IR 05000456/2012009
| ML12362A257 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Braidwood  |
| Issue date: | 12/27/2012 |
| From: | Duncan E R Region 3 Branch 3 |
| To: | Pacilio M J Exelon Generation Co |
| References | |
| IR-12-009 | |
| Download: ML12362A257 (21) | |
Text
December 27, 2012
Mr. Michael Senior Vice President, Exelon Generation Company, LLC President and Chief Nuclear Officer (CNO), Exelon Nuclear 4300 Winfield Road Warrenville, IL 60555
SUBJECT: BRAIDWOOD STATION, UNIT 2, SUPPLEMENTAL INSPECTION REPORT 05000457/2012009 AND ASSESSMENT FOLLOW-UP LETTER
Dear Mr. Pacilio:
On November 30, 2012, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a supplemental inspection pursuant to Inspection Procedure 95001, "Supplemental Inspection for One or Two White Inputs in a Strategic Performance Area," at your Braidwood Station, Unit 2. The enclosed report documents the inspection results, which were discussed during a Regulatory Performance Meeting on November 30, 2012, with Mr. D. Enright and other members of your staff. In accordance with the NRC Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) Action Matrix, this supplemental inspection was performed to follow up on the White Mitigating System Performance Index (MSPI) for the Cooling Water Systems Performance Indicator (PI) which crossed the threshold from Green to White in the second quarter of 2012. We documented this issue in our Assessment Follow-Up Letter (ML12220A393) to you on August 6, 2012. The NRC staff was informed by your letter (ML12305A423) dated October 30, 2012, of your readiness for this inspection. The objective of this supplemental inspection was to provide assurance that the root causes and contributing causes resulting in the White MSPI were understood, the extent of condition and extent of cause were identified, and that the corrective actions were sufficient to address the root causes and contributing causes and to prevent recurrence. The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspector reviewed selected procedures and records and interviewed personnel. Based on the results of this inspection, no findings were identified. We determined that your root cause evaluation was conducted to a level of detail commensurate with the significance of the problem and reached reasonable conclusions as to the root and contributing causes of the event. We also concluded that you identified the extent of condition and extent of cause of the issue, that you identified appropriate corrective actions for each root and contributing cause, and that you appropriately prioritized these actions. As a result of our quarterly review of plant performance, which was completed on October 31, 2012, the NRC updated its assessment of Braidwood Station Unit 2. The NRC's evaluation consisted of a review of PIs and inspection results. The NRC's review of Braidwood Unit 2 identified that the MSPI for the Cooling Water Systems returned to the Green performance band in the third quarter of 2012. In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0305, "Operating Reactor Assessment Program," the MSPI for the Cooling Water Systems is considered a Green Action Matrix input as of July 1, 2012. Therefore, as a result of the successful completion of the supplemental inspection and a Green MSPI for the Cooling Water Systems, the NRC determined the performance at Braidwood Station, Unit 2 to be within the Licensee Response column of the ROP Action Matrix as of the date of this letter. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any), will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records System (PARS) component of NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,/RA/ Eric R. Duncan, Chief Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 50-457 License No. NPF-77
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000457/2012009
w/Attachment:
Supplemental Information cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ Enclosure U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION III Docket No: 50-457 License No: NPF-77 Report No: 05000457/2012009 Licensee: Exelon Generation Company, LLC Facility: Braidwood Station, Unit 2 Location: Braceville, Illinois Dates: November 26, 2012, through November 30, 2012 Inspector: D. Passehl, Senior Reactor Analyst, Region III Approved by: E. Duncan, Chief Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
......................................................................................................... 1
REPORT DETAILS
OTHER ACTIVITIES
...................................................................................................... 3
4OA4 Supplemental Inspection
.............................................................. 3
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
.................................................................................................. 1
LIST OF ITEMS
OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED ........................................................ 1
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
...................................................................................... 2
LIST OF ACRONYMS
- US [[]]
ED .................................................................................................. 3
Enclosure
- OF [[]]
- FINDIN [[]]
- GS Inspection Report (IR) 05000457/2012009; 11/26/12 - 11/30/12; Braidwood Station, Unit 2; Supplemental Inspection - Inspection Procedure 95001. This supplemental inspection was performed by a Region
