|
---|
Category:REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT (SEE ALSO AO LER)
MONTHYEAR3F0399-04, Special Rept 99-01:on 990310,discovered Containment Tendons That Required Grease Addition in Excess of Prescribed Limits During Recent Insp Activites.Six Tendons Were Refilled with Appropriate Amount of Grease1999-03-10010 March 1999 Special Rept 99-01:on 990310,discovered Containment Tendons That Required Grease Addition in Excess of Prescribed Limits During Recent Insp Activites.Six Tendons Were Refilled with Appropriate Amount of Grease 3F0498-28, Ro:On 980421,unplanned Release of Effluent Water from Crystal River Nuclear Plant Regeneration Waste Neutralization Tank.Root Cause Analysis Currently Being Conducted.Pipe Isolated for Repairs1998-04-23023 April 1998 Ro:On 980421,unplanned Release of Effluent Water from Crystal River Nuclear Plant Regeneration Waste Neutralization Tank.Root Cause Analysis Currently Being Conducted.Pipe Isolated for Repairs 3F0398-21, Special Rept:On 980302,insp Vendor Notified FPC That Grease Sample for Tendon 51H25 Had Water Content of 14.9% Volume by Weight.Caused Undeterminate.Subject Tendon Was Partially re-greased During Performance of Surveillance1998-03-10010 March 1998 Special Rept:On 980302,insp Vendor Notified FPC That Grease Sample for Tendon 51H25 Had Water Content of 14.9% Volume by Weight.Caused Undeterminate.Subject Tendon Was Partially re-greased During Performance of Surveillance 3F0198-07, Special Rept 97-09:provides Details of Conditions Found Not Meeting Acceptance Criteria During Ongoing Twentieth Year Tendon Surveillance of Containment Post Tensioning Sys. Commitments Encl1998-01-0808 January 1998 Special Rept 97-09:provides Details of Conditions Found Not Meeting Acceptance Criteria During Ongoing Twentieth Year Tendon Surveillance of Containment Post Tensioning Sys. Commitments Encl 3F0198-04, Special Rept 97-08:on 971208,mid Range & High Range Noble Gas Stack Monitors Found to Be Inoperable Greater than Seven Days.Cables to low-medium-high Valve Controllers re-connected Inside Radiation Monitoring Panel1998-01-0303 January 1998 Special Rept 97-08:on 971208,mid Range & High Range Noble Gas Stack Monitors Found to Be Inoperable Greater than Seven Days.Cables to low-medium-high Valve Controllers re-connected Inside Radiation Monitoring Panel 3F1297-06, Special Rept 97-07:re Hoop Tendon 51H26 That Was Found to Have Normalized lift-off Force of More than 10% Below Predicted Value.Out of Tolerance Tendons Were Returned to Proper pre-stress Level.Commitment Attached1997-12-0606 December 1997 Special Rept 97-07:re Hoop Tendon 51H26 That Was Found to Have Normalized lift-off Force of More than 10% Below Predicted Value.Out of Tolerance Tendons Were Returned to Proper pre-stress Level.Commitment Attached 3F1197-14, Special Rept 97-03:on 971021,mid Range & High Range Noble Gas Monitors Found Inoperable Greater than Seven Days.Filter Holder Immediately re-installed1997-11-19019 November 1997 Special Rept 97-03:on 971021,mid Range & High Range Noble Gas Monitors Found Inoperable Greater than Seven Days.Filter Holder Immediately re-installed 3F8097-33, Special Rept 97-02:on 970714,fire Suppression Sys Required by Fire Protection Plan Out of Svc for Greater than Fourteen Days.Two Continuous Fire Watches Put in Place as Compensatory Measures as Required by CR-31997-08-22022 August 1997 Special Rept 97-02:on 970714,fire Suppression Sys Required by Fire Protection Plan Out of Svc for Greater than Fourteen Days.Two Continuous Fire Watches Put in Place as Compensatory Measures as Required by CR-3 3F1096-22, Special Rept:On 960902,unit Shutdown Due to Leak in Turbine Lube Oil Sys.Issue Will Be Resolved Before Startup from Current Outage1996-10-28028 October 1996 Special Rept:On 960902,unit Shutdown Due to Leak in Turbine Lube Oil Sys.Issue Will Be Resolved Before Startup from Current Outage 3F0896-25, Special Rept:On 960712,declared Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation Inoperable for More than 30 Days.Caused by Triaxial Peak Accelographs Failures.Instruments Will Be Omitted from FSAR Section 2.5.4.41996-08-28028 August 1996 Special Rept:On 960712,declared Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation Inoperable for More than 30 Days.Caused by Triaxial Peak Accelographs Failures.Instruments Will Be Omitted from FSAR Section 2.5.4.4 3F0496-30, Special Rept 96-02:on 960313,fire Detection Zones Required by Fire Protection Plan Out of Svc for Greater than Fourteen Days.Hourly Fire Watch Established1996-04-26026 April 1996 Special Rept 96-02:on 960313,fire Detection Zones Required by Fire Protection Plan Out of Svc for Greater than Fourteen Days.Hourly Fire Watch Established 3F0396-21, Special Rept 96-01:on 960218,RM-A1 Taken Out of Svc Due to Failure of Detector to Respond to Check Source.Replacement Detector from Stores & Bench Calibrate.Expects to Return RM-A1 to Svc Prior to Restart from Refueling Outage1996-03-26026 March 1996 Special Rept 96-01:on 960218,RM-A1 Taken Out of Svc Due to Failure of Detector to Respond to Check Source.Replacement Detector from Stores & Bench Calibrate.Expects to Return RM-A1 to Svc Prior to Restart from Refueling Outage 3F0895-16, Ro:On 950713,1 H non-emergency Rept Made Re Condition Suspected to Be Outside Design Basis of Plant.Based on Conclusions of Design Basis Evaluation,Rescinds 1 H non-emergency Rept (NRC Event 29062)1995-08-11011 August 1995 Ro:On 950713,1 H non-emergency Rept Made Re Condition Suspected to Be Outside Design Basis of Plant.Based on Conclusions of Design Basis Evaluation,Rescinds 1 H non-emergency Rept (NRC Event 29062) 3F0895-15, Special Rept 95-01:on 950630,ODCM Required Waste Gas Analyzer (WGDA-1) Declared Inoperable & Unavailable for Greater than Seven Days Due to Deficiency in Microprocessor. Microprocessor Replaced & WGDA-1 Returned to Operation1995-08-11011 August 1995 Special Rept 95-01:on 950630,ODCM Required Waste Gas Analyzer (WGDA-1) Declared Inoperable & Unavailable for Greater than Seven Days Due to Deficiency in Microprocessor. Microprocessor Replaced & WGDA-1 Returned to Operation 3F1094-07, Special Rept:On 940919,determined That Two Transmitters Which Comprise Rv Level Indication Sys Portion of Rc Inventory Tracking Sys Not Functioning Normally Due to Line Blockage in Common Tubing.Sys Restoration outage-dependent1994-10-10010 October 1994 Special Rept:On 940919,determined That Two Transmitters Which Comprise Rv Level Indication Sys Portion of Rc Inventory Tracking Sys Not Functioning Normally Due to Line Blockage in Common Tubing.Sys