ML20117D569

Requests Exemption for Ons,Units 1 & 2 & Cns,Units 1 & 2 Iaw/Provisions of 10CFR73.5, Requirements for Physical Protection of Licensed Activities in Nuclear Power Reactors Against Radiological Sabotage

ML20117D569
Person / Time
Site:	Oconee, Mcguire, Catawba, McGuire
Issue date:	08/23/1996
From:	Tuckman M DUKE POWER CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
NUDOCS 9608280374
Download: ML20117D569 (7)

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MherCompwne y S nauw P.O. Box M Senior Vicehesident M ,NC2 M M NudearGeneration (M)382-2200 Omce (M)3824360 Fat DUKEPOWER August 23, 1996 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D . C ,. 20555

Subject:

Oconee' Nuclear Station Units 1, 2 and 3 l Dock.et Nos 50-269/270/287 l- McGuire Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 j Docket Nos 50-369/370

} Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2

! Docket Nos 50-413/414 Duke Power Company Nuclear Security and Contingency Request for Exemption - Biometrics Access Control i

The purpose of this letter is to request an exemption, in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 73.5, " Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage" for Duke Power Company's Oconee Nuclear Station units 1, 2& 3, McGuire Nuclear Station units 1 & 2 and Catawba Nuclear Station units

-1 & 2.

Duke Powbrl Company expects to implement biometrics access control at Catawba Nuclear Station during the last quarter 1997, at Oconee Nuclear Station during the first quarter 1998 and at McGuire Nuclear Station during the second quarter l

1998.

l-l . Duke Power Company requests this exemption be issued by first 4 quarter 1997.

l l' s l Should.there be any questions concerning this request, l contact Ron Eller at (704) 382-3144.

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i M. S. Tuckman

Senior Vice President-l Nuclear Production attachment i 9608280374 960823 n n PDR ADOCK 05000269 gO J L F PCR ( q nonkapuka \ \

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1 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

[ I August 23, 1996 page 2 cc: w/ attachment U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II l

P. O. Box 2257 L Atlanta, Georgia 30301 l ATTN: William Stansberry cc: w/o attachment S. D. Ebneter Regional Administrator Region II U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission i P. S. Tam l U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

! 1 Victor Nerses i U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l Washington, D. C.

D. E. Lebarge U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.

l M. A. Scott NRC Resident Inspector Oconee Nuclear Station l S. M. Shaeffer i NRC Resident Inspector McGuire Nuclear Station R. J. Freudenberger NRC Resident Inspector l Catawba Nuclear Station l l

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• U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission )

August 23, 1996 l page-3 bcc: w/o attachment-J. W. Hampton Vice President Oconee Nuclear Station ,

i T. C. McMeekin Vice President McGuire Nuclear Station W. R. McCollum j r.

Vice President Catawba Nuclear Station l

G. A. Copp Manager Nuclear Regulatory & Industry Affairs EC050 R. C. Birmingham Manager Organizational Effectiveness McGuire Nuclear Station 1

L. C. Bolin I Manager Organizational Effectiveness i

Oconee Nuclear Station l B. A. Emmons

! Manager Organizational Effectiveness Catawba Nuclear Station J. E. Burchfield Manager Regulatory Compliance Oconee Nuclear Station i

J. E. Snyder Manager Regulatory Compliance McGuire Nuclear Station I

M. S. Kitlan  ;

i Manager Regulatory Compliance i Catawba Nuclear Station 1 4

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• l U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission August 23, 1996 page 4 I bcc: w/ attachment (continued) )

l T. K. McQuarrie Manager Security i Oconee Nuclear Station I T. W. Keener Manager Security McGuire Nuclear Station W. T. Byers Manager Security i Catawba Nuclear Station l

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ATTACHMENT INTRODUCTION Duke Power Company (DPC) requests, in accordance with the provisions of Title 10 CFR Part 73.5, " Specific exemptions,"

an exemption from certain requirements of 10 CFR 73.55,

" Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage" for Oconee units 1,2 and 3, McGuire units 1 and 2 and Catawba units 1 and 2. Specifically, DPC requests an exemption from part of 10 CFR 73.55 (d) (5). This section states in part that, "An individual not employed by the licensee but who requires frequent and extended access to protected and vital areas may be authorized access to such areas without escort provided that he receives a picture badge upon entrance into the protected area which must be returned upon exit from the protected area..."

