3F0684-09, Special Rept 84-02:on 840312,engineered Safeguards High Pressure Injection Initiated.Caused by Spurious Actuation of Channel 2 Train B.Equipment Replaced & Borated Water Injected

Special Rept 84-02:on 840312,engineered Safeguards High Pressure Injection Initiated.Caused by Spurious Actuation of Channel 2 Train B.Equipment Replaced & Borated Water Injected

ML20092K536
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	06/13/1984
From:	Westafer G FLORIDA POWER CORP.
To:	James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
References
3F0684-09, 3F684-9, 84-02, 84-2, NUDOCS 8406280409
Download: ML20092K536 (3)

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, n . .e. . n .wr June 13,1984 3F0684-09 Mr. James P. O'Reilly Regional Administrator, Region II Office of Inspection & Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 101 Marietta Street N.W., Suite 2900 Atlanta, GA 30323

Subject:

Crystai River Unit 3 Docket No. 50-302 Operating Licensing No. DPR-72 Special Report No. 34-02

Dear Sir:

Enclosed is Special Report No. 84-02 which is submitted in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.2.a.

Should there be any questions, please contact this office.

Sincerely,

/

a G. R. Westafer Manager, Nuclear Operations Licensing and Fuel Management AEF/feb Enclosure cc: Documert Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 0

OFFICIAL CbYW 2 g

GENERAL OFFICE 3201 Thirty fourth Street South e P.O. Box 14042, St. Petersburg, Florida 33733 e 813-866-5151

e-5PECIAL REPORT 84-02 EVENT DESCRIPTION On March 12, 1984, the Instrument and Control (I&C) Technicians were performing a surveillance test on the Engineered Safeguards System. After having completed the testing on Channels 1, 2, and 3 'A' train equipment, they began with the Reactor Building Isolation and Cooling portion of the 'B' train. Channel 2 had been tested satisfactorily and the test switch was positioned to test Channel 3. Approximately ten to fifteen seconds later, the High Pressure Injection relay in Channel 2 'B' train actuated several times and then cleared.

With Channel 3 in test and Channel 2 actuated, the two out of three logic requirement was met and the 'B' train of Engineered Safeguards High Pressure Injection was initiated.

PLANT PERFORMANCE

1. Pre-Event The plant was at ninety-eight percent (98%) Reactor Power (877 MWe). Both Emergency Diesel Generators were in standby. The 'B' Makeup and Purification Pump was running, supplying normal makeup to the Reactor Coolant System. The Reactor Containment Fans 'A' and 'C' were running in slow. Decay Heat Removal Pumps 'A' and 'B' were off. All other Engineered Safeguards associated systems were in a normal lineup with tae normal duty unit in service and the emergency units in standby. These systems are:

a. Emergency Diesel Generators

b. Decay Heat Closed Cycle Cooling

c. Nuclear Services Closed Cycle Cooling

d. Nuclear Services Seawater

2. Initiating Event The initiating event was the spurious actuation of a relay in Channel 2 of High Pressure Injection train 'B' of the Engineered Safeguards System while Channel 3 of the same system was in test. This satisfied the two out of three logic requirement and initiated High Pressure Injection.

All appropriate equipment started automatically and borated water was injected into the Reactor Coolant System. No anomalies in equipment were noted.

3. Post Event The operators ascertained that the actuation was falsely initiated and began recovery.

The equipment which was unnecessarily started was replaced with normal duty equipment. Injection of borated water was secured. The power reduction caused by '

boron injection was approximately eight percent. No abnormalities in equipment operation were noted, i

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4. Operator Actions and Procedural Adequacy The I&C Technicians were following the surveillance procedure and there were no deviations from it. Their actions . were appropriate both before and af ter the initiation. The procedure has been used as it is written for the last five months without a prior occurrence of this event.

The actions of the control room operators were expeditious and appropriate following the initiation. All procedures were adequate for recovery operations.

ACCUMULATED ACTUATION CYCLES Transient MUV-42 MUV-43 MUV-36 MUV-37 ES Actuation (Expected) 2 2 2 2 ES Actuation (Inadvertent) 4 4 4 4 ES Actuation (Test) 15 15 15 15

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