimble Tube Inspection program, as well as Procedure ETP-BB-01200, Incore Flux Thimble Tube Inspection Program, Revision 1, which implements the program. The inspectors also reviewed NRC Bulletin 88-09, "Thimble Tube Thinning in Westinghouse Reactors," to ensure the inspection program continues to implement the recommendations. The inspectors reviewed the latest contractor report, Callaway RF26 Thimble Tube Examination Field Report dated October 5, 2023, which provided the current state of the flux thimble tubes, a comparison with the previous examination in RF24, and a historical comparison table of tube conditions between 2002 and 2023. No issues of concern were identified.

Based on a review of the actions implemented related to the flux thimble tube inspection program, we concluded your program will continue to effectively manage the effects of aging through the period of extended operation.

This program had no additional commitments.

A1.25 Buried and Underground Piping and Tanks and Commitment 20:

This was a new program that is consistent with GALL report as modified by license renewal interim staff guidance LR-ISG-2015-01, Changes to Buried and Underground Piping and Tank Recommendations. The program is credited with managing loss of material, cracking, blistering, and change of color of the external surfaces of buried and underground piping and tanks. The program augments other programs that manage the aging of internal surfaces of buried and underground piping and tanks. The materials managed by this program include steel, stainless steel, and high-density polyethylene. The program manages aging through preventive, mitigative, and inspection activities. Preventive and mitigative actions include selection of component materials, external coatings for corrosion control, backfill quality control and the application of cathodic protection. Inspection activities include electrochemical verification of the effectiveness of cathodic protection, non-destructive evaluation of pipe or tank wall thickness, and visual inspection of the exterior, as permitted by opportunistic or directed excavations.

Commitment 20 specified:

  • Implement the Buried and Underground Piping and Tanks Program as described in LRA Section B2.1.25.

The licensee committed to start the implementation of the program within the 10-year period prior to the period of extended operation and complete the implementation no later than 6 months prior to the period of extended operation. The commitment also required that inspections be completed no later than 6 months prior to the period of extended operation or the end of the last refueling outage prior to the period of extended operation, whichever occurs later.

The inspectors reviewed the UFSAR supplemental, the program evaluation report, implementing procedures describing required tests and inspections, as well as a review of previous underground piping inspection results. The inspectors reviewed the program and compared the content to the guidance in license renewal interim staff guidance LR-ISG-2015-01, noting that Appendix B to LR-ISG-2015-01, Changes to Buried and Underground Piping and Tank Recommendations, has replaced the aging management program (AMP) XI.M41, Buried and Underground Piping and Tanks, described in GALL report, Revision 2. The inspectors had discussions with the AMP program owner and the cathodic protection system engineer responsible for supporting the program, including cathodic protection system availability and reliability measures, polarizing potential limits in use, anode lifecycles, backfill requirements for high-density polyethylene (HDPE) piping, the revised criteria in Table XI.M41-2, "Inspection of Buried and Underground Piping and Tanks," as well as risk ranking of critical piping systems. The inspectors walked down Cathodic Protection system rectifiers and held discussions on the automated monitoring system in use for monitoring the performance of the cathodic protection system. No buried piping or tank inspections were scheduled during the onsite inspection period; however, the inspectors and program owner discussed the use of opportunistic inspections for buried piping of differing compositions and how the program made use of the site corrective action program to track and trend related issues. No issues of concern were identified.

Based on our review of the actions implemented related to the buried and underground piping and tanks program, we concluded your program will continue to effectively manage the effects of aging through the period of extended operation and concluded that you met the conditions of Commitment 20. This commitment is considered closed.

Plant Condition Monitoring Walkdowns The inspectors walked down normally inaccessible areas of the facility looking at the structures, systems, and components for signs of aging, such as corrosion on piping, component supports, and cable trays, water intrusion, structural cracking, and spalling of concrete.

Specific structures, systems, areas, and components walked down and evaluated during this inspection included:

  • auxiliary building o

main steam safety relief valve area o

main feedwater regulating valve area

  • containment - multiple elevations
  • reactor vessel head studs and hardware, and vessel head flange
  • boric acid corrosion program, including plant areas:

o RM-1111, A RHR pump room o

RM-1112, A CTMT spray pump room o

RM-1113, A SI pump room o

RM-1114, A CCP room o

RM-1117, A BAT room o

RM-1310, A RHR HX room o

RM-6105, A SPF HX/pump room During the walk downs of the areas, the inspectors did not identify any new signs of aging that affected the structures, systems, or components.

INSPECTION RESULTS

No findings were identified.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

  • On October 12, 2023, the inspectors presented the Post-Approval Site Inspection for License Renewal results to Warren Witt, Senior Director of Nuclear Operations and Plant Manager and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

71003

Calculations

KC-163

Callaway Fire Protection Monitoring Program Calculation

2

71003

Corrective Action

Documents

201902118, 201902358, 201902506, 202205808,

2207467, 202207698, 202207879, 202208145,

2302487, 202303051, 202303052, 202303073,

2303556, 202303961, 202307278, 202307476

71003

Corrective Action

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

2307479

71003

Miscellaneous

Halon System Unavailability Data Cycle 25 and 26

71003

Miscellaneous

Risk Analysis Table - Buried Piping and Tanks

71003

Miscellaneous

Whitepaper - Question and Answer for Cathodic Protection

Anode Replacement/Degradation

71003

Miscellaneous

Plant Health Report - Buried Pipe

10/07/2023

71003

Miscellaneous

CW-AMP-B2.1.4

Boric Acid Corrosion - Program Evaluation Report

000

71003

Miscellaneous

20512327-500

Vendor Report - Thimble Tube Examination Field Report

10/05/2023

71003

Miscellaneous

23001180.500

Investigate/Repair Interruption Capabilities Of Rectifier

CPRQH1022-CATHODIC PROTECTION RECTIFIER (EOF)

