05000269/LER-1982-015, Forwards LER 82-015/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Forwards LER 82-015/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

ML20065R379
Person / Time
Site:	Oconee
Issue date:	10/15/1982
From:	Tucker H DUKE POWER CO.
To:	James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML20065R381	List: 05000269/LER-1982-015, Forwards LER 82-015/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
References
NUDOCS 8210290190
Download: ML20065R379 (3)

LER-2082-015, Forwards LER 82-015/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Event date:
Report date:
2692082015R00 - NRC Website

text

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Y Duxe POWER GOMPm P.O. ISOK 33180 CIIAHLOTTE, N.C. 28242 II AL 15. TUCKEH TELEPHONE tua e maser.t (704) 373-4531

.mu..."'""" October 15, 1982 Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator $ Nc U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission cm rm Region II C $h 101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100 m -4 0 Atlanta, Georgia 30303  ?" - a y m S1 Re: Oconee Nuclear Station u:: ff_! N Docket No. 50-269 - 2M v _

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Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report R0-269/82-15. This report ~

is submitted pursuant to Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specification 6.6.2.1.b(2) which concerns operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation, and describes an incident which is considered to be of no sig-nificance with respect to its effect on the health and safety of the public.

Very truly yours, Hal B. Tucker JCP/php Attachment cc: Document Control Desk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 INPO Records Center Suite 1500 1100 Circle 75 Parkway Atlanta, Georgia 30339 Mr. W. T. Orders NRC Resident Inspector Oconee Nuclear Station Mr. Philip C. Wagner Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555

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DUKE POWER COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION Report Number: R0-269/82-15 Report Date: October 15, 1982 Occurrence Date: September 17, 1982 Facility: Oconee Unit 1, Seneca, South Carolina Identification of Occurrence: The Unit 1 Reactor Protective System (RPS) manual reactor trip pushbutton was declared technically inoperable since it had not been tested in accordance with Technical Specification 4.1-1.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: 100% FP Description of Occurrence: On September 17, 1982, during a visit to Oconee Nuclear Station, representatives from INPO (Institute of Nuclear Power Operations) discovered that the Oconee procedure for the Reactor Trip Recovery did not include the required testing of the Reactor Protective System (RPS) manual reactor trip pushbutton. Per Technical Specification Table 4.1-1 Item 37, the manual reactor trip circuitry should be tested, prior to startup, if it has not been tested during the previous week.

Unit 1 had tripped and was started up on September 11, 1982 using the Reactor Trip Recovery Procedure. The RPS manual reactor trip pushbutton was not tested and had not been tested within the previous seven days. This violated Technical Specification 3.5.1.1; the pushbutton was then declared technically inoperable and a twelve hour time limit to hot shutdown was imposed per Technical Specifica-tion 3.5.1.2 at about 1500 on September 17, 1982.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The cause of the occurrence was a procedure deficiency in OP/1/A/1102/02 (Reactor Trip Recovery Procedure), in that it did not reflect the Technical Specification requirement for the testing of the RPS manual reactor trip pushbutton.

Analysis of Occurrence: The manual reactor trip is independent from the auto-matic portion of the RPS. The manual reactor trip is therefore not needed to aesure protection against either fuel rod clad damage or over-pressurization of the RCS (Reactor Coolant Systcm) .

Manual reactor trip capability is desirable. If it had become necessary to trip the reactor and the manual reactor trip via the pushbutton in the control room had been inoperable, the reactor could be tripped as indicated below.

Turbine on-line - A manual turbine trip would have tripped the reactor in approximately 10 seconds on high RCS pressure prior to the installation of the anticipatory trip. After the installation of the anticipatory trip, a manual turbine trip would have tripped the reactor instantly.

F e .

V Report No. R0-269/82-15 Page 2 Turbine off-line - The reactor could have been tripped in about one minute by opening the CRD (Contrcl Rod Drive) breakers in the cable room.

It is concluded that the health and safety of the public were not compromised as a result of this incident.

Corrective Action: After the RPS manual reactor trip pushbutton was declared inoperable, a twelve hour time limit to hot shutdown was imposed. At 2158, the procedure for Verification of Manual Reactor Switch Operation was performed and completed while the unit was on-line. This test returned the operable status to the RPS manual reactor trip. To prevent recurrence, procedure changes were initiated to OP/1,2,3/A/1102/01 (Controlling Procedure for Unit Startup) and OP/1,2,3/A/1102/02 (Reactor Trip Recovery) in order to make the Oconee procedural surveillance requirements consistent with the Technical Specifications.

Prior to the INPO discovery of the deficiency in OP/1,2,3/A/1102/02 (Reactor Trip Recovery), operating practice at Oconee was to test manual reactor trip at a reactor coolant pressure of approximately 350 psig during heatups from cold conditions per OP/1,2,3/1102/01 (Controlling Procedure for Unit Startup).

Now, when a startup is controlled by the Controlling Procedure for Unit Startup, the Reactor Manual Trip Test will be done at a reactor coolant pressure of approximately 350 psig and again at hot shutdown just prior to criticality.

If a startup is controlled by the Reactor Trip Recovery, the Reactor Manual Trip Test will be performed prior to going critical after a reactor trip.

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