IR 05000443/1989010
| ML19325C902 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 10/02/1989 |
| From: | Fox E, Lazarus W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19325C901 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-443-89-10, NUDOCS 8910180073 | |
| Download: ML19325C902 (9) | |
Text
r; m
.
,
<
,
,
i.?.,y.
..
p.
. c.;
(e t yi-i -
a
,
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
-*
- REGION:1-Report No.. 50-443/89-10
-
,
Docket No. _50-443
,.
. License No. CPPR-135 Priority---
Category
.Q
- Licensee:
Public Service Co. of New Hamoshir.t P.O. Box 330-h Manchester. New Hamoshire 03105 Facility Name:~
Seabrook Station l
Inspection At:
Seabrook. New Hamoshire L3
.
.
. September 26-28.'1989
Inspection ~ Conduct'ed:
l[
Inspectors: k brea k to[2 fQ
'
i E. F. Fox, Jr., 9r. Emergency Preparedness
/date
lt Specialist, EPS, FRS&SB, DRSS
,
C. Amato, EPS, FRS&SB, DRSS A. Cerne, SRI, Seabrook Nuclear Power Station
'
i ll R..Serbu, PEPB, NRR-
' '
W. Laza us, Chief, EPS, FRS&SB, DRSS
-
[
m
/d/ P
Approved by:
e W.pa'zpfgh, Chief. Emergency Preparedness date
- Section, FRS&SB, DRSS l
L
. Inspection Summarvt.
Inspection on September 26-28. 1989 I
(Recort No. 50-443/89-10)
. l
<
.
Areas Inspected:
Routine, announced emergency preparedness inspection and observation of the licensee's partial-participation annual emergency'
- preparedness exercise conducted on September 27, 1989. The inspection was
- performed by a team of five NRC Region I and headquarters personnel.
- Results: -
No violations, deviations or unresolved items were identified. The licensee's response actions for this exercise demonstrated the ability to
- implement the emergency plan in a manner which would provide adequate I
- protective measures for the health and safety of the public.
<
8910180073 891005
.
t
,ye vy v
r,,-r
.-%.,-,-w,*~~+
r
- - -
,-w m,,--.,
.
.,se+-
. --,
m
-,
,-,.,.
...--r r
..
.-,-c--,
.
,- - ee r--,
.
,
_
(;
",
'
l3'f i
.
L
'
. DETAILS
,
p
.1.0L Persons Contacted
-
.n The following licensee rep'resentatives attended the exit meeting held on'
-September 28,.1989.
>
S. Buchwald, Quality As:;urance Supervisor R. Boyd, Jr., Performance Services Manager E.' Brown, President
. A. Callendrello, Manager, Emergency Planning Licensing P. Casey, Senior Emergency Planner E. Desmarais, Independent Review Team Manager B; Drawbridge, Executive Director Nuclear Production J. Ellis, Manager, Response and Implementation T.. Feigenbaum, Chief Operating Officer and Sr Vice President
.
T. Grew,' Manager, Specialty Training J..Grillo, Operations Manager.
T. Harpster, Director,: Licensing Services-J. MacDonald, Radiological-Technical Specialist L
J. Martin,. Manager, Community Relations l
D. McLain, Production Services Manager y
n D. Moody, Station Manager
.j P. Richardson, Manager, Training
~
N. Pillsbury. Director, Quality Programs
'P. Stroup, Director, Emergency Implement.ation and Response W. Sturgeon, Nuclear Services Manager R. Sweeny,. Bethesda Licensing Office Manager 0. Tailleart,~ Emergency Preparedness Manager
>
J.-Tefft, Lead Engineer
R. Winn, Director, Corporate Communications During the conduct of the. inspection, other licensee emergency response personnel were interviewed and observed.
l
,
l
?
2.0. Emeroency Exercise The Seabrook Station partial-participation exercise of the licensee's on-site
,
Emergency Plan was conducted on September 27, 1989, from 8:00 a.m. until 3:30 v
p.m.. FEMA did not observe. There was limited 'off-site participation of State of New Hampshire' Incident Field Office (IF0) and the licensee's Off-site Response Organization (ORO) to test the interface with the licensee's on-site emergency response personnel.
2.1 Pre-exercise Activities The exercise objectives submitted to the NRC Region I on June 30, 1989 were
reviewed and determined to adequately test the licensee's Emergency Plan.
On
'
July 27,1989, the i W ce submitted the complete scenario package for NRC review and evaluat ; e k.gion I representatives had telephone conversations with the licensee's er.a acy preparedness staff to discuss the scope and content of the scenaric xs a result, minor revisions were made to the scenario and supporting' data provided by the licensee. As this was a partial-participation er.ercise, it was not necessary to demonstrate off-site
.. -,
~.