Restoration outage-dependent 3F1293-07, Special Rept 93-03:on 931124,ODCM Required Radiation Monitor Taken Out of Svc Due to Failure to Pass Check Source Functional Test & Unavailable for Greater than 7 Days. Subj Monitor Restored to Normal Operation on 9312061993-12-23023 December 1993 Special Rept 93-03:on 931124,ODCM Required Radiation Monitor Taken Out of Svc Due to Failure to Pass Check Source Functional Test & Unavailable for Greater than 7 Days. Subj Monitor Restored to Normal Operation on 931206 3F1093-17, Special Rept 93-02:on 931011,primary Meteorlogical Sys Taken Out of Svc for Performance of TS Surveillance 4.3.3.4 & TS 3.3.3.4 Entered Since Backup Sys Out of Svc.Surveillance Performed & Sys Returned to Operation on 9310191993-10-27027 October 1993 Special Rept 93-02:on 931011,primary Meteorlogical Sys Taken Out of Svc for Performance of TS Surveillance 4.3.3.4 & TS 3.3.3.4 Entered Since Backup Sys Out of Svc.Surveillance Performed & Sys Returned to Operation on 931019 3F0992-18, Special Rept 92-003:on 920815,auxiliary Bldg high-range Noble Gas Monitor Failed Calibr & Declared Inoperable for More than 7 Days.Automatic Isotopic Monitoring Sys Available for Use.Amplifier Components & detector-sensor Replaced1992-09-24024 September 1992 Special Rept 92-003:on 920815,auxiliary Bldg high-range Noble Gas Monitor Failed Calibr & Declared Inoperable for More than 7 Days.Automatic Isotopic Monitoring Sys Available for Use.Amplifier Components & detector-sensor Replaced 3F0692-10, Special Rept 92-02:on 920514,waste Gas Decay Tank Hydrogen & Oxygen Monitoring Channels Removed from Svc & Not Returned to Operable Status within 14 Days.Caused by Need to Facilitate Maint.Ts Amend Will Be in Place by Sept 19921992-06-12012 June 1992 Special Rept 92-02:on 920514,waste Gas Decay Tank Hydrogen & Oxygen Monitoring Channels Removed from Svc & Not Returned to Operable Status within 14 Days.Caused by Need to Facilitate Maint.Ts Amend Will Be in Place by Sept 1992 3F0592-17, Special Rept 92-01,on 920506,reactor Bldg Purge Exhaust Duct Monitor Was Taken Out of Svc.Caused by Inability to Calibrate RM-A1 Noble Gas Activity.Monitor mid-range Channel Was Recalibrated1992-05-26026 May 1992 Special Rept 92-01,on 920506,reactor Bldg Purge Exhaust Duct Monitor Was Taken Out of Svc.Caused by Inability to Calibrate RM-A1 Noble Gas Activity.Monitor mid-range Channel Was Recalibrated 3F0591-02, Special Rept 91-001:on 910320,waste Gas Analyzer Removed from Svc to Allow Isolation of Waste Gas Compressor from Maint.Moisture Discovered in Sample Tubing.Work Request to Correct Moisture Intrusion in Analyzer Sample Lines Written1991-05-0101 May 1991 Special Rept 91-001:on 910320,waste Gas Analyzer Removed from Svc to Allow Isolation of Waste Gas Compressor from Maint.Moisture Discovered in Sample Tubing.Work Request to Correct Moisture Intrusion in Analyzer Sample Lines Written 3F1190-13, Special Rept 90-04:on 901015,portion of Mounting Platform for Triaxial Peak Accelograph on Piping on Top of Steam Generator Melted1990-11-21021 November 1990 Special Rept 90-04:on 901015,portion of Mounting Platform for Triaxial Peak Accelograph on Piping on Top of Steam Generator Melted 3F0989-08, Special Rept 89-001:on 890826,dose Equivalent Iodine Dei of RCS Samples Exceeded Tech Specs Limit.Sampling & Analysis of RCS Continued at 4 H Intervals Until Dei Decrease Below Tech Spec Limit.Dei Analysis Results Presented1989-09-21021 September 1989 Special Rept 89-001:on 890826,dose Equivalent Iodine Dei of RCS Samples Exceeded Tech Specs Limit.Sampling & Analysis of RCS Continued at 4 H Intervals Until Dei Decrease Below Tech Spec Limit.Dei Analysis Results Presented 3F0389-01, Ro:On 890118,reactor Coolant Pump 1A Failed.Cause Not Discussed.Sequence of Events Encl1989-03-0101 March 1989 Ro:On 890118,reactor Coolant Pump 1A Failed.Cause Not Discussed.Sequence of Events Encl 3F1188-01, Special Rept 88-001:on 881009,RCS Sample Obtained & Analyzed for Iodine Activity Indicated Dose Equivalent Iodine (Dei) Exceeding Tech Spec Limit.Chemists Continued Sampling & Analysis of RCS at Intervals Until Dei Decreased1988-11-0101 November 1988 Special Rept 88-001:on 881009,RCS Sample Obtained & Analyzed for Iodine Activity Indicated Dose Equivalent Iodine (Dei) Exceeding Tech Spec Limit.Chemists Continued Sampling & Analysis of RCS at Intervals Until Dei Decreased 3F0688-19, Ro:On 880527,emergency Feedwater Piping Near Flow Control Valve Found to Be Warmer than Normal.Cause Not Stated.Water Added to Reseat & to Cool Emergency Feedwater Line & Valve Closed to Prevent Inadvertent Manual Addition of Water1988-06-28028 June 1988 Ro:On 880527,emergency Feedwater Piping Near Flow Control Valve Found to Be Warmer than Normal.Cause Not Stated.Water Added to Reseat & to Cool Emergency Feedwater Line & Valve Closed to Prevent Inadvertent Manual Addition of Water 3F0388-02, Special Rept 87-05-01:two Steam Generator Tubes Found Defective,Having Indications Greater than 40% Through Wall & One Tube Identified as Degraded W/Indication of 38% Through Wall.Tubes Removed from Svc by Plugging.Addl Info Encl1988-03-21021 March 1988 Special Rept 87-05-01:two Steam Generator Tubes Found Defective,Having Indications Greater than 40% Through Wall & One Tube Identified as Degraded W/Indication of 38% Through Wall.Tubes Removed from Svc by Plugging.Addl Info Encl 3F0188-19, Special Rept 87-05:during Refuel IV Outage,Steam Generator Eddy Current Testing Revealed Defective tubes.Pre-outage Planning Developed 6% Random Sampling Insp Plan That Would Be Completed on a Steam Generator1988-01-20020 January 1988 Special Rept 87-05:during Refuel IV Outage,Steam Generator Eddy Current Testing Revealed Defective tubes.Pre-outage Planning Developed 6% Random Sampling Insp Plan That Would Be Completed on a Steam Generator 3F1187-09, Special Rept 87-04:Tech Spec 3.3.3.10 Violated.Caused by Removal of Waste Gas Decay Tank Hydrogen & Oxygen Monitors from Svc & Not Returned to Operable Status within 14 Days. Monitors Will Remain Out of Svc Until Sys in Use1987-11-18018 November 1987 Special Rept 87-04:Tech Spec 3.3.3.10 Violated.Caused by Removal of Waste Gas Decay Tank Hydrogen & Oxygen Monitors from Svc & Not Returned to Operable Status within 14 Days. Monitors Will Remain Out of Svc Until Sys in Use ML20236L4161987-11-0505 November 1987 Special Rept 87-03:on 870927,during Channel Check of Triaxial Peak,Monitor SI-005-MEI Found Inoperable.Cause Undetermined.Replacement Monitor to Be Installed After Refueling & Engineering Design Evaluation to Be Made 3F0887-01, Special Rept 