- NRC 's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in
- NUREG -1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006. A. Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
- NRC [[-Identified and Self-Revealed Findings This supplemental inspection was performed in accordance with Inspection Procedure 95001, "Supplemental Inspection for One or Two White Inputs in a Strategic Performance Area," to assess the licensee's root cause evaluation, extent of condition and extent of cause determination, and corrective actions related to the identification of a White performance indicator (PI) with the Cooling Water Systems element of the Mitigating Systems Performance Index (MSPI). Specifically, this Cooling Water Systems]]
- 2012 PI submittal. In preparation for the inspection, the licensee performed Root Cause Evaluation (
- CWS [[[Cooling Water Systems]," to identify the root and contributing causes for this White]]
- MSPI was due to probabilistic risk assessment model change errors, operating restrictions on the cooling water systems, and equipment failures; and that these problems were due to organizational weaknesses with
- MS [[]]
RCE. The inspector reviewed corrective actions that were taken or planned to address the identified causes. The inspector also held discussions with licensee personnel to ensure that the root and contributing causes and the contribution of safety culture components were understood, and corrective actions taken or planned were appropriate to address the causes and preclude repetition. During this inspection, the inspector determined that the licensee's root cause evaluation was conducted to a level of detail commensurate with the significance of the problem and reached reasonable conclusions as to the root and contributing causes of the event. The inspector also concluded that the licensee identified appropriate corrective actions for each root and contributing cause and that these actions were appropriately
prioritized. Consistent with
NRC Action Matrix input as of July 1, 2012. Therefore, since all other NRC Action Matrix
Enclosure inputs are currently Green, Braidwood Station, Unit 2 has transitioned from the Regulatory Response column back to the Licensee Response column of the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) Action Matrix as of the date of this supplemental inspection report and assessment follow-up letter. B. None. Licensee-Identified Violations
Enclosure
- REPORT [[]]
- OTHER [[]]
- 4OA [[4 Supplemental Inspection (95001) .01 Inspection Scope This inspection was conducted in accordance with Inspection Procedure 95001, "Supplemental Inspection for One or Two White Inputs in a Strategic Performance Area," to assess the licensee's evaluation associated with unreliability and unavailability reporting in the Cooling Water Systems element of the Mitigating Systems Performance Index (]]
- PI [[submittal. The inspection objectives were to: Provide assurance that the root causes and contributing causes of risk-significant performance issues were understood; Provide assurance that the extent of condition and extent of cause of risk-significant issues were identified; and Provide assurance that the licensee's corrective actions for risk-significant performance issues were or will be sufficient to address the root causes and contributing causes, and to prevent recurrence. By letter dated August 6, 2012, the]]
- NRC communicated the results of its quarterly evaluation of plant performance, which was completed on July 31, 2012. The evaluation included an overall review of performance indicators and inspection results. The
- MSPI crossed the Green-to-White threshold in the second quarter of 2012. This was due to probabilistic risk assessment model change errors, operating restrictions on the cooling water system, and equipment failures. The
- NRC determined the performance at Braidwood Station Unit 2 to be in the Regulatory Response column of the
- NRC to conduct this supplemental inspection to review their evaluation of the causes and the actions taken to address the White Cooling Water Systems
- CWS [[[Cooling Water Systems]," to identify the root and contributing causes for the White Cooling Water System]]
RCE in addition to other evaluations conducted in support and as a result of the RCE. The inspector reviewed
Enclosure corrective actions that were taken or planned to address the identified causes. The inspector also held discussions with licensee personnel to ensure that the root and contributing causes and the contribution of safety culture components were understood and corrective actions taken or planned were appropriate to address the causes and preclude repetition. .02 Evaluation of the Inspection Requirements 02.01 Problem Identification a. Determine that the evaluation documented who identified the issue (i.e., license-identified, self-revealed, or
- NRC -identified) and under what conditions the issue was identified. The inspector determined that the licensee's
- RCE [[adequately described the conditions through which this self-revealed issue was identified. During the entry of Cooling Water Systems data into the Consolidated Data Entry (CDE) reporting software for the second quarter 2012, it was self-revealed to the component cooling water and essential service water system managers that the Unit 2 Cooling Water Systems]]
MSPI value of 1.1E-06.
