05000269/LER-1982-016, Forwards LER 82-016/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Forwards LER 82-016/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

ML20066C735
Person / Time
Site:	Oconee
Issue date:	11/01/1982
From:	Tucker H DUKE POWER CO.
To:	James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML20066C737	List: 05000269/LER-1982-016, Forwards LER 82-016/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
References
NUDOCS 8211100308
Download: ML20066C735 (3)

LER-2082-016, Forwards LER 82-016/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Event date:
Report date:
2692082016R00 - NRC Website

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CHARIDTTE. N.C. 28242 5 * * , p' U ri d j 4 IIAL 15. TUCKER Trteenior.2 vu e resterneur (704) 3HM1

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November 1,19WOV8 ap P3: 00 Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street. Suite 3100 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Re: Oconee Nuclear Station Docket No. 50-269

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report R0-269/82-16. 'Ihis report is submitted pursuant to Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specification 6.6.2.1.a(2) which concerns an operation subject to a limiting condition for operation which was less conservative than the least conservative aspect of the limiting condition for operation established in the Technical Specifications, and describes an incident which is considered to be of no significance with respect to its effect on the health and safety of the public.

Very truly yours, fB. 6Lg Hal B. Tucker JCP/php Attachment cc: Document Control Desk Mr. W. T. Orders U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRC Resident Inspector Washington, D. C. 20555 Oconee Nuclear Station INFO Records Center Mr. Philip C. Wagner Suite 1500 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 1100 Circle 75 Parkway U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atlanta, Georgia 30339 Washington, D. C. 20555 o#Cbc0jk M

8211100308 821101 "

PDR ADOCK 05000269 S PDR

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DUKE POWER COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR CTATION Report Number: RO-209/82-16 l keport Date: November 1, 1982 Determination of Occurrence Date: October 18, 1982 Actual Occurrence Dates: January 29 - February 4, 1982

, Facility: Oconee Unit 1, Seneca, South Carolina i

Identificaticn of Occurrence: Engineering Safeguard (E.S.) Surveillance tests were not conducted during January 1982 as required.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: Highest Power Level 75% during time of inoperability Description of Occurrence On October 18, 1982, as a result of an internal

Quality Assurance audit, it was determined that Unit 1 Engineering Safeguards i (E.S.) Surveillance tcsts were not performed in January 1982 within the 45 day

maximum allowable interval for monthly reports. Therefore, the systems that were to be tested were declared technically inoperable, i Engineering Safeguard (E.5.) Surveillance tests are required to be performed monthly per Technical Specification 3.5.1.1. They are to be performed every

. 30 days, but.also given, if necessary, an additional 15 day grace period, thus totaling 45. days. If the unit is shutdown at thet time required to conduct

the E.S. Surveillance tests, they are to be taken at the next opportunity where allewable system conditions are present, prior to startup. Prior to 4 this occurrence, the last E.S. Surveillance tests were performed November 23, 1981 - December 17, 1981. They were next scheduled to be performed. January 5,-

1982. (Forty-five days af ter the beginning _ of the previoua surveillcnce date would have been January 8, 1982.) Because of a large work load, the tests were reecheduled for January 6, 1982. However, the reactor was shutdown tha~c day and the E.S. Surveillance could not be-taken. The reactor reached criticality on January 29, 1982. The tests should have been performed at

, this point; thus, the systems were then technically inoparable. February 4, 1982, the Engineering Safeguard Surveillance tests were conducted. Successfully completing these tests restored operability status to the systems involved.

3 Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The cause of this occurrence can be attributed to both personnel error and administrative deficiency. The personnel error ,

was made when, after several schedulings and cancellations of the E.S. tests, the person responsible did not reschedule the tests after the last cancellation.

This was complicated by the fact that the reactor was shutdown on the last scheduled day for testing. These tests are not required when the unit is shutdown. The administrative deficiency was found in the accepted practice method used. This practice caused the delayed surveillance to be overlooked.

If this method was corrected, it would have allowed the E.S. Surveillance to have been performed in the rcquired time limit.

t Report No. R0-269/82-16 Page 2 Analysis of Occurrence: Although the systems on which the surveillance was missed were technically inoperable when the reactor reached criticality on January 29, 1982, the tests performed February'4, 1982 proved that the Engineering Safeguards System would have performed its function as designed.

Thus, the health and safety of the public were not jeopardized.

Corrective Action: The accepted practice method will be modified to allow no misunderstanding of the completion of the required surveillances. Addition-ally, a mechanism will be established to notify Operations personnel that the testing is overdue and must be performed prior to startup. The person responsible has been counseled on_the requirements of meeting dates of surveillance procedures.

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