87-02:on 870702,reactor Trip Occurred from 88% Rated Thermal Power.Primary Coolant Sample Obtained & Analyzed for Iodine Activity,Per Tech Spec 4.4.8.Reactor Power History,Fuel Burnup & Time Duration Provided1987-08-0303 August 1987 Special Rept 87-02:on 870702,reactor Trip Occurred from 88% Rated Thermal Power.Primary Coolant Sample Obtained & Analyzed for Iodine Activity,Per Tech Spec 4.4.8.Reactor Power History,Fuel Burnup & Time Duration Provided 3F0687-06, Special Rept 87-01:on 870519,auxiliary Bldg & Fuel Handling Area Exhaust Duct mid-range Noble Gas Monitor Inoperable for Seven or More Days.Caused by Alarm Circuit Repair Altering Calibr of Monitor,Rendering Instrument Inoperable1987-06-0909 June 1987 Special Rept 87-01:on 870519,auxiliary Bldg & Fuel Handling Area Exhaust Duct mid-range Noble Gas Monitor Inoperable for Seven or More Days.Caused by Alarm Circuit Repair Altering Calibr of Monitor,Rendering Instrument Inoperable 3F0287-17, Ro:On 870121,during Performance of Surveillance Procedure SP-110,CRD a Ac Breaker Failed to Trip.Caused by Malfunction of Undervoltage Trip Coil Device.Breaker Replaced & Successfully Tested1987-02-23023 February 1987 Ro:On 870121,during Performance of Surveillance Procedure SP-110,CRD a Ac Breaker Failed to Trip.Caused by Malfunction of Undervoltage Trip Coil Device.Breaker Replaced & Successfully Tested 3F0287-21, Ro:On 870112,6-month Interval for Containment Air Lock Type B Tests Found Exceeded Due to Inconsistencies Between Tech Specs & App J.Caused by Failure to Recognize Dual Sources of Requirements.Test Schedule Revised & Tech Spec Changed1987-02-23023 February 1987 Ro:On 870112,6-month Interval for Containment Air Lock Type B Tests Found Exceeded Due to Inconsistencies Between Tech Specs & App J.Caused by Failure to Recognize Dual Sources of Requirements.Test Schedule Revised & Tech Spec Changed 3F0187-07, Special Rept 86-01:on 861223,during Startup from Mode 5,unit Entered Mode 4 W/Noble Gas Activity Monitor & Fuel Handling Bldg Area Exhaust Duct Inoperable.Caused by Poor Response of Installed Check Source.Instrument Recalibr1987-01-0909 January 1987 Special Rept 86-01:on 861223,during Startup from Mode 5,unit Entered Mode 4 W/Noble Gas Activity Monitor & Fuel Handling Bldg Area Exhaust Duct Inoperable.Caused by Poor Response of Installed Check Source.Instrument Recalibr ML20211E0731986-09-26026 September 1986 Unplanned Operating Event Rept 85-6, Manual Reactor Trip Following MSIV Closure Due to Inadvertent Emergency Feedwater Actuation,851009 3F0786-22, Ro:On 860629,reactor Bldg Vented to Relieve Long Term Pressure Buildup.Initially Reported on 860630.Draft LER Under Mgt Review to Determine Reporting Requirements.Next Rept Will Be Submitted by 8608081986-07-29029 July 1986 Ro:On 860629,reactor Bldg Vented to Relieve Long Term Pressure Buildup.Initially Reported on 860630.Draft LER Under Mgt Review to Determine Reporting Requirements.Next Rept Will Be Submitted by 860808 3F0386-13, Suppl 2 to Special Rept 85-03:on 850807,intermediate- & high-range Channels of Gaseous Release Monitors RM-A1 & RM-A2 Not Calibr.Mod to Achieve Overlap & Calibr of Intermediate Channels Completed1986-03-31031 March 1986 Suppl 2 to Special Rept 85-03:on 850807,intermediate- & high-range Channels of Gaseous Release Monitors RM-A1 & RM-A2 Not Calibr.Mod to Achieve Overlap & Calibr of Intermediate Channels Completed 3F0286-08, RO:86-002-00:on 860110,incident Occurred in Seawater Intake Area Resulting in Deaths of Two Divers.All Seawater Pumps Shut Off for 2 H 45 Minutes.Ler Will Be Sent by 8602211986-02-10010 February 1986 RO:86-002-00:on 860110,incident Occurred in Seawater Intake Area Resulting in Deaths of Two Divers.All Seawater Pumps Shut Off for 2 H 45 Minutes.Ler Will Be Sent by 860221 3F0885-10, Special Rept 85-03:on 850807,discovered That mid- & high- Range Channels of Gaseous Effluent Release Monitors Out of Calibr.Caused by Delays in Contractual Arrangements for Supplies.Action Taken to Obtain Matls.Part 21 Related1985-08-21021 August 1985 Special Rept 85-03:on 850807,discovered That mid- & high- Range Channels of Gaseous Effluent Release Monitors Out of Calibr.Caused by Delays in Contractual Arrangements for Supplies.Action Taken to Obtain Matls.Part 21 Related 3F0785-29, Revised Special Rept 85-01 Re Inoperability of Three Triaxial Peak Accelographs.Installation of Reactor Vessel Head Device Delayed Until 850714 Due to Unforeseen Activities1985-07-24024 July 1985 Revised Special Rept 85-01 Re Inoperability of Three Triaxial Peak Accelographs.Installation of Reactor Vessel Head Device Delayed Until 850714 Due to Unforeseen Activities 3F0785-30, Suppl 1 to Special Rept 85-02:Halon Portion of Fire Suppression Sys Inoperable.Addl Work Required Due to Unanticipated Difficulties W/Asbestos Matls in Areas Being Modified.Operability Not Restored by 8507011985-07-24024 July 1985 Suppl 1 to Special Rept 85-02:Halon Portion of Fire Suppression Sys Inoperable.Addl Work Required Due to Unanticipated Difficulties W/Asbestos Matls in Areas Being Modified.Operability Not Restored by 850701 3F0585-14, Special Rept 85-02:on 850408,during Refueling & Mod Outage, Halon Portion of Fire Suppression Sys for Cable Spreading Room Taken Out of Svc in Support of Various Mods to Cable Spreading Room.Fire Watches Immediately Established1985-05-22022 May 1985 Special Rept 85-02:on 850408,during Refueling & Mod Outage, Halon Portion of Fire Suppression Sys for Cable Spreading Room Taken Out of Svc in Support of Various Mods to Cable Spreading Room.Fire Watches Immediately Established 3F0485-20, Special Rept 85-01:on 850317,during Performance of Refueling Interval Surveillance,All Three Triaxial Peak Accelographs Required by Tech Specs Discovered Inoperable.Cause Undetermined.Accelographs Will Be Repaired1985-04-26026 April 1985 Special Rept 85-01:on 850317,during Performance of Refueling Interval Surveillance,All Three Triaxial Peak Accelographs Required by Tech Specs Discovered Inoperable.Cause Undetermined.Accelographs Will Be Repaired 3F1284-04, Special Rept SR-84-5:on 841029,Halon Portion of Fire Suppression Sys for Cable Spreading Room Taken Out of Svc for Mod to Cable Spreading Room.Sys Will Be Out of Svc Periodically During Mod for Welding in Cable Spreading Room1984-12-0707 December 1984 Special Rept SR-84-5:on 841029,Halon Portion of Fire Suppression Sys for Cable Spreading Room Taken Out of Svc for Mod to Cable Spreading Room.Sys Will Be Out of Svc Periodically During Mod for Welding in Cable Spreading Room 3F1084-05, Special Rept 84-04:on 840919,fire Suppression