Title 10 CFR 73.55 (a) states, "The licensee shall establish and maintain an onsite physical protection system and security organization which will have as its objective to provide high assurance that activities involving special nuclear material are not inimical to the common defense and security and do not constitute an unreasonable risk to the public healtn and safety." Furthermore, title 10 CFR 73.55 (a) specifies that the Commission may authorize an applicant or licensee to provide measures for the protection against radiological sabotage other than those required by 10 CFR 73.55. This can be accomplished if the applicant or licensee demonstrates that the measures have the same high assurance objective as specified in the regulation and meets the j general performance requirements or the regulation.

This exemption is requested to allow the use of a hand geometry biometrics system to control unescorted access into the protected areas of the Oconee, McGuire and Catawba nuclear plants, in conjuncticn with taking the photograph identification badges offsite.

CURRENT SITUATION Currently, unescorted access into Oconee, McGuire and Catawba is controlled through the use of a photograph and a badge

/keycard (hereafter referred to as " badge"). The security officer at each Personnel Access Portal (PAP) door use the photo on the badge to visually identify the individual requesting access. The licensee's employees and contractor personnel who have been granted unescorted access are issued J

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• badges upon entrance at each entrance location and the badges j are returned upon exit. The badges are retrievable at each exit location. In accordance with 10 CFR 73.55 (d) (5) ,

contractors are not allowed to take these badges offsite.

PROPOSED SYSTEM Under the proposed biometrics system, each individual who is authorized unescorted access will have the physical characteristics of his/her hand (i.e., hand geometry) registered, along with his/her badge number in the access control system. When a registered user enters his/her Ladge into the card reader and places his/her hand onto the measuring surface, the system detects that the hand is properly positioned, and records the image. The unique characteristics of the hand image are then compared with the previously stored template in the access control computer system corresponding to the badge to verify authorization for  !

entry. ,

Individuals, including DPC plant employees and contractors, ,

would be allowed to keep their badges when they depart the site and, thus, eliminate the need to issue, retrieve and store badges at the entrance stations to the plant (s) . Badges do not carry information other than a unique identification l number. This system will not be used for persons requiring  ;

escorted access (i.e., visitors).

Based on the Sandia report, "A Performance Evaluation of  ;

Biometrics Identification Devices," SAND 91-0276-UC-906, ,

Unlimited Release, June 1991, that concluded hand geometry i equipment possess strong performance and high detection l characteristics, and with our own experience with the current i photo badging system DPC has determined that the proposed l l hand geometry system will provide a higher level of assurance I than the current system that access is only granted to authorized individuals. The biometrics system has been in use for a number of years at several sensitive Department of l Energy facilities and more recently at nuclear power plants.

l Duke Power Company will implement a process for testing of the proposed system to ensure continued overall level of performance equivalent to that specified in the regulation (detection probability of 90 % with 95 % confidence level).

When the changes are implemented the Duke Power Company Nuclear Security and Contingency Plan will be revised to include implementation and testing of the hand geometry access control system and to allow DPC employees and contractors to take their badges offsite.

When implemented, DPC will control personnel access into the protected area under observation of security personnel through the use of badge and a hand geometry verification system. The picture badge identification system wi]1 continue

to be used for all individuals who are authorized unescorted l access to protected areas. Badges will continue to be l displayed by all individuals while in the protected areas.

l Since both the badge and hand geometry would be necessary for access into the protected areas, the proposed system will i provide a positive verification process. The potential loss of a badge by an individual as a result of taking the badge offsite will not enable an unauthorized entry into protected areas.

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