In the subsequent
- MSPI , there were five key contributors that led to the Green-to-White threshold being exceeded. The licensee determined that had any one of the five contributors not occurred, the Cooling Water Systems
- MSPI [[contributors were as follows: Component Cooling Water Pump Pressure Switch Failures; Probabilistic Risk Assessment Model Changes; Component Cooling Water System Split Train Operation; Essential Service Water System Unavailability Above Baseline; and Removal of Credit and Use of the Auxiliary Feedwater (]]
- AF ) System Cross-Tie. b. Determine that the evaluation documented how long the issue existed and prior opportunities for identification. The inspector determined that the licensee's
- RCE adequately documented how long the issues leading to the second quarter 2012 Cooling Water Systems
MSPI data exceeding 1.0E-6 existed and prior opportunities for identification. Component Cooling Water Pump Pressure Switch Failures
Braidwood had two Component Cooling Water (CC) pump failures early in the 12 quarter
- MSPI monitoring period attributable to failures of the pump discharge pressure switches. The first occurred in July 2009 with the 2B
CC pump and the second occurred in
Enclosure January 2010 with the 2A
- CC pump. These switches were considered nonsafety-related and provide for an automatic start of the standby
- CC pump on low discharge header pressure (85 pounds per square inch gauge decreasing). These switches also provide a "CC Pump Discharge Pressure Low" alarm in the Main Control Room. These pressure switch failures were classified as
- MSPI failures because actuation on low discharge pressure had not been explicitly excluded from the monitored scope in the Cooling Water Systems
- MSPI Basis Document. In March 2010, the licensee determined that the switch failures should not have been classified as
- MSPI failures because the switches were not part of the engineered safety feature start circuitry and had no impact on the safety function of the
- CC pumps. Even though the switches were later reclassified, the licensee could not exclude the failures from past consideration because
- MS [[]]
PI is a forward-looking indicator.
The inspector observed that the
- CC pump pressure switch failures contributed the most to the second quarter 2012 Cooling Water Systems
- MSPI value, yet in hindsight was the easiest of the five contributors to address. Had the licensee performed a risk evaluation and removed the switches from the
- MSPI scope following the initial switch failure in July 2009, then the second pressure switch failure in January 2010 would not have been counted and the Cooling Water Systems
- MSPI would have remained Green for the second quarter of 2012. Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Model Changes The licensee determined that the process for
- PRA model changes did not include adequate controls to ensure that an impact to the Cooling Water Systems
MSPI margin was recognized and understood in advance of these changes. Margin refers to the change in Core Damager Frequency (CDF) required for delta-CDF to exceed 1.0E-6/year. Probabilistic Risk Assessment Model Change 6F in September 2011 resulted from CC split train operation (discussed below). Probabilistic Risk Assessment periodic
update
AF cross-tie (also discussed below). The licensee had not recognized the impact of these PRA model changes
sufficiently in advance of the
- MSPI reporting period to identify and evaluate potential conservative assumptions in the model that could have been re-examined and possibly modified to allow the
- MSPI to remain Green. Component Cooling Water Pump Split Train Operation For most of the life of the plant the
- CC system was operated as a shared train system and a semi-shared system between units. This included post-
- LOCA [[[Loss-of-Coolant-Accident] operation, during which time the system would not be split into its individual trains unless there was a leak detected in the system. In late 2008, the licensee found that this practice was not in compliance with the operating license and subsequently required the]]
- CC system to be split with the trains operated independently for emergency core cooling system recirculation during post-
- CC pump was not a fully qualified functional spare pump for it to be aligned to replace the Unit 1 or Unit 2 'B'
CC surge tank during post-LOCA operation. This situation increased the unreliability of the individual CC trains and core damage frequency. This issue of spilt train operation was
Enclosure initially identified by the licensee as early as 2008 at the Byron Station during preparation for an
- NRC Component Design Basis Inspection. Essential Service Water System Unavailability Greater Than Baseline Braidwood essential service water (
- SX ) system planned unavailability had been greater than its predicted baseline unavailability during the 12-quarter