Water Sys Placed in Degraded Mode of Operation to Support Sys Mod. Caused by Redundant Loop Flow Path Allowing Only One Fire Svc Sys Header to Remain in Svc.Loop Removed1984-10-0303 October 1984 Special Rept 84-04:on 840919,fire Suppression Water Sys Placed in Degraded Mode of Operation to Support Sys Mod. Caused by Redundant Loop Flow Path Allowing Only One Fire Svc Sys Header to Remain in Svc.Loop Removed 3F0784-16, Special Rept 84-03:on 840424,false Low & High Pressure Injection Occurred When Channel 2 Low Pressure Bistable Inadvertently Actuated.Cause Not Stated.Bistable Replaced. Plant Stabilized W/Injection of Borated Water Into RCS1984-07-23023 July 1984 Special Rept 84-03:on 840424,false Low & High Pressure Injection Occurred When Channel 2 Low Pressure Bistable Inadvertently Actuated.Cause Not Stated.Bistable Replaced. Plant Stabilized W/Injection of Borated Water Into RCS 3F0684-09, Special Rept 84-02:on 840312,engineered Safeguards High Pressure Injection Initiated.Caused by Spurious Actuation of Channel 2 Train B.Equipment Replaced & Borated Water Injected1984-06-13013 June 1984 Special Rept 84-02:on 840312,engineered Safeguards High Pressure Injection Initiated.Caused by Spurious Actuation of Channel 2 Train B.Equipment Replaced & Borated Water Injected 3F0184-22, RO Special Rept 84-01:on 840114,leak Found in Fire Suppression Water Sys,Rendering Sys Inoperable.Caused by Compliance W/Tech Spec Limiting Condition for Operation.Sys Returned to Operable Status on 8401151984-01-23023 January 1984 RO Special Rept 84-01:on 840114,leak Found in Fire Suppression Water Sys,Rendering Sys Inoperable.Caused by Compliance W/Tech Spec Limiting Condition for Operation.Sys Returned to Operable Status on 840115 3F1283-06, RO 83-050:on 830719,mode Ascension Occurred (Mode 5 to 4) Prior to Completing Required Surveillance.Occurrence Analysis Continuing.Ler Will Be Submitted by 8312221983-12-0505 December 1983 RO 83-050:on 830719,mode Ascension Occurred (Mode 5 to 4) Prior to Completing Required Surveillance.Occurrence Analysis Continuing.Ler Will Be Submitted by 831222 1999-03-10
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217G0191999-10-15015 October 1999 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Licensee Followed Analytical Methods Provided in GL 90-05.Grants Relief Until Next Refueling Outage,Scheduled to Start on 991001.Temporary non-Code Repair Must Then Be Replaced with Code Repair 3F1099-19, Part 21 Rept Re Damage on safety-grade Cable Provided to FPC by Bicc Brand-Rex Co.Damage Was Created During Cabling Process While Combining Three Conducters.Corrective Action Program Precursor Card PC99-2868 Was Initiated1999-10-13013 October 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Damage on safety-grade Cable Provided to FPC by Bicc Brand-Rex Co.Damage Was Created During Cabling Process While Combining Three Conducters.Corrective Action Program Precursor Card PC99-2868 Was Initiated ML20217B0931999-10-0606 October 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Damaged Safety Grade Electrical Cabling Found in Supply on 990831.Damage Created During Cabling Process While Combining Three Conductors Just Prior to Closing.Vendor Notified of Reporting of Issue ML20212L0881999-10-0404 October 1999 SER Accepting Licensee Requests for Relief 98-012 to 98-018 Related to Implementation of Subsections IWE & Iwl of ASME Section XI for Containment Insp for Crystal River Unit 3 ML20212J8631999-10-0101 October 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Licensee Proposed Alternatives to Provide Reasonable Assurance of Structural Integrity of Subject Welds & Provide Acceptable Level of Quality & Safety.Relief Granted Per 10CFR50.55a(g)(6)(i) ML20212E9031999-09-30030 September 1999 FPC Crystal River Unit 3 Plant Reference Simulator Four Year Simulator Certification Rept Sept 1995-Sept 1999 3F1099-02, Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Crystal River,Unit 3.With1999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Crystal River,Unit 3.With ML20212E6911999-09-21021 September 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Proposed EALs Changes for Plant Unit 3.Changes Meet Requirements of 10CFR50.47(b)(4) & App E to 10CFR50 ML20211L1321999-08-31031 August 1999 EAL Basis Document 3F0999-02, Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Crystal River,Unit 3.With1999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Crystal River,Unit 3.With ML20212C1501999-08-31031 August 1999 Non-proprietary Version of Rev 0 to Crystal River Unit 3 Enhanced Spent Fuel Storage Engineering Input to LAR Number 239 ML20211B7291999-08-16016 August 1999 Rev 2 to Cycle 11 Colr ML20210P1111999-08-0505 August 1999 SER Accepting Evaluation of Third 10-year Interval Inservice Insp Program Requests for Relief for Plant,Unit 3 ML20210U5341999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Crystal River,Unit 3 ML20209F5601999-07-31031 July 1999 EAL Basis Document, for Jul 1999 3F0799-01, Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Crystal River,Unit 3.With1999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Crystal River,Unit 3.With ML20210U5411999-06-30030 June 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Crystal River,Unit 3 3F0699-07, Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Crystal River,Unit 3.With1999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Crystal River,Unit 3.With ML20210U5601999-05-31031 May 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Crystal River,Unit 3 ML20195C6271999-05-28028 May 1999 Non-proprietary Rev 0 to Addendum to Topical Rept BAW-2346P, CR-3 Plant Specific MSLB Leak Rates ML20196L2031999-05-19019 May 1999 Non-proprietary Rev 0 to BAW-2346NP, Alternate Repair Criteria for Tube End Cracking in Tube-to-Tubesheet Roll Joint of Once-Through Sgs 3F0599-04, Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Crystal River Unit 3.With1999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Crystal River Unit 3.With ML20210U5631999-04-30030 April 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Crystal River,Unit 3 3F0499-04, Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Crystal River Unit 3.With1999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Crystal River Unit 3.With ML20204D9661999-03-31031 March 1999 Non-proprietary Rev 1,Addendum a to BAW-2342, OTSG Repair Roll Qualification Rept 3F0399-04, Special Rept 99-01:on 990310,discovered Containment Tendons That Required Grease Addition in Excess of Prescribed Limits During Recent Insp Activites.Six Tendons Were Refilled with