05000270/LER-1982-013, Forwards LER 82-013/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

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Forwards LER 82-013/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
ML20066C687
Person / Time
Site: Oconee Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 11/04/1982
From: Tucker H
DUKE POWER CO.
To: James O'Reilly
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML20066C690 List:
References
NUDOCS 8211100242
Download: ML20066C687 (2)


LER-2082-013, Forwards LER 82-013/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
Event date:
Report date:
2702082013R00 - NRC Website

text

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00 1 Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regiona'. Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Re: Oconee Nuclear Station Docket No. 50-270

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

l Please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report R0-270/82-13. This report is submitted pursuant to Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specification 6.6.2.1.b(2) which concerns operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation, and describes an incident which is considered l to be of no significance with respect to its effect on the health and safety  ;

of the public.

Very truly yours, b LG'lgg Hal B. Tucker JCP/php Attachment cc: Document Control Desk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Mr. W. T. Orders NRC Resident Inspector Ocones Nuclear Station INP0 Records Center Suite 1500 1100 Circle 75 Parkway Atlanta, Georgia 30339 Mr. Philip C. Wagner Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 OYEl P211100242 821104 V

r' h PDR ADOCK 05000270 S PDR I

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. - i DUKE POWER COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION Report Number: R0-270/82-13 Report Date: November 4, 1982 Occurrence Date: October 5, 1982 Facility: Oconee Unit 2, Seneca, South Carolina Identification of Occurrence: The Unit 2 Turbine Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump Trip / Throttle (TDEFWPT) Stop Valve was accidentally tripped closed, thus causing the TDEFW Pump to be inoperable.

, Conditions Prior to Occurrence: 100% FP Description of Occurrence: On October 5, 1982, at approximately 1400, two Jagging crew members began insulating 2MS-94 (TDEFWP Trip / Throttle Valve).

At 1432 while attempting to place insulation around 2MS-94 the latching spring for that valve was bumped and the valve tripped. The lagging crew members, upon noticing the valve tripping, attempted to contact Operations ,,

personnel. Prior to their notifying Operations, a Nuclear Equipment Operator was at the scene and reset the valve, restoring the pump to operability. The operator was sent to investigate af ter the Control Room received a computer video alarm stating 2MS-94 had tripped.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The cause of the valve tripping was determined to be insulation material striking the trip level on 2MS-94. This normally should not cause a trip. The latching mechanism on valve 2MS-94 is suspected to be very sensitive. There have been previous incidents of spurious tripping of this valve described in R0-270/82-08 and R0-270/82-12, where the cause for the ' tripping of valve 2MS-94 was unknown. The cause of occurrence in this case will be attributed to both component failure and personnel. error.

Analysis of Occurrence: Due to 2MS-94 being tripped the TDEFWP could not start automatically; however, the pump could have been manually started. In addition, during the 13 minutes in which the pump's automatic start feature was inoperable, both Motor Driven EFWPs were operable. Should the need have arisen, the MDEFWPs would have provided sufficient cooling water to the Steam Generators. Technical Specification 3.4.2.6 states if one EFW pump or EFW flow path is inoperable, restore it to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, The TDEFWP was restored to operable status well within the time permitted. Thus, the health and safety of the public were not endangered.

Corrective Action: The immediate corrective action was to reset 2MS-94. This was done by 1445; therefore, the pump was out of service for only 13 minutes.

Lagging crew members involved have been instructed to use more caution when insulating around 2MS-94. A work request has been written to inspect and repair the latching mechanism on 2MS-94. This is to be completed by November 15, 1982.

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