IR 05000482/2006004

IR 05000482-06-004, Errata for Wolf Creek Generating Station

ML070100532
Person / Time
Site:	Wolf Creek
Issue date:	01/10/2007
From:	Vincent Gaddy NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-B
To:	Muench R Wolf Creek
References
IR-06-004
Download: ML070100532 (5)

Text

ary 10, 2007

SUBJECT:

ERRATA FOR WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000482/2006004

Dear Mr. Muench:

Please replace page 23 of the Report Details in NRC Inspection Report 05000428/2006004, dated November 9, 2006, with the enclosed revised page. This change is needed to properly characterize the crosscutting aspects associated with failure to close Valves EC-V025 and-V033 during a lineup to recirculate the refueling water storage tank through the spent fuel pool cleanup system.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, your response (if any) will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Should you have any questions concerning this inspection, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Vincent G. Gaddy, Chief Project Branch B Division of Reactor Projects Docket: 50-482 License: NPF-42 Enclosure:

As stated

Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation -2-cc w/enclosure:

Vice President Operations/Plant Manager Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corp.

P.O. Box 411 Burlington, KS 66839 Jay Silberg, Esq.

Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP 2300 N Street, NW Washington, DC 20037 Supervisor Licensing Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corp.

P.O. Box 411 Burlington, KS 66839 Chief Engineer Utilities Division Kansas Corporation Commission 1500 SW Arrowhead Road Topeka, KS 66604-4027 Office of the Governor State of Kansas Topeka, KS 66612 Attorney General 120 S.W. 10th Avenue, 2nd Floor Topeka, KS 66612-1597 County Clerk Coffey County Courthouse 110 South 6th Street Burlington, KS 66839-1798 Chief, Radiation and Asbestos Control Section Kansas Department of Health and Environment Bureau of Air and Radiation 1000 SW Jackson, Suite 310 Topeka, KS 66612-1366

Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation -3-Chief, Radiological Emergency Preparedness Section Kansas City Field Office Chemical and Nuclear Preparedness and Protection Division Dept. of Homeland Security 9221 Ward Parkway Suite 300 Kansas City, MO 64114-3372

Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation -4-Electronic distribution by RIV:

Regional Administrator (BSM1)

DRP Director (ATH)

DRS Director (DDC)

DRS Deputy Director (RJC1)

Senior Resident Inspector (SDC)

SRI, Callaway (MSP)

Branch Chief, DRP/B (VGG)

Senior Project Engineer, DRP/B (FLB2)

Team Leader, DRP/TSS (MAS3)

RITS Coordinator (MSH3)

DRS STA (DAP)

D. Cullison, OEDO RIV Coordinator (DGC)

ROPreports WC Site Secretary (SLA2)

W. A. Maier, RSLO (WAM)

R. E. Kahler, NSIR (REK)

SUNSI Review Completed: __yes__ ADAMS: / Yes G No Initials: __vgg__

/ Publicly Available G Non-Publicly Available G Sensitive / Non-Sensitive R:\_REACTORS\_WC\2006\WC2006-04RP Errata.wpd C:DRP/B VGGaddy;df

/RA/

1/10/07 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY T=Telephone E=E-mail F=Fax

Analysis: The failure to completely close Valves EC-V025 and -V033 was considered a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the barrier integrity cornerstone attribute of configuration control and affected the cornerstone objective to maintain functionality of the SFP system. Using Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 worksheets, the inspectors determined that the finding is only of very low significance because the finding only affected the barrier function of the SFP. The inspectors also determined that the finding has crosscutting aspects in the area of human performance associated with work practices because the operators failed to use appropriate human error prevention techniques, such as peer-checking and not proceeding in the face of uncertainty.

Enforcement: TS 5.4.1.a, Procedures, requires that written procedures be established, implemented, and maintained covering the activities specified in Appendix A, Typical Procedures for Pressurized Water Reactors, of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Quality Assurance Program Requirements, February 1978. Appendix A, Item 3.h, requires procedures for SFP cooling system operation. Station Procedure SYS EC-121, Recirculation of the RWST Through the Fuel Pool Cleanup System, Revision 11, step 6.1.3, requires that Valves EC-V025 and -V033 be closed when placing the RWST in recirculation through the SFP cleanup system. Contrary to the above procedure, on May 27, 2006, an operator failed to close Valves EC-V025 and-V033. Because this finding is of very low safety significance and was entered into the licensee's CAP as Condition Report 2006-000589, this violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy:

NCV 05000482/2006004-02, Failure to completely close SFP valves resulted in a loss of SFP water inventory.

4OA3 Followup of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion (71153)

Personnel Performance During Nonroutine Evolutions, Events and Transients a. Inspection Scope The inspectors: (1) reviewed operator logs, plant computer data, and/or strip charts for the below listed evolutions to evaluate operator performance in coping with nonroutine events and transients; (2) verified that operator actions were in accordance with the response required by plant procedures and training; and (3) verified that the licensee has identified and implemented appropriate corrective actions associated with personnel performance problems that occurred during the events sampled.

• On June 22, 2006, the inspectors observed site response to a portable air monitor alarm in the radwaste building at the 1976 foot level. Following the start of a volume control tank purge on the chemical volume control system, the purge was secured due to unexpected excessive moisture in the oxygen flow meter to the recombiner inlet. After approximately 10 minutes of draining the moisture, the purge was re-initiated. Approximately 40 minutes after restarting the purge, airborne activity levels increased in the radwaste building and the volume control tank purge was secured. The licensee determined that the unexpected airborne activity was caused by opening Valve HA-V0706 to drain the moisture which-23- Enclosure