Appropriate Amount of Grease1999-03-10010 March 1999 Special Rept 99-01:on 990310,discovered Containment Tendons That Required Grease Addition in Excess of Prescribed Limits During Recent Insp Activites.Six Tendons Were Refilled with Appropriate Amount of Grease 3F0399-03, Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Crystal River Unit 3.With1999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Crystal River Unit 3.With ML20203A4381999-02-0303 February 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting EAL Changes for License DPR-72, Per 10CFR50.47(b)(4) & App E to 10CFR50 ML20206E9891998-12-31031 December 1998 Kissimmee Utility Authority 1998 Annual Rept ML20206E9021998-12-31031 December 1998 Florida Progress Corp 1998 Annual Rept ML20206E9701998-12-31031 December 1998 Ouc 1998 Annual Rept. with Financial Statements from Seminole Electric Cooperative,Inc 3F0199-05, Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1998 for Crystal River Unit 3.With1998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1998 for Crystal River Unit 3.With ML20206E9261998-12-31031 December 1998 Gainesville Regional Utilities 1998 Annual Rept 3F1298-13, Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1998 for Crystal River,Unit 3.With1998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1998 for Crystal River,Unit 3.With 3F1198-05, Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1998 for Crystal River,Unit 3.With1998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1998 for Crystal River,Unit 3.With ML20155F4071998-10-31031 October 1998 Rev 2 to Pressure/Temp Limits Rept ML20155J2701998-10-28028 October 1998 Second Ten-Year Insp Interval Closeout Summary Rept 3F1098-06, Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for Crystal River Unit 3.With1998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for Crystal River Unit 3.With ML20206E9461998-09-30030 September 1998 Utilities Commission City of New Smyrna Beach,Fl Comprehensive Annual Financial Rept Sept 30,1998 & 1997 ML20206E9561998-09-30030 September 1998 City of Ocala Comprehensive Annual Financial Rept for Yr Ended 980930 ML20206E9101998-09-30030 September 1998 City of Bushnell Fl Comprehensive Annual Financial Rept for Fiscal Yr Ended 980930 ML20206E9811998-09-30030 September 1998 City of Tallahassee,Fl Comprehensive Annual Financial Rept for Yr Ended 980930 ML20195E3121998-09-30030 September 1998 Comprehensive Annual Financial Rept for City of Leesburg,Fl Fiscal Yr Ended 980930 3F0998-07, Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1998 for Crystal River Unit 3.With1998-08-31031 August 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1998 for Crystal River Unit 3.With ML20236W6501998-07-31031 July 1998 Emergency Action Level Basis Document 3F0898-02, Monthly Operating Rept for Jul 1998 for Crystal River,Unit 11998-07-31031 July 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Jul 1998 for Crystal River,Unit 1 ML20236V8801998-07-30030 July 1998 Control Room Habitability Rept 3F0798-01, Monthly Operating Rept for June 1998 for Crystal River Unit 31998-06-30030 June 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1998 for Crystal River Unit 3 ML20236Q4611998-06-30030 June 1998 SER for Crystal River Power Station,Unit 3,individual Plant Exam (Ipe).Concludes That Plant IPE Complete Re Info Requested by GL 88-20 & IPE Results Reasonable Given Plant Design,Operation & History 3F0698-02, Monthly Operating Rept for May 1998 for Crystal River Unit 31998-05-31031 May 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1998 for Crystal River Unit 3 1999-09-30
[Table view] |
Text
->
Florida Power CORPORATION thames reaar August 11, 1995 3F0895-16 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555
Subject:
NRC Event #29062
Dear Sir:
During a plant walkdown, the NRC's follow-up to Florida Power Corporation's (FPC)
Crystal River Unit 3 (CR-3) Service Water Self Assessment, an NRC inspector identified a condition suspected to be outside the design basis of the plant.
A Problem Report (PR-95-0125) was initiated, and at 1835 on July 13, 1995 a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> non-emergency report was made to the NRC as directed by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B). This report was assigned the NRC Event #29062 (see Attachment 1).
The condition reported to the NRC comprised the shell side of a decay heat exchanger not having a relief valve for overpressure protection, if the cooling water was isolated from the heat exchanger (see Figure 1). Subsequently, a ;
Design Basis Evaluation (NED95-0399) was performed which stated, in part, "The ;
DC [ed. Decay Heat Closed Cycle Cooling System] and DH [ed. Decay Heat] heat '
exchangers are designed in accordance with applicable design basis codes, l standards, and regulatory requirements and are acceptable 'as designed'" (see l Attachment 2). .
r-
.5, l
1 i
CRYSTAL Rh/ER ENERGY COMPLEX: 15700 W Power une St . Crystal River, Florida 344284706 e (904) 795 6486 A Fkwida Progress Company l 9508190242 950811 PDR ADOCK 05000302 i S PDR
?
U. S.- Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- [
3F0895-16~
Page 2 of 2 l 3
Based on the conclusions of the Design Basis Evaluation, FPC hereby rescinds the l 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> non-emergency report (NRC Event #29062). Should you have any questions !
concerning the engineering evaluation, please contact Brian Gutherman, f
. Supervisor, Nuclear Engineering Design at (904) 795-6486 extension 3325. '
Sincerely, l
']25 /.4 $[da -
B. J. Hickle, Director Nuclear Plant Operations ,
JAF:ff Attachments xc: Regional Administrator, Region II i Project Manager, NRR _ l Senior Resident Inspector l
l 1
l I
l l
2 i
)c 895-16 Attachment !
l NT NOTTFTCATTON WORKSHEET ENCLOSURE 8 (Page 1 of 21 Nec fvfkT NOTIFtCATION WORIGHffT NRC m asiCATOS Ob teCIVENT # . bb NOuetcArog- ruxm u1 c=uns no
/ b G TITALRfW R 3 .5ti;eeA>ey cut auxOr , ens i4 eono.4 ari.4 err murr- mur si - p. O. ==
}Vh1 Yh3 W /00//
,0
/00 l e
,. . / . + + . -
y,# .ng;,, , ,w.p y-e:/_ y m:. w, N MM4 SM .Mt)f # $ ;Y M 6.Mh; :..{h ,,ffl$2.,, m('(,&.mv.uMNM :.egs ~me.w, uw w ,
+ ;: b yb. -n3;p? iWm W v y v cygna;py:psssy .m
> a
, 4-mm y 3y . b.+ , J f,A?pgu q;p:: y p wmt;;k t
. . :..m w%, n, ,
O CINIRAL EMFRCfNCY O@ Tw-c 0 nm(s) RHR f"--
O 5fif AffA fMfRCINCY O flin (W Netwal F _ _
O (15HO Contenf af Rad Redeems O Al f RT O fM FCC1 C'A_ to RC5 O tim (D) t---
A4#1mmaan O UMJ5UAt (VfNT OM 1ast TNS
.~^ -. ,. - O fMW Nr Esteene > 20X "9 Ii M " 8 N M $) , .e ~ ~w OM t ost f. ._m, g
4
.g.
y .+ !
.:. .