- SX [[Train, for example, the actual planned unavailability from July 2009 through June 2012 was higher than baseline with 236 hours of actual unavailability as compared to a planned unavailability of 135 hours. This was primarily due to normal preventive maintenance work, system upgrades, and degraded component repairs. At the beginning of the second quarter 2012, when the Cooling Water Systems]]
- SX [[maintenance practices over the last 3 years such that activities previously counted towards system unavailability would not be considered as such going forward. Removal of Credit and Use of the Auxiliary Feedwater System Cross-Tie In October 2009 the licensee installed a cross-tie between the Unit 1 and 2 'A' (motor-driven)]]
- 10 CFR 50.59, "Changes, Tests, and Experiments," associated with installation of the cross-tie. Specifically, licensee personnel failed to obtain a required license amendment prior to installing the cross-tie. This issue was documented in
- NRC Inspection Report 05000456/2011004; 05000457/2011004. In response, the licensee removed the reference to the use of the cross-tie in the emergency operating procedures and its credit in the
- CC pump pressure switch failures. c. Determine that the evaluation documented the plant-specific risk consequences, as applicable, and compliance concerns associated with the issue. The inspector determined that the
RCE adequately documented the plant-specific risk consequences and compliance concerns associated with the event. Component Cooling Water Pump Pressure Switch Failures
The
- CC pump pressure switch failures that were identified in July 2009 and January 2010 increased the unreliability of the
- 2012 MSPI monitoring period, the first pressure switch failure in July 2009 would no longer be considered in the reporting of Cooling Water Systems
MSPI data since this failure was outside of the 3-year monitoring period. As discussed earlier, following the second pressure switch failure, the licensee reclassified the pressure switch failures as being of low safety significance. The inspector agreed with the licensee's actions and conclusions regarding reclassification of future pressure switch
Enclosure failures. Therefore, any future
- PRA modeling errors (i.e. modeling mistakes that caused the model to not adequately represent the as-built and as-operated plant). However, the
- PRA model revision process, including an absence of station reviews of pending model changes to identify losses of
- PRA was also used to support other applications, such as online work risk assessments, maintenance rule applications, risk-informed in-service inspections, and risk-informed license amendment requests. All
- MSPI , permitted interim changes if minor modeling assumptions or logic inputs needed to be revised. For
- MSPI [[margin management process was not well defined and relied on a single corporate expert. The corporate knowledge was not adequately captured in processes and procedures. Component Cooling Water System Split Train Operation As discussed above, the licensee revised the operation of]]
- LOCA conditions to require the system to be split. Loss-of-Coolant-Accident events are low likelihood, passive system failure events. The impact of a
- LOCA [[is of greater risk in the split train configuration due to the loss of redundancy and cross-train power supplies. Administrative controls were implemented by the licensee as short-term corrective actions until a license amendment request (LAR) was submitted and approved. These short-term actions included reducing the]]
- 0 CC pump from being aligned to replace either unit's "B" pump. Longer-term corrective actions included modifications to restore compliance with the current licensing basis (
- CC [[system configurations, Byron and Braidwood were working together on a common resolution. At the end of this inspection, the issue had been entered into the licensee's corrective action program and was identified in the root cause report as Corrective Action Item 1, "Submit a]]
- CWS [[[Cooling Water Systems]]]
- NRC Inspection Report 05000454/2011004; 05000455/2011004 for the Byron Station. Essential Service Water System Unavailability Above Baseline Although Braidwood
SX maintenance unavailability had historically exceeded its baseline unavailability value, the overall risk significance was low. In Braidwood Unit 1
Enclosure
- SX pump contributed approximately 1.5 percent to the plant core damage frequency, and for the 1B (normally running)
- SX pump the maintenance term was approximately 0.17 percent. Removal of Credit and Use of the Auxiliary Feedwater System Cross-Tie The compliance issues and risk significance were discussed in a previous
NRC Inspection Report 05000456/2011004; 05000457/2011004. d. Findings No findings were identified. 02.02 Root Cause, Extent of Condition, and Extent of Cause Evaluation a. Determine that the problem was evaluated using a systematic methodology to identify the root and contributing causes. The inspector determined that the root cause evaluation adequately applied systematic methods in evaluating the issue in order to identify root causes and contributing causes.