...
.
.
.
.. -.
..
..
..
-.
.
..- - --
.
..
-
.
, 'y
.t
,
-
1 protective actions.
It'was determined that the scenario would support an
)
adequate partial-participation exercise of the licensee's Emergency Plan and-
'
- n Implementing Procedures.
The scenario' involved a loss-of-cooli,nt accident which would result in declaration of a Site Area Emergency-and would test the licensee's on-site emergency response facilities including the' functions.of
-
R dose. assessment, protective action decision-making, and the' interface with the
,
State of New Hampshire officials and the OR0, which compensates for the lack of participation by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Although a major-release of radioactivity was not included in the scenario, the existence of
,
the potential for such a release would force the demonstration of the' major
'
areas of the licensee's emergency response organization. NRC observers attended a licensee briefing on: September 27, 1989 and participated.in the discussion of emergency. response actions expected during the scenario.
It was agreed that controllers would intercede in exercise activities to prevent scenario deviations or disruption.of normal plant operations.
L The exercise scenario included the following events:
Loss-of both emergency diesel generators requiring declaration of
--
an UNUSUAL EVENT;-
L A leak in the reactor coolant system of greater than 50 gallons
-.
l per minute from the Resistance Temperature Detector (RTD) manifold return line isolation valve requiring declaration of an ALERT; A small break loss-of coolant accident (LOCA) from the RTD
--
,
manifold requiring declaration of a SITE AREA EMERGENCY.
l K
The above events caused the activation of the licensee's on-site emergency
<
response facilities and demonstration of the interface with the OR0 and the State of New Hampshire.
2.2 Activities Observed l
During the conduct of the licensee's exercise, NRC team members made detailed i.
observations of the activation and augmentation of the emergency response organization, activation of emergency response facilities, and actions of emergency response personnel during the operation of the emergency response facilities. The following activities were observed:
1.
Detection, classification, and assessment of scenario events; l
2.
Direction and coordination of the emergency response; 3.
Notification of licensee personnel and off-site agencies; 4.
Communications /information flow, and record keeping; 5.
Assessment and projection of radiological dose and consideration of protective actions; u
6.
Provisions for in-plant radiation protection; I
7.
Performance of off-site and in-plant radiological surveys; 8.
Maintenance of site security and access control; 9.
Perfonnance of technical support, repair and corrective actions; 10.
Assembly and accountability of personnel; and 11.
Provisions for communicating information to the public.
I
'-
.. -.. -. -
--
... -
-..
-
- - -
-.
..
.-
+
-
,
.,
.,
I
'
'
.e
. l
'..
.
.q,
.
.
.-
.
1/
.
.
3.0-Classification of Exercise Findinas.
' j
%
Emergency Preparedness exercise findings are classified as follows:
' Exercise Strenoths
-
Exercise strengths are areas of the licensee's response that provide I
'
strong positive indication of the ability to cope with abnormal plant conditions and implement the emergency plan and procedures.
1,.
Exercise Weaknesses Exercise weaknesses are areas of the licensee's response in which the-performance was such that it could have precluded effective.
. implementation of. the emergency plan in the event of an actual emergency-L in the area being' observed.
Existence,of an exercise weakness does not of itself indicate that the overall response was inadequate to protect-1:
the health and safety of the public.
'
Areas for Imorovement An area for improvement is an area which did not have a significant
,
negative impact on the ability to implement the emergency plan and
response was adequate; however it should be evaluated by the licensee to determine if corrective action could improve perforinance.
4.0 Exercice Observations The inspectors observed licensee response actions in the emergency
.
response facilities-as follows:
-
Control Room (The licensee' simulator was used)
Several exercise strengths were identified.
1.
The shift crew demonstrated alertness and fast response to alarms and indications.
For exa:ple, the increased leakage from the reactor coolant system was quickly identified and quantified based on-decreasing pressurizer level before any alarms were received which would have brought it.to the operators' attention.
2.
The Shift Supervisor (SS) completed correct preliminary classification of the UNUSUAL EVENT in 2 minutes and announced it as soon as the loss of the second diesel generator was confirmed by the auxiliary operator (total elapsed time of 4 minutes).
3.
Notifications of the UNUSUAL EVENT were made to the states within 3 minutes and the NRC within 9 minutes of the classification of the event. Since the exercise involved the use of the simulator control room rather than the actual control room, these times are based on when the operators simulated the use of the " orange"
.
.
..
-
..
- -
- -
. -.....
.
.
.
-
.
-
-
.
---
--
--
-
,
,,
,
p (
i
-
j
= 4
,
,
upu
. c
,
'1
- i
~
.
phone (used for notificationof New Hampshire and Massachusetts)
and the-NRC Emergency Notification' System phone in the simulator Ti
.
control room.- -These emergency phones are'not capable of being
used from the simulator.