N.'y@.j O IMfS) (la Retsame > 20X '___. __ $
+ m y y, OM We N C _. _ . _-'m _
OM N" -' I i
O 304A) 71 Roguered Shut Otman OM f:- _. .. , Sirens 1 . awe O fv0 ONgote NortStonen Em@ T5 Occa-. ne, O s.4 Dew aded Candsetan
" fvo k Nhih' h k,'[
O M) Tome can "
O '.444) Umandvreif Condetkin O dv0 Rad Rf _ N PHY5pCM $FCUQFTY (71 f t)
T fine Ouesuie Dessen Bases O avn other H1_.., Sade Ocormaan O TRANSPORTATION y '. .w:- a nn.mumsna tn;pgey
' 00fG Noe Covered 9y ops /EPs ..v..-.
4 HOUR N M M sO M O MATTRIM/fXPOSURE (20 ??07 1
_% re ~;
Q eMyyy;Oviy@j*g.
m
. U S m,._ . .. -
j O nTNfss roR ouTY "O 'M Hood O to Cere %9de 58 ur Down O OTHfR O(4 wurwane O sin RPS ace =*- i _.:
" W) Ire /H ad O fu) fsF Act.-
O rien h ew i 6t O IliniAl Safe Shut /0c=== Casabesv Ot3GFTION C f N L$ JAhl/fhmA/L%
L AM la M k /] Lt fNA)/Al LudT A >$A J th m4,:a dL w14s Mht $9 m enxuLAh uom Lv & Adm%nunti MmL N a mdMMnaML. Muhin'w Math ki,A a Rhknl O
.~w .w -. . . ..
..m-m._ z
__ + pg (y r%c _ _ , , , , , , ,__ ,,
N.C nes oeN,
/ N siarr or noem /
o o ut mmes ruNCr>ON As m NO +
y OTWU1 & LIVY CCKWTits arquintor
[ *==
DHMS MOOf of OrfaAT10N UNTIL ESTIA44tf FOR ADDITIONAL o,Dm/~,..n u, / cnnnect m
/ mestAnt onre k MO woON
.A m CP-111 Rev. 53 Page 53
(
l
3F0895-16 Attachment 1
/ EVENT NOTIFfCATION WORKSHEET ENCLOSURE 8
\ (Pago 2 of 2):
rn.m ass w h ^
o=a or ta in
&;9,,*,.e, , , . eu.= i e d d./ .hmidd b. cm d m -
A%h+ * ,,
O 08eae Proemessie nem muniended C Assas Evenumand 1 (0 OWome asiamsi Saane tubes pas m----
C Peruanami W w Camammmaand
\
> 9??
~w.m.e Ny.;4 Chad w Fa tre Ap,imatie (synsses denum/
- , ,- i n, ~'gl%.
m., - y ,~
sheadd be emuumed in esem t w n*.= au d au o ri.- d a ua,m d a one-, a re -im.d a coCu a au Alun.
Deseded Cameos asiamme O Mouserad O Unnamneured C riamind O Unpimpsed O Osgemq Q Terwunmand O0o04 O aM Alarns am
\
tw "^..-, . . .m; % ,
- .. % %MM Inni & % M l bah
- <r M Ann mner W eof ms ,oi c.
\ l
\
- \
bend (endudeg evown a desoAetf noWe tessef k \
i-,w,
\
l r~ \
. \
[med'O, ama,ss. ages ,w j Poems send ch/ Air unen semens use Osher (usu
. pn
?.NI ^ g g g g
}
~~ \
\
s ooc- i- --
\ l s
..4 ,- . . . .. ..,:. y
' mar.,asur.h.wc cc o.6 or rs i. e . : w - -
t #
g; .m dm m.
t e s ,+. i.a .. . sce. * = .ee i
\
i .a a.., ua < ,d i v.s n,
\ csodd . oio,,,r- e . .,
o, ice se-. tw- co.a.,,e = h. _, o f,.d se er,,d i . a se a.i. d r. ru _ \
\
EvtWr Otsatrfgoet (Canonued frorn frenet
\
\
l \
l \
\
,,.m.. de i CP-lli Rev. 53 Page 54
. e; Figure 1 Decar Heat Removal (In) ,
VENT From DC N Decay Heat Pump [ DCV-5 SeaIed_
l_ Removal (Out)
Open DHHE-1A DCV-17 % Decay Heat Removal H e a-t Exchanger OTHER DC HEAT LOADS D C V - 17 7 -
c5
- c. ., ., -.-
To DC Heat -
Exchanger DCV-7 DRAIN Seaied Open Not to Scale "A" Train . Decay Heat R e m_o v a.1 DetaiI
- u m s- a w ai-ea e
\ ei:rida INTEROFFICE CORRESPONDENCE Power Nuclear Engineerine Desien NA1E 240-3325 CORPORATION OFFICE MAC TELEPHONE i
l
SUBJECT:
PR-95-0125, Corrective Item Step J - Design Basis Evaluation l
To: S. Chernenko DATE: July 24,1995 NED95-0399 This correspondence is being transmitted to you to provide you with the results of the above subject evaluation. The results of the evaluation are summarized below for your information.
Per ASME Section VIII, Division 1, UG-125,1968 edition, the heat exchangers for the Decay Heat Closed Cycle Cooling System (DC) are required by code to have pressure relief devices installed to protect the vessel, irrespective of the size or pressure of the vessel, in accordance with the requirements of UG-125 through UG-134. The installation of the relief capability need not be supplied by the vessel manufacturer. Relief capability may be installed within the inlet or outlet piping, between the inlet and outlet isolation valve (s) and the heat exchanger, in lieu of providing relief capabilities at the vessel itself.
As a result, the vessel manufacturer was not required nor under any obligation by code to provide relief capabilities at the vessel.
Per flow diagram, FD-302-631, sheets 1 and 2 of 3, closure of DCV-5 and DCV-7 for DHHE-1A; and, closure of DCV-6 and DCV-8 for DHHE-1B would isolate these heat exchangers from the relief valves installed within the remainder of the DC piping system.
During isolation of the heat exchangers, pressure relief would not be provided for these heat exchangers as required by the above referenced code requirements unless one of the two available vent valves were opened. Additionally, the existing pressure relief arrangement within the DC piping system, at first glance, does not appear to be in ;
compliance with the above code requirements, as pressure relief capabilities located l
within the existing piping for DHHE-1A and DHHE-1B do not appear to be located between the existing isolation valves used for maintenance purposes for these heat exchangers, DCV-5 and DCV-7 for DHHE-1 A; and, DCV-6 and DCV-8 for DHHE-1B.