In the root cause evaluation, the licensee utilized Event and Causal Factor Charting, the TapRooT system, Barrier Analysis, Interviewing, and Why Staircase root cause methodologies. The root cause investigation was conducted by a team of eight investigators. The systematic methodology was applied to the evaluation of plant history, operational changes, and process issues (margin assessment and
- MSPI [[Green-to-White threshold. b. Determine that the root cause evaluation was conducted to a level of detail commensurate with the significance of the problem. The inspector determined that the root cause evaluation was conducted to a level of detail commensurate with the significance of the problem and reached reasonable conclusions as to the root and contributing causes of the event. As a result of the investigation into these issues the licensee identified two root causes (RCs) and five contributing causes (CCs). The identified root causes were as follows:]]
- MS [[]]
PI margin. The identified contributing causes were as follows:
Enclosure
- GDC [[[General Design Criteria] 44;]]
- AA [[-600-1015, "FPIE [Full Power Internal Events]]]
- CC -5: Less reliable replacement switches for the component cooling water pumps caused increased failures. The licensee's root cause evaluation found the overall process for managing
- MS [[]]
PI margin over time. A key factor that
impacted all of the identified root and contributing causes was management of the site
MSPI margin is known and understood prior to model approval, and that the margin status is precisely communicated to station management. c. Determine that the root cause evaluation included a consideration of prior occurrences
of the problem and knowledge of prior operating experience. The inspector determined that the root cause evaluation included consideration of prior occurrences of the problem and knowledge of prior operating experience. The root cause evaluation included a search for prior occurrences and operating experience within internal and external databases, including the Exelon Corrective Action Program database.
With regard to prior occurrences, the root cause evaluation included a search of corrective action documents to identify previous events related to
- IR [[s. With regard to operating experience, the root cause evaluation report discussed ten operating experience issues external to Exelon. The licensee performed an adequate review of these issues. No new corrective action documents were written as a result of the operating experience reviews since either relevant issues were already captured as part of the licensee's own root cause investigation, or the issues did not impact]]
- MSPI. [[Enclosure d. Determine that the root cause evaluation addressed the extent of condition and the extent of cause of the problem. The inspector concluded that the licensee adequately addressed the extent of condition and extent of cause of the problem. The inspector's review of the extent of condition for which the root and contributing causes were identified found that each problem was evaluated against other systems or programs that may be affected. The extent of condition included assignments to review the root and contributing causes at other plants in the Exelon fleet and to implement additional reviews for Low Margin and "At-Risk"]]
- MSPI [[systems. The licensee's extent of cause effort included a review of each of the seven root and contributing causes and either described how the causes were being reviewed (including a reference to an action tracking item) or statements on acceptability. e. Determine that the root cause, extent of condition, and extent of cause evaluations appropriately considered the safety culture components as described in Inspection Manual Chapter (]]
IMC) 0305. The inspector determined that the root cause, extent of condition, and extent of cause evaluations appropriately considered the safety culture components as described in IMC 0305.