In an actual: event, the calls are made j
l
- from phones which are operable,in the plant control room.
.
The: Shift Supervisor / Shift Techncial Advisor (SS/STA) conducted
!
- 4.
=
,
frequent, independent critical safety function checks of the'
pl ant.
5.
There was excellenticommunication among the shift personnel.
,
I 6.~
Correct recognition of and adherence to Technical Specification
- Action Statements'were demonstrated.
.
7.
Routine operations and emergency procedure compliance were._
j professional and precise.
,
-
' 8.
Good communication was maintained with emergency response a
L personnel outside the control room. An additional licensed operator reported ~ to the control room after the declaration of the
'
ALERT to set' up and maintain direct on-line communications with.
the Technical Support Center (TSC) and Operations' Support Center (OSC)v ' This aided in establishing' priorities-for direction' of repair and troubleshooting activities outside the control room.
One. area for' improvement was brought to the licensee's attention:
-i The transfer of authority from the Short-Term Emergency Director
(STED):(Shift Supervisor in the Control Room) to the Site Emergency Director (SED) in the Technical Support Center was not-
- announced on the plant paging system. Although the STED and SED were both clearly aware that the. transfer had occurred,
,
o announcement of that fact may be beneficial to other emergency
,
response personnel.
Technical Suonort Center Several exercise strengths were identified, l
-
o
'
l.
Appropriate engineering solutions were pursued to correct or mitigate casualties to equipment, including S
Use of both a fire truck and compressed gas cylinders on-site to recharge the emergency diesel generator air bank; J
Use of the site-specific Probabilistic Risk Assessment to identify probable locations of the reactor coolant system leakage and the subsequent small-break LOCA.
'
.
sj
,-qg
-,, -,
..y~
+
a
---
,,r-r
--,
,,, -,,
--
,,
,
.
-
.
_
_
_
_
,
,M'1'
-
i
,
'
- v'6,
u
.
v,s a
... m < :
g n q(s,
, _
j
'
'
,
1;'
2.
Additional support was sought from a6d use was 'made of Yankee l<
' Atomic Service Department'to identify the location 'of the reactor
- coolant; system _ leakage -
3.
Communications were effective and continuous.
]
'
'
4..
Effective use was made of status boards which were updated every
fifteen minutes. Data relating to Regulatory Guide 1.97. accident-.
]
(
variables were trended, including extrapolation of Refueling Water
Storage Tank level and interpretation of the trend.
Plots were
>
cross correlated. -
,
- 5.
Discussions were held regarding the potential need for protective -
actions and at what point they would become necessary if conditions worsened.
l.
6.
The TSC' effectively coordinated OSC personnel to determine plant'
~ t conditions-and effect repairs.
l
- Two areas for improvement were brought to the licensee's attention:
,
.Within the Technical Support Center, two instances of telephone -
'.
line noise occurred, causing some minor communications problems 9
~during the exercise;
<
Boron concentration curves should be reviewed to verify that they cover all reasonably expected conditions.
.
Operations Support Center
,
- Several exercise strengths were identified.
- 1.
Excellent command and control was demonstrated.
2.
. Dispatch'of repair teams was timely and proper. - Approximately'
-
nine (9) teams were used in accordance with repair efforts t
determined by the TSC.
3.
Information from the repair teams,= including results of both
' '
- containment air and reactor coolant samples obtained from the Post Accident Sampling System (PASS) were~ rapidly provided to decision p
makers at the TSC and the Emergency Operations Facility.
.
4.
Excellent in-plant radiation protection precautions were instituted and maintained throughout the exercise.
-
..
=
m aw-mw-
--
m
--m
.m
- --e-e.
-
-ar---s w ' ve-av ew-r-=
w-weet-w-vs w+-
eie-e--
-wr r-gip--
-#-'-
G;
'1
-~
a
'
,
,,
,
,
<
>
...
3. s
,,
/4 ^
-
.ii i
7-
.,
,
Emeraency Operations Facility:(EOFF
.
.Several exercise strengths'were identified.
>
i
'1.:
The EOF was: activated promptly and.was operated effectively.o a
Actions by response personnel were timely and in'accordance with-
procedures.-
.
r 2. -
Coordination and communication with'other. emergency response facilities including the TSC, OR0, and the New Hampshire IF0 were frequent and effective as were communications between the various-m divisions of the EOF emergency response staff.
,
3.
Technical assessment was clearly in evidence throughout the-exercise. Any suspected inconsistencies between various pieces of
,
=information_were questioned and resolved.
!
L 4.
Emergency communications (news releases) were effectively
prepared, reviewed and approved.
5.