The existing DC System piping arrangements provide relief capabilities for the remaining 1 components within the DC System in accordance with the requirements of the ASME Codes (ie: relief valves are currently installed between the inlet isolation valves for all heat exchangers and pumps). The arrangement for DHHE-1A and DHHE-1B was designed to provide a minimum and maximun. cooling water flow to the heat exchangers l
by automatic valve positioning of DCV-17 and DCV-177 for DHHE-1 A or DCV-18 and {
DCV-178 for DHHE-1B, the outlet control valves nearest each heat exchanger and the bypass control valves for these heat exchangers. This arrangement prevents " dead
- ./
, SFOs95-14
_ Mkachunent t
- NED95-0399 '
Page 2 of 6 t
r o j
' heading" and " pump , m out" of the 1;C System now within the DH heat exchangers, i eliminating the need for closure of the inlet and outlet isolation valves, DCV-5 and DCV-7 for DHHE-1A and DCV-6 and DCV-8 for DHHE-1B, when placing one or both 'of !
these heat exchangers "out-of service" or in " stand-by service"during normal plant operation. This design arrangement eliminates the need for closure of the inlet and outlet !
isolation valves, DCV-5 and DCV-7 for DHHE-1 A; and, DCV-6 and DCV-8 for DHHE-IB, except during maintenance activities. This arrangement assures there is adequate ' l cooling . water now through the heat exchangers when the heat exchangers are out of service or in stand-by service (ie: Decay Heat Removal System is isolated), preventing ,
tube fouling on the cooling water side of these heat exchangers. ]
During maintenance periods, when inlet and outlet isolation valves, DCV-5 and DCV-7 for DHHE-1 A; and, DCV-6 and DCV-8 for DHHE-1B, for these heat exchangers may-be closed for performing maintenance on the DC or DH side of these heat exchangers, l one of the two available heat exchanger vents must be opened, as a minimum, to prevent any potential for inadvertent over pressurization of the isolated heat exchanger due to thermal transfer from the remainder of the DC System piping or the heat within the tube bundles from the DH System. This should occur whether the tube side has been isolated ;
or not. Vents and drains are provided at the heat exchangers and must be used for this I purpose.
The design pressure for the shell side is 100 psig (cold) and 487 psig (hot) for the tube side of these Decay Heat heat exchangers. The design temperature for both is 300 -i degrees F. !
As part of this evaluation, plant procedure OP-404, " Operating Procedure For The Decay Heat Removal System (and DC System)", was reviewed. Per the requirements of this procedure, inlet and outlet isolation valves DCV-5 and DCV-7 for DHHE-1 A and DCV-6 ,
and DCV-8 for DHHE-1B, ate not closed during normal plant operation of these >
systems, to include " initial filling and venting operations of the DHCCC System" !
contained within section 4.2 of this procedure; and, " isolation ~ and restoration of individual decay heat pumps and heat exchangers", contained within section 4.14 of this l procedure. Placing either of the heat exchangers, DHHE-1 A or DHHE-1B,'in " stand-by" service is accomplished using the flow controller for either DHHE-1 A or DFHE-1B, !
DCV-177-MS for DHHE-1 A and DCV-178-MS for DHHE-1B. This is accomplished by -
placing either of the controllers in the "0" position (ie: " minimum cooling), which opens L the bypass valves DCV-177 for DHHE-1 A or DCV-178 for DHHE-1B, while placing the 1 outlet control valve nearest the heat exchanger (ie: DCV-17 for DHHE-1 A or DCV-18 for DHHE-1B) to the minimum cooling position, assuring that relief capability is provided during normal plant operation of these heat exchangers (ie: heat exchangers are not isolated during normal plant operation). Additional information is contained within ,
this procedure for temperature step changes, setting the flow requirements, etc. for these
3F0895-r 6 Attachmat 2 NED95-0399 Page 3 of 6 heat exchangers using the above referenced controllers. See OP-404 for additional information. Per OP-404, when these heat exchangers are removed from service or are in stand-by service, the Decay Heat Removal System (tube side) is isolated. This prevents the internal temperature on the cooling water side (DC System) from exceeding the temperature limitations contained within this procedure for operation of these heat exchangers when the flow control controllers, DCV-177-MS for DHHE-1A and DCV-178-MS for DHHE-1B, are set in the "0" position (ie: minimum cooling, and not isolated on the cooling water side of the heat exchangers).
Per NED review of OP-404, this procedure does not provide specific guidance as to what steps should be accomplished when one of these heat exchangers is taken out of service for maintenance. During maintenance activities, such as removal of internal fouling (ie:
cleaning) of these heat exchangers, isolation of the Decay Heat Removal System for the affected heat exchanger would be required. Isolation of DCV-5 and DCV-7 for DHHE-1 A and DCV-6'and DCV-8 for DHHE-1B would require sealed closure. The vents and drains for the removed heat exchanger would require opening for venting and draining of the shell side of the heat exchanger. These steps are implied throughout the procedure but are not specifically addressed, similar to what is provided for DCHE-1 A and DCHE-IB, the other heat exchangers contained within the DC System. Additional guidance may be required regarding the isolation of DHHE-1 A or DHHE-1B during the performance of maintenance activities to assure the there is no potential for over pressurization of the heat exchangers when the inlet and outlet isolation valves are closed in the event these heat exchangers are not immediately vented and drained.
Per the review of the above design of the system, the current arrangement provides for pressure relief capabilities in accordance with the requirements of ASME Section VIII, UG-125,1968 edition, to include Appendix M reouirements, for these heat exchangers during normal plant operation. Placing a heat exchanger in " stand-by" service during normal plant operation is accomplished by opening the DC System bypass control valve for the non-operational heat exchanger, DCV-17 for DHHE-1A and DCV-18 for DHHE-1B; and, placing the outlet control valve closest to the heat exchanger outlet in the minimum flow position, DCV-177 for DHHE-1A and DCV-178 for DHHE-1B (ie:
"0" position for controllers DCV-177-MS for DHHE-1 A and DCV-178-MS for DHHE-IB). During maintenance of the heat exchangers, when the DC System is isolated from the heat exchangers using DCV-5 and DCV-7 for DHHE-1A and DCV-6 and DCV-8 for DHHE-1B, a vent valve (and/or drain valve) must be opened to assure there is no potential for over pressurization of the isolated heat exchanger due to thermal transfer from the isolated Decay Heat Removal System. Since the Decay Heat Removal System is isolated, transfer of residual heat to the isolated heat exchanger may occur over a period of time and would not be instantaneous. During these periods of isolation for maintenance purposes, the requirements for relief capabilities for these heat exchangers are satisfied by opening one of the two available vent valves, eliminating the need for
.' 3F0895-16 Mtachmen 2 l NED95-0399 Page 4 of 6 specific relief capabilities in the form of a relief valve or rupture disc while the equipment is isolated for maintenance purposes.
From the above, the existing arrangement complies with the requirements of the initial design for the DH heat exchangers, DHHE-1A and DHHE-1B, as described within ASME Section VIII, Division 1, UG-125,1968 edition, for normal plant operation, provided the heat exchangers are isolated in accordance with the design of the system as stated previously as currently established by procedure (ie: OP-404). During maintenance activities, when the DC System is to be isolated by closing the inlet and outlet isolation valves for these heat exchangers, a vent valve or drain valve should be immediately opened to assure that any potential for over pressurization of the isolated heat exchanger is eliminated in the event the heat exchanger removed from service is not immediately l vented or drained for maintenance purposes.