The inspector reviewed the
- RCE and validated the licensee had systematically considered each of the safety culture components. The safety culture components, as identified in
NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2006-13, "Information on the Changes Made to the Reactor Oversight Process to More Fully Address Safety Culture," were assessed as part of this root cause. Issues were identified in the areas of decision-making, work control, work practices, corrective action program, and continuous learning
environment. Recommended actions to address these issues were properly identified in the RCE report. f. Findings No findings were identified. 02.03 Corrective Actions a. Determine that appropriate corrective actions are specified for each root and contributing cause or that the licensee has an adequate evaluation for why no corrective actions are necessary.
The inspector reviewed applicable corrective actions (CAs) and corrective actions to prevent recurrence (CAPRs) and determined that the licensee specified reasonable and
appropriate corrective actions for each root and contributing cause. The root cause evaluation report identified
- CA s, and 12 action items (ACITs). There were also pre-existing corrective action items for the specific key factors discussed earlier. The inspector confirmed that each
CA were entered into the licensee's computerized tracking system, and sampled the other corrective action
Enclosure program assignments. In those instances when it was determined that no corrective actions were necessary, the basis for those decisions were clearly documented in the RCE. b. Determine that corrective actions have been prioritized with consideration of risk
significance and regulatory compliance. The inspector concluded that the licensee adequately prioritized the corrective actions with consideration of the risk significance and regulatory compliance. Overall, the corrective action implementation deadlines appeared reasonable and commensurate with risk significance. The licensee's immediate corrective actions appeared effective in preventing similar events until the long-term
- CAPR s could be completed. Time frames for actions to address the root causes and contributing causes were established commensurate with their safety significance and contribution to the event. There were two regulatory issues referenced related to the
LAR. c. Determine that a schedule has been established for implementing and completing the corrective actions. The inspector determined that the licensee adequately established a schedule for implementing and completing the corrective actions. The licensee assigned completion due dates that were commensurate with the safety significance of the issues being addressed as well as the level of effort required to complete the actions. Completion dates were being tracked in the corrective action program. d. Determine that quantitative or qualitative measures of success have been developed for determining the effectiveness of the corrective actions to prevent recurrence. The inspector determined that the licensee adequately developed quantitative or qualitative measures of success for determining effectiveness of the corrective actions
to prevent recurrence.
Each root cause had an associated effectiveness review scheduled in the corrective action program. The effectiveness reviews were all scheduled to be completed 1 year after the associated
- CAPR [[s had been completed to allow an adequate basis to assess effectiveness. The inspector determined that the effectiveness review criteria established for the issues were appropriate. e. Determine that the corrective actions planned or taken adequately address a]]
NOV that was the basis for the supplemental inspection, if applicable.
Enclosure The White Cooling Water Systems
- NOV. [[Therefore, this inspection aspect was not applicable and, as a result, was not reviewed. f. Findings No findings were identified. 02.04 Evaluation of Inspection Manual Chapter 0305 Criteria for Treatment of Old Design Issues The licensee did not request credit for self-identification of an old design issue; therefore, the White Cooling Water Systems]]
- 4OA [[6 Management Meetings .01 Exit Meeting Summary The inspector presented the inspection results to Mr. D. Enright and other members of the licensee management on November 30, 2012. Proprietary material received during the inspection was returned to the licensee and was not included in this report. .02 Regulatory Performance Meeting On November 30, 2012, the]]
- MSPI that resulted in Braidwood Station, Unit 2, being placed in the Regulatory Response column of the
- ROP Action Matrix. This discussion included the causes, corrective actions, extent of condition, extent of cause, and other planned licensee actions.