71003

Miscellaneous

As Found Buried

Piping Inspection

BN-003-HCD, BN-007-HCB, EF-003-AZC, EF-003-HCC,

KH2-101, KH2-102, JE-003-HBC, JE-018-HBC, JE-020-HBC,

JE-021-HBC, JE-048-HBC

71003

Miscellaneous

CW-AMP-B2.1.13

Fire Protection - Program Evaluation Report

000

71003

Miscellaneous

CW-AMP-B2.1.22

Flux Thimble Tube Inspection - Program Evaluation Report

000

71003

Miscellaneous

CW-AMP-B2.1.25

Buried and Underground Piping and Tanks - Program

Evaluation Report

000

71003

Miscellaneous

CW-AMP-B2.1.3

Reactor Head Closure Stud Bolting - Program Evaluation

Report

000

71003

Miscellaneous

FR271659-01

Vendor Report - InVista' and LifeQuest' Pipeline

Inspection of 12-Inch AL-001-HBD

11/20/2020

71003

Miscellaneous

NRC BULLETIN

NO. 88-09

Thimble Tube Thinning In Westinghouse Reactors

07/26/1998

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

71003

Miscellaneous

NUREG-2172

Safety Evaluation Report Related to the License Renewal of

Callaway Plant, Unit 1

03/01/2015

71003

Miscellaneous

TS Coverage

23 report

summary

Cathodic Protection Polarization Survey Results (2019 -

23)

71003

Miscellaneous

Updated Final

Safety Analysis

Report

Chapter 19.0 - License Renewal Supplement

71003

Miscellaneous

Vendor Manual

Watchdog Scout Rectifier Monitoring System with Interruption

71003

NDE Reports

20512327-500

Thimble Tube Examination Field Report

10/5/2023

71003

NDE Reports

5040-16-0014

VT-1 Examination Report: Nuts inspected: 25, 28, 37, 40,

2R1

Washers inspected: 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41,

2R1

04/15/2016

71003

NDE Reports

5040-16-0016

VT-1 Examination Report: Nuts inspected 13, 16, 43, 46, 49,

& 52.

Washers inspected 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47,

48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, & 54.

04/21/2016

71003

NDE Reports

5040-16-0017

VT-1 Examination Report: Nuts inspected:

03,06,10,22,24R

1,31,34

Washers inspected:

1,2,3,4,5,6,7R

1, 8,

9R

1, 10,

11,12,19,20,21,22,23,24R

1,31,32,33,34,35R

1,36

04/15/2016

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

71003

NDE Reports

5040-16-0020

VT-1 Examination Report: Nut #19

04/18/2016

71003

NDE Reports

5040-23-0036

VT-1 Examination Report: 2-CH-NUT-20, 2-CH-NUT-21, and

2-CH-NUT-23

10/12/2023

71003

NDE Reports

5040-23-0037

VT-1 Examination Report: 2-CH-NUT-14, 2-CH-NUT-15, 2-

CH-NUT-17 and 2-CH-NUT-18

10/10/2023

71003

NDE Reports

5040-23-0038

VT-1 Examination Report: 2-CH-NUT-02-R1, 2-CH-NUT-04-

R1, 2-CH-NUT-05-R1, 2-CH-NUT-38, 2-CH-NUT-39,

2-CH-NUT-41

10/10/2023

71003

NDE Reports

UT-023-009

Ultrasonic Calibration/Examination Data Sheet: 54 RPV Studs

10/13/2023

71003

NDE Reports

WDI-PJF-

1316481-FSR-

001

Reactor Vessel Nozzle Inspection Outage RF21 Interval 4

Period 1 2016: Threads in Flange Ultrasonic Examination

4/20/2016

71003

Procedures

APA-ZZ-00703

Fire Protection Operability Criteria And Surveillance

Requirements

034

71003

Procedures

EDP-ZZ-01004

Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program

71003

Procedures

EDP-ZZ-01011

Buried Pipe Inspection Program

016

71003

Procedures

EDP-ZZ-01011

APPENDIX 1

License Renewal Scope Inspections

000

71003

Procedures

EDP-ZZ-04044

Fire Protection Reviews

20

71003

Procedures

ETP-BB-01200

Incore Flux Thimble Tube Inspection Program

001

71003

Procedures

MDP-ZZ-LM001

Fluid Leak Management Program

71003

Procedures

MSM-KC-FQ001

Functional Test - Halon Systems Protecting Safety Related

Areas

038

71003

Procedures

MSM-KC-FT001

Halon Fire Protection Cylinder Inspection

038

71003

Procedures

MSM-ZZ-FG002

Fire Damper Inspection And Drop Test

2

71003

Procedures

OSP-KC-00015

Fire Door Inspections

24

71003

Procedures

QCP-ZZ-05040

Visual Examination to ASME VT-1

71003

Procedures

QCP-ZZ-05048

Boric Acid Walkdown for RCS Pressure Boundary

71003

Procedures

QCP-ZZ-05049

RPV Head Bare Metal Examination

71003

Procedures

QSP-ZZ-65045

Fire Barrier Seal Visual Inspection

2

71003

Procedures

QSP-ZZ-65046

Fire Barrier Inspection

017

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

71003

Self-

Assessments

OSA-202200120-

056

License Renewal IP 71003 Phase 1 Inspection

09/13/2023

71003

Work Orders

Job

16508715, 17005309, 18510366, 21506309. 22505625,

2506565, 22502427, 22504564, 22506453, 22500962,

21506809, 23001180, 23001182