Per ASME Section VIII, UG-125,1968 edition, Appendix M, Paragraphs UA-354 and UA-355, as referenced within UG-125(e) and UG-134, states that an isolation stop valve may be installed between the vessel and the pressure relieving device provided in the event the isolation of the relief device from the vessel is so accomplished to isolate the pressure source to the vessel. The existing arrangement for the DHHE-1 A and DHHE-1B meets the restrictions. During normal operation, the DC System outlet control valves and the bypass valves are repositioned to the "0" position (ie: minimum cooling) when the heat exchanger is not in service or is in stand-by service. During the performance of maintenance activities, when the DC System inlet and outlet isolation valves for these heat exchangers are closed and the Decay heat removal System is isolated, the pressure source for these heat exchangers is isolated. Since both the shell side and the tube side are designed for a temperature of 300 degrees F, and the normal function of the heat exchangers is to cool the RCS within the DH System from 280 degrees to 140 degrees F within 14 hours1.62037e-4 days <br />0.00389 hours <br />2.314815e-5 weeks <br />5.327e-6 months <br />, thermal transfer (ie: thermal over pressurization of the heat exchanger) during the short period when one of the two heat exchangers is taken out of service for maintenance is unlikely (pressure and temperature sources isolated). l Established maintenance clearances provide an adequate means to meet the requirements j of Appendix M, Section UA-354, which states that (isolation valves installed between the pressure vessel and relief device) "it shall not be closed except by authorized personnel who shall remain stationed there during that period of the vessel's operation within which the valve remains closed, and who shall again lock or seal the stop valve (ie: isolation valve - added for clarity) in the open position before leaving the station". Per Enclosure 2, Checklist II of OP-404, Page 3 for DCV-5 and DCV-7; and, Page 4 for DCV-6 and DCV-8, these isolation valves are " sealed open" during normal plant operation as ;
required by ASME Section VIII, Division 1, UG-125, Appendix M. i As a result of the above, the previously identified potential Design Basis Issue of not having relief valves installed on the shell side of the DH heat exchangers or between
]
,+ . ,. . - .. . . . . . . - . .. -. - - . . - .- -
g S 3F0895-76 Attaciument f I NED95-0399 ,
Page 5 of 6 the isolation valves DCV-5 and DCV-7 for DHHE-1A and DCV-6 and DCV-8 for - l DHHE-1B, is not a design basis issue. The DC System and the DH heat exchangers are !
- designed in accordance with applicable design basis codes,--standards, and regulatory i requirements and are acceptable "as designed".
No further action is required for this issue. The Corrective Action Plan for this problem ,
report is not needed nor required and will not be developed per this correspondence. We {
recommend voiding PR95-0125 and retraction of the NRC report generated for PR 95-1025.
A copy of this correspondence will be transmitted to the System Engineer for any follow up action with operations which may be deemed necessary concerning additional guidance .
for isolating either DHHE-1 A or DHHE-1B while performing maintenance activities.
NED will initiate a design basis document change to incorpomte this correspondence into !
the design basis document for the DH System, documenting the evaluation within a i design reference.
REFERENCES:
FSAR Sections: 6.1.2.3, 6.2.2.1, 9.4.2, 9.5.1.b, 9.5.2.2 and Table 9-9.
i (Revision 21) i Design Basis '!
Documents: EDBD 6/3, Enhanced Design Basis Document For The Decay Heat Removal System", Revision 5. ,
EDBD 6/6 Enhanced Design Basis Document For The Decay Heat Closed Cycle Cooling System", Revision 3. ~l i
9rocedures, ;
Drawings, etc.: OP-404, " Operation of the Decay Removal System", Revision 92. ;
FD-302-631, Sheets 1 and 2 of 3 !
i Codes, Standards, j Regulations: ASME Section VIII, Division 1,1968 edition, Paragraphs UG-125 i through 134, and Appendix M. .I i
l
-l l,
.f .3,F0895.;6 4gggg Page 6 of 6 If you have any questions or require additionalinformation, please contact R. E. Robbins at 240-3293. ,
[
/k R. E. Robbins, Project Engineer Nuclear Engineering De.ign s /-
M B. Gutherman, Supervisor !
Nuclear Engineering Design cc: J. R. Maseda w/ attach B. J. Hickle w/ attach K. R. Wilson w/ attach '
M.W. Donovan w/ attach ~
D. A. Shook w/ attach S. A. Stewart w/ attach K. R. Campbell w/ attach :
M. W. Donovan w/ attach i Records Management (DXREF = EQUIP 4-15-1) w/ attach I
b i
L-- , _ ._ _.
srosss->*
- 5g5 g,,gg secaca. m 1
.. 1
.' APPENDIX M Installation and Operation UA 350 Introduction feasible. There are also rules in regard to the (a) The rules in this Appendix are for general desi6n of discharge piping from safety and relief information only, because they pertain to the valves, which can only be general ir nature be-installation and operation of pressure ves- cause the design engineer must fit the scrange-sels, which are the prerogative and responsi- ment and proportions of such a system to the bility of the law enforcement authorities in those particular requirements in the operation of the states and municipalities which have made pro- equipment involved.
vision for the enforcement of Section Vill of the Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. UA-354 Stop Valves Between Pressere-Relieving (b) It is permissive to use any departures sug- Device and Vessel '
gested her< in from provisions in the mandatory (a) A vessel, in which pressure can be parts 'of this Division of Section Villwhen granted generated because of service conditions, may by the authority havin8 legal jurisdiction over the have a full-area stop valve between it and its installation of unfired pressure vessels. pressure-relieving device for inspection and UA-351 Corrosios " Pair purposes only. When such a stop valve is (a) Vessels subject to external corrosion shall Provided, it shall be so arranged that it can be be so installed that there is sufficient access to locked or sealed opes, and it shall not be closed all parts of the exterior to permit proper inspection "c'Pt by an authorized person who shall remain of the exterior, unless adequate protection against stationed there during that period of the vessel,a corrosion is provided or unless the vessel is of Operation within which the valve remains closed, such size and is so connected that it may readily and who shall again lock er seal the stop valvein ,
be removed from its permanent location for the open position before leaving the station, inspec tion. OI A " * ** I *' 'Y (see Par. UG-132(cT) f r which the pressure on.".ginates from an outside (b) Vessels having manholes, handholes, or cover plates to permit inspection of the interior " fee exclusively may have individual pressure-shall be so installed that these openings are ac- relieving devices on each vessel, or connected to cessible any Point on the connecting piping, a on any one of the vessels to be protected. Under such an (c) In vertical cylindrical vessels subject to armagement, there may be a stop valve between corrosion, to insure complete drainage,the bottom ,
head, if dished, should preferably be concave to ""Y ".ssel and the pressure relieving devices, and this stop valve need not be locked open, Pre u m . provided it also closes off that vessel from the UA-352 Lrking on the Vessel source of pressure.
The marking required by this Division shall be so located that it will be accessible after instal. UA-355 StoP Valves on the Dische'E' Side of a Pressure-Relieving Device (See Par. UG-134(e).)
lation and when installed shall not be covered with ,
full *f** 81 P valve may be placed on the dis-insulation or other material that is not readily charge side of a pressure relieving device when removable (see Par. UG-116(i)). ,
its discharge is connected to a common header UA-353 Pressere-Relieving Safety Devices with other discharge lines from other pressure.
The general provisions for the installation of relieving devices on nearby vessels that are in pressure relieving devices are fully covered in operation, so that this stop valve when closed Par. UG-134. The followin6 Paragraphs contain will prevent a discharge from any connected details in arrangement of stop valves for shut- operating vessels from backing up beyond the off control of safety pressure.eelief devices which valve so closed. Such a stop valve shall be so are sometimes necessary to the continuous opera- arranged that it een be locked or sealed in either tion of processins equipment of such a complex the open or closed position, and it shall be locked nature that the shut-down of any part of it is not or sealed in either position only by an authorized 4 -.
286 L-. : _ _ _ _ _ _