- SUPPLE [[]]
- MENTAL [[]]
- INFORM [[]]
- SUPPLE [[]]
- MENTAL [[]]
- INFORM [[]]
- ATION [[]]
- KEY [[]]
- POINTS [[]]
- OF [[]]
- D. [[Enright, Site Vice President M. Kanavos, Plant Manager Licensee M. Marchionda-Palmer, Director, Site Operations G. Krueger, Director, Probabilistic Risk Assessment P. Boyle, Director, Site Work Management F. Gogliotti, Senior Manager, Plant Engineering P. Raush, Senior Manager, Design Engineering R. Radulovich, Manager, Site Nuclear Oversight J. Kijowski, Manager,]]
- NSSS Systems C. VanDenburgh, Manager, Site Regulatory Assurance J. Odeen, Manager, Site Projects J. Nedza, Supervisor, Security Operations C. Xydis, Supervisor, Radwaste/Environmental D. Gullott, Corporate Licensing
- J. Bashor, Special Projects R. Linthicum, Risk Engineer H. Addis, Risk Management S. Falvo, Risk Management J. Zoeller, Nuclear Oversight M. Abbas,
- G. Shear, Deputy Division Director, Division of Reactor Projects Nuclear Regulatory Commission E. Duncan, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 3 D. Passehl, Senior Reactor Analyst J. Benjamin, Senior Resident Inspector C. Sanders, Reactor Operations Engineer
- LIST [[]]
- OF [[]]
- ITEMS [[]]
- CLOSED [[]]
- AND [[]]
DISCUSSED Opened None. Closed None. Discussed None.
Attachment
- LIST [[]]
- OF [[]]
- DOCUME [[]]
- NTS [[]]
- REVIEW [[]]
- ED The following is a list of documents reviewed during the inspection. Inclusion on this list does not imply that the
- NRC inspector reviewed the documents in their entirety, but rather, that selected sections of portions of the documents were evaluated as part of the overall inspection effort. Inclusion of a document on this list does not imply
- NRC acceptance of the document or any part of it, unless this is stated in the body of the inspection report. Documents Reviewed
- MRC [[[Management Review Committee]]]
- BRD [[]]
- CDBI [[[Component Design Bases Inspection]]]
- FASA [[]]
- LOCA [[[Loss-of-Coolant-Accident] Passive Failures (Byron)]]
- EACE [[[Equipment Apparent Cause Evaluation] - Extent Of Condition Review]]
- FPIE [[]]
CWS [Cooling Water Systems]
Attachment
- LIST [[]]
- OF [[]]
- ACRONY [[]]
- MS [[]]
- USED [[]]
- M. [[Pacilio -2- We determined that your root cause evaluation was conducted to a level of detail commensurate with the significance of the problem and reached reasonable conclusions as to the root and contributing causes of the event. We also concluded that you identified the extent of condition and extent of cause of the issue, that you identified appropriate corrective actions for each root and contributing cause, and that you appropriately prioritized these actions. As a result of our quarterly review of plant performance, which was completed on October 31, 2012, the]]
- MSPI for the Cooling Water Systems returned to the Green performance band in the third quarter of 2012. In accordance with
- MSPI for the Cooling Water Systems is considered a Green Action Matrix input as of July 1, 2012. Therefore, as a result of the successful completion of the supplemental inspection and a Green
- MS [[]]
PI for the Cooling
Water Systems, the
- NRC determined the performance at Braidwood Station, Unit 2 to be within the Licensee Response column of the
- NRC 's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any), will be available electronically for public inspection in the
PARS)
component of
NRC Website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room). Sincerely,
/RA/ Eric
- NPF -77 Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000457/2012009 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ
- DOCUME [[]]
- NT [[]]
- MSPI. docx Publicly Available Non-Publicly Available Sensitive Non-Sensitive To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the concurrence box "C" = Copy without attach/encl "E" = Copy with attach/encl "N" = No copy
- OFFICE [[]]
- RIII [[]]
- RIII [[]]
- RIII [[]]
- NAME [[]]
- RECORD [[]]
- BRAIDW [[]]
- OOD [[]]
- SUPPLE [[]]
- MENTAL [[]]
- INSPEC [[]]
- TION [[]]
- AND [[]]
- ASSESS [[]]
- MENT [[]]
- UP [[]]
- LETT [[]]
- ER [[]]