Radiation Monitoring. Teams were effectively staged, dispatched and.
'
L
. directed.
6.
Dose assessment capability was promptly established using the l
L backup Hewlett-Packard HP41-CV calculator after the scenario p
indicated failure.of the METPAC system primary, backup, and Yankee l:
Atomic computer':ystems to force use of the-HP41-CV system.
,
l
-
Several-proposals were made which would have quickly l
restored the METPAC computers i.o operation, however in order L
to test the backup, they were prevented from being
,
l
. implemented by the. exercise controllers, q
l:
. Several "what if" projections were made for potential events-i with radioactive material releases including steam generator-tube rupture, containment venting, and containment failure.
Field samples.were received.and promptly counted in accordance with procedures.
Meteorology was kept current and forecast conditions carefully evaluated.
The effect of any potential wind shift
. on protective action considerations was considered.
7.
Effective security was maintained at the E0F.
Personnel accountability results were provided to both the E0F and TSC
'
Managers in a timely manner.
8.
Possible protective actions were discussed with the ORO and New Hampshire IFO. These discussions were frequent and effective and included the determination of potentially affected areas and consideration of whether school children should be dismissed at
.
--
,
c
-, - -
-
-en..
-,..
.
,v.
.w.-
- -
,g
-
-
-
---
-
, - -
,
,
\\ UI
.
x.
3;+ u
- .
,. r,.,
,
,:
-8-
th'e normal-end of the. school day or_. held at> school:where they-.
-
could be more easily evacuated if conditions worsened. Conditions.
,
- consideredincluded plant evolutions such as the switchover from -
'
p the: injection-to the recirculation mode and the stability of
projected weather. conditions.
!
-.
-Field Monitorina Teams
.
.i
Several exercise' strengths were identified.
j
,
l.
Field monitoring team members arrived at the EOF promptly and
'
effectively prepared for dispatch.
i
'
The teams performed thorough monitoring kit inventory, instrument checks including source checks,-portable air a
sampler checks, radio checks, and-vehicle checks in l
accordance with their procedures.
Personnel were very knowledgeable of the procedures and-demonstrated proficiency and a good understanding of their responsibilities.
,
- 1 g'
Good radiological practices were followed in the set-up of i
the vehicle bay used for the dispatch of the. teams.and
receipt'of samples.
'
Teams were thoroughly briefed on plant conditions and expected radiological conditions-prior to dispatch.
Team members received appropriate dosimetry prior to dispatch.
o 2.
The teams 'were dispatched promptly (within 50 minutes of arrival
'
at the E0F).
3.
Communications between the EOF and the field teams was excellent.
4.
Sample counting equipment was set-up promptly.
5.
Sample control and analysis including surveys and the use of anti-
,
contamination clothing were effectively demonstrated.
<<
6.
A personnel monitoring and decontamination station was established
,
in-the vehicle bay, using effective procedures for control of access and egress, installation of floor coverings, use of survey equipment, and manning the control point.
_..
.
...
.. -.
. -
.
.
.
.. ~.
._
.
.
-
. -
m-m y a
'
'
.
^
,,
^
'
'
, c f. Q t-y f e
-
>m.m,;
.;.,
,
,
,
,.
.;
<
i r
c9 u
Media Center / Joint Telephone Information Center-i
.
\\
'
'
Several-exercise _ strengths.were identified.
- l 1.
Activation, staffing, and command and control were effectively and W
, efficiently accomplished.
'
2.
Information was obtained through authorized; officials, and
.u appropriately coordinated and reviewed' prior to release to the l-
- public. :
T 3.
Information provided to the public was clear, concise and.
.
accurate.-
4.
Rumor control was effective.- Media Center rumor control personnel I
promptly sought verification of _ rumors and provided the correct information in all cases.
l 5.
Responses to-questions posed by exercise' controllers simulating-
press personnel.to media briefers were_ detailed and understandable.
,
- Overall Conclusions The NRC team noted that the licensee's activation and augmentation of the
.
emergency organization, activation of the emergency response facilities, and.
use of the facilities were consistent with their emergency response plan and
,.
,
- implementing procedures. No exercise weaknesses were identified.
The licensee demonstrated the ability to implement the emergency plan in a
.
manner which would have provided adequate protection for the health and safety
. of the public.
-l
'
5.0 Licensee Critiaue and Exit Interview -
The licenseo conducted an adequate self-critique of the exercise. There were no exercise weaknesses identified.
Following the licensee's self-critique,
- the NRC team met with the licensee representatives listed in Section-1 of this report'to present exercise observations as detailed in this report.
-
!-
- At no time during this inspection did the inspectors provide any written information to the licensee.
>
.
$-
-,.
.... - -, - -...
, -
.
..
.
_, - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
-